

An Online Learning-based Optimal Bidding Approach for FTR Market Participants

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Abstract—We consider the problem of optimal bidding and portfolio optimization for bidders in the financial transmission rights (FTR) auction market. Based on the price-taker assumption, each FTR market participant aims to maximize his profit, which is the difference between the clearing price and FTR revenue. However, both the clearing price and the FTR revenue are random and unknown. An online learning methodology is proposed to learn the optimal bidding by updating its policy with the newest observations of clearing results. With bidding prices derived by the online learning algorithm, a budget-constrained portfolio optimization problem is solved to distribute the budget among profitable FTRs. Compared to other state-of-the-art online learning approaches, our proposed tree-based bid searching (TBS) algorithm converges faster to the optimal bidding price and has favorable linearithmic time complexity.

Index Terms—Financial transmission rights, online learning, congestion, conditional value at risk.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

THE growing penetration of renewable resources and the uncertain demand make the transmission system more likely to operate closer to its capacity[1]. Hence, congestion in power systems becomes less predictable, and locational marginal prices (LMPs) are more volatile. The uncertainty of LMPs may leave market participants exposed to unknown congestion price risks, which dampens long-term power trading and thus causes inefficiencies of the market. In addition, the independent system operator (ISO) also expects a mechanism to effectively and reasonably allocate the collected congestion charges. All these desires facilitate the emergence of FTR, which is a risk-hedging instrument for mitigating congestion price risks for market participants and a revenue redistribution mechanism for the ISO [2].

The FTR entitles its holders to be paid or charged at the value of congestion rents of specified transmission paths collected by the ISO in the day-ahead market [3]. An FTR is specified by the transmission capacity, a directional node pair and a certain holding period. The FTR has been considered as a successful mechanism and has been implemented in PJM, New York, New England, and other electricity markets for decades [4-7]. In general, there exist two categories of FTR: FTR obligations and

FTR options. Holders with FTR obligations are charged whenever the differences between the LMPs of the source node and the sink node are negative. In contrast, the FTR options would never be a liability for holders in such situations [8].

The purpose of the FTR is to provide insurance for traders with physical transactions in the power market. Nevertheless, to hamper market power and facilitate liquidity, the ISO permits speculators without power transactions to purchase or sell FTRs. The use of arbitrage has become a common industry practice [9]. However, the distribution of LMPs and clearing prices remains unknown and even nonstationary. How to formulate a bidding strategy to acquire the maximum payoff from the FTR auction market becomes rather difficult for price-takers. Although a higher bidding price increases the probability of acquiring an FTR, it causes inefficiency of budget allocation and will encounter more financial loss whenever the clearing price exceeds the FTR revenue. Thus, to continuously arbitrage from FTR auction markets, a bidder needs to learn the optimal bidding from the interaction processes with the market.

B. Related Work

The concept of FTR was first proposed by Hogan in 1992 [10]. Furthermore, the mathematical framework of PJM's clearing mechanism for the FTR auction was investigated by [11-13]. The AC-OPF-based FTR auction model considering contingencies and system loss allocation was developed in [14] and [15]. The efficiency of implementing an FTR in realistic power markets was analysed in [16-19]. Holding FTRs also affects market participants' bidding behaviour in the energy market. [20] analysed the impacts of the FTR on load serving entities' bidding strategy. How virtual traders manipulate day-ahead LMPs to profit from FTRs was discussed in [21]. A comprehensive survey on the FTR's effects on power systems and evolved processes was conducted in [22].

Studies on the bidding strategy and portfolio construction are rare. [23] establishes a bilevel optimization framework to solve the optimal bidding problem in the FTR market. The advantage of such methodology lies in its ability to model the self-interested bidding strategies of the bidder (modelled as the upper-level optimization problem or UL) and the clearing process of the ISO (modelled as the lower-level or LL). However, there are inevitable limitations to such a model:

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solving the LL problem requires knowledge of the sensitivity parameters of the network and the bidding decisions of competitors. Since the FTR auction market acts as an opening market with hundreds of FTR products, a bidder has no access to system parameters and all potential competitors' bidding decisions. Another approach to solve the optimal bidding problem in the FTR market falls into the category of the reinforcement learning field [24][25]. However, previous work adopting a reinforcement learning algorithm was based on the Q-learning method, which mainly relies on the Q-table to describe the action-value function. Due to the discretization of continuous space, such a method may suffer from the curse of dimensionality.

The effect of distribution factors in financial transmission rights application was investigated by [26]. Based on the conclusion of [26], an approach for optimal FTR portfolio construction focusing on identifying congested transmission lines in the network is presented in [27]. With the information of *power transfer distribution factors* (PTDFs), market players can select FTRs impacted significantly by congested lines. Nevertheless, the approach proposed in [27] assumes that bidders are capable of forecasting accurate congestion information and requires a fixed topology, which generally constitutes a limited assumption. In addition, the strategy to obtain the (bidding price of) FTRs in the auction market is not considered in [27].

