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Lecture 14: Finite State Verification


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So, You Want to Perform Verification...

- You have a requirement the program must obey.
- Great! Let's write some tests!
- **Does testing guarantee the requirement is met?**
 - Not quite...
 - Testing can make a **statistical** argument in favor of verification, but usually cannot guarantee that the requirement holds in *all* situations.

Testing


- Most systems have near-infinite possible inputs.
- Some faults trigger failures extremely rarely, or under conditions that are hard to control and recreate through testing.
- How can we *prove* that our system meets the requirements?



What About a Model?

- We have previously used models to analyze programs, and to generate test cases.
- Models can be used to “tame” the complexity of the program.
 - Models are simpler than the real program.
 - By abstracting away unnecessary details, we can learn important insights.
- Models can be used to verify full programs.


What Can We Do With This Model?



If we can show that the model satisfies the requirement, then the program should as well.

Finite-State Verification

- Express specification as a set of logical properties, written as Boolean formulae.
- Exhaustively search the state space of the model for violations of those properties.
- If the property holds - proof that the model is correct.
- Contrast with testing - no violation might just mean bad tests.



Today's Goals

- Formulating specification statements as formal logical expressions.
 - Introduction to temporal logic.
- Building behavioral models in NuSMV.
- Performing finite-state verification over the model.
 - Exhaustive search algorithms.

Expressing Specification Statements as Provable Properties

Expressing Properties

- Properties expressed in a formal logic.
 - Temporal logic ensures that properties hold over execution paths, not just at a single point in time.
- Safety Properties
 - System **never** reaches bad state.
 - **Always** in some good state.
- Liveness Properties
 - **Eventually** useful things happen.
 - **Fairness** criteria.

Temporal Logic

- Sets of rules and symbolism for representing propositions qualified over time.
- Linear Time Logic (LTL)
 - Reason about events over a timeline.
- Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
 - Branching logic that can reason about multiple timelines.
- We need both forms of logic - each can express properties that the other cannot.

Linear Time Logic Formulae

Formulae written with propositional variables (boolean properties), logical operators (and, or, not, implication), and a set of modal operators:

hunger = “I am hungry”

burger = “I eat a burger”

X (next)	X hunger	In the next state, I will be hungry.
G (globally)	G hunger	In all future states, I will be hungry.
F (finally)	F hunger	Eventually, there will be a state where I am hungry.
U (until)	hunger U burger	I will be hungry until I start to eat a burger. (hunger does not need to be true once burger becomes true)
R (release)	hunger R burger	I will cease to be hungry after I eat a burger. (hunger and burger are true at the same time for at least one state before hunger becomes false)

LTL Examples

- **X (next)** - This operator provides a constraint on the next moment in time.
 - $(\text{sad} \ \&\& \ !\text{rich}) \rightarrow X(\text{sad})$
 - $((x==0) \ \&\& \ (\text{add}3)) \rightarrow X(x == 3)$
- **F (finally)** - At some point in the future, this property will be true.
 - $(\text{funny} \ \&\& \ \text{ownCamera}) \rightarrow F(\text{famous})$
 - $\text{sad} \rightarrow F(\text{happy})$
 - $\text{send} \rightarrow F(\text{receive})$

LTL Examples

- G (globally) - This property must always be true.
 - winLottery \rightarrow G(rich)
- U (until) - One property must be true until the second becomes true.
 - startLecture \rightarrow (talk U endLecture)
 - born \rightarrow (alive U dead)
 - request \rightarrow (!reply U acknowledgement)

More LTL Examples

requested = action requested
received = request received
processed = request processed
done = action completed

- $G (\text{requested} \rightarrow F (\text{received}))$
- $G (\text{received} \rightarrow X (\text{processed}))$
- $G (\text{processed} \rightarrow F (G (\text{done})))$
- If the above are true, can this be true?
 - $G (\text{requested}) \ \&\& \ G (!\text{done})$

Computation Tree Logic Formulae

Combines all-path quantifiers with path-specific quantifiers:

A (all)	A hunger	Starting from the current state, I must be hungry on all paths.
E (exists)	E hunger	There must be some path, starting from the current state, where I am hungry.

