



Web Application Security

Lecture:03

Mapping the Application

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Mapping

- **Enumerate application's content and functionality**
- **Some is hidden, requiring guesswork and luck to discover**
- **Examine every aspect of behavior, security mechanisms, and technologies**
- **Determine *attack surface* and *vulnerabilities***

Enumerating Content and Functionality

Web Spiders

- **Load web page, find all links on it**
 - **(into the targeted domain)**
- **Load those pages, find more links**
- **Continue until no new content is discovered**

Web Application Spiders

- **Also parse HTML forms**
 - **Fill in the forms with preset or random values and submit them**
 - **Trying to walk through multistage functionality**
- **Can also parse client-side JavaScript to extract URLs**
- **Tools: WebScarab, Zed Attack Proxy, and CAT**

Robots.txt

- **Intended to stop search engines**
- **May guide spiders to interesting content**



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying `www.ccsf.edu/robots.txt`. The page content is a text file with the following text:

```
# /robots.txt for http://www.ccsf.cc.ca.us/  
# comments to jjah@cloud.ccsf.cc.ca.us  
  
User-agent: *  
Disallow: /autodiscover.xml  
Disallow: /crossdomain.xml  
Disallow: /browserconfig.xml  
Disallow: /api  
Disallow: /admin  
Disallow: /Schedule/Archive/  
Disallow: /Schedule/Archives/  
Disallow: /translate.google.com  
Disallow: /Shared_Files  
Disallow: /shared_images  
Disallow: /applications  
Disallow: /sitemap.xml  
Disallow: /Campuses/  
Disallow: /Chat/  
Disallow: /Departments/
```




Figure 4-1: Mapping part of an application using Burp Spider

Limitations of Automatic Spidering

May fail to handle unusual navigation mechanisms, such as dynamically created JavaScript menus

- So it may miss whole areas of an application**

Links buried in compiled client-side objects like Flash or Java may be missed

Limitations of Automatic Spidering

- **Forms may have validation checks, such as user registration forms**
- **Email address, telephone number, address, zip code**
- **Too complex for most spiders, which use a single text string for all form fields**
- **Spider cannot understand the "Invalid" error messages**

Limitations of Automatic Spidering

- **Spiders only fetch each URL once**
 - **But applications use forms-based navigation, in which the same URL may return different content and functions**
 - **For example, a bank may implement every user action with POST to /account.jsp with parameters determining the action**
 - **Spiders aren't smart enough to handle that**

Example

View Account Balance Request:

`Get/account.jsp?action=view_balance`

The server returns the account balance.

Make a Transfer Request:

`POST/account.jsp?action=make_transfer&amount=100&to_account=12345`

The server processes the transfer request and deducts \$100 from the user's account.

Pay a Bill Request:

`POST /account.jsp?action=pay_bill&bill_id=789`

The server processes the bill payment.

Limitations of Automatic Spidering

- **Some applications place volatile data within URLs**
- **Parameters containing timers or random number seeds**
- **Spider will fetch the same page over and over, thinking it's new**
- **May freeze up**

Example

**/account.jsp?user_id=12345×tamp=1634567891&random_se
ed=xyz987**

**/account.jsp?user_id=12345×tamp=1634567891&random_se
ed=xyz988**

**/account.jsp?user_id=12345×tamp=1634567892&random_se
ed=xyz989**

All leads to same page

Limitations of Automatic Spidering

- **Authentication: spider must be able to submit valid credentials**
 - **Perhaps using a valid cookie**
- **However, spiders often break the authenticated session, by**
 - **Requesting a logout function**
 - **Submitting invalid input to a sensitive function**
 - **Requesting pages out-of-sequence**

Warning

- Spiders may find an administrative page and**
 - click every link**
 - Delete User, Shut Down Database, Restart Server...**

User-Directed Spidering

- **More sophisticated and controlled technique than automated spidering, usually preferable**
- **User walks through application using a browser connected to Burp (or another proxy)**
- **The proxy collects all requests and responses**

Advantages of User-Directed Spidering

- **User can follow unusual or complex navigation mechanisms**
- **User can enter valid data where needed**
- **User can log in as needed**
- **User can avoid dangerous functionality, such as deleteUser.jsp**

Browser Tools

- **Chrome's Developer Tools can show details of requests and responses within the browser**
- **No proxy needed**
- **Often useful; shows timing as well as content**

Discovering Hidden Content

- Finding it requires automates testing, manual testing, and luck
- Testing or debugging features left in application
- Different functionality for different categories of users
 - Anonymous, authenticated, administrators
- Backup copies of live files
 - May be non-executable and reveal source code

