A Rising Tide? The Effects of Municipal Muslim Population Shares on Local Islamophobia in Switzerland

DWKB3

Supervisor: Dr Moritz Marbach

Word Count: 7997

Dissertation submitted in part-fulfilment of the Bachelor's degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, UCL, July 2024.

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of municipal Muslim population shares on local Islamophobic attitudes in Switzerland. It overcomes previous data limitations by leveraging the results of the 2009 Minaret Construction Ban and the 2021 Face-Covering Ban referenda to measure changes in local Islamophobic sentiment. Employing first-difference models, our study indicates that increases in Muslim population shares generally reduce Islamophobia, with larger increments having a more pronounced effect. Additionally, our research is the first to differentiate between Arab and non-Arab Muslim impacts, finding that increases in the shares of non-Arab Muslims have a stronger mitigating effect on Islamophobic attitudes. In contrast, reductions in Muslim shares are found to increase Islamophobia, although significant effects are mostly confined to large decreases in shares and are less robust for Muslim sub-groups. Our results underscore the influence of the size and characteristics of local Muslim populations on Swiss Islamophobia dynamics and substantiate that these dynamics align more closely with Intergroup Contact Theory than Threat Theory. These findings hold important implications for policymakers, particularly in contexts of rising Muslim populations and the need for effective integration strategies.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Moritz Marbach, for his precious guidance and advice during the realisation of this research project. I also wish to thank Dr Sarah Correia for her help and J-P Salter for his lectures and the insights he provided on dissertation writing and structuring during the last academic year. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for their continuous support.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: Unveiling the Dynamics between Local Muslim Populations and Islamophobia in Switzerland

Recent decades have been marked by events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the London bombings, which have significantly influenced perceptions and attitudes towards Muslim communities in Western countries, including Switzerland. Notably, the 2009 Minaret Construction Ban and 2021 Face-Covering Ban referenda, are highlighted as particularly contentious periods in Switzerland's history regarding its treatment of Muslims. Although the immediate controversies have subsided, the question of the Swiss population's attitude towards Muslim communities remains pressing amid increasing cultural and religious diversity.

Our study aims to better understand the dynamics of Islamophobia in Switzerland through the prisms of Intergroup Contact Theory, predicting reduced prejudice with increased intergroup exposure under specific conditions, and Threat Theory, suggesting that perceived threats from Muslim immigration may exacerbate intergroup tensions. More specifically, we investigate the impact of municipal Muslim population shares on local Islamophobia by employing a first-difference approach and leveraging Switzerland's semi-direct democracy, using the results of the two above-mentioned referenda as indicators of Islamophobic sentiments. Despite a growing body of research on Islamophobia, data limitations have hindered robust causal studies on the impact of contact between natives and Muslims, with no such study conducted in Switzerland to date. Moreover, our study is unique in its granularity, considering both the magnitude and direction of changes in local Muslim populations, as well as being the first to explore how intergroup contact effects on Islamophobia differ between the Arab and non-Arab Muslim sub-groups.

Our findings reveal that increases in municipal Muslim shares decrease Islamophobia, with larger increases having a greater impact. Furthermore, while both Arab and non-Arab Muslim increases contribute to decreasing Islamophobia, the effect is more pronounced for non-Arab Muslims. Conversely, reductions in local Muslim demographics typically increase Islamophobia, but significant effects are largely limited to large decreases and show little consistency in robustness tests across Muslim sub-groups. Our results, indicating that the effect of local Muslim immigration aligns more closely with Intergroup Contact Theory than Threat Theory, are relevant both in Switzerland and internationally. Considering that the Muslim population in Europe is expected to grow by up to 9.1 percentage points from 2016 to 2050, understanding its local impact on Islamophobia is necessary for effective policy-making and supporting social cohesion, notably concerning refugee reception and urban planning (Pew Research Center, 2017; Nathan and Sands, 2023). This holds particular importance in decentralised federal states like Switzerland, where political discussions often take place at the local level (Horber-Papazian, 2007), and municipalities have substantial power over policies concerning (Muslim) immigrants, for example in naturalisation decisions (Green, Fasel and Sarasin, 2010).

2. Literature Review

2.1 Defining Islamophobia: Conceptual Clarifications

Coined in 1918, the term "Islamophobia" remained ambiguous until 1997, when the Runnymede Trust clarified it as a fear and dislike of Islam and Muslims, distinguishing between legitimate criticism and prejudice (Sayyid, 2014; Helbling, 2012). Bleich (2011) critiqued this definition as too broad, suggesting a narrower focus on "*indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims*" (p.1585). This refined definition emphasises the generalisation of negative feelings towards either or both Muslims and Islam, the range of negative attitudes and emotions involved, and the specific targeting of the religion and its followers. The severity of Islamophobia is gauged by the frequency and consistency of these negative attitudes and emotions (Helbling, 2012; Bleich, 2011). Our study adopts this refined definition.

2.2 Exploring the Causal Relationship Between Native-Muslim Interactions and Islamophobia: A Research Gap

Although increased Muslim immigration in Western countries has prompted extensive research, there remains a notable gap in studies exploring the causal relationships between native-Muslim interactions and Islamophobia.

Research has historically focussed on Islam's role in the West and state regulation of religions. Recently, attention has shifted to the attitudes of native residents towards Islam and Muslims (Helbling, 2012). This newer research has primarily focussed on exploring the nature and presence of Islamophobia (Bleich, 2011; Direnberger et al., 2022; Cheng, 2015; Lindemann, 2021; Sayyid, 2014; Aidenberger and Doehne, 2021), its determinants (Orlanski and Schultze,

2017; Herrchen, 2016; Ciftci, 2012; Perocco, 2018), and its impacts on Muslim communities (Abu Khalaf et al, 2022; Kaminski, 2014; Khokhar, 2021; Elkassem et al., 2018).

Within this body of literature, a growing subset investigates how native-Muslim interactions might influence Islamophobic attitudes, with mixed findings: while most studies report that such contacts reduce Islamophobia (Pickel and Öztürk, 2018; Mansouri and Vergani, 2018; Gomez del Tronco, 2023; Abrams et al., 2017; Pickel 2019; Colic-Peisker and Mikola, 2021; Stoddard, 2023), others find the opposite (Orlanski and Schulze, 2017; Velasco González et al., 2008), or show varied outcomes depending on the native groups in question (Jung, 2012; Gravelle, 2021). Yet, most of this research has relied on non-causal, cross-sectional methods, prone to bias and endogeneity.

Only three studies have employed robust causal frameworks to examine the effects of interactions with Muslims on Islamophobia. Adida, Laintin, and Valfort (2016) conducted a field experiment in France where participants played games in groups with varying proportions of Muslim players. They found that higher proportions of Muslim players increased Islamophobia among other players. Alrababa'h et al. (2021) used synthetic control to assess the impact of exposure to Muslim football star Mohamed Salah, finding that it reduced Islamophobic attitudes in the UK. Finally, Bursztyn et al. (2022) employed instrumental variables to show that greater long-term exposure to Arab Muslims decreases prejudice against them in the United States.

This limited range of causal research is partly due to historical survey methods that lump Muslim migrants with broader immigrant categories, overlooking specific attitudes towards Muslims (Direnberger et al., 2022). Although some surveys now aim to capture Islamophobic

attitudes, the necessary changes in survey design are often too recent to offer panel data or not intended for longitudinal analysis, limiting the range of available causal research designs (Gravelle, 2021; Pickel and Öztürk, 2018; Mansouri and Vergani, 2018). This is compounded by the reliance of some causal methods on an exogenous shock affecting only the targeted out-group, a condition more readily met for general immigrant or refugee groups than for Muslims (Gerber and Green, 2012). Consequently, causal studies often focus on broader immigrant attitudes rather than on Islamophobia.

Our study aims to address this gap in the literature, utilising Switzerland's semi-direct democracy to overcome the scarcity of appropriate data and implement a first-difference research design, as detailed in Section 3.

2.3 Contact and Threat in the Context of Swiss Local Population Shares

A vast literature has investigated how immigration and inter-group interactions shape attitudes and prejudice. While a full review is out of our scope, we focus on the theories and mechanisms most relevant to the context of Islamophobic attitudes amidst rising immigration and direct the interested reader to the excellent reviews of Alesina and Tabellini (2022), Paluck et al. (2019), and Helbling (2012).

Allport (1954) lays the foundation of intergroup contact theory, elucidating the circumstances under which interactions between a majority in-group and a perceived out-group can enhance empathy and understanding (Pettigrew et al., 2011). He posits that "optimal contact", which reduces intergroup prejudice, requires the fulfilment of four conditions: equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and authority support (Pettigrew et al., 2011; Paluck et al., 2019; Alesina and Tabellini, 2022; Cerruti and Robbiano, 2023). In other words, groups

must perceive equal status *during* the contact situation, share common goals that are achievable only through cooperation, and receive endorsement from authorities to establish acceptance norms. In such circumstances, competing groups learn from one another and revise their negative perceptions (Pettigrew, 1998). When these conditions are not met, contact instead exacerbates prejudice (Nathan and Sands, 2023).

Intergroup threat theory (ITT), as introduced by Stephan and Stephan (1996), offers insights into how this may happen. According to the ITT, the more individuals perceive specific social groups as a threat, the more likely they are to hold prejudice against them (Uenal, 2016). ITT traditionally identifies two main types of threats: realistic (concerning jobs, social welfare, political power, and physical safety) and symbolic (pertaining to cultural norms and values) (Uenal, 2016). Whether one or the other becomes salient depends on the characteristics of the out-group (Makashvili, et al., 2018). For instance, economically powerful groups may invoke realistic threats (Stephan et al., 2005), while socially marginalised groups like homosexuals may provoke symbolic threats (Haddock, Zanna, and Esses, 1993). More recent developments in the field suggest differentiating between realistic threats, relating to economic, political, and material concerns, and safety threats, focussing on physical safety and well-being. This distinction follows observations that both forms of threat are associated with different prejudicial emotions and uniquely predict out-group attitudes (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005; Crawford, 2014; Riek et al., 2006; Doosje et al., 2009). Studies indicate that realistic, symbolic, and safety threats can mediate the outcomes of intergroup interactions. Accordingly, contact failing to meet Allport's conditions may increase perceived threats and thus, intergroup prejudice (Uenal, 2016; Pettigrew et al., 2007; Nathan and Sands, 2023).

Yet, studies have reported reductions in prejudice - although smaller - when only some or none of Allport's conditions were met (Pettigrew et al., 2011). Pettigrew (1998) accounts for this by arguing that these conditions are facilitating, not necessary for prejudice reduction. Furthermore, he identified three overlooked mechanisms which facilitate the generalisation of prejudice reduction across situations and out-groups: changes in behaviour, forming emotional connections, and reassessing one's in-group. These mechanisms, however, develop slowly and contact may initially exacerbate prejudice before reducing it. Hence, Pettigrew (1998) proposes a fifth condition to the contact theory, termed "friendship potential". This condition underscores the importance of engaging in close, cooperative interactions with the chance for repeated encounters across a variety of social contexts (Nathan and Sands, 2023). This amendment to contact theory anticipates a growth in "optimal contact" effects with increasing duration.

Thus, empirical studies of intergroup contact can be categorised by the depth and duration of interactions using a quadrant model, depicted in Figure 1. Here, contact encompasses any form of intergroup interaction, with research indicating that even visual proximity to out-groups can influence attitudes (Nathan and Sands, 2023). Contact depth ranges from casual, with minimal engagement, to cooperative, ideally meeting Allport's four conditions. Duration extends from brief singular encounters to sustained exposure (Nathan and Sands, 2023).

Figure 1: Quadrant Model of Empirical Intergroup Contact Studies



Source: Nathan and Sands,2023, p.237

"Friendship potential" increases with both depth and duration, reaching its maximum in the top-right quadrant. This area involves studies on long-term, immersive exposures to out-groups, such as cohabitation in communal settings (Samii, 2013; Rao 2019), or repeated, though less intense cooperative activities like team sports (Ditlmann and Samii, 2016; Mousa 2020), generally showing positive contact effects.

Studies in the bottom-right quadrant involve single-shot cooperative interactions, like doctor-patient meetings (Weiss, 2021) or collaborative puzzle-solving experiments (Gu et al., 2019). While these short-term instances sometimes yield positive outcomes, these are scarcer than for more sustained cooperative interactions, with greater opportunities for attitude change (Nathan and Sands, 2023).