X (next)	X hunger	In the next state on this path, I will be hungry.
G (globally)	G hunger	In all future states on this path, I will be hungry.
F (finally)	F hunger	Eventually on this path, there will be a state where I am hungry.
U (until)	hunger U burger	On this path, I will be hungry until I start to eat a burger. (I must eventually eat a burger)
W (weak until)	hunger W burger	On this path, I will be hungry until I start to eat a burger. (There is no guarantee that I eat a burger)


CTL Examples

- chocolate = “I like chocolate.”
- warm = “It is warm outside.”
- AG chocolate
- EF chocolate
- AF (EG chocolate)
- EG (AF chocolate)
- AG (chocolate U warm)
- EF ((EX chocolate) U (AG warm))

Examples

- **requested**: if true, a request has been made
- **acknowledged**: if true, the request has been acknowledged.
- CTL: $AG (\text{requested} \rightarrow AF \text{ acknowledged})$
 - On all paths (A) from an initial state, at every state in the path (G), if **requested** holds true, then (\rightarrow) for all paths (A) from that state, eventually (F) at some other state, **acknowledge** holds true.
- LTL: $G (\text{requested} \rightarrow F \text{ acknowledged})$
 - On all paths from an initial state, at every state in the path (G), if **requested** holds true, then (\rightarrow) eventually (F) at some other state, **acknowledge** holds true.

Examples



- It is always possible to reach a state where we can reset.
 - **AG (EF reset)**
 - Is the LTL formula **G (F reset)** the same expression?
- Eventually, the system will reach a state where P is true and remain there.
 - **F (G P)**
 - Is the CTL formula **AF (AG P)** the same?

Building Models

Building Models

- Many different modeling languages.
- Most verification tools use their own language.
- Conceptually, most map to state machines.
 - Define a list of variables.
 - Describe how their values are calculated.
 - Each “time step”, recalculate the values of these variables.
 - The state is the current set of values for all variables.

Building Models in NuSMV

- NuSMV is a symbolic model checker.
 - Models written in a basic language, represented using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs).
 - BDDs translate concrete states into compact summary states.
 - Allows large models to be processed efficiently.
 - Properties may be expressed in CTL or LTL.
 - If a model may be falsified, it provides a concrete counterexample demonstrating how it was falsified.

A Basic NuSMV Model

MODULE main Models consist of one or more modules, which execute in parallel.

VAR The state of the model is the current value of all variables.

```
request: boolean;
```

```
status: {ready, busy};
```

ASSIGN Expressions define how the state of each variable can change.

```
init(status) := ready;
```

```
next(status) :=
```

```
case
```

```
    status=ready & request: busy;
```

```
    status=ready & !request : ready;
```

```
    TRUE: {ready, busy};
```

```
esac;
```

SPEC AG(request -> AF (status = busy))

“request” is set randomly. This represents an environmental factor out of our control.

Property we wish to prove over the model.

MODULE main

VAR

```
traffic_light: {RED, YELLOW, GREEN};  
ped_light: {WAIT, WALK, FLASH};  
button: {RESET, SET};
```

ASSIGN

```
init(traffic_light) := RED;  
next(traffic_light) := case  
    traffic_light=RED & button=RESET:  
        GREEN;  
    traffic_light=RED: RED;  
    traffic_light=GREEN & button=SET:  
        {GREEN,YELLOW};  
    traffic_light=GREEN: GREEN;  
    traffic_light=YELLOW:  
        {YELLOW, RED};  
    TRUE: {RED};  
esac;
```

```
init(ped_light) := WAIT;  
next(ped_light) := case  
    ped_light=WAIT &  
        traffic_light=RED: WALK;  
    ped_light=WAIT: WAIT;  
    ped_light=WALK: {WALK,FLASH};  
    ped_light=FLASH: {FLASH, WAIT};  
    TRUE: {WAIT};  
esac;  
next(button) := case  
    button=SET & ped_light=WALK: RESET;  
    button=SET: SET;  
    button=RESET & traffic_light=GREEN:  
        {RESET,SET};  
    button=RESET: RESET;  
    TRUE: {RESET};  
esac;
```

Let's Take a Break

Activity

- For this model:
 - Briefly describe a safety-property (nothing “bad” ever happens) for this model and formulate it in CTL.
 - Briefly describe a liveness-property (something “good” eventually happens) for this model and formulate it in LTL.

Activity - Potential Solutions

- Safety Property
 - System **never** reaches bad state.
 - **Always** in some good state.
- AG (pedestrian_light = walk \rightarrow traffic_light \neq green)
 - The pedestrian light cannot indicate that I should walk when the traffic light is green.
 - This is a safety property. We are saying that something should NEVER happen.

