

Heist Challenge

Sherlock Scenario
Forela recently received complaints from viewers that the live stream on their YouTube channel was showing strange content. Instead of the usual company content, the live stream showed videos promoting cryptocurrency scams. The channel was used to showcase the company's products and services and provide educational content related to the industry they were in. Alonzo Spire, the IT administrator of Forela, managed the YouTube channel. The incident response team was notified of an incident as soon as complaints were received. Alonzo's system was triaged and artefacts were acquired from his system for forensics analysis to confirm how the company's channel got hacked.

Task 1:
At what time was the suspected phishing email received in the victim's inbox? (UTC)

I checked the Email.eml file

Received: from authenticated-user ([88.238.190.54])
(using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits))
(No client certificate requested)
by [88.238.190.54] (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 51F59101A9E
for <alonzo.spire@forela.co.uk>; Tue, 11 Apr 2023 08:55:22 +0000 (UTC)

Answer: 2023-04-11 08:55:22

Task 2:
Please provide the download URL that was utilised to retrieve the file initially downloaded as part of this security event.

I checked the Chrome History and found several links of the Google drive and docs.
Then I found the correct URL at the "downloads_url_chains" table

| | | | |
|----|----|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 11 | 12 | 0 | https://doc-0p-5g-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesp/3pauka4p255d8rb5aa0d1d9k29c/08kmueker1h57koe14o1osg4uhbaf/1681208325000/03105725814018983462/138094614450784447892/1KsmF7YLzReVfV0zeyWY0ooJfewRmJgpp?e=download&uud=d3c4b3f-c99f-42b3-df4ac4669a |
| 12 | 12 | 1 | https://drive.google.com/nonceSigner?nonce=iojdm13djs58&continue=https://doc-0p-5g-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesp/3pauka4p255d8rb5aa0d1d9k29c/08kmueker1h57koe14o1osg4uhbaf/1681208325000/03105725814018983462/138094614450784447892/1KsmF7YLzReVfV0zeyWY0ooJfewRmJgpp?.. |
| 13 | 12 | 2 | https://doc-0p-5g-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesp/3pauka4p255d8rb5aa0d1d9k29c/08kmueker1h57koe14o1osg4uhbaf/1681208325000/03105725814018983462/138094614450784447892/1KsmF7YLzReVfV0zeyWY0ooJfewRmJgpp?e=download&uud=d3c4b3f-c99f-42b3-df4ac4669a |

Answer: <https://doc-0p-5g-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesp/3pauka4p255d8rb5aa0d1d9k29c/08kmueker1h57koe14o1osg4uhbaf/1681208325000/03105725814018983462/138094614450784447892/1KsmF7YLzReVfV0zeyWY0ooJfewRmJgpp?e=download&uud=d3c4b3f-c99f-42b3-df4ac4669a>

Task 3:
What is the name of the file suspected to have been initially downloaded as part of this security event?

At the downloads table, the tab_url is
"https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ZxG5yDGNVD_oC8PXorVTt6HwX3V1t1d"
tab_url

Filter
<https://filezilla-project.org/download.php?platform=win64>
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ZxG5yDGNVD_oC8PXorVTt6HwX3V1t1d

So the target_path was "C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\Forela-Partnership.zip"

| id | guid | current_path | target_path *1 |
|--------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Filter | Filter | Filter | Filter |
| 6 | d2144ea2-67ef-4993-b5d4-f1b02aea486 | C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\FileZilla_3.63.2.1_win64_sponsored2-setup.exe | C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\FileZilla_3.63.2.1_win64_sponsored2-setup.exe |
| 12 | 0a0a73ba-5f66-4fad-84cc-379c0dafb939 | C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\Forela-Partnership.zip | C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\Forela-Partnership.zip |

Answer: Forela-Partnership.zip

Task 4:
When was this file downloaded onto the system?

I have a Python script for webkit timestamp at the "start_time" - "13325681964931025"

```
target_path *1      start_time
C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\FileZilla_3.63.2.1_win64_sponsored2-setup.exe 1332565398448472
C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\Forela-Partnership.zip 13325681964931025

from datetime import datetime, timedelta

def convert_webkit_timestamp(webkit_timestamp):
    # Convert microseconds to seconds
    seconds_since_1601 = webkit_timestamp / 1e6

    # Define the start date (January 1, 1601)
    epoch_start = datetime(1601, 1, 1)

    # Calculate the actual date and time
    visit_datetime = epoch_start + timedelta(seconds=seconds_since_1601)

    # Format the datetime in the desired format
    return visit_datetime.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')

# Example usage
webkit_timestamp = 13325681964931025
formatted_date = convert_webkit_timestamp(webkit_timestamp)
print(f"Formatted Date and Time: {formatted_date}")

C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads
> python hana.py
Formatted Date and Time: 2023-04-11 10:19:24
```

Answer: 2023-04-11 10:19:24

Task 5:
What is the name of the file that initiated malicious activity on the endpoint?

