Yale

Differential Privacy

CPSC 471 / 571: Trustworthy Deep Learning

Rex Ying

Content

- Introduction of Privacy
- Differential Privacy (DP)
- Differential Privacy in Deep Learning

Privacy – An Example

If the university asks you to take a survey if you have diabetes or not, **the result will be released to the public**, would you participate in this survey?

Medical Research

Privacy – An Example

If the university asks you to take a survey if you have diabetes or not, **the result will be released to the public**, would you participate in this survey?

Probably not

Medical Research

Privacy – An Example

If the university asks you to take a survey if you have diabetes or not, **the result will be released to the public**, would you participate in this survey?

- **What if** they only ask for your age, location, birthday, and diseases you got in the past, no personally identifiable information?

Medical Research

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- **What if** they only ask for your age, location, birthday, and diseases you got in the past, no personally identifiable information???
  - Not my name, bank account, or identity card. **So it's safe???**



Medical Research

Privacy – An Example

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  - Not my name, bank account, or identity card. **So it's safe???**

Not sure, why?

Medical Research

Linkage Attacks

- Connecting different datasets that seem to not relate to each other might reveal your identity.
- **The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC)** releases 135,000 records of patient encounters, each with 100 attributes.
  - Relevant attributes were removed, but **ZIP, birth date, and gender** were available.
  - It's usually considered as a "*safe*" practice.
- **Public voter registration record**
  - Contain, among others, name, address, **ZIP, birth date, and gender**

Linkage



87 % of the US population is uniquely identifiable by 5-digit ZIP, gender, and Date of Birth

The adversary can query the database using your ZIP code, birth date, and gender to see if you have diabetes or not.

Privacy – An Example

- From the university's point of view

How can we provide a more rigorous guarantee to protect user's privacy?

- **Idea**: add random noise to users' answers
  - We **flip a coin** for each answer to determine if we collect the true user's answer.
  - If it's head, we record the user's true answer.
  - If it's tail, we record a random answer (50/50 the user could either have diabetes or not).

How does this strategy prevent adversaries from accessing private information?



Privacy – An Example

- From the university's point of view

How can we provide a more rigorous guarantee to protect user's privacy?

- **Idea**: add random noise to users' answers
- **Do we still have meaningful statistics?**
  - **Yes, we can still know the true probability of people having diabetes**
  - $p_{T'} = \frac{1}{2} p_T + \frac{1}{4}$

$$\Rightarrow p_T = 2p_{T'} - \frac{1}{2}$$

(true) probability of a person having diabetes.

(noisy) probability of a person having diabetes according to the survey.



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Differential Privacy

- **Cynthia Dwork (2006)** proposes a formal definition of *individual* privacy:
  - **Intuition:** Any information-related risk to a person should not change due to that person's information being included or not in the analysis.



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

Differential Privacy

- Cynthia Dwork (2006) proposes a formal definition of *individual* privacy:
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

ϵ −Differential Privacy

Definition [ϵ − Differential Privacy] For $\varepsilon \geq 0$, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is **ε-differentially private** if and only if for any pair of neighboring datasets **D and D' that differ in only one element** and any $C \subseteq \text{range}(\mathcal{A})$:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C], \qquad \forall C$$

where $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C]$ denotes the probability that the algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $c \in C$.

- **Derived differential privacy loss**: $\ln \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C]}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C]} \leq \varepsilon.$



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where $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C]$ denotes the probability that the algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $c \in C$.

- **Implication on individual privacy**: Anything an adversary can do to you, it could do without your data.



X: undesired model outputs that could affect you (an individual) negatively.
The probability of bad things happening to you remains nearly the same regardless of whether you participate in the database or not

Bad responses: X X X

ϵ −Differential Privacy

Definition [ϵ −Differential Privacy]

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\boldsymbol{D}) \in \boldsymbol{C}] \leq \boldsymbol{e}^{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\boldsymbol{D}') \in \boldsymbol{C}], \qquad \forall \subseteq \text{range}(\mathcal{A})$$

Is there any drawback associated with this definition??