Discovering Hidden Content

- **Backup archives that contain snapshot of entire application**
- **New functionality implemented for testing but not yet linked from main application**
- **Default functionality in an off-the-shelf application that has been superficially hidden from the user but not removed**
- **Old versions of files--may still be exploitable**

Discovering Hidden Content

- **Configuration and include files containing sensitive data such as database credentials**
- **Source files from which application functions were compiled**
- **Comments in source code; may contain usernames and passwords, "test this" marks, and other useful data**
- **Log files--may contain valid usernames, session tokens, etc.**

Brute-Force Techniques

- **Suppose user-directed spidering finds the URLs on the left**
- **A brute-forcer will try names as shown on the right**

```
http://eis/auth/Login  
http://eis/auth/ForgotPassword  
http://eis/home/  
http://eis/pub/media/100/view  
http://eis/images/eis.gif  
http://eis/include/eis.css
```

```
http://eis/About/  
http://eis/abstract/  
http://eis/academics/  
http://eis/accessibility/  
http://eis/accounts/  
http://eis/action/  
...
```

Burp's Brute-Forcer

- Burp's brute-forcer is crippled in the free version

Request	Position	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length
0			200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	74451
1	1	images	301	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	585
2	1	css	301	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	573
3	1	LC_MESSAGES	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
4	1	js	301	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	569
5	1	tmpl	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
6	1	lang	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
7	1	default	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
8	1	README	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
9	1	templates	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
10	1	langs	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
11	1	config	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
12	1	GNUmakefile	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
13	1	themes	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232
14	1	en	404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22232

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Inference from Published Content

- Look for patterns
- All subdirectories of "auth" start with a capital letter
- One is "ForgotPassword", so try these

```
http://eis/auth/AddPassword  
http://eis/auth/ForgotPassword  
http://eis/auth/GetPassword  
http://eis/auth/ResetPassword  
http://eis/auth/RetrievePassword  
http://eis/auth/UpdatePassword  
...
```


Discovering Hidden Parameters

- **Try adding "debug=true" to requests**
 - **Or test, hide, source, etc.**
- **Burp Intruder can do this (see Ch 14)**

Analyzing the Application

- **Key areas**
 - **Core functionality**
 - **Peripheral behavior: off-site links, error messages, administrative and logging functions, and use of redirects**
 - **Core security mechanisms: session state, access control, authentication**
 - **User registration, password change, account recovery**

Key Areas (continued)

- **Everywhere the application processes user-supplied input**
 - **URL, query string, POST data, cookies**
- **Client-side technologies**
 - **Forms, scripts, thick-client components (Java applets, ActiveX controls, and Flash), and cookies**

Key Areas (continued)

- **Server-side technologies**
 - **Static and dynamic pages, request parameters, SSL, Web server software, interaction with databases, email systems, and other back-end components**

Entry Points for User Input

- Every URL string up to the query string marker
- Every parameter submitted within the URL query string
- Every parameter submitted within the body of a `POST` request
- Every cookie
- Every other HTTP header that the application might process — in particular, the `User-Agent`, `Referer`, `Accept`, `Accept-Language`, and `Host` headers

URL File Paths

- **RESTful URLs put parameters where folder names would go**

```
http://eis/shop/browse/electronics/iPhone3G/
```

In this example, the strings `electronics` and `iPhone3G` should be treated as parameters to store a search function.

Request Parameters

Here are some nonstandard parameter formats

- - `/dir/file;foo=bar&foo2=bar2`
 - `/dir/file?foo=bar$foo2=bar2`
 - `/dir/file/foo%3dbar%26foo2%3dbar2`
 - `/dir/foo.bar/file`
 - `/dir/foo=bar/file`
 - `/dir/file?param=foo:bar`
 - `/dir/file?data=%3cfoo%3ebar%3c%2ffoo%3e%3cfoo2%3ebar2%3c%2ffoo2%3e`

HTTP Headers

- **User-Agent is used to detect small screens**
- **Sometimes to modify content to boost search engine rankings**
- **May allow XSS and other injection attacks**
- **Changing User-Agent may reveal a different user interface**

HTTP Headers

- **Applications behind a load balancer or proxy may use X-Forwarded-For header to identify source**
- **Can be manipulated by attacker to inject content**

Out-of-Band Channels

- **User data may come in via**
 - **Email**
 - **Publishing content via HTTP from another server**
 - **IDS that sniffs traffic and puts it into a Web application**
 - **API interface for non-browser user agents, such as cell phone apps, and then shares data with the primary web application**

Identifying Server-Side Technologies

Banner Grabbing

Many web servers disclose fine-grained version information, both about the web server software itself and about other components that have been installed.

