

Yale

Differential Privacy

CPSC680: Trustworthy Deep Learning

Rex Ying

Content

- Introduction of Privacy
- Differential Privacy (DP)
- Differential Privacy in Deep Learning

Privacy – An Example

If the university asks you to take a survey if you have diabetes or not, **the result will be released to the public**, would you participate in this survey?



Privacy – An Example

If the university asks you to take a survey if you have diabetes or not, the result will be released to the public, would you participate in this survey?

Probably not



Privacy – An Example

If the university asks you to take a survey if you have diabetes or not, **the result will be released to the public**, would you participate in this survey?

- **What if** they only ask for your age, location, birthday, and diseases you got in the past, **no personally identifiable information**?



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- **What if** they only ask for your age, location, birthday, and diseases you got in the past, no personally identifiable information???
- Not my name, bank account, or identity card. **So it's safe???**



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- **What if** they only ask for your age, location, birthday, and diseases you got in the past, no personally identifiable information???
- Not my name, bank account, or identity card. **So it's safe???**



Not sure, why?




Linkage Attacks

- Connecting different datasets that seem to not relate to each other might reveal your identity.
- **The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC)** releases 135,000 records of patient encounters, each with 100 attributes.
 - Relevant attributes were removed, but **ZIP, birth date, and gender** were available.
 - It's usually considered as a “safe” practice.
- **Public voter registration record**
 - Contain, among others, name, address, **ZIP, birth date, and gender**

87 % of the US population is uniquely identifiable by 5-digit ZIP, gender, and Date of Birth

The adversary can query the database using your ZIP code, birth date, and gender to see if you have diabetes or not.

[See Article](#)



Privacy – An Example


- From the university's point of view

How can we provide a more rigorous guarantee to protect user's privacy?

- **Idea:** add random noise to users' answers

- We **flip a coin** for each answer to determine if we collect the true user's answer.
- If it's head, we record the user's true answer.
- If it's tail, we record a random answer (50/50 the user could either have diabetes or not).

How does this strategy prevent adversaries from accessing private information?



Privacy – An Example

- From the university's point of view

How can we provide a more rigorous guarantee to protect user's privacy?

- **Idea:** add random noise to users' answers

- **Do we still have meaningful statistics?**

- Yes, we can still know the true probability of people having diabetes


$$p_{T'} = \frac{1}{2}p_T + \frac{1}{4}$$

$$\Rightarrow p_T = 2p_{T'} - \frac{1}{2}$$

T

(noisy) probability of a person having diabetes according to the survey.

(true) probability of a person having diabetes.




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
Differential Privacy

- Cynthia Dwork (2006) proposes a formal definition of *individual* privacy:
 - **Intuition:** Any information-related risk to a person should not change due to that person's information being included or not in the analysis.




Differential Privacy

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Differential Privacy

- Cynthia Dwork (2006) proposes a formal definition of *individual* privacy:
 - **Intuition:** Any information-related risk to a person should not change **significantly** due to that person's information being included or not in the analysis.




ϵ – Differential Privacy

Definition [ϵ – Differential Privacy] For $\varepsilon \geq 0$, an algorithm \mathcal{A} is **ε -differentially private** if and only if for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D' that differ in only one element and any $C \in \text{range}(\mathcal{A})$:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^\varepsilon \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C], \quad \forall C$$

where $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C]$ denotes the probability that the algorithm \mathcal{A} outputs $c \in C$.

- **Derived differential privacy loss:** $\ln \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C]}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C]} \leq \varepsilon$.




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where $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C]$ denotes the probability that the algorithm \mathcal{A} outputs $c \in C$.

- **Implication on individual privacy:** Anything an adversary can do to you, it could do without your data.



ϵ –Differential Privacy

Definition [ϵ –Differential Privacy]

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C], \quad \forall C$$

Is there any drawback associated with this definition??

ϵ –Differential Privacy

Definition [ϵ –Differential Privacy]

$$0 = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C], \quad \forall C$$

Is there any drawback associated with this definition??

- If an ϵ –differentially private algorithm \mathcal{A} has probability zero at any output c for the dataset D' , i. e., $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') = c] = 0$,
 - then the algorithm \mathcal{A} has probability zero at c for every other dataset D .
- Too strong?