The bottom-left quadrant focusses on brief and casual contact, investigating the effects of incidental interactions in local settings, such as encounters in public transportation or other

public places (Pettigrew, 1998; Enos, 2014; Sands, 2017; Condra and Linardi, 2019). These interactions typically result in negative outcomes (Cerruti and Robbiano, 2023).

The top-left quadrant covers prolonged but superficial contacts, such as repeated interactions with the same individuals or various out-group members. This segment, often associated with the ITT, includes studies on "familiar strangers" (Milgram, 1977), and analyses like Hangartner et al. (2018), looking into the electoral repercussions of prolonged exposure to Syrian refugees on Greek islands during transit periods. Most of these studies report adverse effects (ibid, 2018; Dinas et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2021).

Notably, Figure 1's typology does not encompass studies where the nature of intergroup interactions remains unobserved. Such research employs the spatial organisation of groups as a proxy for contact, often through the demographic makeup of communities, to infer how local context impacts behaviour and attitudes (Robinson, 2017; Enos, 2015; Kasara, 2013; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). Our investigation into the dynamics between Muslim immigrants and native populations within Swiss municipalities falls into this category. As the local Muslim demographic grows, so does the frequency of intergroup contact. Although direct observation of these contacts is not feasible, indirect indicators allow us to estimate their nature and locate our study within the quadrant framework. Indeed, interactions with local Muslim residents are clearly sustained. This places our research between the top-left and top-right quadrants, that is, between conditions conducive to optimal contact and those expected to heighten Islamophobia.

Upon initial examination, it might be suggested that an increase in local Muslim population shares could lead to casual interactions that fuel Islamophobia, supported by three primary arguments. Firstly, strong empirical evidence corroborates the ITT in the context of

Islamophobia. In this regard, terroristic threats are a major focus within safety threats, reflecting the prevalent view of Muslims posing an immediate yet unpredictable risk of terrorist attacks (Uenal, 2016; Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005; Herrchen, 2016; Gould, 2014). Studies consistently find that perceived terroristic threats, along with symbolic and realistic threats – either individually or combined – significantly contribute to *anti-Muslim prejudice* (Uenal, 2016; Schumann, 2010; Leibold, 2010; Doosje et al., 2009; Oswald, 2005). Similarly, symbolic and terroristic threats are shown to be significantly linked to *anti-Islam prejudice* (Pickel, 2013; Frindte and Haußecker, 2010; Leibold and Kummerer, 2010). Secondly, perceived threat levels from Muslim immigration in Swiss municipalities are likely elevated. Research suggests that the perception of cultural threats from out-groups intensifies due to cultural differences, increased perceptual distinctiveness, and the perceived cohesiveness of the out-group (Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Sniderman et al., 2004). In Switzerland, Muslims are culturally distinct from the native population, which predominantly identifies with Catholic-Roman and Western European backgrounds (Swiss Confederation, 2023). This distinction is emphasised by ethnic differences and the wearing of face coverings by Muslim women. Moreover, Green, Fasel, and Sarasin (2010) have observed the Swiss Muslim community's efforts to form cross-cultural and linguistic organisations that represent shared interests, thereby enhancing their group cohesion. Consequently, Muslims' growing presence may be perceived as a sizeable threat by the native population. Finally, contact tends to exacerbate prejudice when individuals feel threatened, and optimal contact is less probable among those with strong prejudices (Pettigrew et al., 2011; Alesina and Tabellini, 2022). Indeed, the degree of one's prejudice towards an out-group determines whether they avoid or seek contact (Pettigrew, 1998; Sniderman et al., 2004; Nathan and Sands, 2023). Furthermore, existing prejudices can make any contact that does occur suboptimal, lacking the depth needed to foster friendship and intergroup understanding

(Pettigrew, 1998). Therefore, an increase in municipal Muslim population shares could escalate fears, leading to superficial contacts and rising Islamophobia.

However, as above-mentioned, most cross-sectional studies report a reduction in Islamophobia following native-Muslim interactions. This points to the practical aspects of Muslim integration in Switzerland, providing reasons to believe that their immigration might instead lead to positive intergroup contacts. Given that a considerable portion of Muslim immigration during the study period consisted of asylum seekers (SEM, 2024), refugee reception programs offer valuable insights. These programs, aimed at facilitating "*swift and long-term integration*", address several barriers to positive contact (OSAR, n.d.). For instance, they demonstrate the authorities' endorsement of cooperative interactions by offering comprehensive support to facilitate integration, promote local networking, and assist with labour market entry (SEM, 2019). Additionally, Cantonal Integration Programs (CIP) allocate CHF 18,000 per refugee to facilitate their integration into local communities via social events, professional training, and dialogues with Swiss society (UNHCR, 2024; SEM, 2019). CIPs also mandate courses to overcome language barriers, an important obstacle to positive contacts (ibid, 2019; Pettigrew, 1998). Furthermore, the 2015 Syrian crisis prompted a shift from housing refugees in remote collective centres to placing them in host families or subsidised flats within cities, improving cultural understanding and tolerance (OSAR, n.d.). Government policies thus create a framework conducive to positive intergroup contact. Consequently, 22% of Swiss residents count refugees as friends, 21% engage with them in their neighbourhoods, and 17% through leisure activities (HEKS, 2019).

The potential for positive contact effects extends to the broader, non-refugee Muslim population, whose integration is making "*clear progress*" (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017).

Contrary to the expectations of casual contacts, a majority of Muslims report they feel well-integrated (Monnet, 2015), and 87% have regular contact with people from other religions during their leisure time (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). Similarly, Muslim immigrants surveyed by Amnesty International (2014) report that stereotypes and prejudice against them were short-lived and that they felt "*perfectly integrated*" a few years after immigrating. Furthermore, the Swiss education system mandates all children up to age 15 to attend school, providing an environment where Muslim and native students can engage in sustained, cooperative intergroup interactions with common goals (Swiss Confederation, 2021). Since contact effects can generalise across individuals (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Alrababa'h et al., 2021), reductions in Islamophobic attitudes among native students may influence their relatives' attitudes as well. Importantly, living in mixed neighbourhoods increases the likelihood of forming out-group friendships, and the positive aggregate impact of these friendships generally surpasses the lesser prejudice reductions from those avoiding contact (Pettigrew, 1998). Accordingly, we hypothesise:

H1: An increase in the municipal share of Muslims decreases the Islamophobia of native residents[1].

Building on Hypothesis H1, we ask if the impact of increasing municipal Muslim shares differs between Arab and non-Arab Muslim sub-groups. Research shows that contact effects vary significantly based on out-group characteristics, such as immigrant ethnicity (Paluck et al., 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Stereotypes notably influence these effects (Pettigrew, 1998); Arabs face specific stereotypes that may heighten perceived threats, including

[1] Our hypotheses are formulated to reflect the literature's focus on the effects of increasing out-group contact and expectations of rising Muslim population shares.

associations with terrorism more than other Muslims (Monnet, 2015), and misperceptions as robbers (Rosello, 1994; Mamou, 2008) and thieves (Amnesty International, 2014). This leads to our second hypothesis:

H2: All else being equal, an increase in the municipal shares of Arab Muslims will decrease Islamophobia to a lesser extent than an equivalent increase in non-Arab Muslim (NAM) shares.

3. Methodology

3.1 Data Sourcing

Data for the 2131 Swiss municipalities were obtained from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO), a popular source for reliable demographic data (Orlanski and Schulze, 2017; Green, Fasel, and Sarrasin, 2010; Afonso, 2004; Zimmerman and Stutzer, 2022). Further information on data sourcing, cleaning and wrangling is available in Appendix A.

3.2 Measuring Islamophobia - Outcome Variable

As previously mentioned, the scarcity of panel data on Islamophobic attitudes was addressed by taking advantage of Switzerland's semi-direct democracy. The use of referenda results – for which voting is anonymous and outcomes consequential – also tackled surveys' tendency to overestimate favourable views towards Muslims due to social desirability and hypothetical bias (Orlanski and Schulze, 2017; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018). Thus, we argue that the following two constitutional referenda can serve as longitudinal indicators of municipal Islamophobia.

2009 Minaret Construction Ban

Led by the right-wing party Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), the referendum followed a dispute over the Turkish Cultural Association's 2005 bid to construct Switzerland's *third* minaret (Dodd, 2015; Cheng, 2015). Despite efforts to halt the project, it was ultimately approved by the Supreme Court, resulting in a campaign for a national minaret construction ban to halt the perceived growth of Muslims' insidious presence and the ensuing spread of Sharia law (Cheng, 2015). The SVP portrayed itself as on a "*moral crusade*" to preserve Swiss security, economy, values, territory, and women's rights (Direnberger et al., 2022, p.396). To cement this narrative, it claimed the Al-Qaeda terrorist network had recruited fighters near a Swiss mosque, and requested the deportation of Imams, namely the "*preachers of hate*" (ibid,

2022, p.391). These assertions were illustrated by pro-ban posters depicting a burqa-clad figure against a Swiss flag pierced by minarets strikingly resembling missiles, shown in Figure 2 (Dodd, 2015). The referendum was approved by 58.5% of voters (VoteInfo, 2024).

Figure 2: SVP Pro-Minaret Construction Ban Poster

Source: Financial Times, 2016

2021 Ban on Face-Coverings in the Public Space

Direnberger et al. (2022)'s analysis of parliamentary debates between 2001 and 2015 showcases the referendum's background, revealing that its initiators, the CDPP and SVP parties, held three assumptions about Muslim women. First, they viewed wearing scarves as a sign of radical Islamism and a "*crusade against Western values*" (Direnberger et al., 2022, p.392). Second, they considered Muslim women oppressed by Muslim men, citing increases in forced marriages, veil wearing, and female genital mutilation, as well as "*honour crimes*" against female family members as evidence (ibid, 2022, p.393). Third, they perceived veiled women as security risks, complicating identity checks during violent incidents. Starting in 2010 and fuelled by the success of the Minaret Construction Ban, these beliefs spurred various

cantonal initiatives for "*burqa bans*", culminating in the 2021 national referendum, endorsed by 51.2% of voters (Humanrights.ch, 2023; VoteInfo, 2024). During their campaign, the SVP and CDPP used crime prevention and anti-extremism rhetoric to promote stereotypes of Islam as violent and a threat to democracy (Direnberger et al., 2022). Figure 3 illustrates these claims.

Figure 3: SVP Pro-Face Covering Ban Poster

Source: SVP, 2019

Although some might argue that support for the referendum does not solely reflect Islamophobia but also genuine concerns that face coverings fuel violent crime and oppress women, several arguments suggest the predominant sentiment was Islamophobic. Prominent opponents, including the Government, Parliament, and major religious groups repeatedly emphasised that the referendum violated principles of freedom and stigmatised the Muslim minority (Courrier International, 2021). In particular, the Government pointed out the referendum's disproportionate nature, concerning only an estimated 30 to 40 women nationwide, and proposed an alternative project requiring individuals to show their faces for

identity verification upon request (Courrier International, 2021; VoteInfo, 2024). Furthermore, the Government and Parliament argued that the referendum would exclude Muslim women from public life rather than protect their rights, noting that forcing women to wear veils was already illegal (VoteInfo, 2024). Similarly, feminist groups argued that prohibiting women from choosing their attire would violate their rights (Courrier International, 2024). Accordingly, the Government's counter-proposal also included broader, non-binding measures to promote women's rights. Finally, 19 of 26 cantons already had bans on face coverings at sports events and protests, the very scenarios the SVP identified as centres of anonymous violence (VoteInfo, 2024). Considering the above, we contend that voters genuinely concerned about violent crime and women's rights would have supported the counterproposal rather than the referendum, indicating the latter's results are a valid measure of Islamophobic attitudes.

3.3 Treatment Variables

Exposure to Muslims was measured by the percentage of permanent residents who are nationals from Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member countries in each municipality for 2010 and 2021 (OIC, 2018). Similarly, exposure to Arab Muslims (hereafter "Arabs") was determined by the shares of nationals from League of Arab States countries (European Union, 2021), all of which are OIC members. The 2000 Census was considered as an alternative source, for estimates of Muslim presence independent of nationality. However, its cross-sectional nature and outdated sourcing would have failed to capture the evolution of Muslim immigration, limiting causal estimates. Although the chosen method assumes all immigrants from OIC countries are Muslims, no more accurate alternative was identified, as no exact figure on Muslims in Switzerland is available (Orlanski and Schulte, 2017). Potential underestimation due to naturalisations remains marginal; naturalised Muslims representing only 12% of their total numbers and 0.5% of the population (Dodd, 2015).

