KYALMUN'26

GA:1 DISEC

Study Guide

Agenda Item: Ensuring the Compliance of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Under Secretary General
Ela Elif Sarıkoç

Academic Assistant
Beste Gedikoğlu

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1. Letter from the Secretary General

Dear Distinguished Delegates,

It is my great honor to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee of KYALMUN’26. DISEC stands at the very heart of international peace and security, where diplomacy meets responsibility and where words have the power to prevent destruction. This year, you will be addressing the critical issue of ensuring compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention—an agreement that symbolizes humanity’s collective commitment to limit the horrors of war.

Throughout this committee, you will be challenged to think beyond national interests and consider the broader consequences of security, accountability, and international cooperation. I encourage you to engage in respectful debate, listen carefully to opposing perspectives, and work collaboratively toward practical and effective solutions. May this committee inspire you to recognize the true weight of diplomacy and the impact of your voice.
Sincerely,

Yağmur Sarıtaş

Secretary-General, KYALMUN’26

2. Letter from the USG

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). I am honored to be your Under-Secretary-General for this committee and to guide you throughout the conference.

The committee will be addressing the agenda item “Ensuring the Compliance of the Chemical Weapons Convention.” The persistence of chemical weapons as a threat to international peace and security makes this topic highly relevant and challenging. Delegates are expected to analyze the legal framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention, evaluate past and present compliance issues, and propose realistic and cooperative solutions in line with international law.

As representatives of your respective countries, you are encouraged to conduct thorough research, actively participate in debate, and engage in constructive diplomacy. DISEC provides a platform not only to discuss disarmament but also to strengthen global trust and cooperation.

I look forward to witnessing insightful debates throughout the conference. I hope DISEC becomes a space where you not only grow as a delegate but also form friendships and memories that last beyond the sessions. I wish you all an engaging, inspiring, and enjoyable conference.

Best regards,
Ela Elif SARIKOÇ
Under-Secretary-General
Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

3. Letter from the Academic Assistant

Dear Delegates,
It is with great honour that I welcome all of you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). I am very honored and also very eager to be your Academic Assistant in this committee.
According to the agenda item which is “Ensuring the Compliance of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, this committee’s foremost topic will be about the utilization of the chemical weapons which possess the risk of becoming a life-threatening article. In this committee, the delegates are expected to comprehend and examine the Chemical Weapons Convention, and negotiate thoroughly upon the compliance to the convention, consider new and renovative changes, and put the position of the allocated country of themselves into action.
Before the three days and various sessions in this committee, you are encouraged to do an extensive research that contains the key points that can benefit you in the debates.
Throughout these days, you are encouraged to participate in the debates actively and follow a path that prioritizes the importance of diplomatic discussion while following the principles of your representative countries. DISEC creates an environment where all delegates can equally state and opinion and partake in debates upon the topic of disarmament and also it provides the space to ensure and further strengthen worldwide trust and collaboration.
I, as your Academic Assistant, am very enthusiastic to be a part of this committee and to observe the spirited but respectful discussions. I hope that DISEC becomes one of the best experiences that you’ve encountered, and becomes a safe space where you evolve as a delegate and form new and great friendships, too. I wish you all an unforgettable conference.

Sincerely,
Beste Gedikoğlu
Academic Assistant
Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

4. Committee Introduction

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) has the intention of advocating, debating and finding solutions to the matters of international disarmament and security. This aim leads the committee to discuss a wide variety of global issues. Out of six General Assembly (GA) committees in the UN, DISEC is also known as the First Committee of the GA.