(ϵ, δ) –Differential Privacy

Definition (ϵ, δ) –Differential Privacy]

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C] + \delta, \quad \forall C$$

- **Solution:** We can relax this constraint by allowing an additive difference δ between two subsets of data, along with the multiplicative factor (e^ϵ).

- **Derived differential privacy loss:** $\ln \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] - \delta}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C]} \leq \epsilon.$



(ϵ, δ) –Differential Privacy

Definition (ϵ, δ) –Differential Privacy]


$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C] + \delta, \quad \forall C$$

- **Solution:** We can relax this constraint by allowing an additive difference δ between two subsets of data, along with the multiplicative factor (e^ϵ).
- **Derived differential privacy loss:** $\ln \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in C] - \delta}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D') \in C]} \leq \epsilon.$
- **Remarks:** Differential privacy is a **statistical property** of **algorithmic mechanisms**.
 - DP remains robust against auxiliary information (e.g., voting database in linkage attack example).
 - The guarantee of DP is independent of the computational capabilities of a potential adversary.

How can we inject differential privacy into an algorithm?

Design Differentially Private Algorithms

- **Idea (again):** add random noise to algorithm outputs.



- **How much noise is needed?**

- **Intuition:**

- Add **more noise** if \mathcal{A} is **more sensitive** to individual data (may contain more private information).
- Add **less noise** if \mathcal{A} is **less sensitive** to individual data.


Laplace Mechanism $\rightarrow \epsilon$ -DP

Definition (Global sensitivity): Global sensitivity of a function \mathcal{A} , denoted Δ , is

$$\Delta = \sup_{D, D': ||D - D'|| \leq 1} |\mathcal{A}(D) - \mathcal{A}(D')|$$

D, D' differ in only one element.


Theorem (Laplace Mechanism): Given a function \mathcal{A} , a dataset D and a fixed $\epsilon \geq 0$, the randomizing algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D) = \mathcal{A}(D) + Z$ satisfies ϵ -DP, where Z is a random variable from a **Laplace distribution**, i.e., $Z \sim \text{Lap}(0, \frac{\Delta}{\epsilon})$.



$$Z \sim \text{Lap}(x; \mu, b) = \frac{1}{2b} \exp\left(-\frac{|x - \mu|}{b}\right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}(|Z|) = b \quad \& \quad \Pr(|Z| \geq t \cdot b) = e^{-t}$$

Laplacian mechanism offering **0.5-differential privacy** for a function with **sensitivity (b) 1**.



Source: [wikipedia](#)

Gaussian Mechanism $\rightarrow (\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP

Definition (ℓ_2 -sensitivity): ℓ_2 -sensitivity of a function \mathcal{A} , denoted Δ_2 , is

$$\Delta_2 = \sup_{D, D': \|D - D'\| \leq 1} \|\mathcal{A}(D) - \mathcal{A}(D')\|_2$$


D, D' differ in only one element.

Theorem (Gaussian Mechanism): Given a function \mathcal{A} , a dataset D and a fixed $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$, the randomizing algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D) = \mathcal{A}(D) + Z$ satisfies (ϵ, δ) -DP, where Z is a random variable from a **Gaussian distribution**, i.e., $Z \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \frac{2\Delta_2^2 \ln(\frac{1.25}{\delta})}{\epsilon^2})$.

- Exponential mechanism is also commonly used in literature but will not be discussed in this lecture.

$$Z \sim \mathcal{N}(x; \mu, \sigma^2) = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{x - \mu}{\sigma}\right)^2\right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}(Z) = 0 \quad \& \quad \Pr(|Z| \geq t) \leq 2e^{-t^2/(2\sigma^2)}$$



Properties of Differential Privacy

Prop 1 (Sequential Composition): Let $\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2$ is an (ϵ_1, δ_1) -DP algorithm \mathcal{A}_1 followed by an (ϵ_2, δ_2) -DP algorithm \mathcal{A}_2 . Then $\mathcal{A}_1 + \mathcal{A}_2$ is $(\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2, \delta_1 + \delta_2)$ -DP.

