

Assignment 6

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Exercise 1

Let $p = 41$ and $q = 17$ be the primes used in RSA key generation.

- Which of the candidates $e_1 = 5$ and $e_2 = 19$ is a valid RSA public exponent?
- Compute the private key exponent d using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.

Solution

$$n = pq = 41 \cdot 17 = 697$$

$$\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 40 \cdot 16 = 640$$

A valid public exponent e must satisfy $\gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1$.

Check $e_1 = 5$:

$$\gcd(5, 640) = 5 \neq 1$$

So e_1 has no inverse modulo $\varphi(n)$ and is **not valid**.

Check $e_2 = 19$:

$$640 = 19 \cdot 33 + 13, \quad 19 = 13 \cdot 1 + 6, \quad 13 = 6 \cdot 2 + 1$$

Thus $\gcd(19, 640) = 1$, so $e_2 = 19$ is **valid**.

We now compute $d \equiv 19^{-1} \pmod{640}$.

From:

$$1 = 13 - 6 \cdot 2$$

and $6 = 19 - 13$:

$$1 = 13 - 2(19 - 13) = 3 \cdot 13 - 2 \cdot 19$$

and $13 = 640 - 19 \cdot 33$:

$$1 = 3(640 - 19 \cdot 33) - 2 \cdot 19 = 3 \cdot 640 - 19(99 + 2) = 3 \cdot 640 - 101 \cdot 19$$

Hence:

$$-101 \cdot 19 \equiv 1 \pmod{640}$$

So:

$$d \equiv -101 \equiv 640 - 101 = 539 \pmod{640}$$

$$\boxed{e = 19, \quad d = 539}$$

Exercise 2

Compute the following modular exponentiations $m^e \pmod{n}$ by hand using the *square-and-multiply* algorithm:

- $m = 2, e = 31, n = 101$
- $m = 3, e = 97, n = 101$

Solution

$$2^{31} \pmod{101}$$

We have $31 = (11111)_2$. Applying square-and-multiply yields:

$$2^{31} \equiv 34 \pmod{101}$$

$$\boxed{2^{31} \pmod{101} = 34}$$

$$3^{97} \pmod{101}$$

We have $97 = (1100001)_2$. Applying square-and-multiply yields:

$$3^{97} \equiv 15 \pmod{101}$$

$$\boxed{3^{97} \pmod{101} = 15}$$

Exercise 3

Using RSA, encrypt and decrypt with the given parameters:

- $p = 3, q = 11, d = 7, m = 4$
- $p = 5, q = 11, e = 3, m = 20$

Solution

Case 1: $p = 3, q = 11, d = 7, m = 4$

$$n = pq = 3 \cdot 11 = 33$$

$$\varphi(n) = (3 - 1)(11 - 1) = 2 \cdot 10 = 20$$

We need e such that:

$$ed \equiv 1 \pmod{20}$$

With $d = 7$, we solve:

$$7e \equiv 1 \pmod{20}$$

Using EEA:

$$20 = 7 \cdot 2 + 6, \quad 7 = 6 \cdot 1 + 1$$

Back-substitution:

$$1 = 7 - 6 = 7 - (20 - 7 \cdot 2) = 3 \cdot 7 - 20$$

So:

$$e = 3$$

Encryption:

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{n} = 4^3 \pmod{33} = 64 \pmod{33} = 31$$

$$c = 31$$

Decryption (given result):

$$m = 4$$

Case 2: $p = 5, q = 11, e = 3, m = 20$

$$n = pq = 5 \cdot 11 = 55, \quad \varphi(n) = (4)(10) = 40$$

Encryption:

$$c \equiv 20^3 \pmod{55} = 8000 \pmod{55}$$

$$8000 = 55 \cdot 145 + 25 \Rightarrow c = 25$$

$$c = 25$$

Decryption (given result):

$$m = 20$$

Exercise 4

RSA parameters:

$$p = 31, \quad q = 37, \quad e = 17$$

Decrypt $c = 2$ using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and verify by encrypting the plaintext (without CRT).

Solution

$$n = pq = 31 \cdot 37 = 1147$$

$$\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 30 \cdot 36 = 1080$$

We compute $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{1080}$.

EEA:

$$1080 = 17 \cdot 63 + 9, \quad 17 = 9 \cdot 1 + 8, \quad 9 = 8 \cdot 1 + 1$$

Back-substitution:

$$1 = 9 - 8, \quad 8 = 17 - 9 \Rightarrow 1 = 9 - (17 - 9) = 2 \cdot 9 - 17$$

$$9 = 1080 - 17 \cdot 63 \Rightarrow 1 = 2(1080 - 17 \cdot 63) - 17 = 2 \cdot 1080 - 17 \cdot 127$$

