

Public Key Cryptography

1 Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)

Bézout's Identity

Lemma. $a, b \in \mathbb{Z} \implies \exists x, y \in \mathbb{Z} : \gcd(a, b) = ax + by.$

Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)

Theorem. Given a system of k linear congruences:

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \\ x &\equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2} \\ &\vdots \\ x &\equiv a_k \pmod{m_k} \end{aligned}$$

where m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k are pairwise coprime. Let $M = \prod_{i=1}^k m_i$. Then, the unique solution of the system of congruences is given by

$$\begin{aligned} X &\equiv \sum_{i=1}^k a_i M_i b_i \pmod{M} \\ &\equiv a_1 M_1 b_1 + a_2 M_2 b_2 + \dots + a_k M_k b_k \pmod{M}. \end{aligned}$$

where $M_i = M/m_i$ and $b_i \equiv M_i^{-1} \pmod{m_i}$.

Proof. (Existence) Define

$$\begin{aligned} M &:= \prod_{i=1}^k m_i = m_1 m_2 \dots m_k \quad \text{and} \\ M_i &:= \frac{M}{m_i} = m_1 m_2 \dots m_{i-1} m_{i+1} \dots m_k. \end{aligned}$$

By Bézout's identity, we know that

$$\exists b_i, c_i \in \mathbb{Z} : M_i b_i + m_i c_i = \gcd(M_i, m_i) = 1.$$

because M_i has not m_i as factor. Note that

$$(1) \quad M_i b_i + m_i c_i = 1 \Leftrightarrow M_i b_i = (-c_i) m_i + 1 \Leftrightarrow M_i b_i \equiv 1 \pmod{m_i}.$$

(2) Let $i, j \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\}$ with $i \neq j$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \gcd(m_i, m_j) = 1 &\implies m_j \in \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_{i-1}, m_{i+1}, \dots, m_k\} \\ &\implies m_j \mid M_i \quad \because M_i = m_1 m_2 \dots m_{i-1} m_{i+1} \dots m_k \\ &\implies m_j \mid M_i - 0 \\ &\implies M_i \equiv 0 \pmod{m_j}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we have

$$\begin{cases} M_i b_i \equiv 1 \pmod{m_i} & \dots\dots\dots (1) \\ M_i b_i \equiv 0 \pmod{m_j} \text{ for } j \neq i & \dots\dots\dots (2). \end{cases}$$

Then we claim that $X = \sum_{i=1}^k a_i M_i b_i$ is a solution to the system of linear congruences:

$$\begin{aligned} X - a_i &= \left(\sum_{j=1}^k a_j M_j b_j \right) - a_i = \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^k a_j M_j b_j + a_i M_i b_i - a_i = \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^k a_j M_j b_j + a_i (M_i b_i - 1) \\ &\equiv \left[\sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^k a_j \cdot \left(\cancel{M_j b_j} \right) \right] + a_i (M_i b_i - 1) \pmod{m_i} \quad \text{by (2)} \\ &\equiv \cancel{a_i (M_i b_i - 1)} \pmod{m_i} \quad \text{by (1)} \\ &\equiv 0 \pmod{m_i}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we have:

$$X - a_i \equiv 0 \pmod{m_i}$$

Hence X satisfies all of the linear congruence.

(Uniqueness) Let X_0, X_1 are roots of the system of linear equations. Let $1 \leq i \leq k$. Then

$$X_0 \equiv a_i \equiv X_1 \pmod{m_i}$$

and so

$$m_i \mid X_0 - X_1.$$

Hence $m_1 m_2 \cdots m_k \mid X_0 - X_1$, i.e.,

$$X_0 \equiv X_1 \pmod{M = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_k}.$$

□

2 Special Case of CRT

CRT - Special Case

Corollary. Consider a system of two linear congruences:

$$x \equiv a_1 \pmod{p}$$

$$x \equiv a_2 \pmod{q}$$

where p, q are coprime. Let $N = pq$. Then, the unique solution of the system of congruences is given by

$$x = a_1 q q_p^{-1} + a_2 p p_q^{-1} \pmod{N}$$

where $q_p^{-1} = q^{-1} \pmod{p}$ and $p_q^{-1} = p^{-1} \pmod{q}$.

Remark 1. Recall that Bézout's identity : $a, b \in \mathbb{Z} \implies \exists x, y \in \mathbb{Z} : \gcd(a, b) = ax + by$. Especially,

$$p, q \text{ are coprime} \implies \exists x, y \in \mathbb{Z} : px + qy = 1.$$

Since p, q are coprime, we know that $\exists x, y \in \mathbb{Z} : px + qy = 1$ and so

$$px = (-y)q + 1 \implies px \equiv 1 \pmod{q} \implies x = p^{-1} \pmod{q}.$$

Similarly, $y = q^{-1} \pmod{p}$. Thus we have $px + qy = 1 \implies pp_q^{-1} + qq_p^{-1} = 1$. Consequently,

$$\begin{aligned} x = a_1qq_p^{-1} + a_2pp_q^{-1} \pmod{N} &\implies x = a_1qq_p^{-1} + a_2(1 - qq_p^{-1}) \pmod{N} \\ &\implies x = (a_1 - a_2)qq_p^{-1} + a_2 \pmod{N}. \end{aligned}$$

3 RSA-CRT Algorithm

Algorithm 1: RSA-CRT Algorithm

Data: The security parameter k , a public key (N, e) , a ciphertext C .

