

Copy No. 24

Information Brief:

VIET MINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

16 March 1955

RECORD COPY
NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM THE
FILES

VIET MINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

Introduction

On July 21, 1954, after three months of negotiation, the participants of the Geneva Conference signed Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina, Laos and Cambodia, and the Final Conference Declaration substantially incorporating the provisions of the Agreements. These Geneva Agreements defined the procedures for an orderly withdrawal and regrouping of the military forces, prohibition of acquisition of additional war materiel, cessation of political rule by either party in areas relinquished by Agreements, and free movement of persons wishing to transfer from one zone to the other. Supervision of the Agreements' provisions was made the responsibility of specially constituted International Control Commissions.

One of the signatories to the Agreements and the Final Conference Declaration was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, usually referred to as the Viet Minh. This Communist government, under the Agreements, was given control of the Vietnam territory north of the 17th Parallel. Although the Viet Minh publicly pledged itself at Geneva to the provisions of the Agreements, the whole course of its activities since the Conference has been to violate the Agreements in spirit and in letter, and to obstruct the workings of the International Control Commission.

Violations

1. Failure to Withdraw Military Forces and Equipment.

Although the Viet Minh has made a great show of moving its military personnel, either into Viet Minh territory or into the specified reassembly areas, there are persistent and reliable reports that many Viet Minh troops remain the south.

Disguised as civilians, and their places in the Viet Minh military ranks taken by recruits in order to deceive the International Control Commission observers, these military men remain in free Vietnam as agents of HO Chi Minh. They receive systematic instruction from the Viet Minh for obstructing the orderly take-over by South Vietnamese civil and military authorities.

As late as early March 1955, Nha Trang and Tourane were reported to be the scene of clandestine opposition to pacification.

In Laos, the Viet Minh follows the same pattern of leaving many of its military personnel behind disguised as civilians. Their number has been estimated by one observer to be 4,000. Mingling with Laotian citizens, they are methodically making certain that the Communist underground stays alive.

In Cambodia, although the transfer of Vietnamese forces to North Vietnam was ostensibly completed by the end of October, 1954, Cambodian officials assert that the 2,500 Viet Minh troops observed to depart were only about half of the number known to be in Cambodia. The half remaining of these troops have either gone into hiding or have merged themselves into the civilian Vietnamese population in Cambodia.

Although the demobilization of the Communist Khmer Resistance Forces by Viet Minh military units in Cambodia allegedly took place in late August 1954, no third party witnessed the demobilization. The Viet Minh units which were later evacuated from Cambodia did not take out extra arms, nor have any arms belonging to the Khmer Resistance Forces been subsequently surrendered to any authority in Cambodia. So far as is known, not even a single member of the Khmer Resistance Forces has reported to the Cambodian authorities to receive the identity card which would permit him to vote in the

forthcoming Cambodian elections. It is thus to be presumed that members of the Khmer Resistance Forces may, in fact, not have been demobilized.

In South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, caches of arms and ammunition continue to be discovered. A secret depot of 3,000 mines was recently found by South Vietnam authorities in the Quang Ngai region, soon after the evacuation of that area by the Viet Minh.

2. Recruitment of Laotians for Military Service.

In Laos at least 4,000 young men have been forcibly recruited and sent off to North Vietnam for Communist training and indoctrination. The kidnapping took place after the cease fire, but official Laotian and French protests were in vain, since poor communications and the time needed by the International Control Commission prevented interception of the recruits before they were delivered to Communist-controlled areas. This technique of forcible recruitment is identical with that so notoriously used by the Greek Communist rebels five years ago; its object is to indoctrinate and arm these recruits for subsequent revolutionary action in their homeland.

3. Violation of Cease-fire.

There have been numerous small scale attacks by the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao against Royal Laotian Army forces. The most serious of these violations of cease-fire took place on 12 January against Nong Khang and Houei Thao, two commando outposts of the Laotian Army, soon after an inspection trip of the area had been completed by the International Control Commission.

