Detection of Anomalies in Communication Ne

Mid Semester Examination -1 (September 12, 2022, Monday) Project Phase I (ECD401)



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Contents

- Introduction
- Problem Statement
- Problem Formulation
- Literature Survey
 - Timeline
- Progress
- Results Short Term Goals
- Conclusion
- References



Introduction

- Detecting anomalies is a major issue that has been studied for centuries. Nu distinct methods have been developed and used to detect anomalies for diff applications. Anomaly detection refers to "the problem of finding patterns in do not conform to expected behavior".
- Normal statistical methods fail in the times when the anomalies/intrusions a following no previous pattern and are not constrained to a particular method
- In our college network too, intrusions into the network could occur both from the college or outside. Although there have been firewalls installed and mea have been adapted for network security, there is still a risk involved, the firev checking anomalies based on fixed protocols and patterns may become out soon and there is a need for ML based firewalls and IDSs.

Problem Statement

Detection of Anomalies in Communication Networks using Machine Learning.



Problem Formulation

- The rapid growth in the use of computer networks results in the issues of ma the network availability, integrity, and confidentiality.
- Many techniques have been used to detect anomalies. One of the increasing significant techniques is Machine Learning (ML), which plays an important re
- Traditional rule based IDSs are not useful for more advanced times where a and intrusion pattern change. Thus the need for machine learning and deep based systems arises.
- Hence, we are using Machine Learning Techniques to detect and classify the anomalies in Communication Networks in our problem statement.

Literature Survey

- Intrusions and the mode of intrusions could be any of the following:
- Host based or network based intrusions
- Signature based mechanism or behavioural based mechanism
- Anomaly based intrusion detection
- Protocol anomaly detection : Refers to exceptions based on protocol format and behavi espect to common practice. Anomalies like - illegitimate command usage, field values combinations, unusual occurrences of particular commands etc
 - Application Payload anomaly: Eg. presence of shell code in unexpected fields 0
- Statistical anomaly detection : includes threshold detection and profile based detection
- Machine Learning
- In contrast to statistical methods stated above, ML techniques are well suited to learnir with no prior knowledge of the patterns.
 - Clustering and classification are two popular machine learning algorithms used in IDS 0

A Machine Learning-Based Classification Prediction Technique for DDoS Attacks

DDoS attacks

Distributed network attacks are referred to, usually, as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)attacks. The take advantage of specific limitations that apply to any arrangement asset, such as the framework of th

DDoS attacks are web applications and business websites; and the attacker may have different goals. Some common types DDoS attacks are SYN flood,is a form of denial of service attack, in which an attacker rapidly initiates a connection to a se finalizing the connection. The server has to spend resources waiting for half-opened connections, whic consume enough resources to make the system unresponsive to legitimate traffic. The UDP flood is a kind of denial-of-service attacks in which numerous User Datagram Protocol (UDP) forwarded to a computer server (targeted) in order to exhaust that server's capability to execute and re The HTTP flood is an attack type in which the attacker manipulates HTTP and POST unwanted reques application. The Smurf attack uses a malware program called smurf to abuse the Internet Protocol (IP) and Interne Message Protocol (ICMP). It imitates the IP address and use ICMP to ping the IP address of the specific The Fraggle attack uses a large amount of UDP traffic to transmit to the transmission organization of tl This is like a Smurf attack using UDP instead of ICMP. NTP amplification attack, the attacker abuses a functionality of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) serve devastate a targeted server or network with a large quantity of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic; result this rendering the destination infrastructure unreachable to regular legitimate users traffic. Among the machine learning techniques, random forest and XGBoost both are powerful supervised le models.Both are applicable and used for classification problems. The random forest algorithm is appro times faster than other algorithms and best working for classification problems. This should be noted XGBoost is the ideal algorithm of machine learning because it is approximately 100 times faster than t forest and best for forbid data analysis. Both are simple and faster than other algorithm in terms of ex

Using Machine Learning Algorithms Detecting Denial of Service Attacks

- DDos is a type of attack in which the power of multiple malware affected systems a disrupt a network connection.
- It creates a massive amount of traffic and network congestion. Due to this, it becor impossible for data packets to reach its destination. This leads to denial of service f
- This is the most significant cyber-threat at the moment. This is because, by inhibitir server's ability to provide resources to legitimate clients,the impacted server's par such as bandwidth and buffer size, are slowed down.

- There are two different models used to identify DDOS attacks.
- Mathematical Model: In mathematical model, we establish a relation between inter-ar of requests and throughput.


Throughput (S) = Packet Size(L) *Inter-arrival time of requests

- We compute the median of thresholds and consider it as the threshold. If throughput is chreshold, then it is categorized as an attack or else it is not an attack. 0
- Machine Learning Model: In machine learning model, we compare the throughput of th with the threshold. If throughput is above the threshold, then it is categorized as an att it is not an attack. 0
 - Later, we calculate the Miss Rate of the model.

Communication Networks: an Autoence Unsupervised Anomaly Detection for Approach

- Anomaly Detection in Communication Networks is a challenging task as systems ha components and the sheer scale and the dynamic nature of these systems make tra Anomaly Detection Techniques inadequate.
- Many traditional Anomaly Detections are threshold based, it becomes infeasible to the threshold manually, and this leads to a very high rate of false positives.
- Skyline communications has come up with a solution which monitors Communicati Networks and detects upcoming network failures and informs the customers of its
- But, in real time, we just need to be notified about critical anomalies as the non cri are financially exhausting.
- So, with this Auto Encoder approach, we can predict anomalies when behavior dev normal behavior.