C. Scope and Contributions

The goal of this work is to develop a bidding strategy for an FTR bidder based on an online learning method. Through bidding in the FTR auction, the bidder aims to determine the bidding prices for available FTRs and allocate his or her budget among them to minimize the risk related to the portfolio. Since the demand and system operation conditions would not remain fixed in the long-term period, the distribution pattern of FTR revenues and clearing prices would remain changed and unknown. By adopting the online learning method, the policy that determines the optimal bidding price for each FTR is dynamically updated with newly observed information, which makes it suitable for the FTR bidding problem. In particular, we consider the objective of the online learning policy as maximizing the expected cumulative unit profit of the FTR.

More specifically, the main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.

The optimal bidding problem in the FTR auction is solved using an online learning scheme based on the proposed TBS algorithm. Unlike previous works solving the optimal bidding problem in an FTR auction with complete information, our work solves the examined problem with only instantaneous clearing outcomes as input and provides a practical approach for FTR bidders.

A budget-constrained risk-minimization portfolio construction model is developed based on conditional value at risk (CVaR). Compared with a previous online learning-based portfolio construction model [28], our work further includes purchase quantities as decision variables, which makes the proposed model more efficient in portfolio optimization.

The proposed TBS algorithm deals directly with continuous space and has a strong convergence property over finite auction rounds. In addition, the TBS algorithm has a favourable

computational complexity as $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$, making it an effective methodology for big data scenarios.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the overall framework. Section III details the proposed online learning methodology. The performance of the proposed TBS algorithm and the portfolio optimization model are discussed in Section IV. Section V presents the numerical results. Conclusions are discussed in Section VI.

II. PROBLEM MODELLING

A. Preliminary

FTRs are issued by the ISO through the auction market. Any bidder is required to submit his or her bidding price and purchasing *MW* amount for a specified FTR in the auction market. Then, the ISO conducts a clearing process with collected bidding prices from all bidders under the constraints of transmission capacity and contingencies. Meanwhile, to ensure that collected congestion rents are higher or at least equal to the payments paid to FTR holders, the ISO conducts a simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) in the clearing process. ISO entitles bidders whose bidding prices are no less than the clearing prices with the specified FTRs for a certain period, and winning bidders pay the clearing prices as the cost.

In this paper, we take the PJM FTR auction market as an example, which consists of four types of markets: long-term, annual, monthly, and secondary markets. Both the long-term and the annual FTR auctions are multi-round auctions. A monthly FTR auction is a single-round auction. FTRs acquired in the monthly FTR auction have a one-month term, and the auction would be started approximately half a month ahead for FTRs awarded in the next month. The PJM FTR secondary market is a bilateral trading system in which market participants can directly trade with each other. Without loss of generality, only the monthly FTR auction is discussed.

The hourly economic value of the FTR obligation is calculated as

$$P = (\lambda_{\text{sink}} - \lambda_{\text{source}}) * Q \quad (1)$$

where

λ_{sink}	LMP of sink node in day-ahead market
λ_{source}	LMP of source node in day-ahead market
Q	<i>MW</i> amount of the FTR

As shown in Equation (1), the economic value of the FTR obligation turns into a liability whenever λ_{source} is larger than λ_{sink} . In contrast, the FTR option becomes effective only when economic value is beneficial to holders.

For a bidder, his profit for bidding an FTR obligation is

$$P_i = \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{i,h} * Q_i - \pi_i * Q_i \right) \mathbb{1}_{\{b_i \geq \pi_i\}} \quad (2)$$

where

H	number of hours for holding an FTR obligation
P_i	payoff of FTR i
$\Delta \lambda$	hourly LMP differences between pricing nodes of FTR i during the holding period
Q_i	purchasing <i>MW</i> amount of FTR i
π_i	market clearing price for FTR i

b_i bidding price for FTR i

For the FTR option, the payoff for holding it is

$$P_i = \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \max(\Delta\lambda_{i,h}, 0) * Q_i - \pi_i * Q_i \right) \mathbb{1}\{b_i \geq \pi_i\} \quad (3)$$

Different from the FTR obligation, the revenue of the FTR option remains nonnegative. Here, the $\mathbb{1}\{\cdot\}$ acts as an indicator function that equals to one if the argument is true and zero otherwise. Without loss of generality, only the FTR obligations are discussed in this paper.

Next, we study the problem in which an FTR bidder who intends to bid on M FTRs aims to identify the optimal b_i for each $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, M\}$ and construct an optimal portfolio under a certain budget constraint.

B. Bilevel Optimization

In this subsection, we develop a bilevel optimization model for repeated auctions in the FTR monthly market. At each round, an FTR bidder needs to decide the optimal bidding price for each FTR and determine how to allocate his budget. Therefore, the optimal bidding problem and portfolio optimization problem need to be solved separately, which formulates a bilevel optimization problem.

C. Lower-level Problem

The lower-level problem focuses on exploring each FTR's optimal bidding that maximizes the expected cumulative unit profit during N rounds of the FTR monthly auction. Since the joint distribution of future FTR revenue and clearing prices remains unknown, it is impossible to solve the lower-level problem analytically.

