

# Orchid: A Fully Distributed, Anonymous Proxy Network Incentivized Through Bandwidth Mining

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## Abstract

As methods for censoring browsing and discovering private browsing information have improved, interest in anonymization methods has increased. Unfortunately, existing approaches to unrestricted, unsurveilled Internet access such as I2P and Tor suffer from a tragedy of the commons – only a few thousand unpaid volunteers host proxies and exit nodes, allowing sophisticated attackers a tractable number of nodes to monitor or otherwise compromise. We present a market based, fully decentralized, anonymous peer-to-peer system based on “bandwidth mining” which we hope will address this lack of relays by paying them.

Contributions include:

- A payment mechanism suitable for transactions as inexpensive as a ten-thousandth of a penny, up to arbitrarily high denominations.
- A commodity specification for the sale of bandwidth.
- A method for distributed inductive proofs in peer-to-peer systems which make Eclipse attacks arbitrarily difficult.
- An efficient security-hardened auction mechanism suited for the sale of bandwidth in circumstances where an attacker may alter their bid as part of an attack.
- A fully distributed anonymous bandwidth market.

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. System Goals

The Orchid Network was designed with three goals:

1. To codify the right to unrestricted, unsurveilled Internet access on a networking level.
2. To build a system suited for daily use. To say that a freedom is not a part of daily life is to say that the freedom is dying.
3. To make such a system worthy of trust, by developing it in the open and releasing the source code for full public audit.

These are ambitious goals, and are not realized by the system described in this document. This document does, however, contain an imperfect first attempt – an invitation to join us in design, construction, and use of what we believe is the future of networking.

## 1.2. Acknowledgements

Professor Boneh, Professor Vigna, Justin Sheek. Add people!

## 1.3. Document Structure

This document begins with an overview of the system (Section 1), describes the kind of attacks and attackers that can be reasonably anticipated against such a system (Section 2), and then discusses the lessons that can be learned from the previous deployment of similar systems (Section 3). We include these sections in the hope that they might help jog the readers memory, perhaps alert them to interesting references, and assist intuition for the context in which the system will be deployed.

Once the stage has been set, we will move on to a detailed discussion of the system components themselves. We will detail the external libraries we have chosen to rely on, and why (Section 4), describe a micropayment system suited to the sale of bandwidth (Section 6), a commodity specification for the sale of bandwidth (Section 7), a distributed marketplace for the sale of bandwidth (Section 10), and a method of employing our commodity specification for bandwidth to build an uncensorable and anonymously Internet connection (Section 8). This is to say these sections provide a “nuts and bolts” view of the Agora network. Each component uses the previous as building blocks, so it is recommended that you read these sections in order.

We close out with a discussion of what an attacker’s experience of the system might be (Section 15), both as a means of discussing the security of the system when viewed as a whole, and as a thought experiments for those wishing to assist us in improving system security. Next we discuss non-security features we hope to add in future releases (Section 16). Readers interested in assisting with the project are encouraged to read these sections carefully.

Because the system is to be fully decentralized, fully autonomous, and fully anonymous, much of this design document is centered on attacks. Although attack analysis is important, and will take up much of our time, it is ultimately no more than a necessary conceit to the context in which the market is to operate; please do not let thoughts of security distract you unduly from an understanding the system itself. We look forward to conversing about the system with experts in economics, autonomous markets, network engineers, applications programmers, and anyone with interest.

## 1.4. Terms

- Node. A computer running a program which implements the Orchid Protocol.
- Medallion. Data used by a node to demonstrate it is in exclusive possession of computational resources.
- User. The owner of a node.
- Agora. A collection of nodes interacting through the Orchid Distributed Marketplace Protocol.

- *The Agora*. The Agora in possession of the most global computational power.
- *Econ*. A node who is a member of an Agora's collection.
- *Entry Econ*. An econ who is willing to accept direct TCP connections from Users.
- *Address*. The location in Medallion-space inhabited by an Econ.
- *Customer*. A buyer on the Agora.
- *Relay*. A node willing to sell bandwidth to customers.
- *Proxy*. A relay which is additionally willing to interact with web servers on behalf of customers.
- *Manifold*. A chain of relays used for anonymous communication.
- *Ticket*. A stochastic micropayment.
- *Attack*. A method for causing the non-consensual transfer of money or information.
- *Attacker*. A person or group of people interested in performing attacks.

## 1.5. Core Security Assumptions

The security of the Orchid system as a whole ultimately rests on basic assumptions about the world. In the event this assumption is ever falsified, the system will not function as intended.

- The majority of global computation power will not cooperate on an attack.

Without this assumption (or a similar for a different resource), it would be impossible for a fully anonymous and distributed system to function. No distributed quorum could be trusted, because the majority of users might vote in such a way as to facilitate attacks. Users would be left relying on web-of-trust approaches, which by their nature are non-anonymous.

We use this assumption, combined with a method for rapidly demonstrating significant computational work has been done, to construct the basis for trust on our system: medallions. Production of a medallion ties ownership of computation to a public key. They are presented as needed to prove that a given node is “real.” For a more detailed discussion see Section ??.

## 1.6. High-Level System Overview

### 1.6.1. The Agora




Figure 1: An Agora with eight Econs

The Agora is a globally distributed P2P market place for bandwidth. Although it is tempting to believe such a market should take the form of a classic order book (a list of currently unfilled bids and asks at

different prices), a very important property of bandwidth to be used for anonymity purposes is that purchase decisions are made in a way that places severe limits on what influence can be exerted by an attacker. For this reason, rather than provide an order book, the Agora provides a way to traverse the space of currently valid medallions. Once a location in medallion-space has been selected, a miniature pseudo-auction is held. For example, if the econ at position 2 in the figure wished to buy bandwidth, it would select the median of 1's, 3's, 5's and 6's price, rounded down. For users not seeking anonymity, the lowest price may be selected instead.

