

# Liquid Democracy for Rating Systems

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## **Abstract**

Liquid democracy offers a flexible alternative to traditional voting, allowing individuals either to vote directly or to delegate their vote to trusted peers. This project integrates a full liquid democracy system (including transitive vote delegation) into vodle, a web-based group decision-making platform, to promote broader participation. Several variations were developed: ranked delegation with backup options, per-option delegation, and a trust-based weighted delegation model that enables fine-grained expression of user confidence. These innovations give users greater control over how their votes are cast, even when not directly participating. Performance benchmarks indicate that the delegation algorithm resolves votes within milliseconds for hundreds of users, validating the approach. By combining flexible delegation mechanisms with an intuitive, real-time interface, vodle demonstrates the practical viability of liquid democracy for modern, web-based environments.

**Keywords:** liquid democracy, ranked delegation, weighted delegation, flexible participation, user autonomy, online decision-making, real-time voting systems, web-based voting systems

# Contents

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>List of Figures</b>   | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>List of Tables</b>  | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>1 Introduction</b>  | <b>8</b>  |
| 1.1 Context and Motivation . . . . .   | 8         |
| 1.2 Project Goals . . . . .  | 9         |
| 1.3 Structure of This Report . . . . .   | 9         |
| 1.4 Contributions . . . . .  | 10        |
| <b>2 Background Research</b>   | <b>11</b> |
| 2.1 Liquid Democracy . . . . .   | 11        |
| 2.1.1 Issues With Liquid Democracy . . . . .   | 12        |
| 2.1.2 Variations of Liquid Democracy . . . . .                                       | 15        |
| 2.2 Existing Implementations of Liquid Democracy . . . . .                           | 20        |
| 2.2.1 LiquidFeedback . . . . .   | 20        |
| 2.2.2 Google Votes . . . . .   | 21        |
| 2.3 Agent Based Modelling . . . . .  | 23        |
| 2.4 Vodle . . . . .  | 24        |
| 2.4.1 MaxParC . . . . .  | 24        |
| 2.4.2 Technical Architecture and Implementation Constraints . . . . .                | 25        |
| 2.4.3 Partially Implemented Delegation in Vodle . . . . .                            | 27        |
| 2.5 Summary . . . . .  | 27        |
| <b>3 Project Objectives</b>  | <b>29</b> |
| 3.1 Core Objectives (Mandatory) . . . . .  | 29        |
| 3.2 Extension Objective (Optional) . . . . .   | 30        |
| 3.3 Project Requirements . . . . .   | 30        |
| 3.3.1 Requirements for Core Objective 1: Core Delegation Model . . . . .             | 30        |
| 3.3.2 Requirements for Core Objective 2: Ranked Delegation . . . . .                 | 31        |
| 3.3.3 Requirements for Core Objective 3: Weighted Delegation . . . . .               | 31        |
| 3.3.4 Requirements for Core Objective 4: Per-Option Delegation . . . . .             | 32        |
| 3.3.5 Requirements for Extension Objective: Simulate Delegation Mechanisms . . . . . | 32        |

|          |   |           |
|----------|---|-----------|
| <b>4</b> | <b>Design and Implementation</b>                              | <b>33</b> |
| 4.1      | System Architecture Overview . . . . .                        | 33        |
| 4.1.1    | Summary of Storage and Validation Constraints . . . . .       | 35        |
| 4.2      | Implement a Core Delegation Model into vodle . . . . .        | 35        |
| 4.2.1    | Limitations of the Pre-existing Implementation . . . . .      | 36        |
| 4.2.2    | Revised Implementation . . . . .                              | 38        |
| 4.2.3    | Summary . . . . .   | 42        |
| 4.3      | Implement Ranked Delegation into Vodle . . . . .              | 42        |
| 4.3.1    | Data Structures . . . . .                                     | 42        |
| 4.3.2    | Delegation Resolution Using MinSum . . . . .                  | 43        |
| 4.3.3    | Determining Who is a Casting Voter . . . . .                  | 45        |
| 4.3.4    | Extending the Delegation Invitation Process . . . . .         | 46        |
| 4.3.5    | Managing and Reordering Delegations . . . . .                 | 47        |
| 4.3.6    | Summary . . . . .   | 49        |
| 4.4      | Implement Per-Option Delegation . . . . .                     | 50        |
| 4.4.1    | Displaying Correct Delegate Name . . . . .                    | 51        |
| 4.4.2    | Per-Option Selection During Invitation . . . . .              | 51        |
| 4.4.3    | Information Screen for Managing Delegations . . . . .         | 53        |
| 4.4.4    | Summary . . . . .   | 53        |
| 4.5      | Implement Weighted Delegation into Vodle . . . . .            | 54        |
| 4.5.1    | Data Structures . . . . .                                     | 54        |
| 4.5.2    | User Interface Extensions . . . . .                           | 55        |
| 4.5.3    | Effective Rating Calculation . . . . .                        | 56        |
| 4.5.4    | Summary . . . . .   | 58        |
| 4.6      | Summary . . . . .   | 58        |
| <b>5</b> | <b>Evaluation</b>   | <b>60</b> |
| 5.1      | Testing . . . . .   | 60        |
| 5.1.1    | Unit Testing . . . . .  | 60        |
| 5.1.2    | Performance Testing . . . . .                                 | 62        |
| 5.2      | Evaluation Against Requirements . . . . .                     | 65        |
| 5.2.1    | Objective 1: Implement a Core Delegation Model . . . . .      | 65        |
| 5.2.2    | Objective 2: Implement Ranked Delegation . . . . .            | 66        |
| 5.2.3    | Objective 3: Implement Weighted Delegation . . . . .          | 67        |
| 5.2.4    | Objective 4: Implement Per-Option Delegation . . . . .        | 68        |
| 5.2.5    | Extension Objective: Simulate Delegation Mechanisms . . . . . | 69        |
| 5.3      | Feedback . . . . .  | 70        |
| <b>6</b> | <b>Project Management</b>                                     | <b>71</b> |
| 6.1      | Methodology . . . . .   | 71        |
| 6.2      | Plan . . . . .  | 72        |

|          |   |            |
|----------|---|------------|
| 6.3      | Changes to the Project Plan . . . . .                   | 73         |
| 6.3.1    | Actual Timeline Compared to Planned Timeline . . . . .  | 74         |
| 6.4      | Risk Assessment . . . . .                               | 75         |
| 6.5      | Risk Management Reflection . . . . .                    | 77         |
| 6.6      | Legal and Ethical Considerations . . . . .              | 79         |
| <b>7</b> | <b>Future Work</b>                                      | <b>80</b>  |
| 7.1      | Agent-Based Modelling for Delegation Dynamics . . . . . | 80         |
| 7.1.1    | Prior Simulation Studies of Liquid Democracy . . . . .  | 80         |
| 7.1.2    | Baseline Agent-Based Model . . . . .                    | 81         |
| 7.1.3    | Extensions to the Baseline Model . . . . .              | 82         |
| 7.1.4    | Evaluation Metrics . . . . .                            | 82         |
| 7.1.5    | Summary . . . . .                                       | 83         |
| 7.2      | Potential Extensions for Vodle . . . . .                | 84         |
| 7.2.1    | Global Delegations . . . . .                            | 84         |
| 7.2.2    | Delegation Expiry Mechanisms . . . . .                  | 84         |
| 7.2.3    | Auditability of Delegation Chains . . . . .             | 84         |
| 7.3      | Summary . . . . .                                       | 85         |
| <b>8</b> | <b>Conclusion</b>                                       | <b>86</b>  |
|          | <b>References</b>                                       | <b>88</b>  |
|          | <b>Appendices</b>                                       | <b>91</b>  |
| <b>A</b> | <b>Unit Testing Scripts</b>                             | <b>92</b>  |
| A.1      | Core Delegation . . . . .                               | 92         |
| A.2      | Ranked Delegation . . . . .                             | 98         |
| A.3      | Weighted Delegation . . . . .                           | 103        |
| <b>B</b> | <b>Performance Testing Script</b>                       | <b>110</b> |

# List of Figures

|     |  |    |
|-----|--|----|
| 2.1 | Example of transitivity in action: Voter A delegates to Voter B, who delegates to Voter C. Voter C then casts a vote with the weight of three individuals (A, B and C). . . . .  | 12 |
| 2.2 | Delegation cycle: A delegates to B, B to C, and C back to A. . . . .   | 13 |
| 2.3 | Delegation chain ending in abstention: A delegates to B, B to C. C abstains, causing the votes of A and B to be lost. . . . .  | 14 |
| 2.4 | Super-voter: A delegates to B, B to C. No matter which vote D or E cast, C's vote will always determine the outcome as it has a weight of 3. . . .   | 14 |
| 2.5 | Screenshot taken from Hardt and Lopes (2015) showing the user interface of Google Votes. . . . .   | 22 |
| 2.6 | Visual representation of MaxParC from the perspective of a voter (Alice). Ratings represent conditional approval thresholds. An option is counted as approved by Alice if the approval bar (light grey) overlaps with her rating needle. Graphic from Heitzig et al. (2024). . . . . | 25 |
| 4.1 | Sequence for a delegation to be initiated. User A shares a link with user B, who accepts the delegation. . . . .   | 37 |
| 4.2 | Sequence for a rejected delegation. User A shares a delegation link with user B, who rejects the delegation. . . . .   | 37 |
| 4.3 | User is prevented from accepting a delegation that would create a cycle. . . . .   | 39 |
| 4.4 | Code for checking if a delegation is valid. . . . .  | 40 |
| 4.5 | User interface after delegating: users can selectively submit their own ratings instead of accepting delegated ratings. Additionally, pressing the trash can icon on the yellow banner allows then to revoke their delegation. . . . .   | 41 |
| 4.6 | Example of a <code>direct_delegation_map</code> entry for ranked delegation. B is marked as active as the path $A \rightarrow B$ has the lowest total sum of ranks. . . . .  | 43 |
| 4.7 | Delegation invitation popup showing dynamically filtered rank options. In this case, rank 1 has already been used, so only ranks 2 and 3 are available for selection. . . . .  | 47 |
| 4.8 | The information dialog can be accessed by tapping the information icon (second icon from the left) in the delegation info banner. . . . .  | 47 |

|      |   |    |
|------|---|----|
| 4.9  | Information dialog for managing and reordering ranked delegations which appears after clicking the information button. . . . .  | 48 |
| 4.10 | User interface after delegating with per-option delegation. . . . .   | 51 |
| 4.11 | Delegation invitation dialog allowing users to select one or more poll options to delegate. Only options without existing delegations are shown.                                      | 52 |
| 4.12 | Information dialog showing active per-option delegations. Users can view assigned delegates and revoke delegations individually for each option. . . . .                              | 53 |
| 4.13 | Delegation invitation dialog with trust percentage slider. . . . .  | 55 |
| 4.14 | Information dialog for managing and editing weighted delegations which appears after clicking the information button. . . . .   | 56 |
| 5.1  | Weighted delegation convergence performance with $\epsilon = 1$ . Average and maximum iteration counts and convergence times for graph sizes of 100, 200, and 500 voters. . . . .     | 63 |
| 5.2  | Weighted delegation convergence performance with $\epsilon = 0$ . Stricter convergence requirements lead to higher iteration counts and slightly increased convergence times. . . . . | 64 |
| 6.1  | Gantt chart illustrating the project plan from the progress report. . . . .   | 73 |
| 6.2  | Gantt chart illustrating the actual timeline of the project. Data taken from git commit history . . . . .   | 74 |



# List of Tables

|     |   |    |
|-----|---|----|
| 2.1 | Diagram legend showing symbols used for different voter behaviours in a liquid democracy context. . . . . | 13 |
| 5.1 | Evaluation of Objective 1: Core Delegation Model Requirements . . . . .                                   | 65 |
| 5.2 | Evaluation of Objective 2: Ranked Delegation Requirements . . . . .                                       | 66 |
| 5.3 | Evaluation of Objective 3: Weighted Delegation Requirements . . . . .                                     | 67 |
| 5.4 | Evaluation of Objective 4: Per-Option Delegation Requirements . . . . .                                   | 68 |
| 5.5 | Evaluation of Extension Objective: Simulate Delegation Mechanisms Requirements . . . . .                  | 69 |
| 6.1 | Risks and Mitigation Strategies . . . . .   | 76 |

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Context and Motivation

Collective decision-making is a cornerstone of modern governance, but traditional approaches often struggle to balance transparency, efficiency, and scalability. *Direct democracy* grants citizens full participation in decisions, promoting transparency and individual control; however, it does not scale easily to large or complex societies. In contrast, *representative democracy* improves scalability by delegating authority to elected officials, but at the cost of reduced personal influence and flexibility.

Liquid democracy emerges as a hybrid model that balances these trade-offs by allowing individuals either to vote directly or to delegate their voting power to trusted peers, combining the transparency of direct democracy with the scalability of representation (Ford, 2002; Blum and Zuber, 2016). Unlike traditional representation, where authority is typically fixed for a term, liquid democracy supports dynamic, reversible delegations, enabling voters to adapt their participation to changing circumstances, expertise, or trust.

This project applies liquid democracy to *vodle*, a web-based platform for participatory decision-making, where users rate options on a scale (from 1 to 100) using the MaxParC rating system. While *vodle* enables users to express nuanced preferences across decision options, it shares a common challenge inherent to direct democracy: as decisions become more numerous and complex, many users lack the time, expertise, or motivation to engage with every vote (Ford, 2002; Blum and Zuber, 2016). This disengagement can lead to underrepresentation and diminished decision quality. Without delegation, *vodle* risked low participation on complex decisions, undermining its goal of fostering broad consensus. This motivated the integration of liquid democracy mechanisms to keep users involved.

By integrating liquid democracy mechanisms, this project aims to address these limitations by providing a flexible way for users to remain active participants even when

direct engagement is impractical, helping to improve inclusiveness, scalability, and responsiveness while preserving transparency and individual control.

## 1.2 Project Goals

The core goal of this project is to design and implement a flexible, scalable, and transparent liquid democracy system for vodle. The system should allow users to delegate their votes in ways that preserve autonomy, promote engagement, and accommodate a range of different behaviours and participation levels.

Objectives include:

- Supporting users to delegate their voting power to others while ensuring that all votes are correctly attributed and included in the final outcome.
- Supporting ranked delegation with backup options.
- Supporting weighted delegation based on trust.
- Supporting delegation on a per-option basis.

## 1.3 Structure of This Report

This report is organised to guide the reader from theoretical foundations through to practical implementation, evaluation, and reflection. Each chapter builds logically upon the previous, tracing the project's development from research to outcomes:

- Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical background of liquid democracy, identifying key challenges such as delegation cycles, abstentions, and super-voters. It further analyses real-world implementations, including LiquidFeedback and Google Votes, to draw lessons from existing systems. Finally, it examines vodle's technical architecture and partially implemented delegation system, establishing the practical constraints and requirements for the project.
- Chapter 3 defines the project's objectives, translating the issues identified in Chapter 2 into specific functional and non-functional requirements. These objectives provide a clear framework to guide implementation and evaluation.
- Chapter 4 details the design and implementation of the delegation mechanisms within vodle. Each delegation model—core delegation, ranked delegation, weighted delegation, and per-option delegation—is discussed, with explanations of key technical decisions and how they address the project objectives.

- Chapter 5 evaluates the system through unit testing, performance analysis, and a critical assessment of how successfully the final implementation meets the defined objectives.
- Chapter 6 reflects on project management aspects, including the development methodology, planning and scheduling, risk assessment, and ethical considerations, and how these processes shaped the technical outcomes.
- Chapter 7 proposes directions for future work, suggesting potential enhancements to delegation features and the use of agent-based modelling to explore delegation dynamics at a larger scale.
- Chapter 8 concludes by summarising the project's contributions and reflecting on its achievements.

## 1.4 Contributions

In summary, this project contributes:

- An enhanced liquid democracy module for vodle addressing cycle detection, vote loss, and super-voter issues.
- New delegation modes (ranked, weighted, per-option) implemented with client-side logic optimised for CouchDB storage.
- An evaluation demonstrating scalability and robustness of the proposed mechanisms through performance testing.

## Chapter 2

# Background Research

This chapter provides the necessary foundation for designing and implementing a liquid democracy system within vodle. It begins by comparing liquid democracy to traditional models (direct and representative democracy), highlighting its potential to balance transparency, scalability, and individual agency.

The chapter then examines key limitations of liquid democracy in practice – including delegation cycles, abstentions, and the emergence of super-voters – alongside the strategies proposed in the literature to mitigate them.

Furthermore, real-world deployments of liquid democracy are considered, drawing lessons from systems such as LiquidFeedback and Google Votes. These examples inform both the technical feasibility and design challenges of integrating delegation mechanisms into online platforms.

Finally, the chapter outlines the technical foundations of vodle, including its architecture and existing (incomplete) delegation features. These constraints play a key role in shaping the design choices presented in later chapters.

## 2.1 Liquid Democracy

While liquid democracy was briefly introduced in Chapter 1, this section provides a more detailed rationale for its relevance – particularly in the context of decision-making systems like vodle.

**Direct democracy** maximises personal agency and transparency by allowing individuals to vote on every issue. It is often viewed as the most egalitarian form of governance, as it ensures that all participants have a direct say in decisions. However, this model becomes impractical at scale. Expecting all users to remain consistently informed and engaged across all relevant knowledge areas is unrealistic, particularly in large or diverse groups (Ford, 2002). As Ford (2002) observes, the assumption that the

majority can or will make consistently well-informed decisions across a broad range of topics does not hold in practice. This can lead to voter fatigue, low turnout, and uninformed or irrational decision-making.

**Representative democracy** addresses some of these issues (particularly scalability) by allowing users to elect officials who vote on their behalf. This model forms the basis of most modern democracies, enabling stable governance in large populations. It allows representatives, who have develop expertise, to reduce the decision-making burden on the general population. However, the model has key limitations: between elections, representatives may act without sufficient accountability, and voters have limited influence over individual decisions (Blum and Zuber, 2016). As a result, the outcomes of decision-making can become misaligned with the preferences and interests of individual voters.

**Liquid democracy** attempts to reconcile these competing trade-offs. It allows each participant to either vote directly or delegate (entrust) their vote to another participant (a delegate). Delegates can in turn delegate their votes, forming chains of trust. This is known as *transitive delegation*: voting power is passed along the chain until it reaches a user who casts a vote. Delegations are also *revocable*, allowing users to reclaim and reassign their vote at any time.




Figure 2.1: Example of transitivity in action: Voter A delegates to Voter B, who delegates to Voter C. Voter C then casts a vote with the weight of three individuals (A, B and C).

By supporting both direct and delegated participation, liquid democracy allows users to engage at varying levels depending on their interest, expertise, or availability. This flexibility makes it a promising model for decision making in online platforms such as vodle, where participation levels naturally fluctuate.

### 2.1.1 Issues With Liquid Democracy

Although liquid democracy offers an elegant compromise between agency and scalability, it introduces several non-trivial implementation challenges. This section identifies three core issues that threaten its reliability and fairness in practice: cycles in delegation chains, vote loss due to abstentions, and the disproportionate influence of super-voters.

