Solidity Security Best Practices

tl;dr Don't be Parity



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For the Waterloo Ethereum Developers Meetup
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
Topics

- Solidity Security
 - o require() vs. assert()
 - Safe Math
 - Payments
 - Blockhashes
- Software Engineering Best Practices
 - Test Coverage
 - Standard Libraries
 - Upgradeable Smart Contracts
 - Bounties



Intro

- The actions we make have serious consequences
 - Not mission critical hardware code, but millions of dollars
- To grow the ecosystem we need trust from the general public
- How do you expect your mom to use the blockchain if it's unsafe?



Solidity Security

Visibility Modifier: Private

```
// ANYONE CAN SEE THIS
bytes32 private privKey = "0xn0t4actua77yakey...";
```

require()

- Use to validate inputs
- Generally found at beginning of function
- Returns your gas
- Use it often!

```
function send(uint256 _amount) public {
  require(_amount < balances[msg.sender]);
  require(_amount < dailyLimit);
  // Send the funds
}</pre>
```

assert()

- Use to validate conditions that shouldn't happen
- Use at the end of functions
- Will consume all your gas
- Doesn't want to deal with your shit

```
// Stolen from Consensys Smart Contract Best Practices
function deposit(uint256 _amount) public payable {
  balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
  totalSupply += msg.value;
  assert(this.balance >= totalSupply);
}
```

Safe Math

- General for max value is:
 - \circ uint<n>: $2^n 1$
- Examples:
 - \circ uint8: $2^8 1 = 255$
 - o uint256: 2^{256} 1 = really big
- It's important to watch these limits
 - assert() is good for this kind of stuff

```
function sneakyLoop(uint256 _length) public returns (uint256) {
  for (var i = 0; i < _length; i++) {
    // Do Some Action
  }
}</pre>
```

send() vs. transfer()

- Each only given a gas stipend of 2300 gas
 - Safe against reentrancy
 - Comes at the cost of failing if there are "complex" fallback functions

```
function giveToPoorFriend(address _to, uint256 _amount) public {
    require(msg.sender.balance > _to.balance);
    require(msg.sender.balance >= _amount);
    _to.transfer(_amount); // If this fails, it will throw
    // Or
    _to.send(_amount); // If this fails, it will return false
}
```

Pull vs. Push Payments

```
// This is a bad idea
function refundAll() public {
   // Pretend I have a list of attendees
   for (uint i = 0; i < attendees.length; i++) {
    if (attendees[i].attended) {
        // Refund the amount they deposited
        attendees[i].send(attendees.deposit);
    }
}</pre>
```

- Meetup group now taking an ETH deposit
- Will refund deposit if you show up
- Problems 'refundAll()' function:
 - Can run out of gas
 - Overflow of the loop counter
 - One failed transaction can ruin everything


Pull vs. Push Payments

```
In our case, this is the better way
function widthdraw() external {
  Attendee attendee = attendees[msg.sender];
  require(!attendee.gotRefund);
  require(attendee.paidDeposit);
  attendee.gotRefund = true;
  bool success = msg.sender.send(attendee.deposit);
  if (!success) {
    attendee.gotRefund = false;
```

- This is where *Pull* payments come in handy
- Whoever made a deposit asks for it back
- If their transaction fails, at least it is isolated from the rest

Timestamps

- There is no central atomic clock on the Ethereum network
- We rely on miners to provide us with time
- Miners can influence block.timestamp (a.k.a now) by moving it forward a bit
- Dangerous if conditions depend on it being after a certain time
- Shouldn't use as a source of randomness either



Blockhashes

- Like timestamps, can be manipulated by malicious miners to some degree
 - This means you shouldn't use them as a source of randomness
- From Solidity Documentation

Block and Transaction Properties

- block.blockhash(uint blockNumber) returns (bytes32): hash of the given block only works for
 256 most recent blocks excluding current
- Key point: Can only access last 256 blocks!
 - Will return 0 otherwise