- **Implication:** Differential privacy loss scales with the number of queries, *i.e.*, if we run an (ϵ, δ) -DP algorithm k times, the accumulated DP loss is $(k\epsilon, k\delta)$ -DP.
- If we *do not allow* any slack in δ , this bound cannot be tightened.

Properties of Differential Privacy

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- If we *do not allow* any slack in δ , this bound cannot be tightened.
If we *allow* a slack in the additive factor, we can get a higher privacy.

Prop 1.1 (Advanced Composition): For any $\epsilon > 0, \delta \in [0, 1], \tilde{\delta} \in (0, 1]$, an (ϵ, δ) -DP algorithm \mathcal{A} satisfies $(\tilde{\epsilon}, k\delta + \tilde{\delta})$ -DP under k -fold composition, where

$$\tilde{\epsilon} = k\epsilon(e^\epsilon - 1) + \epsilon \sqrt{2k \log(1/\delta)}$$

See [proof](#)

$$\approx O(k\epsilon^2 + \sqrt{k\epsilon^2}) \ll O(k\epsilon) \quad \text{if } \epsilon \ll 1$$

$$\approx O\left(k\epsilon^2 + \sqrt{k\epsilon^2 \log(1/\tilde{\delta})}\right)$$

Properties of Differential Privacy

Prop 2 (Parallel Composition): If \mathcal{A} is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private on datasets X . Then an algorithm releasing $\mathcal{A}(D_1), \mathcal{A}(D_2), \dots, \mathcal{A}(D_k)$ is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private if D_1, D_2, \dots, D_k are disjoint sets in X

- **Implication:** splitting your dataset into disjoint chunks and running a differentially private mechanism on each chunk separately does **not** increase your DP loss.

Prop 3 (Post-processing): If \mathcal{A} is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private, then for any (deterministic or randomized) function g , $g(\mathcal{A})$ satisfies (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy

- **Implication:** DP is independent of the adversary's power. In other words, it is impossible to reverse the privacy protection provided by differential privacy by post-processing the output in some way.



Further Readings

- **Most of the bounds** on the privacy cost we have seen so far are *upper bound* and they *sometimes* are very loose bounds.
- There are some variants of DP to enable tighter bounds on the privacy cost, especially for iterative algorithms, e.g., [Rényi differential privacy](#) and [Zero-concentrated differential privacy](#):

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
ML Model Are Not Safe



Membership Inference Attack (1)


- **Goal:** speculate whether a given data instance is part of the training dataset of a target model
- **Main idea:** train several **shadow models** that mimic the behavior of the target model. Then **use these shadow models to train a binary classifier** to **infer the membership** of the target model.

Blackbox setting




Membership Inference Attack (2)

- **Shadow Training Set:** has a **similar distribution** as the Private Training Set
- How to generate shadow training sets?
 - **Model-based synthesis:** records the data that are classified by the target model with high confidence
 - **Statistics-based synthesis:** the attacker knows some statistical information about the dataset
 - **Noisy real data:** the attacker has access to the noisy version of the real data



Membership Inference Attack (3)

- Use the **output probability vectors** from the shadow models to train the attack model (binary classifier)
- Shadow test set $D_{\text{shadow}_i}^{\text{test}}$ is **disjoint** from the shadow training set $D_{\text{shadow}_i}^{\text{train}}$
- $\mathbf{D}_{\text{attack}}$: training set for Attack Model
- $f_{\text{shadow}_i}(\cdot)$: the i -th shadow model
 - For $(x, y) \in D_{\text{shadow}_i}^{\text{train}}$, add $(y, f_{\text{shadow}_i}(x), \text{in})$ to $\mathbf{D}_{\text{attack}}$
 - For $(x, y) \in D_{\text{shadow}_i}^{\text{test}}$, add $(y, f_{\text{shadow}_i}(x), \text{out})$ to $\mathbf{D}_{\text{attack}}$



$$D_{\text{shadow}_i}^{\text{test}} \cap D_{\text{shadow}_i}^{\text{train}} = \emptyset$$

Attack Model: predict whether individual instances are in the private training set of the target model