### 1.6.2. Manifolds




Figure 2: A three-Econ Manifold routing traffic for a Customer

Once relay and proxy bandwidth has been purchased, the customer configures them into a connected chain termed a manifold. In the above picture, Relay 1 receives bandwidth from the Customer, performs cryptographic operations on it, and forwards it to Relay 2. Relay 2 performs a similar role with respect to Relay 1 and the Proxy. The Proxy then sends this data to a web server. Any data returned by the web server is sent back to the Customer along another manifold, perhaps implemented using the same nodes in reverse.

### 1.6.3. Web Browsing

The majority of initial usage of the Orchid Network will likely happen in support of uncensorable, anonymous web browsing. In this use case, the client software will automatically use the Agora to create a manifold, and provide additional checks to verify that SSL/TLS is being used in a way suited to this networking model. Unless two or more nodes in a manifold are working together (Section 8.2), perhaps because they are run by the same user, no single node knows the Customer's IP Address and the server they communicated with.

## 1.7. User Stories

### 1.7.1. Bandwidth Miners

Users with excess computational power and bandwidth may choose to support the Orchid project, as well as earn money, by running an econ on their computer. To do so, they install and run the Orchid software package and supply a payment address. To verify realness while preserving anonymity, the software will convert computational resources into Medallions. Econs are compensated for their lost computation by bandwidth customers.

### 1.7.2. Resisting Oppressive Governments

Users who live under oppressive regimes (where, for example, it is illegal to access Wikipedia), can use the system to hide information about the websites they are browsing. To do so they install and run the Orchid software, provide an initial payment to their Orchid wallet, and browse the web as normal. Unlike similar services (Section 3), the network pays hosts for their participation. We hope this will lead to greater participation, which in turn will lead to greater anonymity (Section 10).

### 1.7.3. Resisting Oppressive Web Applications

Users of oppressive web applications (sites which change services offered based on geographic location), can use the Orchid Network to appear to be browsing from the country of their choice. Unlike similar services

(Section 3), traffic will not come from IP ranges allocated to server farms, and so will be much harder for oppressive websites to block. Additionally, because bandwidth is incentivized, it will likely prove much more plentiful on the Orchid Network, i.e. making the real-time playback of high resolution video viable.

## 2. Attacks

### 2.1. Bug Bounty / White Hat Policy

TODO: we should offer a “hall of fame”, a cash/token reward, and maybe a t-shirt or coffee mug or something?

Note that token rewards are very interesting, since we could set aside a fixed amount and pay out x% of that amount for each vulnerability which is found.. it would likely become the largest bug bounty program in history. If the issue is that putting those tokens aside might be difficult at this point, I also think that incentivizing vulnerability disclosure this a very compelling reason to inflate the currency.

### 2.2. Attacker Goals

#### 2.2.1. Information Gathering

The largest class of attacks against which the Orchid Protocol must defend against are those which reveal information about its users. Because Orchid is implemented as an overlay on the existing Internet, some information is unavoidably shared with some peers. In the list below, such information is marked with a “\*”. Any information which is not specifically listed as unavoidably shared in this document, but for which a method is discovered to uncover that information is termed an *informational attack* and is covered by Orchid’s White Hat Bug Bounty. For more information on what is shared, see the protocol specification in Section 7 and discussion of collusion in Section 8.2, and our reference implementation of the network **oursoftware**

Types of data which are assumed to be of interest to an attacker (timeless):

- Real-World Identity Information. A user’s given name, SSN, address, etc.
- Website Account Information. The user accounts at a specific website. Note this can be different from Real-World Identity Information.
- \*IP Information. The IP address from which a user is accessing the Orchid Network. Note that in some usage scenarios this may be equivalent to learning Real-World Identity Information.
- \*Ethereum Information. The keys associated with a user’s wallet (\*public or private). Note that in some usage scenarios this may be equivalent to learning Real-World Identity Information.
- \*Orchid Network Information. The keys associated with a node’s current business on the Orchid network (\*public or private).

Types of Behavioral information which are assumed to be of interest to an attacker (time and manifold associated data):

- \*Customer Identification. The attacker learns the IP address of a customer.
- \*Relay Identification. The attacker learns the IP address of a relay.
- \*Proxy Identification. The attacker learns the IP address of a proxy.
- \*Link Identification. The attacker learns that two IP addresses were employed in a manifold.
- \*Website Access. The attacker learns that an outbound connection was made from the Orchid network to a specific website.

- **\*Webserver Access.** The attacker learns that an outbound connection was made from the Orchid network to a specific webserver (which may host multiple websites).
- **\*Ethereum Linking.** The attacker learns that an Ethereum public key is held by a Orchid user.
- **\*Purchase Linking.** The attacker learns that two transactions share a common payer.
- **\*Purchase Information.** The attacker learns the quantity and timing of bandwidth sent over a Manifold.

Although all of the above behavioral information is shared with other nodes on the Orchid Network during normal operation, as described below, in most contexts it is assumed that users will only be directly harmed by Behavioral Information Gathering if the attacker can learn several pieces of information at once (for example, to say that user X accessed website Y the attacker would need: buyer identification, website access information and several pieces of link identification). It is for this reason that peers following the reference spec do not store or share any of the above information, except as required to provide the services a customer has purchased.

## 2.3. Economic Attacks

Unlike similar systems, Orchid must also concern itself with attacks on payment mechanisms. The taxonomy used in this paper is:

1. **Economic Exploits.** Profitable undesirable behavior. (Example: if a user gives out “free sample” bandwidth, some users might exclusively use free sample bandwidth).
2. **Economic Denial of Service (EDoS).** The ability to pay to overwhelm another node on the Orchid Network with purchases, thereby taking them offline.

## 2.4. QoS Attacks

Some adversaries may be satisfied simply slowing down the system performance of Orchid network users generally, thereby potentially diminishing usage.