For the FTR obligation, the lower-level problem is formulated as:

$$\max_{b_i} \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta\lambda_{i,h,n} - \pi_{i,n} \right) \mathbb{1}\{b_i \geq \pi_{i,n}\} \right) \quad (4)$$

For the FTR option, the lower-level problem is formulated as:

$$\max_{b_i} \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \left(\max \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta\lambda_{i,h,n} - \pi_{i,n}, 0 \right) \right) \mathbb{1}\{b_i \geq \pi_{i,n}\} \right) \quad (5)$$

An alternative way is to formulate policy μ to determine the bidding price that maximizes the expected cumulative unit profit based on newly observed clearing results $\{\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta\lambda_{i,h,n-1}, \pi_{i,n-1}\}$ and previous outcomes since the revenue and clearing price for FTR i of the last round of auction can be observed at the beginning of each auction. Denote the policy μ as a sequence: $\mu_0, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_{N-1}$, which is updated with the increase in auctions. Therefore, the bidding price b_i for FTR i is updated by the newly updated policy μ_n .

We develop an online learning algorithm to act as the policy μ . Based on the newly observed clearing results, the policy is updated sequentially and adaptively, which dynamically tracks the optimal bidding price.

D. Upper-level Problem

The upper-level problem is a budget-constrained portfolio optimization problem as shown in Eq. (6)-(9).

$$\min(CVaR_\alpha \left(\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_{i,n}, R_{i,n}) \right)) \quad (6)$$

subject to

$$Q_{i,n} \geq 0 \quad (7)$$




Fig. 1. Illustration of optimal bid search in the tree.

$$Q_{i,n} * b_{i,n} \leq B \quad (8)$$

$$f(Q_{i,n}, R_{i,n}) = -Q_{i,n} * R_{i,n} \quad (9)$$

where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, M\}$.

Based on the bidding prices $b_{i,n}$ derived from the lower-level problem for each $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, M\}$ at round n , the upper-level problem aims at minimizing the risk associated with decision variable $Q_{i,n}$, which represents the purchased quantity for FTR i at round n . The objective function is defined as the conditional value at risk (CVaR) with confidence level α . Eq. (8) is the budget constraint, where the B represents a fixed budget for each round. The loss function $\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_{i,n}, R_{i,n})$ denotes the summation of the loss of individual FTR bidding (Eq. (9)), where $R_{i,n}$ represents the potential unit profit for holding FTR i at round n . The details about the CVaR instrument are discussed in Section IV-B.

III. ONLINE LEARNING APPROACH FOR FTR BIDDING

In this section, we propose a TBS algorithm to solve the lower-level problem in Section II-C. The proposed methodology is inspired by the binary tree structure in [29], which addresses online optimization problems using a binary tree. The nodes of the tree are correlated to measurable regions of the action space. The TBS algorithm utilizes nodes of the binary tree to cover the corresponding size of the bidding space, and the tree is constructed incrementally.

The bidding space is explored under the guidance of upper bounds on the potential profit of bids covered within different nodes. One key insight is that the tree is expanded by refining optimistic nodes to increase the resolution of nodes as well as the associated bidding space to find more accurate bids, which enables us to approximate the global optimal bid with an increase in rounds.

In each round $n = 0, 1, 2, \dots, N$, a bidder repeatedly submits a bidding price $b_{i,n}$ to the ISO from the bidding space, a continuous interval, for purchasing the FTR i of the next month. For simplicity, here, the payoff is normalized and bounded in the continuous interval $[-1, 1]$, while the bidding price and clearing price are bounded in the continuous interval $[0, 1]$.

Denote the entire bidding space by B , which consists of bids from the continuous interval $[0, 1]$. To describe the similarity

between different bids, we assume that there exists a dissimilarity function M , which is a nonnegative mapping $M: B^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. For example, $M(b, b') > 0$ and $M(b, b') = 0$ for all $(b, b') \in B^2$. Note that the dissimilarity M is used only for theoretical analysis, and the algorithm has no requirement for an explicit input of M . Generally, the dissimilarity could be some positive power of the Euclidean norm..

Given the concept of the dissimilarity function M , the size of B and its subsets can be measured by M and expressly defined as

$$\text{Diam}(B) = \max_{b, b' \in B} M(b, b') \quad (10)$$

Fig. 1 presents the tree structure as well as the partitioning process of the bidding space. Each node (d, i) covers a particular bidding space $R_{d,i}$ (i.e., the root node that covers B is indexed by $(0, 1)$), where d denotes the depth of the node and i denotes the rank of nodes with the same depth. For node (d, i) , $(d+1, 2i-1)$ and $(d+1, 2i)$ represent its two children nodes, which have no intersection with each other:

$$R_{0,1} = B \quad (11)$$

$$R_{d,i} = R_{d+1,2i-1} \cup R_{d+1,2i} \quad (\forall d \geq 0 \text{ and } 1 \leq i \leq 2^d) \quad (12)$$

$$R_{d+1,2i-1} \cap R_{d+1,2i} = \emptyset \quad (13)$$

As shown above, the covering bidding space monotonically decreases with increasing of depth, which implies narrowing the searching range to explore a more accurate solution. Meanwhile, a reasonable assumption is made to efficiently denote the size of nodes at different depths.