3.4 Model Selection and Specification

Due to the absence of a suitable instrument (see Appendix B) and the availability of panel data, first-difference models were chosen over IV methods. These models control for endogeneity by eliminating time-constant differences across municipalities, as well as account for any shock or trend that would affect all municipalities in an equal manner, crucial for robust causal estimates (Brunner and Kuhn, 2018). The baseline version of our first-difference models is:

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \beta_1 \Delta X_{it} + \Delta \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where for any municipality i, ΔY_{it} is the change in support for the Islamophobic referenda, ΔX_{it} is a categorical variable classifying the change in Muslim shares between 2010 and 2021, β_1 is the estimated impact of moving from the reference category to any of the other categories, and $\Delta \varepsilon_{it}$ is the change in the error term. The reference category, constant Muslim shares, includes changes within +/- 0.05 percentage points, considered imperceptible, to ensure sufficient observations. Remaining municipalities were then categorised into those with increasing and decreasing shares. Research indicates that the magnitude of change in an out-group's size can have important impacts on its effect (Hangartner et al., 2018; Newman and Valez, 2014; Vertier, 2022); therefore, changes in shares were further divided into large and small increases and decreases, based on their respective medians.

To assess whether Arabs have a lesser Islamophobia-reducing impact than NAMs (H2), we used a similar categorical variable for fluctuations in the shares of the sub-group of interest, while also controlling for continuous changes in the shares of the other Muslim sub-group. For robustness, we ran a third model excluding Turks from the NAM group and controlling for both changes in Arab and Turkish shares. Turks, who began immigrating in the 1960s, are now Switzerland's largest non-European foreign group and have the second highest naturalisation rate among all foreigners (Willemin et al., 2023; FSO, 2023a), with over three times as many

holding Swiss citizenship compared to the broader Muslim population (FSO, 2010; Dodd, 2015). This high rate of naturalisation may explain why their numbers fell by 3,071 from 2009 to 2021, accounting for 97% of the total decline in Muslim immigrant counts, even as the number of Turkish refugees increased markedly during this period (FMO, 2024). Turks' high integration and large numbers, constituting 70% of the initial NAM population, could have skewed the effects for the overall NAM group, motivating this adjusted model.

A core assumption of our design is that of parallel trends, holding that Islamophobia trends in all municipalities would have been identical without changes in Muslim population shares (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This assumption is inherently untestable because no unit can be both treated and untreated simultaneously (Cunningham, 2021). Typically, placebo tests and examining pre-treatment trends help assess the assumption's plausibility, but such tests are feasible only if units are initially untreated. In our case, not only did some municipalities already have a Muslim population before the first referendum, but the lack of earlier municipal Islamophobia measurements also prevented us from establishing trends before 2009.

Two measures were nonetheless employed to make the assumption more likely to hold. First, we controlled for three time-constant factors that might affect contact effects, ensuring municipalities with constant and changing shares were comparable. Thus, we controlled for districts' 2020 violent crime rate per thousand residents, accounting for the second referendum's focus on violent crime prevention and the possibility that higher violent transgression rates might lead residents to have legitimate concerns about potential increases in offences due to face coverings. We also controlled for municipality wealth, defining rich municipalities as those with average incomes above the national median during the study period. This factor was considered constant, with a mean yearly change in real incomes of only

0.77% (FSO, 2024a). This second control addressed income levels' influence on immigration concerns (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010; Alesina and Tabellini, 2022; Miguet, 2008), and acknowledged that wealthier municipalities tend to host fewer refugees, 56% of whom are from Muslim countries (FSO, 2023e; SEM, 2024; Zünd, 2016; Salvadé, 1999). This variation in refugee presence could have moderated contact effects if interactions with refugee and non-refugee Muslims differently impact Islamophobia. Finally, having noted that areas with constant Muslim shares are disproportionately rural (see Appendix H4), we controlled for municipalities' degree of urbanicity, considering the influence of urban segregation on the frequency and form of intergroup interactions (Alesina and Tabellini, 2022; Pettigrew et al., 2011, Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010; Nathan and Sands, 2023).

The second measure involved the addition of time-varying covariates, aiming to address first-differences models' inability to account for shocks that would affect only one or some municipalities, or heterogeneously affect all municipalities. The first such covariate is the change in municipal shares of non-Muslim foreigners. Since contact effects can generalise across out-groups (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Paluck et al., 2019), variation in these shares could have influenced attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. The second time-varying covariate is the change in municipal SVP support between the 2007 and 2019 parliamentary elections, considering the possibility that some partisan voters may have been influenced solely by their support for the SVP, regardless of their own Islamophobia. Alternatively, SVP support could have directly affected voters' Islamophobia (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

In addition to assuming parallel trends, first-difference models require no autocorrelation between error terms across periods (Nau, 2020). Violations can bias standard errors, p-values,

and estimates (Analyttica Datalab, 2021). Introducing lagged variables is a common method to mitigate autocorrelation (Nau, 2020; Keele and Kelly, 2006), with the potential to capture the influence of past variable values and diminish correlation between residuals across periods. Accordingly, baseline values for the dependent variable, as well as for the change in municipal Muslim and non-Muslim foreigner shares were included.

4. Analysis

4.1 Empirical Results

We begin by examining the impact of changes in municipal Muslim shares on natives' Islamophobia. Table 1 reports the results for four model specifications of increasing complexity, with full summary tables in Appendix D2,4. The first model is a vanilla model with only the change in Muslim shares as a predictor. The second model incorporates the time-constant controls, the third adds the time-varying covariates, and the fourth model — our main specification — builds on the previous ones by including the lagged variables. Durbin-Watson tests revealed significant positive autocorrelation in all models, albeit to a lesser extent in the main specification. To ensure the reliability of our estimates, the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was applied to all models. Original outputs are detailed in Appendices D1,3.

Table 1: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Main Specification	
	Estimate	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**
Large Increase	-0.188	0.602	-0.373	0.316	-0.379	0.306	-0.919	0.006**
Small Increase	-0.451	0.193	-0.566	0.109	-0.584	0.098¨	-0.820	1.018e-02*
Small Decrease	0.122	0.788	0.042	0.926	0.025	0.956	-0.009	0.983
Large Decrease	0.107	0.815	0.046	0.921	-0.032	0.946	1.203	0.008**

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

The initial results indicate no apparent relationship between changes in Muslim shares and Islamophobia, with no significant coefficient in Models 1 and 2. While Model 3 yields very similar estimates and p-values to Model 2, suggesting that time-varying controls have little effect, it begins to show some statistical significance: small increases in Muslim shares reduce Islamophobia by 0.584 percentage points, significant at the 10% level. Introducing lagged

variables in the main specification brings considerable change: not only is the magnitude of some estimates multiplied by more than tenfold (large decrease), but p-values are also considerably lower. Both small and large increases reduce Islamophobia, significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Conversely, a large decrease in Muslim shares significantly increases Islamophobia at the 1% level. Interestingly, the first three models show a negative correlation between the magnitude of increases in Muslim shares and their coefficients, whereas the main specification reveals a positive relationship.

We now investigate whether Muslims' ethnicity influences the effect of changes in their population shares. Table 2 presents the Cochrane-Orcutt adjusted results of our main specification, applied to the Arab, NAM, and NAM excluding Turks (NAMET) sub-groups.

Table 2: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares

	Arab		**NAM**		**NAM Excl. Turks**	
	Estimate	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**
Large Increase	-1.053	7.000e-04***	-0.518	0.107	-1.254	6.644e-05***
Small Increase	-0.729	0.012*	-0.865	4.829e-03**	-1.023	3.908e-04***
Small Decrease	-0.701	0.093¨	-0.327	0.404	-0.361	0.445
Large Decrease	0.902	0.050*	0.213	0.638	0.601	0.254

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Three key insights emerge: first, the models for changes in Arab and NAMET shares both show a positive relationship between the magnitude of coefficients and that of the change. However, this pattern is absent for the broader NAM group. Second, an increase in NAMET shares reduces Islamophobia more than an equivalent increase in Arab shares, significant at least at the 5% level. However, this association does not hold for the NAM group, for which only

municipalities with small increases show significant results and larger coefficients than those for Arabs. Finally, estimates for increasing shares are substantially more robust than those for decreasing shares, with declining shares only significant in the Arab model. As in the main specification, p-values for this model are much smaller for large decreases, which increase Islamophobia.

4.2 Model Diagnostics

We evaluated the four underlying assumptions of first-difference models. First, we assessed multicollinearity and found it to be negligible, with low VIF scores detailed in Appendix E1. Second, we used Breusch-Pagan tests to detect heteroskedasticity, which was present in all but the vanilla model. However, transforming the models into Orcutt objects to meet the no autocorrelation assumption precluded the computation of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and utilisation of weighted least squares (WLS), requiring linear model objects. Despite this, Appendix E2 demonstrates that using HC1 standard errors and running WLS versions of our main specification only minimally impacts the significance of coefficients in the original, non-Orcutt model, supporting the reliability of our results. Third, we evaluated the linearity assumption using residual versus fitted plots, which revealed that the assumption was broadly met, as seen in Appendix E3. Finally, the QQ-plots and histograms in Appendix E4 showed that residuals were generally normally distributed, with light deviations in the tails. This raised the question of whether to remove outliers from our models to better satisfy the assumption. Since the data is sourced from the FSO, sampling errors are improbable, and any outlier likely arises from omitted variable bias or natural variation. Appendices I1,3 indicate that the main specification's outliers are proportionately distributed across linguistic regions and municipality types, suggesting they stem from natural variation. Given these findings and the minor deviations from the normal distribution of our residuals, we retained these outliers

in our models. Nonetheless, we explored the impact of their removal as part of our robustness checks, detailed in the next section.

4.3 Robustness Checks

We conducted two robustness checks. First, we re-computed models excluding the imputed values for municipality wealth and change in SVP support. Results are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. These imputed values were used to address missing data in small municipalities where data was unavailable due to privacy concerns or a lack of candidates in parliamentary elections, as detailed in Appendix A.

Table 3: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares, Excl. Imputed Values

	Model 2		**Model 3**		**Main Specification**	
	Estimate	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**
Large Increase	-0.509	0.166	-0.489	0.185	-0.842	0.012**
Small Increase	-0.731	0.037*	-0.737	0.036*	-0.805	0.012*
Small Decrease	-0.102	0.820	-0.124	0.784	-0.025	0.952
Large Decrease	-0.232	0.611	-0.285	0.534	1.067	0.017*

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Small increases in Muslim shares have become significant at the 5% level in Models 2 and 3, while the magnitude of their estimates increased by about 30%. Conversely, the main specification's coefficients have slightly reduced in size and significance.

Table 4: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares, Excl. Imputed Values

	Arabs		NAM		NAM Excl. Turks	
	Estimate	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**
Large Increase	-1.000	0.001**	-0.457	0.150	-1.194	1.035e-04***
Small Increase	-0.690	0.015*	-0.828	0.006**	-0.958	7.089e-04***
Small Decrease	-0.709	0.082¨	-0.332	0.390	-0.334	0.466
Large Decrease	0.797	0.074¨	0.117	0.791	0.524	0.310

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Changes within the sub-group models remain minor. Variations in significance are confined to significant values: the magnitude of significant coefficients slightly decreased, while large increases in Arab shares shifted from the 0.1% to the 1% significance level and large decreases went from the 5% to 10% level.

Second, we refitted all models after removing municipalities identified as influential outliers through leverage, Cook's distance, and standardised residuals. Results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares, Excl. Outliers

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Main Specification	
	Estimate	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**
Large Increase	-0.112	0.739	-0.255	0.515	-0.064	0.852	-0.784	1.045e-02*
Small Increase	-0.314	0.333	-0.371	0.260	-0.384	0.236	-0.599	0.041*
Small Decrease	-0.268	0.539	-0.136	0.753	-0.152	0.725	0.099	0.798
Large Decrease	-0.278	0.543	-0.298	0.508	-0.456	0.302	1.310	0.003**

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Regarding models for all Muslims, removing outliers resulted primarily in a decrease in coefficient sizes for increasing shares, and the opposite effect for decreasing shares. The lack of significance in the first three models persists, with Model 3's small increases no longer significant at the 10% level. Additionally, the p-value for large increases in the main specification increased slightly, but statistical significance is unchanged.

