

Name:	Gowrav Kumar Baitharu Aripaka
Lab User ID:	23SEK3324_U02
Date:	11-01-2024
Application Name:	Vulnerable Java Application

Follow the below guidelines:

Define Hypotheses and **Scenarios:**

• Similar to Chaos Engineering, start by defining hypotheses and scenarios related to potential threats.

Inject Controlled Failure:

- Introduce controlled failure scenarios that mimic potential attack vectors or vulnerabilities identified in Threat Modeling.
- Simulate failure conditions, such as network disruptions, component failures, or data breaches, to observe the system's response.

Measure System Behavior:

- Capture and measure relevant system behavior metrics during the chaos experiments.
- Monitor the system's response to the injected failures, including performance metrics, error rates, and securityrelated indicators.
- Analyze and compare the observed behavior against the expected outcomes defined in the Threat Modeling process.

Learn and Iterate:

- Learn from the results of the chaos experiments and iterate on the Threat Modeling process.
- Analyze the observations and insights gained from the chaos experiments to refine the Threat Models. Update threat scenarios, adjust mitigation strategies, and improve security controls based on the lessons learned.

Define Threat Scenario

•Identify SQL injection as a Identify SQL Injection as a potential threat, where an attacker attempts to manipulate database queries to gain unauthorized access or extract sensitive data.

Monitor System Behavior

- Monitor the system's response during the simulated attack. · Capture metrics such as error
- rates, abnormal database query patterns, and unexpected system behaviors.

Refine Threat Models and Mitigation Strategies:

• Update threat models to reflect the SQL injection vulnerability and its impact on the system. Refine mitigation strategies to address the identified weaknesses, such as enhancing input validation mechanisms and implementing additional database security controls.













- Analyze the captured data to understand the system's behavior under the SQL injection threat.
- Injection trieat:
 •Identify any successful injection attempts, potential weaknesses in input validation, or inadequate security controls.
 •Evaluate the effectiveness of existing country and the effectiveness of the provi
- existing security measures, such as input sanitization and parameterized queries.







 Inject SQL statements into input fields to exploit potential vulnerabilities.



System Architecture:

(Understand the system and document the physical and logical architecture of the system, use the shapes and icons to capture the system architecture)



Define system's normal behavior:

(Define the steady state of the system is defined, thereby defining some measurable outputs which can indicate the system's normal behavior)

This is an simple and self-contained Java web application with security flaws

The application uses Spring Boot and an embedded H2 database that resets every time it starts.

If you break it just restart and everything will be reset.

The application will run on HTTPS port 9001

The application uses Spring Boot and an embedded H2 database that resets every time it starts. If you break it just restart and everything will be reset.

Hypothesis:

(During an experiment, we need a hypothesis for comparing to a stable control group, and the same applies here too. If there is a reasonable expectation for a particular action according to which we will change the steady state of a system, then the first thing to do is to fix the system so that we accommodate for the action that will potentially have that effect on the system. For eg: "If one of our database servers fails, our service will automatically switch to a backup server, and users will not experience any downtime or data loss.")

Known-Knowns

 We know that when a replica shuts down it will be removed from the cluster. We know that a new replica will then be cloned from the primary and added back to the cluster.

Known-Unknowns

- We know that the clone will occur, as we have logs that confirm if it succeeds or fails, but we don't know the weekly average of the mean time it takes from experiencing a failure to adding a clone back to the cluster effectively.
- We know we will get an alert that the cluster has only one replica after 5 minutes but we don't know if our alerting threshold should be adjusted to more effectively prevent incidents.

Region A Region B Primary Pseudo Primary Replica Replica Pseudo Replica Pseudo Replica

Unknown-Knowns

• If we shutdown the two replicas for a cluster at the same time, we don't know exactly the mean time during a Monday morning it would take us to clone two new replicas off the existing primary. But we do know we have a pseudo primary and two replicas which will also have the transactions.

Unknown-Unknowns

• We don't know exactly what would happen if we shutdown an entire cluster in our main region, and we don't know if the pseudo region would be able to failover effectively because we have not yet run this scenario.





Hypothesis: The website tester Hypothesis: The website tester application correctly identifies and application may have limitations in reports well-known vulnerabilities detecting certain variations or new such as SQL injection, cross-site techniques of known vulnerabilities. Known Rationale: Despite being aware of scripting (XSS), and security misconfigurations. known vulnerabilities, the application Rationale: These are common might not cover all possible evasion vulnerabilities that the application is techniques or variations. expected to recognize and report. Introduce controlled chaos through Introduce unexpected data or fuzzing (injecting random data or actions related to the known actions) or stress testing (applying functionality (e.g., large cache extreme load). Monitor for invalidation, invalid cache emergent issues and unexpected entries). Monitor for emergent Unknown behaviors, focusing on identifying issues and unexpected system entirely new failure modes or behavior. vulnerabilities.