ϵ −Differential Privacy

Definition [ϵ −Differential Privacy]

$$0 = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C], \quad \forall C \subseteq \text{range}(\mathcal{A})$$

$0 =$: $=0$

Is there any drawback associated with this definition??

- **If** an ϵ −differentially private algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ has probability zero at any output c for the dataset $D', i.e., \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') = c] = 0,$
- **then** the algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ has probability zero at c for every other dataset D.

→ Too strong?

(ϵ, δ) −Differential Privacy

Definition [$(\epsilon, \boldsymbol{\delta})$ −Differential Privacy]

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\boldsymbol{D}) \in \boldsymbol{C}] \leq \boldsymbol{e^{\varepsilon}} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\boldsymbol{D'}) \in \boldsymbol{C}] + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \qquad \forall C \subseteq \text{range}(\mathcal{A})$$

- **Solution:** We can relax this constraint by allowing an additive difference $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ between two subsets of data, along with the multiplicative factor ($\boldsymbol{e^{\epsilon}}$).
- **Derived differential privacy loss:** $\ln \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] - \delta}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C]} \leq \varepsilon.$



(ϵ, δ) −Differential Privacy

Definition [$(\epsilon, \boldsymbol{\delta})$ −Differential Privacy]

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- **Derived differential privacy loss:** $\ln \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] - \delta}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C]} \leq \varepsilon.$

Why it intuitively makes sense?

- **Remarks**: Differential privacy is a **statistical property** of **algorithmic mechanisms**.
  - DP remains robust against auxiliary information (*e.g.,* voting database in linkage attack example).
  - The guarantee of DP is independent of the computational capabilities of a potential adversary.

How can we inject differential privacy into an algorithm?

Design Differentially Private Algorithms

- **Idea (again)**: add random noise to algorithm outputs.



- **How much noise is needed?**
  - **Intuition:**
    - Add ***more noise*** if $\mathcal{A}$ is ***more sensitive*** to individual data (may contain more private information).
    - Add ***less noise*** if $\mathcal{A}$ is ***less sensitive*** to individual data.

Laplace Mechanism → ϵ-DP

Definition (Global sensitivity): **Global sensitivity** of a function $\mathcal{A}$, denoted Δ, is

$$\Delta = \sup_{D,D': \|D - D'\| \leq 1} |\mathcal{A}(D) - \mathcal{A}(D')|$$

D, D' differ in only one element.

Theorem (Laplace Mechanism): Given a function $\mathcal{A}$, a dataset D and a fixed $\varepsilon \geq 0$, the randomizing algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D) = \mathcal{A}(D) + Z$ satisfies **ε-DP**, where Z is a random variable from a **Laplace distribution**, i.e., $Z \sim Lap(0, \frac{\Delta}{\varepsilon})$.



$$Z \sim Lap(x; \mu, b) = \frac{1}{2b} \exp\left(-\frac{|x - \mu|}{b}\right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}(|Z|) = b \quad \& \quad \Pr(|Z| \geq t \cdot b) = e^{-t}$$

Laplacian mechanism offering **0.5-differential privacy** for a function with **sensitivity (b) 1**.



Source: wikipedia

Gaussian Mechanism → (ϵ, δ)-DP

Definition (ℓ_2-sensitivity): **ℓ_2-sensitivity** of a function $\mathcal{A}$, denoted Δ_2, is

$$\Delta_2 = \sup_{D,D': ||D - D'|| \le 1} ||\mathcal{A}(D) - \mathcal{A}(D')||_2$$

D, D' differ in only one element.