For example, the HTTP Server header discloses a huge amount of detail about some installations:

```
Server: Apache/1.3.31 (Unix) mod_gzip/1.3.26.1a mod_auth_passthrough/  
1.8 mod_log_bytes/1.2 mod_bwlimited/1.4 PHP/4.3.9 FrontPage/  
5.0.2.2634a mod_ssl/2.8.20 OpenSSL/0.9.7a
```

HTTP Fingerprinting

Httprecon:

- This is a tool specifically designed for HTTP fingerprinting.
- It performs a variety of tests against a web server and analyzes its responses.
- The tool can provide: Possible Server Identifications: Based on the responses received, it will suggest what type of server might be running, along with the confidence level of each guess.

Example


see output like this: Detected

Servers:

Apache 2.4: Confidence level 90%

Nginx 1.18: Confidence level 70%

IIS 10: Confidence level 50% This means that




File Extensions

- **Disclose platform or language**
 - `asp` — Microsoft Active Server Pages
 - `aspx` — Microsoft ASP.NET
 - `jsp` — Java Server Pages
 - `cfm` — Cold Fusion
 - `php` — The PHP language
 - `d2w` — WebSphere
 - `p1` — The Perl language
 - `py` — The Python language
 - `d11` — Usually compiled native code (C or C++)
 - `nsf` or `ntf` — Lotus Domino


Error Messages

Figure 4.12 A customized error page indicating that the ASP.NET platform is present on the server



Error Message


Figure 4.13 A generic error message created when an unrecognized file extension is requested



File Extension Mappings

- **Different DLLs may lead to different error messages**

Figure 4.14 File extension mappings in IIS 5.0



OpenText

```
https://wahh-app/news/0,,2-421206,00.html
```

The comma-separated numbers toward the end of the URL are usually generated by the Vignette content management platform.

- **Vignette is now rebranded as OpenText**
- **Link Ch 4i**

Directory Names

- **Indicate technology in use**
 - `servlet` — Java servlets
 - `pls` — Oracle Application Server PL/SQL gateway
 - `cfdocs` or `cfide` — Cold Fusion
 - `SilverStream` — The SilverStream web server
 - `WebObjects` or `{function}.woa` — Apple WebObjects
 - `rails` — Ruby on Rails

Session Tokens

- `JSESSIONID` — The Java Platform
- `ASPSESSIONID` — Microsoft IIS server
- `ASP.NET_SessionId` — Microsoft ASP.NET
- `CFID/CFTOKEN` — Cold Fusion
- `PHPSESSID` — PHP

Third-Party Code Components

- **Add common functionality like**
 - **Shopping carts**
 - **Login mechanisms**
 - **Message boards**
- **Open-Source or commercial**
- **May contain known vulnerabilities**

Hack Steps

1. Identify all entry points for user input

- URL, query string parameters, POST data, cookies, HTTP headers**

2.Examine query string format; should be some variation on name/value pair

3.Identify any other channels that allow user-controllable or third-party data into the app

Hack Steps

**4. View HTTP server banner returned by the app;
it may use several different servers**

**5. Check for other software identifiers in custom
HTTP headers or HTML source code**

6. Run httpprint to fingerprint the web server

7. Research software versions for vulnerabilities

**8. Review map of URLs to find interesting file
extensions, directories, etc. with clues about
the technologies in use**

httpprint



- **Not updated since 2005 (link Ch 4j)**
- **Alternatives include nmap, Netcraft, and SHODAN (Link Ch 4k)**
- **Also the Wappalyzer Chrome extension**

Hack Steps

- 9. Review names of session tokens to identify technologies being used**
- 10. Use lists of common technologies, or Google, to identify technologies in use, or discover other websites that use the same technologies**
- 11. Google unusual cookie names, scripts, HTTP headers, etc. If possible, download and install the software to analyze it and find vulnerabilities**

Identifying Server-Side Functionality

```
https://wahh-  
app.com/calendar.jsp?name=new%20applicants&isExpired=  
0&startDate=22%2F09%2F2010&endDate=22%2F03%2F2011&OrderBy=name
```

- **.jsp - Java Server Pages**
- **OrderBy parameter looks like SQL**
- **isExpired suggests that we could get expired content by changing this value**

Identifying Server-Side Functionality

```
https://wahh-app.com/workbench.aspx?template=NewBranch.tpl&loc=/default&ver=2.31&edit=false
```

- **.aspx - Active Server Pages (Microsoft)**
- **template - seems to be a filename and loc - looks like a directory; may be vulnerable to path traversal**
- **edit - maybe we can change files if this is true**
- **ver - perhaps changing this will reveal other functions to attack**

