

Example

Recap of Theory

- Each individual (trader) starts with some initial endowments (bundle of goods)
- Market \rightarrow buy and sell
- Someone announces the prices (Walras' Law)
- You trade such that: value of sales = value of purchase
- Value of bundle consumed equals value of bundle started with

Recap of Theory

- Total consumption limited by initial endowment
- That is, for each good total ss equals total dd (*non-wasteful*)
- Prices are everything
- Suppose at that initial price total ss of good $i >$ total dd; then price of good i falls and new prices set in
- Final (market clearing) prices ensure eqm allocation of goods

Walrasian Equilibrium

- Each person buying the best bundle that he can afford and all individual decisions are consistent
- If market does not clear, prices adjust until $d = s$
- Once eqm reached, no incentive to deviate


Example

- Two individuals i (1 and 2); two goods j (apples and grapefruits)
- $(u_1; u_2)$
- Suppose we start with prices (10, 25)
- Endowments $(\omega_1; \omega_2)$
such that $\omega_1 = (\omega_{11}; \omega_{12}); \omega_2 = (\omega_{21}; \omega_{22})$

Example

- Suppose we start with $\omega_1 = (0;10)$
- Budget constraint for 1: $10A + 25G = 250$
- In general: $p_1x_{11} + p_2x_{12} \leq p_1\omega_{11} + p_2\omega_{12}$
- Final consumption $\hat{x}_1 = (x_{11}, x_{12})$ depends on ω_1 and
 $p = (p_1, p_2)$
- That is, value of initial bundle given prices (perfect competition, price taking)

Example




Example

- Similarly, for individual 2


$$p_1 x_{21} + p_2 x_{22} \leq p_1 \omega_{21} + p_2 \omega_{22}$$

- But, non-wastefulness implies: $x_{1j} + x_{2j} = x_j; j = 1, 2$
- Let's assume $x_j = 1; j = 1, 2$
- Rearrange BL for 2 – get BL for 1

Example



Example




Example

- But given the initial (p_1, p_2) we have total demand for 1 exceeds total supply of 1 in the economy

$$p_1 x_{21} + p_2 x_{22} \leq p_1 \omega_{21} + p_2 \omega_{22}$$

- So excess demand for 1
- Prices should change such that $\frac{p_1}{p_2} \uparrow$

Example



Numerical Example

- Let's assume $u_1 = x_{11} + 2x_{12}$; $\omega_1 = (1, \frac{1}{2})$
- MRS for 1: $\frac{1}{2}$
- Individual 2: $u_2 = x_{21} \cdot x_{22}$; $\omega_2 = (0, \frac{1}{2})$
- MRS for 2: $\frac{x_{22}}{x_{21}}$
- BL for 2: $p_1 x_{21} + p_2 x_{22} = \frac{1}{2} p_2$
- MRS = relative price implies $p_1 x_{21} = p_2 x_{22}$

Numerical Example

- Solving: $x_{21} = \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{p_2}{p_1}$; $x_{22} = \frac{1}{4}$
- $MRS_1 = MRS_2$: $\frac{x_{22}}{x_{21}} = \frac{1}{2} \Rightarrow 2x_{22} = x_{21}$
- Therefore, $x_{21} = \frac{1}{2}$
- Rel prices: $\frac{p_2}{p_1} = \frac{1}{2}$
- Endowments imply supply of both goods = 1
- At eqm: $x_{11} + x_{21} = 1$ $x_{12} + x_{22} = 1$
 $\Rightarrow x_{11} = \frac{1}{2}$ $\Rightarrow x_{12} = \frac{3}{4}$

Numerical Example

- So, by 1st FWT we have —

$$\hat{x}_1 = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{4}); \hat{x}_2 = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}); \frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{1}{2}$$

- Suppose govt wants to implement: $y_1 = (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{5}{8}); y_2 = (\frac{3}{4}, \frac{3}{8})$
- Let $p = (1, 2)$
- We must have: $p \cdot y_1 = p \cdot \omega_1 + T_1$ and $p \cdot y_2 = p \cdot \omega_2 + T_2$
- Solving: $T_1 = -\frac{1}{2}; T_2 = +\frac{1}{2}$ (2nd FWT)