4. Continuation of Political Control in Laos.

The Pathet Lao "government", which has been a puppet of the Viet Minh since 1949, is in effective control of the two northern provinces of Laos, Phong Saly and Sam Neua, both politically

and militarily. Although the Pathet Lao recognized at the Geneva Conference the authority of the Royal Laotian Government as the sole governmental authority in Laos, they have continued to control their territory under the guidance of their Viet Minh masters, and to obstruct the attempts of the Laotian Government to reassert its authority there. Current negotiations between the Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao toward effecting political settlement, therefore, are being carried on with the obvious danger that the entry of the Pathet Lao into union with the Laotian Government will mean nothing other than infiltration of the latter by agents of the Viet Minh. Furthermore, since the Pathet Lao represents itself as a nationalist movement, any revolt on its part against the Laotian Government will be denied by the Communists to be aggression, even though it is completely dependent on the Viet Minh.

The Pathet Lao leaders make no secret of the fact that they are working toward a Communist take-over. They distribute propaganda throughout the Laotian villages to the effect that the Communists won the war; that the Laotian Government is controlled by the French; and that if the Pathet Lao group becomes the government, all Laotians will be equal, officials and public alike. Since the Laotian people are eager to forget war and to resume their quiet way of life, the Pathet Lao infiltration teams, under Viet Minh direction, have little trouble in gaining control over whole groups of villages.

5. Importation of Military Equipment.

In flagrant contravention of the Geneva Agreements, war materiel, including ammunition, artillery and mechanized transport has been moved into North Vietnam in large quantity across the Chinese border. Reliable reports tell of the Viet Minh speed-up of delivery of artillery and artillery shells which took place in the period between the signing of the

Geneva Agreements and the time when the International Control Commission's supervision could become effective.

In November 1954 an official French source revealed the existence of an itemized list of 105mm cannon and other artillery pieces which had been smuggled in from China. The length and inaccessibility of the border makes smuggling of dismantled equipment relatively safe from the observation of International Control Commission teams, whose arrival for inspection is bound to be known to the Viet Minh well in advance.

There is strong reason to believe that Viet Minh military personnel are being trained by Communist personnel in China; upon their return to North Vietnam, they smuggle in small pieces of equipment. This importation of materiel is only one factor in the enormous military build-up which is going on in North Vietnam.

6. Failure to Allow Transfer of Civilians to South Vietnam.

Of all the Viet Minh violations of the Geneva Agreements, the most inhumane and constant has been its obstruction of the free movement of civilians desiring to transfer from North to South Vietnam. Whereas the Geneva Agreements stipulate that civilians desirous of transferring to another zone shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities of the zone of their residence, the Viet Minh has consistently blocked the efforts of its citizens to transfer south. Far from aiding or even permitting the movement southward, the Viet Minh has intimidated the would-be travelers in a wide variety of ways, ranging from picayune registration processes to armed intervention.

The North Vietnam citizen wishing to transfer to the south is branded with the stigma of criminality. He has to sell his possessions at a loss, can take with him only what he can carry, and must overcome all manner of restrictions on travel in a land where transportation is difficult at best.

Since most of the available routes are waterways, the traveler is easily impeded by government seizure of available watercraft. In countless cases, when the traveler has found some means of transportation, he has had his craft destroyed, or has been shot at by Viet Minh armed forces. Once arrived at the seacoast, he has had to face the threats of starvation, intimidation and force while waiting for sea transportation to the south. Conditions of travel are so difficult that the aged and infirm cannot undertake the trip; such families as manage to start on their way run the risk of separation by force, - children have been torn from their parents' arms. Even the last stage of the escape, the passage from the shore to friendly transport ships, is imperiled by the hazard of gunfire from Viet Minh coastal patrols.

In early November 1954 more than 6,000 refugees from the Tonkin area were rescued from a sandspit at Tra Ly, where rising waters threatened to engulf them all. These thousands of refugees were from the Catholic centers of Bui Chu and Phat Diem. Barred from legal evacuation by the Viet Minh authorities, they had put out from the coast at night in fishing boats, junks, rafts, and even on foot, wading from sandbar to sandbar, in their struggle to reach French rescue ships lying outside of Viet Minh territorial waters.

In January of this year, another incident involving thousands of North Vietnamese desirous of transferring to the south occurred in Ba Lang. In this case the International Control Commission was planning to have one of its mobile teams conduct an on-the-spot investigation of Viet Minh obstruction of southward emigration. It must be remembered that the Commission is empowered to investigate only after it has received a complaint. Viet Minh intimidation and obstruction make this process of complaining to the Commission

almost impossible; the only information must come from refugees who have successfully reached the south, where they can inform the Commission without risking their lives. In Ba Lang, once the Viet Minh authorities learned that the mobile team was to make a visit, they made their preparations. During the week before the inspection visit, there were pitched battles between Viet Minh armed forces and the Catholic civilians anxious to emigrate. Many citizens were arrested, including the local Bishop. When the inspection team arrived, the Viet Minh had brought in their own supporters from surrounding areas, in an attempt to intimidate the Catholics and to create the false impression upon the inspection team that the local population did not wish to emigrate. Only the sight, on the outskirts of the crowd, of weeping women whose menfolk had been killed in the preceding skirmishes, enabled the inspection team to discover that it was being deceived.