To support this discussion, the following diagram legend is used to visually distinguish between voter behaviours:

| Role                    | Description   | Symbol   |
|-------------------------|---|----------|
| <b>Delegated voter</b>  | Has delegated their vote and does not cast one directly | Circle   |
| <b>Casting voter</b>    | Casts their vote and has not delegated                  | Square   |
| <b>Abstaining voter</b> | Neither delegates nor casts their vote                  | Triangle |

Table 2.1: Diagram legend showing symbols used for different voter behaviours in a liquid democracy context.

## Delegation Cycles

Delegation cycles occur when a vote is delegated in such a way that it ends up forming a loop (Brill et al., 2022), preventing the vote from reaching a final casting voter. For example, if Alice delegates her vote to Bob, Bob delegates to Charlie, and Charlie delegates back to Alice, the votes become trapped in a cycle (see Figure 2.2) and can be treated as a loss of representation (Christoff and Grossi, 2017a).




Figure 2.2: Delegation cycle: A delegates to B, B to C, and C back to A.

This issue is particularly problematic because it can nullify votes without the affected users' knowledge – in implementations that do not properly handle cycles, the final decision-making outcome may be altered without participants realising it.

One straightforward method for preventing cycles is to check whether a new delegation would introduce a cycle before accepting it. For example, if Alice tries to delegate her vote to Bob, the system checks whether Bob has already directly or indirectly delegated their vote to Alice. If so, the delegation is rejected. However, this approach can be cumbersome and may lead to a poor user experience, as users may not understand why their delegation was denied.

Delegation cycles are particularly likely to emerge in dynamic, real-time voting systems like vodle, where users can add or remove delegations at any time. Delegation chains that are initially valid may later form part of a cycle as other participants update their preferences. This makes cycle detection not just a one-off validation step, but an ongoing requirement for maintaining consistency and ensuring vote resolution remains reliable.

## Abstentions

A voter abstains<sup>1</sup> by neither casting a vote nor delegating it to another user (Brill et al., 2022).

Abstentions are especially impactful when they occur at the end of a larger delegation chain (see Figure 2.3), as all votes passed along the chain to that voter are effectively lost (Brill et al., 2022). Additionally, the voters whose decisions were passed along the chain may also be unaware that their votes have been nullified, worsening the effect of the abstention.




Figure 2.3: Delegation chain ending in abstention: A delegates to B, B to C. C abstains, causing the votes of A and B to be lost.

## Super-Voters




Figure 2.4: Super-voter: A delegates to B, B to C. No matter which vote D or E cast, C's vote will always determine the outcome as it has a weight of 3.

In liquid democracy, a *super-voter* is a user who receives a large number of delegations, thereby accumulating significant voting power (Kling et al., 2015). While such concentration may arise from genuine trust, it risks creating imbalances that contradict the egalitarian goals of the system. Super-voters effectively act as unelected representatives – potentially swaying results with little accountability.

Even when systems allow voters to revoke delegations at any time, many users may not actively monitor how their vote is used, leading to persistent power structures where a small number of users hold substantial, often unnoticed, influence over outcomes.

For example, in the German Pirate Party's use of LiquidFeedback, some participants became so dominant that their votes carried decree-like weight, even though they were not formally elected (Becker, 2012; Kling et al., 2015). While Kling et al. (2015) observed that these super-voters generally aligned with majority opinion, contributing to system stability rather than distorting it, their disproportionate influence still raises concerns about transparency and the extent to which individual voters retain meaningful control over their vote.

<sup>1</sup>Abstention may be deliberate, with a voter intentionally choosing not to participate, or unintentional, due to lack of awareness of the poll or inability to engage.



This is not confined to traditional political platforms. In decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs), which use token-based voting on blockchains, similar patterns emerge. Hall and Miyazaki (2024) found that in many DAOs, voting power was highly concentrated among a few delegates due to low overall participation. In some cases, such as *Gitcoin*, over 90% of votes cast were controlled by the top five delegates. Although DAOs operate within blockchain environments rather than web platforms like *vodle*, these patterns underline the need for safeguards against disproportionate power accumulation across all liquid democracy systems.

These examples emphasise the importance of delegation mechanisms that can curb excessive power accumulation. Techniques such as weighted delegation and capping the maximum voting power of an individual are essential to preserving fairness, especially in *vodle*, which aims to uphold proportional representation and protect minority voices through its rating aggregation system (see Section 2.4.1).

### 2.1.2 Variations of Liquid Democracy

Several proposed extensions to liquid democracy aim to mitigate the limitations outlined above. While many models offer theoretical advantages, this section focuses on ranked delegation and weighted delegation – two techniques that are not only promising from a fairness and soundness perspective but are also feasible to implement within *vodle*’s existing architecture.

The challenges discussed in the previous section, such as delegation cycles, vote loss due to abstentions, and the emergence of super-voters, highlight inherent vulnerabilities in the standard liquid democracy model. To mitigate these issues, enhancements have been proposed that modify how delegations function. These include techniques that allow voters to specify multiple delegates or distribute their vote to multiple casting voters. Each approach introduces different trade-offs and requires algorithmic support to ensure sound and interpretable outcomes.

The following subsections present several such variations, along with the algorithms that can be used to implement them.

#### Ranked Delegation

Ranked delegation improves liquid democracy by allowing voters to list several trusted delegates in order of preference. Instead of choosing just one delegate, a voter can specify a ranked list so that if their top choice is unavailable (e.g. due to abstention or being a part of a delegation cycle) the system can use the next delegate specified.

Implementing ranked delegation requires a mechanism to decide among multiple possible delegation paths (routes that a vote can take through the delegation graph).

This is done through a *delegation rule*, a function that, given a ranked delegation instance and a delegating voter, selects a unique path leading to a *casting voter* (Brill et al., 2022).

The following key properties help evaluate these delegation rules:

- **Guru Participation:** Ensures that a voter accepting delegated votes (a “guru”) is never worse off by doing so. Receiving additional delegations should not decrease their influence over the final outcome (Kotsialou and Riley, 2020).
- **Confluence:** Guarantees that each delegating voter ends up with one clear and unambiguous delegation path. This property simplifies vote resolution and enhances transparency (Brill et al., 2022).
- **Copy Robustness:** Prevents strategic manipulation where a voter might mimic their delegate’s vote outside the system to gain extra influence. A copy-robust rule makes sure that duplicating a vote externally does not yield more combined power than a proper delegation (Brill et al., 2022; Behrens and Swierczek, 2015).

The literature considers several delegation rules, each with distinct trade-offs:

**Depth-First Delegation (DFD):** Selects the path beginning with the highest-ranked delegate, even if the resulting chain is long. Although it prioritises individual trust preferences, DFD can violate guru participation (Kotsialou and Riley, 2020).

**Breadth-First Delegation (BFD):** Chooses the shortest available delegation path and uses rankings only to resolve ties. This approach usually produces direct, predictable chains and satisfies guru participation, although it might sometimes assign a vote to a lower-ranked delegate (Kotsialou and Riley, 2020; Brill et al., 2022).

**MinSum:** Balances path length and delegation quality by selecting the path with the lowest total sum of edge ranks. Due to this, MinSum avoids both unnecessarily long chains and poorly ranked delegations (Brill et al., 2022).

**Diffusion:** Constructs delegation paths in stages by assigning votes layer by layer based on the lowest available rank at each step. This method tends to avoid poor delegations but can sometimes produce unintuitive outcomes due to its tie-breaking procedure (Brill et al., 2022).

**Leximax:** Compares paths based on their worst-ranked edge. This ensures that especially low-ranked delegations are avoided early in the path while maintaining confluence (Brill et al., 2022).

**BordaBranching:** Takes a global view of the delegation graph by selecting a branching that minimises the total rank across all delegation edges. It satisfies both guru

participation and copy robustness, though it is more computationally intensive (Brill et al., 2022).

In summary, ranked delegation enhances liquid democracy by reducing the risk of lost votes. The choice of delegation rule not only affects system efficiency but also influences fairness and robustness. While simpler methods such as DFD and BFD are easier to implement, advanced rules like MinSum, Leximax, and BordaBranching offer stronger guarantees and are better suited for practical deployment in platforms such as vodle.

Based on these considerations, the project adopts the MinSum rule. It offers a clear trade-off between delegation quality, computational efficiency, and user interpretability, making it well-suited for deployment within vodle. By selecting the path with the lowest total rank sum, MinSum prioritises higher-ranked delegates while avoiding unnecessarily long or indirect chains. This supports user trust and clarity by ensuring that final delegation paths reflect stated preferences in an understandable way.

## Weighted Delegation

Traditional delegation systems require voters to entrust their entire vote to a single delegate, creating risks such as vote loss or excessive concentration of power. Weighted delegation addresses these issues by allowing voters to divide their voting weight among multiple trusted individuals.

Weighted delegation offers several key advantages:

- **Increased resilience:** Distributing votes across multiple delegates mitigates the effect of abstentions by individual delegates.
- **Reduced concentration of power:** Allowing partial votes to different delegates decreases the likelihood of any single delegate becoming a super-voter.
- **Enhanced voter expression:** Voters can more precisely express their preferences and trust levels by allocating voting power proportionally to multiple individuals.

Several methodologies for implementing weighted delegation have been explored in the literature, each with its strengths and weaknesses:

### Equal Vote Distribution (Degrave, 2014)

Degreve's Equal Vote Distribution model offers a simple and intuitive approach but comes with significant limitations. In this system, voters must distribute their entire

vote evenly among a selected group of delegates (not including those that abstain), without the ability to assign differing trust levels. Crucially, voters cannot allocate any portion of their vote to themselves: they must either delegate their full voting power or retain it entirely, severely limiting personal control. While Equal Vote Distribution is easy to implement and reduces the impact of delegate abstentions, its rigidity makes it unsuitable for systems like vodle that prioritise nuanced voter autonomy and trust expression.

### **Fractional Delegation (Bersetché, 2024)**

Bersetché proposes a generalisation of liquid democracy in which voters are allowed to divide their voting weight arbitrarily among multiple delegates, while optionally retaining a fraction for themselves. Each agent expresses their preferences through a delegation matrix, where each entry specifies the proportion of voting weight delegated to a given individual. This approach enables a more flexible expression of trust relationships compared to classical single-delegation models.

To ensure the system remains stable and to prevent cases such as delegation cycles, Bersetché introduces an artificial agent, referred to as agent  $n + 1$ . Every delegation path carries a small probability ( $\epsilon$ ) of transferring the voting weight to this agent. This mechanism ensures that votes trapped in delegation cycles or excessively long chains are eventually absorbed, preventing them from destabilising the voting process. In the limit as  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ , the model approximates the classical behaviour of liquid democracy without losses, but with  $\epsilon > 0$ , it guarantees the existence of equilibrium states.

Votes absorbed by agent  $n + 1$  are effectively considered lost. As a result, users who delegate without ultimately terminating in a direct voter may see a fraction of their influence dissipate. This diverges from standard liquid democracy approaches, where all delegated votes are ultimately assumed to participate in the outcome.

Overall, fractional delegation as formalised by Bersetché retains desirable properties such as self-selection, delegation consistency, and conservation of total voting weight (accounting for losses), while enabling more expressive delegation structures and guaranteeing equilibrium under mild conditions.

### **Trust Matrix Model (proposed by Heitzig)**

The Trust Matrix Model offers the most expressive form of weighted delegation but at the cost of substantial computational and usability complexity. By allowing voters to assign fine-grained trust values to multiple delegates (including themselves), it captures highly nuanced voting preferences. However, the iterative computation process to resolve final effective ratings can become resource-intensive, especially in densely

connected networks, and may challenge user understanding due to the complexity of maintaining trust matrices. Nonetheless, this model aligns closely with vodle's emphasis on user autonomy and flexible participation, making it the most powerful option among weighted delegation strategies.

Let  $\text{rating}_{i,x}$  denote the direct rating that voter  $i$  assigns to option  $x$ , and  $\text{eff}_{i,x}$  denote their final effective rating. Then,  $\text{eff}_{i,x}$  can be defined as a combination of the voter's own rating and the effective ratings of their delegates, determined by the trust levels specified:

$$\text{eff}_{i,x} = \text{trust}_{i,i} \cdot \text{rating}_{i,x} + \sum_{j \neq i} \text{trust}_{i,j} \cdot \text{eff}_{j,x} \quad (2.1)$$

Each voter's trust values must sum to exactly 1:

$$\sum_j \text{trust}_{i,j} = 1$$

The computation proceeds iteratively, with the effective ratings updated at each step based on the current estimates of delegates' effective ratings. This process continues until there is no longer a change in the effective ratings. Convergence is guaranteed when each voter has some non-zero self-trust ( $\text{trust}_{i,i} > 0$ ), as the system then forms a contraction mapping and Banach's fixed point theorem applies.

This model offers the highest granularity and flexibility, allowing voters to finely express confidence across multiple delegates per option. However, it also introduces significant computational overhead and may scale poorly in densely connected delegation graphs. Additionally, users may find it difficult to understand or maintain trust matrices of this complexity, raising potential usability concerns in real-world systems.

### Summary of Approaches

- **Equal Vote Distribution (Degrave)** excels in simplicity and ease of implementation, ensuring robustness through straightforward delegation. However, it significantly limits voter expression and prohibits voters from allocating votes to themselves.
- **Fractional Delegation (Bersette)** provides greater flexibility, permitting detailed voter preference expression, including self-allocation of votes. This method increases both computational complexity and interface complexity.
- **Trust Matrix Model** offers the highest expressivity and detail in delegation relationships, capturing complex trust dynamics. However, this method entails

substantial computational overhead and introduces complexity in terms of usability and understanding for voters.

Each weighted-delegation method balances voter expressivity, computational complexity, and ease of implementation differently. After evaluating these trade-offs, this project selects the trust matrix model for its high expressiveness and compatibility with votle’s principles of autonomy and transparency. While more computationally intensive, it captures nuanced trust relationships and enables fine-grained participation – both essential for resilient, inclusive decision-making at scale.

## 2.2 Existing Implementations of Liquid Democracy

Having reviewed the theoretical background and proposed extensions to liquid democracy, this section explores real-world systems, examining two major implementations – LiquidFeedback and Google Votes – that offer valuable insights into the technical, social, and usability challenges of applying liquid democracy at scale.

### 2.2.1 LiquidFeedback

LiquidFeedback is one of the earliest and most influential real-world implementations of liquid democracy. Developed as an open-source platform, it was notably adopted by the German Pirate Party in 2010 to facilitate internal policy-making through online participation (Behrens et al., 2014). The platform allowed members to submit proposals, debate them in structured phases, and vote either directly or via transitive delegation.

In LiquidFeedback, users could choose different delegates for different topics, allowing them to assign their vote to someone they trusted on a specific issue. These choices remained in place until the user changed them, which meant that certain individuals could gradually accumulate more influence if others did not update their delegations. When multiple proposals were put forward, the system used a ranking-based voting method (the Schulze method) to decide which one should win. The Schulze method compares proposals in head-to-head matchups and identifies the option with the strongest overall support, even considering indirect chains of preference. This helped ensure that the winning proposal was broadly supported across the electorate. Importantly, LiquidFeedback only accepted a proposal if it clearly beat the default option of doing nothing, helping to avoid unnecessary or unpopular changes.

In practice, the Pirate Party’s use of LiquidFeedback revealed several key dynamics relevant to this project. The platform was successful in enabling large-scale particip-

ation and crowdsourced policy formation, but it also demonstrated common risks of liquid democracy, such as the existence of super-voters(as discussed previously).

Another practical issue was the complexity of the system. LiquidFeedback was difficult to understand, especially for users unfamiliar with concepts such as transitive delegation or multi-stage voting, which limited its accessibility and contributed to declining engagement over time (Kling et al., 2015).

For a platform like vodle, the experience of LiquidFeedback highlights several important design considerations. First, user interfaces must be intuitive enough to allow voters to participate without needing deep technical knowledge. Second, the user must know the status of their delegation at a glance - improving the understanding of the platform. Finally, ensuring that votes lead to visible and actionable outcomes is critical for maintaining user engagement.

### **2.2.2 Google Votes**

Google Votes was an internal experiment at Google designed to explore the practical application of liquid democracy within a corporate environment. Built on top of the company's internal Google+ social network, it operated between 2012 and 2015 and allowed employees to participate in decision making by either voting directly or delegating their vote to a colleague (Hardt and Lopes, 2015).

Delegations in Google Votes were category-specific, meaning that users could choose different delegates for different areas of interest, such as food, events, or technical infrastructure. These delegations were persistent but could be overridden at any time, giving users flexibility to either rely on trusted experts or vote independently as needed. The system supported transitive delegation and allowed users to reclaim control by casting their own vote, even after delegating.

Figure 2.5 shows the user interface of Google Votes, highlighting how delegation and voting transparency were presented to users




Figure 2.5: Screenshot taken from Hardt and Lopes (2015) showing the user interface of Google Votes.

The platform placed strong emphasis on usability and transparency. Delegation features were rolled out incrementally, with additional tools such as voting power estimates and delegation advertisements helping users understand their influence. One key design principle was what the authors called the “Golden Rule of Liquid Democracy”: if a user delegates their vote, they should be able to see how it is being used. To accomplish this, users received notifications when their delegate voted, and all votes were visible to the relevant group. This encouraged accountability and gave voters confidence that their delegated votes were being used appropriately.

While Google Votes was never made publicly available, it served as a successful demonstration of liquid democracy in a structured, real-world setting. It showed that being able to delegate votes could improve engagement and decision making within large organisations, especially when designed with attention to user experience. For vodle, the system provides a concrete example of how features like topic-specific delegation, transparency tools, and real-time voting feedback can make liquid democracy more practical and accessible.



## 2.3 Agent Based Modelling

Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a computational approach used to simulate the actions and interactions of autonomous agents in order to assess their effects on a system as a whole. It is particularly suited for exploring complex, dynamic systems where behaviour emerges from local interactions between individual entities (agents) rather than being dictated by central control. ABM has been widely applied in domains such as economics, sociology, and ecology to study decentralised systems, market dynamics, and collective behaviours (Bonabeau, 2002).

The need to explore ABM arises due to the project's goal of introducing a weighted-delegation mechanism that hasn't been explored before into vodle. Traditional analysis alone may not effectively capture the dynamic interactions or unintended consequences that can emerge from this novel feature. Through ABM, it is possible to simulate realistic voting scenarios, track delegation chains, identify potential power imbalances, and anticipate challenges. These simulations can reveal performance insights and inform design decisions before implementing the mechanisms within the live platform.