To prevent the great damage once again after World War II, the committee was established to have a stable, international structure that forms a peaceful ground and solves such conflicts with discussion before using weapons. This structure began to be formed in 1945. The organs in the structure are divided into six main organizations. These fields work on agendas such as elimination of conventional weapons, economic development, international trade, international conventions, welfare and human rights, budget and legal issues. The First Committee of the GA, established as a result of atomic bombs dropped on Japan, focused on situations such as political and security issues. For the events that occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first resolution by DISEC was created in 1946 to address the concerns in the topic of atomic energy. By 2013, it adopted a decision which requested an international meeting to debate upon nuclear disarmament to eliminate the danger of nuclear war which has the risk of another world war and the death of millions. Under Article 11 of Chapter IV of the UN Charter, "The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armament." In conclusion, the establishment and issues such as security and war prevention, the spread of nuclear weapons, the usage of illegal weapons and drug trafficking are discussed in the DISEC committee.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an important international agreement that works upon the prohibition of the formation, development, transferring and usage of some chemical weapons. It aims to strictly remove the entire category of chemical weapons that has the ability to cause mass destruction. Also, with this convention, peaceful usage of chemistry is aimed, however, one of the critical challenges of the DISEC is about the compliance with the CWC. Some of the topics that raise concern around the globe are allegations of chemical weapons use, inadequate national implementation, difficulties in observation and verification. This agenda focuses on improving the overall transparency and monitoring upon the nuclear weapon producing and utilization, and addressing any violation with an effective and solution based manner. In this committee, the representatives are expected to take the necessary steps to enforce the prohibition of chemical weapons in respect of the citizens within their government's regulations. In this convention, all included states have agreed to chemically disarm by destroying any already stocked chemical weapons and any facilities that produced them, as well as the chemical weapons that they have placed in any other territories so far. States Parties have also agreed to establish a verification regime for certain toxic chemicals for ensuring that those chemicals are only used for purposes which are not banned in the convention such as for science and education purposes. Any State Party that has suspicions that a violation is occurring of any article by another State Party has the

right to start an investigation and this investigation has the principle of "any time, anywhere under the "challenge inspection" procedure of the convention.

5. Key Words

Chemical Weapons: Toxic chemical substances designed to cause death, injury, or harm to humans, animals, or the environment.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): An international treaty that prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): The international organization responsible for implementing and verifying compliance with the CWC.

Compliance: The act of fully adhering to the rules and obligations set by an international treaty.

Non-Compliance: Failure or refusal of a state to meet its obligations under the CWC.

Verification: Processes used to confirm that states are complying with the terms of the Convention, including inspections.

Inspection: On-site investigations conducted to monitor chemical facilities and weapon destruction.

Disarmament: The reduction or elimination of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction.

Dual-Use Chemicals: Chemicals that can be used for both civilian purposes and the production of chemical weapons.

State Actors: Governments or official representatives acting on behalf of a country.

Non-State Actors: Groups or individuals, such as terrorist organizations, that are not affiliated with any government.

Sanctions: Diplomatic, economic, or political measures imposed on states that fail to comply with international obligations.

Transparency: The openness of states in sharing accurate information about their chemical activities.

Confidence-Building Measures: Actions taken to increase trust and reduce suspicion between states.

Technical Assistance: Support and expertise provided to help states fulfill their obligations under the CWC.

National Implementation Measures
Legal and administrative steps taken by states to enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention at the national level.

6. Historical Background

a. Early Use:

The modern act of chemical warfare emerged from the mid 19th century, where the development of modern chemistry and chemistry associated industries were at its climax. The first recorded modern usage of chemical warfare was made by Lyon Playfair, secretary of the Science and Art Department in 1854 during the Crimean War. He proposed a cacodyl cyanide artillery shell for protection from the enemy ships during the siege of Sevastopol. This proposal was rejected by the British Ordnance Department for the following reason: "as bad a mode of warfare poisoning the wells of the enemy." Playfair's response which contains statements such as "Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men without suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible." used to be enough to justify chemical warfare into the next century.

Later, during the American Civil War, a school teacher in New York, John Doughty, proposed the offensive use of chlorine gas that was used for another artillery shell. Doughty's plan was apparently never acted on.

In March 1868, during the War of Triple Alliance, the Paraguayan corps threw lit tubes that contained suffocating mixtures of chemicals onto the Brazilian canoes. The attack was a failure due to the defender's tactics.

In June 1898, during the Spanish- American War, Spanish inventors Manuel Daza and Antonio Meulner tested the "tóxpiro", which is a chemical artillery grenade. They activated it from their battleship against a scow which was loaded with some animals. The animals got killed but the scow remained scatheless. This process was not enough for the Spanish government to be interested.

A huge concern over the usage of poisonous gas started in 1899 at the Hague Conference with a proposal that prohibits artillery shells which are filled with toxic gas. The proposal was successful, with a single negative vote from the United States. The American representative, Navy Captain Ared Thayer Mahan, justified voting against because of the following statement: "the inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the areas such as development of new weapons."

a. World War I:

The French were the primary ones to use chemical weapons against their enemies in the First World War, using the gases "ethyl bromoacetate" and "chloroacetone". The French did not realize the effects might be more serious under wartime conditions than in normal controllable situations. It is also likely that their tear gas usage escalated into the use of poisonous gases. The Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited the firing of a sole object which has the diffusion of asphyxiating overall toxic gases. The first country to exploit this loophole was Germany. Germany opened canisters filled with poisonous gas into the wind and let the wind carry it towards the enemy lines. Also in October 27, 1914, when shells containing a chemical substance which is called dianisidine chlorosulfonate were fired at British troops, Germany conducted this operation as well. The full scale deployment of deadly chemical warfare agents during WW1 was at another war called the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, when the Germans attacked French, Canadian and Algerian troops with chlorine gas released from canisters by the carrying of the wind.