Blockhashes: How Not to Use Them



- Offered a 1500 ETH (\$500k USD) bounty for anyone who could hack their smart contract
- Surprise surprise, it was hacked
- A hacker got away with 400 ETH (\$120k USD) before Smart Billions widthdrew the rest of the contract funds

-	Fra	n	22	cti	on	Ir	fo	rm	at	in	n
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TxHash: 0x6c28b5058aabc4a1a900a5ac6ceaaa11b033dea35e73a4cbe9aba1d4ff4627db

Block Height: 4337096 (260652 block confirmations)

TimeStamp: 48 days 4 hrs ago (Oct-04-2017 08:25:31 PM +UTC)

From: 0x6245c1804f7fceb305a60bbb5cb6e18f939edb69

Value: 0.01 Ether (\$3.62)

Gas Limit: 200000

Gas Used By Txn: 123205

Gas Price: 0.000000021 Ether (21 Gwei)

Actual Tx Cost/Fee: 0.002587305 Ether (\$0.94)

Cumulative Gas Used: 6573385

Nonce: 0

Input Data:

Function: playSystem(uint256 _hash, address _partner)

MethodID: 0x26699576

Convert To Ascil

Event Logs

Comments

Transaction Information

Tools & Utilities ▼

TxHash: 0x09cd170f4f33497b91e8a29ad2da115acfbf09586099a4b56b5564473e8c7e01

Block Height: 4337369 (260379 block confirmations)

TimeStamp: 48 days 2 hrs ago (Oct-04-2017 10:57:00 PM +UTC)

From: 0x6245c1804f7fceb305a60bbb5cb6e18f939edb69

.... TRANSFER 200 Ether to → 0x6245c1804f7fceb305a60...

Value: 0 Ether (\$0.00)

Gas Limit: 200000

Gas Used By Txn: 59233

Gas Price: 0.000000021 Ether (21 Gwei)

Actual Tx Cost/Fee: 0.001243893 Ether (\$0.45)

Cumulative Gas Used: 6114959

Nonce:

Input Data:

Function: won()

MethodID: 0x12c8052f

Convert To Ascil

Software Engineering

Programmer

- Develops and Writes Code
- Build Products
- One Aspect of Software Development
- Force Pushes to master

Software Engineer

- Manages Project Requirements
- Designs System Architecture
- Tests Software
- Implements Development and Deployment Processes
- Makes Pull Requests

Test Coverage



- Aim for as close to 100% test coverage
- Suggestions of things to test
 - Return values of send() or call()
 - require() and assert()
 - Loops: are they throwing out of gas errors?
 - Fallback function that consumes more than 2300 gas


Use Well Audited Code

- Something something OpenZeppelin Libraries
- Includes things like:
 - SafeMath.sol
 - StandardToken.sol
 - Crowdsale.sol
 - Pausable.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.4.18;
 * @title SafeMath
 * @dev Math operations with safety checks that throw on error
 library SafeMath {
  function mul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
   if (a == 0) {
     return 0;
    uint256 c = a * b;
    assert(c / a == b);
    return c:
  function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
   // assert(b > 0): // Solidity automatically throws when dividing by 0
    uint256 c = a / b:
    // assert(a == b * c + a % b); // There is no case in which this doesn't hold
    return c;
  function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
   assert(b <= a);
    return a - b;
  function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
   uint256 c = a + b;
    assert(c >= a);
    return c:
```

Upgradeable Smart Contracts

- Once a contract is deployed on the network, it's up there forever
 - Can kinda think about it like a hardware device
- Very hard, if not impossible, to address bugs if precautions aren't taken beforehand



Parity Multisig: July Hack

```
// constructor - just pass on the owner array to the multiowned and
// the limit to daylimit
function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) {
    initDaylimit(_daylimit);
    initMultiowned(_owners, _required);
}