## 2.5. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Actions that can be performed only after inserting oneself between two interacting parties are collectively referred to as man-in-the-middle attacks. Encrypted information may be logged for analysis of metadata (Section 2.8), non-encrypted data may additionally be changed to control behavior. If key exchange is not secured, the man in the middle may also trick two parties into wrongly believing the attacker’s key is the other parties key.

## 2.6. Sybil Attacks

Malicious actions, performed by pretending to be multiple users, are termed Sybil attacks, after a patient suffering from multiple personality disorder. Applications of this type of attack include:

- Submitting multiple reviews to Yelp, Amazon, etc.
- Achieving faster downloads on BitTorrent by pretending to be multiple leachers [[freeridingBittorrent](#)].

## 2.7. Eclipse Attacks

In an Eclipse Attack, the Attacker’s goal is to hide part of a system from itself. The methods employed are generally the network equivalent of privilege escalation attacks: gain control of network positions which have more control of the network, then use that control to acquire more control.

- Segmenting the Bitcoin mining P2P network, allowing for so-called “51% attacks” when the attacker controls substantially less than 51% of the compute power[[bitcoinEclipse](#)].



- Removing a file from the BitTorrent DHT by taking over the address space associated with its magnet link[**bittorrentSybilAttacks**].

## 2.8. Inference Attacks

Deanonymization which stems from a statistical modeling of system behavior are termed Inference Attacks or Monitoring Attacks. These can be especially effective when combined with “probing moves” such as carefully crafted or timed requests, or other attacks such as DoSing a specific peer off of the network and observing how traffic patterns respond.

- Inferring medical illnesses, family income, and investment choices of end- users from SSL encrypted web traffic[**broadInferenceAttacks**].
- Deanonymizing Tor, I2P and Orchid traffic from global traffic logs[**mixTrafficAnalysis**].
- Learning the private key of an OpenSSL server through timing analysis[**opensslTimingAttack**].

## 2.9. Denial of Service Attacks

Attacks centered around taking a specific resource offline are termed Denial of Service Attacks. Because system behavior during “unexpected” circumstances is often poorly specified and tested, perhaps surprisingly, DoS attacks are quite useful for deanonymizing nodes in P2P networks. Notable examples:

- Targeted DoS attacks used in concert with sybil-attack based monitoring to deanonymize Tor traffic[**DOSvsSec**].
- DoS off lining for complete control of I2P’s floodfill database, requiring only 20 sybil nodes, thereby deanonymizing all traffic on the network[**I2P-vigna**].

## 2.10. Hacking

Particularly motivated attackers might directly compromise nodes on the network, converting historically trustworthy peers into attack vectors. When bandwidth is deployed using Manifolds, such hacking may potentially be performed iteratively, allowing an attacker to eventually “backtrace” a connection. Such attacks are out of scope for the Orchid system, but do have important security implications. If the Orchid Network’s design achieves its goals, this will be the main attack against users of the system.

# 3. Prior Work

## 3.1. Unprotected Internet Access

Users simply browsing the internet without protection are simply handing over their data to their ISP, the websites they use, and anyone either of those companies wishes to share it with.

## 3.2. Virtual Private Networking (VPN) Services

VPNs create encrypted connections between an end user and the VPN server.

Unfortunately, VPN services are a very poor approach for those users seeking anonymity – the VPN provider has complete payment information for the subscriber in question. If you expect that an adversary might be capable of wiretapping a VPN, or otherwise force VPN cooperation, VPN providers are therefore a poor choice.

## 3.3. Tor

Tor is a free software project famous for introducing the idea of Onion Routing.

### 3.4. Tor with Incentives

### 3.5. I2P

I2P is billed as a “next generation” onion router.

### 3.6. Mixmaster, Mixminion, and other Chaumian relay schemes

These are cool!

## 4. External Libraries

Orchid’s functionality is built on several important primitives. As some readers may not be familiar with these primitives, or be familiar with the specific properties used in the Orchid Network, we briefly summarize them here.

### 4.1. WebRTC

WebRTC **webrtc** is a system originally designed to facilitate real-time communication between web browsers. It provides excellent implementations NAT and firewall traversal methods, including STUN, ICE, TURN, and RTP-over-TCP. By selecting WebRTC as the basis for our networking protocol, rather than custom coded TCP and UDP networking code, we both get a world-class implementation of these technologies, and (to an extent) mask our user’s traffic as general web traffic.

### 4.2. NaCL

NaCL **nacl** is a cryptography library by Daniel J. Bernstein et al., focused on building the core operations needed to build high-level cryptographic tools. It was chosen as the source for cryptographic primitives on this project due to both it and its author’s sterling reputation. All cryptographic operations described below are implemented using NaCL, aside from Ethereum smart contract cryptographic code.

### 4.3. Ethereum

Ethereum **29** is a decentralized blockchain and platform that includes a native currency (ETH) and Turing-complete smart contracts. The smart contracts proved extremely useful for the design of Orchid, allowing us to offload a plethora of design concerns related to the tracking of token balances and the verification / fairness of our *Ticket* payment channels.

## 5. Medallions

Medallions form the bridge between our core security assumptions and the network as a whole. To produce a medallion, a peer takes a public key  $K$ , and the previous Ethereum block hash  $E$ , then performs a large number of computations to locate a salt  $S$  such that  $H(K, E, S) \geq N$ , where  $N$  is some difficulty scaling factor. When a new Ethereum block is added to the chain, a new  $S$  must be calculated to keep the Medallion current.

### 5.1. Selection of Proof-Type

Readers who are familiar with other distributed market based networks will have recognized our core security assumptions (Section 1.5) as forming the basis for proof-of-work systems (bitcoin, etc), and may be inclined to ask: why not use proof-of-stake, proof-of-idle, or other less energetically wasteful methods for proving “realness”?