In WW1, a total of 50K agents were deployed by both sides of the conflict which carried chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas. 500K to 1.3 million casualties were affected directly by chemical warfare agents during the course of war. A minimum of around 1300 civilians were injured due to the use of the weapons, and at least 4000 were injured during the production of those certain weapons.

The most common post-war method of disposal of chemical weapons was to dump them into the largest local body of water. Approximately 65K tons of chemical warfare agents may have been dumped in the Baltic Sea only, and these agents included mustard gas, phosgene, chlorovinyldichloroarsine, adamsite, Clark 1 (diphenylchloroarsine) and Clark 2 (diphenylcyanoarsine). Over time while the containers collapsed, the chemicals leaked out. On the floor of the sea, lumps within the skin of chemical byproducts that were formed by mustard gas were found by

authorities. These remains are extremely toxic, and can wash onto shore where they look like chunks of waxy yellowish clay which can be extremely dangerous for the freshwater and saltwater organisms.

b. World War II:

The Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons with some violations of the 1899 Hague Declaration. However, those weapons were never used against the Westerns, but against other Asians judged "inferior" by imperial propaganda. According to historians, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Emperor Hirohito himself, transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. The Emperır authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate locations during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October in 1938. The Imperial Japanese Army had used mustard gas against Chinese scouts and guerillas. Experiments involving chemical substances were conducted on live prisoners.

During the Holocaust, a genocide conducted by Nazi Germany, millions of Jews, Romani, Slaws, other marginalized groups were gassed with carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide. This remains as the deadliest use of poisonous gas in history. Nevertheless, the Nazi Germany did not extensively use chemical weapons during combat, at least not against the Western Allies. Their decision to avoid the use of chemical warfare on the battlefield has been connected to a lack of technical ability in the German military and fears that the Allies would retaliate with their own chemical weapons. The Nazis did use chemical weapons in combat on several occasions within the Black Sea, notably in Sevastopol where they used toxic smoke to force Soviet resistance fighters out of caverns below the city, and this action violated the Geneva Protocol. The Nazis also used asphyxiating gas in the catacombs of Odessa in November 1941, and in late May 1942 during the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula in eastern Crimea. In February 1943, German troops stationed in Kuban received a telegram which read as follows: "Russians might have to be cleared out of the mountain range with gas."

The Western Allies did not use chemical weapons in WW2. The British planned to use mustard gas and phosgene to help spout a German invasion in 1940-1941. The British manufactured mustard, chlorine, lewisite, phosgene and stored them at airfields for use on the beaches. In July 1944, fearing that rocket attacks on London would get even worse and worse, Winston Churchill stated that he would only use chemical weapons if it was life or death for them. He also stated that "it is absurd to consider morality over this topic when every state used it in the last war without a word of complaint."

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the United States located two atomic bombs over the Japanese cities which are Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WW2. The aerial bombing killed 150K to 246K people, mostly civilians, and remains the only use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict. Japan announced its surrender to the Allies on 15

August, six days after the aforesaid bombings and the Soviet's declaration of war against Japan. The Japanese government signed an instrument of surrender on 2 September which marked the ending of the war. In the final year of WW2, the Allies prepared for a costly invasion of Japanese territory. This attempt was preceded by a conventional bombing and firebombing campaign that devastated 64 Japanese cities, including Tokyo. By July 1945, the Allies' plan had produced two atomic bombs which were called "Little Boy" and "Fat Man". The consent of the United Kingdom was obtained for the designated bombing, as was required by the Quebec Agreement, and orders were issued on 25 July by General T.Handy, the chief of staff of the US Army, for atomic bombs to be used on Hiroshima, Niigata and Nagasaki. How large and how urban these areas were, and how they also held significant military facilities made these destinations the targets. On 6 August, Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima. On 9 August, Fat Man was dropped on Nagasaki. Over the next two to four months, the effects of the atomic bombings were responsible for the killing of 90K to 166K people in Hiroshima and 60K to 80K people in Nagasaki. For months afterward, many people pursued to die from the effects of burns, radiation sickness and other injuries which were caused by illness and the lack of nutrition.

c. Cold War Era and Stockpilling:

After WW2, the Allies recovered German artillery shells which contained some chemicals called tabun, sarin and soman. Although the threat of global nuclear war was the primary thought in the minds of most during the Cold War, both the Soviet and Western governments put huge resources into developing chemical weapons.