I searched in the MFT for "C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads" because I assumed the user extracted the Forela-Partnership.zip and opened the file.
Then I found a suspicious file with extension of .pdf.exe similar to the name of the Partnership

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|---|--------|---|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| 89208 | 85324 | 4 | 283334 | 4 | C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads | Partnership.pdf.exe |
|-------|-------|---|--------|---|---------------------------------|---------------------|

Answer: Partnership.pdf.exe

Task 6:
What file type was the malicious payload disguised as to deceive the user into executing it?

Same as task 5

Answer: pdf

Task 7:
From which directory path was the malicious file executed?

I checked the Prefetch and searched for the file Partnership.pdf.exe and then looked at the Files Loaded tab

[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\USER32.DLL,
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\WOW64CPU.DLL,
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\WINDOWS\SYSTEM64\WTDLL.DLL,
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\DOCUMENTS\PARTNERSHIP.PDF.EXE,

Answer: C:\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\DOCUMENTS\

Task 8:

There was a file on users desktop with a note. What were the contents of the note?

I searched in the MFT for ".\Users\alonzo.spire\Desktop" and then choose the extension .txt and found file named reminder.exe

| Line | Tag | Entry Number | Sequence Number | Parent Entry Number | Parent Sequence Number | In Use | Parent Path | File Name | Extension |
|--------|-----|--------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------|-------------|------------------------------|-----------|
| 518906 | | 427727 | 2 | 213316 | | 4 | | .\Users\alonzo.spire\Desktop | .txt |

Then I took the Entry Number 427727 and used it with MFTECmd.exe -de command

```
ASCII:  Contact Pakistan operations team to get updates and assist them if needed.
UNICODE:  ???4???????????4?????????????

C:\Users\Bubble\Desktop\EZTools>MFTECmd.exe -f C:\Users\Bubble\Desktop\Heist\Acquisition\C\%MFT --de 427727
```

Answer: Contact Pakistan operations team to get updates and assist them if needed

Task 9:

At what time was the malicious file was executed?

I searched in the Prefetch for "Partnership.pdf.exe" and took the Last Run timestamp

| Executable Name | Run Count | Hash | Size | Version | Last Run |
|---------------------|-----------|----------|-------|-------------|---------------------|
| | -- | | -- | | -- |
| PARTNERSHIP.PDF.EXE | 1 | CCA24020 | 25148 | Windows ... | 2023-04-11 10:20:06 |

Answer: 2023-04-11 10:20:06

Task 10:

The malicious file dropped 2 files on the system which performed further actions on the endpoint. What's the name of these 2 files? (alphabetical order)

Same log from task 9 and 7, I checked the Files Loaded tab and found the 2 files

```
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IXP000.TMP\UN598654.EXE,
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IXP000.TMP\S1168290.EXE
```

Answer: S1168290.EXE, UN598654.EXE

Task 11:

One of the files from Question 10 dropped two more files onto the system. What are the names of these files? (in alphabetical order)

I did the same thing like task 10

```
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IXP001.TMP\PRO5093.EXE,
[VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}]\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IXP001.TMP\QU2705.EXE
```

Answer: PRO5093.EXE, QU2705.EXE

Task 12:

What's the malicious C2 IP Address and port?

I searched on the Amcache for the malicious file Partnership.pdf.exe

| SHA1 | Is Os Component | Full Path |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| 4497fa1407ff15dbec75f30a6c694b006919aa97 | | c:\users\alonzo.spire\documents\partnership.pdf.exe |

Then I copied the SHA1 and checked it on Virus Total - 4497fa1407ff15dbec75f30a6c694b006919aa97

59

74

59/74 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

3ce222c117e3139d1b2b686d0898539d13b1154fb7768c54b301vedd7986a

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

Community Score

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

WEXTRACT.EXE .MUJ

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY

Join our Community

and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label

trojan,dealer,redline

Threat categories

trojan, dropper

I checked the Behavior tab

IP Traffic

TCP 176.113.115.145:4125

UDP 176.113.115.145:4125

TCP 20.39.233.109:443

ICP 192.229.211.100:80

UDP 192.168.0.94:137

TCP 23.116.81.152:80 [www.microsoft.com]

Memory Pattern Urls

http://176.113.115.145:4125

tcp://176.113.115.145:4125

Memory Pattern IPs

176.113.115.145

176.113.115.145:4125

Answer: 176.113.115.145:4125

Task 13:

What's the malware family of the malicious file?