Several widely used ABM frameworks exist, each with their own strengths and drawbacks relevant to this project:

- **NetLogo** (Tisue and Wilensky, 2004) is a highly accessible and widely adopted modelling platform known for its user friendly graphical interface and ease of learning. It offers rapid prototyping capabilities and excellent visualisation features, allowing clear communication of results. However, it struggles with very complicated models.
- **Repast** (Collier, 2003) provides a powerful and versatile suite of tools for building large scale, computationally intensive simulations. It supports distributed computing, which is beneficial for extensive delegation networks with potentially thousands of agents. However, Repast has a steep learning curve, which could hinder its compatibility with this heavily time restricted project.
- **Mesa** (Kazil et al., 2020) is an open source framework written in Python and specifically designed for agent based modelling. Its advantage lies in its integration with Python's ecosystem of data science libraries. Simulations built with Mesa can easily make use of tools such as NumPy and pandas for efficient data processing, and Matplotlib or Seaborn for visualising model outputs. This compatibility allows for rapid analysis and iteration, while also significantly lowering the learning curve for developers already familiar with Python. Mesa offers a practical balance between usability and computational flexibility, making it well suited for customisable and moderately large simulations.

- **Agents.jl** (Vahdati, 2019) is a high-performance agent-based modelling framework written in Julia. Due to Julia's speed and efficiency, it is suitable for large-scale and computationally demanding simulations. The framework is designed to be user-friendly, with a syntax that is approachable for those familiar with scientific computing. However, the Julia ecosystem is less mature compared to Python's, which may limit the availability of additional libraries and resources. However, this trade off may be acceptable for highly performance driven solutions.

Given the time constraints of this project, Mesa offers a practical and efficient solution. Its Python-based interface and straightforward setup allow for rapid development without the overhead of learning a new framework. This ease of use enables more time to be spent designing meaningful experiments and analysing results, rather than configuring tooling.

## 2.4 Vodle

Having established the broader context of liquid democracy and examined existing systems, this section introduces vodle – the platform into which these mechanisms are integrated. Vodle is a web-based decision-making tool designed to support participatory group processes through interactive polls and transparent aggregation methods. It allows users to rate decision options on a 0-100 scale using sliders, encouraging nuanced input and fostering compromise.

The section outlines vodle's core architecture, including its underlying rating system (MaxParC) and the technologies that support its operation. These technical foundations played a critical role in shaping the design and feasibility of the advanced delegation features developed during this project.

### 2.4.1 MaxParC

MaxParC (Maximum Partial Consensus) is the rating system used in vodle to aggregate user preferences and determine poll outcomes. Introduced by Heitzig et al. (2024), MaxParC was designed to address common limitations of traditional voting systems, particularly the tendency for majority rule to overlook minority preferences. Its goal is to balance fairness, consensus, and efficiency in collective decision making.

In MaxParC, each user rates an option on a scale from 0 to 100. This rating reflects the user's willingness to approve that option based on how many other users also support it. Specifically, a rating of  $x$  means that the voter will approve the option if

fewer than  $x\%$  of participants disapprove. A rating of 0 means the option is never approved, while 100 means it is always approved regardless of others' opinions. This structure transforms a simple rating into a conditional approval, allowing for a more nuanced expression of preferences with the potential for compromise.




Figure 2.6: Visual representation of MaxParC from the perspective of a voter (Alice). Ratings represent conditional approval thresholds. An option is counted as approved by Alice if the approval bar (light grey) overlaps with her rating needle. Graphic from Heitzig et al. (2024).

Understanding how MaxParC processes ratings is essential for this project, as the proposed weighted delegation mechanism must operate within its conditional approval framework. When a user splits their vote among multiple delegates, the system must ensure that their own rating continues to contribute appropriately. Specifically, if a user delegates  $x\%$  of their rating to others, their final rating must not fall below  $(100 - x)\%$  of their original input. This constraint guarantees that the user's approval remains proportionally represented, even when part of their voting power is passed on to others.

Integrating liquid democracy into vodle therefore requires careful design to align with MaxParC's logic, ensuring both technical compatibility and conceptual consistency.

## 2.4.2 Technical Architecture and Implementation Constraints

Understanding vodle's technology stack is crucial for the successful integration of liquid democracy features into the platform. As the project adds complex delegation and voting logic, it is important to understand the technological constraints of vodle, which directly influence design and implementation choices.

## Angular

Vodle is built with Angular (Angular Team, 2024), a TypeScript-based frontend framework created by Google. Angular’s modularity and structured component system provide a strong foundation for incremental development, essential when introducing new features such as ranked delegation that build upon existing components. Its clear separation of concerns helps maintain readable and maintainable code, simplifying debugging and future enhancements – particularly beneficial given the expected growth in delegation logic complexity during the project.

## Ionic Framework

The Ionic (Ionic Team, 2024) framework complements Angular by enabling the creation of responsive, mobile-compatible applications from a single codebase. Given vodle’s goal of broad user participation, Ionic ensures consistent functionality across both desktop and mobile devices. New delegation features must integrate seamlessly with the existing Ionic framework to ensure usability and visual appeal across platforms, including mobile devices.

## CouchDB

CouchDB (Apache CouchDB Project, 2024) is vodle’s primary database, communicating directly with the client through HTTP requests without a dedicated backend. This architecture places significant computational responsibilities on the client-side Angular application, including the handling of delegation chains, cycle detection, and the computation of final vote outcomes. Furthermore, as CouchDB stores data exclusively as JSON documents, complex delegation structures and voting relationships must be serialised and deserialised on the client side.

The lack of server-side computation means the delegation algorithms must be designed with client-side efficiency in mind, ensuring performance remains acceptable even as delegation complexity increases. Thus, the choice of algorithms for liquid democracy features, such as those to resolve conflicting delegation paths, is directly influenced by CouchDB’s architectural constraints.

These technological considerations (covered in more detail in Section 4.1) strongly shaped the practical implementation of liquid democracy in vodle. They necessitated a focus on efficient client-side logic as well as careful management of data flow.

### 2.4.3 Partially Implemented Delegation in Vodle

At the start of the project, vodle contained a partially implemented, currently disabled delegation system. Although never deployed in a working state, this prototype included an invitation-based mechanism for initiating delegations and early user interface components to support the feature.

However, the implementation lacked several core features required for wide-scale deployment. Most notably, it failed to reliably detect or prevent delegation cycles. Since delegation graphs were stored only in each user's local memory, clients could have inconsistent views of the system. This meant that delegation actions appearing valid on one browser could later form cycles as other users updated their delegations, compromising system reliability.

These initial limitations – especially the absence of consistent cycle prevention and consistent delegation states – defined the key technical challenges addressed during the system redesign, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

## 2.5 Summary

The background research presented in this chapter has provided the necessary foundation for designing and implementing advanced delegation features within vodle. It highlighted critical limitations in traditional liquid democracy systems, including delegation cycles, abstention risks, and the disproportionate influence of super-voters.

In response, several promising delegation strategies were identified, with particular emphasis on ranked and weighted delegation. Ranked delegation was found to be an effective method for reducing the risk of lost votes, with the MinSum delegation rule offering a strong balance between efficiency, interpretability, and fairness.

Weighted delegation emerged as a valuable strategy for enhancing voter flexibility by allowing influence to be distributed across multiple trusted delegates. Practical experiences from systems such as Google Votes further supported the value of topic-specific delegation, where assigning different delegates for different decision areas improved engagement and representation accuracy.

Among the weighted delegation methods explored, the trust matrix model stood out for its expressiveness and alignment with vodle's principles of user autonomy and flexible participation. By allowing voters to articulate nuanced trust relationships across multiple delegates – including themselves – the model offers a compelling balance between representation quality and individual control.

Although more computationally intensive than simpler approaches, the trust matrix model presents a viable strategy for implementing robust weighted delegation within

a real-time voting system. The technological constraints of vodle itself, particularly the reliance on client-side processing through CouchDB, further emphasised the need for efficient, lightweight implementation strategies.

Together, these insights define the objectives and requirements addressed in the next stage of the project. The following chapter formalises these design goals and describes the development of a fully integrated liquid democracy system within vodle.

## Chapter 3

# Project Objectives

This chapter defines the objectives of the project. Based on the challenges and needs identified during background research (Chapter 2), the objectives address both technical limitations in vodle's existing delegation system and theoretical concerns with liquid democracy models.

Objectives are divided into two categories:

- **Core Objectives** – Mandatory goals that are essential to delivering a functional, improved delegation system in vodle.
- **Extension Objective** – A stretch goal intended to provide additional insights if time allows (see and Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 for details).

Each objective is broken down into specific functional and non-functional requirements to ensure measurability and verifiability. These requirements provide a structured framework for implementation and evaluation.

### 3.1 Core Objectives (Mandatory)

1. **Implement a Core Delegation Model into vodle:** Build a fully functional, cycle-safe delegation system, addressing the challenges of cycle prevention and transitive delegation (identified in Section 2.4.3).
2. **Implement Ranked Delegation into vodle:** Extend the system to allow users to specify multiple backup delegates, mitigating vote loss due to unavailable delegates (motivated by issues discussed in Section 2.1.2).
3. **Implement Weighted Delegation into vodle:** Enable fractional delegation to multiple delegates using the trust matrix model (see Section 2.1.2).

4. **Implement Per-Option Delegation:** Allow users to delegate different options to different delegates within the same poll, enhancing voter flexibility (inspired by Google Votes; see Section 2.2.2).

## 3.2 Extension Objective (Optional)

1. **Simulate Delegation Mechanisms:** Develop an agent-based modelling (ABM) simulation to evaluate the performance and robustness of different delegation mechanisms.

## 3.3 Project Requirements

The following functional (F) and non-functional (NF) requirements operationalise the project objectives. Each requirement is stated to be specific, measurable, and testable, enabling systematic verification against the project goals.

### 3.3.1 Requirements for Core Objective 1: Core Delegation Model

#### Functional Requirements

- **FR1.1:** The system shall allow users to invite others to act as delegates.
- **FR1.2:** Invited users shall be able to accept or decline delegation requests.
- **FR1.3:** Users shall be prevented from accepting their own delegation invitations.
- **FR1.4:** The system shall detect and prevent cyclic delegations.
- **FR1.5:** Users shall be able to view and revoke existing delegations.
- **FR1.6:** Delegations shall be resolved transitively to ensure accurate final vote attribution.
- **FR1.7:** Users shall be able to override their delegation by submitting direct votes.

#### Non-Functional Requirements

- **NFR1.1:** Delegation data shall be stored in JSON format for compatibility with vodle's CouchDB backend.
- **NFR1.2:** Database schema changes must be backward compatible.



- **NFR1.3:** Users' voting and delegation choices shall remain private.
- **NFR1.4:** The delegation interface shall be intuitive and accessible.

### 3.3.2 Requirements for Core Objective 2: Ranked Delegation

#### Functional Requirements

- **FR2.1:** Users shall be able to specify up to three ranked delegates per poll.
- **FR2.2:** The MinSum rule shall be applied to resolve delegation paths.
- **FR2.3:** Users shall be able to override ranked delegations by direct voting.
- **FR2.4:** Users shall be able to modify or revoke ranked delegation preferences.

#### Non-Functional Requirements

- **NFR2.1:** Ranked delegation data shall be stored in a JSON-compatible format.
- **NFR2.2:** The user interface for ranked delegation shall be clear and user-friendly.

### 3.3.3 Requirements for Core Objective 3: Weighted Delegation

#### Functional Requirements

- **FR3.1:** Users shall be able to assign fractional votes to multiple delegates, ensuring the total weight does not exceed 0.99.
- **FR3.2:** Final vote weights shall be calculated using the trust matrix model.

#### Non-Functional Requirements

- **NFR3.1:** Weighted delegation calculations shall occur client-side.
- **NFR3.2:** Data shall be stored as JSON to maintain CouchDB compatibility.
- **NFR3.3:** The weighted delegation UI shall provide intuitive controls (e.g., sliders) for assigning weights.

### 3.3.4 Requirements for Core Objective 4: Per-Option Delegation

#### Functional Requirements

- **FR4.1:** Users shall be able to assign different delegates for different poll options.
- **FR4.2:** Delegation resolution shall be performed independently for each option.
- **FR4.3:** Users shall be able to override per-option delegations with direct votes.
- **FR4.4:** Users shall be able to view and manage per-option delegations easily.

#### Non-Functional Requirements

- **NFR4.1:** Per-option delegation data shall be stored in JSON format.
- **NFR4.2:** The user interface shall clearly show assigned delegates per option.

### 3.3.5 Requirements for Extension Objective: Simulate Delegation Mechanisms

#### Functional Requirements

- **FR5.1:** The simulation system shall model agents capable of voting, abstaining, or delegating.
- **FR5.2:** Simulations shall support core, ranked, and weighted delegation modes.
- **FR5.3:** Key parameters (number of agents, delegation probability, abstention rates) shall be configurable.
- **FR5.4:** Metrics such as super-voter concentration, delegation chain length, and vote loss shall be recorded.
- **FR5.5:** Simulation results shall be exportable in CSV or JSON format.

#### Non-Functional Requirements

- **NFR5.1:** The simulation shall be lightweight and extensible.
- **NFR5.2:** Mesa shall be used as the agent-based modelling framework.
- **NFR5.3:** Simulations shall be reproducible with fixed random seeds.

## Chapter 4

# Design and Implementation

This chapter describes the design decisions and implementation work undertaken to meet the core objectives of the project. Each section focuses on a major delegation mechanism introduced into vodle. These include: a core delegation model providing global consistency and cycle prevention; ranked delegation allowing users to specify backup preferences; per-option delegation enabling different delegates for different poll options; and weighted delegation allowing fractional trust-based voting.

Due to the distinct design goals of each delegation mechanism, they were developed as separate modes rather than fully interoperable features. When creating a poll, users must select a single delegation mode – standard delegation, ranked delegation, weighted delegation, or per-option delegation – which then determines the available delegation features during voting.

This separation also reflects the project’s longer-term intention: in the final version of vodle, only one delegation mechanism will be retained (see Chapter 8 for more details). Exploring multiple modes in the development environment allowed evaluation of different approaches, but mixing modes within a single poll was deliberately avoided. Allowing poll creators to combine delegation features could introduce bias by letting them selectively favour mechanisms advantageous to themselves. By enforcing a single, consistent delegation mode per poll, vodle preserves fairness and neutrality.

The design and implementation challenges for each mechanism are presented in turn, followed by a summary of how they were integrated into vodle’s architecture.

### 4.1 System Architecture Overview

Vodle is built as a serverless web application that emphasises accessibility, client-side performance, and ease of deployment. Its architecture comprises two components:

1. **Frontend:** Implemented using Angular and the Ionic framework, the frontend provides a responsive and modular interface that works across both desktop and mobile devices. The use of Angular facilitates the creation of component-based user interfaces, essential for introducing interactive features such as the ranked delegation UI and weighted delegation sliders.
2. **Backend:** Vodle uses CouchDB as its database. There is no custom backend logic or middleware instead, the frontend application communicates directly with CouchDB over HTTP.

## Implications of This Architecture

This architecture has several implications for the design and implementation of the delegation mechanisms. These arise especially due to the absence of a traditional data processing backend. The following points summarise the key considerations:

- All vote delegation logic, including transitive resolution, cycle detection, and weighted delegation calculations, must be executed in the browser, placing constraints on performance and requires careful optimisation of algorithms used.
- CouchDB's document-based storage model means that all data must be serialised and deserialised in JSON format. This affects how data structures are designed and manipulated, as well as how they are stored and retrieved from the database.

## Write Validation and Constraints

CouchDB enforces document-level security: users may only modify their own documents, and core artefacts (such as `poll.json` and `results`) are immutable once created. All updates must replace the full document in a single operation, with no support for merging concurrent changes.

This model simplifies validation logic, but it also imposes important constraints on implementing liquid democracy features. In particular, updating delegations or splitting votes requires replacing a user's entire vote document in a single, atomic write. This means that incremental updates (e.g., adjusting part of a delegation tree or partially reassigning vote weights) are not possible; the client must construct and submit a complete new version of the user's voting data each time. These constraints influenced both the design of weighted-delegation algorithms and the structure of delegation management within vodle.

### 4.1.1 Summary of Storage and Validation Constraints

The architecture of vodle, particularly its reliance on CouchDB and the absence of a custom backend, imposes important constraints on how delegation features are designed and implemented.

- **User autonomy is strictly enforced.** Each user can only modify documents that are explicitly associated with their own identity. This guarantees that vote and delegation data cannot be tampered with by other clients but also eliminates the possibility of directly setting or managing another user's vote.
- **Issues with sharing a document.** The current database design does not support the modification of a single document by multiple users. As a result, features that require a global view – such as a delegation graph – require a rework of the database schema.
- **Validation logic is structural, not contextual.** Since CouchDB validation functions can only inspect the document being written, they cannot reason about relationships across documents. This prohibits logic such as resolving delegations server-side, enforcing uniqueness of votes, or validating delegation cycles at the point of write.
- **Client-side logic carries the burden.** Due to the previous point, all logic for delegation resolution, cycle checking, and weighted delegation must be implemented in the client. This requires careful design to ensure that the frontend can handle complex delegation scenarios without overwhelming the user or causing performance issues.

Together, these constraints shape some of the design and implementation choices of the delegation features in vodle, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

## 4.2 Implement a Core Delegation Model into vodle

In order to provide a reliable foundation for liquid democracy within vodle, the core delegation model was redesigned to ensure consistent, cycle-free delegation across all users. The new system addresses the critical flaws of the previous implementation by maintaining a global view of the delegation graph and enforcing delegation validation at the moment of acceptance. Delegations are initiated through explicit invitation links, preserving user autonomy, and direct votes override delegations on a per-option basis. These improvements ensure that delegation relationships are robust, transparent, and correctly resolved across all clients.

### 4.2.1 Limitations of the Pre-existing Implementation

Prior to the inception of this project, vodle included a partially implemented delegation system. Although disabled due to critical flaws, the system introduced several foundational ideas and structures that influenced the final design. This section introduces the key data structures used in the original model, explains the intended delegation flow, and analyses why a redesign was necessary.

#### Delegation Maps

The delegation mechanism relied on several maps to track how votes were delegated and resolved. These maps were stored and updated locally on each client:

- **direct\_delegation\_map**: This map recorded direct delegation relationships. For each option ID (`oid`), it stored a mapping from voter IDs to the user they directly delegated to.
- **effective\_delegation\_map**: This map stored the final casting voter for each user by resolving the full transitive chain of delegations. For example, if user A delegated to user B and user B delegated to user C, the effective delegate of user A was user C.
- **inv\_effective\_delegation\_map**: The inverse of the effective map. For each user, it stored the set of voters whose votes were ultimately counted under them. This was useful for computing voting weights and for cycle detection.

Each map was maintained locally by the browser and not synchronised consistently across clients. This made the correctness of delegation state dependent on each user's local view.

#### Delegation Flow

Delegation in vodle followed an explicit, link-based invitation model:

1. A user (the delegator) generated a delegation ID (DID), created a key pair, and constructed a `del_request` object specifying the options to delegate.
2. A magic link containing this information was shared with the intended delegate.
3. The delegate could accept or reject the invitation. If accepted, a signed `del_response` was created, completing the delegation handshake.