In late 1940s and early 1950s, a British postwar chemical weapons research was aimed at providing Britain the ability to arm itself with a modern nerve-agent-based capability and to develop scientific means of defense against these agents. There were years of difficult work to develop the means of prophylaxis, therapy, rapid detection and identification, and more effective protection of the body against nerve agents on the defensive side. In the Early 1950s, nerve agents such as sarin were produced in the amount of approximately 20 tons. Small amounts were produced, mainly for laboratory test purposes, but also to validate plant designs and optimize chemical processes for potential mass destruction. However, full scalse mass production never took place, with the 1956 decision to end the UK's offensive chemical weapons programme. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was obvious that the production of chemical weapons could easily restart if the government declared that it's essential and required.

In 1952, the US Army patented a process for the preparation of toxic ricin, and they published a method of producing this toxin. In 1958, the British government traded one of their chemical technologies with the US in exchange for information on thermonuclear weapons. By 1961, the US was producing large amounts of this chemical technology called the VX and performing its own nerve agent research. From 1662 to 1973, the Department of Defense planned 134 tests under a chemical

and biological weapons vulnerability test program. Later in the 2000s, they admitted for the first time that some of the tests used real chemical weapons, not just harmless stimulants. In October 2002, the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Personnel tested chemical agents on thousands of American military personnel. The hearings about this topic were chaired by Senator Max Cleland, a Vietnam War veteran.

Due to the secrecy of the Soviet Union's government, very little information was available about the usage and progress of the Soviet chemical weapons until very recently. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a Russian chemist published articles revealing illegal chemical weapons experimentation in Russia. Among the information that was released, several highly toxic agents were developed during the mid 1980s. The Soviets also developed weapons that were safer to control, which led to the development of binary weapons. During the 1980s and 1990s, binary versions of several Soviet agents were developed.

d. International Efforts Towards Prohibition

Hague Conventions:

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1908 are a series of international treaties which are negotiated at two international peacebuilding conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands. Along with the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions were among the first official statements of the regulations of war crimes in the body of secular international law. A third conference was planned for 1914 and later postponed to 1915, but did not take place due to WW1.

The First Hague Conference came from a proposal by Russian Tsar Nicholas II on 24th of August. The treaties, declarations, and the finale of the conference were signed on 29th of July of that year, and the decisions were put into act on 4th of September 1900. The Hague Convention of 1899 consisted of three main treaties and three additional declarations:

(I) Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes - This convention included the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. All signatories would ratify by 1904, except the Ottoman Empire which ratified in 1907.

(II) Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land - This convention contains the laws to be used in all wars on land between the signatories. It specifies the treatment of prisoners from any war, includes the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the treatment of the wounded, and forbids the use of poisonous gases, the killing of enemy combatants who have surrendered, looting of a town or place, and the attack or bombardment of undefended towns or habitations.

(III) Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864 - This convention is for the protection of

hospital ships and requires them to treat the injured and shipwrecked sailors of all parties.

(IV/1) Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons or by Other New Analogous Methods - This declaration is declared for a period of five years, in any war between signatory states, no projectiles or explosives would be launched from aircrafts, or by other new methods of the similar field. This declaration was ratified by all major powers except the UK and the US.

(IV/2) Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles with the Sole Object to Spread Asphyxiating Poisonous Gases - This declaration states that in any war between signatory powers, the parties will refrain from using projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of any asphyxiating chemical gases. Ratified by all major powers, except the US.

(IV/3) Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Bullets which can Easily Expand or Change their Form inside the Human Body such as Bullets with a Hard Covering which does not Completely Cover the Core or containing Indentations - This declaration states that in any war between signatory nations, the parties will refrain from using bullets which can change in shape or form in the human body. This directly banned soft-point bullets and cross tipped bullets. It was ratified by all major powers, except the US.

The second conference was called at the suggestion of the US President at that time in 1904. It was postponed because of the ongoing war between Japan and Russia. It was held from June 15 to October 18 1907. The intention of the conference was to modify some parts from the 1899 Hague Convention and add new topics. The second convention consists of thirteen treaties and one declaration.