Model Inversion and Attribute Inference

- **Goal:** infer sensitive attributes of a given data instance from the non-sensitive attributes of the instance and the target model
- **Main idea:** apply gradient descent on the input to maximize the logit of the target label
 - Example: given a person's name and access to a facial recognition system, the attacker recovers an averaged image that makes the person recognizable



Recovered image using
model inversion attack



True image in
the training set

Algorithm 1 Inversion attack for facial recognition models.


```
1: function MI-FACE(label,  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\lambda$ )
2:    $c(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 1 - \tilde{f}_{\text{label}}(\mathbf{x}) + \text{AUXTERM}(\mathbf{x})$ 
3:    $\mathbf{x}_0 \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$ 
4:   for  $i \leftarrow 1 \dots \alpha$  do
5:      $\mathbf{x}_i \leftarrow \text{PROCESS}(\mathbf{x}_{i-1} - \lambda \cdot \nabla c(\mathbf{x}_{i-1}))$ 
6:     if  $c(\mathbf{x}_i) \geq \max(c(\mathbf{x}_{i-1}), \dots, c(\mathbf{x}_{i-\beta}))$  then
7:       break
8:     if  $c(\mathbf{x}_i) \leq \gamma$  then
9:       break
10:    return  $[\arg \min_{\mathbf{x}_i} (c(\mathbf{x}_i)), \min_{\mathbf{x}_i} (c(\mathbf{x}_i))]$ 
```

Optimize x , such that $\tilde{f}_{\text{label}}(x) \rightarrow 1$

Limitations?


Model Extraction Attack

- **Model Extraction** reconstructs **an approximation model $\hat{f}(x)$** of the target model $f(x)$, including:
 - recover the **model parameters** via black-box access to the target model
 - find the **hyperparameters** used in the model training, e.g., number of layers, activation function, regularization coefficients, etc.



Example: Extraction of Logistic Regression

- Task: binary classification with logistic regression



Assume **x has n features**, then
model has **$n + 1$ unknown
parameters** (n for w and 1 for b)

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(w \cdot x + b)}}$$
$$\ln\left(\frac{f(x)}{1 - f(x)}\right) = w \cdot x + b$$




Linear equation with
 $n + 1$ unknowns

Query $n + 1$ predictions with random samples \Rightarrow solve a linear system of $n + 1$ equations


Differential Privacy in Machine Learning

- Differential Privacy is achieved by applying noise mechanisms to
 - **Input data**
 - **Training stage**
 - Objective perturbation
 - Gradient perturbation
 - **Inference stage**
 - Label perturbation
 - Output perturbation




Pipeline of Differential Privacy

Input perturbation: a type of Data Anonymization



Gradient Perturbation:



DP SGD: Clips the gradients to ensure that the gradient norms are bounded. Then **add noise to the gradients**



Label Perturbation:

Used in [teacher ensemble method \(PATE\)](#)

Add noise to the labels of the teacher models and aggregate labels to train a student model




Objective/output perturbation:

- Hard to calculate the sensitivity
- Use convex polynomial functions to approximate the target model

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-ERM

- **How to train** a differentially private model to mitigate membership inference attacks and model inversion attacks?
- **Naïve approach:** Differentially Private Empirical Risk Minimization (DP-ERP)
 1. Train an ML model to get optimal parameters $\theta^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta} \mathcal{L}(f, \theta, \mathcal{D})$.
 2. Add noise to the optimal parameters to perturb the model's output $\hat{\theta} = \theta^* + Y$, where Y is a Gaussian noise $Y \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$.

Private Dataset $\mathcal{D} = (X, y)$



Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-ERM

- **Privacy guarantee for DP-ERM:** Translated from Gaussian Mechanism

Gaussian Mechanism	DP-ERM
If <ul style="list-style-type: none">the algorithm \mathcal{A} is Δ_2-sensitive,the model $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D) = \mathcal{A}(D) + Z$ where $Z \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{2\Delta_2^2 \ln\left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right)}{\epsilon^2}\right)$.	If <ul style="list-style-type: none">the loss function $\mathcal{L}(f, \theta, \mathcal{D})$ is 1-Lipschitz,the model $f_{DP, \hat{\theta}}$, where $\hat{\theta} = \theta^* + Y$ where $Y \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{8\ln\left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}\right)$ where $n = \mathcal{D}$,
Then <ul style="list-style-type: none">Algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{DP}(D)$ satisfies (ϵ, δ)-DP.	Then <ul style="list-style-type: none">Training algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{f, \mathcal{L}}$ satisfies (ϵ, δ)-DP.