Assumption 1. For all nodes and their covering bidding space, given constants $L > 0$ and $m \in (0, 1)$, there exists a dissimilarity function \mathcal{M} such that for any node (d, i) :

$$\text{Diam}(R_{d,i}) \leq L(m)^d \quad (14)$$

Based on the above assumption, the size of the bidding subspace covered by node (d, i) is bounded by $L(m)^d$. As the number of nodes increases exponentially with increasing depth d , it is reasonable to use the exponentially decreasing term $L(m)^d$ to bound the size of the covering regions. Note that Diam is based on the dissimilarity, which can be adjusted by selecting the appropriate mapping given constants L and m .

In addition, we assume that the minimum bidding space's size at each depth is bounded by $L_1(m)^d$. For notational simplicity, here we use $\mu(b) = \mathbb{E}(\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{n'=1}^{n-1} (\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{n',h} - \pi_{n'})) \mathbb{I}\{b \geq \pi_{n'}\}$ to denote the expected mean payoff that could be obtained by a fixed bidding price b up to round n for FTR obligation, while $\mu(b) = \mathbb{E}(\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{n'=1}^{n-1} \max(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{n',h} - \pi_{n'}, 0)) \mathbb{I}\{b \geq \pi_{n'}\}$ for FTR option. It is reasonable to believe that an individual has negligible influence on the market. Therefore, similar bidding prices from a price-taker could acquire a similar mean payoff with randomly distributed clearing prices and FTR revenue. We assume that for bidding prices from the same node covering space, the differences of their mean payoff can be upper bounded by the dissimilarity \mathcal{M} .

Assumption 2. For bids (b, b') from the same node, the differences in their expected payoff could be upper bounded by:

$$\mu(b) - \mu(b') \leq M(b, b').$$

Note that the above assumption is appropriate for bids that are close. Due to the random distribution of payoffs, two close bids may acquire widely varying instantaneous payoffs in practice. Nevertheless, in regard to the empirical mean payoff, two close bids would achieve a similar expected payoff. For the convenience of mathematical analysis, the number for near-optimal nodes must be upper bounded. The number of β' -cover ball within a β -optimal node could be bounded by $C_h(\beta')^{-d_c}$, where d_c is the near-optimality dimension defined in Definition 5 of [24], $\beta > \beta'$ and C_h is a constant.

Due to space limitations, details of the TBS algorithm's implementation procedure are discussed in Appendix A in [38].

IV. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

A. Performance of TBS Algorithm

1) Regret Analysis

As defined by previous online machine learning literature, the performance of such an algorithm is described by the regret, which is the difference between the cumulative reward acquired by the algorithm's strategy and the best fixed price in hindsight over the total periods [28-36]. The objective of the lower-level problem is to find the global optimal bid that maximizes the total payoff over N rounds. For the FTR obligation, the global optimal bid is defined as

$$b^* = \arg\max_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N (\Delta \lambda_n - \pi_n) \mathbb{I}\{b^* \geq \pi_n\} \right) \quad (15)$$

For the FTR option, the global optimal bid is defined as:

$$b^* = \arg\max_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \max((\Delta \lambda_n - \pi_n), 0) \mathbb{I}\{b^* \geq \pi_n\} \right) \quad (16)$$

Then, the regret is defined as the difference between the expected cumulative payoff acquired by the TBS's bidding policy and that of the optimal bid b^* for the FTR obligation, i.e.,

$$R_N = \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{n,h} - \pi_n \right) \mathbb{I}\{b^* \geq \pi_n\} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{n,h} - \pi_n \right) \mathbb{I}\{b_n \geq \pi_n\} \right) \quad (17)$$

The regret for the FTR option is defined as

$$R_N = \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \left(\max \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{i,h,n} - \pi_{i,n}, 0 \right) \right) \mathbb{I}\{b^* \geq \pi_n\} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{n=1}^N \left(\max \left(\sum_{h=1}^H \Delta \lambda_{i,h,n} - \pi_{i,n}, 0 \right) \right) \mathbb{I}\{b_n \geq \pi_n\} \right) \quad (18)$$

The regret is monotonically nondecreasing and grows linearly with N for the worst case. Since we define the optimality as maximizing the expected payoff for holding an FTR, we observe that the algorithm converges to the optimal solution if the incremental regret of (17-18) goes to zero as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Several important remarks are presented to demonstrate that the R_N of TBS grows sublinearly with N .

Remark 1 illustrates that the exploration and exploitation policy of TBS bounds the increase rate of the tree depth, which only increases logarithmically with rounds n . Such a $\mathcal{O}(\ln n)$ growth rate reduces the computational complexity of the algorithm since it bounds the growth rate of the number of nodes in the tree.

Furthermore, regret is considered in situations depending on whether the differences between the empirical mean payoff and the expected mean payoff of a node are within a confidence interval. Remark 2 below illustrates the probability of the corresponding situation.

