





Gregory Gay DIT635 - March 13, 2020



## The Impending Exam

- Thursday, March 19, 8:30 12:30
  - The usual room (Alfons)
- Practice exam on Canvas.
  - Let's go over it.
  - Recommended Practice:
    - Try solving the exam without using the sample solutions.
       Compare your answers.





## **Topics**

- Quality (Dependability, Performance, Scalability, Availability, Security)
- Unit Testing
- Exploratory Testing
- Functional Testing
- Structural Testing
- Data Flow Testing

- Acceptance Testing
- Regression Testing
- Integration Testing
- Testing OO Systems
- Mutation Testing
- Model-Based Testing
- Finite State Verification
- Testing in Industry

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- 1. A program may be correct, yet not reliable.
  - a. True
  - b. False
- 2. If a system is on an average down for a total 30 minutes during any 24-hour period:
  - **a.** Its availability is about 98% (approximated to the nearest integer)
  - b. Its reliability is about 98% (approximated to the nearest integer)
  - c. Its mean time between failures is 23.5 hours
  - d. Its maintenance window is 30 minutes



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- 3. In general, we need either mock objects or drivers but not both, when testing a module.
  - a. True
  - b. False
- 4. If a temporal property holds for a finite-state model of a system, it holds for any implementation that conforms to the model.
  - a. True
  - b. False



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  - a. True
  - b. False
- 4. If a temporal property holds for a finite-state model of a system, it holds for any implementation that conforms to the model.
  - a. True
  - b. False



- 5. Self-check oracles (assertions) do not require the expected output for judging whether a program passed or failed a test.
  - a. True
  - b. False
- Object-oriented design and implementation typically have an impact on verification such that OO specific approaches are required for:
  - Unit Testing
  - **Integration Testing**
  - System Testing
  - **Acceptance Testing**



- 5. Self-check oracles (assertions) do not require the expected output for judging whether a program passed or failed a test.
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  - b. False
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  - Unit Testing
  - **Integration Testing**
  - System Testing
  - **Acceptance Testing**



- 7. A test suite that meets a stronger coverage criterion will find any defects that are detected by any test suite that meets only a weaker coverage criterion
  - True
  - False
- 8. A test suite that is known to achieve Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MC/DC) for a given program, when executed, will exercise, at least once:
  - Every statement in the program.
  - Every branch in the program.
  - Every combination of condition values in every decision.
  - Every path in the program.



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  - Every branch in the program.
  - Every combination of condition values in every decision.
  - Every path in the program.



- 9. Sources of information for functional testing include:
  - Requirements Specification
  - User Manuals
  - Program Source Code
  - Domain Experts
- 10. Category-Partition Testing technique requires identification of:
  - Parameter characteristics
  - Representative values
  - Def-Use pairs
  - Pairwise combinations



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  - Requirements Specification
  - User Manuals
  - Program Source Code
  - Domain Experts
- 10. Category-Partition Testing technique requires identification of:
  - Parameter characteristics
  - Representative values
  - Def-Use pairs
  - Pairwise combinations

- 11. Validation activities can only be performed once the complete system has been built.
  - True or False
- 12. Statement coverage criterion never requires as many test cases to satisfy as branch coverage criterion.
  - True or False
- 13. Requirement specifications are not needed for generating inputs to satisfy structural coverage of program code.
  - True or False
- 14. A system that fails to meet its user's needs may still be:
  - Correct with respect to its specification.
  - Safe to operate.
  - Robust in the presence of exceptional conditions.
  - Considered to have passed verification.

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  - Considered to have passed verification.

Consider the software for air-traffic control at an airport.

Identify one performance, one availability, and one security requirement that you think would be necessary for this software and develop a quality scenario for each.



**Performance Requirement:** Under normal load (< 500 aircraft), displayed aircraft positions shall be updated at least every 50 ms.

#### **Performance Scenario:**

- Overview: Check system responsiveness for displaying aircraft positions
- System and environment state: Deployment environment working correctly with less than 500 tracked aircraft.
- External stimulus: 50 Hz update of ATC system.
- System response: radar/sensor values are computed, new position is displayed to the air traffic controller with maximum error of 5 meters.
- Response measure: Display process completes in less than 50 ms.