Identifying Server-Side Functionality

```
POST /feedback.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: wahn-app.com  
Content-Length: 389
```

```
from=user@wahn-mail.com&to=helpdesk@wahn-app.com&subject=  
Problem+logging+in&message=Please+help...
```

- **.php - PHP**
- **Connecting to an email server, with user-controllable content in all fields**
- **May be usable to send emails**
- **Any fields may be vulnerable to email header injection**

Identifying Server-Side Functionality

```
http://eis/pub/media/117/view
```

The handling of this URL is probably functionally equivalent to the following:

```
http://eis/manager?schema=pub&type=media&id=117&action=view
```

- **Change action to "edit" or "add"**
- **Try viewing other collections by changing the id number**

Extrapolating Application Behavior

- **An application often behaves consistently across the range of its functionality**
 - **Because code is re-used or written by the same developer, or to the same specifications**
- **So if your SQL injections are being filtered out, try injecting elsewhere to see what filtering is in effect**

Extrapolating Application Behavior

- **If app obfuscates data, try finding a place where a user can enter an obfuscated string and retrieve the original**
 - **Such as an error message**
- **Or test systematically-varying values and deduce the obfuscation scheme**

Demo: Stitcher


The image shows a mobile application interface on the left and a Burp Suite HTTP history window on the right. The mobile app is titled "WELCOME BACK" and has a "Login" section. It features two social login buttons: "Sign In with Facebook" and "Sign In with Google". Below these, there are input fields for "Username:" (containing "a@aol.com") and "Password:" (containing a single character). The Burp Suite window on the right shows a list of HTTP requests. The second request is highlighted, showing a GET request to "/Service/CheckAuthentication.php?". Below this, the "Request" tab is selected, displaying a table of request parameters.

#	Host	Method	URL
1	http://ads.nexage.com	POST	/admax/sdk/handshake/1
2	http://stitcher.com	GET	/Service/CheckAuthentication.php?...
3	http://stitcher.com	POST	/Service/PostAction.php?mode=an...

Type	Name	Value
URL	markStartup	
URL	mode	android-Google Galaxy Nexus - 4.3 - API 18 - 720x1280
URL	deviceType	phone
URL	version	3.58
URL	hiRes	
URL	os	18
URL	timezone	-14400
URL	connectionType	NONE
URL	email	a@aol.com
URL	epx	sn
URL	udid	ff3c2dff28ffff06443d4bff2cffffff69ffff

Error Handling

- **Some errors may be properly handled and give little information**
Others may crash and return verbose error information



Isolate Unique Application Behavior

- **App may use a consistent framework that prevents attacks**
- **Look for extra parts "bolted on" later, which may not be integrated into the framework**
 - **Debug functions, CAPTCHAs, usage tracking, third-party code**
 - **Different GUI appearance, parameter naming conventions, comments in source code**

Mapping the Attack Surface

- **Client-side validation**
- **Database interaction -- SQL injection**
- **File uploading and downloading -- Path traversal, stored XSS**
- **Display of user-supplied data - XSS**
- **Dynamic redirects -- Redirection and header attacks**

Mapping the Attack Surface

- **Social networking features -- username enumeration, stored XSS**
- **Login -- Username enumeration, weak passwords, brute-force attacks**
- **Multistage login -- Logic flaws**
- **Session state -- Predictable tokens, insecure token handling**


Mapping the Attack Surface

- **Access controls -- Horizontal and vertical privilege escalation**
- **User impersonation functions -- Privilege escalation**
- **Cleartext communications -- Session hijacking, credential theft**
- **Off-site links -- Leakage of query string parameters in the Referer header**
- **Interfaces to external systems -- Shortcuts handling sessions or access controls**

Mapping the Attack Surface


- **Error messages -- Information leakage**
- **Email interaction -- Email or command injection**
- **Native code components or interaction -- Buffer overflows**
- **Third-party components -- Known vulnerabilities**
- **Identifiable Web server -- Common configuration errors, known bugs**

Example



- **/auth contains authentication functions -- test session handling and access control**
- **/core/sitestats -- parameters; try varying them; try wildcards like *all* and ***; PageID contains a path, try traversal**
- **/home -- authenticated user content; try horizontal privilege escalation to see other user's info**

Example



- **/icons and /images -- static content, might find icons indicating third-party content, but probably nothing interesting here**
- **/pub -- RESTful resources under /pub/media and /pub/user; try changing the numerical value at the end**
- **/shop -- online shopping, all items handled similarly; check logic for possible exploits**