- Anomalies have been classified into 4 types- outliers, trend changes, variance chan
- Outliers is when there is a sudden spike in the number of packets of data requested
- Trend changes is when there is a slow change in behavior over a long time period.
- Variance changes is when the variance of the number of packets requested change
 - Level Shifts is when there is a temporary change in the behavior.
- A stream of data with timestamp is created.
- A time-based window function is created and separates the data into different stre
- The reconstruction error is calculated by flagging the thresholds based on the inter representation.
- The time stamp wise division and the RE helps in checking changes that happens in interval and reduces False Positive Rate.
- Various Architectures such as Dense AE, LSTM AE, LSTM seq2seq, TCN AE and TCN architectures perform best on the artificial datasets ,while dense AE shows best re was implemented to classify these anomalies and was observed that TCN seq2seq the real time use data.



	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	1 0.000000	192.168.137.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	217 M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
	2 0.384720	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,14	MDP	1285 55872 + 443 Len=1243
	3 0.385031	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,14	MOD	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
100	4 0.385232	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,14	don	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
40.1	5 0.385410	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,14	dQn	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
1000	6 0.385586	192.168.137.64	142,250,183.14	dOn	1292 55872 > 443 Len=1250
1000	7 0.385767	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.14	HOD	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
-	8 0.385935	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.14	dOn	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
01	9 0.386113	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.14	dQN	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
100	10 0.386283	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,14	dOn	1292 55872 + 443 Len=1250
1000	11 0.386443	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,14	MOD	267 55872 + 443 Len=225
10001080	12 0.389657	192,168,137,64	142,250,183,206	MOD	1285 49422 + 443 Len=1243
	13 0.389914	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.206	don	1292 49422 → 443 Len=1250
- 1	14 0.390098	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,206	don	1292 49422 → 443 Len=1250
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w	16 0.390407	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.206	dON	1292 49422 + 443 Len=1250
407	17 0.390556	192,168,137,64	142.250.183.206	dOn	1292 49422 → 443 Len=1250
w	18 0.390705	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,206	dOn	1292 49422 + 443 Len=1250
OT	19 0.390867	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,206	don	1292 49422 + 443 Len=1250
0	20 0.390993	192,168,137,64	142,250,183,206	MOD	1292 49422 + 443 Len=1250
-	21 0.391148	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.206	dOn	1292 49422 → 443 Len=1250
22	0.391331	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,206	dOn	1292 49422 > 443 Len=1250
100	23 0.391506	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.206	NDP	1292 49422 + 443 Len=1250
2	24 0.391683	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.206	dQN	274 49422 → 443 Len=232
M.L.	25 0.404643	142.250.183.14	192.168.137.64	dQN	71 443 + 55872 Len=29
w	26 0.404643	142.250.183.14	192.168.137.64	dOn	72 443 + 55872 Len=30
10	27 0.404866	142.250.183.206	192.168.137.64	don	74 443 + 49422 Len=32
w	28 0.408002	142.250.183.206	192,168,137,64	don	68 443 + 49422 Len=26
0	29 0.408700	142.250.183.14	192,168,137,64	dQn	68 443 + 55872 Len=26
0	30 0.409243	192.168.137.64	142,250,183,206	dOn	76 49422 → 443 Len=34
-	31 0.409679	192.168.137.64	142.250.183.14	NDP	75 55872 + 443 Len=33

Wireshark Dataset

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2	0	dpn	private SF	SF		105 146	0	0	0	0		254	1.0	0.01	00.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
8	0	dpn	private SF	SF		105 146	0	0	0	0	8	254	1.0	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
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311025	0	dpn	private	SF	105	147	0	0	0	0	Ĭ	255	1.0	0.00	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
311026	0	dpn	private SF	SF	105	147	0	0	0	0	*	255	1.0	0.00	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
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KDDCup99 Dataset

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Firewall dataset obtained from network centre

4	Sep 1, 2022 3:31:56 PM	2022-09- 01T10:01:56Z	inbound	4a6d8a91- 6b95-4070- be89- fc5e432f6fcf	Session	2022-09- 01T08:48:48Z	HTTPS	2022-08- 30T04:11:05Z
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
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Timeline for the Project Completior



Work Done

- Researched various real time problem statements which can be of use in ou day lives
- Some such topics were
- Calculation of path loss in Wireless Communication Networks
- Prediction of Video quality using ML
- Detection of anomalies in Communication Networks
- Explored various papers and understood the concept
- Finalised our problem statement based on the importance and relevance of problems
- Acquired sample Firewall data from Network Centre

Results

- Formulated the problem statement after researching on the need to have an efficie learning based system to detect anomalies
- Researched on the existing methods for anomaly detection and need for machine based algorithms
- Researched the different types of attacks possible in the communication network a the importance of this project specifically to the college network

Work to be Done by the Next **Evaluation**

- Prepare our dataset using packet sniffer
- To simulate an attack using softwares like Slowloris
- Analyse our own dataset and analyse the features needed to process the da comparing it with already publicly available datasets like KDCup1999

Conclusion

- The numerous variety of attacks make it a necessity to have an intelligent learning algorithm to detect the attacks.
- Firewalls and other current IDS use statistical methods to detect anomalies and inti
- Need to find the best parameters/features to train the model on to get best accura

Monday, 12 September 2022

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