4. Once accepted, a `del_agreement` object was created and cached by both parties. This structure tracked which options were accepted and which were currently active.

This invitation model upheld user autonomy: users could not be delegated to without their explicit consent. Delegation could also be revoked at any time and overridden on a per-option basis.




Figure 4.1: Sequence for a delegation to be initiated. User A shares a link with user B, who accepts the delegation.




Figure 4.2: Sequence for a rejected delegation. User A shares a delegation link with user B, who rejects the delegation.

### Cycle Detection Failures

The main flaw in the system was its inability to reliably prevent delegation cycles. A cycle occurs when a user indirectly delegates back to themselves, such as in the sequence  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$ . In such cases, the vote becomes trapped and is not cast.

Clients attempted to detect cycles during the delegation acceptance phase by examining local delegation maps. A typical check would confirm whether the proposed delegate was already an effective delegate of the user. If so, the client marked the request as cyclic and blocked it.

However, because these maps were not always synchronised, different clients could hold conflicting views of the delegation graph. A delegation that passed validation on one device might cause a cycle once accepted, or be silently invalidated by another. This undermined correctness and made vote resolution unpredictable.

## Summary

The original delegation system implemented many strong conceptual ideas. It preserved user autonomy through an invitation model, allowed for control over which options used the delegated rating, and supported transitive delegation. However, without a global, synchronised delegation graph, the system could not reliably detect cycles or ensure consistent resolution of votes. These limitations made it unsuitable for deployment and motivated a full redesign, described in the next section.

### 4.2.2 Revised Implementation

To address the critical flaws in the original delegation system, a redesigned core delegation model was implemented. The revised system maintains a global, synchronised view of delegation relationships, ensures efficient cycle prevention, and preserves user autonomy through an explicit invitation model. This section details the design decisions, algorithms, and implementation work undertaken.

#### Cycle Checking: Algorithm and Rationale

We can represent delegation relationships as a directed graph, where users are nodes and delegations form directed edges. A valid vote delegation must not introduce cycles in this graph: for example, a sequence such as  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$  would result in all votes becoming trapped, with no final casting voter. Therefore, delegation cycles must be proactively prevented at the time a new delegation is proposed.

A proposed delegation from user  $X$  to user  $Y$  is valid if and only if  $Y$  is not a descendant of  $X$  in the current delegation graph. That is, there must be no existing path from  $Y$  back to  $X$ .

Instead of checking for this condition directly using a depth-first search (DFS) or breadth-first search (BFS), a more efficient approach is to maintain a list of all descendants for each user. This allows us to check if  $Y$  is in the list of descendants of  $X$  in constant time. Cycle checking is performed when a delegation link is opened, because it is only at that point that the system knows the identity of the intended delegate, as any user could theoretically click on the link.

If a cycle is detected during delegation acceptance, the system blocks the delegation from being accepted whilst explaining why to the user (see Figure 4.3).



Act as delegate?

---

User C asks you to act as their delegate in the poll "Example Poll".

However, your own delegate for this poll has directly or indirectly delegated your waps further to User C. As long as this is the case, you cannot accept this request.

Otherwise, this would create a delegation cycle and vodle would not know whose waps to use.

⊘ DECLINE
✓ ACCEPT

If you would still like to accept the request, please consider revoking your own delegation first and then return here.

→ GO TO POLL

Figure 4.3: User is prevented from accepting a delegation that would create a cycle.

## Implementation Details

Building on the algorithm described above, this section explains how cycle checking and delegation resolution were practically implemented in vodle, including the key data structures and user interface workflows.

The descendant sets used for cycle checking are accessed through a hashmap referred to as the `inverse_indirect_map` in the code, which is synchronised across all clients to ensure consistent delegation resolution. Each entry in the `inverse_indirect_map` has the following structure:

- **Key:** a user ID representing a delegate.
- **Value:** a set of user IDs representing all users (both direct and indirect) who have delegated to the user identified by the key.

Suppose the following delegations exist:

- A delegates to B
- B delegates to C
- C delegates to D

The resulting `inverse_indirect_map` is:

```
inverse_indirect_map = {
  "B": {"A"},
  "C": {"B", "A"},
  "D": {"C", "B", "A"}
}
```

Whenever a user modifies the `inverse_indirect_map` (for example, by accepting or revoking a delegation), the updated map is serialised into JSON and pushed to the CouchDB database. Other clients then pull and de-serialise the latest version, ensuring that all users maintain a consistent and up-to-date view of the global delegation graph.

This map enables several key operations required for maintaining a consistent and cycle-free delegation graph:

- **Check Delegation Validity:** To determine whether a delegation  $X \rightarrow Y$  would create a cycle, the system checks if  $Y$  already appears in the set of descendants of  $X$ . If so, the new delegation is invalid. This check takes  $O(1)$  time.

```
const inverse_indirect_map =
  ↪ this.G.D.get_inverse_indirect_map(pid);
const descendant_set = inverse_indirect_map.get(delegate_vid);
if (descendant_set.has(myvid)) {
  cycle = true;
}
```

Figure 4.4: Code for checking if a delegation is valid.

- **Add Delegation Edge:** When a new delegation  $X \rightarrow Y$  is accepted, the system must ensure that the descendant relationship is updated consistently. Specifically, for  $Y$  and every user  $u$  such that  $Y \in \text{desc}(u)$ , their descendants must be updated to include both  $X$  and all of  $X$ 's current descendants.

$$\forall u \text{ such that } Y \in \text{desc}(u) \cup \{Y\}, \quad \text{desc}(u) \leftarrow \text{desc}(u) \cup \{X\} \cup \text{desc}(X)$$

- **Remove Delegation Edge:** When a delegation  $X \rightarrow Y$  is removed, the system must ensure that the descendant relationship is updated consistently. Specifically, for  $Y$  and every user  $u$  such that  $Y \in \text{desc}(u)$ , their descendants must be updated to remove both  $X$  and all of  $X$ 's current descendants.

$$\forall u \text{ such that } Y \in \text{desc}(u) \cup \{Y\}, \quad \text{desc}(u) \leftarrow \text{desc}(u) \setminus (\{X\} \cup \text{desc}(X))$$

## Overriding Delegated Vote

The original vodle implementation included basic support for per-option overriding of delegated votes: when a user had active delegations, a banner such as “B controls some of your waps as your delegate” was displayed, and users could manually toggle between using their delegate’s rating or submitting their own per poll option. However, the existing override functionality was inconsistent and often failed to

update the UI correctly when delegation states changed. As part of this project, the override system was revised and extended to integrate reliably with the redesigned core delegation model, as well as the new ranked, weighted, and per-option delegation mechanisms developed during this project.

The toggle for each poll option was backed by the `rate_yourself_toggle[option_id]` array. When set to true, the user's own rating was applied; otherwise, the delegated rating was used. The number of options under delegation was tracked using the following logic:

```
n_delegated = 0;
for (const oid of this.p.oids) {
  if (!this.rate_yourself_toggle[oid]) {
    n_delegated++;
  }
}
```

This allowed the banner text to dynamically reflect the delegation status, by setting the appropriate translation key depending on how many options were still delegated:

```
const all_most_some_none = n_delegated === this.p.oids.length ? 'all' : 2
  → * n_delegated > this.p.oids.length ? 'most' : n_delegated > 0 ?
  → 'some' : 'none';

delegate_controls_string = 'poll.delegate-controls-' +
  → all_most_some_none;
```

The user interface provided a clear visual distinction: when a user toggled to “my own,” their individual rating immediately replaced any delegated rating for that option. Otherwise, the delegate’s rating continued to apply.



Figure 4.5: User interface after delegating: users can selectively submit their own ratings instead of accepting delegated ratings. Additionally, pressing the trash can icon on the yellow banner allows them to revoke their delegation.

Overall, this mechanism ensured that delegation never prevented individual user agency, aligning with vodle’s principle of retaining user control at all stages of the voting process.

### 4.2.3 Summary

The core delegation model successfully replaced the original, flawed system by introducing a global, synchronised delegation graph. Cycle prevention was enforced through an efficient descendant tracking mechanism, allowing constant-time validation of new delegations. Transitive delegation and per-option overrides were preserved, ensuring that users maintain control over their votes while guaranteeing consistent resolution across all clients.

## 4.3 Implement Ranked Delegation into Vodle

To enhance the resilience of delegation relationships and reduce the risk of vote loss, ranked delegation was introduced. This extension allows users to specify multiple trusted delegates in a preferred order, ensuring that their vote remains effective even if their primary delegate abstains or becomes part of a delegation cycle. Ranked delegation is resolved according to the MinSum rule, striking a balance between favouring the most preferred available delegate and shortest path.

The implementation of ranked delegation in vodle is as follows: each user may specify a ranked list of up to three delegates for a given poll. These preferences are evaluated using the MinSum delegation rule (see Section 2.1.2), which selects the delegation path with the lowest cumulative rank cost. This ensures that the system respects the user’s stated preferences as closely as possible, while avoiding unnecessarily long or indirect delegation chains.

### 4.3.1 Data Structures

Each voter’s ranked delegates are stored in the `direct_delegation_map`, which maps a user ID to a list of delegation entries. Each entry is a triple:

`[delegate_id, rank, status]`

where:

- `delegate_id` uniquely identifies a delegation.

- rank is the position in the ranking (1 = most preferred).
- status indicates whether the delegation is accepted (1), pending (0), rejected (0), or active (2).

This new map was necessary because the existing `inverse_indirect_map`, used for cycle detection, only tracked resolved descendant relationships and did not retain information about alternative, unused delegations. Ranked delegation, by contrast, required maintaining multiple potential delegates per user, their relative preferences, and their acceptance statuses.

For example, if only User A has delegated and they rank User B first, User C second, and User D third, and B and C accept the delegation while D does not respond, the resulting map is:

```
direct_delegation_map = {
  "A": [["B", 1, 2], ["C", 2, 1], ["D", 3, 0]]
}
```

Figure 4.6: Example of a `direct_delegation_map` entry for ranked delegation. B is marked as active as the path  $A \rightarrow B$  has the lowest total sum of ranks.

### 4.3.2 Delegation Resolution Using MinSum

Whenever a delegation is accepted, rejected, or revoked, all resolution paths must be recomputed using the MinSum rule. This ensures that each user's vote flows through the most preferred available delegate, while maintaining consistency across all clients.

The MinSum algorithm proceeds in three main stages:

1. All reachable paths from each voter to a casting voter are generated by traversing the delegation graph. Only delegates with accepted status are considered.
2. Each edge in a path is assigned a cost equal to the delegate's rank (1, 2, or 3).
3. The path with the lowest total rank sum is selected.

#### 1. Collecting all valid paths and preventing cycles

Delegation paths are constructed via a depth-first search (DFS), beginning from each delegating user and only traversing accepted delegations.

Cycle prevention is handled implicitly during traversal: before iterating further, the function checks whether the proposed delegate has already been seen in the current path. If so, that path is skipped.

```

private find_all_paths(pid: string, vid: string, current_path: string[], paths:
→ string[][] ) {
  const dm = this.G.D.get_direct_delegation_map(pid);
  for (const [did, _, active] of dm.get(vid) || []) {
    if (active === '0') continue; // skip rejected or pending
    const a = this.get_agreement(pid, did);
    let new_path = [...current_path, did];

    if (this.is_casting_voter(pid, a.delegate_vid)) {
      paths.push(new_path); // path to casting voter found
    } else if (!current_path.includes(did)) { // cycle prevention
      this.find_all_paths(pid, a.delegate_vid, new_path, paths);
    }
  }
}

```

## 2. Selecting the minimal-sum path

Once all valid paths have been gathered, the system computes their total rank cost. The one with the smallest cumulative rank sum is selected.

```

private min_sum(pid: string, vid: string): string[] {
  let paths: string[][] = [];
  this.find_all_paths(pid, vid, [], paths);

  let minSum = Number.MAX_VALUE;
  let bestPath: string[] = [];

  for (const path of paths) {
    let sum = path
      .map(did => this.get_rank_from_did(pid, did)) // maps did to rank
      .reduce((acc, r) => acc + r, 0); // sums the ranks
    if (sum < minSum) {
      minSum = sum;
      bestPath = path;
    }
  }
  return bestPath;
}

```

## 3. Updating delegation statuses atomically

The function `min_sum_all` runs this logic for every delegating user. Once the best path is identified, each edge in that path is marked as active ('2'). Previously active edges that are no longer on any minimal path are demoted to inactive ('1').

If no valid path is found (e.g. due to rejection or cycles), all active statuses are cleared. This ensures that outdated or invalid delegation edges never persist.

```

private min_sum_all(pid: string) {
  const dm = this.G.D.get_direct_delegation_map(pid);
  for (const vid of this.delegating_voters(pid)) {
    const path = this.min_sum(pid, vid);

    for (const did of path) {
      const a = this.get_agreement(pid, did);
      const entries = dm.get(a.client_vid) || [];
      const updated = entries.map(([d, rank, st]) =>
        d === did
        ? [d, rank, '2'] // mark as active
        : (st === '2'
        ? [d, rank, '1'] // demote to inactive if accepted
        : [d, rank, st]) // remain the same (not accepted)
      );
      dm.set(a.client_vid, updated);
    }

    // no paths are found for user
    // -> set each accepted delegation to inactive
    if (path.length === 0) {
      const entries = dm.get(vid) || [];
      entries.forEach(e => { if (e[2] === '2') e[2] = '1'; });
      dm.set(vid, entries);
    }
  }
  this.G.D.set_direct_delegation_map(pid, dm);
}

```

This resolution pipeline ensures that delegation is transitive, preference-aware, and cycle-free, with all updates applied via a single document write to CouchDB.

### 4.3.3 Determining Who is a Casting Voter

In traditional liquid democracy models, participants typically make a fixed decision at the outset: either to vote directly, delegate their vote, or abstain entirely. However, vodle allows users to submit or modify their votes at any time before the poll closes, meaning no final commitment is made until voting ends.

As a result, in our project a casting voter is defined dynamically: any user who has assigned a non-zero rating to at least one option is treated as a casting voter.

This definition is directly motivated by the interpretation of ratings in MaxParC (see Section 2.4.1). In MaxParC, a rating expresses a conditional willingness to approve an option depending on the behaviour of others. Therefore, a non-zero rating of at least one option represents active participation in the poll.

Accordingly, vodle treats any user with a non-zero rating as a valid casting voter in the context of resolving delegation paths. This ensures that delegation chains terminate at users who are actively contributing to consensus, prevents misclassifying participants as abstainers, and aligns delegation resolution with the principles of vodle.

### 4.3.4 Extending the Delegation Invitation Process

The delegation invitation popup from the existing implementation of liquid democracy in vodle was extended to incorporate rank selection. When creating a delegation, users must now select an available rank for the delegate.

The invitation popup dynamically filters available ranks (1, 2, or 3), ensuring that no two delegates are assigned the same rank. If a user has already delegated ranks 1 and 2, only rank 3 remains available for selection. This constraint is enforced directly in the frontend interface.

#### Rank Selection Logic

The following code snippet dynamically filters available ranks when presenting the invitation form:

```
initialise_rank_values() {
  const uid = this.parent.p.myvid;
  const dir_del_map =
    → this.G.D.get_direct_delegation_map(this.parent.pid);
  // get ranks that have already been delegated
  const usedRanks = (dir_del_map.get(uid) || []).map(entry =>
    → Number(entry[1]));

  // create new array from 1..max_delegations
  // then remove all used ranks
  this.rank_options = Array.from({ length:
    → environment.delegation.max_delegations }, (_, i) => i +
    → 1).filter(rank => !usedRanks.includes(rank));

  this.rank = this.rank_options[0];
}
```



Only unused ranks are displayed to the user, avoiding manual validation and maintaining consistency in the delegation graph.





Figure 4.7: Delegation invitation popup showing dynamically filtered rank options. In this case, rank 1 has already been used, so only ranks 2 and 3 are available for selection.

### 4.3.5 Managing and Reordering Delegations


This project also introduced a new user interface for managing existing delegations during an active poll. This work supports functional requirements FR4 (provide users with a clear view of their ranked delegation choices, including the ability to alter their rankings at any time) as specified in the requirements (see Section 3.3.2). Users can view their current delegations, revoke them, or reorder them via drag-and-drop. This interface is provided through an information dialog, as shown in in Figure 4.9 and can be accessed by pressing the information button shown in in Figure 4.8.



Figure 4.8: The information dialog can be accessed by tapping the information icon (second icon from the left) in the delegation info banner.



(a) Initial view of the information dialog showing delegates, ranks, and revoke buttons.



(b) Reordering mode enabled. Users can drag delegates to reorder their ranks and then save.

Figure 4.9: Information dialog for managing and reordering ranked delegations which appears after clicking the information button.

### Drag-and-Drop Reordering Logic

Delegates can be reordered by dragging items in the list. After each reorder event, ranks are automatically reassigned to preserve uniqueness and maintain a sequential order.

The following function handles reordering and rank updates:

```
handle_reorder(event: CustomEvent) {
  const from = event.detail.from;
  const to = event.detail.to;

  const movedItem = this.delegation_list.splice(from, 1)[0];
  this.delegation_list.splice(to, 0, movedItem);

  this.updateRanks();
  event.detail.complete();
}

updateRanks() {
  this.delegation_list.forEach((item, index) => {
    item.rank = index + 1;
  });
}
```

Once reordering is complete, users can confirm their changes by clicking the save button. The following function updates the `direct_delegation_map` with the newly assigned ranks, ensuring the updated order is preserved and consistently applied:

```
reorder_button_clicked() {
  // enables drag and drop
  if (this.reorder_disabled) {
    this.reorder_disabled = false;
    return;
  }

  const ddm = this.G.D.get_direct_delegation_map(this.parent.pid);
  const list = ddm.get(this.parent.p.myvid);

  // update ranks in direct_delegation_map
  for (const entry of list) {
    entry[1] = this.delegation_list.find(x => x.did === entry[0]).rank;
  }

  // order delegations by rank
  list.sort((a, b) => Number(a[1]) - Number(b[1]));
  ddm.set(this.parent.p.myvid, list);

  // save new map in database
  this.G.D.set_direct_delegation_map(this.parent.pid, ddm);

  // trigger re-computation of delegation map.
  this.parent.update_delegation_info();
  this.order_changed = true;
  this.reorder_disabled = true;
}
```

Saving the updated order commits the changes to the local delegation structure and immediately triggers a re-computation of the active delegation paths using the MinSum resolution rule as previously discussed.

### 4.3.6 Summary

Ranked delegation extended the core model by allowing users to specify multiple backup delegates, ranked by trust preference. Using the MinSum rule, the system dynamically selects the delegation path with the lowest cumulative rank cost, ensuring that votes flow through the most preferred available delegates. A new drag-and-drop

interface was introduced to enable users to easily manage and reorder their ranked delegates during an active poll.

## 4.4 Implement Per-Option Delegation

To better reflect the varying expertise and trust relationships that arise across different decision topics, per-option delegation was introduced into vodle. This feature allows users to assign different delegates for individual poll options, providing significantly greater flexibility than poll-wide delegation models.

