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Designing Exception Handling using Event-B

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
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Outline

- Motivation + Background
- Case study – SBB electronic voting system
 - normal behaviour
 - exceptional behaviour
 - verifying recovery
- Conclusions
- Future directions

Motivation

- Systems must deal with failures and attacks - Exceptions
 - Failures can occur in machinery that is part of the system
 - Security Attacks can target code that is part of the controller of the system
 - E.G ARM Morello - raise exceptions for capability violations
- Designers naturally focus on normal behaviour first, but ...
- Exceptions must be handled in a way that maintains system integrity properties
- Formal Analysis of exceptional behaviour would verify exception handling
 - But Event-B has no explicit support/structures/methods for exception handling
- We are exploring approaches to model/verify exception handling in Event-B



Background - Exceptions

- We consider two types of exception detected by the following interrupt signals
 - **SIGPROT**: a memory protection exception can be generated by capability hardware when a pointer is used outside of its protected range (representing a possible memory attack).
 - **SIGALARM**: a timeout exception can be raised when an expected response from the environment (e.g. a machine or user) fails to occur within a time limit.


Background - Event-B

```
1 context c
2 constants SA SB
3 sets states
4 axioms @def-states: partition(states, {SA}, {SB})
Context: Static aspects of the model
```

```
1 machine m, sees c
2 variables st // state
3 invariants @typeof-st: st ∈ {SA, SB}
4 events
5 event INITIALISATION
6 then @init-st: st := SA
7 end
8 event t1
9 where @source: st = SA // event t1 guard
10 then @target-st: st := SB // event t1 action
11 end
Machine: Dynamic aspects of the model
```


- Used to model specifications of systems
- Proof of model consistency with respect to
 - Invariant properties
 - Abstract levels
- Event-B models have two parts:
 - Contexts: Contain sets, constants and axioms
 - Machines: Variables, events, and invariants
- Refined to add more details to the model
 - Superposition refinement: additional variables
 - Data refinement: abstract variables replaced with new concrete variables
 - New events: Refines implicit abstract event that does nothing “skip” – i.e. cannot modify old variables

Background – UML-B state machines




- Transitions:
 - enabled when their source state is active and change the active state of the system
 - [...] Guards: Extra conditions that must be satisfied for a transition to be enabled
 - / Actions: updates performed as transition fires
- Variables
 - Used in guards and actions
- Parallel Statemachines
 - can synchronise transitions
- Hierarchical
 - States may contain nested state machines
- UML-B generates Event-B automatically

Case Study – SBB voting system




Case Study – Normal Behaviour

- Model of the ROLLER equipment.




Case Study – Normal Behaviour

- Model of the main controller.
 - Some transitions synchronise with the ROLLER state machine.




Case Study – Normal Behaviour

- In the waiting state
- The roller should be in the state ROLLER Standby so that it is ready to take another paper.
- The count of votes cast by the user should be the same as the count of papers accepted by the roller.



Case Study – Normal Behaviour

- Other invariants needed to achieve proof
 - But note one area where cast count is out of step with accepted count




Case Study – Exceptional Behaviour

Exception	Signal	States	Handling	Rollback
Memory protection error	SIGPROT	BarcodeReading, BarcodeProcessing, UserSelection	reject ballot	-
User does not enter selection	SIGALRM	UserSelection	reject ballot	-
Roller jammed	SIGALRM	Accepting	maintenance	cast count
Roller jammed	SIGALRM	Spoiling, Rejecting	maintenance	-


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
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Verifying Recovery – rollback actions

Roller jammed

SIGALRM

Accepting

maintenance

cast
count

*Need for rollback
detected by provers*

- Proof obligations for exception handler event –
 - preservation of invariants concerning cast count = accepted count.
- Most discharged automatically
 - (after splitting the event and adding some theorems to distinguish cases)
- One case remains... s=SIGALRM, SBB=Accepting
 - corresponds to the case where we need to add a rollback of the cast count.
- *Event-B verification identifies any missing rollback actions and discovers the exact case where they are needed.*


Verifying Recovery – recovery states

Exception	Signal	States	Handling	Rollback
Memory protection error	SIGPROT	BarcodeReading, BarcodeProcessing, UserSelection	reject ballot	-

- Proof obligations for exception handler event –
 - preservation of invariants concerning external machines after state change.
- Initially, we specified recovery from BarcodeReading to Waiting
 - The ROLLER would be left in the state ROLLER PaperIn violating the safety invariant.
 - We could not prove this unsafe design - counter-example using the ProB model checker.
 - Since the Roller is an external system it cannot be easily changed like the cast count.
 - Use ‘PrepareRejecting’ as recovery state - allows ROLLER sub-system to reject the paper.
- Similarly, for Roller timeout, maintenance state allows repair and manual paper removal
- *State invariants identify inappropriate handling recovery states.*

Conclusions

- Initially we design *and verify* the system normal behaviour
 - States of the controller
 - Consistency with state of external machinery
 - Consistency with ancillary variables (e.g. counters)
- Exceptional behaviour added later (although not a refinement)
 - Different types of exceptions
 - Recovery state
- Event-B verification detects
 - Inappropriate recovery states - external machinery in wrong state
 - Need for rollback - ancillary variables in wrong state



Future Directions

- Visualisation of exception handling on UML-B statemachines
 - Generation of Event-B exception handling events etc.
- Code generation including Exception handling – ‘C’
- Explore SIGPROT generated on Morrello processor
 - Capabilities
 - Detecting security violations

QUESTIONS