Theorem (Gaussian Mechanism): Given a function $\mathcal{A}$, a dataset D and a fixed $\varepsilon, \boldsymbol{\delta} \geq 0$, the randomizing algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D) = \mathcal{A}(D) + Z$ satisfies **$(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \boldsymbol{\delta})$-DP**, where Z is a random variable from a **Gaussian distribution**, i.e., $Z \sim \boldsymbol{\mathcal{N}}(0, \frac{\mathbf{2\Delta_2^2 \ln(\frac{1.25}{\delta})}}{\boldsymbol{\epsilon^2}})$.

- Exponential mechanism is also commonly used in literature but will not be discussed in this lecture.

$$Z \sim \mathcal{N}(x; \mu, \sigma^2) = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{x - \mu}{\sigma}\right)^2\right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}(Z) = 0 \quad \& \quad \Pr(|Z| \geq t) \leq 2e^{-t^2/(2\sigma^2)}$$



See proof

Source: wikipedia

Properties of Differential Privacy

Prop 1 (Sequential Composition): Let $\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2$ is an (ϵ_1, δ_1)-DP algorithm $\mathcal{A}_1$ followed by an (ϵ_2, δ_2)-DP algorithm $\mathcal{A}_2$. Then $\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2$ is $(\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \delta_1 + \delta_2)$-DP.

- **Implication**: Differential privacy loss scales with the number of queries, *i.e.*, if we run an (ϵ, δ)-DP algorithm k times, the accumulated DP loss is $(k\epsilon, k\delta)$-DP.

- If we *do not allow* any slack in δ, this bound cannot be tightened.

Properties of Differential Privacy

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- **Implication**: Differential privacy loss scales with the number of queries, *i.e.*, if we run an (ϵ, δ)-DP algorithm k times, the accumulated DP loss is $(k\epsilon, k\delta)$-DP.

- If we *do not allow* any slack in δ, this bound cannot be tightened.
  If we *allow* a slack in the additive factor, we can get a higher privacy.

Prop 1.1 (Advanced Composition): For any $\epsilon > 0, \delta \in [0, 1], \tilde{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \in (0, 1]$, an (ϵ, δ)-DP algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ satisfies $\left(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}, k\delta + \tilde{\boldsymbol{\delta}}\right)$-DP under k-fold composition, where

$$\tilde{\epsilon} = k\epsilon(e^{\epsilon} - 1) + \epsilon\sqrt{2k\log(1/\tilde{\delta})}$$

See proof

$$\approx O(k\epsilon^2 + \sqrt{k\epsilon^2}) \ll O(k\epsilon) \quad \text{if } \epsilon \ll 1$$

$$\approx O\left(k\epsilon^2 + \sqrt{k\epsilon^2\log(1/\tilde{\delta})}\right)$$

Properties of Differential Privacy

Prop 2 (Parallel Composition): If $\mathcal{A}$ is (ϵ,δ)-differentially private on datasets X. Then an algorithm releasing $\mathcal{A}(D_1), \mathcal{A}(D_2), \dots, \mathcal{A}(D_k)$ is (ϵ,δ)-differentially private if $D_1, D_2, \dots, D_k$ are disjoint sets in X

- **Implication**: splitting your dataset into disjoint chunks and running a differentially private mechanism on each chunk separately does ***not*** increase your DP loss.

Prop 3 (Post-processing): If $\mathcal{A}$ is (ϵ, δ)-differentially private, then for any (deterministic or randomized) function g, $g(\mathcal{A})$ satisfies (ϵ, δ)-differential privacy

- **Implication**: DP is independent of the adversary's power. In other words, it is impossible to reverse the privacy protection provided by differential privacy by post-processing the output in some way.

Further Readings

- **Most of the bounds** on the privacy cost we have seen so far are *upper* bound and they *sometimes* are very loose bounds.

