
# \*After downloading the files I copied and pasted all the json files together in one folder and find used the communand find name "\*.json" -exec cat {} + | jq -s '.' > merged json To parsed all the files together\*



 ${\it Task 1:} \\ {\it What is the MDS sum of the binary the Threat Actor found the S3 bucket location in?} \\$ 

In the first challenge the exfiltrated file the user sent to the attacker is located at "elfidence\_collection \TriageData\C\users\Elfin\Appdata\Roaming\top-secret"

I checked the MD5 of the santa\_deliveries



Answer: 62d5c1f1f9020c98f97d8085b9456b05

Task 2: What time did the Threat Actor begin their automated retrieval of the contents of our exposed S3 bucket?

## \*This task and task 3 are the last ones I completed so I used my other answers to complete this tasks\*

I searched for the source attacker IP 191.101.31.57 and found some logs with AccessDenied

rections" "NEW-1-0970015088",
rections" "Meaduret",
rections "Mead outcoline" "[ass-dk-qo-v2/i.11.5 os/lanux lang/os/1.20. reordod" "AccessDenied", reordod" "AccessDenied", ope-theameters"; "MosterUnes" "morth-pole-private", "Moster": "north-pole-private,",

"Records": [ "eventVersion": "1.09",
"userIdentity": {
 "type": "AWSAccount",
 "principalId": "",
 "accountId": "anonymous" "Scounties" "anonymous"
"scounties" "1033-11-2900:24:072",
"eventSours" "3-3 amazonavs.com",
"eventSeet" "3-3 amazonavs.com",
"eventSeet" "3-3 amazonavs.com",
"eventSeet" "591.00:33:55",
"sourselRadit="6-events-1",
"sourselRad

Task 3: What time did the Threat Actor complete their automated retrieval of the contents of our exposed S 3 bucket?

Just like task 2, I kept scrolling down the logs and found all the files the attacker retrieved and also found the file answer for task 5 which I didn't answered.

I kept scrolling until the last log and found the complete automated timestamp

```
"tope": "Militable blocks.".
```

Answer: 2023-11-29 08:24:16

Task 4: Based on the Threat Actor's user agent - what scripting language did the TA likely utilise to retrieve the files?

I opened the merged.json file with Notepad++ and searched for UserAgent and found the unusual user agent

```
agent

Search works - (2040 bht)

Search "Darrhgent" | 22440 http://district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/district.com/di
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Inter in file of 2 searched)
Nise)

"usr2dpert" * "cloudtrail searched>"com",
"usr2dpert" * [Stoto/1.27, Tem/Sectoore#1.32.7 us/2.0 os/linux#6.2.0-37-qeneric md/arch#s6_64 lang/pythne95.10.12 md/pythne95.10.12 md/pyt
```

Answer: python

Task 5: Which file did the Threat Actor locate some hard coded credentials within?

```
I found this answer while searching for the answer in task 3.

While scrolling down looking at the files that the attacker was retrieving I found several files which was suspicious like disk.ps, backup.py, claus.py
```

```
"accountie": "anonymous"
),
"eventime": "003-11-9700124:142",
"eventime": "3.amaronava.com",
"eventimes": "3.amaronava.com",
"eventimes": "5.amaronava.com",
"avarôcien": "5.amaronava.com",
"avarôcient": "5.amaronava.com,
"avarôcient": "5.amaronava.com,
"avarôcient": "5.amaronava.com,
"boutellame": "5.amaronava.com,
"boutellame": "5.amaronava.com,
"boutellame": "5.amaronava.com,
"key": "NFoleScripts/backup.py"
                                                           "accountid": "anonymous"
"eventime": "3033-11-29708:24:152",
"evendousce": "3.amasonava.com",
"evendiman": "40-60-60-60",
"sourceThäddream": "52:103:31:5",
"sourceThäddream": "52:103:31:5",
"sequestParemetera": [57:00:31:5]",
"sequestParemetera": [57:00:31:5]",
"sourceThaddream": "59:00-60-1",
"sourceThaddream": "50:00-60-1",
"sourceThaddream": "50:00-6
```

I tried both files but the correct one was claus.py

```
"accountId": "anonymous"
"accounted" "Anonymous"
)
"eventToure": "203-11-20703:24:152",
"eventSoure": "35.amaronavs.com",
"eventSoure": "35.amaronavs.com",
"eventSoure": "46-cCopect",
"eventSoure": "46-cCopect",
"seafopont": "[python-equests/2.25.1]",
"sequestFacementers": "[python-equests/2.25.1]",
"fequestFacementers": "[python-equests/2.25.1]",
"feque
```

Answer: claus nv

The first malicious IP I found was 191.101.31.57 when I searched for the UserAgent so I also checked if it was malicious. The second malicious IP I found is after I completed task 7.

Answer: 45.133.193.41, 191.101.31.57

We are extremely concerned the TA managed to compromise our private S3 bucket, which contains an important VPN file. Please confirm the name of this VPN file and the time it was retrieved by the TA.

\*I completed this task before completing task 6 so I also found the malicious IP\*

I searched the word VPN in the logs and checked the source IP and found that this IP is malicious and also a file name with the extension of .ovpn

```
Line 20001: "sessionToken": "[QobbJpf21uXIV]EEIscKViLKdicSQtHLJMBEUUIÇ
Line 265331: "key": "bytesparkis.copm"
Line 26534: "ARMY: "ansawer31:incrot-pole-private/bytesparkis.copm"
"eventVirsion": "1.08",
"useridentiy": 1
"type": "EMDMee",
"principalid": "ALDASGFOBCODESVFGAO",
"arin": "arnawsiam:59962200360";
"acocomsfe": "99962200360",
"acocomsfed": "99962200360",
"useridene": "elfadmin"
              "userlane": "elfadam"

"encline": "sold-il-ST0-id-SS0",

"encline": "sold-il-ST0-id-SS0",

"encline": "sold-il-ST0-id-SS0",

"excellane": "sold-il-ST0-id-SS0",

"avarigacine": "sold-il-ST0-id-SS0",

"avarigacine": "sold-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0-il-SS0
```

Answer: bytesparkle.ovpn, 2023-11-29 10:16:53

Task 8: Please confirm the username of the compromised AWS account?

hed the exfiltrated file santa\_deliveries and found a username and password

Task 9: Based on the analysis completed Santa Claus has asked for some advice. What is the ARN of the S3 Bucket that requires locking down?

I checked the santa\_deliveries file once again near the username and password and I noticed a link with s3.amazonaws.com named papa-noel

Then I searched papa-noel in the merged json and found several file names with this S3 so I copied the ARN name

```
the merged join and found several file names with this 53 to loopled the

"ABM": "arminare 33::papa-moel."
"blocketimen": "papa-moel."
"blocketimen": "papa-moel."
"blocketimen": "papa-moel."
"Blocketimen": "papa-moel."
"Blocketimen": "papa-moel."
"ABMT: "arminare 33::papa-moel."
"blocketimen": "papa-moel."
"b
| Line | 21096 | Line | 22096 | Line
```

Answer: arn:aws:s3:::papa-noel