前言

今天领导找到我提了这么一个需求:想实现权限的精细化控制,然后将这些角色授予给其他业务部门的DBA,不过仅能实现某些操作,这样就不需要我们全权负责了,对方也能做某类运维操作。权限体系共分为三个层级:

- 第一层、允许查询系统表和业务表
- 第二层:包含部分数据库的管理权限,比如杀会话、在SQL跑慢的时候允许创建索引,扩展表空间,收集统计信息,执行 vacuum 等管理操作
- 第三层:拥有业务表的修改权限

实现

让我们一起看看这个需求如何实现。首先第一层很好实现,只需创建一个 readonly 角色,相应表的查询权限授予给该角色,后续通过该角色来划分权限。

第三层也很好实现,直接 grant delete, insert, update on xxx to xxx 即可。

麻烦一点的是第二层,比如创建索引,需要是表的 owner 或者 superuser 才可以

```
postgres=# create table t1(id int);
CREATE TABLE
postgres=# \c postgres u1
psql (15beta1, server 14.2)
You are now connected to database "postgres" as user "u1".
postgres=> create index on t1(id);
ERROR: must be owner of table t1
```

👆 报错很明显,同理,vacuum/analyze 等也是类似

```
postgres=> vacuum t1;
WARNING: skipping "t1" --- only table or database owner can vacuum it
VACUUM
postgres=> analyze t1;
WARNING: skipping "t1" --- only table or database owner can analyze it
ANALYZE
postgres=> analyze verbose t1;
WARNING: skipping "t1" --- only table or database owner can analyze it
ANALYZE
```

而杀会话的权限,从 9.6 以后提供了 pg_signal_backend 角色,Signal another backend to cancel a query or terminate its session. 按需授予即可。

那么该如何实现上面这几个功能?这里就必须得提到PostgreSQL中的另一个骚操作了:函数安全性。

```
postgres=# \h create function
Command: CREATE FUNCTION
Description: define a new function
Syntax:
```

```
CREATE [ OR REPLACE ] FUNCTION
   name ( [ argmode ] [ argname ] argtype [ { DEFAULT | = } default expr ] [, ...] ]
   [ RETURNS rettype
      RETURNS TABLE ( column_name column_type [, ...] ) ]
  { LANGUAGE lang name
   TRANSFORM { FOR TYPE type name } [, ...]
    WINDOW
    { IMMUTABLE | STABLE | VOLATILE }
    [ NOT ] LEAKPROOF
    | { CALLED ON NULL INPUT | RETURNS NULL ON NULL INPUT | STRICT }
    | { [ EXTERNAL ] SECURITY INVOKER | [ EXTERNAL ] SECURITY DEFINER } ----→此处
   PARALLEL { UNSAFE | RESTRICTED | SAFE }
   COST execution cost
   ROWS result rows
   SUPPORT support function
    | SET configuration parameter { TO value | = value | FROM CURRENT }
    AS 'definition'
    AS 'obj_file', 'link_symbol'
   sql body
 } ...
URL: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/15/sql-createfunction.html
```

在创建函数的时候可以同时指定权限,分为 SECURITY INVOKER 和 SECURITY DEFINER,前者以调用者权限执行函数,这是默认的安全环境。后者以创建者权限执行函数,在函数执行期间以创建该函数的权限执行。

SECURITY INVOKER indicates that the function is to be executed with the privileges of the user that calls it. That is the default. SECURITY DEFINER specifies that the function is to be executed with the privileges of the user that owns it.