- There are some variants of DP to enable tighter bounds on the privacy cost, especially for iterative algorithms, e.g., Rényi differential privacy and Zero-concentrated differential privacy:

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ML Model Are Not Safe



Indirect leakage:

- infer the information
- do not have access to the actual data



Membership Inference Attack (1)

- **Goal:** speculate whether a given data instance is part of the training dataset of a target model
- **Main idea:** train several **shadow models** that mimic the behavior of the target model. Then **use these shadow models to train a binary classifier** to **infer the membership** of the target model.

Blackbox setting



Liu, Bo, et al. "When machine learning meets privacy: A survey and outlook."

Membership Inference Attack (2)

- **Shadow Training Set:** has a **similar distribution** as the Private Training Set
- How to generate shadow training sets?
  - **Model-based synthesis:** records the data that are classified by the target model with high confidence
  - **Statistics-based synthesis:** the attacker knows some statistical information about the dataset
  - **Noisy real data:** the attacker has access to the noisy version of the real data



Shokri, Reza, et al. "Membership inference attacks against machine learning models."

Membership Inference Attack (3)

- Use the **output probability vectors** from the shadow models to train the attack model (**binary classifier**)

- Shadow test set $D^{test}_{shadow_i}$ is **disjoint** from the shadow training set $D^{train}_{shadow_i}$
- D_{attack}: training set for the **Attack Model**
- $f_{shadow_i}(\,)$: the i-th shadow model
  - For $(x, y) \in D^{train}_{shadow_i}$, add $(y, f_{shadow_i}(x), \boldsymbol{in})$ to D_{attack}
  - For $(x, y) \in D^{test}_{shadow_i}$, add $(y, f_{shadow_i}(x), \boldsymbol{out})$ to D_{attack}



$D^{test}_{shadow_i} \cap D^{train}_{shadow_i} = \emptyset$

D_{attack}

Attack Model: predict whether individual instances are in the private training set of the target model

Model Inversion and Attribute Inference

- **Goal: infer sensitive attributes** of a given data instance from the non-sensitive attributes of the instance and the target model
- **Main idea:** apply **gradient descent** on the input to **maximize the logit of the target label**
  - Example: given a person's name and access to a facial recognition system, the attacker recovers an averaged image that makes the person recognizable

Recovered image using **model inversion attack**

True image in the training set

Algorithm 1 Inversion attack for facial recognition models.

function MI-FACE($label, \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \lambda$)
  $c(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 1 - \tilde{f}_{label}(\mathbf{x}) + \text{AUXTERM}(\mathbf{x})$
  $\mathbf{x}_0 \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$
  for $i \leftarrow 1 \ldots \alpha$ **do**
    $\mathbf{x}_i \leftarrow \text{PROCESS}(\mathbf{x}_{i-1} - \lambda \cdot \nabla c(\mathbf{x}_{i-1}))$
    if $c(\mathbf{x}_i) \geq \max(c(\mathbf{x}_{i-1}), \ldots, c(\mathbf{x}_{i-\beta}))$ **then**
      break
    if $c(\mathbf{x}_i) \leq \gamma$ **then**
      break
  return $[\arg\min_{\mathbf{x}_i}(c(\mathbf{x}_i)), \min_{\mathbf{x}_i}(c(\mathbf{x}_i))]$

Optimize x, such that $\tilde{f}_{label}(x) \rightarrow 1$

Limitations?

Fredrikson, et al. "Model inversion attacks that exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures."

Model Extraction Attack

- **Model Extraction** reconstructs **an approximation model $\hat{f}(x)$** of the target model $f(x)$, including:
  - recover the **model parameters** via black-box access to the target model
  - find the **hyperparameters** used in the model training, e.g., number of layers, activation function, regularization coefficients, etc.



