

MISP

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Account Information

Web address: https://3.87.57.59/



[Figure 1 Login Form]

ID	readevent@gmail.com
Password	Readevent*10025800

[Figure 2 Account information]


Automation code: https://github.com/HELLOMOONGYU/MoonGyu_MISP

1. A description of the deployment

I used these kinds of tags for identifying what case is. My custom tags are APT, Lazarus, email, hwp, maldoc, malware, postscript, network_icmp. These Things make it easier to identify cases. And then, Galaxy, internal of MISP, is very useful to handle the cases sush as APT group attack pattern. The postscript tag is a method used in hwp malicious documents.



[Figure 3 Tag list that I used]



[Figure 4 Tag list that I used]

2. Use case of sharing based on the chosen campaign

I designed a case for the Lazarus apt group. This group distributes document-type malicious codes such as hwp and docm. Samples were obtained directly from hybrid analysis and cases were created based on information from Virustotal. Among them, I directly analyzed 인천광역시 코로나바이러스 대응 긴급 조회. hwp file in 2020.



[Figure 5 List event]

The document file below was used in a spear phishing attack targeting public institutions. In the hwp file, a malicious postscript was inserted under bindata, and if we analyze this postscript, there is a built-in PowerShell code that downloads and executes the dropper from the C&C server.




[Figure 6 인천광역시 코로나바이러스 대응 긴급 조회.hwp]

Galaxies show detail attack patterns and apt groups. Through this, this case is a spear phishing attack and information about the Lazarus apt group can be confirmed.




[Figure 7 Galaxies of MISP]

IOCs have each payload hash value (md5, sha1, sha256), C&C server, and dropper file name. If you look at the dropper file name, you can see that it is a jpg extension, but it is actually an executable PE file.



[Figure 8 IOCs]


The graph below makes it easy to identify the data associated with the case.




[Figure 9 Correlation Graph]

3. MISP network

I visited the MISP(SungHwan Seo). There are lots of events. Among them, malware targeting Ukrainian government agencies was interesting.



[Figure 10 Event List of MISP(SungHwan Seo)]




[Figure 11 Malware targeting Ukrainian organizations]

Among these IOCs, the commandline stood out. It appears to be a command downloaded from the malicious drop file c2 and executed.



[Figure 12 IOCs]

By looking at the correlation graph, information about this case could be identified at a glance.



[Figure 13 Correlation Graph]