Proof-of-stake rests on the assumption that no attacker will ever control the majority of tokens. As our attack model includes oppressive governments, this can not be counted on. Even Bitcoin’s astonishing market

capitalization is far less than the GDP of a modestly sized country. Making matters more complicated, in the near future we intend to extend the system to support anonymous payments, which will make detection of such a “hostile takeover” much more difficult. In short: we did not use proof-of-stake because we did not want to engineer a system in which our users’ right to privacy might be sold to the highest bidder.

Proof-of-space looks much more interesting. Although we are not sure that a suitable method will be located, we are exploring the possibility of using proof-of-space for an upcoming version of the Orchid Protocol. This would allow old smart phones, for example, to be installed by users in their homes as Relays and Proxies. See Section 16.1.

Proof-of-idle rests on the additional assumption that periodic, synchronized proof-of-work is sufficient to demonstrate a User’s share of the global computational power. Unfortunately, while the network is in its infancy ( $\leq 10$  million Econs), this leads to a situation where any company in control of a supercomputing center may, with only the sacrifice of 1% of their computational power, take control of the network. As we expect it to be quite a while before we have sufficient numbers of econs for this attack to cease being devastating, we are not using proof-of-idle for this release.

## 5.2. Hash function selection

[TODO: Professor Boneh should be consulted before this is finalized.]

One of the concerns when selecting a hash function for proof-of-work systems is that an attacker may construct custom hardware specifically for performing the computation. To minimize the possible impact of this, the Orchid Network uses the Equihash hash function (??).

Equihash is a memory-asymmetric (proofs require large amounts of RAM, verification does not), optimization/amortization free (it is based on a very well studied NP-complete problem), limited parallelism proof-of-work scheme. We are not aware of a proof-of-work scheme more suited to minimizing the influence of custom hardware.

## 6. Tickets

Paying for bandwidth presents a rather unique set of challenges. In most other payment systems, the cost of an item is substantially greater than the cost of sending a packet, and so the networking cost may be safely ignored as just another transaction cost. In the Orchid Network however, the cost of a packet is the *price being paid*, and so even if the transaction costs for sending payment are as low as a single packet, they would be equal in cost to the purchased item. Making matters more troublesome, we will soon see that the transaction costs also include paying miners on the Ethereum block chain.

### 6.1. How Much Will A Packet Cost?

For the purposes of this discussion, let us assume that a packet is 1e3 bytes in length. To calculate an upper bound, we observe that the most expensive bandwidth known to mankind is AWS’s Singapore CloudFront bandwidth, at \$0.14 per 1e9 bytes. This yields a per-packet cost of 1.4e-5 cents (\$0.00000014). Because bandwidth is a wasting good (any unsold bandwidth is lost forever), the actual price is likely to be significantly lower than this upper bound.

### 6.2. Ethereum Transaction Costs

Because the Orchid System uses Ethereum as its payment processor, we might also be curious about what the expected cost of sending money in the system is. Although the transaction costs may vary according to [Gustav please save me]. A reasonable estimate of likely transaction costs are \$0.20 for urgent type transactions (happening on the order of 20 seconds), down to \$0.01 for non-urgent transactions (happening on the order of 20 minutes).

### 6.3. Building Micropayments from Macropayments

With transaction costs now discussed, and looming large, let us now look at what methods exist for controlling them.

One potentially interesting approach, which was employed in MojoNation[**mojonation**], is to have a “balance of trade” between each pair of nodes. As bandwidth flows between them, they periodically settle up when the balance gets too far from zero. However, as we have seen, the transaction costs of settling up using Ethereum as a payment processor in this scheme would result in at minimum a \$0.01 transaction fee. Using our upper bound, we can see this price is around 100 megabytes of bandwidth. A secondary issue with this approach, is that peers nearing the reconciliation threshold would know that fact, and be tempted to disconnect and create a new identity rather than pay the fee. For these reasons, is tempting to believe that there exists no deterministic payment scheme suited to fully anonymous bandwidth sales using Ethereum as the payment processor. We therefore turn our attention to stochastic payments.

To explore stochastic payments, let us consider a lottery ticket (hereafter simply *ticket*) which has a  $1e-5$  chance of being worth \$1.40. How much is it worth in expectation? The answer is  $1.4e-5$  cents, exactly the upper bound we established for the cost of a packet. In the event that the lottery ticket is a winner, cashing in on it with urgency will cost around 14% ( $\frac{\$0.20}{\$1.4}$ ) in transaction costs, and with non-urgency around 0.7% ( $\frac{\$0.01}{\$1.4}$ ). A surprising outcome of this approach is that the effective Ethereum transaction costs may be set arbitrary low by simply multiplying the face value by some factor, and reducing the odds of winning by the same. As this approach possesses the desired properties, we have chosen it as the method of payment in the Orchid Network.

## 6.4. Implementation Constraints

Now that we have located a suitable abstraction for our payments, the question becomes: how should they be implemented? The main requirements are:

- The method for constructing new tickets must be reusable, as otherwise transaction fees will once again be an issue.
- Double spending must be prevented, or failing that not profitable.
- The system must be sufficiently performant in terms of computational cost so as not to overwhelm the cost of a packet.

Of those requirements, the last element is perhaps the most troublesome. To the best of our knowledge, no method for constructing lottery tickets exist which does not depend on computation similar to that of asymmetric encryption. A modest computer can do around  $1e4$  such computations per second, but can easily send  $1e6$  packets per second when connected to high speed Internet. For this reason, although it was not sufficient for use alone, we are forced to employ a balance-of-trade approach similar to the one mentioned above. This in turn leads to a new requirement, namely “the balance of trade must be kept sufficiently small so as to not cause an incentive to disconnect during trade”. As this is a mechanism design issue caused by an implementation reality, let us for now focus on implementation by assuming a solution exists, and defer further discussion until Section 6.5.