Example: Extraction of Logistic Regression

- Task: binary classification with logistic regression
- **Model distillation** (recall defensive distillation in adversarial defense) in its simplest form



$f(x) > 0.5 \Rightarrow$ Alice
$f(x) \leq 0.5 \Rightarrow$ Bob

Assume x **has** n **features**, then model has $n+1$ **unknown parameters** (n for w and 1 for b)

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-(w*x+b)}}$$

$$\ln\left(\frac{f(x)}{1-f(x)}\right) = w * x + b$$

↓

Linear equation with $n+1$ unknows

Query $n+1$ predictions with random samples ⇒ **solve a linear system of $n+1$ equations**

Differential Privacy in Machine Learning

- Differential Privacy is achieved by applying noise mechanisms to
  - **Input data**
  - **Training stage**
    - Objective perturbation
    - Gradient perturbation
  - **Inference stage**
    - Label perturbation
    - Output perturbation



Pipeline of Differential Pravicy

Input perturbation: a type of Data Anonymization

Label Perturbation:
Used in [teacher ensemble method (PATE)]
Add noise to the labels of the teacher models and aggregate labels to train a student model



Gradient Perturbation:
DP SGD: Clips the gradients to ensure that the gradient norms are bounded. Then **add noise to the gradients**

Objective/output perturbation:
- Hard to calculate the sensitivity
- Use convex polynomial functions to approximate the target model

reference

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-ERM

- **How to train** a differentially private model to mitigate membership inference attacks and model inversion attacks?
- **Naïve approach:** Differentially Private Empirical Risk Minimization (DP-ERM)
  1. Train an ML model to get optimal parameters $\theta^\star = \text{argmin}_\theta \mathcal{L}(f, \theta, \mathfrak{D})$.
  2. Add noise to the optimal parameters to perturb the model's output $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}} = \theta^\star + Y$, where Y is a Gaussian noise $Y \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$.



Guarantee?

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-ERM

- **Privacy guarantee for DP-ERM**: applying Gaussian Mechanism

Gaussian Mechanism

If

- the algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is Δ_2-sensitive (Δ_2 can be bounded),
- the model $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D) = \mathcal{A}(D) + Z$ where $Z \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{2\Delta_2^2 \ln\left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right)}{\epsilon^2}\right)$.

Then

- Algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D)$satisfies (ε, δ)-**DP**.

DP-ERM

If

- the loss function $\mathcal{L}(f, \theta, \mathfrak{D})$ is 1-Lipschitz,
- the model $f_{DP,\hat{\theta}}$, where $\hat{\theta} = \theta^\star + Y$ where $Y \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{8\ln\left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right)}{n^2\epsilon^2}\right)$ where $n = |\mathfrak{D}|$,

Then

- Training algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{f,\mathcal{L}}$ satisfies (ε, δ)-**DP**.

See proof

Definition (Lipschitz):

A function $\mathcal{L}$ is L-**Lipschitz w.r.t.** a norm (e.g. L2 norm in this case) $||\cdot||$ if and only if:

$$|\mathcal{L}(\theta) - \mathcal{L}(\theta')| \leq L||\theta - \theta'|| \qquad \forall\, \theta, \theta' \in \Theta$$

If we use L2 norm, the above is equivalent to $||\nabla\mathcal{L}(\theta)||_2 \leq L \quad \forall\, \theta \in \Theta$.

Limitations?

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-ERM

- **Limitations**
  - It requires restrictive assumptions on the loss function.
  - The sensitivity is likely to be pessimistic (loose bound) as it treats ERM as a black box



Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent**
  - The idea is to perturb only the quantities needed for the optimizer
    → Perturb the gradient instead of perturbing the optimal model parameters.
  - Applying to Minibatch Stochastic Gradient Descent, which is already a randomized algorithm.



