


Final Project - CatFlix

Final Project - CatFlix	1
Task 1	2
Task 2	3
Task 3	16



Task 1






Task 2

Windows

IPs




Manageability


Manageability



Windows Group Policy Implementation


















Powershell Transcripts







Linux(LAMP Stack)

IPs











<u>Mediawiki</u>



Security Detail







PaloAlto

Interface Management

```
Name: Management Interface
Link status:
Runtime link speed/duplex/state: 10000/full/up
Configured link speed/duplex/state: auto/auto/auto
MAC address:
Port MAC address 00:50:56:86:5f:a0


Ip address: 192.168.254.106
Netmask: 255.255.25

Befault gatemay: 192.168.254.254
Ipv6 address: unknown
Ipv6 link local address: fe00::250:56ff:fe06:5fa0/64
Ipv6 default gatemay:


Logical interface counters:

bytes received 32816
bytes transmitted 452
IInes =241
```


Config and Basic Implementation




















Security Blocks



Traveler IP





Task 3

Hardware Inventory list

Attackers, who can be located anywhere in the world, are continuously scanning the address space of target organizations, waiting for new and possibly unprotected systems to be attached to the network. They are particularly interested in devices which come and go off of the enterprise's network such as laptops or Bring-Your-Own-Devices (BYOD) which might be out of synch with security updates or might already be compromised. Attacks can take advantage of new hardware that is installed on the network one evening but not configured and patched with appropriate security updates until the following day. Even devices that are not visible from the Internet can be used by attackers who have already gained internal access and are hunting for internal pivot points or victims. Additional systems that connect to the enterprise's network (e.g., demonstration systems, temporary test systems, guest networks) should also be managed carefully and/or isolated in order to prevent adversarial access from affecting the security of enterprise operations.

Large, complex enterprises understandably struggle with the challenge of managing intricate, fast-changing environments. But attackers have shown the ability, patience, and willingness to "inventory and control" our assets at very large scale in order to support their opportunities.

Managed control of all devices also plays a critical role in planning and executing system backup, incident response, and recovery.

Name	Category	IP	MAC	OS
Windows Server	Domain Controller, AD	10.42.6.70	00-50-56-86-7d- 2b	Windows Server 2016
Windows Client	Client	10.42.6.10	00-50-56-86-3c- a7	Windows 10
Linux Client	Client	10.42.6.2	00-50-56-86-87- 32	Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS
WEB	Web Server	10.43.6.12	00-50-56-86-d0- cf	Ubuntu Server



DB	Database Server	10.43.6.3	00-50-56-86-da- 9b	CentOS Core(8.0.1905)
Palo Alto	Router, Firewall	MI - 192.168.254.106 ,10.42.6.1, 10.43.6.1	00-50-56-86-d3- 78 00-50-56-86-49- db	PanOS
Traveler	Client, Outside	192.168.13.176	00-50-56-86-53- ce	Windows Server 2016

Finding MAC

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> arp -a
Interface: 10.42.6.70 --- 0x3
  Internet Address Physical Address
                                                         Type
  10.42.6.1
10.42.6.2
10.42.6.10
10.42.6.255
                             00-50-56-86-d3-78
                                                         dynamic
                             00-50-56-86-87-32
00-50-56-86-3c-a7
ff-ff-ff-ff-ff
                                                        dynamic
                                                        dynamic
                                                        static
  224.0.0.22
                             01-00-5e-00-00-16
                                                        static
  224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
                             01-00-5e-00-00-fc
                                                        static
                             01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa
                                                        static
PS C:\Users\Administrator>
```

```
[root@localnost network-scripts]# arp
                                                     Flags Mask
Address
                         HWtype HWaddress
                                                                           Iface
10.43.6.12
                                 00:50:56:86:d0:cf
                                                                           ens16
                        ether
                                                     C
Θ
gateway
                        ether
                                 00:50:56:86:49:d8
                                                                           ens16
[root@localhost network-scripts]#
```

```
jursimransingh@gursimran-virtual-machine:~/Downloads$ arp
Address
                         HWtype HWaddress
                                                       Flags Mask
                                                                              Ifac
10.42.6.70
                                  00:50:56:86:7d:2b
                         ether
                                                       C
                                                                              ens1
50
10.42.6.10
                                  00:50:56:86:3c:a7
                         ether
                                                       C
                                                                              ens1
50
gateway
                         ether
                                  00:50:56:86:d3:78
                                                       C
                                                                              ens1
50
```