Table 6: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares, Excl. Outliers

	Arabs		NAM		NAM Excl. Turks	
	Estimate	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**	**Estimate**	**p-value**
Large Increase	-1.071	1.956e-04***	-0.432	0.140	-1.289	9.980e-06***
Small Increase	-0.675	0.011*	-0.841	0.002**	-1.029	8.977e-05***
Small Decrease	-0.640	0.105	-0.485	0.175	-0.230	0.507
Large Decrease	0.679	0.140	0.243	0.575	0.415	0.445

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Remarkably, the effects of falling Arab shares are no longer significant, rendering effects for decreasing shares insignificant across all sub-group models. Interestingly, the relationship between the magnitude of share changes and their coefficients observed after the removal of outliers in the broader Muslim models does not extend to the sub-groups.

5. Discussion

Overall, the results support Hypothesis H1, demonstrating that an increase in municipal Muslim shares reduces Islamophobia, with larger increases yielding greater reductions. The absence of noteworthy multicollinearity or linearity and normality violations, the application of Cochrane-Orcutt corrections for autocorrelation, and the minimal impacts of robust standard errors and WLS confirm the reliability of our statistical tests and findings. Furthermore, models excluding imputed values and outliers enhance our confidence in the robustness of these results, as the estimates remain significant and consistent in direction, although with modest changes in size. Our findings contrast with Orlanski and Schulze (2017), who observed increased approval for the minaret referendum – also used as an indicator of Islamophobia – with higher Muslim populations in municipalities. This discrepancy might stem from their reliance on the 2000 Census data to quantify 2009 Muslim shares, potentially misrepresenting the actual shares at the time of the referendum. Additionally, their study aimed to identify the determinants of disapproval for the minaret referendum. While their use of OLS models on cross-sectional data is appropriate for this purpose, it is susceptible to endogeneity, limiting causal inferences. An alternative explanation for our differing results could be that the dynamics between intergroup contact and Islamophobia have evolved from 2009 to 2021. Indeed, sufficient time is needed between initial contact, which may generate anxiety, and reductions in prejudice, suggesting that earlier contact might have increased Islamophobia, which diminished over time as residents became accustomed to a Muslim presence (Pettigrew, 1998).

This could also explain our results for the sub-group models, suggesting that NAMs reduce Islamophobia more than Arabs, corroborating Hypothesis H2 and indicating that ethnic differences influence the causal relationship between intergroup contact and Islamophobia.

However, definitive conclusions are contingent on Turks' exclusion from the NAM group. Specifically, increases in NAM shares significantly reduce Islamophobia only for small increases, and NAM coefficients are larger than those for Arabs in these instances only. Concurrently, estimates for NAMETs consistently exceed those for both NAMs and Arabs, with the coefficient for NAMETs surpassing that for Arabs by up to 52% for small increases when outliers are removed. This substantiates the idea that Turks' well-established integration moderates their influence on attitudes because the Swiss have become familiarised with their presence, thereby suppressing the impact of changes in broader NAM shares.

Nonetheless, we have considered an alternative explanation for the differing effects observed. One possibility is that Arabs and NAMs are perceived similarly by residents but immigrate to different linguistic regions. If potential outcomes vary by linguistic region, an increase in Muslim shares could affect Islamophobia differently across regions, irrespective of the Muslim sub-group involved. Specifically, although first-differences control for constant unobserved heterogeneity within municipalities, our categorisation of changes in Muslim shares assumes that these changes are the only differences between categories. Therefore, if the distribution of these categories varies by region, the effects attributed to changes in Muslim sub-group shares could reflect regional differences in potential outcomes.

Appendices H1-3 support the hypothesis of differential regional immigration patterns: municipalities with constant Arab shares are relatively more common in the French and German regions, while those with constant NAMET shares are relatively more frequent in the Italian region. Similar trends emerge between Arabs and NAMs for increasing shares, while municipalities with decreasing Arab shares are almost three times more common in the Italian region than those with decreasing NAMET shares. Additionally, Appendices I2-3 indicate that

support for the face-ban referendum decreased by about 10-15 percentage points in the German and Italian regions compared to the minaret referendum, but increased by the same amount in the French region. Given the modest scale of our estimates, these sizeable shifts suggest that changes in Muslim shares are not the primary factors driving referendum support fluctuations. While these regional voting differences could stem from a time-varying omitted variable affecting only specific municipalities, the historical pattern of distinct voting outcomes by linguistic region instead suggests inherent regional variations (VoteInfo, 2024). Without discounting the potential influence of ethnicity, we recommend that future research using categorical predictors controls for linguistic regions. Future research could also explore contact effects within linguistic regions, rather than solely at the aggregate level.

Our findings further indicate that decreasing municipal Muslim shares are associated with an increase in Islamophobia. Although this also suggests that localities with higher Muslim populations exhibit less Islamophobia, caution is advised before considering this as evidence supporting Hypothesis H1: the effect of decreases in Muslim shares represents that of a presumed reduction in contact. This is not the same as the effect of an increase in contact. Moreover, while increases in Muslim shares are clearly linked to the presence of Muslim nationals, decreases might also stem from naturalisations, in which case, the Muslim presence in the municipal territory would not have truly diminished, potentially biasing the estimates. Uncertainty concerning the effects of decreasing shares is compounded by the fact that significant findings are essentially confined to large decreases and, although they hold in robustness tests for the main specification, this significance disappears across all models for Muslim sub-groups. Therefore, our research suggests that less contact with Muslims may increase Islamophobia, but further investigation, perhaps in controlled experimental settings, is needed to confirm these conclusions.

Our study faces a limitation in implicitly assuming that changes in Muslim population shares happened simultaneously across all municipalities by only measuring these shares at the start and end of our study period. However, contact effects vary over time and Muslim immigration did not occur uniformly (Pettigrew, 1998; FSO, 2023d). This does not invalidate our findings; rather, it offers a chance to nuance them. By 2016, about 85% of the 2021 Muslim population was already in Switzerland and most of the Muslim immigration taking place between the two referenda had occurred (FSO, 2023d). This is largely due to the more than 50,000 asylum requests filed by Muslims between 2014 and 2016 due to the Syrian crisis (FMO, 2024). By the time of the face-ban referendum, most of these Muslims had likely been in Switzerland long enough to form positive intergroup relationships. Assuming that a two-year period is enough for long-term positive contact effects, i.e., to reduce prejudice after any initial feelings of threat caused by the out-group, this would apply to 93% of the Muslim population present by the face-ban referendum (FSO, 2023d). Thus, despite time-varying contact effects and our inability to track the exact duration of Muslim exposure in municipalities, our results likely reflect long-term rather than short-term contact effects.

Another limitation concerns the potential for omitted variable bias, briefly mentioned in our discussion on linguistic regions. To mitigate this, we considered including a baseline lagged variable for SVP support, as voters might consistently support the same party without re-evaluating their preferences. However, it proved insignificant in our main specification, and ANOVA tests showed that the baseline proportion of non-Muslim foreigners significantly influenced the baseline SVP support, making the variable redundant. Similarly, we tested the change in municipal population density, as it could affect the likelihood of intergroup encounters, but found it insignificant and diminishing the significance of our estimates for

changes in Muslim shares. Tukey tests indicated that both increases and decreases in Muslim population shares significantly affected population density, suggesting that including this variable might inadvertently control for the effect we aimed to measure. Summary tables for the above models are presented in Appendix G. We also considered including changes in district violent crime rates, which some may associate with Muslims irrespective of the crime component of the face-ban referendum (Riaz, Bischof and Wagner, 2023), but lacked the necessary data. Finally, our design could be improved by considering intergroup contact beyond municipal boundaries, for example, due to work commuting. Future research could include a proxy variable, such as changes in Muslim population shares in municipalities within a 15km radius (the average one-way daily distance travelled in Switzerland) or the distance to the nearest urban agglomeration (FSO, 2021b).

6. Conclusion

This study employed a first-difference approach to assess the impact of changes in local Muslim population shares on natives' Islamophobic attitudes in Swiss municipalities. Our results revealed that increases in the percentage of Muslims within municipalities generally decrease Islamophobia, with larger increases resulting in more important reductions. In contrast, decreases in Muslim populations tend to increase Islamophobia, although these results are less robust and confined to large decreases. Moreover, this study finds that the effects of intergroup contact on Islamophobia differ between Arab and non-Arab Muslim sub-groups. While increases in both groups reduce Islamophobia, the impact is more pronounced for non-Arab Muslims. This distinction underscores the importance of out-group characteristics and perceived threat levels in shaping attitudes towards Muslims.

This study also emphasises the need for further research into the long-term dynamics of intergroup contact and its effect on Islamophobia, considering the potential for evolving attitudes over time, particularly when the frequency of contact decreases. Future studies could benefit from more granular data to better track the duration and nature of intergroup interactions, as well as extend beyond the aggregate level to examine how effects may vary across different types of municipalities or linguistic regions. Additionally, investigating gender-specific impacts could be valuable given the potential for different perceived threats and the visual distinctiveness of women's religious garments.

Our findings carry important implications for policymakers in Europe and Switzerland, especially against the backdrop of steadily increasing Muslim populations. Effective policy-making should incorporate strategies that promote optimal contact to foster social cohesion. While directly attributing the measured positive intergroup contact effects to Switzerland's

policy framework is challenging due to unobservable interactions, our findings suggest that current policies encourage intercultural tolerance and understanding. This is particularly relevant for policy-making in federal states like Switzerland, where municipalities have considerable authority over integration policies. Our results should also be viewed in the context of rising far-right and populist movements in Switzerland and beyond, indicating that the local effect of Muslim immigration aligns more closely with the intergroup contact theory than the threat theory, opposite to the Islamophobic rhetoric often associated with parties like the SVP. Looking forward, there is reason for optimism regarding Switzerland's capacity for cultural integration.

Bibliography

Abrams, D., Van de Vyver, J., Houston, D.M. and Vasiljevic, M. (2017). Does terror defeat contact? Intergroup contact and prejudice toward Muslims before and after the London bombings. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 23(3), pp.260–268. doi:https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000167.

Abu Khalaf, N., Woolweaver, A.B., Reynoso Marmolejos, R., Little, G.A., Burnett, K. and Espelage, D.L. (2022). The Impact of Islamophobia on Muslim Students: A Systematic Review of the Literature. *School Psychology Review*, 52(2), pp.1–18. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/2372966x.2022.2075710.

Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2016). 'One Muslim is Enough!' Evidence from a Field Experiment in France. *Annals of Economics and Statistics*, [online] 121/122(121/122), p.121. doi:https://doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.121-122.121.

Afonso, A. (2004). Immigration and Its Impacts in Switzerland. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, [online] 15(4), pp.147–166. Available at: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/176888 [Accessed 9 Dec. 2023].

Aidenberger, A. and Doehne, M. (2021). Unveiling everyday discrimination. Two field experiments on discrimination against religious minorities in day-to-day interactions. *The British Journal of Sociology*. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12811.

Alesina, A. and Tabellini, M. (2022). The Political Effects of Immigration: Culture or Economics? *NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH* . doi:https://doi.org/10.3386/w30079.

Allport, G. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. [online] Available at: https://faculty.washington.edu/caporaso/courses/203/readings/allport_Nature_of_prejudice.pdf [Accessed 15 Apr. 2024].

ALRABABA'H, A., MARBLE, W., MOUSA, S. and SIEGEL, A.A. (2021). Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? The Effect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes. *American Political Science Review*, 115(4), pp.1111–1128. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055421000423.

Amnesty International (2014). *MAGHRÉBIN·E·S: 'CHEZ NOUS EN SUISSE'*. [online] Amnesty International. Available at: https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/sur-amnesty/publications/magazine-amnesty/2014-1/migration-maghrebin-e-s-chez-nous-en-suisse#.

Analyttica Datalab (2021). *Understanding Durbin-Watson Test*. [online] Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/@analyttica/durbin-watson-test-fde429f79203.

