

TRM at Umbra facilities November 16th, 2016

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


- List of data used to supply 2016 maturity plan
- 2016 Maturity plan :
 - Reliability & Robustness
 - Maturity of design
 - Obsolescence management
 - Thermal Capabilities (Limitations)
 - Improvements
- Synthesis of 2016 Maturity Plan





List of data (tests, events,....) used to supply 2016 maturity plan:







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Theme: Thermal upscreening at PBCU level

- Observation(s):
 - Thermal upscreening is only performed at PBCU level during final production tests.
 - ☐ In engine environment, SAFRAN used to performed these tests at component level in order to eliminate weakest parts.
- <u>Risk(s)</u>:
 - PBCU failures : Low time removal high rate



- Recommendation(s):
 - ✓ SAFRAN recommend to perform upscreening at component level
- Impact(s):
 - PBCU production process modification





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Issue: Global maturity of design

- Observation(s):
 - Observations of PBCU schematics shown design weaknesses:
 - Instability of Operational Amplifiers in some usages
 - Two diodes in parallel
 - Some electronic components are overstressed:
 - Tantalum capacitors
 - Aluminium capacitors
 - Minor error in schematics

- Risk(s):
 - Early fatigue of electronics components.

- Recommendation(s):
 - ✓ Umbra to perform a full review of the schematics and perform updates consequently


- Impact(s) :
 - PBCU control board redesign





Issue: Design error on discrete interface

- Observation(s):
 - On discrete interface (SVO A & B), conditioning interface is redundant (this is not a requirement).
 - ✓ The consequence is an output current in excess: 8mA
 - ✓ Requirement is: 4mA maximum



- Risk(s):
 - No compliance on Airbus requirement
 - Impact on interface not studied.

- Recommendation(s):
 - ✓ Apply electronic design correction (hardware only)

- Impact(s):
 - PBCU control board redesign





Issue: Protection of power H-bridge – AR0346

- Observation(s):
 - H-bridge has been damaged by back EMF from PBU.
 - H-bridge does not have dedicated protection against over voltage.



Risk(s):

 Steady failure of H-bridge due to back EMF or EMI/lighting conditions.

- Recommendation(s):
 - ✓ Add dedicated components in order to protect this part.
- Impact(s):
 - PBCU control board redesign





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Issue: Obsolescence of very single source components

- Observation(s): Safran Aircraft Engines has no visibility on Umbra obsolescence management.
 - No information about PBCU changes due to obsolescence treatments since 2013.
 - In 2013, list of sensitive components has been identified. U1 is still considered as the most sensitive component. Its replacement would impact significantly PBCU internal board.

- Risk(s):
 - No anticipation of part obsolescence.
 - Potential production impacts.



- Recommendation(s):
 - ✓ Umbra to provide a synthesis of BOM obsolescence status twice a year.
 - ✓ Umbra to provide the strategy to avoid obsolescence of single sources (stock, P/N of selected part to replace the single source in case of obsolescence,...)
- Impact(s):
 - No impact on PBCU HW or SW





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Issue: Thermal limitation of PBCU

- Observation(s): In 2015, Engineering tests have been done to identified PBCU limitations. Tests performed in Umbra facilities.
- Engineering tests conclusions :
 - U1 component is the limitation of PBCU
 - In steady state: PBCU thermal limit is 80°C
- Studies and the identified evolution will only be launched if ADS finance these activities

 Risk(s): The PBCU thermal limitation (ISA+22) is disadvantageous for TP400 engine missions.

- Recommendation(s):
 - ✓ PBCU thermal limitation can be extended if power duration is limited (less than 2minutes).
 - ✓ PBCU thermal limitation can be removed if U1 component is replaced by a part with a thermal range of [-55°C; +125°C].

Impact(s):

- No impact for bullet n°1
- PBCU control board redesign for bullet n°2





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Issue: Anticipate thermal limit & Protect against over-temperature

- Obsvervation(s): PBCU thermal limit cannot be detected because no thermal sensor is populated inside the PBCU box.
- As a consequence, margins have be integrated to take into account dispersion between components.
- Add a thermal sensor will permit to warn ECU in case of PBCU over-temperature and extend PBCU thermal limitation.

- Risk(s):
 - Thermal limitation below ISA+40
 - Damage of PBCU board in case of overtemperature.

- Recommendation(s):
 - Address this issue in two steps:
 - Short term solution: adding of thermal stamps inside the PBCU case to detect over-temperatures
 - Long term solution: populate thermal sensor on PBCU control board

- Impact(s):
 - PBCU control board redesign