Activity - Potential Solutions

- Liveness Property
 - **Eventually** useful things happen.
 - **Fairness** criteria.
- $G (\text{traffic_light} = \text{RED} \ \& \ \text{button} = \text{RESET} \rightarrow F (\text{traffic_light} = \text{green}))$
 - If the light is red, and the button is reset, then eventually, the light will turn green.
 - This is a liveness property, as we assert that something will eventually happen.

Proving Properties Over Models

Proving Properties

- To perform verification, we take properties and exhaustively search the state space of the model for violations.
- Violations give us counter-examples
 - Path that demonstrates the violation.
- Implications of counter-example:
 - Property is incorrect.
 - Model does not reflect expected behavior.
 - Real issue found in the system being designed.

Test Generation from FS Verification


- We can also take properties and **negate** them.
 - Called a “trap property” - we assert that a property can never be met.
- The counter-example shows one way the property can be met.
- This can be used as a test for the real system - to demonstrate that the final system meets its specification.

NuSMV Demonstration

- Model examples:
 - <http://nusmv.fbk.eu/examples/examples.html>
- (in Linux or Mac): `./NuSMV <model name>.smv`

Exhaustive Search

- Algorithms exhaustively comb through the possible execution paths through the model.
- Major limitation - state space explosion.



Exhaustive Search - Dining Philosophers

- Problem - X philosophers sit at a table with Y forks between them. Philosophers may think or eat. When they eat, they need two forks.
- Goal is to avoid deadlock - a state where no progress is possible.
 - 5 philosophers/forks - deadlock after exploring 145 states
 - 10 philosophers/forks - deadlock after exploring 18,313 states
 - 15 philosophers/forks - deadlock after exploring 148,897 states
 - 9 philosophers/10 forks - deadlock found after exploring 404,796 states

Search Based on SAT

- Express properties as conjunctive normal form expressions:
 - $$f = (!x2 \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ !x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ x2)$$
- Examine reachable states and choose a transition based on how it affects the CNF expression.
 - If we want $x2$ to be false, choose a transition that imposes that change.
- Continue until CNF expression is satisfied.

Branch & Bound Algorithm

- Set a variable to a particular value (true/false).
- Apply that value to the CNF expression.
- See whether that value satisfies all of the clauses that it appears in.
 - If so, assign a value to the next variable.
 - If not, backtrack (bound) and apply the other value.
- Prune branches of the boolean decision tree as values are applied.

Branch & Bound Algorithm

$$f = (!x2 \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ x2)$$

1. **Set x1 to false.**

$$f = (!x2 \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (0 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (0 \ || \ x2)$$

2. **Set x2 to false.**

$$f = (1 \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (0 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (0 \ || \ 0)$$

3. **Backtrack and set x2 to true.**

$$f = (0 \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (0 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (0 \ || \ 1)$$

DPLL Algorithm

- Set a variable to a particular value (true/false).
- Apply that value to the CNF expression.
- If the value satisfies a clause, that clause is removed from the formula.
- If the variable is negated, but does not satisfy a clause, then the variable is removed from that clause.
- Repeat until a solution is found.

DPLL Algorithm

$$f = (!x2 \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ x2)$$

1. Set x2 to false.

$$f = (\textcolor{blue}{1} \ || \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1 \ || \ \textcolor{red}{0})$$
$$f = (x1 \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (x1)$$


2. Set x1 to true.

$$f = (\textcolor{blue}{1} \ || \ !x3 \ || \ x4) \ \&\& \ (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5) \ \&\& \ (\textcolor{blue}{1})$$
$$f = (x4 \ || \ ! \ x5)$$

3. Set x4 to false, then x5 to false.

Model Refinement

- Models have to balance precision with efficiency.
- Abstractions that are too simple introduce failure paths that may not be in the real system.
- Complex models may render model checking infeasible due to resource exhaustion.



We Have Learned

- We can perform verification by creating models of the system and proving that the specification properties hold over the model.
- To do so, we must express specifications as sets of logical formulae written in a temporal logic.
- Finite state verification exhaustively searches the state space for violations of properties.

We Have Learned

- By performing this process, we can gain confidence that the system will meet the specifications.
 - We can even generate test cases from the model to help demonstrate that properties still hold over the final system.

Next Time

- Exercise Session: Finite-State Verification
 - More practice on what we talked about today.
- Next Time: Guest Lectures
 - Testing (Anna Lundberg and Karolina Hawker, TIBCO) and Quality (Vard Antinyan, Volvo Cars) in industry.
 - Please attend!!!!
- Assignment 3
 - Due next Friday
 - Should get feedback to you on March 16 so you can study.



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