

1 Introduction

2 The data

3 Model and Strategy

4 Results

5 Conclusion

- 1 Introduction
- 2 **The data**
 - Description of PriceMinister.com
 - Transaction procedure
 - Content of Data
- 3 Model and Strategy
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

Description of PriceMinister.com

- Serves as a pure platform.
- No auction.Price posted by sellers.
- Uses a special feedback and transaction control mechanism.
(details on p7)
- Impose a fixed shipping fee.(no competition on shipping fees)

Transaction procedure

- ① Buyer's payment goes to PriceMinister
- ② Seller become informed and conduct shipping.
- ③ Buyers give feedbacks after receiving the product.
- ④ Sellers get paid.

1 Introduction

2 The data

- Description of PriceMinister.com
- Transaction procedure
- Content of Data
 - Initial Data Set
 - Details on the analysis
 - Descriptive Statistics(p9-p13)

3 Model and Strategy

- 3.1 Econometric Model
- 3.2 Identification issues
- Estimation
- 3.3 Estimation

4 Results

- 4.1 The effect of reputation on prices
- 4.2 Results by product condition(p24)
- 4.3 Results for professional sellers and new/used goods(p25)
- 4.4 Prices, reputation and recent feedback history
- 4.5-4.6 Robustness & Comparisons with other literature

5 Conclusion

Content of the Initial Data Set(Time:2001-2008)

The data set contains the following information:

- Initial transaction time
completed time
- seller's identifier
seller's state
product's identifier
- transaction price
advertised condition
the type of shipping

Details on the analysis

- Focus:
 - 4 categories (books, CDs, games and videos)
(accounts for the majority of the PriceMinister sell)
 - Individual sellers
 - Used goods
- Price Variable:
 - The advert price without shipping fee
- Constructed Variable:
 - Seller's average rating: r
 - Number of a seller's completed transactions : s
 - The length of time between the date when the item was sold and the transaction date: age

Figure 1

- Row1: the total sum of transactions(updated monthly)
- Row2: the evolution of average transaction prices
- Row3: the distribution of ratings for each category

Table 1:Features

(For detailed statistics,see page 11.)

- some individual sellers are **relatively big** regardless of the **substantial dispersion in seller size**
- more than half of the **individual sellers** make over 30 transactions
- there is enough variation in feedback scores that caused the rating of sellers to change

The dispersion of price of a product.

- Wide range of price.
- Asymmetric distribution.
- No external programs needed.

- 1 Introduction
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Problems

- Fixed effect of product and sellers.
(thus place an influence on a seller's rating and size)
- Exploiting the variation of price is problematic.

structure

- 3.2.1 First Transactions(p16)
- 3.2.2 Product Heterogeneity(p17)
Main:Product list price,age and condition
Residual:Features not captured by the list price (The seller's specialization and so forth).
- 3.2.3 The Dynamics of Reputation(p17)

1 Introduction

2 The data

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Effects(for individual sellers only)

- Rating
Estimates(based on GMM) show a significant, positive and strong effect of rating on prices
(the same is true for professional sellers)
- Size
the effect size on prices is significant, small, negative, essentially linear and similar across product categories.
- Other Product Characteristics
Age:negatively affects prices
List price:positive and significant
Product condition:Positive and strong.(the price increase per level is almost constant)

1 Introduction

2 The data

3 Model and Strategy

4 Results

5 Conclusion

Contribution

- Explicitly accounted for seller unobserved heterogeneity
- Provided empirical evidence of the effect of seller reputation on transaction prices for product categories (books to video games), product conditions (used or new) and types of seller (individual or professional)
- Further research directions(see on page 35)