(I) Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes

(II) Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts

(III) Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities

(IV) Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land

(V) Convention relative to the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land

(VI) Convention relative to the Legal Position of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Start of Hostilities

(VII) Convention relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-ships

(VIII) Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines

(IX) Convention concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War

(X) Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention (of 6 July 1906)

(XI) Convention relative to Certain Restrictions with regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War

(XII) Convention relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court

(XIII) Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War

(XIV) Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons

The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 continue to stand as symbols of the need for restrictions and regulations on war mechanisms and the ability of avoiding it worldwide.

Geneva Protocol:

The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, usually known as the Geneva Protocol is a treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in international conflicts. This protocol was signed at Geneva on 17th of July 1925 and entered into force on 8th of February 1928. It prohibits the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods of warfare". This protocol has nothing to say about the production, storage or transferring of the aforesaid substances. Later treaties covered these aspects, which are the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In the Hague Conventions, the use of toxic chemical agents was outlawed. But in contrast, WW1 witnessed a large amount of chemical warfare usage. This resulted in the development of a wide range of horrendous chemicals affecting lungs, skin, eyes and many other body parts. At the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in AArms, the French suggested a protocol for the usage of poisonous gases. The Second Polish Republic suggested the addition of bacteriological weapons. It was signed on the 17th of July.

Eric Croddy, who was assessing the Protocol in 2005, realized that the historical record of the Protocol showed that it had been largely ineffective. Specifically, it does not prohibit the use against not-ratifying parties, retaliation using such weapons, so effectively making it a no-first-use agreement, use within a state's own borders in a civil conflict, research and development of such weapons or stockpiling them. The

Protocol resulted in a legal framework that allowed states to conduct chemical weapons research, develop new chemical weapons and ultimately engage in armed conflicts that included chemical weapons. Additionally, the use of chemical weapons inside a nation's own land against its citizens was not prohibited, such as those employed by Spain in the Rif War, Japan against Seediq indigenous rebels in Taiwan, Iraq against ethnic Kurdish civilians in the 1988 attack on Halabja during the Iran-Iraq War, and Syrian opposition forces during the civil war.

Several state parties have used chemical weapons for combat in spite of this treaty. Italy used mustard gas against the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. In WW2, Germany deployed chemical weapons in combat on several occasions within the Black Sea. They also used asphyxiating gas in the catacombs of Odesa in November 1941. Germans released toxic gas and killed almost 3000 non-evacuated Red Army soldiers and an unestimated amount of Soviet civilians that are hiding in caves and tunnels in the nearby Adzhimushkay quarry. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iran employed a variety of chemical weapons against the Iranian forces. Around 100K Iranian soldiers were found to be casualties of Iraqi chemical weapons during the war. To become a party to the Protocol, states must deposit an instrument with the government of France which was the depositary power. Thirty eight states originally signed the Protocol. France was the first state to ratify the Protocol on 10th of May 1926. El Salvador, the final signatory to ratify the Protocol, acted on 26th of February 2008. As of April 2021, 146 states have ratified the Protocol, most recently Colombia on 24th of November 2015.

e. Adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention:

The Convention aims to banish an entire category of weapons which can cause mass destruction by prohibiting the development, producing, obtaining, stockpiling, containment, transfer and usage of all kinds of chemical weapons by State Parties. In turn, State Parties must take the steps necessary to enforce the required prohibition in respect of the citizens within their jurisdiction. All States Parties have agreed to chemically disarm by destroying any stockpiles of chemical weapons that they held or any facilities that produced them, also with the chemical weapons that they carry in any other territory which isn't theirs.

The General Obligations of the Convention read as follows:

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons for anyone, or to use chemical weapons, or to engage in any military preparations for the purpose of using chemical weapons, or to assist, encourage or induce, in any ways, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.

The Definitions and Criteria of the Convention read as follows:

1. Chemical Weapons means toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified before, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified before.
2. Toxic Chemical means any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic chemicals which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
3. Precursor means any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system. (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, precursors which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
4. Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical Systems (referred to as "key component") means the precursor which plays the most important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.
5. Old Chemical Weapons means chemical weapons which were produced before 1925 or Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons.