[Better version solicited]. We now describe a design which meets the remaining two requirements. Setup phase:

1. Alice deposits money into an Ethereum smart contract which will control outbound payments until some time in the future ( $\geq 1$  minute from now).
2. Bob generates a random number  $N$ , and sends the hash  $h = H(N)$  to Alice.

Ticket production:

1. Alice creates the tuple  $t = (timestamp, facevalue, odds, nonce, h)$ , signs it  $s = SIG(t)$ , and sends the pair  $(t, s)$  to Bob.
2. Bob then computes  $XOR(N, s)$ , and if the result is  $\geq odds$ , wins.
3. To redeem winners, Bob sends  $(N, t, s)$  to the Ethereum smart contract managing Alice’s lottery tickets along with a payment address.

To prevent double-spending, two methods are employed. First, some portion of Alice’s initial smart-contract deposit exists only to prevent double-spending. In the event of a double spend, Alice will suffer losses of 2x the double-spend amount. However, this alone is not sufficient to prevent double-spending, because Alice might decide to over-spend on a grand scale. To address this second issue, the value of winning lottery tickets begins decreasing exponentially 20 seconds after *timestamp*, thereby providing a strong incentive for winners to cash in immediately. This immediacy is then used by Bob to compute the “wasting rate” of Alice’s smart contract balance.

Lottery ticket type payments are not novel to Orchid. For interested readers, we recommend the extremely detailed and helpful **DAM** which includes discussion of extending tickets to support anonymous payments.

## 6.5. Balance of Trade

As mentioned above, the realities of symmetric encryption performance prevent us from sending payment with every packet, and so we need a good understanding of the risks inherent in employing a “balance of trade” approach. We do so here in a general setting: imagine Alice and Bob wish to transact in a fully anonymous manner. Bob is to perform some task for which he charges  $x$ , and Alice is to pay him once every  $y$  tasks. Unfortunately, the nature of anonymity is such that without prior transactions, Alice and Bob have no mechanism to trust one another. Can they cooperate?

If there is some setup cost to Alice and Bob’s relationship ( $S_{Alice}, S_{Bob}$  s.t.  $S_{Alice} > xy, S_{Bob} > xy$ ), the answer is yes: running away with the money or work ceases to be economically rational, unless (1) the total amount of work Alice was seeking was  $\leq xy$  or (2) the total amount of work that Bob can perform is  $\leq xy$ . As we will see in our discussion of the Agora (Section 10), setup costs exist on the Orchid Network which support trade imbalances in excess of 1e3 packets. Because sellers in the Agora generally pay a higher setup cost than buyers, and because Customers asymmetrically know how much work they will require, the Orchid Network has Customers pre-pay.

## 6.6. Risk Management

One of the drawbacks of stochastic payments is that some users will get unlucky. Customers using Orchid as a VPN alternative may be pleasantly surprised if their bill is randomly cheaper than expected, but a random overrun may cause them to quit the network.

The probability a mine will be exhausted after  $k$  uses is:  $\binom{m}{k-1} p^k (1-p)^{m-k}$ , where  $m$  is the number of tickets issued,  $k$  is the number of tickets required to exhaust the source, and  $p$  are the odds given to Econs. If users initially deposits \$20, and a \$2 face value is commonly used to mitigate transaction costs, this means that  $k$  is fixed at 10.

[need more on this]

## 7. Bandwidth Mining




Figure 3: A three-Econ Manifold routing traffic for a Customer

In this section we will describe the specification for Relay and Proxy behavior, and discuss the “chaining together” of these nodes to support uncensorable, anonymous web browsing.

### 7.1. Specification for the Sale of Bandwidth

Relay nodes implement a relatively simple behavior pattern:

- Maintain one or more connections, each with their own encryption key.
- Check any tickets received, and cash-in winners.
- Monitor the balance of trade, and disconnect if it exceeds a predeclared amount.
- Receive data from any open connection, and perform decryption at message boundaries.
- Process decrypted messages as follows:
  - Forward any non-control segments to the connection(s) specified in the message.
  - Process any control segments:
    - \* *Dummy Data*. Instructs the Relay to discard this segment.
    - \* *Burn at Rate*. Instructs the Relay to send data over a connection at a fixed rate, queueing packets and generating data as necessary to maintain the rate.
    - \* *Ratchet Ticket*. Instructs the Relay to pass a Ticket to the peer it received this packet from.
    - \* *Initiate Connection*. Instructs the Relay to establish a new connection. Used during setup and to handle disconnection.
    - \* *Initial Web Connection*. (Proxies Only.) Instructs the proxy to open an SSL connection to the specified host. To support whitelists, this cannot be a raw IP address.

An important consideration in the above behavior is that no proof-of-work is required of Relays on an ongoing basis. When combined with all our connections being WebRTC connections, this leaves the door open for websites potentially monetizing their visitors by running pure javascript relay code.

For discussion of possible extensions via application specific control segments, see Section 16.

## 7.2. Guard Nodes and “Bandwidth Burning”

The relay that a customer is connected to has a very important piece of information: the customer’s IP address. We assume customers will want to keep this as private as possible, and so the default client expresses a preference for long-lived peers as the first hop.

Another concern for nodes at the first hop, which is discussed in depth in our discussion of informational attacks stemming from collusion (Section 8.2), is they sit in an ideal position to perform timing attacks. To prevent these attacks, we recommend that privacy-conscious users employ a method called *Bandwidth Burning* – paying the second hop to send a fixed amount of bandwidth to the customer. As this approach results in data-usage which is completely uncorrelated to network usage, this approach prevents timing attacks performed by adversaries which cannot see the inbound traffic of relay three.

## 8. Chaining and Informational Attacks on Manifolds

The primary initial application of the above specification is the creation of chains.

In this section we explore what kinds of information are available to different nodes for different manifold structures. Perhaps more importantly, we look at how different types of collusion change a user’s privacy, and what the chance of such collusion are given  $a$ , the percentage of a network controlled by a given attacker, and  $n$ , the total size of the network.