```
gursimran@localhost:/etc/sysconfig/network-scripts
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[root@localhost network-scripts]# ifconfig -a
ens160: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        inet 10.43.6.3 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.43.6.255
        inet6 fe80::dfa8:e5c4:6ce4:aa04 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
        ether 00:50:56:86:da:9b txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
RX packets 714251 bytes 937836091 (894.3 MiB)
        RX errors 0 dropped 364 overruns 0 frame 0
        TX packets 98297 bytes 12016949 (11.4 MiB)
        TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
        inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
        inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
        loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
        RX packets 15 bytes 1254 (1.2 KiB)
        RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
        TX packets 15 bytes 1254 (1.2 KiB)
        TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
virbr0: flags=4099<UP, BROADCAST, MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        inet 192.168.122.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.122.255
```

```
Administrator Command Prompt
                                                                                                                                                             П
   Primary Dns Suffix .
   WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . : No DNS Suffix Search List. . . . : cse.buffalo.edu
Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix .: cse.buffalo.edu
Description . . . . . . . : vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter
Physical Address . . . . . : 00-50-56-86-53-CE
   DHCP Enabled . . . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . : Yes
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . : fe80::7c81:6448:a745:4998%4(Preferred)
    IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . . .
                                                      192.168.13.176(Preferred)
    Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . . :
   Lease Obtained. . . . : Tuesday, May 19, 2020 5:24:14 AM
Lease Expires . . . : Wednesday, May 20, 2020 3:24:14 AM
Default Gateway . . . : 192.168.0.1
DHCP Server
                                                     255.255.240.0
   DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
    DHCPv6 IAID .
                                                      100683862
   DHCPv6 Client DUID. .
                                       . . . . : 00-01-00-01-26-55-19-70-00-50-56-86-53-CE
                                     . . . . . : 192.168.0.2
   DNS Servers . . . . NetBIOS over Tcpip.
  \Users\Administrator>_
```

Software Inventory list

Attackers continuously scan target organizations looking for vulnerable versions of software that can be remotely exploited. Some attackers also distribute hostile web pages, document files, media files, and other content via their own web pages or otherwise trustworthy third-party sites. When unsuspecting victims access this content with a vulnerable browser or other client-side program, attackers compromise their machines, often installing backdoor programs and bots that give the attacker long-term control of the system. Some sophisticated attackers may use zero-day exploits, which take advantage of previously unknown vulnerabilities for which no patch has yet



been released by the software vendor. Without proper knowledge or control of the software deployed in an organization, defenders cannot properly secure their assets.

Poorly controlled machines are more likely to be either running software that is unneeded for business purposes (introducing potential security flaws), or running malware introduced by an attacker after a system is compromised. Once a single machine has been exploited, attackers often use it as a staging point for collecting sensitive information from the compromised system and from other systems connected to it. In addition, compromised machines are used as a launching point for movement throughout the network and partnering networks. In this way, attackers may quickly turn one compromised machine into many. Organizations that do not have complete software inventories are unable to find systems running vulnerable or malicious software to mitigate problems or root out attackers.

Managed control of all software also plays a critical role in planning and executing system backup, incident response, and recovery.


Name	Category	<u>Use</u>	<u>Usage</u>
Apache2	WebServer	Hosting HTTP Server	WebServer
Mediawiki	WebService	Software App	WebServer
MariaDB	Database	Maintaining DB for WebServer	Database
net-tools	Network tools	Used for Networking tasks like ifconfig, arp, etc	Linux Client




Controlled use of Admin Privileges

The misuse of administrative privileges is a primary method for attackers to spread inside a target enterprise. Two very common attacker techniques take advantage of uncontrolled administrative privileges. In the first, a workstation user running as a privileged user, is fooled into opening a malicious email attachment, downloading and opening a file from a malicious website, or simply surfing to a website hosting attacker content that can automatically exploit browsers. The file or exploit contains executable code that runs on the victim's machine either automatically or by tricking the user into executing the attacker's content. If the victim user's account has administrative privileges, the attacker can take over the victim's machine completely and install keystroke loggers, sniffers, and remote control software to find administrative passwords and other sensitive data. Similar attacks occur with email. An administrator inadvertently opens an email that contains an infected attachment and this is used to obtain a pivot point within the network that is used to attack other systems.