Same as task 12

Answer: redline

Task 14:

Which malicious file exfiltrated data from the endpoint?

I filtered in Wireshark for the C2 IP "ip.addr == 176.113.115.145"

Then I followed the TCP Stream and saw a path with the file name "qu 2705" from task 11

```
Authorization...ns1_050a19e1db40824b0f23b7dcf961f4d..."\v...",2,T[...D,D"...D.....V.B;
.B...b...i.E...E9120568315800876513069560f92868E...UTCH09:00] Islamabad, KarachiE...UNIQUE.....E.....E1.C:\Users\alonzo.spire\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP001.TMP\qu2705.exe
```

Answer: C:\Users\ALONZO.SPIRE\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IXP001.TMP\QU2705.EXE

Task 15:

What's the process ID of the malicious file used to exfiltrate data?

I searched for the file name "qu 2705" inside the TCP Stream

```
[0]: 3924, WinP: 642785, rsv:
```

Answer: 3924

Task 16:
There was another alert after this incident of data exfiltration from another FTP server hosting critical files. Our TI team believe there may have been an internal credential leak. What's the IP address and the password of the FTP server which Alonzo had access to?

I searched on Wireshark for "FTP" until I saw some packet with a data contains alonzo.spire which also come from the C2 IP 176.113.115.145

```
0000 00 50 56 e0 c1 1a 00 0c 29 05 78 cb 00 00 45 00  P.....)x...E...
0010 02 07 45 79 40 00 00 06 14 0e 0c 11 0f 03 00 71  ..g.....O..E
0020 73 91 02 f4 10 1d 04 51 c0 df 05 77 3d 1f 50 18  s.....Q...w:P
0030 fa 0f 04 04 00 00 06 dc 01 24 1e 68 74 74 70 3a  o.....S:http
0040 2f 2f 14 65 6f 70 75 72 69 2e 6f 72 07 2f 45 6e  //temp1.org/en
0050 74 69 74 79 2f 49 64 31 32 04 06 7a 00 73 56 02  tity/Id1 2 14pV
0060 00 01 73 04 00 01 61 06 56 08 44 0a 1e 00 82 ab  s...a V.D...
0070 75 08 0d 41 75 74 00 6f 72 69 7a 61 74 69 6f 6e  sAuth rization
0080 08 03 6e 73 31 99 20 30 35 30 61 31 39 65 31 64  ns1 0 50a1eId
0090 62 34 64 30 30 32 34 62 30 66 32 33 62 33 37 64  s4d0020 072037d
00a0 63 66 39 36 31 66 34 1a ad 26 90 70 23 47 bd cF901f4D & p0
00b0 04 47 a8 13 1d 61 f1 73 4f 44 44 2c 44 2a ab 14  G...s 00D,D...
00c0 01 44 0c 1e 00 82 ab 03 01 56 0e 42 10 00 07 42  D.....V.B...B
00d0 77 00 01 62 13 00 01 69 15 45 6d 45 05 99 0e 31  w:b...i tE...1
00e0 33 2e 34 05 2e 36 37 2e 32 33 3a 31 31 45 00 99  3,45,67, 2312E
00f0 0c 61 6c 0f 6e 7a 6f 2e 73 70 69 72 65 45 20 99  alonzo.spireE
0100 0f 54 68 65 41 77 65 73 6f 6d 65 47 72 61 70 65  TheAwes oneGrape
0110 01 01 01 01 01 .....
```

I followed the TCP Stream and searched for alonzo and found some IP with a string that look like a password

```
Authorization:ns1.050a19e1db4d08240ef2b57dcf0c1f40..& p0..S...s 00D,D.....V.B.
.Bw..B...i tE...13,45,67,2312E...alonzo.spireE...TheAwes oneGrape.....http://temp1.org/Entity/Id12Response.Id12Response
```

Answer: 13.45.67.23:TheAwes oneGrape

Task 17:
What was the password of the YouTube channel which was hacked?

Same thing as task 16, while searching for alonzo I found some strings related to youtube

```
https://youtube.com/E...Forela-mediaE...youknowthiNGioNSNoW...E.EoE...LOGID_IDE...alonzo.spire@forela.co.uk...E tEg...Alonzo Spiret
```

Answer: youKnowthiNGioNSNoW

Task 18:
Alonzo reported unauthorised use of his credit card and assumed his card details were stolen. Please confirm his credit card number.