### 8.1. Information Available to a Relay or Proxy

Due to the inherent structure of IP-based networking, and the Orchid protocol, relay nodes gain access to the following information:

- The IP Addresses of both up and down. This is required to perform the IP communication.
- The size, timing, and number of packets they forward. This is required if they are to forward packets.
- A public Ethereum key owned by the user who is paying them. This is required for the selling of bandwidth.

## 8.2. Collusion

Definition of Attacker roles:

- Global Adversary. An attacker with a global view of the network. Occurs with probability 1 in all cases.
- ISP. The user's Internet service provider. Untrustworthy with probability  $s$ .
- Web. The webserver the proxy is connected to. Untrustworthy with probability  $w$ .
- Relay <sub>$n$</sub> . The  $n$ th relay in the chain. Untrustworthy with probability  $\frac{a}{n}$ .
- Proxy. The relay proxying bandwidth for the user. Untrustworthy with probability  $\frac{a}{n}$ .

Definition of attacks:

- Relation. When this is possible, the attacker can deduce the Customer of a Manifold simply by doing lookups of linked IP addresses.
- Timing. By controlling the timing of packets a link which cannot be looked up can be inferred.

## 8.3. Zero Relays, Zero Proxies: Direct Connection

Although the Orchid system is not used when a Customer connects directly to a website, we feel it is important to review what informational risk are present in this setup.

ISP	Website	P(Relate)	P(Timing)
x		$s$	
	x	$w$	

- ISP can directly relate Customer traffic.  $p = s$
- Website alone can directly relate Website traffic.  $p = w$

## 8.4. Zero Relays, One Proxy




Figure 4

ISP	Proxy	Website	P(Relate)	P(Timing)
	x		$\frac{a}{n}$	
x		x		$sw$

- Proxy can relate Website traffic.  $p = \frac{a}{n}$ .
- ISP + Website can relate Website traffic.  $p = sw$ .




Figure 5

### 8.5. One Relay, One Proxy

ISP	Relay <sub>1</sub>	Proxy	Website	P(Relate)	P(Timing)
	x	x		$(\frac{a}{n})^2$	
	x		x	$w(\frac{a}{n})$	
x		x		$s(\frac{a}{n})$	
x			x		$sw$

In the one Relay one Proxy case.

- Relay<sub>1</sub> + Proxy can relate customer traffic.  $p = (\frac{a}{n})^2$
- Relay<sub>1</sub> + Website can relate Website traffic.  $p = w\frac{a}{n}$
- ISP + Proxy can relate all Website traffic.  $p = s\frac{a}{n}$
- ISP + Website can timing attack Website traffic.  $p = sw$

### 8.6. Two Relays, One Proxy




Figure 6

ISP	Relay <sub>1</sub>	Relay <sub>2</sub>	Proxy	Website	Relate	Timing
	x		x		$(\frac{a}{n})^2$	
x		x	x		$s(\frac{a}{n})^2$	
	x	x		x	$w(\frac{a}{n})^2$	
x		x		x	$sw(\frac{a}{n})$	
	x			x		$s(\frac{a}{n})$
x				x		$sw$

In the more familiar two Relays one Proxy case, we can see now.

- Proxy + Relay<sub>1</sub> can relate customer traffic.  $p = (\frac{a}{n})^2$
- Proxy + Relay<sub>2</sub> + ISP can relate customer traffic.  $p = s(\frac{a}{n})^2$
- Website + Relay<sub>1</sub> + Relay<sub>2</sub> can relate Website traffic.  $p = w(\frac{a}{n})^2$
- Website + Relay<sub>2</sub> + ISP can relate Website traffic.  $p = sw\frac{a}{n}$
- Website + Relay<sub>1</sub> can timing attack Website traffic.  $p = w\frac{a}{n}$  [can be prevented with bandwidth burning]



- Website + ISP can timing attack Website traffic.  $p = sw$  [can be prevented with bandwidth burning]

Total risk without bandwidth burning is therefore:

$$(1 + w + s)\left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^2 + (sw + w)\frac{a}{n}$$

and

$$(1 + w + s)\left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^2$$

with bandwidth burning.

## 8.7. Three Relays, One Proxy




Figure 7

- Proxy + Relay<sub>1</sub> + Relay<sub>2</sub> can relate customer traffic.  $p = \left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^3$
- Proxy + Relay<sub>1</sub> + Relay<sub>3</sub> can relate customer traffic.  $p = \left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^3$
- Proxy + Relay<sub>2</sub> + ISP can relate customer traffic.  $p = s\left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^2$
- Website + Relay<sub>1</sub> + Relay<sub>3</sub> can relate Website traffic.  $p = w\left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^2$
- Website + Relay<sub>2</sub> + Relay<sub>3</sub> + ISP can relate Website traffic.  $p = sw\left(\frac{a}{n}\right)^2$
- Website + Relay<sub>1</sub> can timing attack Website traffic.  $p = w\frac{a}{n}$  [can be prevented with bandwidth burning]
- Website + ISP can timing attack Website traffic.  $p = sw$  [can be prevented with bandwidth burning]

## 9. SSL and TLS Vulnerabilities

SSL Downgrade

### 9.1. The old browser problem

### 9.2. The old phone app problem

### 9.3. Mitigation of 8.1.1 and 8.1.2

1. Check SSL Certificates
2. Check SSL Versions, Cipher Suites
3. Check Basic Constraints
4. “Boring SSL”

## 10. The Agora

The Agora, named after the greek work for market, is a P2P network similar in structure to a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), which serves as a meeting ground for buyers and sellers of bandwidth.