[See proof](#)


Definition (Lipschitz): A function f is **L -Lipschitz w.r.t.** a norm $|| \cdot ||$ if and if

$$|f(\theta) - f(\theta')| \leq L ||\theta - \theta'|| \quad \forall \theta, \theta' \in \Theta$$

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-ERM

- **Limitations**

- It requires restrictive assumptions on the loss function.
- The sensitivity is likely to be pessimistic as it treats ERM as a black box




Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent**

- The idea is to perturb only the quantities needed for the optimizer
→ Perturb the gradient instead of perturbing the optimal model parameters.
- Applying to Minibatch Stochastic Gradient Descent, which is already a randomized algorithm.

Private Dataset $D = (X, y)$



Amplification by Subsampling

- The following theorem suggests a privacy amplification via subsampling

Theorem (Amplification by subsampling): Let \mathcal{D} be a data domain and $\mathcal{S}: \mathcal{D}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^m$ be a procedure returning a random mini-batch of data points size m sampled uniformly without replacement from a dataset \mathcal{D} . Let \mathcal{A} be a (ε, δ) -DP algorithm. Then $\mathcal{A} \circ \mathcal{S}$ satisfies $(\varepsilon', \frac{m}{n}\delta)$ -DP, where $\varepsilon' = \ln\left(1 + \frac{m}{n}(e^\varepsilon - 1)\right) \leq 2\frac{m}{n}\varepsilon$ if $\varepsilon \leq 1$

[See proof](#)

- **Implication:** A differentially private mechanism runs on a random subsample of a population provides higher privacy guarantees than when run on the entire population.
- **More data samples** (larger n), higher privacy
- **Less batch size** (smaller m), higher privacy

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- Perturbing the gradient update of SGD to provide a privacy guarantee

Vanilla SGD

- Initialize parameters $\theta^{(0)} \in \Theta$
- For $t = 0, \dots, T - 1$:
 - Choose a sample $x_i \in \mathcal{D}$ uniformly
 - Update gradient
$$\theta^{(t+1)} = \text{Proj}\left(\theta^{(t)} - \gamma \nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i)\right)$$
- Return $\theta^{(T)}$

DP-SGD

- Initialize parameters $\theta^{(0)} \in \Theta$ (independent of D)
 - For $t = 0, \dots, T - 1$:
 - Choose a sample $x_i \in \mathcal{D}$ uniformly
 - Random noise $\eta^{(t)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ where
$$\sigma^2 = \frac{16^2 L^2 T \ln\left(\frac{2}{\delta}\right) \ln\left(\frac{2.5T}{\delta n}\right)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}$$
 - Update gradient
$$\theta^{(t+1)} = \text{Proj}\left(\theta^{(t)} - \gamma (\nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i) - \eta^{(t)})\right)$$
 - Return $\theta^{(T)}$
- $\Rightarrow \text{DP-SGD is } (\epsilon, \delta)\text{-DP}$

- where $\text{Proj}_{\Theta}(\theta) = \underset{\theta' \in \Theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} \|\theta - \theta'\|_2$ is the ℓ_2 -projection operator onto Θ to avoid θ from deviating too much in each iteration and $\mathcal{L}(f, \theta, x)$ is L -Lipschitz.