In short, any person in North Vietnam desiring to travel south is not the migrant envisaged at the Geneva Conference, the man whose free choice of movement was, according to the Agreements, to be aided by the authorities in his area. Instead, he has become an escapee, a fugitive fleeing under terror of his life, separated from his family and his property, ignobly hunted as if he were a criminal. In spite of this harsh oppression, 700,000 escapees have succeeded in making the trip to the safety of South Vietnam. How many thousands of others have lost their lives in the attempt is a sad conjecture. It is significant to note that traffic the other way, from South to North, has, with the exception of Viet Minh armed forces and their families, been a mere trickle, even with the ample facilities willingly provided by the South Vietnam Government.

7. Failure to Relinquish Political Rule in Non-Communist Zone

Although most of the Viet Minh areas south of the 17th Parallel (i.e., the Provisional Assembly Areas of Camau, Xuyen Moc and Plaine des Joncs) have been technically evacuated by Viet Minh forces, repeated and consistent reports reveal that Viet Minh military-political cadres continue to retain de facto control of the local administration, and to conduct activities designed to maintain the population under Communist control. In the Plaine des Joncs area alone, only an estimated 14,000 Viet Minh evacuees have been withdrawn from an announced quota of 20,000.

In the two Northern Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, the Pathet Lao have now consolidated their ranks which before the Geneva Conference had been scattered throughout all Laos. Under Viet Minh leadership this Communist "government" is carrying out the usual strategy of building up a tightly organized political and military regime. The Viet Minh is here exploiting the cease-fire in classic Communist fashion as a step in its pre-determined program of conquest.

Viet Minh advisers have replaced the former leaders of the area. They supervise the activities of the Pathet Lao legislative committee and its racial groups. Viet Minh political commissars advise each Pathet Lao military unit. Refugees from the area tell of the widespread use of standard Chinese and Russian propaganda fare; photographs of Stalin, Malenkov, MAO Tse-tung and HO Chi Minh paper the villages.

In addition to the activities of the cadres left behind in the south through various unblushing subterfuges, the Viet Minh exert a profound influence upon life in South Vietnam by their own build-up of strength in North Vietnam. Consolidation and strengthening of their army, collaboration with the Chinese Communists, incessant propaganda proclaiming their

strength and intention of unifying Vietnam: all these are the Viet Minh's tactics designed to prepare the ground for the acceptance of the Communist concept of "free and democratic" elections. More perhaps than the military violations of the Geneva Agreements, more perhaps than the harassing of the southward-bound refugees, more even than the underground political activities of Viet Minh agents below the 17th Parallel, the loud proclaiming of Viet Minh strength and objectives plays its part in conditioning the free Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians to the fearful prospect of Viet Minh aggression. The cease-fire of the Geneva Agreements is being threatened by the shadow of conquest to come.

~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 24

VIET MINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

16 March 1955

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 6/990
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 10-2
DATE: 3 ^{DEC} 1980 REVIEWER: 056567

~~SECRET~~

VIET MINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

Introduction

On 21 July 1954 the Communist Viet Minh signed a series of agreements to end the eight-year war in Indochina. Although the Viet Minh Regime pledged to honor all portions of the pacts, it has consistently broken many of the major provisions--despite its claims to have faithfully fulfilled all pledges. It has broken the letter as well as the spirit of the agreements. In Laos and Cambodia the Viet Minh has exploited the local Communists and pro-Communists to nullify provisions of the agreements pertaining to those countries.