**Availability Requirement:** The system shall be able to tolerate the failure of any single server host, graphics card, display or network link.

#### **Availability Scenario:**

- Overview: One of the monitor display cards fails during transmission of a screen refresh.
- System and environment state: System is working correctly under normal load with no failures. No relevant environment factors.
- External stimulus: display card fails
- Required system response: display window manager system will detect failure within 10 ms and route display information through redundant graphics card with no user-discernable change to ATC aircraft display.



**Availability Requirement:** The system shall be able to tolerate the failure of any single server host, graphics card, display or network link.

#### **Availability Scenario:**

- External stimulus: display card fails
- Required system response: display window manager system will detect failure within 10 ms and route display information through redundant graphics card with no user-discernable change to ATC aircraft display. Graphics card failure will be displayed as error message at bottom right hand of ATC display.
- Response measure: no loss in continuity of visual display and failover with visual warning completes within 1 s.

**Security Requirement:** The system shall maintain audit logs of any logins to the ATC database.

#### **Security Scenario:**

- Overview: a malicious agent gains access to flight records database.
- System and environment state: System is working under normal load. No relevant environmental factors.
- External stimulus: malicious agent obtains access to the flight records database through password cracking, and downloads flight plans for commercial aircraft.

**Security Requirement:** The system shall maintain audit logs of any logins to the ATC database.

#### **Security Scenario:**

- External stimulus: malicious agent obtains access to the flight records database through password cracking, and downloads flight plans for commercial aircraft.
- Required system response: audit log contains login and download information to support future prosecution of user.
- Response measure: system audit contains time, IP address, and related information w.r.t. download.



- What is the difference between response time and throughput?
- Describe a situation where a system could display excellent throughput but poor response time and vice versa.



# What is the difference between response time and throughput?

- Response time is from the client's perspective.
  - How long does it take to service my request?
- Throughput is from the server's perspective.
  - How many requests can be processed in a given time period?



# A situation where a system could display excellent throughput/poor response time and vice versa.

- Several processors working in tandem to solve a particular problem.
  - (each segment takes time t, with number of segments s, so the total response time is t\*s)
- Instead, imagine a single processor system that processes requests sequentially.
  - If there are few requests, it will have better response time than the pipelined system because there is no latency in servicing the request.
  - However, it will have very poor throughput under heavy load.

You are building a web store that you feel will unseat Amazon as the king of online shops. Your marketing department has come back with figures stating that - to accomplish your goal - your shop will need an **availability** of at least 99%, a **probability of failure on demand** of less than 0.1, and a **rate of fault occurrence** of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

You have recently finished a testing period of one week (seven full 24-hour days). During this time, 972 requests were served to the page. The product failed a total of 64 times. 37 of those resulted in a system crash, while the remaining 27 resulted in incorrect shopping cart totals. When the system crashes, it takes 2 minutes to restart it.

Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

What is the rate of fault occurrence?



Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

- What is the rate of fault occurrence?
- 64/168 hours =0.38/hour = 3.04/8 hourwork day

Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

 What is the probability of failure on demand?

Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

- What is the probability of failure on demand?
- $\bullet$  64/972 = 0.066



Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

What is the availability?



Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

- What is the availability?
- It was down for (37\*2)
   = 74 minutes out of
   168 hours = 74/10089
   minutes = 0.7% of the
   time. Availability =
   99.3%

Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

Is the product ready to ship? If not, why not?

Want: availability of at least 99%, a probability of failure on demand of less than 0.1, and a rate of fault occurrence of less than 2 failures per 8-hour work period.

Currently: 972 requests.. The product failed a total of 64 times (37 crashes, 27 incorrect computations). It takes 2 minutes to restart.

- Is the product ready to ship? If not, why not?
- No. Availability,
   POFOD are good.

   ROCOF is too low.
   How would you
   improve it?