Supporting per-option delegation required significant changes to vodle's delegation architecture. Both the `direct_delegation_map` and `inverse_indirect_map` were refactored to operate on a per-option basis:

- `direct_delegation_map`: Now maps each `option_id` to a nested map of `user_id` to delegation data:

$$\text{option\_id} \rightarrow \text{user\_id} \rightarrow [\text{delegation\_id}, \text{null}, \text{status}]$$

The `null` placeholder was reserved for compatibility with future extensions, such as storing trust values for weighted delegation.

- `inverse_indirect_map`: Similarly adapted to maintain descendant relationships independently for each option:

$$\text{option\_id} \rightarrow \text{user\_id} \rightarrow \text{list of users who delegate to this user (directly or indirectly)}$$

This restructuring introduced complexity in data storage and serialisation, as CouchDB requires all nested structures to be serialised cleanly into JSON. Careful handling was necessary to ensure that per-option delegation maps could be correctly saved and retrieved without introducing inconsistencies.

Delegation resolution logic was also updated. The same cycle-checking and transitive delegation algorithm described in Section 4.2 was applied independently to each option's delegation graph. Resolving per-option graphs separately ensures that cycles and voting power transfers are correctly handled for each option without cross-interference.

From a user interface perspective, several significant modifications were introduced to support per-option delegation.

### 4.4.1 Displaying Correct Delegate Name




Figure 4.10: User interface after delegating with per-option delegation.

Per-option delegation required updating the system to dynamically retrieve and display the correct delegate's nickname depending on the poll option. This ensures that users are always shown who controls their rating for each option.

The `get_delegate()` function was extended (see below) to support this behaviour. When per-option delegation is enabled, it checks whether an option-specific delegation exists and retrieves the corresponding delegate's nickname.

```
get_delegate(oid?: string) {
  ...
  if (oid) {
    return this.G.Del.get_delegate_nickname(
      this.pid, this.option_delegated.get(oid));
  }
  ...
}
```

Figure 4.10 shows an example of the resulting user interface, where different options display different delegate names as appropriate.

### 4.4.2 Per-Option Selection During Invitation

The delegation invitation screen was extended to allow users to select one or more options when inviting a delegate. To prevent conflicting assignments, only options that the user had not already delegated were shown:

```

this.option_names = [];
this.options_selected = new Set<string>();

for (const id of this.parent.p.oids) {
  if (this.parent.option_delegated.has(id)) {
    if (this.parent.option_delegated.get(id) !== '') {
      continue;
    }
  }
  this.option_names.push({id: id, name: this.parent.p.options[id].name});
  this.options_selected.add(id);
}

```

This dynamic filtering ensured that delegation states remained consistent even when users created multiple delegations in quick succession.





Figure 4.11: Delegation invitation dialog allowing users to select one or more poll options to delegate. Only options without existing delegations are shown.

Enabling selection of multiple options within a single delegation invitation simplified the user experience while preserving the flexibility introduced by per-option control.

### 4.4.3 Information Screen for Managing Delegations

To manage active delegations, an information dialog was introduced. This screen lists all currently delegated options, displays the assigned delegate for each option, and provides revoke buttons allowing users to individually cancel delegations.



| Option | Nickname | Status |    |
|--------|----------|--------|----|
| A      | B        | agreed | 🗑️ |
| B      | B        | agreed | 🗑️ |

EXIT 🗑️

Figure 4.12: Information dialog showing active per-option delegations. Users can view assigned delegates and revoke delegations individually for each option.

Maintaining correct UI state in this dialog required careful synchronisation with the underlying data structures, ensuring that revoked delegations were properly reflected both visually and in the stored delegation maps.

### 4.4.4 Summary

Per-option delegation introduced the ability for users to assign different delegates to individual poll options, greatly increasing the flexibility of the delegation system. This required refactoring core delegation data structures to operate independently for each option and adapting the cycle detection and resolution logic accordingly. The user interface was also extended to support multi-option delegation invitations and the management of multiple active delegations.

## 4.5 Implement Weighted Delegation into Vodle

Building on the earlier delegation models, weighted delegation was introduced to enable users to distribute their voting power fractionally across multiple trusted delegates. This approach enhances resilience against vote loss, mitigates the emergence of super-voters, and allows users to express nuanced trust relationships more accurately. This section outlines the design and implementation of weighted delegation in vodle, addressing Objective 4 of the project.

The system builds upon the trust matrix model introduced in Section 2.1.2 but adapts it to vodle's architecture, where all computation must be efficiently performed within the browser.

### 4.5.1 Data Structures

To accommodate weighted delegation, the `direct_delegation_map` was adapted to store trust values instead of ranks:

`[delegation_id, trust_value, status]`

where:

- `delegation_id` uniquely identifies a delegation.
- `trust_value` is an integer between 1 and 99, representing the proportion of trust assigned to this delegate.
- `status` indicates whether the delegation has been accepted (1), or is pending or rejected (0).

Storing trust as an integer percentage simplifies user interactions, avoids floating-point precision issues during UI editing, and is internally converted to decimals during computation.

In addition to the updated `direct_delegation_map`, two new maps were introduced:

- `self_map`: stores each user's direct, self-assigned ratings.
- `effective_map`: stores each user's final, computed ratings after resolving delegations.

Maintaining both maps streamlines client-side computations and ensures separation of direct and effective (delegated) ratings.



### 4.5.2 User Interface Extensions

Ensuring that weighted delegation remains accessible to a broad range of users was a key design goal. Therefore, the interface carefully balances simplicity for casual users with advanced options for power users.

The delegation invitation dialog was extended to include a trust assignment slider (see Figure 4.13). Sliders were chosen over free-text inputs to reduce the risk of input errors and to provide immediate visual feedback. The maximum value on the slider dynamically adjusts based on the remaining unallocated trust: users begin with 99% trust available (reserving a minimum of 1% for self-trust), and the slider maximum decreases as trust is assigned.


The image shows a mobile application interface for a delegation invitation dialog. It features a blue header bar. Below the header, there are three input fields: 'Delegate's nickname:' with the value 'B', and 'The delegate will see the following as the sender of this request:' with the value 'A'. Below these is a 'Trust Level' slider, which is a horizontal line with a blue dot in the middle. Below the slider is a paragraph of text: 'The simplest way to ask that person to act as your delegate is via the share button. Alternatively, you can write them an e-mail. Or you copy the delegation link and send it to them in any way you like.' At the bottom, there are three blue buttons: 'SHARE' with a share icon, 'COMPOSE AN E-MAIL' with an envelope icon, and 'COPY LINK' with a copy icon. The interface is shown within a mobile app frame with a blue header and a grey sidebar on the left.


Figure 4.13: Delegation invitation dialog with trust percentage slider.

Additionally, the delegation management dialog (introduced for ranked delegation) was extended to show trust percentages. An “expert mode” (see Figure 4.14) was also added, allowing users to manually edit trust values. Manual edits are validated according to the following rules:


- The total delegated trust must not exceed 99%.

- Each delegate must be assigned between 1% and 99%.

This dual-interface design ensures accessibility for casual users while granting full control to those who need it.



(a) Initial view of the information dialog showing delegates, their trust level, and revoke buttons.



(b) Expert mode enabled. Users can edit the trust of their delegations and save.

Figure 4.14: Information dialog for managing and editing weighted delegations which appears after clicking the information button.

### 4.5.3 Effective Rating Calculation

The weighted delegation resolution algorithm ensures that updates to ratings or trust assignments propagate accurately through the delegation network. This is crucial because vodle operates entirely client-side: no backend process is available to recalculate or correct inconsistencies. Therefore, any updates must be performed reliably and efficiently in the user's browser.

The central function responsible for computing updated ratings is `update_effective_votes()`, which is called whenever users modify their self-assigned ratings of poll options or delegation relationships (changing trust, adding a delegate, or removing a delegate):

```
call_update_effective_votes() {
    const ret = this.G.Del.update_effective_votes(this.pid,
        → this.self_rating_map);
    this.effective_rating_map = new Map(ret);
}
```

The computation proceeds iteratively according to the following steps:

1. **Initialisation:** At the first iteration, the self-assigned ratings are used as a starting point for the effective ratings:

```
effective_rating_map = new Map(self_rating_map);
```

2. **Update Step:** For each user and poll option, the effective rating is recalculated based on the user's assigned trust distribution, following:

$$\text{effective}_{x,i} = \text{trust}_{i,i} \cdot \text{rating}_{x,i} + \sum_{j \neq i} \text{trust}_{i,j} \cdot \text{effective}_{x,j} \quad (4.1)$$

3. **Convergence Check:** After recalculating all ratings, the system checks whether the change in ratings (compared to the previous iteration) is below a small threshold, `acceptable_diff`.

The `acceptable_diff` value is a configurable threshold that determines when iterative recalculation should stop. It prevents unnecessary updates by halting once changes between successive iterations fall below the precision relevant to users. In this implementation, the value was set to 1, matching the precision with which users can assign ratings, therefore saving computational efficiency without affecting visible accuracy.

```
if (acceptable_diff_reached){
  // Math.floor to every value:
  for (const [id, ratings] of newEffectiveMap) {
    const flooredRatings = new Map<string, number>();
    for (const [oid, value] of ratings) {
      flooredRatings.set(oid, Math.floor(value));
    }
    newEffectiveMap.set(id, flooredRatings);
  }
  this.G.D.set_self_and_effective_waps(pid, newEffectiveMap,
    ↪ self_rating_map);
  return newEffectiveMap;
}
```

4. **Recursion and Termination:** If convergence is not reached, the function recursively calls itself with the updated ratings. To guard against unexpected issues such as infinite loops due to numerical instability, a maximum recursion depth of 15 was imposed. Benchmarking results (Chapter 5) showed that even in worst-case scenarios with 500 voters, convergence typically occurred within fewer than 10 iterations. Setting the limit at 15 provides a safe margin while ensuring the application remains responsive even if an unforeseen problem arises.

```

if (count > 15) {
  for (const [id, ratings] of effective_map) {
    const flooredRatings = new Map<string, number>();
    for (const [oid, value] of ratings) {
      flooredRatings.set(oid, Math.floor(value));
    }
    effective_map.set(id, flooredRatings);
  }
  this.G.D.set_self_and_effective_waps(pid, effective_map,
    ↪ self_rating_map);
  return effective_map;
}

```

5. **Finalisation:** Once convergence is achieved or the maximum depth is reached, the final effective ratings are floored to integers just before they are saved. Deferring flooring until the final step preserves numerical accuracy during intermediate calculations and avoids the accumulation of rounding errors across recursive calls.

#### 4.5.4 Summary

Weighted delegation enabled users to distribute their voting power fractionally across multiple delegates, based on assigned trust percentages. The trust matrix model was adapted to vodle’s client-side environment, with an efficient iterative computation of effective ratings. The user interface was expanded to provide both a simple slider-based system for casual users and an expert mode for manual trust editing, balancing usability and precision.

### 4.6 Summary

This chapter detailed the design and implementation of the delegation mechanisms introduced into vodle, addressing each of the project’s core objectives. Beginning with a robust core delegation model, the system ensured global consistency and cycle prevention while preserving user autonomy. Ranked delegation added backup delegations based on user preference, while per-option delegation allowed finer control over delegation assignments for different poll options. Weighted delegation further extended flexibility by allowing voting power to be distributed proportionally across multiple trusted delegates. Across all features, the designs were carefully adapted to vodle’s serverless, client-driven architecture, ensuring correctness, performance, and

a responsive user experience. Despite the technical challenges, each major objective was fully achieved, laying a strong foundation for future extension work.

# Chapter 5

## Evaluation

This chapter evaluates the design and implementation of the delegation features introduced into vodle, assessing their effectiveness against the original objectives and requirements. It reviews the testing methodology, evaluates completion against functional and non-functional requirements, discusses performance results, presents feedback received, identifies limitations, and concludes with an overall assessment.

### 5.1 Testing

Testing was conducted to verify the correctness, robustness, and scalability of the liquid democracy features integrated into vodle. Two types of testing were performed:

- **Unit Testing:** Verifying that the delegation mechanisms produce correct outputs across standard and edge cases.
- **Performance Testing:** Measuring the scalability and convergence behaviour of the weighted delegation mechanism under realistic and worst-case scenarios.

Full unit test code listings are provided in Appendix A, and benchmarking scripts for weighted delegation are included in Appendix B.

#### 5.1.1 Unit Testing

Unit tests were written for core delegation, ranked delegation, and weighted delegation to verify correctness independently of the main vodle application. Tests were run in isolation to focus on delegation logic without frontend or database dependencies.

## Core Delegation

Tests verified the correct creation, resolution, and revocation of delegations, with a focus on transitive delegation and cycle prevention:

- **Long delegation chains:** Created delegation chains up to 50 voters long ( $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow Z$ ) and confirmed that the original voter's delegation resolved correctly to the final casting voter.
- **Cycle detection:** Attempted to create cycles (e.g.,  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$ ) and verified that the system blocked the delegation that would complete the cycle, preventing inconsistencies.
- **Delegation revocation mid-chain:** Simulated scenarios where a voter in the middle of a delegation chain revoked their delegation, and checked that upstream delegators (e.g., A) were correctly updated, no longer delegating transitively.
- **Direct vote overriding delegation:** Confirmed that when a user submitted a direct vote, it took priority over any existing delegation, and downstream voters delegated to them updated accordingly.

## Ranked Delegation

Tests focused on verifying delegation path resolution under the MinSum rule:

- **Multiple path resolution:** Created scenarios where voters had several possible delegation paths and verified that the system always selected the path with the lowest total rank sum.
- **Unavailable delegates:** Simulated top-ranked delegates abstaining or being removed, and confirmed that the system correctly fell back to the next available ranked delegate.
- **Reordering ranked delegates:** Modified delegate rankings after initial delegation and checked that delegation paths were re-resolved based on the updated order.

## Weighted Delegation

Weighted delegation tests checked the correct calculation of effective ratings through the trust matrix model:

- **Basic trust distributions:** Verified that with no delegations, each voter's effective ratings matched their own submitted ratings.
- **Simple weighted delegation:** Tested cases where users delegated part of their trust to others (e.g., 60% delegation) and confirmed that the resulting ratings were computed proportionally.
- **Delegation chains:** Simulated cases where trust was delegated through multiple layers (e.g., A delegates to B, B delegates to C), and verified that effective ratings propagated correctly through the chain.
- **Multiple delegates:** Tested voters splitting trust across two or more delegates with different weights, and verified that final ratings reflected the correct weighted combination.
- **Maximum delegation edge:** Simulated voters delegating up to 99% of their trust while retaining the required minimum 1% self-trust, and confirmed correct handling of extremely small self-trust contributions.
- **Cyclical delegation with self-trust:** Simulated voters delegating partially to each other in a cycle (e.g., A delegates to B and B delegates to A, each with 50%), and confirmed that the system converged correctly due to the mandatory self-trust floor.

Overall, unit testing demonstrated that the core, ranked, and weighted delegation mechanisms correctly handled a wide range of normal and edge-case scenarios, providing a high degree of confidence in the correctness of the implementation.

### 5.1.2 Performance Testing

To assess the scalability of the weighted delegation algorithm, performance benchmarks were conducted on randomly generated graphs and worst-case chain graphs of varying sizes. The full benchmarking scripts are provided in Appendix B.

Tests were run with graph sizes of 100, 200, and 500 voters. For each size, 500 random graphs were generated and tested. Additionally, for each size ( $N$ ), a worst-case chain graph was constructed, where voters delegated 99% of their trust sequentially in a cycle of size  $N$ .

Performance was measured under two convergence thresholds:

- $\epsilon = 1$ : Allowing updates to terminate when changes between iterations were smaller than 1 unit (the threshold used in vodle's implementation).
- $\epsilon = 0$ : Requiring exact convergence, terminating only when no changes occurred at all.



## Results ( $\epsilon = 1$ )

As shown in Figure 5.1, convergence was fast under the practical  $\epsilon = 1$  setting:

- Average iteration counts increased slowly with graph size, from approximately 7 iterations at 100 voters to around 7.6 iterations at 500 voters.
- Average convergence time scaled linearly with the number of voters, reaching approximately 7 milliseconds for graphs of 500 voters.
- Maximum iteration counts and times were dominated by worst-case chain graphs, but even in these cases, maximum convergence times remained under 200 milliseconds.




Figure 5.1: Weighted delegation convergence performance with  $\epsilon = 1$ . Average and maximum iteration counts and convergence times for graph sizes of 100, 200, and 500 voters.

## Results ( $\epsilon = 0$ )

Under the stricter  $\epsilon = 0$  setting (Figure 5.2), convergence costs increased:

- Average iterations were higher, around 21.8 iterations for 500 voters.
- Maximum iterations reached the number of voters (500) in worst-case chain graphs.

- Average convergence times remained low, scaling linearly with graph size, reaching about 20 milliseconds for 500 voters.
- Maximum times reached approximately 225 milliseconds for worst-case chains.




Figure 5.2: Weighted delegation convergence performance with  $\epsilon = 0$ . Stricter convergence requirements lead to higher iteration counts and slightly increased convergence times.

## Discussion

These results demonstrate that the weighted delegation mechanism scales linearly with the number of voters in typical cases, and remains tractable even in worst-case configurations. Using  $\epsilon = 1$  provides a practical trade-off, offering fast convergence without loss of meaningful rating accuracy. Overall, the performance results confirm that the trust matrix model is efficient and suitable for deployment at the intended application scale.

## Summary

Testing confirmed that the delegation features introduced into vodle are robust, handle both standard and edge cases correctly, and scale efficiently to support realistic deployment sizes. This provides strong evidence for the practical viability of the system in participatory decision-making applications.

## 5.2 Evaluation Against Requirements

This section evaluates the project against the specific functional and non-functional requirements outlined in Chapter 3. For each project objective, a table summarising whether each requirement was achieved is presented, followed by a detailed discussion providing evidence and references to the implementation. Where necessary, placeholders are included for requirements requiring further confirmation or referencing.

### 5.2.1 Objective 1: Implement a Core Delegation Model

| Requirement  | Met? |
|--|------|
| FR1.1: Users can invite others to act as their delegate  | Met  |
| FR1.2: Users can accept delegation requests              | Met  |
| FR1.3: Users are prevented from delegating to themselves | Met  |
| FR1.4: Delegation cycles are detected and prevented      | Met  |
| FR2: Users can view and revoke delegations               | Met  |
| FR3: Delegations are resolved transitively               | Met  |
| FR4: Users can override delegated votes                  | Met  |
| NFR1: Delegation data stored as JSON                     | Met  |
| NFR2: Schema changes backward compatible                 | Met  |
| NFR3: Privacy preserved (only final outcomes visible)    | Met  |
| NFR4: Delegation UI intuitive                            | Met  |

Table 5.1: Evaluation of Objective 1: Core Delegation Model Requirements

#### Discussion:

- **FR1.1 and FR1.2:** Achieved through the delegation invitation system, where users generate a secure, unique link to invite another user to act as their delegate (see Section 4.2.2, Figure 4.1). This process includes both sending and accepting a delegation request, ensuring that all delegations are consensual.
- **FR1.3:** This is enforced proactively when accepting a delegation (see Section 4.2.2).
- **FR1.4:** Cycle prevention is enforced proactively when accepting a delegation (see Section 4.2.2, Figure 4.3).
- **FR2:** Users can view their current delegation and revoke it by pressing a button (see Figure 4.5).