Remark 2: The situation in which differences between the empirical mean payoff and expected mean payoff of node (d, i) are within a confidence interval is described as

$$H_n = \left\{ \bar{p}_{d,i}(n) - \mu(b_{d,i}) \leq c \sqrt{\frac{\ln \frac{\sqrt{4N-2n}}{\varepsilon}}{T_{d,i}(n)}} \right\} \quad (20)$$

with $c = 3\sqrt{1/(1-m)}$, $\varepsilon = \sqrt[18]{m/L}$, the probability for event H_n is $1 - \frac{1}{24}n^{-7}$.

Proof. See Appendix C in [38].

Denote the complementary event of H_n by H_n^c . *Theorem 1* presents the upper bound of regret in situation in which the differences between the empirical mean payoff and expected mean payoff exceed the upper bound value in *Remark 2*.

Theorem 1: With the identified value of c and ε given in *Remark 2*, the upper bound for regret of the TBS algorithm under event H_n^c is

$$R_N^{H^c} \leq \sqrt{N} \quad (21)$$

with probability $1 - 1/(144N^3)$.

Proof. See Appendix D in [38].

Theorem 1 demonstrates that the regret grows logarithmically with the increase in auction rounds N in situation H_n^c . Such a sublinear growth rate indicates that even under such a minor probability situation, the algorithm enables convergence to the optimal value. The main concertation should be attached to regret under the highest probability situation H_n . *Theorem 2* below shows the regret.

Theorem 2: Under situation H_n , the upper bound for regret of the TBS algorithm on a total of N rounds is

$$R_N^H \leq 24\sqrt{2} \left(\frac{L^{d_c} c^2 C_h L^{-d_c} m^{d_c}}{1-m} \right)^{\frac{1}{d_c+2}} \log \left(\frac{2\sqrt{N}}{\varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{d_c+2}} N^{\frac{d_c+1}{d_c+2}} \quad (22)$$

Proof. See Appendix E in [38].

As shown in *Theorem 2*, the regret grows sublinearly as the number of auction rounds increases under situation H_n , which implies that the incremental regret would converge to zero as $N \rightarrow \infty$. Therefore, the TBS algorithm enables convergence to the optimal bid with the increase in auction rounds. By *Theorem 1* and *Theorem 2*, we demonstrate that the proposed online learning algorithm is robust to converge to the optimal bid under all possible situations. Through finite rounds of interactions with the market clearing process, the proposed algorithm shall converge to the optimal bid, thus providing a solution for the lower-level problem in Section II.

2) Computational Complexity

In addition to this main conclusion, the design of our TBS algorithm has a favourable linearithmic computational complexity as $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ (see Appendix F in [38] for detailed analysis). In contrast, the computational complexity of state-of-the-art methods for continuous space, such as DPDS [23] and EXP-Tree [22], is $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$. Apparently, our TBS algorithm is more suitable for big data scenarios.

B. Budget-constrained Portfolio Optimization

The budget-constrained portfolio optimization problem (Eq. (5)-(8)) established in Section II is a convex optimization problem. The objective function is to minimize the CVaR of the portfolio, which is a convex function with respect to the purchasing quantities in the FTR market. In this subsection, we will convert the optimization problem into a linear programming problem.

For all Q_i where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, M\}$, the portfolio loss $\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_i, R_i)$ is a random variable having a distribution over \mathbb{R} because of uncertain R_i . For convenience, we use vector \mathbf{R} to denote R_i for all FTRs. The underlying probability distribution of \mathbf{R} is represented by $p(\mathbf{R})$. Therefore, the probability that the portfolio loss $\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_{i,n}, R_{i,n})$ does not exceed a value δ is defined as

$$\psi(Q, \delta) = \int_{\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_i, R_i) \leq \delta} p(\mathbf{R}) d\mathbf{R} \quad (23)$$

Under a certain confidence level α , the value at risk (VaR) is defined as the minimum δ that is greater than the portfolio loss with probability α .

$$VaR_\alpha = \min \{ \delta : \psi(Q, \delta) > \alpha \} \quad (24)$$

Then, the CVaR of the portfolio under a certain confidence level α is defined as

$$CVaR_\alpha \left(\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_i, R_i) \right) \quad (25)$$

$$= (1-\alpha)^{-1} \int_{\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_i, R_i) \geq VaR_\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_i, R_i) * p(\mathbf{R}) d\mathbf{R}$$

The function $F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha)$ has been defined as an upper bound of $CVaR_\alpha$, which is convex and continuously differentiable [25]

$$F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha) = VaR_\alpha + (1-\alpha)^{-1} \int_{R_i} \left[\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_i, R_{i,n}) - VaR_\alpha \right]^+ p(\mathbf{R}) d\mathbf{R} \quad (26)$$

An analytical expression of $p(\mathbf{R})$ is not needed. By using the Monte Carlo method to generate samples containing clearing results and FTR revenue, $F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha)$ can be further simplified as

$$F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha) = VaR_\alpha + \frac{1}{K(1-\alpha)} \quad (27)$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^K \left[\sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_{i,n}, R_{i,n}) - VaR_\alpha \right]^+$$

where K denotes the number of selecting samples and $K = 2000$. By introducing a substitution variable ζ_i^k for sample k of FTR i , $F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha)$ is simplified as

$$F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha) = VaR_\alpha + \frac{1}{K(1-\alpha)} \sum_{k=1}^K \zeta_i^k \quad (28)$$

subject to

$$\zeta_i^k \geq \sum_{i=1}^M f(Q_{i,n}, R_{i,n}) - VaR_\alpha \quad (29)$$

$$\zeta_i^k \geq 0 \quad (30)$$

Therefore, the original budget constrained FTR portfolio optimization (6)-(9) for round n can be reformulated as

$$\min (F_\alpha(Q_i, VaR_\alpha)) \quad (31)$$

subject to

$$(7) - (9), (29), (30)$$

where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, M\}$.

