Distributed constraint satisfaction

1.1 D-CSP

CSP Variables $= \{x, y, z\}$

Domains $= \{\{1..3\}, \{1..3\}, \{1..3\}\}$

Constraints $= \{$
$x > 1$ ①
$y < z$ ②
$x \leq y \leq z$ ③
$\}$

① Node consistency

$D' = \{\{2..3\}, \{1..3\}, \{1..3\}\}$ because it prunes the x' domain without care the other variables.

② Arc consistency

$D'' = \{\{2..3\}, \{1..2\}, \{2..3\}\}$ because there exits all pairs (a, b) of x and y respetively meets $x < z$.

③ Path consistency

$D''' = \{\{2\}, \{2\}, \{2\}\}$ because all pairs (a, b) in x and y meet $x \leq y$ and in addition there exists a pair (b, c) in y and z that meets $y \leq z$.

Problem:

Inconsistent → the problem has no solution
Solved → Domains just have one value
Inclusive → At lest one domain has more the one value and is no possible to prune more.
Consistent → The problem has some solutions that accomplishs with all constraints.

Notes about of the reading.

Ch 1: Distributed Constraint Satisfaction → CSP
- pruning
- backtraking

→ Pending distribution. (Naive)

Ch 2: Distribute Optimization.
- MDPs
- Search
- Negotiation, auctions, opt.
- Scheduling problem → integer programming
- Conventions (Laws)

Ch 3: Noncooperative games



b is Pareto dominate to a and c
a b and c are Pareto optimal
d is no pareto

Noncooperative Games (¬ coalitional games)

└ individual └ group

Self-interested agents

- Utility theory → quantify preference
- utility function → mapping world to numbers
- Example:



$$\text{home}: \; +50 = 50$$

$$\text{club}: \begin{cases} +0.25\left(0.6(100-90)*1.5 + 0.4(100)*1.5\right) \\ +0.75\left(0.6(100-90) + 0.4(100)\right) \end{cases} = 51.75$$

$$\text{movie}: \begin{cases} +0.25\left(0.6(50) + 0.4(50-40)\right) \\ +0.75\left(0.6(50)*1.5 + 0.4(50-40)*1.5\right) \end{cases} = 46.75$$

- Using Payoff Matrix



Carol \ Bob	club	movie
club	15	150
movie	10	100

Alice = club

Carol \ Bob	club	movie
club	50	10
movie	75	15

Alice = movie

Utility ≡ Preference

- Outcomes $O = \{o_1 \ldots o_n\}$
- Preferences: $o_1, o_2 \in O$, let $o_1 \succeq o_2$
  let $o_1 \sim o_2$
  let $o_1 \succ o_2$
- Lottery: probability distribution over O

$$L = [p_1 : o_1, \ldots, p_k : o_k]$$
where $o_i \in O$
$p_i \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{k} p_i = 1$

Completeness
$\forall o_1, o_2$, $o_1 \succ o_2$ or
$o_2 \succ o_1$ or
$o_1 \sim o_2$

Transitivity
If $o_1 \succeq o_2$ and $o_2 \succeq o_3$ then
$o_1 \succeq o_3$

Substitutability
If $o_1 \sim o_2$ then
$[p : o_1, p_3 : o_3, \ldots, p_k : o_k]$
$= [p : o_2, p_3 : o_3, \ldots, p_k : o_k]$

Monotonicity

Continuity

Decomposability
If $\forall o_i \in O$, $P_{\ell_1}(o_i) = P_{\ell_2}(o_i)$ then
$L_1 \sim L_2$

Normal form

- TCP Dilemma

		colleague: correct	colleague: defective
me	correct	-1, -1	-4, 0
	defective	0, -4	-3, -3

(N, A, u)
- N: Set of players indexed by i till n
- $A_1 \times \dots \times A_n$
- $a = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in A$ — Action profile
- $(u_1, \dots, u_n)$ where $u_i : A \mapsto \mathbb{R}$

why a_n? "n" means 4 or 9?

Common-payoff games $\forall a \in A_1 \times \dots \times A_n$ and $i, j \in N$, $u_i(a) = u_j(a)$

	Quick	Slow
Quick	3 , 3	2 , 2
Slow	2 , 2	1 , 1

Zero-sum games $\exists c, \forall a \in A_1 \times A_2$, $u_1(a) + u_2(a) = c$

	Rock	Paper	Scissors
Rock	0 , 0	-1 , 1	1 , -1
Paper	1 , -1	0 , 0	-1 , 1
Scissors	-1 , 1	1 , -1	0 , 0

No-zero-sum games ✓

Strategies (NFG)

- Pure strategy → single action
- Mixed strategy → using the probability distribution
  let (N, A, u), $S_i = \Pi(A_i)$

Not necessarily a "product"?