- **FR3:** Delegations resolve transitively, meaning that if A delegates to B and B delegates to C, then A effectively delegates to C unless overridden (Section 4.2.2).
- **FR4:** Toggles are implemented, allowing users to switch between their delegate's and their own vote (see Figure 4.5).
- **NFR1 and NFR2:** All data is serialised and stored in JSON, example below:

```
save_inverse_indirect_map(pid: string, oid: string, val: Map<string,
  ↪ string>) {
  const jsonData = JSON.stringify(Array.from(mp.entries(), ([k, v]) =>
    ↪ [k, Array.from(v.entries())]));
  this._setp_in_polldb(pid, `poll.{pid}.inverse_indirect_map`,
    ↪ jsonData);
}
```

- **NFR3:** Only the final vote is visible to the delegated voter (see Figure 4.5).
- **NFR4:** Only one step is required to initiate (create an invite) or remove (press the revoke button) a delegation.

## 5.2.2 Objective 2: Implement Ranked Delegation

| Requirement   | Met? |
|---|------|
| FR1: Users can specify up to 3 ranked delegates             | Met  |
| FR2: Ranked delegation resolution follows Min-Sum rule      | Met  |
| FR3: Users can override ranked delegation by direct voting  | Met  |
| FR4: Users can view, reorder, and revoke ranked delegations | Met  |
| NFR1: UI intuitive  | Met  |
| NFR2: Data stored as JSON                                   | Met  |

Table 5.2: Evaluation of Objective 2: Ranked Delegation Requirements

### Discussion:

- **FR1:** Users are able to assign up to three delegates in a ranked order when setting up a delegation. Uniqueness is enforced when creating an invite (see Section 4.3).
- **FR2:** The MinSum rule is used (see Section 4.3).

- **FR4:** Toggles are implemented, allowing users to switch between their delegate's and their own vote (see Figure 4.5).
- **FR4:** Users are provided with a drag-and-drop dialog that allows for reordering and removal of ranked delegates (see Section 4.3).
- **NFR1:** The system automatically selects the most preferred (lowest ranked) available delegate in the invitation dialog, minimising user effort and making the ranked delegation implementation intuitive and easy to understand. (See Section 4.3, Figure 4.7).
- **NFR2:** Has been achieved using the same methods as Objective 1.

### 5.2.3 Objective 3: Implement Weighted Delegation

| Requirement   | Met? |
|---|------|
| FR1: Users can delegate to multiple users simultaneously  | Met  |
| FR2: Trust weights sum to no more than 0.99               | Met  |
| FR3: Trust matrix model used for final rating calculation | Met  |
| NFR1: Weighted delegation calculated client-side          | Met  |
| NFR2: Data serialised as JSON                             | Met  |
| NFR3: UI provided for adjusting trust weights             | Met  |

Table 5.3: Evaluation of Objective 3: Weighted Delegation Requirements

#### Discussion:

- **FR1:** This can be seen in Figure 4.14.
- **FR2:** Invitation dialog was extended to allow users to specify a trust level (from 1 to the amount of trust available to delegate), see Figure 4.13.
- **FR3:** The final ratings are calculated using an iterative trust matrix model, ensuring that delegation chains propagate weights correctly while converging rapidly to stable outcomes (Section 4.4).
- **NFR1:** Weighted delegation is calculated client-side. (See Section 4.4.)
- **NFR2:** Weighted delegation data is stored using the same method as Objective 1.
- **NFR3:** An “expert mode” was added for adjusting trust values. (See Figure 4.14.)

### 5.2.4 Objective 4: Implement Per-Option Delegation

| Requirement  | Met? |
|--|------|
| FR1: Users can assign different delegates per option   | Met  |
| FR2: Option-specific delegation resolution independent | Met  |
| FR3: Users can override delegated votes per option     | Met  |
| FR4: UI for per-option viewing and revocation          | Met  |
| NFR1: UI clearly indicates delegate per option         | Met  |
| NFR2: Data storage remains CouchDB compatible          | Met  |

Table 5.4: Evaluation of Objective 4: Per-Option Delegation Requirements

#### Discussion:

- **FR1:** See Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11.
- **FR2:** Delegation resolution is performed at the option level (see Section 4.4).
- **FR3:** This was achieved in a similar manner to Objective 1 (see Figure 4.10).
- **FR4:** A detailed information dialog shows active per-option delegations and allows individual revocation, improving transparency and user control (Section 4.4).
- **NFR1 and NFR2:** The user interface clearly indicates option-specific delegations, and data storage follows JSON formatting conventions compatible with CouchDB.

### 5.2.5 Extension Objective: Simulate Delegation Mechanisms

| Requirement  | Met?    |
|--|---------|
| FR1: Model individual agents capable of voting, abstaining, or delegating  | Not Met |
| FR2: Support multiple delegation mechanisms (standard, ranked, weighted)   | Not Met |
| FR3: Allow configuration of simulation parameters (number of agents, etc.) | Not Met |
| FR4: Track and record key metrics (vote concentration, super-voters, etc.) | Not Met |
| FR5: Output simulation results in structured format (CSV/JSON)             | Not Met |
| NFR1: Simulation framework must be lightweight and extensible              | Not Met |
| NFR2: Use Mesa and Python libraries (NumPy, Pandas, Matplotlib)            | Not Met |
| NFR3: Support reproducibility with fixed random seeds                      | Not Met |

Table 5.5: Evaluation of Extension Objective: Simulate Delegation Mechanisms Requirements

#### Discussion:

The extension objective to simulate delegation mechanisms using agent-based modelling was not achieved. As outlined in Chapter 6, while the frameworks for an agent based simulation was chosen, the implementation was descoped during the development phase due to time constraints.

The complexity and time demands of finalising and refining the core objectives meant that there was insufficient capacity to also build the simulation environment. This prioritisation was necessary to ensure the core deliverables met the required quality standards.

Nonetheless, foundational planning was carried out, and Chapter 7 outlines how future work could extend the project by implementing a simulation framework based on the Mesa Python library, with a view to exploring delegation dynamics under different mechanisms and network configurations.

Overall, while this extension objective was not realised within the project timeline, it remains a strong candidate for future research and development.

## 5.3 Feedback

The added user interface components are well designed and integrate very well with the existing UI and UX.

The implemented back-end logic works seamlessly with the rather complicated existing data management.

One possible issue with the backend logic is that there might occur racing conditions when several delegations are accepted at basically the same time. This should be easily fixable.

All new code is well-structured and follows the style and conventions of the existing code-base.

The different mathematical methods for resolving delegation cycles, especially the weighted one, are well motivated and present a range of good options for users to delegate all or part of their vote to trusted others, without breaching privacy unnecessarily.

Overall, this delegation extension will likely be rolled out with the next release of the app.

— Jobst Heitzig

The feedback from Heitzig confirmed that the project successfully achieved its goals. In particular, the new delegation features were assessed as robust, well-integrated into the existing system, and aligned with vodle's emphasis on user autonomy and transparency. The minor issue of potential race conditions was acknowledged as easily addressable. Potential strategies for mitigating this issue are discussed further in Section 7.

Overall, the feedback indicated that the delegation extension provides a substantial and valuable improvement to the vodle platform.



## Chapter 6

# Project Management

This chapter outlines the project's management approach, including the development methodology, planning, and reflections on the process. It also considers legal and ethical issues and assesses key risks associated with the project.

### 6.1 Methodology

The project adopted an agile methodology, chosen for its flexibility, iterative development cycle, and emphasis on frequent customer feedback. The work involved incrementally building a series of interdependent features into vodle – starting with a core delegation mechanism, and progressively expanding functionality to include ranked delegation, weighted delegation, and finally, per-option delegation. This iterative approach allowed each new feature to build directly upon the last, ensuring ongoing compatibility and adaptability in design decisions as the system evolved.

Agile methodology was particularly suitable for this project due to the involvement of an active “customer” figure: Jobst Heitzig, co-supervisor and original creator of vodle. Heitzig played a crucial role in defining system expectations and guiding design decisions based on practical, real-world considerations. Regular meetings, held fortnightly with both Jobst Heitzig and Markus Brill, facilitated continuous feedback and review of progress, enabling rapid adaptation of development plans. This feedback cycle closely reflects the Agile Manifesto's principles of early and continuous delivery, as well as close collaboration between developers and stakeholders (Beck et al., 2001).

Other project management approaches, such as Waterfall, were also evaluated but ultimately dismissed due to their inherent rigidity. Although Waterfall initially appeared attractive due to clearly defined phases and comprehensive documentation at each stage, its requirement to specify the complete project scope upfront was incompatible with the evolving nature of the project. Given the shorter time frame, the flexibility afforded by agile was critical to the project's success.

Scrum, one of the most widely adopted agile frameworks (used by approximately 63% of agile teams (VersionOne, 2020)), was also considered. Its structured, sprint-based cycles, clear team roles, and structured ceremonies such as sprint planning and reviews were appealing for maintaining focused implementation and streamlined communication. However, the project's constraints – limited availability due to academic commitments and a small team size – made Scrum's daily stand-up meetings and fixed sprint lengths impractical. As a result, the project used an adapted agile approach: progress was reviewed every two weeks, effectively maintaining the advantages of frequent feedback without the constraints and scheduling pressures imposed by full Scrum ceremonies.

Each iteration of development produced a functional, testable feature that could be immediately evaluated and integrated into the broader system. This method significantly reduced the risk of late-stage integration issues and ensured steady, measurable progress throughout the project's duration. Overall, the agile methodology's iterative, feedback-oriented structure proved highly effective, meeting both the technical complexity and collaborative needs inherent in this work.

## 6.2 Plan

The project plan was organised into objectives (see Section 3) that built on one another in sequence:

- **Core Objective 1:** Implement a Core Delegation Model into Vodle.
- **Core Objective 2:** Implement Ranked Delegation into Vodle.
- **Core Objective 3:** Implement Weighted Delegation into Vodle.
- **Core Objective 4:** Implement Per-Option Delegation.
- **Extension Objective 1:** Simulate Delegation Mechanisms.

This objective-led structure was well-suited to the agile approach, allowing each milestone to be treated as an iteration with a deliverable at the end. A Gantt chart (see Figure 6.1) was created to visualise the project timeline and to track dependencies and progress.




Figure 6.1: Gantt chart illustrating the project plan from the progress report.

### 6.3 Changes to the Project Plan

The original project plan, illustrated in the Gantt chart (Figure 6.1), outlined a linear progression through the core objectives. However, several adjustments were made during the course of the project to reflect evolving priorities and unforeseen technical challenges.

The most significant change was the decision to de-scope the extension objective (simulating delegation mechanisms). This was prompted by two main factors. First, implementing the core objectives proved more technically demanding than initially anticipated – particularly ranked delegation and weighted delegation. These challenges required more time and attention than expected, leaving limited capacity to complete the extension objective without compromising the quality of the core deliverables.

Second, during the background research phase, it became clear that similar investigations into delegation behaviour had already been conducted – most notably by Brill et al. (2022). Although their study did not use agent based modelling, instead using networks from synthetic and real-world networks (such as partial networks from Facebook, Twitter, Slashdot, etc.), it provided a comprehensive empirical evaluation of ranked delegation rules using various metrics such as maximum vote path length, average vote path rank, the number of isolated voters (voters without a delegation path) and many more.

Given the depth and relevance of these findings, replicating the analysis through agent-based modelling, especially within the project’s limited timeframe, was deemed unnecessary. Instead, the project focused on fully delivering and refining the core objectives, which aligned more directly with vodle’s platform goals and would have a better impact on the user experience of vodle.

A second change involved reversing the development order of Objectives 3 and 4. Originally, Objective 3 (weighted delegation) was scheduled to follow Objective 2. However, during the Christmas Holidays, it became clear that Objective 4 (per-option delegation) could be completed more quickly and required fewer algorithmic dependencies. To maintain development momentum, Objective 4 was brought forward.

This adjustment helped mitigate project risk. Objective 4 involved minimal changes to the database schema and integrated easily with UI components developed for earlier objectives. In contrast, Objective 3 introduced more complex computational logic and performance concerns, which demanded additional design, testing and changes to the database. Tackling Objective 4 earlier helped avoid potential cascading delays and ensured a smoother integration process later in development.

### 6.3.1 Actual Timeline Compared to Planned Timeline

While the original project plan provided a clear sequence for implementing each objective, the actual progression deviated in several key areas due to technical challenges, interface considerations, and evolving priorities. Figure 6.2 (below) shows the actual timeline of the project, which can be compared to the original plan (Figure 6.1).




Figure 6.2: Gantt chart illustrating the actual timeline of the project. Data taken from git commit history

The most significant deviations from the original plan included:

- **Objective 1 (Core Delegation Model)** commenced approximately one week later than planned. This delay stemmed from the need for deeper familiarisation with vodle's existing codebase, particularly its database schema and frontend architecture. Understanding these components was essential to ensure that new

delegation features could integrate seamlessly without disrupting existing functionality. This initial exploration phase, while time consuming, was crucial for establishing a solid foundation for subsequent development.

- **Objective 2 (Ranked Delegation)** extended significantly beyond its initial timeframe. Originally scheduled for completion during the Christmas Holidays, development continued until Term 2, Week 3. This was primarily due to other academic deadlines as well as theoretical issues (e.g. determining how to classify casting voters; see Section 4.3).
- **Objectives 3 and 4's** order was swapped, as discussed earlier in this section. While the original plan positioned Objective 3 (Weighted Delegation) to follow Objective 2, development logistics and dependency considerations prompted a shift to implement Objective 4 (Per-Option Delegation) first. This decision minimised integration risks, as Objective 4 required fewer schema modifications and built more directly on existing UI components, particularly those developed for Objective 2 (Ranked Delegation).
- **Extension Objective (Simulation)** was ultimately descoped from the project plan. This decision reflected both time constraints imposed by the extended development periods for core objectives and the discovery of existing similar research on delegation behaviour by Brill et al. (2022). Focusing resources on delivering robust implementations of the core objectives was deemed more valuable than duplicating existing research.

Despite these deviations, the overall project structure remained intact and successful. The buffer period allocated at the end of Term 2 served its intended purpose as contingency time, effectively absorbing the delays in Objectives 1 and 2. This strategic planning ensured that despite timeline adjustments, the project remained on track for completion with all core objectives delivered to high quality standards.

The ability to adapt the project plan while maintaining focus on delivering the core functionality demonstrates the value of the chosen agile methodology. Rather than rigidly adhering to potentially unrealistic timelines, the flexible approach allowed for continuous reassessment and prioritisation based on evolving technical insights and stakeholder feedback.

## 6.4 Risk Assessment

The following section provides a detailed analysis of the risks identified in the risk assessment table below (see Table 6.1). Each risk is discussed individually in detail later on in the section, outlining its implications and the strategies proposed to mitigate it.

| Risk  | Likelihood | Mitigation Strategy   |
|---|------------|---|
| Breaking the live vodle site during development     | Medium     | Use Git branching to isolate development from production environments. Conduct local testing before deployment. |
| Feature complexity exceeds estimates                | High       | Prioritise core objectives and maintain flexibility in scope.   |
| Lack of engagement from supervisors or stakeholders | Low        | Maintain regular communication through scheduled meetings.  |
| Data loss or corruption                             | Low        | Use Git for version control and take regular local backups.   |

Table 6.1: Risks and Mitigation Strategies

## Breaking the Live Vodle Site During Development

**Likelihood:** Medium

**Description:** Modifications to the existing vodle platform could unintentionally introduce downtime or impair existing functionality on the live website. Any disruptions could negatively impact real users' interactions, leading to dissatisfaction and loss of trust in the platform.

**Mitigation:** Development activities will utilise Git branching to isolate new code from the production environment. Features will be developed and rigorously tested in local or staging environments before integration with the live deployment. Incremental rollouts and thorough pre-deployment testing will further help identify potential problems early, allowing quick remediation or rollback.

## Feature Complexity Exceeds Estimates

**Likelihood:** High

**Description:** Advanced features such as ranked delegation and weighted delegation may prove more complex than initially anticipated. Unexpected complexity can lead to delays, reduced functionality, or incomplete implementations, potentially affecting the project's timeline and deliverables.

**Mitigation:** Core objectives have been clearly defined and prioritised, ensuring focus remains on essential functionality. In cases of higher than anticipated complexity, resources will be redirected towards completing critical core features first, while the extension objective (agent based modelling) can be scaled back or postponed as needed. Regular agile reviews will monitor progress closely, facilitating early identification and management of complexity-related issues.

## Lack of Engagement from Supervisors or Stakeholders

**Likelihood:** Low

**Description:** Regular feedback and engagement from supervisors and stakeholders are crucial to ensure alignment with project goals, requirements, and user expectations. Insufficient feedback could result in misaligned implementations or objectives that do not fully meet user needs.

**Mitigation:** Fortnightly meetings have been scheduled with both the primary supervisor (Markus Brill) and the co-supervisor (Jobst Heitzig), who also fulfils the role of the project customer. This structured schedule ensures consistent opportunities for input and feedback. Additionally, a Telegram group chat is available to handle urgent queries and maintain ongoing dialogue.

## Data Loss or Corruption – Code

**Likelihood:** Low

**Description:** Development activities pose a risk of code loss or corruption due to accidental deletion, unintended changes, or version conflicts. Such incidents could significantly delay development and necessitate additional time for recovery.

**Mitigation:** Version control will be maintained using Git, with frequent commits and descriptive commit messages ensuring traceability. Regular backups of the repository will be taken to safeguard against accidental loss, providing straightforward recovery paths when needed.

## Data Loss or Corruption – Database

**Likelihood:** Low

**Description:** While unlikely, corruption of the CouchDB database during development could occur due to improper schema modifications or accidental changes.

**Mitigation:** No mitigation – in the event of data corruption, the development database will be reset to its original state. As all data in the database is poll and user specific, it does not impact development as no important data is stored in the production environment.

## 6.5 Risk Management Reflection

This section evaluates how effectively the project's risk management strategies addressed both anticipated and unforeseen challenges. It examines which risks were

realised, how mitigation strategies performed in practice, and identifies lessons learned that could inform future projects.

### **Breaking the Live Vodle Site During Development**

The use of Git branching strategies and comprehensive local testing successfully prevented any disruption to the live site. The separation between development and production environments ensured stability throughout the project lifecycle. This disciplined approach proved valuable despite adding some overhead to the development process.

