
### Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade

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## **Quantitative Restrictions: Import Quota**

- An import quota puts a physical restriction on the volume of imports of a country.
- Under perfect competition, similar effects like an import tariff.
- With quota domestic consumers cannot buy foreign goods more than what is permitted by quota regardless of how high price they pay.



**Quota on Imports of Computers** 

## Scarcity Rent

- Quota effectively taxes the consumers.
- The implicit tax or tariff rate is the rate by which the domestic price exceeds the world price.

$$tq = (\widetilde{p} - \rho^W)/p^W$$

• Scarcity rent under quota given by the rectangular area  $p^{W} \tilde{p}e'd$ 

## Distribution of Scarcity Rent

- Home country government can extract rents from importers by auctioning import licenses so that scarcity rent now goes to government.
- Otherwise, licenses are given away on a first-cum-firstserve basis or through a lottery in which case scarcity rent accrues to the importers who obtain the import licenses.

### The Economic Costs of Quota

- Production losses: quota encourages inefficient domestic producers to produce more computers;
- Consumption losses: Home consumers have to pay higher price.
- area e'de is the DWL
  - whether licenses are auctioned off or not, in both cases scarcity rent accrues to economic agents within Home country, the government or importers.
- But if foreign supply is a monopolized, entire scarcity rent can be extracted from Home importers so that scarcity rent also constitutes a DWL.
- Additional loss: wasteful lobbying activities of potential license holders.


## Equivalence of Quota and Tariff

• The *price-equivalence* theorem by Jagdish Bhagwati: the economic effects of quota and tariff are same.

If a quota allowing a particular level of imports is replaced by an equal-import tariff (tariff generating same volume of imports), domestic price will be larger than world price by the same percentage point in both the cases.

- Only difference: tariff generates tariff revenue whereas import quota generates scarcity rent for import license holders.
- Part of this rent may be extracted by the government.

Home Imports



**Tariff, Quota and TOT** 

- With  $\overline{M}$  quota offer curve is OQ  $\overline{M}$
- Home import and export fall leading to TOT improvement for HC.
- If quota is replaced by equal-import tariff, tariff rate must be such that new offer curve is OH', new equilibrium Eq.

#### Comments

• Price-equivalence may not imply *welfare equivalence* of quota and tariff

quota may cause larger economic losses if scarcity rent accrues to foreign supplier and when rent-seekers are engaged in wasteful lobbying activities.

• Price-equivalence extends to TOT effect: Similar to tariff, quota has both TOT effect (for large country) and VOT effect.

## Import Restrictions through licenses in India

- In India import licensing was observed for almost all the imported goods.
- Goods were divided into banned, restricted, limited permissible, and subject to open general licensing (OGL).
- The OGL category was the most liberal. In 1987-88, OGL covered only 30 percent of imports.


## Tariffication of QRs in India

- Important policy shift initiated in India in 1985: QRs were replaced by tariff, but not by equal-import tariff criterion (higher in many cases).
- Tariffication of QRs: In April 2001 as part of the structural adjustment programmes, the QRs on most of the goods including consumer goods were replaced by equivalent tariffs.

## **Export Subsidy**

- Payment made to an exporter for its sales abroad, over and above the price the exporter gets in a Foreign country.
- Export subsidy makes sales abroad more *profitable* so export rises which creates excess demand in domestic market and domestic price of export good rises.
- Exporters export up to the volume for which domestic price exceeds the price abroad by per unit amount of the subsidy.

#### Welfare Implications: Both Large & Small Country



#### **Ad-Valorem Subsidy on Textiles Exports**

- Welfare loss: fall in CS by area acgh, rise in PS by area adfh, but subsidy given is a loss by area gbef.
- Deadweight loss: *area* (*bcg*+ *edf*)

# Welfare Implications: Only for Large Country

Welfare loss for both small & large countries

Additional loss: TOT deterioration

Export subsidy raises export offer creating excess supply in world market for textiles, and lowers its relative price worsening TOT.

• In a perfectly competitive world export subsidy lowers welfare of a country, irrespective of *small* or *large*.

## **Export Subsidy: Reality**

- In oligopoly market, national governments have strategic incentives to provide export subsidy.
- Agricultural and dairy products are provided export subsidies.
- Export Enhancement Program (EEP) in US covering products like wheat, rice, frozen poultry, frozen pork, barley, vegetable oil and the like.
- East Asian countries provide export subsidies mostly on cotton.
- Indirect export subsidy schemes like duty drawback on imported raw materials and inputs for export production in the 18<sup>th</sup> century UK and during 1970s and 1980s in India.

## WTO Rules on Subsidy

- *Prohibited* subsidies: directly linked to exports;
- *Actionable* subsidies: not directly linked to exports but still have an impact on exports;
- *Non-actionable* subsidies: assistance to disadvantaged regions and meeting environmental regulation.

## Reaction of the Importing Country

- Impose *countervailing duty* against subsidized exports which brings a loss to the exporting country but world as a whole gains.
- So a combination of export subsidy and an equal countervailing duty leaves world welfare unchanged.

## Voluntary Export Restraints (VER)

- Export quotas *negotiated* by an importing country with its trading partners.
- If negotiation is successful the trading partner, that is, the exporting country *voluntarily* restricts its exports.
- Example: United States successfully negotiated VER with Japan restricting exports of Japanese automobiles to United States during mid 1980s.
- VER worsens TOT for importing country and thereby shifts scarcity rent from importing to exporting country.

Thus, VER *may* improve welfare of large exporting country if it is not too restrictive.

This explains why VERs may be *voluntary*.

#### **VER versus Quota**

- When there is more than one source of supply of a country's imports, then an import quota imposed by the country may be more restrictive and protective than a VER if the country is not being able to negotiate VER with all its trading partners.
- VER is often source-specific and discriminatory whereas quota is global and non-discriminatory though more restrictive.
- DWL under VER is larger than DWL under an equal-import quota for importing country.

#### Other Non-tariff Barriers (NTB) to Trade

• Quality standards, environmental regulations, technical barriers to trade (TBT), local content requirement related to the nature and standards of imported goods.

Thank you