The above optimization problem can be efficiently solved by commercial solvers such as CPLEX and Gurobi.

V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

In this section, the proposed online learning methodology-based bidding strategy was applied to the IEEE 14-bus system (Fig. 2). To simulate practical electricity market conditions, all loads are time-varying, which results in LMP fluctuations across the system. Based on the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) simulation, we obtain 200 samples that contain FTR monthly revenue pairs with corresponding market clearing prices, which fluctuate around the monthly revenue randomly. The proposed algorithm together with other online learning approaches is tested on an offline dataset. Based on the IEEE 14-bus system, we formulate 14 FTRs constituted by node pairs across locations in the topology. Each FTR is represented by an ordered tuple that contains source node e and sink node k : $\{e, k\}$. All FTRs are enumerated in Table I. For simplicity, the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) will not be conducted to decide the issued FTR capacity. We assume that the bidder is a price-taker whose demand merely occupies a small proportion of the total available amount. Thus, the bidder can obtain the purchasing amount whenever his bid is determined as winning price. The first part presents that the expected unit profit of proposed TBS algorithm converges faster to that of the optimal bid while compared to algorithms from relevant online learning literature. Subsequently, the online learning methodology-based portfolio optimization model is compared with other portfolio construction methods, which also are based on online learning approaches.




Fig. 2. IEEE 14-bus system.

TABLE I
FTR INFORMATION

FTR 1: {14,2}	FTR 2: {1,5}	FTR 3: {2,5}	FTR 4: {5,10}
FTR 5: {3,4}	FTR 6: {4,5}	FTR 7: {6,12}	FTR 8: {7,9}
FTR 9: {9,14}	FTR 10: {13,14}	FTR 11: {2,3}	FTR 12: {6,13}
FTR 13: {2,9}	FTR 14: {8,12}		

A. Performance of TBS Algorithm

1) Benchmarks

To demonstrate the performance of the proposed TBS algorithm in converging to the global optimal bid, we compare it with two algorithms from recently advanced online learning literature.

The first algorithm is the EXP-Tree algorithm by [30], which was applied in repeated sequential auctions. In the sequential auction, in which an auction item's value and bidding price are bounded in interval $[0,1]$, EXP-Tree randomly submits a bidding price from $[0,1]$ and observes the winning bid. Every round, the winning bid would be embedded in the interval $[0,1]$ recursively to derive subintervals, which generate submitted bidding prices for the auction. Then, the profit obtained by the bidding price is used to update the weight of the corresponding subinterval. A subinterval with higher weight has more opportunities to be selected.

The second one is the WIN-EXP algorithm proposed by [33], which aims to find the best fixed bidding price in hindsight for repeated sponsored search auctions. With a delicately formulated utility function, this algorithm updates the weight distribution among the finite bids set B . For example, the initialized weight distribution for each bid b in B is $w(b) = \frac{1}{|B|}$. With the formulation of the utility function as $u_n(b) = \frac{(\Delta\lambda_n - \pi_n - 1)\mathbb{I}\{b \geq \pi_n\}}{\sum_{b' \in B, b' \geq \pi_n} w_n(b')}$, WIN-EXP updates the corresponding bid option's weight as

$$w_{n+1}(b) = w_n(b) * \exp(\eta * u_n(b)) \quad (32)$$

Without loss of generality, the bidding interval $[0,1]$ is uniformly discretized into 11 bidding options here. Since the number of simulated samples is only 200, a more intensive bid options partition would result in insufficient evaluation of the set of bids.

As discussed in Section I, another approach in solving the FTR bidding problem falls into the category of reinforcement learning field [24][25]. To illustrate the performance of the proposed TBS algorithm with the existing approach in the examined problem, we further conduct an experiment to compare the online learning approach with existing reinforcement learning algorithms such as Q-learning and state-of-the-art DDPG (deep deterministic policy gradient) in terms of the collected profit.

2) Results Analysis

We randomly select FTR pricing node pairs across locations in the IEEE 14-bus system. Based on this, the monthly revenue and clearing price for each FTR have been simulated with 200 samples. For comparison among the TBS, EXP-Tree and WIN-EXP algorithms, we arbitrarily select FTR 1 as the target in the auction market. Note that the magnitude of the FTR's unit revenue is normalized in $[-1,1]$ and the bidding space is a continuous interval $[0,1]$ for EXP-Tree and TBS. For WIN-EXP, bid set is adaptively formulated as $[0, 0.1, 0.2, \dots, 0.9, 1]$. All these algorithms are applied in the repeated FTR monthly auction. To measure the performances of all these online learning algorithms in converging to the optimal solution, criteria such as regret and average regret are used. For the reinforcement learning methodology, we evaluate the performance according to the collected profit over the 200 FTR

auction rounds for the same FTR. The bidding space for Q-learning is the same as that of WIN-EXP since it must be set up in discrete action space. The state-of-the-art DDPG adapts to a




Fig. 3. Comparison of regret over 200 FTR monthly auction rounds.