Angrist, J.D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2009). *Mastering 'Metrics*. Princeton University Press.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017). *Results and Country Profiles: Muslims in Europe*. [online] www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de. Available at: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/results-and-country-profiles-muslims-in-europe/ [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Bleich, E. (2011). What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55(12), pp.1581–1600. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211409387.

Brunner, B. and Kuhn, A. (2018). Immigration, Cultural Distance and Natives' Attitudes Towards Immigrants: Evidence from Swiss Voting Results. *Kyklos*, 71(1), pp.28–58. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12161.

Bursztyn et al. (2022). *The Immigrant Next Door: Long-Term Contact, Generosity, and Prejudice*. [online] *Chicago University* , pp.1–84. Available at: http://home.uchicago.edu/~bursztyn/immigrant-next-door_march2022.pdf [Accessed 29 Feb. 2024].

Cerruti, G. and Robbiano, S. (2023). *PRESENCE OF MIGRANTS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE*. [online] ResearchGate. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371439778_PRESENCE_OF_MIGRANTS_AND_VOTING_BEHAVIOR_IN_EUROPE_AN_OVERVIEW_OF_THE_EMPIRICAL_LITERATURE/references [Accessed 2024].

Cheng, J.E. (2015). Islamophobia, Muslimophobia or racism? Parliamentary discourses on Islam and Muslims in debates on the minaret ban in Switzerland. *Discourse & Society*, 26(5), pp.562–586. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926515581157.

Ciftci, S. (2012). Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 32(3), pp.293–309. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2012.727291.

Colic-Peisker, V. and Mikola, M. (2021). Mediated Islamophobia and Local Coexistence: A Case Study of Two Muslim-Concentration Suburbs in Melbourne, Australia. *Sociological Inquiry*. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/soin.12423.

Condra, L.N. and Linardi, S. (2019). Casual Contact and Ethnic Bias: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(3), pp.1028–1042. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/703380.

Cottrell, C.A. and Neuberg, S.L. (2005). Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to 'Prejudice'.. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88(5), pp.770–789. doi:https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.770.

Courrier International (2021). *La Suisse dit non à la burqa dans les lieux publics*. [online] Courrier international. Available at: https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/religion-la-suisse-dit-non-la-burqa-dans-les-lieux-publics [Accessed 27 May 2024].

Crawford, J.T. (2014). Ideological symmetries and asymmetries in political intolerance and prejudice toward political activist groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 55, pp.284–298. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.08.002.

Cunningham, S. (2021). *CAUSAL INFERENCE : the mixtape.* Yale University Press.

Direnberger, L., Banfi, E. and Eskandari, V. (2022). Locating the threat, rebordering the nation: Gender and Islamophobia in the Swiss Parliament, 2001–2015. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, p.135050682210757. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068221075792.

Ditlmann, R.K. and Samii, C. (2016). Can intergroup contact affect ingroup dynamics? Insights from a field study with Jewish and Arab-Palestinian youth in Israel. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 22(4), pp.380–392. doi:https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000217.

Dodd, S.D. (2015). The Structure of Islam in Switzerland and the Effects of the Swiss Minaret Ban. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 35(1), pp.43–64. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2015.1007665.

Doosje, B., Zimmermann, A., Küpper, B., Zick, A. and Meertens, R. (2009). Terrorist Threat and Perceived Islamic Support for Terrorist Attacks as Predictors of Personal and Institutional Out-Group Discrimination and Support for Anti-Immigration Policies – Evidence from 9 European Countries. *Revue internationale de psychologie sociale*, [online] 22(3-4), pp.203–233. Available at: https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-psychologie-sociale-2009-3-page-203.htm?contenu=resume [Accessed 28 Jul. 2024].

Elkassem, S., Csiernik, R., Mantulak, A., Kayssi, G., Hussain, Y., Lambert, K., Bailey, P. and Choudhary, A. (2018). Growing Up Muslim: The Impact of Islamophobia on Children in a

Canadian Community. *Journal of Muslim Mental Health*, 12(1). doi:https://doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0012.101.

Engist, D. (2021). *Swiss municipality mergers since 2000: A dataset to easily aggregate municipality-level data to 2021 municipalities*. [online] www.research-collection.ethz.ch. doi:https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000492382 The SMMT is updated on a monthly basis and can currently aggregate municipality data up to march 2024.

Enos, R.D. (2014). Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111(10), pp.3699–3704. doi:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317670111.

Enos, R.D. (2015). What the Demolition of Public Housing Teaches Us about the Impact of Racial Threat on Political Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1), pp.123–142. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12156.

European Union (2021). *League of Arab States (LAS) and the EU | EEAS*. [online] www.eeas.europa.eu. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/league-arab-states-las-and-eu_en.

Federal Office of Migrations (FMO) (2024). *Asylum Seekers by Nationality - 1986 - 2024*. [online] www.sem.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/fr/home/suche.html#1986-2024 [Accessed 16 May 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2009). *Initiative populaire 'Contre la construction de minarets', par commune - 29.11.2009 | Tableau*. [online] Office fédéral de la statistique. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/catalogues-banques-donnees.assetdetail.269619.html [Accessed 2 Mar. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2010). *Etude: Diaspora et communautés de migrants de Turquie en Suisse*. [online] Google.com. Available at: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/sem/fr/data/publiservice/publikationen/diaspora/diasporastudie-tuerkei-f.pdf.download.pdf/diasporastudie-tuerkei-f.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjUx8qP2KyGAxUt8LsIHe_MBwcQFnoECA4QAw&usg=AOvVaw008hbRnrmtkAWSA5cx6Lj4 [Accessed 27 May 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2012). *Karte: Participation aux Elections au Conseil National en 2007*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/12/fr/256_610_258/1348.html [Accessed 3 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2015). *La population de la Suisse 2014 | Publication*. [online] Federal Statistical Office. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/asset/en/349849 [Accessed 5 Dec. 2023].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2016). *Karte: Force de l'Union démocratique du centre (UDC), en 2007* . [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/12/fr/249_603_258/859.html [Accessed 3 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2019a). *Karte: Force de l'Union démocratique du centre (UDC), en 2019*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/12/fr/14584_603_258/23159.html [Accessed 3 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2019b). *Karte: Participation aux Elections au Conseil National en 2019* . [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/12/fr/14591_610_258/23175.html [Accessed 3 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2021a). *Initiative 'Oui à l'interdiction de se dissimuler le visage', par commune - 7.3.2021 | Tableau*. [online] Office fédéral de la statistique. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/catalogues-banques-donnees/tableaux.assetdetail.15924501.html [Accessed 2 Mar. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2021b). *Population's transport behaviour*. [online] www.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/mobility-transport/passenger-transport/travel-behaviour.html.

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2021c). *Suivi de la mobilité COVID-19*. [online] www.experimental.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.experimental.bfs.admin.ch/expstat/fr/home/projets/mobil.html [Accessed 20 May 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022a). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence d'infractions de violence, en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15952_11475_11461_7266/24927.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022b). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence d'infractions, en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15951_3862_11461_7266/24925.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022c). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence de brigandage (Art. 140), en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15957_11480_11461_7266/24937.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022d). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence de dommages à la propriété sans vol (Art. 144), en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15962_11485_11461_7266/24947.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022e). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence de vol de bicyclette (Art. 139), en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15960_11483_11461_7266/24943.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022f). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence de vol de véhicule sans vol de bicyclette (Art. 139), en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15961_11484_11461_7266/24945.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022g). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence de vol par effraction et par introduction clandestine (Art. 139), en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15959_11482_11461_7266/24941.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2022h). *Karte: Code pénal (CP): fréquence de vol sans vol à l'étalage (Art. 139), en 2020 [Districts]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15958_11481_11461_7266/24939.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023a). *Acquisition of Swiss citizenship*. [online] www.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/citizenship/acquisition-citizenship.html [Accessed 25 May 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023b). *Fécondité*. [online] www.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/naissances-

deces/fecondite.html#:~:text=Depuis%202009%2C%20l%27indicateur%20conjoncturel [Accessed 5 Dec. 2023].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023c). *Karte: Les 4 régions linguistiques de la Suisse par commune, en 2020 [Communes]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/17138_17137_235_227/26599.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023d). *Migration de la population résidante permanente étrangère, de 1950 à 2022 - 1950-2022 | Table*. [online] Federal Statistical Office. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/international-migration.assetdetail.26565422.html [Accessed 5 Dec. 2023].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023e). *Population résidante permanente et non permanente selon la catégorie de nationalité, le sexe et le canton, 2e trimestre 2023 - 1.1.2023-30.6.2023 | Tableau*. [online] Office fédéral de la statistique. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/actualites/quoi-de-neuf.assetdetail.27425024.html [Accessed 5 Dec. 2023].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023f). *Population résidante permanente étrangère selon la nationalité, de 1980 à 2022 - 1980-2022 | Tableau*. [online] Office fédéral de la statistique. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/migration-integration/nationalite-etrangere/composition.assetdetail.26565220.html [Accessed 5 Dec. 2023].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2023g). *Violence*. [online] www.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/crime-criminal-justice/police/violence.html [Accessed 4 Apr. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2024a). *Evolution of nominal wages, consumer prices and real wages, 1993-2023 - 1993-2023 | Diagram*. [online] Federal Statistical Office. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/news/whats-new.assetdetail.31606865.html [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2024b). *Karte: Densité de la population, en 2009 [Communes]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/4665_75_3501_70/7221.html [Accessed 14 Mar. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2024c). *Karte: Revenu net moyen* par contribuable, en 2010 [Communes]*. [online] www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch. Available at:

https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/9162_9161_9202_7267/16349.html [Accessed 14 Mar. 2024].

Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2024d). *Police*. [online] Admin.ch. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/crime-criminal-justice/police.html.

Financial Times (2016). *The advertising guru harnessing Europe's immigration fears*. [online] www.ft.com. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/ce212a22-ce6c-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2 [Accessed 8 May 2024].

Frindte, W. and Haußecker, N. (2010). *Inszenierter Terrorismus*. *VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks*. Springer VS. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92579-0.

Gerber, A.S. and Green, D.P. (2012). *Field experiments : design, analysis, and interpretation*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Gomez Del Tronco, C. (2023). Searching for the 'Muslims' in Czech Islamophobia and the Effects of Intergroup Contact in Challenging the 'Fear of the Unknown'. *Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review*, [online] 59(3), pp.315–338. Available at: https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1165059 [Accessed 29 May 2024].

Gould, E.D. and Klor, E.F. (2015). The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West. *The Economic Journal*, 126(597), pp.2064–2114. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12219.

Grammarly (2024). *Grammarly*. [online] Grammarly.com. Available at: https://app.grammarly.com/ddocs/2539987005 [Accessed 30 Jul. 2024]. Grammarly was used to ensure there weren't any typographic or grammatical errors in my research.

Gravelle, T.B. (2021). Explaining Islamophobia in Australia: partisanship, intergroup contact, and local context. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, pp.1–21. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2021.1884645.

Green, E.G.T., Fasel, N. and Sarrasin, O. (2010). The More the Merrier? The Effects of Type of Cultural Diversity on Exclusionary Immigration Attitudes in Switzerland. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, [online] 4(2), pp.177–190. doi:https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-2824.

Gu, J., Mueller, A., Nielsen, I., Shachat, J. and Smyth, R. (2019). Improving Intergroup Relations through Actual and Imagined Contact: Field Experiments with Malawian Shopkeepers and Chinese Migrants. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 68(1), pp.273–303. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/700569.

Haddock, G., Zanna, M.P. and Esses, V.M. (1993). Assessing the structure of prejudicial attitudes: The case of attitudes toward homosexuals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, [online] 65(6), pp.1105–1118. doi:https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.6.1105.

Hainmueller, J. and Hopkins, D. (2014). Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science*, [online] 17(17). doi:https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818.

HANGARTNER, D., DINAS, E., MARBACH, M., MATAKOS, K. and XEFTERIS, D. (2018). Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile? *American Political Science Review*, [online] 113(2), pp.1–14. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000813.

Helbling, M. (2012). *Islamophobia in the West*. 1st ed. Routledge, pp.1–54.

Herrchen, N.L. (2018). *Pride and Prejudice: The Proliferation of Nationalism and Islamophobia in the context of the European Refugee Crisis*. [online] research.utwente.nl. Available at: https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/pride-and-prejudice-the-proliferation-of-nationalism-and-islamoph [Accessed 30 May 2024].

Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS) (2019). *Volunteering with refugees highly popular with the Swiss public | HEKS*. [online] en.heks.ch. Available at: https://en.heks.ch/medien/volunteering-refugees-highly-popular-swiss-public [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Horber-Papazian, K. (2007). *3.2 The Municipalities*. [online] Available at: https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_B8C1B3F04C96.P002/REF.pdf [Accessed 30 Jul. 2024].

Humanrights.ch (2023). *Interdiction de se dissimuler le visage: Chronologie - humanrights.ch*. [online] www.humanrights.ch. Available at: https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/initiatives-parlement/dissimulation-visage/chronologie/ [Accessed 5 May 2024].

Jung, J.H. (2012). Islamophobia? Religion, Contact with Muslims, and the Respect for Islam. *Review of Religious Research*, 54(1), pp.113–126. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-011-0033-2.

Kaminski, J. (2014). The Islamophobia Industry, Hate, and Its Impact on Muslim Immigrants and OIC State Development. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 2(2), p.157. doi:https://doi.org/10.13169/islastudj.2.2.0157.

Kasara, K. (2013). Separate and Suspicious: Local Social and Political Context and Ethnic Tolerance in Kenya. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4), pp.921–936. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000777.

Keele, L. and Kelly, N.J. (2006). Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Ins and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables. *Political Analysis*, 14(2), pp.186–205. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpj006.

Khokhar, F.J. (2021). Reclaiming the narrative: gendered Islamophobia, its impacts and responses from Muslim women. *Social Identities*, 28(2), pp.1–15. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2021.2006624.

Leibold, J. (2010). Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Islamophobie. *VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks*, pp.149–158. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92385-7_10.

Leibold, J. and Kummerer, A. (2010). *Religion und Religiosität im vereinigten Deutschland*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp.311–323.

Lindemann, A. (2021). Discrimination against Veiled Muslim Women in Switzerland: Insights from Field Experts. *Religions*, 12(7), p.500. doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12070500.

Makashvili, A., Vardanashvili, I. and Javakhishvili, N. (2018). Testing intergroup threat theory: Realistic and symbolic threats, religiosity and gender as predictors of prejudice. *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, [online] 14(2), pp.464–484. doi:https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v14i2.1483.

Mamou, Y. (2008). 'Tous les Arabes sont des... ?' *Le Monde.fr*. [online] 8 Feb. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2008/02/08/l-arabe-la-juive-et-l-ecole_1009013_3224.html [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Mansouri, F. and Vergani, M. (2018). Intercultural contact, knowledge of Islam, and prejudice against muslims in Australia. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 66, pp.85–94. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.07.001.

Miguet, F. (2008). Voting about immigration policy: What does the Swiss experience tell us? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 24(3), pp.628–641. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.005.

Milgram, S. (1977). The familiar stranger: An aspect of urban anonymity. pp.51–53. The individual in a social world.

Monnet, V. (2015). *L'islamisation rampante démentie par les faits*. [online] www.unige.ch. Available at: https://www.unige.ch/campus/numeros/122/recherche2/ [Accessed 19 May 2024].

Mousa, S. (2020). Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq. *Science*, [online] 369(6505), pp.866–870. doi:https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb3153.

Nathan, N.L. and Sands, M.L. (2023). Context and Contact: Unifying the Study of Environmental Effects on Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 26(1). doi:https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051421-012551.

Nau, R. (2020). *Testing the assumptions of linear regression*. [online] people.duke.edu. Available at: https://people.duke.edu/~rnau/testing.htm#independence [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Newman, B.J. and Velez, Y. (2014). Group Size versus Change? Assessing Americans' Perception of Local Immigration. *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(2), pp.293–303. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912913517303.

OpenAi (2024). *ChatGPT*. [online] chatgpt.com. Available at: https://chatgpt.com ChatGPT was used to debug my code and verify the paper's grammatical correctness.

Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) (2018). *Organisation of Islamic Cooperation*. [online] Oic-oci.org. Available at: https://www.oic-oci.org/states/?lan=en.

Orlanski, O. and Schulze, G.G. (2018). *The determinants of Islamophobia: An empirical analysis of the Swiss minaret referendum*. [online] www.econstor.eu. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175867 [Accessed 30 Jul. 2024].

Oswald, D.L. (2005). Understanding Anti-Arab Reactions Post-9/11: The Role of Threats, Social Categories, and Personal Ideologies. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 35(9), pp.1775–1799. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02195.x.

Paluck, E.L., Green, S.A. and Green, D.P. (2019). The contact hypothesis re-evaluated. *Behavioural Public Policy*, 3(02), pp.129–158. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.25.

Perocco, F. (2018). Anti-migrant Islamophobia in Europe. Social roots, mechanisms and actors. *REMHU: Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana*, 26(53), pp.25–40. doi:https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-85852503880005303.

Pettigrew, T.F. (1998). INTERGROUP CONTACT THEORY. *Annual Review of Psychology*, [online] 49(1), pp.65–85. doi:https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65.

Pettigrew, T.F., Christ, O., Wagner, U. and Stellmacher, J. (2007). Direct and indirect intergroup contact effects on prejudice: A normative interpretation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 31(4), pp.411–425. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.11.003.

Pettigrew, T.F., Tropp, L.R., Wagner, U. and Christ, O. (2011). Recent advances in intergroup contact theory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 35(3), pp.271–280. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.03.001.

Pew Research Center (2017). *Europe's Growing Muslim Population*. [online] Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/#:~:text=In%20Europe%20overall%2C%20even%20if.

Pickel, G. (2013). *ReligionMonitor: Understanding Common Ground - An International Comparison of Religious Belief*. [online] Available at: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Studie_LW_Religionsmonitor_Internationaler_Vergleich_2014.pdf.

Pickel, G. (2019). *Nationalism and Perceptions of Threat – Ethnocentrism or Just a Lack of Contact? Islamophobia in Eastern Europe from a Comparative Perspective*. [online] www.connections.clio-online.net. Available at: https://www.connections.clio-online.net/article/id/fda-133250.

Pickel, G. and Öztürk, C. (2018). Islamophobia Without Muslims? The 'Contact Hypothesis' as an Explanation for Anti-Muslim Attitudes – Eastern European Societies in a Comparative Perspective. *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics*, 12(2), pp.162–191. doi:https://doi.org/10.2478/jnmlp-2018-0009.

Rao, G. (2019). Familiarity Does Not Breed Contempt: Generosity, Discrimination, and Diversity in Delhi Schools. *American Economic Review*, 109(3), pp.774–809. doi:https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180044.

Riaz, S., Bischof, D. and Wagner, M. (2023). Out-group Threat and Xenophobic Hate Crimes: Evidence of Local Intergroup Conflict Dynamics between Immigrants and Natives. □*The* □*journal of politics/*□*The* □*Journal of politics*. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/726948.

Riek, B.M., Mania, E.W. and Gaertner, S.L. (2006). Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10(4), pp.336–353. doi:https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4.

Robinson, A.L. (2017). Ethnic Diversity, Segregation and Ethnocentric Trust in Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 50(1), pp.217–239. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000540.

Rosello, M. (1994). Du bon usage des stéréotypes orientalisants: vol et recel de préjugés anti-maghrébins dans les années 1990. *L'Esprit Créateur*, [online] 34(2), pp.42–57. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26287496 [Accessed 8 May 2024].

Salvadé, C. (1999). Plus les communes vaudoises sont riches, moins elles logent de réfugiés - Le Temps. *www.letemps.ch*. [online] 8 Jul. Available at: https://www.letemps.ch/suisse/plus-communes-vaudoises-riches-logent-refugies [Accessed 26 May 2024].

SAMII, C. (2013). Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi. *American Political Science Review*, 107(3), pp.558–573. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055413000282.

Sands, M.L. (2017). Exposure to inequality affects support for redistribution. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114(4), pp.663–668. doi:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1615010113.

Sayyid, S. (2014). A Measure of Islamophobia. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 2(1), pp.10–25. doi:https://doi.org/10.13169/islastudj.2.1.0010.

Schlueter, E. and Scheepers, P. (2010). The relationship between outgroup size and anti-outgroup attitudes: A theoretical synthesis and empirical test of group threat- and intergroup contact theory. *Social Science Research*, 39(2), pp.285–295. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.07.006.

Schumann, S. (2010). Der Zusammenhang zwischen externer Bedrohung und internen Prozessen – eine quantitative Analyse im Rahmen der Jenaer Terrorismus Studie [The relationship between external threat and internal processes – A quantitative analysis in the framework of the Jenaer Terrorismus Study]. *VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks*, pp.254–265. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92579-0_7.

SNIDERMAN, P.M., HAGENDOORN, L. and PRIOR, M. (2004). Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities. *American Political Science Review*, 98(1), pp.35–49. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s000305540400098x.

State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) (2019). *Integration*. [online] www.sem.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/asyl/resettlement/integration.html [Accessed 26 May 2024].

State Secretariat for Migrations (SEM) (2023). *Agenda Intégration Suisse (AIS)*. [online] www.nkvf.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/fr/home/integration-einbuergerung/integrationsfoerderung/kantonale-programme/integrationsagenda.html [Accessed 26 May 2024].

State Secretariat for Migrations (SEM) (2024). *Übersichten*. [online] www.bj.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/statistik/asylstatistik/uebersichten.html [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Stephan, W.G., Lausanne Renfro, C., Esses, V.M., White Stephan, C. and Martin, T. (2005). The effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 29(1), pp.1–19. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.04.011.

Stephan, W.G. and Stephan, C.W. (1996). Predicting prejudice. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20(3-4), pp.409–426. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-1767(96)00026-0.

Stoddard, I. (2023). Islamophobia: The Effect of Personal Interaction and the Media on Arab Prejudice in Spain. *Undergraduate Honors Theses*. [online] Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/studentpub_uht/326/ [Accessed 9 Jun. 2024].

SVP (2019). *Interdiction de dissimuler le visage: seule l'UDC s'engage pour les valeurs suisses!* [online] UDC Suisse. Available at: https://www.udc.ch/actualites/publications/communiques-de-presse/interdiction-de-dissimuler-le-visage-seule-ludc-sengage-pour-les-valeurs-suisses/ [Accessed 20 May 2024].

Swiss Confederation (2021). *École obligatoire*. [online] www.eda.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.eda.admin.ch/aboutswitzerland/fr/home/bildung-wissenschaft/bildung/oblig-schule.html [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Swiss Confederation (2023). *Religion – facts and figures*. [online] www.eda.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.eda.admin.ch/aboutswitzerland/en/home/gesellschaft/religionen/religionen---fakten-und-zahlen.html#:~:text=Switzerland%20is%20a%20predominantly%20Christian.

Swiss Organisation for Refugee Support (OSAR) (n.d.). *Hébergement*. [online] www.osar.ch. Available at: https://www.osar.ch/themes/asile-en-suisse/hebergement [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Swiss Organisation for Refugee Support (OSAR) (n.d.). *Intégration*. [online] www.osar.ch. Available at: https://www.osar.ch/themes/asile-en-suisse/integration#:~:text=Les%20personnes%20ayant%20un%20droit [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Uenal, F. (2016). Disentangling Islamophobia: The differential effects of symbolic, realistic, and terroristic threat perceptions as mediators between social dominance orientation and Islamophobia. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 4(1), pp.66–90. doi:https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v4i1.463.

UNHCR (2024). *CIP: Cantonal Integration Programmes*. [online] The Global Compact on Refugees | UNHCR. Available at: https://globalcompactrefugees.org/good-practices/cip-cantonal-integration-programmes#:~:text=The%20cantons%20receive%20integration%20subsidies [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Velasco González, K., Verkuyten, M., Weesie, J. and Poppe, E. (2008). Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 47(4), pp.667–685. doi:https://doi.org/10.1348/014466608x284443.

Vertier, P., Viskanic, M. and Gamalerio, M. (2022). Dismantling the 'Jungle': migrant relocation and extreme voting in France. *Political Science Research and Methods*, pp.1–15. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.26.

VoteInfo (2024). *VoteInfo*. [online] www.bfs.admin.ch. Available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/politique/votations/voteinfo.html [Accessed 22 Apr. 2024]. VoteInfo is the Federal Statistical Office's and Government's joint app for detailed vote results and background information.