Result: The plaintext message M corresponding to the ciphertext C .

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/* Key Generation                                                                    */
Function KeyGen ( $1^k$ ):
     $p, q \leftarrow$  random prime numbers of  $k/2$  bits each ;           // Generate two primes
     $N \leftarrow pq$  ;                                                  // Compute modulus
     $\phi(N) \leftarrow (p-1)(q-1)$  ;                                     // Compute Euler's phi function
     $e \leftarrow$  integer  $e \in (1, \phi(N))$  s.t.  $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$  ;   // Choose encryption exponent
     $d \leftarrow$  integer  $d \in (1, \phi(N))$  s.t.  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$  ; // Compute decryption exponent
     $d_p \leftarrow d \pmod{p-1}$  ;                                       // Compute decryption exponent for p
     $d_q \leftarrow d \pmod{q-1}$  ;                                       // Compute decryption exponent for q
     $q_{inv} \leftarrow$  integer  $q_{inv} \in (1, p-1)$  s.t.  $qq_{inv} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  ; // Compute q inverse modulo p
    Set the RSA public key as  $(N, e)$ ;
    Set the RSA secret key as  $(p, q, d_p, d_q, q_{inv})$ ;
End Function

/* Encryption                                                                    */
Function Enc ( $N, e, M$ ):
     $C \leftarrow M^e \pmod{N}$  ;                                         // Encrypt with e and N
End Function

/* Decryption                                                                    */
Function Dec ( $C$ ):
     $m_1 \leftarrow C^{d_p} \pmod{p}$  ;                                     // Decrypt with d_p and p
     $m_2 \leftarrow C^{d_q} \pmod{q}$  ;                                     // Decrypt with d_q and q
     $m \leftarrow (m_1 - m_2)qq_{inv} + m_2 \pmod{N}$  ;                 //  $m = (m_1 - m_2)qq_{inv} + m_2 \pmod{N}$ 
    return  $m$ ;
End Function

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Proof of Decryption. Note that

$$\begin{aligned} ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)} &\implies \exists k \in \mathbb{Z} : ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1), \\ d_p = d \pmod{p-1} &\implies \exists k_p \in \mathbb{Z} : d = (p-1)k_p + d_p. \end{aligned}$$

Consider $m_1 := C^{d_p} \pmod{p}$. From $C = M^e \pmod{pq}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} C \equiv M^e \pmod{pq} &\Leftrightarrow pq \mid C - M^e \Leftrightarrow C - M^e = k_N \cdot pq \text{ for some } k_N \in \mathbb{Z} \\ &\Leftrightarrow C - M^e = (k_N q) \cdot p \\ &\Leftrightarrow p \mid C - M^e \\ &\Leftrightarrow C \equiv M^e \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

Then

$$m_1 = C^{d_p} \pmod{p} = (M^e)^{d-(p-1)k_p} \pmod{p} = \left(M^{ed}\right) \cdot M^{-e(p-1)k_p} \pmod{p}.$$

Clearly, either $\gcd(M, p) = 1$ or $\gcd(M, p) \neq 1$:

(Case I) Let $\gcd(M, p) = 1$. By **Fermat's little theorem**, we get

$$M^{-e(p-1)k_p} = \left(M^{p-1}\right)^{-ek_p} \equiv 1^{-ek_p} = 1 \pmod{p}.$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} m_1 = C^{d_p} \pmod{p} &= \left(M^{ed}\right) \cdot \cancel{M^{-e(p-1)k_p}}^1 \pmod{p} \text{ by FLT} \\ &\equiv M^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv \left(\cancel{M^{p-1}}^1\right)^{k(q-1)} \cdot M \pmod{p} \text{ by FLT} \\ &\equiv M \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

That is, $m_1 \equiv M \pmod{p}$.

(Case II) Let $\gcd(M, p) \neq 1$, i.e., $\exists l \in \mathbb{Z} : M = pl$ since p is a prime^a. Then we have

$$M = pl \implies p \mid M - 0 \implies M \equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

Recall that $C \equiv M^e \pmod{p}$. Then $C \equiv M^e \equiv 0^e = 0 \pmod{p}$ and so

$$m_1 = C^{d_p} \pmod{p} = 0^{d_p} \pmod{p} = 0 \pmod{p}.$$

That is, $m_1 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$. Therefore

$$\begin{cases} M \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \\ m_1 \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \end{cases} \implies m_1 \equiv M \pmod{p}.$$

^aSince p is a prime, p has factors 1 and p only. Then $\gcd(M, p) \neq 1$ means that p is only common factor.

Here, we obtain $m_1 \equiv \mathcal{M} \pmod{p}$. Similarly, we have $m_2 \equiv \mathcal{M} \pmod{q}$. Then, the plaintext message \mathcal{M} is a solution to the following system of two linear congruences:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{M} &\equiv m_1 \pmod{p}, \\ \mathcal{M} &\equiv m_2 \pmod{q}.\end{aligned}$$

Then, **Remark 1** guarantees that

$$\mathcal{M} = (m_1 - m_2)qq_{inv} + m_2 \pmod{pq}.$$

□



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