Fig. 4. Comparison of average regret.




Fig. 5. Comparison of profit over 200 FTR monthly auction rounds.

continuous action space. Therefore, the bidding space for DDPG is a continuous interval $[0, 1]$.

As shown in Fig. 3, compared with the EXP-Tree and WIN-EXP algorithms, TBS achieves a significantly lower regret over the total auction rounds. Meanwhile, the WIN-EXP presents the highest regret magnitude in all periods. Such an outcome indicates that a finite discretization bid set is inefficient to converge to the global optimum. Fig. 4 shows the average regret of all these online learning algorithms. It is observed that the average regret curve of TBS is not as smooth as the others,

which is caused by the path reselecting. With the accumulation of samples, all algorithms' average regret goes to a smooth descent stage. TBS outperforms WIN-EXP and EXP-Tree on average regret, with the lowest average regret throughout the auction rounds.

Fig. 5 illustrates the evolution cumulative profit collected by Q-learning, DDPG and the proposed TBS algorithm for bidding for only one unit of FTR over the 200 rounds on the target FTR. Significant differences in the increase in collected profit between the TBS algorithm and the other two reinforcement learning methods can be observed in the figure. This is driven by TBS's capability to explore in continuous bidding space, while searching for accurate solutions in discrete space is more challenging for Q-learning. Although state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning methods such as DDPG can be applied in continuous action space, they require a large number of historical samples derived by interacting with the environment to train the policy neural network. The insufficiency of historical data makes DDPG exhibit very poor performance. Apparently, the proposed approach outperforms existing reinforcement learning methods.

B. Budget-constrained Portfolio Optimization

As illustrated above, compared with other advanced online learning methods, the expected profit of TBS converges faster to the expected payoff of the optimal bid. With the bidding prices derived by the online learning algorithm, the optimized FTR portfolio construction model in the UL problem (6)-(9) further determines the purchasing MW amount for each FTR. In this subsection, the performance of such a portfolio construction model is presented.

1) Benchmark Methods

We compare the proposed portfolio construction model with other online learning method-based portfolio optimization models to evaluate its performance in practical applications. The first model is the DPDS model from [28]. Similar to our work, [28] develops an online learning algorithm to find the global optimal bid in sequential virtual trading. Based on bidding prices derived by the online learning algorithm for all options, the DPDS adopts dynamic programming to accomplish the optimal portfolio construction. In accordance with the procedure of DPDS, the bid set is generated by recursively discretizing the continuum interval $[0, \mathcal{B}]$, where \mathcal{B} is the total budget for each round. For example, the DPDS's bid set is $\mathcal{F}_n = [0, \frac{\mathcal{B}}{\alpha_n}, \frac{2\mathcal{B}}{\alpha_n}, \dots, \frac{(\alpha_n-1)\mathcal{B}}{\alpha_n}, \mathcal{B}]$, where $\alpha_n = n + 1$. Then, the empirical average payoff of a bid in bids set for FTR k would be calculated as

$$\bar{p}_{k,n}(b) = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{s=1}^{n-1} (\Delta\lambda_s - \pi_s) \mathbb{1}\{b \geq \pi_s\} \quad (33)$$

where $b \in \mathcal{F}_n$.

For each FTR, the bidding price that earns the highest empirical average payoff will be submitted for this round. Then with dynamic programming, DPDS will allocate the budget to maximize the total expected payoff.

The other portfolio construction model based on the online learning method is the UCBIID-GR developed by [28] and derived from UCBIID [30]. For each round of auction, the UCBIID-GR observes revenue of each FTR and submits a bid as the average FTR revenue up to the current round. Then, according to the observed FTR revenues and corresponding




Fig. 6. Mean-variance of 14 FTR's profit.




Fig. 7. Purchasing amount for FTR 1-7.




Fig. 8. Purchasing amount for FTR 8-14.


clearing price distributions, UCBID-GR would allocate budget to purchase the most profitable FTR until there is no sufficient residual budget.

2) Results Analysis

Based on the IEEE 14-bus system, we obtain 200 samples for 14 FTR candidates' monthly revenue and clearing prices to simulate for 200 auction rounds' clearing outcomes. Similarly, each portfolio construction model is utilized to allocate the same budget among all these FTR candidates based on bidding prices generated by the corresponding learning algorithms. Note that for simplicity, the magnitude range of FTR's unit

monthly revenue is normalized in $[-1,1]$, and the clearing price is normalized in $[0,1]$.

