Sherlock Scenario

Alonzo Spire is fascinated by Al after noticing the recent uptick in usage of Al tools to help aid in daily tasks. He came across a sponsored post on social media about an Al tool by Google. The post had a massive reach, and the Page which posted had 200k + followers. Without any second thought, he downloaded the tool provided via the Post. But after installing it he could not find the tool on his system which raised hissuspicions. A DFIR analyst was notified of a possible incident on Forela's sysadmin machine. You are tasked to help the analyst in analysis to find the true source of this odd incident.

What is the full link of a social media post which is part of the malware campaign, and was unknowingly opened by Alonzo spire?

By checking the Edge browser history file using DB Browser, I found the Facebook URL:

17 21 https://www.facebook.com/ALultra.new/posts/pfbid0BqpxXypMtY5dWGy2GDfpRD4cQRppdNEC9SSa72FmPVKqik9iWNa2mRkpx9xziAS1l Gemini.AI - Introducing AI GEMINIspecial version for... | Facebook 1 13355296200136503

 $\textbf{Answer:} \\ \underline{\text{https://www.facebook.com/Al.ultra.new/posts/pfbid0BqpxXypMtY5dWGy2GDfpRD4cQRppdNEC9SSa72FmPVKqik9iWNa2mRkpx9xziAS1l} \\ \underline{\text{http://www.facebook.com/al.ultra.new/posts/pfbid0BqpxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5dWqxxypMtY5d$

Task 2:

Can you confirm the timestamp in UTC when alonzo visited this post?

I extracted the timestamp 13355296200136503 from the last_visit_time field. Upon researching online, I found it to be in WebKit timestamp format I used the following Python script for conversion:

from datetime import datetime, timedelta

def convert_webkit_timestamp(webkit_timestamp): # Convert microseconds to seconds seconds_since_1601 = webkit_timestamp / 1e6

Define the start date (January 1, 1601) epoch_start = datetime(1601, 1, 1)

Calculate the actual date and time visit_datetime = epoch_start + timedelta(seconds=seconds_since_1601)

Format the datetime in the desired format return visit_datetime.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')

Example usage

Example usage
webkit_timestamp = 13355296200136503
formatted_date = convert_webkit_timestamp(webkit_timestamp) print(f"Formatted Date and Time: {formatted_date}")

Answer: 2024-03-19 04:30:00

Task 3:

Alonzo downloaded a file on the system thinking it was an Al Assistant tool. What is name of the archive file downloaded?

By checking the downloads table inside DB Browser. I found the file name.



Answer: Al.Gemini Ultra For PC V1.0.1.rar

What was the full direct URL from where the file was downloaded?

I found the "referrer" column in the downloads table, accessed the link via a web browser, and then used www.browserling.com to track its redirections.





Task 5:
Alonzo then proceeded to install the newly download app, thinking that its a legit AI tool. What is the true product versionwhich was installed?

 $After thorough investigation, I found the answer in the SOFTWARE \ registry \ under \ Current Version > Task Cache > Uninstall.$

2024-03-19 04:31:20	{ABC2CE01-78A5-4554-A32A-4402 A4E83BB3}	Install	3.32.3	Google	20240319	MsiExec.exe /I (ABC2CE01-78A5-4554-A32A-4402
						A4E838B33

Answer: 3.32.3

Task 6: When was the malicious product/package successfully installed on the system?

Using MFTECmd to parse the MFT file into a CSV file and analyzing it with Timeline Explorer, I found the MSI file with the timestamp.

Parent Path	File Name	Extension
=	a <u>□</u> c	*@c
.\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads	AI.Gemini Ultra For PC V1.0.1	
.\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\AI.Gemini Ultra For PC V1.0.1	Google AI Gemini Ultra For PC V1.0.1.msi	.msi

I checked the "Last Access0x10" tab

Last Access0x10
-
2024-03-19 04:33:05
2024-03-19 04:31:33

Answer: 2024-03-19 04:31:33

Task 7: The malware used a legitimate location to stage its file on the endpoint. Can you find out the Directory path of this location?