那么我们完全可以使用这个特性来包装一层函数,如下

```
create or replace function dba_operation(operation_type anyelement,operation_details
text)
returns void
as $$
declare
 index_ops text :='create index';
                                     ---创建索引
 kill ops text :='kill session';
                                     ---查杀会话
 analyze_ops text :='analyze table'; ---统计信息
begin
 IF lower(operation_type) = index_ops or lower(operation_type) = kill_ops or
lower(operation_type) = analyze_ops THEN
   execute operation details;
   raise exception 'error! undefined operations!';
 END IF;
END;
```

```
$$ language plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER;
```

将 dba_operation 函数定义为 SECURITY DEFINER,这样以超级用户创建该函数并将函数的使用权限授予给用户,那么即使对应的用户没有对象的权限,也能以"superuser"的身份去执行,看个例子

可以看到索引创建成功了,成功绕过了权限的限制。但是这个函数有漏洞,我仅仅做了操作类型的判断,并没有判断具体执行的SQL,因此完全可以搞一些破坏,比如

```
postgres=> select dba_operation('create index'::text,'drop table t1');
   dba_operation
------
(1 row)

postgres=> \d t1
Did not find any relation named "t1".
```

好家伙,直接把表给干没了!因此,我们还需要去判断一下具体SQL,预防一些可能的风险,这里就简单写一下, 各位可以按需扩充

```
create or replace function dba_operation(operation_type anyelement,operation_details
text)
returns void
as $$
declare
  ret boolean;
  index_ops text :='create index';
  kill_ops text :='kill session';
  analyze_ops text :='analyze table';
begin
  IF lower(operation_type) = index_ops THEN
      select operation_details ~ 'index' into ret;
```

```
raise notice 'ret is %',ret;
   IF ret is true THEN
     execute operation details;
     raise exception 'error! dangerous ';
   END IF;
 ELSIF lower(operation type) = kill ops THEN
   select operation_details ~ 'cancel' into ret;
   IF ret is true THEN
     execute operation details;
   ELSE
     raise exception 'error! dangerous ';
   END IF;
 ELSIF lower(operation type) = analyze ops THEN
   select operation_details ~ 'analyze' into ret;
   IF ret is true THEN
     execute operation details;
     raise exception 'error! dangerous ';
   END IF:
   raise exception 'error! undefined operations!';
 END IF;
END;
$$ language plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER;
```

我使用正则表达式去判断具体执行的SQL是否包含对应的操作

```
ostgres=> create index on t1(id);
ERROR: must be owner of table t1
postgres=> select dba_operation('create index','drop table t1');
ERROR: could not determine polymorphic type because input has type unknown
postgres=> select dba operation('create index'::text,'drop table t1');
NOTICE: ret is f
ERROR: error! dangerous
CONTEXT: PL/pgSQL function dba_operation(anyelement,text) line 14 at RAISE
postgres=> select dba_operation('create index'::text,'alter table t1 add column t_time
timestamp');
NOTICE: ret is f
ERROR: error! dangerous
CONTEXT: PL/pgSQL function dba_operation(anyelement,text) line 14 at RAISE
postgres=> select dba_operation('create index'::text,'create index on t1(id)');
NOTICE: ret is t
dba_operation
_____
(1 row)
postgres=> \d t1
```

```
Table "public.t1"

Column | Type | Collation | Nullable | Default

-----t----t----t-----t-----t-------

id | integer | | |

Indexes:

"t1_id_idx" btree (id)
```

这样就严谨多了,对于这类 SQL 注入会直接退出, perfect ~

小结

通过这个例子,想必各位能得到一些启发了,我可以利用函数安全性去实现一些精细化的权限控制,当然也可以"越权"去做一些事。

举个典型的例子,现在有个监控用户想去审计执行的SQL,常规方式是不行的,会提示权限不足,如下

query 字段你是看不到的,因此我们也可以利用函数的这个特性来实现:用超级用户定义一个函数,并且函数的权限是 SECURITY DEFINER,然后赋予函数的 execute 权限给相应用户即可。怎么样?是不是学到了一个非常棒的技巧?不过要切勿滥用啊,搞不好就提桶跑路了。

视图也有类似的权限控制,可以戳这篇 PostgreSQL 15新特性预览: 视图的security invoker选项。