I copied some of the TCP Stream text to ChatGPT and asked him to can I find the credit card number. ChatGPT recommended to use regex for 16 digits characters like a card number so I told him to build a Python script.

```
import re

# File path to your text file
file_path = "C:\\Users\\Bubble\\Desktop\\file.txt"

# Regular expression to match exactly 16-digit sequences
cc_regex = re.compile(r"^\d{16}$")

# Function to search for 16-digit numbers in the file
def find_credit_card_numbers(file_path):
    credit_card_numbers = [] # List to store all 16-digit numbers
    with open(file_path, 'r') as file:
        content = file.readlines()

        # Loop through each line to search for 16-digit numbers
        for line_num, line in enumerate(content, 1):
            matches = cc_regex.findall(line)
            if matches:
                credit_card_numbers.extend(matches)
            print(f"Line {line_num}: {matches}")

    return credit_card_numbers

# Execute the search and collect 16-digit numbers
credit_card_numbers = find_credit_card_numbers(file_path)

# Print the complete list of detected 16-digit numbers
print("\nList of detected 16-digit numbers:")
print(credit_card_numbers)
```

```
C:\Users\Bubble\Desktop
> python harp.py
Line 380: ['1809936145018042', '1809936145018042', '1809936145016661']
Line 390: ['5432079189712224']
Line 392: ['4012873018191881']
Line 394: ['7208294400084863']
Line 471: ['1681204696177107']

List of detected 16-digit numbers:
['1809936145018042', '1809936145018042', '1809936145016661', '5432079189712224', '4012873018191881', '7208294400084863', '1681204696177107']
```

Answer: 4012873018191881

Task 19:
A migration plan document was also stolen in the attack which included some sensitive internal information. Who sent the document to Alonzo?

This is was last question for me, I first completed task 20 so I did the same like task 20.

Inside the TCP stream I searched for migration and found the filename and path

```
.87..b...i tE...r reminder.txtE..C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Desktop\reinder.txtE\Contact Pakistan operations team to get updates and assist them if needed.E...Users\alonzo.spire\DesktopF.....EcE...AWs 70e110d assesment.docxE..C:\Use
rs\alonzo.spire\Documents\AWs-migration assesment.docxE...reIs..reIs...8.D.b00P...0H.p...0Q..l..m.....{X.....FW3Y...7.h..E.....8..3..80..B.....}..3.R.+..0.....45.p.h.r.i.....
```

Then I did the same activity like task 20.

```
00010830 4F 2E 73 70 49 72 45 5C 44 47 43 76 4D 45 4E 74  o.spire\Document
00010840 73 5C 61 57 53 2D 4D F9 67 72 61 74 69 6F 6E 2D  a\AWs-migration
00010850 61 73 73 6C 73 6C 65 6E 74 2E 6A 6F 63 70 65 2E  s assesment.docxE
00010860 AD 2F 00 00 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  s.Bw.....
00010870 74 69 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  F.....
00010880 00 5F 72 64 6C 73 2F 2F 72 63 6C 73 6D 6F 38 00  s...e/s...s...
00010890 00 00 10 44 2F 62 6D 4F 0A 0A 70 0A 02 0A 41 41  s.F...e...e...
000108A0 0A A3 70 00 0B DE 38 51 E2 6F 6C F3 00 3D 2E 2E  tEg.Ep00..l.w...
000108B0 0E A2 AD 1C ED CC DE 9A AA 79 9A 05 0D 1A C4 C0  s..i10m...F Id
000108C0 18 0C 10 AC 04 45 3A 3A 7A 7A CB 8A 00 9F 3F 0F  s.Bw.FW3YAGP...
```

```
00011300 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....W...
00011310 0F 73 74 79 4C 45 73 2E 7E 4D 4C 50 48 01 02 00  sF...w...lF...
00011320 00 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 3A 1E 7D 34 FF 42 4B 5A F3  ....*..V306t0
00011400 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00011410 00 00 00 00 00 15 09 00 00 3B 43 4F 4E 74 65 45  s.....C...p...
00011420 01 67 11 7E 00 43 02 1D 21 78 4D 00 11 4B 05 04  s.Type...w...
00011430 74 00 00 00 04 00 74 00 90 7A 00 00 4F 0A 00 00  s.....E...i...
00011440 00 00 01 45 0F 00 1C 35 73 65 72 73 8C 61 6C 6F  s...E...M...e...s...aio
00011450 6E 7A 6F 2E 73 70 49 72 65 5C 44 6F 43 75 4D 65  s.e.spire\Docume
00011460 6E 74 73 45 27 14 1D 0E 01 01 45 63 45 05 99 11  s...E...E...E...M...
00011470 43 67 6E 6C 69 44 65 6E 74 65 61 6C 2E 64 6F 63  Confidential.doc
```




Answer: Abdullah Yasin

Task 20:
Foreia is planning to upgrade its infrastructure as its expanding globally. What's the date when the infrastructure will be upgraded?