Weiß, A., Quasinowski, B. and Sommer, I. (2022). Study Report 'Globalizing medical knowledge and practice'. Transcripts, translation, audiovisual and context material for doctor-patient-interaction videoobserved at university hospitals in Ankara (Turkey), Beijing (PRChina), Groningen (Netherlands) and Würzburg (Germany). *media.suub.uni-bremen.de*. [online] doi:https://doi.org/10.26092/elib/1395.

Weiss, C.M. (2021). Diversity in health care institutions reduces Israeli patients' prejudice toward Arabs. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 118(14). doi:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022634118.

WILLEMIN, A., SCUDERI, F., NGUYEN , D.-Q. and WERMUS GENEVAY, O. (2023). *Population, immigration, vieillissement: découvrez l'évolution de la Suisse en 15 graphiques*. [online] Le Temps. Available at: https://archive.letemps.ch/archive/www.letemps.ch/grand-format/population-immigration-vieillissement-decouvrez-levolution-suisse-15-graphiques.html [Accessed 18 May 2024].

Zimmermann, S. and Stutzer, A. (2021). The consequences of hosting asylum seekers for citizens' policy preferences. *European Journal of Political Economy*, p.102130. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102130.

Zünd, C. (2016). Payer 290 000 francs ou accueillir neuf réfugiés: le choix qui divise l'un des plus riches villages d'Argovie - Le Temps. *www.letemps.ch*. [online] 30 Apr. Available at: https://www.letemps.ch/suisse/payer-290-000-francs-accueillir-neuf-refugies-choix-divise-lun-plus-riches-villages-dargovie [Accessed 26 May 2024].

Appendix A: Data Sourcing, Cleaning and Wrangling

When data for referenda years was unavailable, data from the nearest available year was used. Using municipal-level panel data introduced the "modifiable areal unit problem", with municipality mergers between 2009 and 2021 complicating the calculation of demographic and referendum support changes (Nathan and Sands, 2023). To account for these mergers, the Swiss Municipality Merger Tool in R was employed, providing mapping tables for data aggregation (Engist, 2021). A balanced panel of municipalities was then formed using the 2024 territorial boundaries to maintain consistent geographic units through time (Brunner and Kuhn, 2018). Considering municipality size was necessary to accurately calculate changes in average and percentage variables. Therefore, FSO data for these variables was first converted to raw numbers in Excel and the averages and percentages recalculated post-aggregation.

Outcome data for 6 hamlets was unavailable because their votes are combined within those of other municipalities (VoteInfo, 2024). Accordingly, these municipalities were excluded from our analysis. Municipality subtypes (three per municipality type) were merged to prevent dimensionality issues and facilitate subsequent imputation. The average income data for 75 small municipalities was missing due to privacy restrictions and was imputed using the median income of municipalities of the same type within the same canton (FSO, 2024a). SVP support data was also missing for 57 municipalities in 2007 and 3 in 2019, either due to tacit elections or the absence of an SVP candidate (VoteInfo, 2024). This data was imputed using the mean support of similar municipalities in the same canton. Such imputation was impossible in Nidwald, a half-canton with entirely missing data. Imputation for Nidwald using its sibling half-Canton Obwald's municipalities was not feasible due to a lack of corresponding municipality types. Instead, the Canton mean of Obwald was used to impute Nidwald’s values.

Appendix B: Model Selection

Instrumental variables (IV) are a popular approach to measure the impact of immigration on attitudes and were initially considered to address endogeneity concerns (Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Cerruti and Robbiano, 2023). For instance, Hangartner et al. (2018) instrumented Greek Islands' distance from the Turkish coast to measure the impact of temporary exposure to refugees on natives' hostility towards immigrants, while Pieroni et al. (2023) used shift-share instruments to assess immigration's impact on support for Italy's far-right Lega party. Yet, suitable instruments are rare and context-dependent (Gerber and Green, 2012). Thus, implementing an instrument like that of Hangartner et al. (2018) is challenging when studying immigration beyond solely refugees, as natural barriers have a reduced influence on migration patterns, especially in landlocked countries like Switzerland. Similarly, shift-share instruments' suitability for this study was questionable due to initial share data being limited to the above-mentioned 2000 Census. The ensuing instrument could have directly affected 2009 attitudes and referendum results due to the brief interim period, breaching the exclusion restriction (Gerber and Green, 2012). In view of these constraints, we opted for first-difference over IV methods.

Appendix C: Exploratory Data Analysis

C1: Descriptive Statistics – Continuous Variables

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Year Fielded
Support for the Minaret Referendum	63.050	10.785	2009
Support for the Face Ban Referendum	57.380	7.655	2021
Change in Referendum Support	-5.677	8.654	–
Change in Municipal Arab Shares	0.151	0.371	–
Change in Municipal NAM Shares	0.131	0.455	–
Change in Municipal NAMET Shares	0.154	0.327	–
Change in Municipal Non-Muslim Foreigner Shares	2.860	3.011	–
Municipal Muslim Share 2010	0.772	1.115	2010
Municipal Arab Share 2010	0.210	0.358	2010
Municipal NAM Share 2010	0.563	0.926	2010
Municipal NAMET Share 2010	0.171	0.288	2010
Municipal Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	13.560	8.701	2010
Violent Offences	4.472	1.917	2020
Change SVP Support	-1.002	9.907	-
Baseline SVP Support	32.140	14.495	2007
Change in the Municipal Population Density (100 residents/Km2)	0.490	1.007	-

C2: Missing Values

Variable	Missing Values
Baseline SVP Support	57
2019 SVP Support	3
Change in SVP Support	18
2020 Average Income per Municipality	75

Note: Only the variables with missing values were included in the table.

C3: Class Distribution - Categorical Variables



Appendix D: Full Summary Tables for the Models

Note 1: intercepts are not provided as they do not meaningfully correspond to any municipality in the country.

Note 2: original outputs represent the results without correction for autocorrelation.

Table D1: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares, Original Output

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Main Specification	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-0.436	0.431	-1.157	0.023*	-1.043	0.041*	-0.987	0.008**
Small Increase	-0.462	0.404	-0.565	0.256	-0.501	0.313	-0.701	0.051
Small Decrease	0.121	0.869	0.112	0.256	0.139	0.831	0.040	0.933
Large Decrease	0.311	0.674	-0.258	0.695	-0.162	0.805	1.844	0.0003***
Violent Offences	–	–	2.044	2.20e-16***	2.089	2.20e-16***	1.083	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	–	–	-1.221	0.004**	-1.250	0.003**	-0.839	0.006**
Urban Municipality	–	–	-2.022	5.18e-05***	-1.993	6.57e-05***	-1.946	1.75e-06***
Rich Municipality	–	–	1.927	2.14e-07***	2.021	7.02e-08***	-1.849	6.66e-11***
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	–	–	–	–	-0.148	0.008**	0.100	0.014*
Change SVP Support	–	–	–	–	0.035	0.043*	0.063	3.14e-07***
Minaret Support	–	–	–	–	–	–	-0.565	2.20e-16***
Muslim Share 2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	-1.360	2.20e-16***
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.045	0.015*

*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Table D2: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Main Specification	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-0.188	0.602	-0.373	0.316	-0.379	0.306	-0.919	0.006**
Small Increase	-0.451	0.193	-0.566	0.109	-0.584	0.098¨	-0.820	1.02e-02*
Small Decrease	0.122	0.788	0.042	0.926	0.025	0.956	-0.009	0.983
Large Decrease	0.107	0.815	0.046	0.921	-0.032	0.946	1.203	0.008**
Violent Offences	–	–	1.168	2.20e-16 ***	1.191	2.20e-16 ***	0.970	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	–	–	-0.254	0.485	-0.180	0.621	-0.573	0.062¨
Urban Municipality	–	–	-0.639	0.126	-0.507	0.227	-1.472	2.01e-04***
Rich Municipality	–	–	1.352	2.22e-05 ***	1.420	8.88e-06 ***	-1.132	6.48e-05***
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	–	–	–	–	0.017	0.681	0.104	0.006**
Change SVP Support	–	–	–	–	0.048	9.51e-03**	0.073	5.26e-07***
Minaret Support	–	–	–	–	–	–	-0.491	2.20e-16***
Muslim Share 2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	-1.025	6.65e-12***
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.016	0.411

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Table D3: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares, Original Output

Variable	Arab		NAM		NAM Excl. Turks	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-1.193	6.00e-4***	-0.580	0.103	-1.290	2.00e-4***
Small Increase	-0.534	0.102	-0.885	0.010**	-1.104	6.00e-4***
Small Decrease	-0.429	0.366	-0.562	0.203	-0.694	0.185
Large Decrease	1.108	0.032*	0.603	0.243	0.780	0.186
Change Arabs	–	–	-1.214	0.001***	-1.207	0.001**
Change NAM	-0.552	0.071	–	–	–	–
Change Turks	–	–	–	–	0.531	0.292
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	0.106	0.009**	0.106	0.009**	0.111	0.006**
Change SVP Support	0.064	2.05e-07***	0.063	2.90e-07***	0.064	2.19e-07***
Minaret Support	-0.560	2.20e-16***	-0.561	2.20e-16***	-0.557	2.20e-16***
Turks Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-1.001	2.45e-05***
NAMET Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.315	0.598
NAM Share 2010	-1.222	1.65e-10***	-1.345	1.70e-11***	–	–
Arab Share 2010	-0.530	0.235	-0.405	0.345	-0.630	0.174
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	0.039	0.035*	0.039	0.034*	0.042	0.024*
Violent Offences	1.066	2.20e-16***	1.055	2.20e-16***	1.034	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	-0.869	0.004**	-0.878	0.004**	-0.905	0.003**
Urban Municipality	-2.070	3.67e-07***	-2.098	2.54e-07***	-2.096	2.53e-07***
Rich Municipality	-1.810	1.87e-10***	-1.854	7.52e-11***	-1.829	1.10e-10***

*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Table D4: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares

Variable	Arab		NAM		NAM Excl. Turks	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-1.053	7.00e-04***	-0.518	0.107	-1.254	6.64e-05***
Small Increase	-0.729	0.012*	-0.865	4.83e-03**	-1.023	3.91e-04***
Small Decrease	-0.701	0.093¨	-0.327	0.404	-0.361	0.445
Large Decrease	0.902	0.050*	0.213	0.638	0.601	0.254
Change Arabs	–	–	-0.904	0.006**	-0.803	0.016*
Change NAM	-0.380	0.163	–	–	–	–
Change Turks	–	–	–	–	0.647	0.152
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	0.101	0.007**	0.105	0.005**	0.104	0.006**
Change SVP Support	0.074	2.76e-07***	0.074	3.71e-07***	0.074	3.46e-07***
Minaret Support	-0.489	2.20e-16***	-0.490	2.20e-16***	-0.490	2.20e-16***
Turks Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.555	0.015
NAMET Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.494	0.366
NAM Share 2010	-0.806	1.42e-05***	-0.904	1.83e-06***	–	–
Arab Share 2010	-0.766	0.058¨	-0.603	0.124	-0.591	0.156
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	0.012	0.522	0.011	0.568	0.014	0.472
Violent Offences	0.964	2.20e-16***	0.960	2.20e-16***	0.945	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	-0.634	0.039*	-0.633	0.040*	-0.636	0.038*
Urban Municipality	-1.585	6.05e-05***	-1.644	3.21e-05***	-1.623	4.05e-05***
Rich Municipality	-1.073	2.00e-4***	-1.115	8.88e-06***	-1.131	6.64e-05***

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Appendix E: Model Diagnostics

E1: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Tests:

Table E1.1: VIF Tests for the Models on the Impact of Changes in Muslim Shares

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Main Specification
Change in Municipal Muslim Share	N/A	*1.089*	*1.103*	1.372
Violent Offenses	–	1.059	1.099	1.281
Municipality Type	–	*1.326*	*1.333*	*1.877*
Rich Municipality	–	*1.239*	*1.267*	*1.404*
Change SVP Support	–	–	1.093	1.111
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	–	–	1.015	1.049
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	–	–	–	1.810
Muslim Share 2010	–	–	–	2.054
Minaret Support	–	–	–	1.502

Note: Model 1 contains a single variable and is therefore labelled N/A
Note: Categorical variables are displayed in Italic

Table E1.2: VIF Tests for the Models on the Impact of Changes in Muslim Sub-Group Shares