- Mixed strategy profile → $S_1 \times \dots \times S_n$

Can I use this to obtain a probability?

Alice
- Home = 50
- Club = 51.75
- Movie = 46.75

$s_i(a_i)$ → Probability that a_i is played under s_i

Doesn't matter if they are good or no?

- Support → set of actions with positive probability over s_i
  $\{a_i \mid s_i(a_i) > 0\}$
  Note: - Pure strategy → support a single action
  - Fully mixed → full support
- Expected utility ?

$$u_i(s) = \sum_{a \in A} u_i(a) \prod_{j=1}^{n} s_j(a_j)$$

More notes:
- $|A| = |S|$
- a_i contains utility; s_i contains probability.
- $u_i(a)$ means "utility"; $u_i(s)$ means "utility expected"

From optimality to equilibrium → strategy? output? utility? probability?

- optimal strategy → maximize the agent's expected payoff
  Note: The best strategy depends on the choices of others

Pareto → Point of view of an outside observer   "utility of an strategy" is it ok?

- Pareto domination: $s \overset{PD}{\rightarrow} s'$ if $\forall i \in N$, $u_i(s) \geq u_i(s')$, and $\exists j \in N$, $u_j(s) > u_j(s')$

- Pareto optimality: $\nexists s' \in S$, $s' \overset{PD}{\rightarrow} s$

Equilibrium → Point of view of an individual agent   the best?

- Best response: → of player i of s_{-i} is a mixed strategy $s_i^* \in S_i$
  such that $u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$ for all $s_i \in S$

  Note: this is not the concept of solution

- Nash equilibrium → s is a Nash equilibrium if $\forall i \in N$, s_i is the best response to s_{-i}
  → is strict if $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i', s_{-i})$
  → is weak if $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i', s_{-i})$

		Husband	
		LW	WL
wife	LW	2, 1	0, 0
	WL	0, 0	1, 2

husband
- LW $\pi = 1/3$ $u_h(LW) = 1/3$?
- WL $\boxed{\pi = 2/3}$

wife
- LW $\boxed{\pi = 2/3}$ $u_w(LW) = 2/3$?
- WL $\pi = 1/3$

Rationalizability   A strategy profile of a player i is ratinalizable if it is a best response to some believes that i could have about the strategies that other players have. → or will take.

		Player 2	
		Head	Tail
Player 1	Head	1, -1	-1, 1
	Tail	-1, 1	1, -1

Maxmin strategy   think of the worst-case

$$\max_{s_i} \min_{s_{-i}} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$$

4 Computing

Nash equilibria two-player zero-sum games

Linear programming

Example: $G = (\{1,2\}, A_1 \times A_2, (u_1, u_2))$ Expected utility $U_1^* = -U_2^*$

Because is zero-sum games

$$\sum_{k \in A_2} \underbrace{u_1(a_1^j, a_2^k)}_{\text{constant}} \cdot s_2^k \leq U_1^*$$

$$\sum_{k \in A} s_2^k = 1, \quad s_2^k \geq 0$$

Because there are probabilities.

$$\sum_{k \in A_2} u_1(a_1^j, a_2^k) \cdot s_2^k + r_1^j = U_1^*$$

$$\sum_{k \in A} s_2^k = 1, \quad s_2^k \geq 0, \quad r_1^j \geq 0$$

Rock - Paper - Scissors

	Rock	Mix (25%)	Paper	Mix (25%)	Scissors	Mix (50%)
Rock	0 , 0	0.25	-1 , 1	-0.25	1 , -1	0
Mix (50%)	0					
Paper	1 , -1		0 , 0		-1 , 1	
Mix (25%)	-0.25					
Scissors	-1 , 1		1 , -1		0 , 0	
Mix (25%)	0.25					

50%(0) + 25%(1) + 25%(-1) = 0

50%(-1) + 25%(0) + 25%(1) = -0.25

50%(1) + 25%(-1) + 25%(0) = 0.25

25%(0) + 25%(-1) + 50%(1) = 0.25

25%(1) + 25%(0) + 50%(-1) = -0.25

25%(1) + 25%(-1) + 50%(0) = 0

Heads and tails

which value usually is posted when it is written just one ?