This task was one of the latest, took me sometime to understand the answer is not the full path. The first time I found this path is at task 8.

Answer: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google

The malware executed a command from a file. What is name of this file?

While exploring the logs for another task, I noticed a powershell script inside the powershell logs

Provider "Variable" is Started. ProviderName=Variable NewProviderState=Started SequenceNumber=11 Sequelectronium=11 HostStame=ConsoleHost HostVerson=5.1.19041.3031 HostStame=ConsoleHost HostApication=powershel = LexcutionPolicy Bypass - File C.\Program Files (x86)\Google\Instal\inmmhkkegccagdidgimedpic/ru.ps1 EngineVerson= EngineVerson= EngineVerson= CommandYape= Command

So I search on the MFT for the path "Program Files (x86)\Google\Install" and then I found several files.

Parent Path	File Name	Extension
	-	-
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic	
.\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic	background.js	.js
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	New Folder #%d2	
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\New Folder #%d2	account_manager (22).xls	.xls
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	System.Deployment.dll	.dl1
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	Microsoft.VisualC.Dll	.D11
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic	favicon.png	.png
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	System.Web.DynamicData.Design.dll	.dl1
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic	manifest.json	.json
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic	ru.ps1	.ps1
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\Vew Folder #%d2	account_manager (21).xls	.xls
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	install.cmd	.cmd
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\New Folder #%d2	list_page (3).xlsx	.xlsx
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\New Folder #%d2	account_manager (20).xls	.xls
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install	logo.ico	.ico
\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic	content.js	.js

So I assumed that if the malware executed command from a file it will be from the cmd file.

Answer: install.cmd

Task 9:

What are the contents of the file from question 8? Remove whitespace to avoid format issues.

Same picture from task 8, I took the Entry number 51471 and used --de 514741 on MFTECmd.exe

.\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install 54502 51471 4 install.cmd 51349

@echo off -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "%~dp θ nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic/ru.ps1"

Then I went to CyberChef and used the Remove whiespace recipe



Answer: @echooffpowershell-ExecutionPolicyBypass-File" % ``dpOnmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic/ru.ps1" answer: @echooffpowershell-ExecutionPolicyBypass-File" % ``dpOnmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic/ru.ps2" and ``dpOnmmhkegccagdldgiimedpic/ru.ps2" and ``dpOnmmhkegccagdldgiimedpic/ru.ps2"

Task 10:

Task 11:

What was the command executed from this file according to the logs?

Same as task 8, I found the command from the powershell logs.

Provider "Variable" is Started.

Details:
Provideriame - Variable
NewProvides Starte-Started
SequenceNumber - 11
HostHame - ConsoleHost
HostVersion - 5.1.1994-1.303
HostVersion - 5.1.1994-1.303
HostVersion - 5.1.1994-1.303
HostVersion - 5.1.1994-1.303
Host Version - 5.1.1994-1.303
Host Version - 5.1.1994-1.303
Host Version - 1.1.1994-1.303
Host Version - 1.1.1994-1.303
Host Version - 1.1.1994
Host Application - powershell - Execution Policy Bypass - File C\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\text{Install\text{Inmmhkkegccagdidgimedpic/ru.ps1}}
RunspaceId - Polented Immae
Command Type =
SorptName =
Command Pub =
Command Details - Command

 $Answer: powershell - Execution Policy \ Bypass - File \ C: Program \ Files \ (x86) \ Google \ Install \ nmmhkkegc \ cagdld giimed pic/ru.ps 1$

Under malware staging Directory, a js file resides whic I took the entry number and used the MFTECmd on it

Under malware staging Directory, a js file resides which is very small in size. What is the hex offset for this file on the flesystem?