Known Unknown



Experiment:

(Document your Preparation, Implementation, Observation and Analysis)

Preparation:

- Launched 3 virtual machines on AWS with Ubuntu 20.04
- Set up a Kubernetes cluster with master and two nodes (n1 & n2)

```
This node has joined the cluster:
* Certificate signing request was sent to apiserver and a response was received.
 The Kubelet was informed of the new secure connection details.
Run 'kubectl get nodes' on the control-plane to see this node join the cluster.
root@kube-n1:~#
This node has joined the cluster:
 Certificate signing request was sent to apiserver and a response was received.
 The Kubelet was informed of the new secure connection details.
Run 'kubectl get nodes' on the control-plane to see this node join the cluster.
root@kube-n2:~#
                 STATUS
                            ROLES
NAME
                                                         AGE
                                                                   VERSION
kube-master
                 Ready
                            control-plane, master
                                                         8m28s
                                                                   v1.21.1
kube-n1
                                                                   v1.21.1
                 Ready
                            <none>
                                                         6m44s
                                                                   v1.21.1
kube-n2
                 Ready
                            <none>
                                                         6m32s
```

Implementation:

• Now creating a deployment using the following script which has replicas = 3

```
kind: Deployment
apiVersion: apps/v1
metadata:
name: vuljavaapp
 replicas: 3
 template:
  metadata:
   labels:
    app: vuljavaapp
  spec:
   containers:
   - name: vuljavaapp
    image: dhwanit28/vuljapp
 selector:
  matchLabels:
   app: vuljavaapp
```

root@kube-master:~#



• Now Creating a service using the following script

kind: Service apiVersion: v1 metadata: name: vuljavaapp spec:


type: NodePort selector:

app: vuljavaapp

ports:
- name: http
port: 9000
targetPort: 9000

NAME READY UP-TO-DATE AVAILABLE AGE 3 3 3/3 5h28m juice-shop vuljavaapp 3/3 3 3 52m root@kube-master:~# kubectl get svc NAME TYPE EXTERNAL-IP PORT (S) AGE CLUSTER-IP juice-shop 10.106.98.218 NodePort <none> 8000:31088/TCP 5h24m kubernetes ClusterIP 10.96.0.1 <none> 443/TCP 5h44m 10.101.95.224 9000:31002/TCP vuljavaapp NodePort <none> 52m

• Now we can see the website gets hosted on localhost:31002 but not able to get any response







Observation and Analysis

• Performing chaos engineering on this cluster

Initially 2 pods of juice-shop runs on node 1 and 1 pod runs on node 2 vuljavaapp-766dfbbf76-6mps4 vuljavaapp-766dfbbf76-dbk96 vuljavaapp-766dfbbf76-pnr18 Running 192.168.133.73 1/1 Running 54m 192.168.34.12 kube-n1 <none> <none> Running 192.168.34.11 54m kube-n1 <none>




o We observe the following: even if node 1 shuts down then replica takes care of that and the pods that used to run on node 1 started running on node 2





• Performed vulnerability analysis of the following repo using the snyk tool and found:



- Out of these Vulnerabilities some critical ones are and their fixes are mentioned below:
 - 1) Vul: ch.qos.logback:logback-classic- Insecure deserialization

Impact: may allow an attacker to manipulate serialized objects and pass harmful data into the application code. Insecure deserialization can lead to denial of service, arbitrary code execution, or privilege escalation

Fix:

- Introduce digital signatures and other integrity checks to stop malicious object creation or other data interfering.
- Run deserialization code in low privilege environments.
- Keep a log with deserialization exceptions and failures.
- Use language-agnostic methods for deserialization such as JSON, XML, or YAML.
- Use safer API which avoids the use of the interpreter.

2) Vul: org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core-Information Exposure

Impact: If the send file processing completed quickly, it was possible for the Processor to be added to the processor cache twice. This could result in the same Processor being used for multiple requests which in turn could lead to unexpected errors and/or response mix-up.

Fix: It enables a potential attacker to understand the state of the login function, and could allow an attacker to discover a valid username by trying different values until the incorrect password message is returned. In essence, this makes it easier for an attacker to obtain half of the necessary authentication credentials.

3) Vul: org.springframework:spring-beans-Remote Code Execution

Impact: This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform remote code execution on an application server running a vulnerable configuration, giving them full access to the compromised server.

Fix: here are some fixes:

- 1. Upgrade Spring Framework to a version equal to or greater than 5.2.20 or 5.3.18.
- 2. If you are using Spring Boot directly, upgrade to a version equal to or greater than 2.6.6.

4) Vul: org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core-Remote Code Execution

Impact: It allows an attacker to inject malicious code into an application through a user input field, which is then executed on the fly. Can result in a total loss of integrity, availability, and confidentiality within the application. An attacker may also abuse a code injection vulnerability to execute terminal commands on that server and pivot to adjacent systems.

Fix: here are some fixes:

Avoid the use of dangerous functions

learn..evolve

Chaos Engineering – Hypothesis

- Reconsider the need for dynamic code execution
- Lock down the interpreter
- Utilize a static analysis tool
- 5) Vul: socket.io-parser-Denial of Service (DoS)

Impact: ReDoS attack attempts to slow down or even render an application unavailable. processing of the malicious string exhausts the computing power or memory available, thus impacting the application's performance and, in certain circumstances, causing a denial of service (or DoS).

Fix: Avoid using regex for user input validation. Closely review and analyze all patterns before implementation to ensure they do not contain any evil regex patterns.