Inside the TCP Stream, I searched for "infra" and found the file from the path
"C:\Users\alonso.spire\Documents\infra upgrade.docx"

E:\Users\alonso.spire\Documents\E....docx...infra upgrade.docx...C:\Users\alonso.spire\Documents\infra upgrade.docx\

Then I changed the TCP Stream from "ASCII" to "Raw" and clicked on "Save as"



Then I opened the file with "HxD" but first, there is a website
"https://www.garykessler.net/library/file_sigs.html"
which is a signatures table for files extensions. I searched in the website for "DOCX" which shows how the HEX should look like while searching for it in "HxD"

The HEX for DOCX

```
50 4B 03 04 14 00 06 00 PK.....
DOCX, PPTX, XLSX Microsoft Office Open XML Format (OOXML) Document
NOTE: There is no subheader for MS OOXML files as there is with
DOC, PPT, and XLS files. To better understand the format of these files,
rename any OOXML file to have a .ZIP extension and then unzip the file,
look at the resultant file named <Content_Type>.xml to see the content
types. In particular, look for the <Override PartName> tag, where you
will find word, ppt, or xl, respectively.

Trailer: Look for 50 4B 05 06 (PK..) followed by 18 additional bytes
at the end of the file.

50 4B 03 04 14 00 08 00 PK.....
```

Inside HxD I searched for "docx" and found the file name and the path we found in the TCP Stream.
Then I copied the 50 4B which is also the "PK" like the picture said from Gary Kessler website and
scrolled down until I found another docx file that start with 50 4B



I copied it and open a new tab in HxD paste it and saved it as filename.docx and opened it

Infrastructure upgrade by 17 January 2024

As an IT administrator, upgrading the infrastructure is a critical task that requires careful planning and execution. Upgrading the infrastructure can improve the organization's efficiency, security, and productivity. However, it can also be a complex and time-consuming process that requires a detailed plan.

The first step in an infrastructure upgrade plan is to assess the current state of the infrastructure. This includes identifying the hardware, software, and network components that need to be upgraded, as well as any potential risks or vulnerabilities. Once the assessment is complete, it is important to define the goals and objectives of the upgrade, such as improving performance, increasing capacity, or enhancing security.

Next, it is important to develop a detailed plan that outlines the steps required to complete the upgrade. This plan should include a timeline, budget, and resource allocation. It should also identify any potential risks or challenges that may arise during the upgrade process and outline strategies for mitigating those risks.

Once the plan is in place, it is time to execute the upgrade. This may involve installing new hardware or software, configuring network components, and testing the new infrastructure to ensure that it meets the organization's needs and requirements. It is important to communicate the upgrade plan and its impact to all stakeholders, including employees and customers, to minimize disruption and ensure a smooth transition.

Finally, it is important to monitor the new infrastructure and make any necessary adjustments or improvements. This may involve regular maintenance, updates, and security audits to ensure that the infrastructure remains secure, reliable, and efficient.

Keeping all this in mind, it would be cost effective and secure to move into hybrid environment by connecting out AWS and Qn prem infrastructure. This way we can slowly fully migrate into the cloud in the future. I have tasked "Abdullah Yasin", our dev in Lahore, Pakistan to create this plan and send it to me. I will present that in our quarterly meeting

By following a detailed infrastructure upgrade plan, I can help ensure that the organization's IT infrastructure remains up-to-date and meets the evolving needs of the business.

Answer: 2024-01-17

Task 21:
How many bytes of data were sent by the malicious process found in question 14? Please note - the PCAP data does not provide the answer.

I checked the SRUM artifact and checked the NetwrokUsages and searched for the file from task 14 "QLJ2705"

| File Info | Sid Type | Sid | User Name | Bytes Received | Bytes Sent |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------|
| = | + | + | + | = | = |
| C:\Users\Hardik\OneDrive\Documents\update\local\temp\logOFF.tmp | + | + | UnknownOrUser\Sid-5-5-5-21-3279435629-3863873788-2794363899-1384 | 12657 | 187855 |

Answer: 107059