67387 64067 4 51351 4 .\Program Files (x86)\Google\Install\nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpic content.js

Select C\Window\System\2\condexe - X

Author: Eric Zimmerman(gamil.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/NFTEcmd

Command line: -f C:\Users\Bubble\Desktop\Triage\C\\$MFT --de 64067

Marning: Administrator privileges not found!
File type: Hft

Processed C:\Users\Bubble\Desktop\Triage\C\\$MFT in 15.3531 seconds

C:\Users\Bubble\Desktop\Triage\C\\$MFFT: FILE records found: 489,505 (Free records: 1,165) File size: 479.2MB

ping details for file record with key 0000FA43-00000004

Answer: 3E90C00

Task 12:

Recover the contents of this js file so we can forward this to our RE/MA team for further analysis and understanding of thisinfection chain. To sanitize the payload, remove whitespaces.

Same output in MFTECmd from task 11

ASCII: var isContentScriptExecuted = localStorage.getItem('contentScriptExecuted');
if (lisContentScriptExecuted) {
chrome.runtine.sendMessage(| action: 'executeFunction' }, function (response) {
localStorage.setItem('contentScriptExecuted', true);
});
})
}

I did the same thing In CyberChef like in Task 9



Answer: varisContentScriptExecuted=localStorage.getItem('contentScriptExecuted');iff(lisContentScriptExecuted);chrome.runtimesendMessage((action:'executeFunction'),function(response);(localStorage.setitem('contentscriptExecuted',true);});)

Task 13:
Upon seeing no Al Assistant app being run, alonzo tried searching it from file explorer. What keywords did he use to search?

Took me some time but after investigating all the artifacts from Registry I found the answer at the "WordWheelQuery"



	Search Term	Mru Position	Key Name	Last Write Timestamp
ŀ	a c	=	AD:	=
П	Google Ai Gemini tool	0	WordWheelQuery	2024-03-19 04:32:11

Answer: Google Ai Gemini tool

Task 14: When did alonzo searched it?

Same place from task 13

Last Write Timestamp 2024-03-19 04:32:11

Answer: 2024-03-19 04:32:11

Task 15:
After alonzo could not find any Al tool on the system, he became suspicious, contacted the security team and deleted the downloaded file. When was the file deleted by alonzo?

Inside the SRecycle.Bin folder there is an archive file "SR2MU60B.rar" which includes the MSI file



I checked the USN Journal and filtered for the name "\$R2MU60B.rar" and found the timestamp

Update Timestamp 2024-03-19 04:34:16 2024-03-19 04:34:16 2024-03-19 04:34:16

Answer: 2024-03-19 04:34:16

Task 16: Looking back at the starting point of this infection, please find the md5 hash of the malicious installer.

Inside the \$Recycle.Bin there is a file "\$R2MU60B.rar" containes the "Google AI Gemini Ultra For PC VI.0.1.msi" but the archive is protected with a password. After searching online, I found the file on Malware Bazaar with the password "022024" and obtained the hash.

SHA256 hash:	3f79fff587d4eaee9ac530408280987e1317bacc7ada5acb163cffd618b9d932			
SHA3-384 hash:				
SHA1 hash:	© 9123d4abce7af105faa7c32c3a2ea5ad4d219d2c © a0af1cc1265b96de8699a4daeab236a7 © bulldog-snake-fifteen-floor ALGemini Ultra For PC V1.0.1.rar			
MD5 hash:				
humanhash:				
File name:				
Download:	download sample			
File size:	404'274 bytes			
First seen:	2024-03-16 11:01:47 UTC			
Last seen:	Never			
File type:	1) rar			
MIME type:	application/x-rar			
Note:	This file is a password protected archive. The password is: **D 022024**			
ssdeep ③	12288:1fDgARzJdLN4iKWGBc2FW2JH8IhnscBhl:1rtRin4HW12FW2I8+7I			
TLSH ®	☼ T150842393BC6C5A1F0ADCAC40EB69F17DCEB774562F66C6174DC8168B005BAC98802B37			
TrID ①	61.5% (.RAR) RAR compressed archive (v5.0) (8000/1) 38.4% (.RAR) RAR compressed archive (gen) (5000/1)			
Reporter ®	■ e24111111154168			
Tags:	FacebookStealer FakeGeminiAI pw-022024 rar			



Answer: BF17D7F8DAC7DF58B37582CEC39E609D