To illustrate the mechanism of the FTR portfolio model, we present the mean and variance of 14 FTRs' profit (Fig.6) and the purchasing amount for all FTRs over the 200 rounds (Fig. 7-8). Due to the space limitations, only the purchasing amount determined by CVaR with a confidence level of 0.9 and budget

Fig. 9. Cumulative profit trajectory over 200 FTR auction rounds with $B = 6$.

level $B = 6$ is presented. As shown in Fig. 7-8, the purchasing amount for FTRs with a higher mean value of profit continues to increase and remains higher than the rest. As the CVaR model aims to minimize the risk associated with portfolio construction, the purchasing amount for FTRs with higher variance in their profit is less than that of FTRs with lower variance. For example, the purchasing amount for FTR 1 is larger than that of FTR 2, which has the highest variance, although its mean value remains the highest.

The trajectory of the cumulative payoff obtained by each model over a 200-month auction with budget level $B = 6$ is presented in Fig. 9. The inherent risk aversion of the CVaR model enables a trade-off between profitability and risk in FTR auctions. Fig. 9 shows that the CVaR model with a confidence level of 0.9 achieves a higher cumulative profit over all auction rounds. The other CVaR model, at the 0.99 confidence level, appears to be smoother than CVaR(0.9). A higher confidence level leads to more risk-averse behaviour, which restrains the purchase of risky FTR products and therefore reduces opportunities to acquire more profit.

This is unlike DPDS and UCBID-GR, which purchase profitable options per unit amount at most. Our model enables the determination of flexible purchasing quantities in the auction market. We observed that these two benchmark models, DPDS and UCBID-GR, could not collect more profit with a higher budget. Similar to the numerical results shown in [28], the DPDS model outperforms the UCBID-GR by its ERM (empirical risk minimization) approach and dynamic programming (DP) method in portfolio construction. However, the DPDS considers portfolio optimization as a 0-1 knapsack problem, which restricts the inclusion of quantities as decision variables. Therefore, even with a higher budget level, these two models could not achieve a significant profit increase. Obviously, the CVaR-based model is more compatible with practical situations.

The Sharpe ratio¹ is commonly used to gauge the performance of an investment [37]. The higher the ratio is, the greater the investment return relative to the amount of risk taken. As presented in Table II, the DPDS and UCBID-GR have higher Sharpe ratios than CVaR(0.9) and CVaR(0.99); although these two models achieve higher cumulative profits in the FTR monthly auction, their Sharpe ratios are less than those of the DPDS and UCBID-GR under lower budget levels.

TABLE II

SHARPE RATIOS OF PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION MODELS			
Model	$B = 1$	$B = 6$	$B = 14$
CVaR(0.9)	7.424	9.081	10.239
CVaR(0.99)	12.263	12.143	15.071
DPDS	17.129	16.358	16.362
UCBID-GR	17.474	17.474	17.474

As mentioned previously, DPDS and UCBID-GR just purchase per unit quantities for each profitable FTR product, which enables them to achieve a higher Sharpe ratio as they minimize the deviation of the return. In addition, the CVaR-based model includes quantity as a decision variable and therefore leads to a significant deviation of return. This is especially true for CVaR(0.9), which intends to allocate more budget for products with high profitability while focusing less on the risk of payoff fluctuation. In addition, as shown in Table II, the Sharpe ratios of the DPDS and UCBID-GR remain the same when the budget level is sufficient for them to purchase profitable products. Even though there is still a surplus in the budget, no more quantities would be bought.

In contrast, both the CVaR(0.9) and CVaR(0.99) models achieve a higher Sharpe ratio with increasing budget levels. As shown in Table II, with the increase in the budget level, the Sharpe ratio of CVaR(0.99) almost approximates that of DPDS. This phenomenon indicates that our CVaR-based model also could present a satisfied Sharpe ratio with a sufficient budget. This phenomenon illustrates that the proposed model is more compatible with realistic situations than the similar DPDS model. Any speculators in a practical FTR auction market may have a budget level that is sufficient to purchase a certain quantity of products instead of a per unit amount.

VI. CONCLUSION

We address the optimal bidding problem and portfolio optimization problem in repeated FTR auctions, where bidders do not know the underlying profit of FTRs. We develop an online learning approach with only observed clearing outcomes as input to search for the optimal bidding price. The proposed TBS algorithm sets up the bidding problem in continuous space and can converge to the optimal solution as auction rounds increase. Meanwhile, the well-designed binary tree expansion scheme realizes a favourable computational complexity as $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$, making the algorithm an effective method for big data scenarios. Instead of simply considering bidding on a

specific FTR, we combine the online learning algorithm with the conditional value at risk (CVaR) tool, which can assess many FTRs simultaneously and derive optimal purchasing quantities among them. To summarize, we provide an effective methodology for an FTR bidder to search for the optimal bidding price and to analytically optimize his or her FTR portfolio with adjustable risk preference.

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¹In this paper, Sharpe ratio is calculated as $\sqrt{N} \frac{\bar{p}_N}{\sqrt{\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{n=1}^N (p_n - \bar{p}_N)^2}}$, where

$\bar{p}_N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N p_n$. N is the total auction rounds under consideration and p_n is the profit of round n .

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