## 10.1. Fundamental Agora Operations

At a high-level, the operations provided by the Agora are:

- A method for Econs to join the Agora.
- A method for asking Econs what services they have for sale.
- A method for selecting a subset of all peers, randomly weighted by computational resources, such that the *lookup property* holds:

$$\text{lookup}(\text{rand}(\text{address})) \approx \text{rand}(\text{Econ})$$

The *lookup property* is important because it allows customers to know with assurance that their chosen Econ is an attacker with probability  $\frac{a}{n}$ .

To implement these operations, the Agora takes the structure of a DHT with no keys and values. To perform the random selection, a user simply generates a random address and locates the Econ closest to that point.

## 10.2. Fundamental Econ Operations

The operations supported by Econs on the Agora are:

- *Get Routing Table and Medallion.* This returns the Econ's proof of work and signed routing table for inspection, along with the cost of relaying traffic to members of the routing table.
- *Relay Traffic.* Pays the Econ to forward traffic to one of the peers in its routing table.
- *List Services.* Asks the Econ for a list of services it sells.
- *Purchase Service.* Employ the Econ as a service provider.

The first two of these are used by customers to navigate to an Econ of interest, while the second two are used to negotiate the purchase of services once that Econ is found.

Navigation through the Agora takes a form similar to that used in Manifolds. A customer connects to some known Econ (found through bootstrapping, see 10.7), inspects its routing table, and pays to forward traffic to the Econ closest to its chosen point. As we will see in the section on routing tables, this allows customers to keep their IP addresses secret, while still providing relatively efficient random access to Econs of  $O(\log^2 n)$  packets.

## 10.3. Chord Routing Structure

[need graphic]

Econs are connected in the Orchid Protocol using the same scheme used in the Chord DHT.

Addresses are viewed as a ring of size  $2^{256}$ , and the distance between peers at addresses  $a, b \in [0, 2^{256} - 1]$  is defined to be  $n$  s.t.  $0 \leq n < 2^{256}$  and  $a + n \equiv b \pmod{2^{256}}$ .

For a collection of Econs in an Agora,  $A$ , the forced connections for a given Econ  $e$  are defined to be  $\min_{f \in A} \text{dist}(e + t, f)$ , for each of 256 target addresses  $t \in \{1, 2, 4, \dots, 2^{255}\}$ .

We chose to use this routing structure because of its maturity, successful track record in deployed systems, and correctness proofs. Readers interested in learning more are encouraged to read ???. For our purposes, it is enough to note that the following two properties are provided by this routing scheme:

1. *Finite, Deterministic Connections.* Every Econ has a number of forced connections  $\leq 256$ .
2. *Logarithmic Traversal Distance.* Given a random address  $t$  and a random connected Econ  $e$  with connections  $C$ , that  $\text{distance}(e, t) \approx 2 * \min_{f \in C} \text{distance}(f, t)$ . Because the distance will half with each hop, the expected traversal length on the network is  $\log_2(n)$  where  $n$  is the network size.

## 10.4. Medallions on the Agora

To prevent attackers from choosing their location on the Agora, the location of Econs is defined to be the hash of their Medallion. To prevent an attacker from running more Econs than is proportional to their share of the Agora's total computational power, every Econ checks the validity of all its connections' Medallions every Medallion cycle. In the event that a valid Medallion is not supplied, it is disconnected from the network.

## 10.5. Signed Routing and Eclipse Attacks

One of the issues that arises in distributed networks is that no one (except, perhaps, an attacker) has a global view of the network. For example, imagine if in the above routing scheme an attacker chose to lie about what connections it has – if the buyer has no way of detecting this, they might be led off to a fake Agora in which all “participants” were owned by the attacker. To put a stop to this situation, Agora's routing tables are verified non-malicious by the peers contained on them.

When a node would like to establish a forced connection, that node must prove to each node on its forced connections list that each other node on that list is a member of the same Agora. To do this, we first select a random econ  $G$  by finding the Econ with an address closest to the hash of all the connections in the routing table  $H(C_i)$ . Then we supply:

1. Proof that all the Econs on the list can all route to  $G$ .
2. Proof that  $G$  can route to each Econ
3. Proof that each Econ on the list is indeed a forced connection.

These proofs all take the form of signed routing table chains which lead from  $C_i$  to  $G$ , or in the case of (3) the chain of signed routing tables which led from the Entry Econ to each  $C_i$ . Once such proof has been provided, all of the peers on the new routing table sign the table, and the connecting Econ signs theirs. For those elements of  $C_i$  for whom the new Econ is a forced connection, the same proof is sent to each of their connections for signature.

Because this is the only method for adding Econs to the Agora, these requirements form an inductive proof of the Agora's soundness. If one of the nodes in  $C_i$  attempts to supply a fake routing table, it will not route to the same  $G$  as the other Econs in  $C_i$ . If one of the nodes  $C_i$  is not a member of the Agora,  $G$  will not be able to route to them. If the Econ seeking to connect has lied about  $C_i$  being nearest nodes to his forced connection points, (3) will demonstrate that to be false.

From these properties, we can see that the avenues left for an attacker are:

- If an attacker can generate a Medallion address such that all  $C_i$  are controlled by them, the above system will cease to function. This will happen with probability  $(\frac{a}{n})^{\log(n)}$ . If such a collision occurs,  $(1 - \frac{n - \log(n)}{n})^{\log(n)}$  percent of all queries will be compromised. To put these numbers in perspective, if an attacker controls 10% of the network, at 1 million nodes there is a 1e-8% chance of such a collision happening, and if it does occur around 1e3% of all system queries will be impacted. At 100 million nodes the chance drops to 1e-12%, causing disruption of 1e-5% of queries. Note this damage is repaired during Agora Regeneration 10.6.
- If an attacker has now joined the network, but was forced to use a valid routing table, the only attacks it can perform are related to selling services, not routing traffic on the Agora. As this is the situation expected in the rest of our attack models (that an attacker will control a number of econs proportional to the computational resources), we do not consider this an attack.