Amplification by Subsampling

- The following theorem suggests a privacy amplification via subsampling

Theorem (Amplification by subsampling): Let $\mathfrak{D}$ be a data domain and $\mathcal{S}: \mathfrak{D}^n \to \mathfrak{D}^m$ be a procedure returning a random mini-batch of data points size m sampled uniformly without replacement from a dataset $\mathfrak{D}$. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a (ε, δ)-DP algorithm. Then $\mathcal{A} \circ \mathcal{S}$ satisfies $\left(\varepsilon', \frac{m}{n}\delta\right)$-DP, where $\varepsilon' = ln\left(1 + \frac{m}{n}(e^{\varepsilon} - 1)\right) \leq 2\frac{m}{n}\varepsilon$ if $\varepsilon \leq 1$

See proof

- **Implication:** A differentially private mechanism runs on a random subsample of a population provides **higher** privacy guarantees than when run on the entire population.
- **More data samples** (larger n), higher privacy
- **Less batch size** (smaller m), higher privacy

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Perturbing the gradient update of SGD to provide a privacy guarantee**

Vanilla SGD

- Initialize parameters $\theta^{(0)} \in \Theta$
- For $t = 0, \dots, T-1$:
  - Choose a sample $x_i \in \mathfrak{D}$ uniformly
  - Update gradient
    $\theta^{(t+1)} = \text{Proj}\left(\theta^{(t)} - \gamma \nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i)\right)$
- Return $\theta^{(T)}$

DP-SGD

- Initialize parameters $\theta^{(0)} \in \Theta$ **(independent of D)**
- **For $t = 0, \dots, T-1$:** → Advanced composition
  - **Choose a sample $x_i \in \mathfrak{D}$ uniformly** → Amplification by subsampling with batch size = 1
  - **Random noise $\eta^{(t)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ where**

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{16^2 L^2 T \ln\left(\frac{2}{\delta}\right) \ln\left(\frac{2.5T}{\delta n}\right)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}$$ → Gaussian mechanism

  - Update gradient
    $\theta^{(t+1)} = \text{Proj}\left(\theta^{(t)} - \gamma\left(\nabla \mathcal{L}\left(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i\right) - \eta^{(t)}\right)\right)$
- Return $\theta^{(T)}$

$\Rightarrow$ DP-SGD is (ϵ, δ)-DP

- where $\text{Proj}_\Theta(\theta) = \text{argmin}_{\theta' \in \Theta} ||\theta - \theta'||_2$ is the ℓ_2-projection operator onto Θ to avoid θ from deviating too much in each iteration and $\mathcal{L}(f, \theta, x)$ is L-Lipschitz.

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

DP-SGD

- Initialize parameters $\theta^{(0)} \in \Theta$
- **For $t = 0, \dots, T-1$:**
  - **Choose a sample $x_i \in \mathfrak{D}$ uniformly**
  - **Random noise $\eta^{(t)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ where**

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{16^2\, L^2 T \ln\left(\frac{2}{\delta}\right) \ln\left(\frac{2.5T}{\delta n}\right)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}$$

  - Update gradient

$$\theta^{(t+1)} = \text{Proj}\left(\theta^{(t)} - \gamma\left(\nabla\mathcal{L}\left(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i\right) - \eta^{(t)}\right)\right)$$

- Return $\theta^{(T)}$

Proof sketch

Gaussian Mechanism (GM)

- $\mathcal{L}$ is L-Lipschitz → $||\nabla\mathcal{L}\left(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i\right)|| \leq L$

→ **ℓ_2-sensitivity** of $\mathcal{L}$ is

$$\Delta_2 = \sup_{x, x'} ||\nabla\mathcal{L}\left(f, \theta^{(t)}, x\right) - \nabla\mathcal{L}\left(f, \theta^{(t)}, x\right)||_2 \leq 2L$$

- For $\Delta_2 = 2L$, $\sigma^2 = \frac{16^2\, L^2 T \ln\left(\frac{2}{\delta}\right) \ln\left(\frac{2.5T}{\delta n}\right)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}$, by GM

  each gradient update is $\left(\frac{n\varepsilon}{4\sqrt{2T\ln(2/\delta)}}, \frac{\delta n}{2T}\right)$-DP

Amplification by subsampling with batch size = 1

- Taking into account the randomness in the choice of x_i,

  each noisy gradient is in fact $\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2\sqrt{2T\ln(2/\delta)}}, \frac{\delta}{2T}\right)$-DP

By advanced composition of T DP mechanism

⇒ DP-SGD is (ϵ, δ)-DP

Reference

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Utility trade-off for privacy:**
  - There is no free lunch; privacy comes with a cost in utility (accuracy).