Violations of the agreements have been frequent. Almost from the first day of the Armistice there has been some violation of either the letter or the spirit of the agreements. In all its actions the Viet Minh has been supported by world Communism--material aid from the Chinese, psychological aid from the Soviets and direct support in the International Control Commission (ICC) from the Poles. With such support from without, and a well organized network of agents within the country, the Viet Minh has not been afraid to undertake any action short of open warfare. The Viet Minh does not feel that hostilities are necessary in Vietnam because of the expectations of having South Vietnam delivered to them intact by the elections scheduled for 1956. This is, in some ways, not unlike previous instances of Communist use of cease-fires as a strategic device. Capitalizing on the problems of the newly independent Vietnamese Government and the effectiveness of their own well-organized stay-behind network, the Viet Minh expect to have little difficulty

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in attaining the goal of control of all Vietnam. Militarily the Viet Minh is much stronger now than at the cessation of hostilities. Better trained, reorganized, and with new equipment received from the Chinese in contravention of the agreements, the Viet Minh is now more than a match for all the anti-Communist forces in Vietnam.

Evidence of Viet Minh violations is found in almost every province of the country occupied and free. Not only have these violations concerned the military sections of the agreements but those portions dealing with human rights as well. All types of violations have been recurrent and deliberate.

Violations

1. Failure to Withdraw Military Forces and Equipment and to Relinquish Political Control in Non-Communist Zones

In South Vietnam the Viet Minh has been flagrant in its violation of Article 15 of the Vietnam agreement dealing with the disengagement of all combatants, their transfer to specified regroupment zones, together with all their supplies and equipment, and to evacuate these zones according to agreed schedules and procedures.

In carrying out these evacuations, the Communists have left behind many cadres and caches of military supplies. To fill out the ranks of units to be evacuated, in order to bring them up to the strength reported to the ICC, the Viet Minh has used new recruits, leaving trained stay-behinds in the south. French and Vietnamese authorities have found many such caches of equipment and supplies throughout the south, such as a cache of 3,000

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

mines in the Quang Ngai region. In early March 1955 evidence of clandestine opposition to pacification was found in Nha Trang and Tourane.

In some cases, such as in Quang Tri province, there was evidence of units being reintroduced into the south by devious means after supposed evacuation.

The political and administrative networks of the Viet Minh that ruled occupied areas of the south before the truce and were making preparations for the control of other areas, continue to exist. This is the network of Administrative and Resistance Committees. The purpose of this organization now appears to be to prepare for the election scheduled for 1956, and the Viet Minh-expected take-over of the south as a result of these elections. These groups have been particularly active in Quang Nam Province and in the environs of the twin cities of Saigon and Cholon.

The Xuyen Moc and Plaine des Joncs areas are also important scenes of Viet Minh stay-behind political and military preparation activity. In these areas it has been reported that only 14,000 of an estimated 20,000 Viet Minh believed to have been in the area were evacuated.

In Cambodia the Viet Minh and the Khmer Resistance Forces (KRF), the Viet Minh-supported Cambodian Communists, have been violating Articles 4 and 5 of the Cambodian agreement which are substantially the same as the articles described above.

The Viet Minh officially reported to the ICC that it would withdraw 4,050 troops from Cambodia. A Canadian member of the Commission reported that the total actually evacuated was only about 2,400. This correlates very well with a US Army estimate

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of 2,800 removed. Battambang Province is a typical example of Viet Minh evacuation of only about half of the reported number of troops.

The Viet Minh have claimed officially that on or about 20 August 1954 the KRF was completely demobilized, however, no third party witnessed this demobilization.

Furthermore, no KRF arms or equipment were turned in to any Cambodian authority or were removed with Viet Minh forces during evacuation. This adds additional credence to complaints by Cambodian authorities that they have found many caches of arms, ammunition and mines throughout Cambodia.

Additional evidence of non-demobilization is seen in the fact that no former KRF members have registered for the identity card which is necessary for voting and other privileges. There is a general feeling on the part of western observers that in fact the KRF has not been demobilized and is actually a well trained stay-behind network.

In Laos there have been numerous reports of the failure of the Viet Minh and the Pathet Lao, local Viet Minh-supported Communists, to withdraw military forces and equipment from areas of free Laos. As of January, the Communists had still failed to remove their troops from the areas of Pakse, Paksong and Savannakhet in Lower Laos.

There have been reliable reports of Viet Minh resupply of the Pathet Lao. It was further reported that such supplies were being sent from North Vietnam through places not designated as official checkpoints for the entry of such materiel. The supplies have been going to the Pathet Lao in the two provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly which were designated, in the truce agreement, as assembly areas for the Pathet Lao.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

For many months the Pathet Lao usurped the Royal Laotian Government's sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of these provinces although the Pathet Lao had recognized this sovereignty in the Joint Conference Declaration which accompanied the truce agreements. This is further described below.