You are testing the following method:

public double max(double a, double b);

Devise three executable test cases for this method in the JUnit notation. See the attached handout for a refresher on the notation.

```
@Test
  public void aLarger() {
    double a = 16.0;
    double b = 10.0;
    double expected = 16.0;
    double actual = max(a,b);
    assertTrue("should be larger", actual>b);
    assertEquals(expected, actual);
@Test
  public void bLarger() {
    double a = 10.0;
    double b = 16.0;
    double expected = 16.0;
    double actual = max(a,b);
    assertThat("b should be larger", b>a);
    assertEquals(expected, actual);
```

```
@Test
  public void bothEqual() {
    double a = 16.0;
    double b = 16.0;
    double expected = 16.0;
    double actual = max(a,b);
    assertEquals(a,b);
    assertEquals(expected, actual);
@Test
  public void bothNegative() {
    double a = -2.0;
    double b = -1.0;
    double expected = -1.0;
    double actual = max(a,b);
    assertTrue("should be negative",actual<0);</pre>
    assertEquals(expected, actual);
```

After carefully and thoroughly developing a collection of requirements-based tests and running your test suite, you determine that you have achieved only 60% statement coverage. You are surprised (and saddened), since you had done a very thorough job developing the requirements-based tests and you expected the result to be closer to 100%.

Briefly describe two (2) things that might have happened to account for the fact that 40% of the code was not exercised during the requirements-based tests.

- Poor job choosing test cases.
- Missing requirements.
- Dead or inactive code.
- Error-handling.
  - Code used only in special cases.

Should you, in general, be able to expect 100% statement coverage through thorough requirements-based testing alone (why or why not)?

- No.
- There are almost always special cases not covered by requirements.
  - Code optimizations, debug code, exception handling.

Some structural criteria, such as MC/DC, prescribe obligations that are impossible to satisfy. What are two reasons why a test obligation may be impossible to satisfy?

- Impossible combination of conditions
- Defensive programming (situations that may not happen in practice are planned for).
- Other situations that result in unused code (i.e., code implemented for future use that is not currently reachable).

In class we discussed the importance of defining a test case for each requirement. What are the two primary benefits of defining this test case?

- Helps when performing integration testing. Can build test cases early, apply to code once it is written.
- Forces us to write testable requirements.



- The airport connection check is part of a travel reservation system. It checks the validity of a single connection between two flights in an itinerary.
  - If the arrival airport of Flight A differs from the departure airport of Flight B, the connection is invalid.
  - If the departure time of Flight B is too close to the arrival time of Flight A, the connection is invalid.
  - If an airport doesn't exist, the connection is invalid...

A Flight is a data structure consisting of:

- A unique identifying flight code (string, three characters followed by four numbers).
- The originating airport code (three character string).
- The scheduled departure time (in universal time).
- The destination airport code (three character string).
- The scheduled arrival time (in universal time).

There is also a flight database, where each record contains:

- Three-letter airport code (three character string).
- Airport country (two character string).
- Minimum connection times (integer, minimum number of minutes that must be allowed for flight connections).

There is also a flight database, where each record contains:

- Three-letter airport code (three character string).
- Airport country (two character string).
- Minimum connection time (integer, minimum number of minutes that must be allowed for flight connections).

#### ValidityCode is an integer with value:

- 0 for OK
- 1 for invalid airport code
- 2 for a connection that is too short
- 3 for flights that do not connect (arrivingFlight does not land in the same location as departingFlight)
- 4 for any other errors (malformed input or any other unexpected errors).



#### Parameter: Arriving flight

#### Flight code:

- malformed
- not in database
- valid

#### Originating airport code:

- malformed
- not in database
- valid city

#### Scheduled departure time:

- syntactically malformed
- out of legal range
- legal

### Destination airport (transfer airport):

- malformed
- not in database
- valid city

#### Scheduled arrival time (tA):

- syntactically malformed
- out of legal range
- legal

#### Parameter: Departing flight

#### Flight code:

- malformed
- not in database
- valid

#### Originating airport code:

- malformed
- not in database
- differs from transfer airport
- same as transfer airport

#### Scheduled departure time:

- syntactically malformed
- out of legal range
- before arriving flight time (tA)
- between tA and tA + minimum connection time (CT)
- equal to tA + CT
- greater than tA + CT

#### Destination airport code:

- malformed
- not in database
- valid city

#### Scheduled arrival time:

- malformed
- out of legal range
- legal

#### Parameter: Database record

This parameter refers to the database record corresponding to the transfer airport.