6. Abandoned Chemical Weapons means chemical weapons, including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without the consent of the latter.
7. Riot Control Agent means any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.
8. Chemical Weapons Production Facility means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any time since 1 January 1946 as part of the stage in the production of chemicals ("final technological stage") where the material flows would contain, when the equipment is in operation, any chemical listed in Schedule 1 in the Annex on Chemicals or Any other chemical that has no use, above 1 tonne per year on the territory of a State Party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, but can be used for chemical weapons purposes or; for filling chemical weapons, the filling of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk storage containers; the filling of chemicals into containers that form part of assembled binary munitions and devices or into chemical submunitions that form part of assembled unitary munitions and devices, and the loading of the containers and chemical submunitions into the respective munitions and devices. It does not mean any facility having a production capacity for synthesis of chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) (i) that is less than 1 tonne; any facility in which a chemical specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is or was produced as an unavoidable by-product of activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, provided that the chemical does not exceed 3 per cent of the total product and that the facility is subject to declaration and inspection under the Annex on Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred to as "Verification Annex"); or the single small-scale facility for production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention as referred to in Part VI of the Verification Annex.
9. Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention means industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.
10. Production Capacity means: the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific chemical based on the technological process actually used or, if the process is not yet operational, planned to be used at the relevant facility. It shall be deemed to be equal to the nameplate capacity or, if the nameplate capacity is not available, to the design capacity. The nameplate capacity is the product output under conditions optimized for maximum quantity for the production facility, as demonstrated by one or more test-runs.

The design capacity is the corresponding theoretically calculated product output.

11. Organization means the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established pursuant to Article VIII of this Convention.
12. For the purposes of Article VI: "Production" of a chemical means its formation through chemical reaction; "Processing" of a chemical means a physical process, such as formulation, extraction and purification, in which a chemical is not converted into another chemical; "Consumption" of a chemical means its conversion into another chemical via a chemical reaction.

The Declarations of the Convention read as follows:

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall: With respect to chemical weapons: Declare whether it owns or possesses any chemical weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control; Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Verification Annex, except for those chemical weapons referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii); Report any chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and possessed by another State and located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex; Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 5, of the Verification Annex; Provide its general plan for destruction of chemical weapons that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex; With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons: Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical weapons and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, of the Verification Annex; Declare whether there are abandoned chemical weapons on its territory and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 8, of the Verification Annex; Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of other States and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex; With respect to chemical weapons production facilities: Declare whether it has or has had any chemical weapons production facility under its ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946; Specify any chemical weapons production facility it has or has had under its ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any

place under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1, of the Verification Annex, except for those facilities referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii); Report any chemical weapons production facility on its territory that another State has or has had under its ownership and possession and that is or has been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 2, of the Verification Annex; Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the transfer or receipt of such equipment, in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the Verification Annex; Provide its general plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex; Specify actions to be taken for closure of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1 (i), of the Verification Annex; Provide its general plan for any temporary conversion of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, into a chemical weapons destruction facility, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 7, of the Verification Annex; With respect to other facilities: Specify the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment under its ownership or possession, or located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and that has been designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons. Such declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites; With respect to riot control agents: Specify the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shall be updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective.

2. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

The Chemical Weapons article of this Convention read as follows:

1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its implementation shall apply to all chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, except old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons to which Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex applies.

2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.
3. All locations at which chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (a), has been submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to a chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic on-site verification.
5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.
6. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of destruction"). Such destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate.
7. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 29, of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next annual destruction period; submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1, not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period; and certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it shall destroy chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. The order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.
9. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.

10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.
11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons that are owned or possessed by another State, or that are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that these chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it. If they are not removed within one year, the State Party may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.
12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Parties that request information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons.
13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons storage and their destruction among States Parties.
14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.
15. Nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14 shall affect the obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7
17. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

Activities Not Prohibited Under this Convention read as follows:

1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, to verification measures as provided in the Verification Annex.
3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 1 chemicals") to the prohibitions on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use as specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 2 chemicals") and facilities specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 3 (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 3 chemicals") and facilities specified in Part VIII of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
6. Each State Party shall subject facilities specified in Part IX of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and eventual on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex unless decided otherwise by the Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part IX, paragraph 22, of the Verification Annex.
7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, each State Party shall make an initial declaration on relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex.
8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations regarding the relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex.
9. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the inspectors access to facilities as required in the Verification Annex.
10. In conducting verification activities, the Technical Secretariat shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and, in particular, abide by the provisions set forth in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (hereinafter referred to as "Confidentiality Annex").

11. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

After the start of the Chemical Weapons Convention from the 29th of April in 1997, as for that time the first multilateral disarmament convention in the entire world encompassing the entire scope of chemical weapons, OPCW or Organisation for the prohibition of Chemical Weapons was born. The OPCW mission also encompasses carrying out the task of preventing further production, possessing, transferring, and using chemical weapons in addition to destroying any existing stocks of such weapons, in order to ensure that the entire world is protected against the threat of chemical wars.