### **Feature Complexity Exceeds Estimates**

This materialised as the most significant risk, particularly during the implementation of ranked delegation (Objective 2) and weighted delegation (Objective 3). The algorithmic complexity and UI considerations extended development beyond initial estimates. The strategy of prioritising core objectives proved invaluable, allowing the project to successfully deliver all essential functionality. The decision to descope the extension objective demonstrates effective risk management balancing ambition with practical constraints. In hindsight, breaking complex features into smaller subtasks during planning might have improved estimation accuracy, though the agile methodology compensated through its inherent flexibility.

### **Lack of Engagement from Supervisors or Stakeholders**

This risk did not take place. The fortnightly meetings and additional communication channels maintained strong engagement throughout the project. Jobst Heitzig's dual role as co-supervisor and customer representative provided crucial domain expertise and timely feedback on design decisions.

### **Data Loss or Corruption**

No significant data loss incidents occurred. Git version control provided reliable tracking of code changes, while the lightweight approach to database management proved appropriate as no critical data was compromised.

### **Summary**

Overall, the risk management approach proved effective in supporting project delivery despite several challenges. The most significant risk – feature complexity exceeding estimates – did occur and required timeline adjustments, but the contingency buffer and flexible scope management successfully mitigated its impact. The disciplined development approach prevented any disruption to the live site, while strong stakeholder engagement and version control systems effectively addressed the remaining identified risks. The experience highlighted the importance of integrating contingency time into project schedules and maintaining flexibility when dealing with technically complex features.



## **6.6 Legal and Ethical Considerations**

As vodle may be used to gather votes on sensitive topics, particular attention was paid to ensuring user privacy and system fairness throughout development.

Delegation chains are resolved internally within the browser and are never publicly exposed. Additionally, delegations only becomes active when the delegate explicitly accepts the invitation – ensuring that no information about a user’s voting intentions is shared without their consent.

Furthermore, no personal data was collected or processed for the purposes of this project. All stored information relates strictly to poll participation and delegation structures, with no link to identifiable personal attributes. As a result, no changes to vodle’s terms of service were required, and the project remains compliant with relevant data protection and ethical standards.

# Chapter 7

## Future Work

This project established a foundation for flexible, transitive, ranked, and weighted delegation within vodle. While the primary development goals were achieved, several areas remain for extension and refinement. These include the development of agent-based simulation tools to better understand delegation dynamics, and the expansion of vodle's delegation features to support a wider range of use cases. Addressing these areas would strengthen both theoretical understanding and practical deployment of liquid democracy systems.

### 7.1 Agent-Based Modelling for Delegation Dynamics

Agent-based modelling (ABM) provides a method for analysing how local decisions and interactions aggregate into system-level outcomes (Bonabeau, 2002). Although the simulation objective outlined in Section 2.3 was descoped during this project (see Section 6), ABM remains a promising approach for investigating delegation dynamics, particularly in large or complex settings.

Prior research has examined delegation behaviour primarily through observational studies and mathematical models. However, few studies have simulated how trust, strategic behaviour, and delegation reluctance evolve dynamically over time. This section outlines future directions for developing agent-based simulations that capture these behaviours, supported by appropriate evaluation metrics.

#### 7.1.1 Prior Simulation Studies of Liquid Democracy

Several studies have explored delegation structures within liquid democracy systems, although most focus on static analyses rather than dynamic agent behaviour.

## Observational Studies

Kling et al. (2015) analysed delegation graphs from the LiquidFeedback platform, highlighting the emergence of super-voters. While informative, this study was observational, examining static snapshots rather than modelling how delegations evolve.

## Mathematical Modelling and Synthetic Evaluation

Brill et al. (2022) evaluated various delegation rules on both synthetic and real-world datasets. However, their models assumed fixed agent preferences without modelling trust evolution or delegation reassignment.

## Formal Binary Models

Christoff and Grossi (2017b) introduced logical frameworks for binary voting settings, focusing on aggregation rules and rationality. Their work assumed a given delegation graph, without modelling agent decision-making processes.

## Summary

While prior work has characterised the static properties of delegation networks, the dynamic formation and adaptation of delegation links based on agent-level behaviour remains underexplored. ABM provides a natural framework to investigate these dynamics.

### 7.1.2 Baseline Agent-Based Model

A baseline simulation could model agents defined by:

- **Voting Intention:** An initial preference (Yes, No, or Abstain).
- **Delegation Willingness ( $w_i$ ):** Propensity to delegate rather than vote directly.
- **Trust Vector ( $T_i$ ):** Trust scores towards potential delegates.
- **Memory:** Record of past delegation outcomes for trust updates.

At each polling event:

1. **Delegation Decision:** If trust and willingness exceed thresholds  $\theta$  and  $\theta'$ , the agent delegates; otherwise, it votes directly.

2. **Delegate Selection:** The agent selects the highest-trust available delegate.
3. **Trust Update:** Trust increases if delegate outcomes align with the agent's preferences and decreases otherwise.

Delegation chains would be resolved via a predefined rule (e.g., minimal rank sum), and the process would iterate across multiple polls.

### 7.1.3 Extensions to the Baseline Model

Realism can be enhanced through several extensions:

#### Dynamic Trust Evolution

Trust levels evolve based on delegate performance, with recent outcomes weighted more heavily to model realistic memory effects (Casella et al., 2022).

#### Delegation Reassignment

Agents periodically re-evaluate their delegations, switching delegates or reverting to direct voting if trust falls below acceptable thresholds.

#### User Behaviour and Strategic Delegation

Incorporating varied agent behaviour, including:

- **Overconfident Delegation:** Agents may choose to delegate even when could reduce the quality of the overall result (Casella et al., 2022).
- **Reluctance to Delegate:** Agents could prefer self-representation despite potential benefits from delegation.

### 7.1.4 Evaluation Metrics

To assess the effectiveness and fairness of delegation mechanisms in agent-based simulations, a clear set of evaluation metrics is needed. These metrics should capture both the distribution of voting power and the structural properties of the delegation network.

## Voting Power Distribution

Voting power in liquid democracy systems can be viewed as a transferable resource, similar to wealth or income. As it flows through delegation chains, it can become unevenly distributed, concentrating influence in the hands of a few. To quantify and monitor this distribution, standard inequality metrics from economics can be applied:

- **Lorenz Curve:** The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of total voting power against the cumulative share of voters, sorted from least to most powerful (Cowell, 2011). A perfectly equal system would produce a diagonal line; greater curvature indicates greater inequality.
- **Gini Coefficient:** The Gini coefficient summarises the Lorenz curve into a single value between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents maximum inequality (Cowell, 2011).
- **Maximum Voting Weight:** Tracking the maximum voting weight held by any single agent provides a direct measure of super-voter emergence.

These measures, traditionally used in economic contexts to assess wealth inequality, are well-suited for evaluating how fairly voting power is distributed within a delegation network.

## Delegation Network Structure

Analysing:

- **Average Delegation Path Length.**
- **Cycle Frequency:** Even if prevented.
- **Connectivity and Robustness.**

## Comparative Analysis

Comparing metrics across different delegation modes (core, ranked, weighted) to assess relative fairness and stability.

### 7.1.5 Summary

Agent-based simulations could reveal how delegation networks emerge, concentrate power, or adapt over time. This would inform design choices for more robust and equitable liquid democracy systems.

## 7.2 Potential Extensions for Vodle

While vodle’s current delegation features substantially extend user flexibility, further enhancements could improve scalability, transparency, and long-term usability.

### 7.2.1 Global Delegations

Currently, delegations are poll-specific. Global delegations – persisting across polls unless overridden – would reduce friction for users who consistently trust certain delegates. This mirrors systems like LiquidFeedback (Behrens et al., 2014).

Implementation would require:

- Persistent delegation identifiers, scoped to delegation only (preserving poll privacy).
- Resolution logic combining global and local delegations.
- New UI components for managing global settings.

### 7.2.2 Delegation Expiry Mechanisms

Persistent delegations risk becoming outdated. Introducing optional expiry periods (e.g., six months) would encourage regular review and prevent passive concentration of voting power.

Expiry mechanisms would involve:

- Expiry timestamps on delegations.
- Automatic fallback to backup delegates or direct voting.
- User notifications prior to expiry.

### 7.2.3 Auditability of Delegation Chains

Transparency into delegation paths increases trust. Vodle could offer auditability features inspired by the “Golden Rule” of Google Votes (Hardt and Lopes, 2015):

- Users can view the number of delegation steps their vote traversed.
- Public delegates opt-in to visibility; others remain anonymised.

This balances accountability with privacy, strengthening user confidence.

## **7.3 Summary**

Extending vodle with agent-based modelling tools and platform enhancements would significantly advance its capabilities. Simulation could illuminate delegation stability, inequality, and resilience under realistic behaviour. Platform features like global delegations, expiry, and privacy-respecting auditability would further improve usability, transparency, and trust. Together, these directions offer a path toward a more scalable, adaptive, and fair implementation of liquid democracy principles.

## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

This project has successfully designed, implemented, and evaluated a comprehensive liquid democracy system within the vodle platform. The work advances vodle from a system reliant on direct voting alone to one capable of supporting flexible, transitive, ranked, and weighted delegation, thereby greatly expanding user autonomy and participation options. Several complex delegation models were integrated – including ranked delegation using the MinSum rule, per-option delegation, and trust-based weighted delegation – with cycle prevention and client-side resolution mechanisms ensuring system consistency despite the architectural constraints of a CouchDB-backed, serverless design.

The project’s technical contribution lies in the development of a client-side delegation framework compatible with real-time collaborative environments without requiring server-side computation. Special attention was given to resolving key challenges such as cycle detection, delegation graph resolution, and maintaining user privacy. Furthermore, this work proposes solutions for critical scalability issues, notably the potential database collisions caused by shared delegation maps, laying out pathways for future architectural improvements through strategies like per-user delegation documents.

This contribution is highly relevant to the field of Computer Science, particularly in areas such as computational social choice, participatory system design, and decentralised decision-making architectures. It demonstrates practical methods to balance decentralisation, flexibility, and reliability – trade-offs that are central to many modern digital decision-making platforms.

Other developers and researchers can build upon this work by adopting or extending the delegation models presented here. The delegation structures and resolution algorithms are adaptable to a wide range of decision-making contexts beyond vodle, such as online governance platforms, collaborative filtering systems, and digital democracy initiatives.

The project represents a significant achievement in its integration of complex liquid



democracy mechanisms within tight architectural constraints, preserving usability, efficiency, and trustworthiness for end users. It required extensive background research, careful technical design, and iterative validation to ensure correctness and scalability, all of which were successfully delivered within the project timeline.

Nonetheless, some limitations remain. The database collision issue, while identified and partially addressed, requires deeper architectural redesign for full resolution. Furthermore, the agent-based simulation component, though proposed and partially scoped, was not fully implemented within the available time. Finally, large-scale empirical validation on live user data remains an avenue for future work.

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## **Appendices**

# Appendix A

## Unit Testing Scripts

### A.1 Core Delegation

```
// --- Global Test Counter ---
let testCounter = 0;

// --- Simulated Maps for Testing ---
const directDelegationMap = new Map();
const inverseIndirectMap = new Map();

// --- Simulated Database Accessors ---
function get_direct_delegation_map() {
  return directDelegationMap;
}

function get_inverse_indirect_map() {
  return inverseIndirectMap;
}

function set_inverse_indirect_map(newMap) {
  inverseIndirectMap.clear();
  for (const [k, v] of newMap.entries()) {
    inverseIndirectMap.set(k, new Set(v));
  }
}

// --- Core Delegation Logic ---
function can_add_delegation(voter, delegate) {
  if (voter === delegate) return false;
```

```

    const dm = get_direct_delegation_map();
    const existingDelegate = dm.get(delegate);
    if (existingDelegate === voter) return false;
    const sm = get_inverse_indirect_map();
    const voterDependents = sm.get(voter);
    if (voterDependents && voterDependents.has(delegate)) return false;
    return true;
}

function add_delegation(voter, delegate) {
    if (!can_add_delegation(voter, delegate)) return false;
    const dm = get_direct_delegation_map();
    dm.set(voter, delegate);

    const sm = get_inverse_indirect_map();
    const voterDependents = new Set([voter]);
    const voterIndirect = sm.get(voter);
    if (voterIndirect) {
        for (const dep of voterIndirect) {
            voterDependents.add(dep);
        }
    }
    const delegateDependents = sm.get(delegate) || new Set();
    for (const dep of voterDependents) {
        delegateDependents.add(dep);
    }
    sm.set(delegate, delegateDependents);
    return true;
}

function remove_delegation(voter) {
    const dm = get_direct_delegation_map();
    const sm = get_inverse_indirect_map();
    const delegate = dm.get(voter);
    if (!delegate) return false;
    dm.delete(voter);

    const voterDependents = new Set([voter]);
    const voterIndirect = sm.get(voter);
    if (voterIndirect) {
        for (const dep of voterIndirect) {

```

```

        voterDependents.add(dep);
    }
}
for (const [d, dependents] of sm.entries()) {
    for (const dep of voterDependents) {
        dependents.delete(dep);
    }
}
return true;
}

// --- Utilities ---
function resetMaps() {
    directDelegationMap.clear();
    inverseIndirectMap.clear();
}

function assertEquals(actual, expected, message) {
    if (JSON.stringify(actual) !== JSON.stringify(expected)) {
        console.error(`FAIL (Test ${testCounter}): ${message}\nExpected:
        → ${JSON.stringify(expected)}\nGot: ${JSON.stringify(actual)}\n`);
        throw new Error("Test failed");
    } else {
        console.log(`PASS (Test ${testCounter}): ${message}`);
    }
}

function assert(condition, message) {
    if (!condition) {
        console.error(`FAIL (Test ${testCounter}): ${message}`);
        throw new Error("Test failed");
    } else {
        console.log(`PASS (Test ${testCounter}): ${message}`);
    }
}

// --- Test Cases ---
function test_simple_delegation() {
    testCounter++;
    console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Simple Delegation ===`);
    resetMaps();

```



```

    add_delegation('A', 'B');
    assertEquals(Object.fromEntries(directDelegationMap), { A: 'B' }, "A
    ↪ should delegate to B");
  }

function test_chain_no_cycle() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Chain Without Cycle ===`);
  resetMaps();
  add_delegation('A', 'B');
  add_delegation('B', 'C');
  add_delegation('C', 'D');
  assertEquals(Object.fromEntries(directDelegationMap), { A: 'B', B: 'C',
    ↪ C: 'D' }, "Chain A->B->C->D exists");
}

function test_detect_cycle() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Detect Cycle ===`);
  resetMaps();
  add_delegation('A', 'B');
  add_delegation('B', 'C');
  add_delegation('C', 'D');
  const success = add_delegation('D', 'A');
  assert(!success, "Should detect cycle when D tries to delegate to A");
}

function test_remove_delegation() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Remove Delegation ===`);
  resetMaps();
  add_delegation('A', 'B');
  add_delegation('B', 'C');
  remove_delegation('B');
  assertEquals(Object.fromEntries(directDelegationMap), { A: 'B' }, "Only
    ↪ A->B should remain");
}

function test_add_after_removal() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Add After Removal ===`);

```

```

    resetMaps();
    add_delegation('A', 'B');
    add_delegation('B', 'C');
    add_delegation('C', 'D');
    remove_delegation('B');
    const success = add_delegation('D', 'A');
    assert(success, "Should allow D->A after B->C removed");
}

function test_delegation_to_self() {
    testCounter++;
    console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Delegation to Self ===`);
    resetMaps();
    const success = add_delegation('A', 'A');
    assert(!success, "Should not allow delegation to self");
}

function test_indirect_dependency_tracking() {
    testCounter++;
    console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Indirect Dependency Tracking
    → ===`);
    resetMaps();
    add_delegation('A', 'B');
    add_delegation('B', 'C');
    add_delegation('C', 'D');
    const indirect = [...inverseIndirectMap.get('D')];
    indirect.sort();
    assertEquals(indirect, ['A', 'B', 'C'], "D should have indirect
    → dependents A, B, C");
}

function test_multiple_voters_to_same_delegate() {
    testCounter++;
    console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Multiple Voters to Same
    → Delegate ===`);
    resetMaps();
    add_delegation('A', 'Z');
    add_delegation('B', 'Z');
    add_delegation('C', 'Z');
    assertEquals(Object.fromEntries(directDelegationMap), { A: 'Z', B: 'Z',
    → C: 'Z' }, "Multiple voters delegating to Z");
}

```

```

}

function test_star_topology() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Star Topology ===`);
  resetMaps();
  add_delegation('A', 'Z');
  add_delegation('B', 'Z');
  add_delegation('C', 'Z');
  add_delegation('D', 'Z');
  add_delegation('E', 'Z');
  const indirect = [...inverseIndirectMap.get('Z')];
  indirect.sort();
  assertEquals(indirect, ['A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E'], "Z should have A, B,
    ↪ C, D, E as dependents");
}

// --- Run All Tests ---
function run_all_core_delegation_tests() {
  console.log("\n=== Running Core Delegation Unit Tests ===");

  test_simple_delegation();
  test_chain_no_cycle();
  test_detect_cycle();
  test_remove_delegation();
  test_add_after_removal();
  test_delegation_to_self();
  test_indirect_dependency_tracking();
  test_multiple_voters_to_same_delegate();
  test_star_topology();

  console.log(`\n=== ALL ${testCounter} CORE DELEGATION TESTS PASSED
    ↪ ===`);
}

// --- Start ---
run_all_core_delegation_tests();

```

## A.2 Ranked Delegation

```
// --- Simulated Maps for testing (Ranked Delegation Only) ---
const directDelegationMap = new Map(); // voter -> array of [did, rank,
  ↪ status]

// --- Simulated DB accessors ---
function get_direct_delegation_map() {
  return directDelegationMap;
}

function resetMaps() {
  directDelegationMap.clear();
  did_to_delegate.clear();
  did_to_rank.clear();
}

// --- Helper Functions ---

function get_delegations(voter) {
  return get_direct_delegation_map().get(voter) || [];
}

function set_delegations(voter, delegations) {
  get_direct_delegation_map().set(voter, delegations);
}

function find_all_paths(voter, currentPath, paths) {
  const delegations = get_delegations(voter);
  for (const [did, _rank, active] of delegations) {
    if (active === '0') {
      continue;
    }
    const delegate = get_delegate_from_did(did);
    const newPath = [...currentPath, [voter, did]];
    if (is_casting_vote(delegate)) {
      paths.push(newPath);
    } else if (!currentPath.find(([v, _]) => v === delegate)) {
      find_all_paths(delegate, newPath, paths);
    }
  }
}
```

```
}

function is_casting_voter(voter) {
  const delegations = get_delegations(voter);
  for (const [did, _rank, active] of delegations) {
    if (active !== '0') {
      return false;
    }
  }
  return true;
}

function get_delegate_from_did(did) {
  return did_to_delegate.get(did);
}

function get_rank_from_did(did) {
  return did_to_rank.get(did);
}

function min_sum(voter) {
  const paths = [];
  find_all_paths(voter, [], paths);

  let minSumPath = [];
  let minSum = Number.MAX_VALUE;

  for (const path of paths) {
    let sum = 0;
    for (const [_v, did] of path) {
      sum += get_rank_from_did(did);
    }
    if (sum < minSum) {
      minSum = sum;
      minSumPath = path;
    }
  }
  return minSumPath;
}

function min_sum_all() {
```

```

for (const voter of get_direct_delegation_map().keys()) {
  const minPath = min_sum(voter);
  if (minPath.length > 0) {
    for (const [v, did] of minPath) {
      const delegations = get_delegations(v);
      const updated = delegations.map(([d, rank, active]) => {
        if (d === did) {
          return [d, rank, '2'];
        } else if (active === '2') {
          return [d, rank, '1'];
        }
        return [d, rank, active];
      });
      set_delegations(v, updated);
    }
  }
}

// --- Utilities for Testing ---

let testCounter = 1;

function assertEquals(actual, expected, message) {
  if (JSON.stringify(actual) !== JSON.stringify(expected)) {
    console.error(`FAIL (Test #${testCounter}): ${message}\nExpected:
    ↳ ${JSON.stringify(expected)}\nGot: ${JSON.stringify(actual)}\n`);
    throw new Error("Test failed");
  } else {
    console.log(`PASS (Test #${testCounter}): ${message}`);
    testCounter++;
  }
}

// --- Mappings for DID -> delegate and rank ---
const did_to_delegate = new Map();
const did_to_rank = new Map();

// --- Test Cases ---

function test_ranked_delegation_simple() {