#### Airport code:

- malformed
- blank
- valid

#### Airport country:


- malformed
- blank
- invalid (not a country)
- valid

#### Minimum connection time:

- malformed
- blank
- invalid
- valid

- Draw the control-flow graph for this method.
- Develop test input that will provide statement coverage.
- Develop test input that will provide branch coverage.
- Develop test input that will provide path coverage.

```
int findMax(int a, int b, int c) {
    int temp;
    if (a>b)
        temp=a;
    else
        temp=b;
    if (c>temp)
        temp = c;
    return temp;
}
```



```
1. int findMax(int a, int b, int c) {
2. int temp;
    if (a>b)
         temp=a;
    else
        temp=b;
7. if (c>temp)
       temp = c;
9. return temp;
10. }
    Statement:
                        Path:
    (3,2,4), (2,3,4)
                        (4,2,5), (4,2,1), (2,3,4),
   Branch:
                        (2,3,1)
   (3,2,4), (3,4,1)
```



 Modify the program to introduce a fault such that even path coverage could miss the fault.

Use (a >b+1) instead of (a>b) and the test input from the last slide: (4,2,5), (4,2,1), (2,3,4), (2,3,1) will not reveal the fault.

```
int findMax(int a, int b, int c)
    int temp;
   if (a>b)
       temp=a;
   else
       temp=b;
    if (c>temp)
       temp = c;
    return temp;
```



- Identify all DU pairs and write test cases to achieve All DU Pair Coverage.
  - Hint remember that there is a loop.

```
1. int doSomething(int x, int y)
2. {
       while(y > 0) {
3.
           if(x > 0) {
4.
5.
                y = y - x;
6.
            }else {
               x = x + 1;
8.
9.
10.
        return x + y;
11. }
```

```
1. int doSomething(int x, int y)
2. {
       while(y > 0) {
3.
           if(x > 0) {
4.
5.
               y = y - x;
           }else {
6.
7.
               x = x + 1;
8.
9.
       return x + y;
10.
11. }
```

Variable	Defs	Uses
х	1, 7	4, 5, 7, 10
у	1, 5	3, 5, 10

Variable	D-U Pairs	
х	(1, 4), (1, 5), (1, 7), (1, 10), (7, 4), (7, 5), (7, 7), (7, 10)	
у	(1, 3), (1, 5), (1, 10), (5, 3), (5, 5), (5, 10)	



```
1. int doSomething(int x, int y)
2. {
       while(y > 0) {
3.
           if(x > 0) {
4.
5.
               y = y - x;
6.
           }else {
7.
               X = X + 1;
8.
9.
10.
        return x + y;
11. }
```

Variable	D-U Pairs
х	(1, 4), (1, 5), (1, 7), (1, 10), (7, 4), (7, 5), (7, 7), (7, 10)
У	(1, 3), (1, 5), (1, 10), (5, 3), (5, 5), (5, 10)

```
Test 1: (x = 1, y = 2)
Covers lines 1, 3, 4, 5, 3, 4, 5, 3, 10
Test 2: (x = -1, y = 1)
Covers lines 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 3, 4, 6, 7, 3, 4, 5, 3, 10
Test 3: (x = 1, y = 0)
Covers lines 1, 3, 8
```

In a directed graph with a designated exit node, we say that a node **m** post-dominates another node **n**, if m appears on every path from n to the exit node.

Let us write m pdom n to mean that m post-dominates n, and pdom(n) to mean the set of all post-dominators of n, i.e.,  $\{m \mid m \text{ pdom } n\}$ .



- 1. Does *b pdom b* hold true for all b?
- 2. Can both a pdom b and b pdom a hold true for two different nodes a and b?
- 1. Yes. Each node must appear on every path to the exit from itself.
- 2. Not if they are **different** nodes. If a pdom b, then b must be on all paths from a to the exit. Node a cannot appear after b at the same time.



- 3. If both *c pdom b* and *b pdom a* hold true, what can you say about the relationship between c and a?
- 4. If both *c pdom a* and *b pdom a* hold true, what can you say about the relationship between c and b?
- 3. *c pdom a*. Node b appears on all paths from a to the exit. Node c must appear on the subpath from b to the exit.
- 4. Either *c pdom b* or *b pdom c*. Both b and c must appear on all paths from a to the exit. One will pdom the other.