In 1993, Signatory States knew that an undeniable amount of groundwork needed to be done before an international organisation which is capable of implementing the CWC could be established. Fortunately, the Convention stipulated that it would enter into force at least two years after it was opened for signatories and 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification. This created a period of time where those preparations could be planned.Under the Paris Resolution, the Signatory States agreed to establish a Preparatory Commission whose duty it would be to ensure that all necessary preparations are made for the First Conference of the States Parties and to address all issues that had been left undecided by the debaters during the Convention. The first meeting for the Preparatory Commission took place in The Hague in February 1993. They were successful in resolving a number of tasks within its mandate, and the results affected the Final Report. The Preparation Commission was also responsible for the transfer of its property, functions and recommendations to the OPCW.

The OPCW contains three main bodies which are the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. All three bodies work together while facing imposing work agendas. The first session was held on 6th of May 1997, one week after CWC's entry into force.

Ongoing and Modern Efforts

Recently, the international community has been trying to ensure that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is made up-to-date in light of security dynamics. Among the major factors has been ensur ing compliance with the CWC owing to persistent reports of using chemical weapons. States Parties have ensured greater

transparency in submitting their declarations and in cooperating with the OPCW, underlining the fact that a violation of the CWC amounts to a significant violation of international law. The development that has made a significant impact has been the extension of investigatory powers for attribution purposes. Whereas initially, the OPCW only had a mandate to investigate the use of chemical weapons, there has been a shift towards being able to assign blame. The effect has been that there can no longer be impunity, and the Convention can be seen as credible.

Currently, there has been emphasis placed on the threats posed by non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and dual-use chemicals. The terrorist organizations would utilize the toxic industrial chemicals that have a legitimate use but can also be put to other uses. In this respect, states have improved internal control and increased measures for protecting their borders. Moreover, there would be a need for cooperation by states in responding to the challenge posed by terrorism. The OPCW assists in building capacity for protecting chemicals from misuse. In general, these activities confirm the international community's concern for maintaining relevance and effectiveness in the constantly changing international security environment for the CWC**.**

7. Legal Framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the base of international legislative frameworks on chemical weapons. The CWC became effective in the 90s.(1997 to give an exact date). The instrument lays down a comprehensive and legaly binding regime with a paradigmatic goal to eliminate and prevent a resurgence of chemical weapons. In effect up to 2026, The CWC is still possibly one of the most successful disarmament instruments ever.

a. Basic Elements of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Founding the CWC is based on a very important principle: chemical weapons should never be allowed to become a realistic threat to humanity. The CWC is therefore essentially underpinned by an outright and non-discriminatory prohibition of all types of chemical weapons, leading to the establishment of a legally binding global BAN on their use of every reason.

The key elements of the CWC Convention include the obligatory destruction of all stockpiles of chemical weapons present, as well as a BAN and dismantling of chemical weapons

production facilities. These are backed up by transparency measures such as declarations and international inspections, which form the essential tools for verification and building confidence in, and promoting compliance with, the Convention among its States Parties.

However, the CWC recognizes the sovereign right of States Parties to engage in peaceful chemical activities. Article III covers the rights and responsibilities of states to protect the legitimate uses of chemistry for industrial, medical, and scientific purposes. Above all, the CWC presents an appropriate balance between rigid disarmament commitments and the preservation of lawful and beneficial applications of chemical science.

b. States Parties' Obligations

Countries that become part of the CWC become liable to implement all exhaustive measures required to ensure full compliance with the Convention.

Primary obligations include:

Chemical weapon declaration and associated facilities and equipment

Destruction of chemical weapon and chemical weapons production facility within the agreed-upon timeframe

Adoption of domestic law on prohibited acts

Inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW

Cooperate with international verification and assistance schemes

Otherwise, it could attract global attention and remedial measures.

c. Prohibited Activities

`The Chemical Weapons Convention` severely forbids any kind of activity regarding chemical weapons. This applies not only to State Parties, but the provisions of this treaty also cover organizations and individuals operating under the jurisdiction of states. In other words, there is no room for confusion about the requirement to comply.

Banned activities include the production, acquisition, development, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of chemical weapons. Using chemical weapons is prohibited at all times and in all manners. Furthermore, the Convention states that the provision of assistance, encouragement, or inducement to other nations in respect of activities prohibited by the CWC is also prohibited.