2. Violations of Cease-Fire

In Laos the Communists have also been flagrantly violating the cease-fire provisions of the truce agreements. The Pathet Lao have made numerous attacks on Royal Laotian Forces. There were attacks, usually in company strength, in December around the villages of Muong Ou Tay, Muong Hat Hin, Muong Ou Neua, and Boun Neua.

In January the Pathet Lao attacked Royal Troops at Nong Khang and Houei Thao in the area around Sam Neua. For a while on 21 January the Pathet Lao controlled the Nong Khang airstrip. Before being driven from it, they engaged in the scorched-earth tactic of destroying the airfield and much of the equipment there. The ICC investigated this and, in the first split vote of the commission (the Indians siding with the Canadians against the Poles), the ICC officials censured the Pathet Lao for these attacks and instructed them to reconstruct the airfield and replace its equipment.

One of the most recent attacks was made on 1 March at the outpost of Muong Peun, 40 kms. from Sam Neua.

In South Vietnam there have been many instances of Viet Minh violations of cease-fire provisions of the agreements.

On 17 August 1954 a group of Viet Minh soldiers attacked a Vietnamese patrol at Duc Phong in the province of Kien An.

On 27 July 1954 the Viet Minh attacked an outpost of Mung Moc in Quang Yen Province and also attacked the outpost of Khoai Lao.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

On 7 August 1954 the Viet Minh led villagers in attacks on Vietnamese militia in the villages of Tan Thanh, Tay Giang and Dong Giang.

These are but a few examples of the many incidents wherein Communist forces have violated the cease-fire provisions of the truce agreements.

3. Forced Recruitment of Laotians for Military Service

In contravention of the spirit of the Joint Conference Declaration, evacuating Viet Minh units have been forcibly recruiting Laotians into Communist units. Over 4,000 men have been reported to have been kidnapped in this manner by the Viet Minh, in much the same style as the Greek Communist rebels did five years ago. In mid-December 1954 an ICC mobile team at Luang Prabang had collected evidence on this matter from three Pathet Lao deserters.

The procedure used by the Viet Minh to remove these recruits from Laos was the placing of these men in regular Viet Minh units being evacuated, and having an equal number of Viet Minh troops cross illegally into Vietnam bypassing established checkpoints. These recruits are to be trained in North Vietnam and eventually returned to Laos to join Pathet Lao units.

4. Continuing Communist Political Control in Laos

In an effort to settle the problem which arose from the Pathet Lao challenge to the Royal Government's authority in the two northern provinces, negotiations were started between representatives of both sides in February 1955. One month later, after procedures had nearly broken down several times, an agreement was reached wherein both sides agreed to maintain the status quo and refrain from aggressive acts. This constitutes a diplomatic victory of sorts for the Communists.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. Retention of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of War

Another flagrant violation of the Vietnam Truce Agreement by the Viet Minh has been that of Article 21 which provided for the release of all prisoners of war and political prisoners within 30 days after the cessation of hostilities. Until 4 September 1954 there was a steady exchange of prisoners between the French and the Viet Minh. As of that date, over 11,000 French Union Troops had been returned, mostly those of European and African origin. While over 3,000 Vietnamese were returned, many thousands are believed still to be in the hands of Viet Minh. Much as the Russians have done with German and Japanese World War II prisoners, there have been reports of Viet Minh attempts to brain-wash these captives and convert them into Communists either to join the Viet Minh army or to be agents for the Communists in free Vietnam. Among the places in Viet Minh-held territory where prisoners were reported still being held are Luong Duong and Nam Dan.

6. Importation of Contraband Materiel from Communist China

Article 17 of the Vietnam Truce Agreement provides that no "arms, ammunition and other war materiel, such as, combat aircraft, pieces of ordinance, jet engines and jet weapons, armed vehicles" may be introduced into Vietnam. The article further allows for the replacement of items damaged, destroyed or worn out since the end of hostilities by items of similar characteristics. This means that no new types of equipment may be added. Anything brought into the country as a replacement, must be brought in through established checkpoints and after prior notification has been given to the ICC.

On all these points the Viet Minh has been guilty of violating the agreements. It has received from Communist China vast amounts of materiel other than on a replacement basis, new types

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of equipment, has failed to notify the ICC and has bypassed the established checkpoints.