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
           return bSearch(A, value, start, mid);
     } else if (value > A[mid]) {
           return bSearch(A, value, mid+1, end);
     } else {
           return mid;
```

1. Create an equivalent mutant.



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
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     } else if (value > A[mid]) {
           return bSearch(A, value, mid+1, end);
     } else {
           return mid;
```

1. Create an equivalent mutant.

```
} else if (value > A[mid]) {
    return bSearch(A, value,
    mid+1, end);
} else {
}
return mid;
```

**SES - End Block Shift** 



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
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```

2. Create an invalid mutant.



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
           return bSearch(A, value, start, mid);
     } else if (value > A[mid]) {
           return bSearch(A, value, mid+1, end);
     } else {
           return mid;
```

## 2. Create an invalid mutant.

```
mid = (start + end) / 2;
if (A[mid] > value) {
     return bSearch(A, value, start,
mid);
} else if (value > A[mid]) {
     return bSearch(A, value, mid+1,
end);
} else {
     return mid;
```

**SDL - Statement Deletion** 



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
           return bSearch(A, value, start, mid);
     } else if (value > A[mid]) {
           return bSearch(A, value, mid+1, end);
     } else {
           return mid;
```

3. Create a valid-but-not-useful mutant.



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
           return bSearch(A, value, start, mid);
     } else if (value > A[mid]) {
           return bSearch(A, value, mid+1, end);
     } else {
           return mid;
```

```
3. Create a
    valid-but-not-useful
    mutant.
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
    if (end > start)
        return -1;
    mid = (start + end) / 2;
ROR - Relational Operator
Replacement
```



```
Consider the following function:
bSearch(A, value, start, end) {
     if (end <= start)
           return -1;
     mid = (start + end) / 2;
     if (A[mid] > value) {
           return bSearch(A, value, start, mid);
     } else if (value > A[mid]) {
           return bSearch(A, value, mid+1, end);
     } else {
           return mid;
```

3. Create a useful mutant.