## 10.6. Eclipse Attacks and Regeneration

Long lived P2P networks suffer from Eclipse attacks. Although the above signed routing scheme can make these arbitrarily difficult by involving ever increasing number of peers for verification, another approach is simply to limit the lifespan of peers. For this reason, Econs on the Agora must change keys every 100 Ethereum blocks.

This is ensured by  $XOR(address, Eth)$   
[Todo: finalize randomization schedule here.]

## 10.7. Finding Entry Nodes

The distribution of Entry Nodes is a difficult topic. If oppressive governments are able to access this list, they will block user’s abilities to access the list. We have therefore located essential services that would be internet-breaking if they were blocked, and have devised methods for adding Entry Node information to the data contained in them.

## 10.8. Identifying *the* Agora

The above discussion of security is ultimately meaningless if there is no way to locate “the right Agora” on a fresh machine. Any distribution method which exists for *Entry Econs* can not be presumed immune from infiltration by fake Entry Nodes. To do so, we simply estimate the computing power of a given Agora, and select the right one. This is justified by our core security assumptions (Section 1.5).

- Density Estimation. Because an Econ’s forced connections are defined to be the econs nearest to some set of points in a  $2^{256}$  address space, in any real-world situation there will be measurable gaps between the ideal connections and the actual ones. To estimate density in this space, we can observe that these connections as the result of a random binomial process: every point between the ideal point and the actual point is a failure, and the actual point is a success. Therefore, for a given number of missing nodes  $M$  and a given number of realized connections  $C$ , The uniform prior MAP estimate of network density is

$$\frac{C}{C + M} 2^{256}$$

- Traversal Distance. The Agora provides address look ups in  $O(\log_2(n))$  hops. We can use this in reverse to estimate network density.

One might be inclined to believe that density estimation is enough, however a clever attacker in possession of a sybil network of modest size, will have free choice for which node is to be put forward as the the Entry Econs for the false network, while the Entry Econs from the “real Agora” will have a density which is a random sample from the network. To make matters worse, if the traversal distance is chosen as the metric, one might imagine an attacker who anticipates this, and so creates sub-optimal routing tables which require longer than the  $O(\log_2(n))$  to traverse. Thankfully, sub-optimally connected Agoras will perform worse on the density metric. The verification method used in the Orchid System is to traverse to a random address, saving the routing tables along the way, and then perform a density estimate using the routing table from all but the first two hops.

## 10.9. Proxy Whitelists

Some users wishing to offer Proxy services may not be comfortable offering “open access”. For example, allowing users to access facebook.com has a risk profile similar to acting as a relay, while allowing arbitrary connections to the internet may result in a visit from local law enforcement. Econs on the Agora may therefore set a whilelist of websites they will allow users to contact when using them as a Proxy, and specify their whitelists in their responses to *Get Offers*.

## **11. Economic Soundness**

## **12. Golden Shield Related Features**

### **12.1. WebRTC shaping**

### **12.2. IP Cycling on AWS**

## **13. Current State of the Software**

## **14. Performance Scaling**

## **15. Attack Analysis and Attacker User Stories**

### **15.1. Oppressive Web Applications**

Attacker Goals: Identify all Orchid Proxy IP addresses.

### **15.2. Corporate Networks**

Attacker Goals: Prevent usage of the Orchid network.

Resources: The attacker controls the network, and so can engage in traffic shaping and connection dropping.

### **15.3. Passive Monitoring and Inference, perhaps with Sybil Attacks**

Attacker Goals: Learn Customer IP Identification, and Website Identification.

Resources: An attacker has view of some amount of passive network surveillance, and is able to add nodes to the network up to  $s\%$  as a source of additional data.

### **15.4. Great Firewalls**

Attacker Goals: Prevent usage of the Orchid network.

Resources: The attacker controls the network, has passive surveillance of it, and is able to add nodes up to  $s\%$  of the network size.

### **15.5. Small-Time Mayhem and QoS Attacks**

Synopsis: An attacker would like to cause mayhem on as much of the network as possible.

Resources: On the order of ten thousand dollars of networking and computation ability.

## **16. Future Work**

The items in this section fall into two categories: nice-to-haves, and features we are internally conflicted about releasing to the public. We believe this is conflictedness is universal – although almost everyone has favorite examples of power being used for oppression, there are also countless examples of power being used for good. Protocols like Orchid have no judgement of their own, and so cannot tell if they are routing traffic for a freedom fighter or a terrorist, villain or hero.

### **16.1. Proof of Space**

Exploding function, way of verifying.

## 16.2. Content Storage

The issue with modern networking from an surveillance perspective is that it is fundamentally about connections between computers. So long as the model is that a user's computer connects to a specific webserver to access a website, Orchid may be as good as possible. However, if we

## 16.3. Saturated Links

TODO: this would have to be the standard global protocol to work. Idea is have every “guard node” send at 1MB/sec or so... Customers then pay for that bandwidth, rather than minimum amount of bandwidth needed (the regular case).

## 16.4. Protecting Content Hosts

Many prior approaches (Section ??) discovered that content hosts sought similar protections as web users. We are internally conflicted on this point, as we do believe there is content which it is in the public interest not to have freely distributed (information related to the manufacture of nuclear weapons for example). However, should unforeseen circumstances demand it, Orchid could be extended to support such “unrestricted, unsurveilled Hosts” as follows:




Figure 8: A rendezvous node acting as a relay between a Service and a Customer

## 16.5. Orchid as a Platform

Although we anticipate that design of the core system will take up much of our time for the immediate future, we are very interested in the possibility that adding features to support the following use cases may drastically increase the amount of bandwidth routed through the Orchid Network.

1. APIs for websites to directly interface to the network, and incorporate tokens into their service.
2. Static Website Hosting and File Storage.
3. File Sharing.
4. (Okay, these require more build up I think:) an email/messaging service, arbitration services.