Virtually all movements of illicit materiel have followed the supply routes established during hostilities. Three principal routes have been noted. In the area around the checkpoint of Lang Son there are two major routes and one subsidiary route. One major route starts at the border town of Thuy Khau and winds through Quang Uyen to Cao Bang. Another comes from the border town of Dong Dang and on to Thai Nguyen. A subsidiary route comes along the coast from Mon Cay. All three routes bypass Lang Son. In the northwest there is a route that circumvents the border checkpoint of Lao Kay and goes southwest to Lai Chau with branch roads leading into the Pathet Lao areas of Laos.

Heaviest shipments were during late July and August and continued at a reduced rate through mid-October. Since then there has been a marked reduction in the flow except for such non-prohibited materials as gasoline and quartermaster supplies. Even so, certain types of gasoline have been reported to be camouflaged as food supplies. Coincident with the reduction in flow of contraband, the Viet Minh became more lenient and more cooperative with ICC inspection teams.

Among the contraband known to have been received in the period since the cessation of hostilities are more than:

150 pieces of field and antiaircraft artillery

500 mortars

9,000 automatic weapons

500 recoilless weapons

30 light tanks

Known to be among the artillery pieces are over 50-105mm guns. In general most equipment is of recent design.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The problem of checking on illegal introduction of armaments is very complicated. At best the Sino-Vietnamese border is impossible to supervise adequately because of its extent and its mountainous terrains. The Viet Minh has not cooperated with the ICC in allowing it to inspect the accessible border areas. When the Viet Minh has allowed inspection, it appears that it is only when they know that no shipments will be arriving during that period and that evidence of previous shipments has been removed.

7. Failure to Allow Transfer of Civilians to South Vietnam

One violation by the Viet Minh that has received widespread coverage in the press has been the violation of Article 14, d, of the Vietnam agreement.

One of the most recent cases is the Ba Lang Incident. In January a team from the International Control Commission (ICC) visited this village in Central Vietnam to make an on-the-spot investigation of reports that the Viet Minh were not allowing Catholic villagers to emigrate to the south. When word of the impending inspection reached the Viet Minh, they filled the crowd with their own agents disguised as peasants and brought in pro-Viet Minh persons from neighboring villages to outyell the Catholic population and prevent them from speaking to the members of the ICC. In the week prior to the visit of the team there were pitched battles between the Catholics and armed Viet Minh troops. Many arrests ensued, including the local bishop, and as of mid-February these people were still in jail. To this date few of the 1,200 people who requested evacuation to the south have been allowed to leave.

Similar events have taken place elsewhere although not always accompanied by bloodshed.

In late October more than 6,000 refugees from the principal Catholic centers of Bui Chu and Phat Diem, barred from legal

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

evacuation by Viet Minh officials, put out from the coast at night in fishing boats, junks, rafts and on foot, wading from sandbar to sandbar to reach French vessels waiting as close offshore as they could legally come.

About a week or two later several thousand more were similarly rescued from the Tra Ly sandbar.

Refugees arriving from Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Nam Dinh, Son La, Sam Son, Gia Lam and elsewhere in the delta area, all report the same sort of restrictions and obstacles reported above. Many have escaped. Many more who applied have been denied. Permission to leave has been granted sometimes only to counter world-wide disclosures of Viet Minh interference. Another recent occurrence has been in the village of Luu My. An investigation by the ICC reported the following:

Viet Minh authorities did not inform population of clauses in Article 14, d;

People heard rumors ships being sent to evacuate.

Luu My investigation by active and energetic ICC team ended February 19 having ascertained that:

From January 9 to 13 troops and Du-Kich (Guerrillas) attacked entrenched Catholics killing 14 of whom 1 child and 1 tortured. Fact about 22 leaders arrested, one tortured, 10 civilians injured, led civilians to set up self-defense early January; during ICC investigation Du-Kich forcefully prevented Catholics from approaching team; no Catholic has yet been able to leave Luu My and appears register showing 69 permits delivered is false.

Summary

The violations of the Geneva agreements that have been committed by the Viet Minh and the local Communist groups in Laos and Cambodia, which they support, have been frequent and deliberate. They are part of a well-organized plan to bypass, misconstrue and break the agreements.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

As a part of the scheme, the Viet Minh has deliberately interfered with the operation of the International Control Commission by using delaying tactics until either the evidence was removed or too cold to be properly evaluated.

~~SECRET~~