The second common technique used by attackers is elevation of privileges by guessing or cracking a password for an administrative user to gain access to a target machine. If administrative privileges are loosely and widely distributed, or identical to passwords used on less critical systems, the attacker has a much easier time gaining full control of systems, because there are many more accounts that can act as avenues for the attacker to compromise administrative privileges.








<u>Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers</u>

As delivered by manufacturers and resellers, the default configurations for operating systems and applications are normally geared towards ease-of-deployment and ease-of-use – not security. Basic controls, open services and ports, default accounts or passwords, older (vulnerable) protocols, preinstallation of unneeded software; all can be exploitable in their default state.

Developing configuration settings with good security properties is a complex task beyond the ability of individual users, requiring analysis of potentially hundreds or thousands of options in order to make good choices (the Procedures and Tool section below provides resources for secure configurations). Even if a strong initial configuration is developed and installed, it must



be continually managed to avoid security "decay" as software is updated or patched, new security vulnerabilities are reported, and configurations are "tweaked" to allow the installation of new software or support new operational requirements. If not, attackers will find opportunities to exploit both network accessible services and client software.



Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs

Deficiencies in security logging and analysis allow attackers to hide their location, malicious software, and activities on victim machines. Even if the victims know that their systems have been compromised, without protected and complete logging records they are blind to the details



of the attack and to subsequent actions taken by the attackers. Without solid audit logs, an attack may go unnoticed indefinitely and the particular damages done may be irreversible.

Sometimes logging records are the only evidence of a successful attack. Many organizations keep audit records for compliance purposes, but attackers rely on the fact that such organizations rarely look at the audit logs, and they do not know that their systems have been compromised. Because of poor or nonexistent log analysis processes, attackers sometimes control victim machines for months or years without anyone in the target organization knowing, even though the evidence of the attack has been recorded in unexamined log files.



File Edit View Seach Temmal Help
--destination-port 67 --jump ACCEPT' failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).

[gursimam@localhost log]s sudo cat firevalld
2020-05-18 23:36:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -W10 --w -table mangle --delete POSTROUTING --out-interface virbr0 --protoc ol ump --destination-port 68 --jump ACCEPT' failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).

2020-05-18 23:36:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -W10 -w -table mat --delete POSTROUTING --source 192.168.122.0/24 --destin ation 254.0-0.0/27 --jump RETURE 'failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).

2020-05-18 23:35:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -W10 -w -table mat --delete POSTROUTING --source 192.168.122.0/24 --destin ation 255.235.255.235/22 --jump RETURE 'failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).

2020-05-18 23:35:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -W10 -w -table mat --delete POSTROUTING --source 192.168.122.0/24 --p top 1 --destination 192.168.122.0/24 --jump RESURE --to-ports 1024-65555' failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).

2020-05-18 23:35:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -V10 -w -table mat --delete POSTROUTING --source 192.168.122.0/24 --p udp 1 --destination 192.168.122.0/24 --jump MASQUERADE --to-ports 1024-65555' failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).


2020-05-18 23:35:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -V10 -w -table mat --delete POSTROUTING --source 192.168.122.0/24 - p udp 1 --destination 192.168.122.0/24 --jump MASQUERADE --to-ports 1024-65555' failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).


2020-05-18 23:35:16 WARNING: COMMAND FAILED: 'Jusr/sbin/jtables -V10 -w -table mat --delete POSTROUTING --source 192.168.122.0/24 --in-the race virbr0 --jump ACCEPT' failed: jtables: Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).

2020-05-18 23:35:16 W

System Logs	S 1
Description	Time
User admin logged in via Web from 192.168.13.176 using https	05/19 19:51:04
authenticated for user 'admin'. From: 192.168.13.176.	05/19 19:51:04
Connection to Update server: updates.paloaltonetworks.com completed successfully, initiated by 192.168.254.106	05/19 19:45:10
Connection to Update server: updates.paloaltonetworks.com completed successfully, initiated by 192.168.254.106	05/19 19:29:21
Backup of PAN-DB finished successfully.	05/19 19:16:20
Connection to Update server: updates.paloaltonetworks.com completed successfully, initiated by 192.168.254.106	05/19 19:14:51
DHCP client assigned IP: 192.168.254.36 on interface: ethernet1/1 for lease time of: 0 days 2h:00m:00s from server: 192.168.254.254. Subnet mask:255.255.255.0 Gateway:192.168.254.254 DNS1:192.168.0.2 NTP1:128.205.32.2 NTP2:128.205.32.12 DNS Suffix:cse.buffalo.edu	05/19 19:08:09
Connection to Update server: updates.paloaltonetworks.com completed successfully, initiated by 192.168.254.106	05/19 18:59:08







Reference - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/



Username and passwords

System	User	Password
Linux Client	gursimransingh(Gursimran	Team6@123
Windows 10	mannisingh@syssec.com gursimran	Team6@123
Windows Server	SYSSEC/ADMINISTRATO R gursimransingh@syssec.co m	Team6@123
WEB	Gursimran, gursimransingh	Team6@123
DB	Gursimran wikidb->wikiuser	Team6@123 wikipassbig
PaloAlto	admin	Change.me!
Traveler	Administrator	Pal0Alt0