

Assignment 4

Konstantinos Filippou
ics23044

Exercise 1

Let p be a large prime such that $2^{159} < p < 2^{160}$ and

$$K = M = C = \{1, 2, \dots, p - 1\}.$$

Alice and Bob choose a random key $k \in K$ and define:

$$\begin{aligned} e_k(m) &= km \pmod{p} \\ d_k(c) &= k^{-1}c \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

where k^{-1} is the inverse of k modulo p .

Properties

The algorithm satisfies:

- Efficient encryption: multiplication modulo p is efficient.
- Efficient decryption: the inverse k^{-1} can be computed using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.

Security Against COA

The scheme is **not secure** under a Ciphertext-Only Attack (COA).

Given two ciphertexts:

$$c_1 = km_1 \pmod{p}, \quad c_2 = km_2 \pmod{p},$$

we have:

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} \equiv \frac{m_2}{m_1} \pmod{p}.$$

This reveals information about plaintext ratios.

Security Against KPA

The scheme is **not secure** under a Known Plaintext Attack (KPA).

Given one pair (m, c) :

$$c \equiv km \pmod{p}$$

$$k \equiv cm^{-1} \pmod{p}$$

Thus the key is recovered immediately.

Without Modulo Reduction

If encryption is defined as:

$$e_k(m) = km$$

without reduction modulo p , then:

$$k = \frac{c}{m}$$

The scheme becomes even more insecure.

Exercise 2

Using Pohlig–Hellman with:

$$p = 2633, \quad e = 9$$

encrypt and decrypt the message:

”The gold is hidden in the garden!”

Solution

Since encryption is:

$$c = m^e \pmod{p},$$

and p is small relative to the message, block encoding is required.

Because $p = 2633$, only single-character blocks fit:

block size = 1.

Thus encryption and decryption are applied character-by-character.

```

def encrypt_message_block(message, e, p, block_size):
    blocks = []
    for i in range(0, len(message), block_size):
        block = message[i:i+block_size]
        m_block = str2num(block)
        if m_block >= p:
            raise ValueError(f"Block '{block}' έχει μεγάλο για p={p}")
        c_block = PH_enc(m_block, e, p)
        blocks.append(c_block)
    return blocks

def decrypt_message_block(blocks, d, p):
    message_parts = []
    for c_block in blocks:
        m_block = PH_dec(c_block, d, p)
        block_msg = num2str(m_block)
        message_parts.append(block_msg)
    return ''.join(message_parts)

p = 2033
e = 9
d = inverse_mod(e, p-1)
print("Public key: (", e, ", ", p, ")")
print("Private key: (", d, ", ", p, ")")

message = "The gold is hidden in the garden!"
blocks = encrypt_message_blocks(message, e, p, block_size=1)
print(blocks)
blocks = decrypt_message_blocks(blocks, d, p)
decrypted_msg = decrypt_message_block(blocks[0], d, p)
print("Decrypted msg: ", decrypted_msg)

blocks = encrypt_message_blocks(message, e, p, block_size=1)
blocks[0] = 1172
print(blocks)
decrypted_msg = decrypt_message_blocks(blocks, d, p)
print("Decrypted msg: ", decrypted_msg)

blocks = encrypt_message_blocks(message, e, p, block_size=1)
blocks[0] = 1172, 556, 2388, 2865, 592, 2853, 345
print(blocks)
decrypted_msg = decrypt_message_blocks(blocks, d, p)
print("Decrypted msg: ", decrypted_msg)

Anaparoxosymptwsi: ~ % The gold is hidden in the garden!
[1172, 556, 2388, 2865, 592, 2853, 345]
[1172, 556, 2388, 2865, 592, 2853, 345]
Decrypted msg:  The gold is hidden in the garden!

```

Figure 1: Enter Caption

Exercise 3

Given:

p = 29

Ciphertext:

04 19 19 11 04 24 09 15 15

and known that:

$24 \leftrightarrow U(20)$

Encoding:

$$A = 00, \dots, Z = 25$$

Finding e

We solve:

$$20^e \equiv 24 \pmod{29}$$

Compute powers:

$$20^1 \equiv 20$$

$$20^2 \equiv 23$$

$$20^3 \equiv 25$$

$$20^4 \equiv 7$$

$$20^5 \equiv 24$$

Thus:

$$e = 5$$

Finding d

$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{28}$$

$$5^{-1} \equiv 17 \pmod{28}$$

Decrypting

$$m = c^7 \pmod{29}$$

Results:

$$04 \rightarrow 6 \rightarrow G$$

$$19 \rightarrow 14 \rightarrow O$$

$$19 \rightarrow 14 \rightarrow O$$

$$11 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow D$$

$$04 \rightarrow 6 \rightarrow G$$

$$24 \rightarrow 20 \rightarrow U$$

$$09 \rightarrow 4 \rightarrow E$$

$$15 \rightarrow 18 \rightarrow S$$

$$15 \rightarrow 18 \rightarrow S$$

Plaintext:

GOOD GUESS

Exercise 4

A weakness of Pohlig–Hellman is that the plaintext m may not be a generator modulo p , and may have small order.

For example, in \mathbb{Z}_{5003} :

$$m = 1$$

Then:

$$c = 1^e \equiv 1$$

The discrete logarithm problem becomes trivial.

```

p = 5003 #2503
n = 17 #secret space pc 5002
d = inverse_mod(e, p-1)

# Av = c*x(k) mod k, totc: n*k + 1 mod p
# Apw c = n*v = n*(c mod k) mod p

# Papc: n = 1 (col[n] 1)
e = 1
c1 = pow(d, e, p)
print("n = 1 (col[n] 1)")
print("c = 1*n mod p = (%d)" % (c1))
print("n*x(k), n, c = 1 => Eoakko DLPI")

n = 1 (col[n] 1)
c = 1*n mod p = (c1)
n*x(k), n, c = 1 => Eoakko DLPI

```

Figure 2: Enter Caption

Exercise 5

We define:

- PH(bits)
- PH_enc(m,e,p)
- PH_dec(c,d,p)
- str2num(s)
- num2str(n)

Example plaintext:

”Hello there!”

Converted to integer:

5107117560890101249815240

Encryption and decryption return:

Hello there!

Thus correctness is verified.