Variable	Arab	NAM	NAM Excl. Turks
Change in Municipal Arab Share	*1.546*	*N/A*	*N/A*
Change in Municipal NAM Share	*N/A*	*1.730*	*N/A*
Change in Municipal NAMET Share	*N/A*	*N/A*	*1.750*
Change Arabs - Control	N/A	1.286	1.344
Change NAM - Control	1.363	N/A	N/A
Change Turks - Control	N/A	N/A	1.985
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	1.056	1.056	1.057
Turks Share 2010	N/A	N/A	2.726
NAMET Share 2010	N/A	N/A	2.114
NAM Share 2010	2.188	2.384	N/A
Arab Share 2010	1.795	1.659	1.958
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	1.822	1.824	1.828
Violent Offenses	1.325	1.332	1.344
Municipality Type	*1.864*	*1.876*	*1.333*
Rich Municipality	*1.450*	*1.415*	*1.267*
Change SVP Support	1.111	1.111	1.093
Minaret Support	1.530	1.526	1.591

Note: Inapplicable Variables are labelled N/A
Note: Categorical variables are displayed in Italic

E2: Heteroskedasticity Compliant Model Results for the Main Specification

Table E2.1: Main Specification Results with WLS and HC1 Standard Errors

Variable	Main Specification		HC1		WLS	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-0.987	0.008**	-1.002	0.006**	-0.986	0.013*
Small Increase	-0.701	0.051	-0.797	0.025*	-0.701	0.073¨
Small Decrease	0.040	0.933	-0.042	0.928	0.040	0.933
Large Decrease	1.844	3.00e-4***	1.655	1.31e-03**	1.844	1.39e-03**
Violent Offences	1.083	2.20e-16***	1.062	2.20e-16***	1.083	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	-0.839	0.006**	-0.889	0.003**	-0.839	9.74e-03**
Urban Municipality	-1.946	1.75e-06***	-1.971	9.83e-07***	-1.946	1.06e-06***
Rich Municipality	-1.849	6.66e-11***	-1.720	8.01e-10***	-1.849	1.10e-10***
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	0.100	0.014*	0.092	0.024*	0.100	0.037*
Change SVP Support	0.063	3.14e-07***	0.059	1.14e-06***	0.063	5.57e-05***
Minaret Support	-0.565	2.20e-16***	-0.550	2.20e-16***	-0.565	2.20e-16***
Muslim Share 2010	-1.360	2.20e-16***	-1.284	2.20e-16***	-1.360	2.20e-16***
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	0.045	0.015*	0.044	0.018*	0.045	0.030*

*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

E3: Linearity Assumption

Figure E3.1: Residual vs Fitted Plots - Main Specification and Muslim Sub-Groups



E4: Normality Assumption

Figure E4.1 Normality of the Residuals - Main Specification and Muslim Sub-Groups



Appendix F: Robustness Checks

F1: Models Excluding Imputed Values

Table F1.1: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares, Excl. Imputed Values

Variable	Model 2		Model 3		Main Specification	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-0.509	0.166	-0.489	0.185	-0.842	0.012**
Small Increase	-0.731	0.037*	-0.737	0.036*	-0.805	0.012*
Small Decrease	-0.102	0.820	-0.124	0.784	-0.025	0.952
Large Decrease	-0.232	0.611	-0.285	0.534	1.067	0.017*
Violent Offences	1.083	2.20e-16***	1.103	2.20e-16***	0.944	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	-0.084	0.811	-0.022	0.950	-0.551	0.071¨
Urban Municipality	-0.490	0.224	-0.370	0.365	-1.424	0.0003***
Rich Municipality	1.349	1.11e-05***	1.450	2.89e-06***	-1.025	2.00e-4***
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	–	–	0.008	0.853	0.086	0.021*
Change SVP Support	–	–	0.053	0.006**	0.078	3.65e-07***
Minaret Support	–	–	–	–	-0.484	2.20e-16***
Muslim Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.935	1.24e-10***
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	–	–	–	–	0.006	0.731

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Table F1.2: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Shares, Excl. Outliers

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Main Specification	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-0.112	0.739	-0.255	0.515	-0.064	0.852	-0.784	1.05e-03*
Small Increase	-0.314	0.333	-0.371	0.260	-0.384	0.236	-0.599	0.041*
Small Decrease	-0.268	0.539	-0.136	0.753	-0.152	0.725	0.099	0.798
Large Decrease	-0.278	0.543	-0.298	0.508	-0.456	0.302	1.310	0.003**
Violent Offences	–	–	1.732	2.20e-16***	1.679	2.20e-16***	1.139	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	–	–	-0.382	0.255	-0.362	0.281	-0.970	0.0005***
Urban Municipality	–	–	-0.852	0.027*	-0.727	0.060¨	-2.066	1.60e-08***
Rich Municipality	–	–	1.385	2.67e-06***	1.533	1.53e-07***	-1.114	1.30e-05***
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	–	–	–	–	-0.045	0.319	0.072	0.061¨
Change SVP Support	–	–	–	–	0.060	0.003**	0.104	7.85e-11***
Minaret Support	–	–	–	–	–	–	-0.512	2.20e-16***
Muslim Share 2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	-1.067	5.19e-10***
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.058	0.003**

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ***

F2: Models Excluding Outliers

Table F2.1: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares, Excl. Imputed Values

Variable	Arabs		NAM		NAM Excl. Turks	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-1.000	0.001**	-0.457	0.150	-1.194	1.04e-04***
Small Increase	-0.690	0.015*	-0.828	0.006**	-0.958	7.09e-04***
Small Decrease	-0.709	0.082¨	-0.332	0.390	-0.334	0.466
Large Decrease	0.797	0.074¨	0.117	0.791	0.524	0.310
Change Arabs	–	–	-0.919	0.004**	-0.819	0.012*
Change NAM	-0.371	0.163	–	–	–	–
Change Turks	–	–	–	–	0.632	0.148
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	0.084	0.026*	0.087	0.020*	0.085	0.023*
Change SVP Support	0.080	2.30e-07***	0.079	0.079	0.079	2.77e-07***
Minaret Support	-0.480	2.20e-16***	-0.483	2.20e-16***	-0.482	2.20e-16***
Turks Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.524	0.018*
NAMET Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.374	0.500
NAM Share 2010	-0.769	2.00e-05***	-0.833	5.91e-06***	–	–
Arab Share 2010	-0.563	0.153	-0.457	0.232	-0.459	0.263
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	0.003	0.878	0.002	0.915	0.005	0.800
Violent Offences	0.935	2.20e-16***	0.931	2.20e-16***	0.918	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	-0.610	0.045*	-0.604	0.048*	-0.609	0.045*
Urban Municipality	-1.516	9.30e-05***	-1.580	4.67e-05***	-1.555	6.08e-05***
Rich Municipality	-0.968	0.0005***	-1.019	0.0003***	-1.036	0.0002***

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Table F2.2: Impact of Changes in Municipal Muslim Sub-Group Shares, Excl. Outliers

Variable	Arabs		NAM		NAM Excl. Turks	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-1.071	1.96e-04***	-0.432	0.140	-1.289	9.98e-06***
Small Increase	-0.675	0.011*	-0.841	0.002**	-1.029	8.98e-05***
Small Decrease	-0.640	0.105	-0.485	0.175	-0.230	0.507
Large Decrease	0.679	0.140	0.243	0.575	0.415	0.445
Change Arabs	–	–	-1.035	0.003**	-0.982	0.007**
Change NAM	0.019	0.950	–	–	–	–
Change Turks	–	–	–	–	1.078	0.027*
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	0.057	0.140	0.042	0.273	0.046	0.233
Change SVP Support	0.113	1.70e-12***	0.115	8.48e-13***	0.104	4.96e-11***
Minaret Support	-0.503	2.20e-16***	-0.509	2.20e-16***	-0.500	2.20e-16***
Turks Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.763	0.004**
NAMET Share 2010	–	–	–	–	-0.616	0.434
NAM Share 2010	-0.909	1.58e-05***	-0.970	1.20e-05***	–	–
Arab Share 2010	-0.313	0.580	0.097	0.852	0.083	0.884
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	0.040	0.038*	0.030	0.116	0.045	0.018*
Violent Offences	1.079	2.20e-16***	1.098	2.20e-16***	1.091	2.20e-16***
Semi-Urban Municipality	-0.956	7.00***	-0.871	0.002**	-0.902	0.002**
Urban Municipality	-2.028	4.57e-08***	-1.936	1.29e-07***	-2.060	3.36e-08***
Rich Municipality	-0.957	2.00e-4***	-1.056	4.19e-05***	-1.058	5.17e-05***

Note: Models are corrected for autocorrelation.
*Significance levels:10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Appendix G: Supplementary Models

Table G1: Main Specification, including Baseline SVP Support and Population Density

Variable	Baseline SVP Model		Population Density Model	
	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
Large Increase	-0.985	0.008**	-0.983	0.007**
Small Increase	-0.706	0.049*	-0.701	5.066e-2¨
Small Decrease	0.032	0.946	0.020	0.967
Large Decrease	1.838	3.57e-04***	1.789	5.30e-04***
Violent Offences	1.083	2.20e-016***	1.086	2.20e-016***
Semi-Urban Municipality	--0.851	5.36e-03**	-0.836	0.006**
Urban Municipality	-1.977	1.51e-06***	-1.859	6.74e-06***
Rich Municipality	-1.829	1.52e-10***	-1.817	1.61e-10***
Change Non-Muslim Foreigners	0.100	0.013*	0.104	1.041e-03*
Change SVP Support	0.058	3.00e-04***	0.062	4.29e-07***
Minaret Support	-0.560	2.20e-016***	-0.565	2e-016***
Muslim Share 2010	-1.353	2.20e-016***	-1.318	2.20e-016***
Non-Muslim Foreigner Share 2010	0.043	0.021*	0.050	0.009**
Baseline SVP Support	-0.007	0.582	–	–
Population Density	–	–	-0.178	0.226

*Significance levels: 10% = ¨; 5% = *; 1% = **; 0.1% = ****

Appendix H: Geographic Distribution of Muslim Migrations

Table H1: Distribution of Municipalities with Constant Shares Across Linguistic Regions

Region	Total Municipalities	Constant Arab Shares	Constant NAM Shares	Constant NAMET Shares	Prop. Constant Arab Shares	Prop. Constant NAM Shares	Prop. Constant NAMET Shares
French	615	196	167	189	0.319	0.272	0.307
German	1374	412	302	385	0.300	0.220	0.280
Italian	121	57	46	60	0.417	0.380	0.496
Romansh	15	10	8	8	0.666	0.533	0533

Table H2: Distribution of Municipalities with Increasing Shares Across Linguistic Regions

Region	Total Municipalities	Increasing Arab Shares	Increasing NAM Shares	Increasing NAMET Shares	Prop. Increasing Arab Shares	Prop. Increasing NAM Shares	Prop. Increasing NAMET Shares
French	615	291	325	309	0.473	0.528	0.502
German	1374	770	746	843	0.560	0.543	0.614
Italian	121	41	58	53	0.339	0.479	0.438
Romansh	15	3	5	5	0.200	0.333	0.333

Table H3: Distribution of Municipalities with Decreasing Shares Across Linguistic Regions

Region	Total Municipalities	Decreasing Arab Shares	Decreasing NAM Shares	Decreasing NAMET Shares	Prop. Decreasing Arab Shares	Prop. Decreasing NAM Shares	Prop. Decreasing NAMET Shares
French	615	128	123	117	0.208	0.200	0.190
German	1374	192	326	146	0.140	0.237	0.106
Italian	121	23	17	8	0.190	0.140	0.066
Romansh	15	2	2	2	0.133	0.133	0.133

Table H4: Distribution of Municipalities with Constant Muslim Shares by Municipality Type

	Rural	Semi-Urban	Urban
Municipality Type Counts	668	926	511
Municipality Type Proportions	0.324	0.436	0.240
Counts of Municipalities with Constant Shares	197	158	36
Proportions of Municipalities with Constant Shares	0.504	0.404	0.092

Appendix I: Maps

Figure I1: Location of the Main Specification's Outliers by Municipality Type



Source: Author

Figure I2:



Source: Author

Figure I3: Switzerland's Linguistic Regions



Source: FSO, ThemaKart, 2023

Appendix J: Link to GitHub Repository with the Code for this Research

https://github.com/Guiso079/Undergraduate-Dissertation-/tree/main