// gets called when no other function matches
function() payable {
    // just being sent some cash?
    if (msg.value > 0)
        Deposit(msg.sender, msg.value);
    else if (msg.data.length > 0)
        _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);
}
```

- There was a hack in July, in which a hacker got away with ~\$30M USD
- Whitehat group managed to save rest of vulnerable wallets
- tl;dr
 - initWallet() function in the
 WalletLibrary contract was called
 via fallback function
 - Hacker made themselves the sole owner of Multisig
 - Ran away with funds

Parity Multisig: devops199 Edition

anyone can kill your contract #6995



devops199 opened this issue a day ago · 12 comments



devops199 commented a day ago • edited

I accidentally killed it.

https://etherscan.io/address/0x863df6bfa4469f3ead0be8f9f2aae51c91a907b4

Overview

TxHash:

TimeStamp:

From:

Value: Gas Limit:

Gas Price:

Nonce:

Input Data:

To:

Overview	Internal Transactions	Event Logs	Comments						
Transaction Information									
TxHash:		0x47f7cff	0x47f7cff7a5e671884629c93b368cb18f58a993f4b19c2a53a8662e3f1482f690						
TxReceipt St	atus:	Success	Success						
Block Height		4501969	4501969 (102456 block confirmations)						
TimeStamp:		16 days 1	16 days 11 hrs ago (Nov-06-2017 03:25:21 PM +UTC)						
From:		0xae7168	0xae7168deb525862f4fee37d987a971b385b96952						
То:		@ Contra	Contract 0x863df6bfa4469f3ead0be8f9f2aae51c91a907b4 ✓						
Value:		0 Ether (\$	0 Ether (\$0.00)						
Gas Limit:		108082	108082						
Gas Used By	Txn:	69082	69082						
Gas Price:		0.000000	0.000000136 Ether (13.6 Gwei)						
Actual Tx Co	st/Fee:	0.000939	0.0009395152 Ether (\$0.36)						
Cumulative (Gas Used:	4750547	4750547						
Nonce:		89	89						
Input Data:		Functi	Function: kill(address _to)						
			MethodID: 0xcbf0b0c0 [0]:0000000000000000000000000000000000						
		Convert 7	Convert To Ascil						

WHO WOULD WIN?



A well funded development team with over a dozen employees and years of development experience.

Gas Price: 0.0000000136 Ether (13.6 Gwei)

Actual Tx Cost/Fee: 0.0009395152 Ether (\$0.27)

Cumulative Gas Used: 4750547

TxReceipt Status: Success

Nonce: 89


Input Data:

Function: kill(address to)

MethodID: 0xcbf0b0c0

One 27 cent boi

Takeaways from devops199's Exploit



- Have a deployment checklist
 - Comprehensive list of steps to follow before deploying a piece of code
 - Great place to have things like "Remember to initialize contract"
- Have a way to mitigate damage after the fact
 - Upgradable smart contracts anyone?

Upgradeable Smart Contracts

This was line 451 of the smart contract:


```
// FIELDS
address constant _walletLibrary = 0x863df6bfa4469f3ead0be8f9f2aae51c91a907b4;
```

The address of the, now useless, contract was hardcoded in

```
// A Rocket Pool Suggested Solution
address _walletLibrary = 0x863df6bfa4469f3ead0be8f9f2aae51c91a907b4;
/// @dev Set a new wallet library contract address
function setLibraryAddress(address _newAddress) external onlyOwner {
    _walletLibrary = _newAddress;
}
```

Rocket Pool's Approach: Hub and Spoke

- If you upgrade a contract, you MUST have a way to recover the data from the contract
- This is where the Hub comes in useful
 - Simple contract, only job is to handle information
 - This can include setters/getters, deletions, etc
 - Make sure to set up some sort of permission system
- Contracts can ask Hub for address of other contracts they interact with
 - Contracts can be changed, only Hub needs to know this happened



Bug Bounty Programs



Wrap Up

Wrap Up

- Always consider worst case scenarios
- Write simple smart contracts
- Be careful with timestamps and blockhashes
- Write meaningful tests
- Don't roll your own Solidity
- Plan ahead
- Most importantly: Don't be Parity



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