Thus:

$$d \equiv -127 \equiv 1080 - 127 = 953 \pmod{1080}$$

$$d = 953$$

CRT exponents:

$$d_p = d \pmod{p-1} = 953 \pmod{30} = 23$$

$$d_q = d \pmod{q-1} = 953 \pmod{36} = 17$$

Compute:

$$m_p = c^{d_p} \pmod{p} = 2^{23} \pmod{31} = 8$$

$$m_q = c^{d_q} \pmod{q} = 2^{17} \pmod{37} = 18$$

Compute inverses:

$$t_p \equiv q^{-1} \pmod{p} \Rightarrow 37 \equiv 6 \pmod{31}$$

Inverse of 6 mod 31 is 26 (since $6 \cdot 26 = 156 \equiv 1 \pmod{31}$), so:

$$t_p = 26$$

$$t_q \equiv p^{-1} \pmod{q} \Rightarrow 31^{-1} \pmod{37} = 6$$

Combine:

$$m \equiv qt_p m_p + pt_q m_q \pmod{n}$$

$$m \equiv 37 \cdot 26 \cdot 8 + 31 \cdot 6 \cdot 18 \pmod{1147}$$

$$= 7696 + 3348 = 11044$$

$$11044 \pmod{1147} = 721$$

$$m = 721$$

Verification (no CRT)

Compute:

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{n} = 721^{17} \pmod{1147}$$

This evaluates to:

$$\boxed{c = 2}$$

so the decryption is correct.

Exercise 5

Implement the RSA Activity (define and call the functions as described).

Solution

Implementation shown via provided code:

Exercise 6

Design a simple RSA-based protocol that allows Alice and Bob to agree on a shared secret session key over an insecure channel. Who determines the session key: Alice, Bob, or both?

Solution

Let Bob have RSA public key (n, e) and private key d .

1. Alice generates a random session key K such that $K < n$.
2. Alice encrypts it with Bob's public key:

$$C \equiv K^e \pmod{n}$$

and sends C to Bob.

3. Bob decrypts using his private key:

$$K \equiv C^d \pmod{n}$$

Now both share the same K . In this protocol, **Alice determines** the session key and Bob only receives it.

Exercise 7

Suppose in RSA an adversary discovers a non-zero message m that is *not* relatively prime to $n = pq$. Prove the adversary can factor n and thus break RSA. If m is chosen uniformly at random, what is the probability that m is not relatively prime to n ?

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[74]: # Key generation
def keygen(bits):
    a=next_prime(ZZ.random_element(2^(bits//2 +1)))
    b=next_prime(ZZ.random_element(2^(bits//2 +1)))
    n=a*b
    phi_n = (a-1)*(b-1)
    while True:
        e = ZZ.random_element(1,phi_n)
        if gcd(e,phi_n) == 1:
            break
    d = inverse_mod(e,phi_n)
    return n,e,d

[75]: # Code and Decode
def str2num(s):
    x = map(ord,s)
    return ZZ(list(x), 128)
def num2str(n):
    dgs = n.digits(128)
    return ''.join(map(chr,dgs))

[76]: # Encryption and Decryption
def rsa_enc(m,e,n):
    messageCoded = str2num(m)
    ciphertextCoded = lift(Mod(messageCoded,n)^e)
    return num2str(ciphertextCoded)
def rsa_dec(c,d,n):
    cipherCoded = str2num(c)
    decryptedMsgCoded = lift(Mod(cipherCoded,n)^d)
    return num2str(decryptedMsgCoded)

[77]: # Call for key generation
n, e, d = keygen(1024)
```

Figure 1:

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[78]: # Call for encryption
message='Meeting at dawn behind the school'
ciphertext=rsa_enc(message,e,n)
print (ciphertext)

Q$t@)/aC@($CI'@y@G1MvOUD_m@*%_]kL
|@>vwG@K@6:@@0],xWE3<@76@ga@P@4\          @v.U@g&Z!q`@3+F@^@{uJ&  U#w5T#Bi@'P@?]-nK]@(%ao@,@@

[79]: # Call for decryption
decryptedMsg=rsa_dec(ciphertext,d,n)
print (decryptedMsg)

Meeting at dawn behind the school
```

Figure 2:

Solution

If:

$$g = \gcd(m, n), \quad 1 < g < n,$$

then g is a non-trivial divisor of n . Hence:

$$n = g \cdot \frac{n}{g},$$

and both factors are integers greater than 1. Therefore n is factored.

Once p and q are known, the adversary can compute:

$$\varphi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1),$$

and then recover d from e by solving:

$$ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)},$$

thus fully breaking RSA.

Probability

Among $\{1, 2, \dots, n - 1\}$, the values not coprime to $n = pq$ are those divisible by p or by q .

Count multiples of p :

$$\left\lfloor \frac{n-1}{p} \right\rfloor = q - 1$$

Count multiples of q :

$$\left\lfloor \frac{n-1}{q} \right\rfloor = p - 1$$

Total:

$$(q - 1) + (p - 1) = p + q - 2$$

Thus:

$$\Pr(\gcd(m, n) \neq 1) = \frac{p + q - 2}{n - 1}.$$

For large primes, this probability is extremely small.