	Heads	Tails	p , 1-p
Heads	1 , -1	-1 , 1	2p - 1
Tails	-1 , 1	1 , -1	1 - 2p
q , 1-q	1 - 2q	2q - 1	

$p(1) + (1-p)(-1) = p - 1 + p = 2p - 1$

$p(-1) + (1-p)(1) = -p + 1 - p = 1 - 2p$

$q(1) + (1-q)(-1) = q - 1 + q = 2q - 1$

$q(-1) + (1-q)(1) = -q + 1 - q = 1 - 2q$

Is per column or per row ?

what value refers to ?
(oranges or greens)
(columns or rows)

$p = 0.7$

$2(0.7) - 1 = 1.4 - 1 = 0.4$

$1 - 2(0.7) = 1 - 1.4 = -0.6$

	Heads 20%	Tails 80%	Expected Payoff
Heads 70%	-1	1	0.6
Tails 30%	1	-1	-0.6
Expected Payoff	-0.4	0.4	

$20\%(-1) + 80\%(1) = -0.2 + 0.8 = 0.6$

$20\%(1) + 80\%(-1) = 0.2 + -0.8 = -0.6$

$70\%(-1) + 30\%(1) = -0.7 + 0.3 = -0.4$

$70\%(1) + 30\%(-1) = 0.7 + -0.3 = 0.4$

Orange wins when =
Green wins when ≠

Orange should play Heads ! isn't it?
However, it is opposit to the logic!

Other example:

		P_1	P_2	P_3
x_1	0.5 →	-2	1	2
x_2	0.5 →	2	-1	0
x_3	0.0 →	1	0	-2
		0	0	1

$-2(0.5) + 2(0.5) + 1(0) = 0$

$1(0.5) + -1(0.5) + 0(0) = 0$

$2(0.5) + 0(0.5) + -2(0) = 1$

$$\begin{aligned} &P_1 = -2x_1 + 2x_2 + x_3 \\ &P_2 = x_1 - x_2 \\ &P_3 = 2x_1 - 2x_3 \\ &x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1 \\ &x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0 \\ &z = \min\{P_1, P_2, P_3\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &z \leq -2x_1 + 2x_2 + x_3 \\ &z \leq x_1 - x_2 \\ &z \leq 2x_1 - 2x_3 \\ &x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1 \\ &x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Best is <

		25% R	50% S	25% P	
50%	R	0	1	-1	0.25
25%	S	-1	0	1	0
25%	P	1	-1	0	-0.25
		0	0.25	-0.25	0.0625

$0.25(0) + 0.5(1) + 0.25(-1) = 0.25$

$0.25(-1) + 0.5(0) + 0.25(1) = 0$

$0.25(1) + 0.5(-1) + 0.25(0) = -0.25$

$0.25(0) + 0.5(0.25) + 0.25(-0.25) =$

$0.5(0) + 0.25(-1) + 0.25(1) = \emptyset$

$0.5(1) + 0.25(0) + 0.25(-1) = 0.25$

$0.5(-1) + 0.25(1) + 0.25(0) = -0.25$

Best is >

	P_1	P_2	P_3
q_1	-2	1	2
q_2	2	-1	0
q_3	1	0	-2

$$\begin{aligned} &P_1 = -2q_1 + 2q_2 + 1q_3 = q_3 - 2(q_1 - q_2) \\ &P_2 = 1q_1 - 1q_2 + 0q_3 = q_1 - q_2 \\ &P_3 = 2q_1 + 0q_2 - 2q_3 = 2(q_1 - q_3) \\ &q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1 \\ &q_1, q_2, q_3 \geq 0 \\ &z = \min\{P_1, P_2, P_3\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &z \leq q_3 - 2(q_1 - q_2) \\ &z \leq q_1 - q_2 \\ &z \leq 2(q_1 - q_3) \\ &q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1 \\ &q_1, q_2, q_3 \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

(1) $z \leq q_3 - 2(q_1 - q_2)$
(2) $z \leq q_1 - q_2$
(3) $z \leq 2(q_1 - q_3)$
(4) $q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1$
(5) $q_1, q_2, q_3 \geq 0$

(4) $q_1 = 1 - q_2 - q_3$

(4)(1) $z \leq q_3 - 2(1 - q_2 - q_3 - q_2)$
$z \leq q_3 - 2 + 4q_2 + 2q_3$
(1) $z \leq 3q_3 + 4q_2 - 2$

(4)(2) $z \leq 1 - q_2 - q_3 - q_2$
(2) $z \leq 1 - q_3 - 2q_2$

(4)(3) $z \leq 2(1 - q_2 - q_3 - q_3)$
(3) $z \leq 2 - 4q_3 - 2q_2$

(2)(1) $1 - q_3 - 2q_2 \leq 3q_3 + 4q_2 - 2$