Figure 4: Accuracy of various (ε, δ) privacy values on the MNIST dataset. Each curve corresponds to a different δ value.

Could we bound this utility loss?

Yes, see this paper for more details

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Other extensions to DP-SGD**
  - **Mini-batch** and **regularized** version of DP-SGD: Similar analysis
  - **Non-differentiable loss:** if L is only sub-differentiable (e.g., hinge loss, ReLU), one can use a subgradient instead of the gradient
  - **Non-Lipschitz loss**: if the loss function is not Lipschitz, one can use gradient clipping before adding the noise, see paper.
  - One could get **tighter bounds** using moments accountant or Rényi DP.

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: Cloak

- Recall: the model's accuracy **decreases dramatically** when the model does not have access to **the most relevant information**
- **Intuition of Cloak:** Find **essential features based on perturbation**, and **suppress the rest of the features** to protect privacy by adding noise

Original image

Perturbed image

Query: is this person smiling?

Respone to 1: high accuracy ⇒ irrelevant feature
Respone to 2: low accuracy ⇒ important feature



Cloak: Noisy Representation

Original image x

0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0

μ of noise

1	1	1
1	0.2	1
1	0.01	1
1	0.01	1

σ of noise

Add noise $r \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ and suppress the image

Suppressed image $x + r$

Larger scale of σ indicates less importance of the feature

μ, σ: learnable parameters

Cloak: Loss Function

- **Loss function of Cloak:**

Privacy term: to maximize standard deviation of the noise

$$\mathcal{L} = -\log \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=0}^{n} \sigma_i^2 + \lambda \mathbb{E}_{r \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2),\, x \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[-\sum_{k=1}^{K} y_k \log \left(f_\theta (x + r) \right)_k \right]$$

Cross entropy loss: to minimize classification error

- n denotes the number of features; K is the number of classes; $\mathcal{D}$ is the traing set
- $y_k \in \{0,1\}$ denotes if the instance belongs to class k, f_θ is the target model
- x is the original input, $r \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ is the noise, $x + r$ is the noisy representation
- λ controls the accuracy-privacy trade-off

Cloak: Experimental Results

- **Target model: VGG-16**
- **Target detection class:**
  black hair, glasses, gender, smile
- **SR: suppression ratio**
  Higher SR, better privacy-preserving
- **AL: accuracy loss**
  Higher AL, worse model performance
- **Colored space:** essential features for the detection task

Privacy-preserving shifted representation (specific to target detection task)



In-context Learning and Privacy Risks

- **In-context Learning (ICL)** is an emergent ability of large language models to do downstream tasks by conditioning on several input-output examples.
  - In-context learning requires no weight update to learn knowledge from these examples.



In-context Learning and Privacy Risks

- **In-context Learning (ICL)** is an emergent ability of large language models to do downstream tasks by conditioning on several input-output examples.
  - In-context learning requires no weight update to learn knowledge from these examples.
- **Privacy risks of in-context learning** in high-stake domains:
  - **Prompt leaking attack:** A malicious user can use deliberately constructed prompts to reveal confidential information (e.g., health records) in exemplars.



How to protect individual information from these attacks?

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Idea**: adding noise to the output (ICLR'24)
  - **Subsampling examples** from the database multiple times to retrieve multiple answers.
  - **Apply private (noisy) aggregation** to the set of answers to produce a private answer.



Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Apply private (noisy) aggregation** to the set of answers to produce a private answer.
  - **For text classification tasks:** add a Gaussian noise to the output.