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

DP-SGD

- Initialize parameters $\theta^{(0)} \in \Theta$
- For $t = 0, \dots, T - 1$:
 - Choose a sample $x_i \in \mathcal{D}$ uniformly
 - Random noise $\eta^{(t)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ where
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$$\theta^{(t+1)} = \text{Proj}\left(\theta^{(t)} - \gamma(\nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i) - \eta^{(t)})\right)$$
- Return $\theta^{(T)}$

Proof sketch

Gaussian Mechanism (GM)

- \mathcal{L} is L-Lipschitz $\rightarrow \|\nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x_i)\| \leq L$
 $\rightarrow \ell_2$ -sensitivity of \mathcal{L} is
$$\Delta_2 = \sup_{x, x'} \|\nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x) - \nabla \mathcal{L}(f, \theta^{(t)}, x')\|_2 \leq 2L$$
- For $\Delta_2 = 2L$, $\sigma^2 = \frac{16^2 L^2 T \ln\left(\frac{2}{\delta}\right) \ln\left(\frac{2.5T}{\delta n}\right)}{n^2 \epsilon^2}$, by GM
each gradient update is $\left(\frac{n\epsilon}{4\sqrt{2T \ln(2/\delta)}}, \frac{\delta n}{2T}\right)$ -DP

Amplification by subsampling with batch size = 1

- Taking into account the randomness in the choice of x_i ,
each noisy gradient is in fact $\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\sqrt{2T \ln(2/\delta)}}, \frac{\delta}{2T}\right)$ -DP

By advanced composition of T DP mechanism

\Rightarrow DP-SGD is (ϵ, δ) -DP

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Utility trade-off for privacy:**

- There is no free lunch; privacy comes with a cost in utility (accuracy).




Figure 4: Accuracy of various (ε, δ) privacy values on the MNIST dataset. Each curve corresponds to a different δ value.

Could we bound this utility loss?

Yes, see this [paper](#) for more details

Differential Privacy at Training Stage: DP-SGD

- **Other extensions to DP-SGD**

- Mini-batch and **regularized** version of DP-SGD: Similar analysis
- **Non-differentiable loss:** if L is only sub-differentiable (e.g., hinge loss, ReLU), one can use a subgradient instead of the gradient
- **Non-Lipschitz loss:** if the loss function is not Lipschitz, one can use gradient clipping before adding the noise, see [paper](#).
- One could get **tighter bounds** using [moments accountant](#) or [Rényi DP](#).

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: Cloak

- Recall: the model's accuracy **decreases dramatically** when the model does not have access to **the most relevant information**
- **Intuition of Cloak:** Find **essential features based on perturbation**, and **suppress the rest of the features** to protect privacy by adding noise



Original image




Perturbed image

Query: is this person smiling?



Response to 1: high accuracy \Rightarrow irrelevant feature
Response to 2: low accuracy \Rightarrow important feature



Cloak: Noisy Representation



Original image x

0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0

μ of noise

1	1	1
1	0.2	1
1	0.01	1
1	0.01	1

σ of noise

Add noise $r \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$
and suppress the image



Suppressed image $x + r$

Larger scale of
 σ indicates less
importance of
the feature

μ, σ : learnable parameters

Cloak: Loss Function

- **Loss function of Cloak:**

Privacy term: to maximize standard deviation of the noise

$$\mathcal{L} = -\log \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=0}^n \sigma_i^2 + \lambda \mathbb{E}_{r \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2), x \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[-\sum_{k=1}^K y_k \log(f_\theta(x + r))_k \right]$$


Cross entropy loss: to minimize classification error

- n denotes the number of features; K is the number of classes; \mathcal{D} is the training set
- $y_k \in \{0,1\}$ denotes if the instance belongs to class k , f_θ is the target model
- x is the original input, $r \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ is the noise, $x + r$ is the noisy representation
- λ controls the accuracy-privacy trade-off

Cloak: Experimental Results

- **Target model:** VGG-16
- **Target detection class:** black hair, glasses, gender, smile
- **SR: suppression ratio**
Higher SR, better privacy-preserving
- **AL: accuracy loss**
Higher AL, worse model performance
- **Colored space:** essential features for the detection task

Privacy-preserving shifted representation (specific to target detection task)



In-context Learning and Privacy Risks

- **In-context Learning (ICL)** is an emergent ability of large language models to do downstream tasks by conditioning on several input-output examples.
 - In-context learning requires no weight update to learn knowledge from these examples.