```

```

console.log("\n=== Test: Simple Ranked Delegation ===");
resetMaps();

set_delegations('A', [['did1', 1, '1'], ['did2', 2, '1']]);
did_to_delegate.set('did1', 'B');
did_to_delegate.set('did2', 'C');
did_to_rank.set('did1', 1);
did_to_rank.set('did2', 2);

min_sum_all();

assertEqual(get_delegations('A'), [['did1', 1, '2'], ['did2', 2, '1']],
  → "A should activate delegation to B with lower rank");
}

function test_ranked_delegation_chain() {
  console.log("\n=== Test: Ranked Delegation Chain ===");
  resetMaps();

  set_delegations('A', [['did1', 1, '1']]);
  set_delegations('B', [['did2', 2, '1']]);
  did_to_delegate.set('did1', 'B');
  did_to_delegate.set('did2', 'C');
  did_to_rank.set('did1', 1);
  did_to_rank.set('did2', 2);

  min_sum_all();

  assertEquals(get_delegations('A'), [['did1', 1, '2']], "A's delegation
    → to B should stay active");
  assertEquals(get_delegations('B'), [['did2', 2, '2']], "B's delegation
    → to C should be activated");
}

function test_ranked_delegation_multiple_paths() {
  console.log("\n=== Test: Ranked Delegation Multiple Paths ===");
  resetMaps();

  set_delegations('A', [['did1', 3, '1'], ['did2', 1, '1']]);
  did_to_delegate.set('did1', 'B');
  did_to_delegate.set('did2', 'C');

```

```

    did_to_rank.set('did1', 3);
    did_to_rank.set('did2', 1);

    min_sum_all();

    assertEquals(get_delegations('A'), [['did1', 3, '1'], ['did2', 1, '2']],
        ↪ "A should pick delegation to C with lower rank");
}

// --- More Complex Tests ---

function test_ranked_delegation_complex_1() {
    console.log("\n=== Test: Complex Ranked Delegation 1 ===");
    resetMaps();

    set_delegations('A', [['did1', 2, '1'], ['did2', 5, '1']]);
    set_delegations('B', [['did3', 1, '1']]);
    did_to_delegate.set('did1', 'B');
    did_to_delegate.set('did2', 'D');
    did_to_delegate.set('did3', 'C');
    did_to_rank.set('did1', 2);
    did_to_rank.set('did2', 5);
    did_to_rank.set('did3', 1);

    min_sum_all();

    assertEquals(get_delegations('A'), [['did1', 2, '2'], ['did2', 5, '1']],
        ↪ "A should activate to B through did1");
    assertEquals(get_delegations('B'), [['did3', 1, '2']], "B should
        ↪ activate to C through did3");
}

function test_ranked_delegation_complex_2() {
    console.log("\n=== Test: Complex Ranked Delegation 2 ===");
    resetMaps();

    set_delegations('A', [['did1', 5, '1'], ['did2', 2, '1']]);
    set_delegations('B', [['did3', 2, '1']]);
    set_delegations('C', [['did4', 3, '1']]);
    did_to_delegate.set('did1', 'B');
    did_to_delegate.set('did2', 'C');

```



```

    did_to_delegate.set('did3', 'D');
    did_to_delegate.set('did4', 'E');
    did_to_rank.set('did1', 5);
    did_to_rank.set('did2', 2);
    did_to_rank.set('did3', 2);
    did_to_rank.set('did4', 3);

    min_sum_all();

    assertEquals(get_delegations('A'), [['did1', 5, '1'], ['did2', 2,
    → '2']], "A should pick C through did2 (lowest total rank)");
    assertEquals(get_delegations('B'), [['did3', 2, '2']], "B should
    → activate to D through did3");
    assertEquals(get_delegations('C'), [['did4', 3, '2']], "C should
    → activate to E through did4");

}

// --- Run All Tests ---

function run_ranked_delegation_tests() {
    console.log("\n=== Running Ranked Delegation Tests ===");
    test_ranked_delegation_simple();
    test_ranked_delegation_chain();
    test_ranked_delegation_multiple_paths();
    test_ranked_delegation_complex_1();
    test_ranked_delegation_complex_2();
    console.log("\n=== ALL RANKED DELEGATION TESTS PASSED ===");
}

// --- Start Tests ---
run_ranked_delegation_tests();

```

## A.3 Weighted Delegation

```

// test_weighted_delegation.js

// --- Global Test Counter ---

```

```

let testCounter = 0;

// --- Simulated Maps for Testing ---
const directDelegationMap = new Map(); // voter -> array of [did, trust,
  ↳ active]
const didToDelegate      = new Map(); // did -> delegate userId

// --- Utilities ---
function resetMaps() {
  directDelegationMap.clear();
  didToDelegate.clear();
}

function assertEquals(actual, expected, message) {
  if (JSON.stringify(actual) !== JSON.stringify(expected)) {
    console.error(`FAIL (Test ${testCounter}): ${message}
Expected: ${JSON.stringify(expected)}
Got:      ${JSON.stringify(actual)}\n`);
    throw new Error("Test failed");
  } else {
    console.log(`PASS (Test ${testCounter}): ${message}`);
  }
}

// --- Helper Functions for Weighted Delegation ---

/**
 * Runs the iterative weighted-delegation update until convergence or max
  ↳ iterations.
 * - selfMap: Map<userId, Map<optionId, number>>
 */
function updateEffectiveVotes(selfMap, maxIters = 50) {
  // initialize effective = self
  let effective = new Map();
  for (const [uid, ratings] of selfMap.entries()) {
    effective.set(uid, new Map(ratings));
  }

  for (let iter = 0; iter < maxIters; iter++) {
    let changed = false;
    const nextEff = new Map();

```

```

for (const [uid, ratings] of selfMap.entries()) {
  const delegs = directDelegationMap.get(uid) || [];
  if (delegs.length === 0) {
    // no delegation: identical to self
    nextEff.set(uid, new Map(ratings));
    continue;
  }
  const combined = new Map();
  for (const [oid, selfVal] of ratings.entries()) {
    let weightDone = 0, val = 0;
    for (const [did, trustStr, active] of delegs) {
      if (active === '0') continue;
      const trust = parseInt(trustStr, 10);
      weightDone += trust;
      const delegate = didToDelegate.get(did);
      val += (trust/100) * effective.get(delegate).get(oid);
    }
    val += ((100 - weightDone)/100) * selfVal;
    // detect any change
    if (!combined.has(oid) || val !== effective.get(uid).get(oid)) {
      changed = true;
    }
    combined.set(oid, val);
  }
  nextEff.set(uid, combined);
}

effective = nextEff;
if (!changed) break;
}

// floor final values
const floored = new Map();
for (const [uid, ratings] of effective.entries()) {
  const m = new Map();
  for (const [oid, v] of ratings.entries()) {
    m.set(oid, Math.floor(v));
  }
  floored.set(uid, m);
}

```

```

    return floored;
}

// --- Test Cases ---

function test_no_delegation() {
    testCounter++;
    console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: No Delegation ===`);
    resetMaps();
    const self = new Map([
        ['A', new Map([ ['x',50], ['y',80] ])]
    ]);
    const eff = updateEffectiveVotes(self);
    assertEquals(
        Array.from(eff.get('A').entries()),
        [['x',50],['y',80]],
        "With no delegations, effective == self"
    );
}

function test_simple_weighted_delegation() {
    testCounter++;
    console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Simple Weighted Delegation
    ↪ ===`);
    resetMaps();
    directDelegationMap.set('A', [['did1','60','1']]);
    didToDelegate.set('did1','B');
    const self = new Map([
        ['A', new Map([ ['x',100] ])],
        ['B', new Map([ ['x',50] ])]
    ]);
    const eff = updateEffectiveVotes(self);
    // 0.6*50 + 0.4*100 = 30+40 = 70
    assertEquals(
        Array.from(eff.get('A').entries()),
        [['x',70]],
        "A's effective x = 60% of B's 50 + 40% of own 100"
    );
    assertEquals(
        Array.from(eff.get('B').entries()),
        [['x',50]],

```

```

    "B unaffected"
  );
}

function test_chain_weighted_delegation() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Chain Weighted Delegation
    ↪ ===`);
  resetMaps();
  directDelegationMap.set('A', [['d1', '50', '1']]);
  directDelegationMap.set('B', [['d2', '50', '1']]);
  didToDelegate.set('d1', 'B');
  didToDelegate.set('d2', 'C');
  const self = new Map([
    ['A', new Map([ ['x', 100] ])],
    ['B', new Map([ ['x', 80] ])],
    ['C', new Map([ ['x', 20] ])]
  ]);
  const eff = updateEffectiveVotes(self);
  // B: .5*20 + .5*80 = 50
  // A: .5*50 + .5*100 = 75
  assertEquals(
    Array.from(eff.get('B').entries()),
    [['x', 50]],
    "B's effective x = 50%"
  );
  assertEquals(
    Array.from(eff.get('A').entries()),
    [['x', 75]],
    "A's effective x = 75%"
  );
}

function test_multi_delegate_splitting() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Multi-Delegate Splitting ===`);
  resetMaps();
  directDelegationMap.set('A', [
    ['d1', '30', '1'],
    ['d2', '50', '1']
  ]);
}

```

```

    didToDelegate.set('d1', 'B');
    didToDelegate.set('d2', 'C');
    const self = new Map([
      ['A', new Map([ ['x', 100], ['y', 0] ])],
      ['B', new Map([ ['x', 0], ['y', 100] ])],
      ['C', new Map([ ['x', 50], ['y', 50] ])]
    ]);
    const eff = updateEffectiveVotes(self);
    //  $x = .3*0 + .5*50 + .2*100 = 45$  ;  $y = .3*100 + .5*50 + .2*0 = 55$ 
    assertEquals(
      Array.from(eff.get('A').entries()),
      [['x', 45], ['y', 55]],
      "A splits trust: x=45, y=55"
    );
  }

function test_exact_full_self_trust() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Full Self-Trust Edge ===`);
  resetMaps();
  directDelegationMap.set('A', [ ['d1', '100', '1'] ]);
  didToDelegate.set('d1', 'B');
  const self = new Map([
    ['A', new Map([ ['x', 90] ])],
    ['B', new Map([ ['x', 10] ])]
  ]);
  const eff = updateEffectiveVotes(self);
  // A fully delegates, so  $x = B$ 's 10
  assertEquals(
    Array.from(eff.get('A').entries()),
    [['x', 10]],
    "A's x fully delegated to B"
  );
}

function test_cyclical_delegation_convergence() {
  testCounter++;
  console.log(`\n=== Test ${testCounter}: Cyclical Delegation Convergence  

  → ===`);
  resetMaps();
  // A <-> B each 50%

```

```

directDelegationMap.set('A',[ ['d1','50','1'] ]);
directDelegationMap.set('B',[ ['d2','50','1'] ]);
didToDelegate.set('d1','B');
didToDelegate.set('d2','A');
const self = new Map([
  ['A', new Map([ ['x',80] ])],
  ['B', new Map([ ['x',80] ])]
]);
const eff = updateEffectiveVotes(self);
// both should remain at 80 after convergence
assertEqual(
  Array.from(eff.get('A').entries()),
  [['x',80]],
  "A converges to 80 in the A<->B cycle"
);
assertEqual(
  Array.from(eff.get('B').entries()),
  [['x',80]],
  "B converges to 80 in the A<->B cycle"
);
}

// --- Run All Tests ---
function run_all_weighted_tests() {
  console.log("\n=== Running Weighted Delegation Tests ===");
  test_no_delegation();
  test_simple_weighted_delegation();
  test_chain_weighted_delegation();
  test_multi_delegate_splitting();
  test_exact_full_self_trust();
  test_cyclical_delegation_convergence();
  console.log(`\n=== ALL ${testCounter} WEIGHTED DELEGATION TESTS PASSED
  ↳ ===`);
}

run_all_weighted_tests();

```

## Appendix B

### Performance Testing Script

```
// perf_weighted_delegation.js
// This module exports a runPerformance function that benchmarks the
// weighted-delegation convergence routine (random graphs + worst-case
// → chain).

const { performance } = require('perf_hooks');

// --- Core updateEffectiveVotes implementation ---
function updateEffectiveVotes(
  selfMap,
  directDelMap,
  agreementMap,
  options,
  epsilon = 0.00001,
  maxIters = 10000
) {
  let effective = new Map(selfMap);
  let iterations = 0;

  while (iterations < maxIters) {
    let maxDelta = 0;
    const nextEff = new Map();

    for (const [uid, selfRatings] of selfMap.entries()) {
      const delegs = directDelMap.get(uid) || [];
      if (delegs.length === 0) {
        nextEff.set(uid, new Map(selfRatings));
        continue;
      }
    }
  }
}
```



```

    }

    const newRatings = new Map();
    for (const oid of options) {
        let weightDone = 0, acc = 0;
        for (const [did, trust, status] of delegs) {
            if (status === '0') continue;
            const agr = agreementMap.get(did);
            if (!agr || agr.status === 'pending') continue;
            const delId = agr.delegate_vid;
            weightDone += trust;
            acc += (trust / 100) * effective.get(delId).get(oid);
        }
        // include self-trust
        acc += ((100 - weightDone) / 100) * selfMap.get(uid).get(oid);
        maxDelta = Math.max(maxDelta, Math.abs(acc -
            ↪ effective.get(uid).get(oid)));
        newRatings.set(oid, acc);
    }
    nextEff.set(uid, newRatings);
}

effective = nextEff;
iterations++;
if (maxDelta <= epsilon) break;
}

// floor final ratings
for (const ratings of effective.values()) {
    for (const oid of ratings.keys()) {
        ratings.set(oid, Math.floor(ratings.get(oid)));
    }
}

return { effective, iterations };
}

// --- Helper to generate random test graph ---
function randomInt(min, max) {
    return Math.floor(Math.random() * (max - min + 1)) + min;
}

```

```

function generateRandomGraph(N, options) {
  const selfMap = new Map();
  const directDelMap = new Map();
  const agreementMap = new Map();
  const voters = Array.from({ length: N }, (_, i) => `V${i + 1}`);

  // random self-ratings
  voters.forEach(v => {
    const ratings = new Map();
    options.forEach(o => ratings.set(o, Math.random() * 100));
    selfMap.set(v, ratings);
  });

  // random trust delegation
  voters.forEach(v => {
    const pool = voters.filter(x => x !== v);
    let selfTrust = randomInt(1, 100),
        remaining = 100 - selfTrust;

    while (remaining > 0 && pool.length > 0) {
      let delegate, trust;
      if (pool.length === 1) {
        delegate = pool[0];
        trust = remaining;
      } else {
        const idx = randomInt(0, pool.length - 1);
        delegate = pool.splice(idx, 1)[0];
        trust = randomInt(1, remaining);
      }
      remaining -= trust;
      const did = `${v}->${delegate}:${trust}`;
      directDelMap.set(v, (directDelMap.get(v) || []).concat([[did,
        ↪ trust, '2']]));
      agreementMap.set(did, { status: 'agreed', delegate_vid: delegate
        ↪ });
    }
  });

  return { selfMap, directDelMap, agreementMap };
}

```

```

// --- Helper to generate worst-case chain graph ---
function generateChainGraph(N, options) {
  const selfMap = new Map();
  const directDelMap = new Map();
  const agreementMap = new Map();
  const voters = Array.from({ length: N }, (_, i) => `V${i + 1}`);

  // random self-ratings
  voters.forEach(v => {
    const ratings = new Map();
    options.forEach(o => ratings.set(o, Math.random() * 100));
    selfMap.set(v, ratings);
  });

  const trust = 99;
  // build a linear chain: V1->V2->...->VN
  for (let i = 0; i < N - 1; i++) {
    const v = voters[i], nxt = voters[i + 1];
    const did = `${v}->${nxt}:${trust}`;
    directDelMap.set(v, [[did, trust, '2']]);
    agreementMap.set(did, { status: 'agreed', delegate_vid: nxt });
  }
  const did = `${voters[N]}->${voters[0]}:${trust}`;
  directDelMap.set(voters[N], [[did, trust, '2']]);
  agreementMap.set(did, { status: 'agreed', delegate_vid: voters[0] });

  return { selfMap, directDelMap, agreementMap };
}

// --- Main benchmarking function ---
async function runPerformance(sizes, reps, options) {
  const results = [];

  for (const N of sizes) {
    // random graphs
    let sumI = 0, maxI = 0, sumT = 0, maxT = 0;
    for (let r = 0; r < reps; r++) {
      const { selfMap, directDelMap, agreementMap } =
        generateRandomGraph(N, options);
      const t0 = performance.now();

```

```

    const { iterations } = updateEffectiveVotes(selfMap, directDelMap,
      ↪ agreementMap, options);
    const t1 = performance.now();
    sumI += iterations;
    maxI = Math.max(maxI, iterations);
    const dt = t1 - t0;
    sumT += dt;
    maxT = Math.max(maxT, dt);
  }

  // worst-case
  {
    const { selfMap, directDelMap, agreementMap } =
      ↪ generateChainGraph(N, options);
    const t0 = performance.now();
    const { iterations } = updateEffectiveVotes(selfMap, directDelMap,
      ↪ agreementMap, options);
    const t1 = performance.now();
    maxT = Math.max(maxT, t1-t0)
    maxI = Math.max(maxI, iterations);
  }

  results.push({
    size: N,
    type: 'random',
    avgIters: sumI / reps,
    maxIters: maxI,
    avgTimeMs: sumT / reps,
    maxTimeMs: maxT
  });
}

return results;
}

module.exports = { runPerformance, updateEffectiveVotes };

```