```
} else if (value > A[mid]) {
    return bSearch(A, value,
    mid+2, end);
} else {
    return mid;
}
```

**CRP - Constant for Constant Replacement** 



Suppose that finite state verification of an abstract model of some software exposes a counter-example to a property that is expected to hold for true for the system.

Briefly describe what follow-up actions would you take and why?



Tells us one of the following is an issue:

- The model
  - Fault in the model, bad assumptions, incorrect interpretation of requirements
- The property
  - Property not formulated correctly.
- The requirements
  - Contradictory or incorrect requirements.



### Temporal Operators: A quick reference list.

- G p: p holds globally at every state on the path
- F p: p holds at some state on the path
- X p: p holds at the next (second) state on the path
- p U q: q holds at some state on the path and p holds at every state before the first state at which q holds.
- A: for all paths from a state, used in CTL as a modifier for the above properties (AG p)
- E: for some path from a state, used in CTL as a modifier for the above properties (EF p)





## AG (pedestrian\_light = walk -> traffic\_light != green)

#### State variables:

- traffic\_light: {RED, YELLOW, GREEN}
- pedestrian\_light: {WAIT, WALK, FLASH}
- button: {RESET, SET}

Initially: traffic\_light = RED,
pedestrian\_light = WAIT, button = RESET

#### Transitions:

#### pedestrian\_light:

- WAIT → WALK if traffic\_light = RED
- WAIT → WAIT otherwise
- WALK → {WALK, FLASH}
- FLASH → {FLASH, WAIT}

#### traffic\_light:

- RED → GREEN if button = RESET
- RED → RED otherwise
- GREEN → {GREEN, YELLOW} if button = SET
- GREEN → GREEN otherwise
- YELLOW→ {YELLOW, RED}

#### button:

- SET → RESET if pedestrian\_light = WALK
- SET → SET otherwise
- RESET → {RESET, SET} if traffic\_light = GREEN
- RESET → RESET otherwise





## G (traffic\_light = RED & button = RESET -> F (traffic\_light = green))

#### State variables:

- traffic\_light: {RED, YELLOW, GREEN}
- pedestrian\_light: {WAIT, WALK, FLASH}
- button: {RESET, SET}

Initially: traffic\_light = RED,
pedestrian\_light = WAIT, button = RESET

#### **Transitions:**

#### pedestrian\_light:

- WAIT → WALK if traffic\_light = RED
- WAIT → WAIT otherwise
- WALK → {WALK, FLASH}
- FLASH → {FLASH, WAIT}

#### traffic\_light:

- RED → GREEN if button = RESET
- RED → RED otherwise
- GREEN → {GREEN, YELLOW} if button = SET
- GREEN → GREEN otherwise
- YELLOW→ {YELLOW, RED}

#### button:

- SET → RESET if pedestrian\_light = WALK
- SET → SET otherwise
- RESET → {RESET, SET} if traffic\_light = GREEN
- RESET → RESET otherwise

### Negate to get trap property: G!(button = SET -> F (pedestrian\_light = WALK))

#### State variables:

- traffic\_light: {RED, YELLOW, GREEN}
- pedestrian\_light: {WAIT, WALK, FLASH}
- button: {RESET, SET}

Initially: traffic\_light = RED,
pedestrian\_light = WAIT, button = RESET

#### **Transitions:**

#### pedestrian\_light:

- WAIT → WALK if traffic\_light = RED
- WAIT → WAIT otherwise
- WALK → {WALK, FLASH}
- FLASH → {FLASH, WAIT}

#### traffic\_light:

- RED → GREEN if button = RESET
- RED → RED otherwise
- GREEN → {GREEN, YELLOW} if button = SET
- GREEN → GREEN otherwise
- YELLOW→ {YELLOW, RED}

#### button:

- SET → RESET if pedestrian\_light = WALK
- SET → SET otherwise
- RESET → {RESET, SET} if traffic\_light = GREEN
- RESET → RESET otherwise



#### Microwave controller

- Door: {Open, Closed} -- sensor input indicating state of the door
- Button: {None, Start, Stop} -button press
- Timer: 0...999 -- (remaining) seconds to cook
- Cooking: Boolean -- state of the heating element

#### In CTL:

- The microwave shall never cook when the door is open.
- AG (Door = Open -> !Cooking)



#### Microwave controller

- Door: {Open, Closed} -- sensor input indicating state of the door
- Button: {None, Start, Stop} -button press
- Timer: 0...999 -- (remaining) seconds to cook
- Cooking: Boolean -- state of the heating element

#### In CTL:

- The microwave shall cook only as long as there is remaining cook time.
- AG (Cooking -> Timer > 0)





#### Microwave controller

- Door: {Open, Closed} -- sensor input indicating state of the door
- Button: {None, Start, Stop} -button press
- Timer: 0...999 -- (remaining) seconds to cook
- Cooking: Boolean -- state of the heating element

#### In CTL:

- If the stop button is pressed when the microwave is not cooking, the remaining cook time shall be cleared.
- AG (Button = Stop & !Cooking -> AX (Timer = 0))





#### Microwave controller

- Door: {Open, Closed} -- sensor input indicating state of the door
- Button: {None, Start, Stop} -button press
- Timer: 0...999 -- (remaining) seconds to cook
- Cooking: Boolean -- state of the heating element

#### In LTL:

- It shall never be the case that the microwave can continue cooking indefinitely.
- G (Cooking -> F (!Cooking))





#### Microwave controller

- Door: {Open, Closed} -- sensor input indicating state of the door
- Button: {None, Start, Stop} -button press
- Timer: 0...999 -- (remaining) seconds to cook
- Cooking: Boolean -- state of the heating element

#### In LTL:

- The only way to initiate cooking shall be pressing the start button when the door is closed and the remaining cook time is not zero.
- G (!Cooking U
   ((Button = Start &
   Door = Closed)
   & (Timer > 0)))





#### Microwave controller

- Door: {Open, Closed} -- sensor input indicating state of the door
- Button: {None, Start, Stop} -button press
- Timer: 0...999 -- (remaining) seconds to cook
- Cooking: Boolean -- state of the heating element

#### In LTL:

- The microwave shall continue cooking when there is remaining cook time unless the stop button is pressed or the door is opened.
- G ((Cooking & Timer > 0) ->
   X (((Cooking |
   (!Cooking & Button = Stop)) |
   (!Cooking & Door = Open)))





### Any other questions?

# Thank you for being a great class!



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