Demonstrations

Circulation revenue has increased by 5% in Finland. \n Positive

Panostaja did not disclose the purchase price. \n Neutral

Paying off the national debt will be extremely painful. \n Negative

The acquisition will have an immediate positive impact. \n _____

Test input




Prediction

Positive

In-context Learning and Privacy Risks


- **In-context Learning (ICL)** is an emergent ability of large language models to do downstream tasks by conditioning on several input-output examples.
 - In-context learning requires no weight update to learn knowledge from these examples.
- **Privacy risks of in-context learning** in high-stake domains:
 - **Prompt leaking attack:** A malicious user can use deliberately constructed prompts to reveal confidential information (e.g., health records) in exemplars.

How to protect individual information from these attacks?




Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Idea:** adding noise to the output ([ICLR'24](#))
 - **Subsampling examples** from the database multiple times to retrieve multiple answers.
 - **Apply private (noisy) aggregation** to the set of answers to produce a private answer.



Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- Apply private (noisy) aggregation to the set of answers to produce a private answer.
 - For text classification tasks: add a Gaussian noise to the output.



Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- Apply private (noisy) aggregation to the set of answers to produce a private answer.



- For text classification tasks: add a Gaussian noise to the output.

- For generation tasks: We consider several options:

- Add Gaussian noise to the probability of output sequences.

The number of possible output sequences is $|V|^n$, where $|V|$ is the vocab size and n is max sequence length.
→ exponentially large

- Iteratively add Gaussian noise to the probability of each token's output during decoding process?





Drawbacks?

A little noise added in the first few tokens may change the decoding trajectory of the following trajectory significantly. Thus greatly affecting the privacy-utility tradeoff.

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Apply private (noisy) aggregation** to the set of answers to produce a private answer.
 - **For text classification tasks:** add a Gaussian noise to the output.
 - **For generation tasks:** Two alternative solutions: add noise in embedding or keyword spaces




Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Experiment Results:** an inherent trade-off between privacy and accuracy
 - **Text classification:** 4-shot examples, GPT-3 Babbage model

Dataset	Model	$\varepsilon = 0$ (0-shot)	$\varepsilon = 1$	$\varepsilon = 3$	$\varepsilon = 8$	$\varepsilon = \infty$ (Agg)	$\varepsilon = \infty$
SST-2	Babbage	86.58	$91.97_{0.49}$	$92.83_{0.28}$	$92.90_{0.24}$	$92.87_{0.09}$	$91.89_{1.23}$
	Davinci	94.15	$95.11_{0.35}$	$95.80_{0.21}$	$95.83_{0.21}$	$95.73_{0.13}$	$95.49_{0.37}$
Amazon	Babbage	93.80	$93.83_{0.33}$	$94.10_{0.22}$	$94.12_{0.20}$	$94.10_{0.11}$	$93.58_{0.64}$
AGNews	Babbage	52.60	$75.49_{1.46}$	$81.00_{1.14}$	$81.86_{1.22}$	$82.22_{2.16}$	$68.77_{11.31}$
TREC	Babbage	23.00	$24.48_{3.58}$	$26.36_{5.19}$	$26.26_{5.61}$	$26.32_{5.33}$	$27.00_{7.72}$


Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Another Idea:** Construct private examples ([Another paper](#) in ICLR'24)
 - **Construct new private few-shot examples** from the database.
 - Use new private examples to do in-context learning.




Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Construct new private few-shot examples** from the database via LLM.
 - (1) Get examples with a given label y , and generate one token at a time.
 - For each token,
 - (2) Sampling $M \times N$ examples, splitting to M queries, each query has N examples
 - (3) Use M queries propose the M next tokens
 - (4) Use noisy aggregation of M outputs to propose next token for the example \tilde{z}



Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Another Idea:** Construct private examples (Another paper in ICLR'24)
 - **Construct new private few-shot examples** from the database.
 - Use new private examples to do in-context learning.



- **Privacy guarantee:** The proposed algorithm is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private.

Differential Privacy at Inference Stage: DP-ICL

- **Robust against membership inference attacks (MIA)**
 - **The goal of the attack** is to determine if a given data point was used within the 1-shot prompt of the LLM.
 - Higher privacy leads to a lower success rate of MIA.

Table 15: Empirical privacy evaluation for 1-shot ICL by MIA on Babbage model.

ϵ	1	2	4	8	∞
AUC	50.56	50.58	50.55	50.53	81.84