This is crucial because with access to logits, LLM can leak parameter information as well
Reference

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Apply private (noisy) aggregation** to the set of answers to produce a private answer.
  - **For text classification tasks:** add a Gaussian noise to the output.
  - **For generation tasks**: We consider several options:
    - Add Gaussian noise to the probability of output sequences.
      The number of possible output sequences is $|V|^n$, where $|V|$ is the vocab size and n is max sequence length.
      → exponentially large
    - Iteratively add Gaussian noise to the probability of each token's output during decoding process?





Drawbacks?

A little noise added in the first few tokens may change the decoding trajectory of the following trajectory significantly. Thus greatly affecting the privacy-utility tradeoff.

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Apply private (noisy) aggregation** to the set of answers to produce a private answer.
  - **For text classification tasks:** add a Gaussian noise to the output.
  - **For generation tasks**: Two alternative solutions: add noise in embedding or keyword spaces



Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Experiment Results:** an inherent trade-off between privacy and accuracy
  - **Text classification:** 4-shot examples, GPT-3 Babbage model, $\delta = 10^{-4}$.

Aggregation of 10 four-shots: run 4-shot 10 times and aggregate the result

Dataset	Model	$\varepsilon = 0$ (0-shot)	$\varepsilon = 1$	$\varepsilon = 3$	$\varepsilon = 8$	$\varepsilon = \infty$ (Agg)	$\varepsilon = \infty$
SST-2	Babbage	86.58	$91.97_{0.49}$	$92.83_{0.28}$	$92.90_{0.24}$	$92.87_{0.09}$	$91.89_{1.23}$
	Davinci	94.15	$95.11_{0.35}$	$95.80_{0.21}$	$95.83_{0.21}$	$95.73_{0.13}$	$95.49_{0.37}$
Amazon	Babbage	93.80	$93.83_{0.33}$	$94.10_{0.22}$	$94.12_{0.20}$	$94.10_{0.11}$	$93.58_{0.64}$
AGNews	Babbage	52.60	$75.49_{1.46}$	$81.00_{1.14}$	$81.86_{1.22}$	$82.22_{2.16}$	$68.77_{11.31}$
TREC	Babbage	23.00	$24.48_{3.58}$	$26.36_{5.19}$	$26.26_{5.61}$	$26.32_{5.33}$	$27.00_{7.72}$

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Another Idea**: Construct **synthesized** examples (Another paper in ICLR'24)
  - **Construct new synthesized few-shot examples** from the database with a trusted LLM.
  - Use new synthesized examples to do in-context learning with public (more powerful but may be untrusted) LLM.



Will be explained in the next slides

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Construct new synthesized few-shot examples** from the database via LLM.
  - (1) Get examples with a given label y, and generate one token at a time.
  - For each token,
    - (2) Sampling $M \times N$ examples, splitting to M queries, each query has N examples
    - (3) Use M queries propose the M next tokens
    - (4) Use noisy aggregation of M outputs to propose next token for the example $\tilde{z}$

Step	Generated Sample $\tilde{z}$
$t = 0$	$\tilde{z}$ = ""
$t = 1$	$\tilde{z}$ = "Kresge"
$t = 2$	$\tilde{z}$ = "Kresge College"
⋮	
$t = T$	$\tilde{z}$ = "Kresge College is one of the most …."



Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

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

Will be explained in the next slides

- **Privacy guarantee:** The proposed algorithm is (ϵ, δ)-differentially private.

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Robust against membership inference attacks (MIA)**
  - **The goal of the attack** is to determine if a given data point was used within the 1-shot prompt of the LLM.
  - Higher privacy leads to a lower success rate of MIA.

Table 15: Empirical privacy evaluation for 1-shot ICL by MIA on Babbage model.

ϵ	1	2	4	8	∞
AUC	50.56	50.58	50.55	50.53	81.84