The use of riot control agents as a weapon of warfare is also specifically Banned. The Convention takes a zero tolerance policy and considers neither military necessity, self-defense, nor retaliation as valid reasons for the use of chemical weapons, thus underlining the absolute character of the ban.

d. Enforcement and Reporting Mechanisms

The implementation of the CWC is dependent on an effective verification and reporting structure and an international review system.

Key mechanisms involve:

Initial and annual declarations obligatory to be submitted to the OPCW

Routine and challenge inspections of declared and suspected facilities

Examination of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons

Reporting Serious Violations to the (UNSC)

Even as the OPCW has an important technological role, often political enforcement might require cooperation with the UN, and this could be influenced by geopolitical considerations.

d. Mechanisms for Implementation and Reporting

One crucial factor in making the CWC effective is a robust verification, reporting, and international review system. These are related mechanisms designed to make compliance work, deter violations, and build confidence among the States Parties.

Other key measures of enforcement and reporting are the requirements for States Parties to provide initial declarations and annual declarations to the OPCW on chemical stockpiles, production facilities, and relevant industrial activities. Verification is extended by routine inspections of declared facilities, as well as challenge inspections of suspected sites without the right of refusal.

In the case of suspected use of chemical weapons, the OPCW has the authority to investigate such allegations through impartial, technical investigations. In the event of serious violations of this Convention, findings are reported to the UNSC for further action.

While the OPCW has a central technical and verification role, political enforcement often necessitates cooperation with the United Nations. Responses to violations are therefore likely to be determined by greater geopolitical dynamics, which represent an increasingly important aspect of multilateral coordination in support of the CWC regime.

8. Case Studies

a. General Examples of Alleged CWC Violations

The allegations regarding the violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) usually emerge as a consequence of reports that suggest the use of harmful chemicals in a manner that does not comply with the provisions contained in the Convention. The scenario may include the suspected use of banned chemical substances, in addition to the wrongful use of dual chemical substances for any purpose that does not contribute towards achieving a peaceful objective.

b. Investigating and Inspection Processes

In response to such allegations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conducts investigations under the procedures provided for in the CWC, including fact-finding missions, on-site inspections, and the collection and scientific analysis of environmental and biomedical samples. In addition to investigations of alleged use, the OPCW undertakes routine inspections of declared facilities and, under certain circumstances, challenge inspections of suspected sites as a means of verifying compliance with the Convention.

c. International Community Reactions

The international community seeks to redress alleged CWC violations through multilateral and legal frameworks. States Parties may bring up issues in OPCW governing bodies, such as the Executive Council or the Conference of States Parties, for clarification, corrective measures, or requests for technical assistance. Based on these findings, action plans could range from diplomatic engagement and compliance action plans through to collective measures that would reinforce Convention respect. The most important motive here is an attempt to uphold the global chemical weapons taboo and the validity of the CWC regime.

9. Current Situation and Challenges

One of the major contemporary difficulties faced by the CWC is the lack of cooperation on the part of some States in adhering to their obligations under the Convention. Even though these States are required to follow the Convention, some have not worked toward destroying their chemical weapons and lack proper national laws to regulate them.

In fact, the CWC was established on a foundation of transparency and trust, with States Parties called on to provide full and complete disclosure of their chemical weapons, related equipment, and facilities for their manufacture and storage. Nonetheless, questions continue to be raised about incomplete declarations and the possibility of emerging stockpiles of chemical weapons and associated materials. Some countries might secretly store chemical weapons and associated materials in order to provide themselves with an edge in strategy, avoid international monitoring, or avoid the obligation to destroy their chemical stockpiles.

Under the present global circumstances, regional conflicts tend to worsen this challenge. A lack of cooperation and competitive politics in states hinder the efficiency of inspection and investigating processes. Being confronted with the problem of possession and use of chemical weapons, the lack of unity in the global community tends to impede the efficiency of mechanisms for enforcement and accountability.

Technological progress in the chemical industry also raised concerns about clandestine stockpiles. Chemical synthesis advances, miniaturization of chemical production facilities, and easy accessibility of dual-use chemicals have made it even more difficult to verify chemical weapons-related activities than in the past and may facilitate clandestine production or stockpiling of banned chemicals.

Undeclared stockpiles are not only illegal but also directly challenge international peace and security. Unidentified stores can lead to disastrous humanitarian, environmental, and political implications in case they are used intentionally or leak through an accident. Besides, there are concerns that unaccounted-for chemical weapons are an issue in building trust among States Parties, as well as undermine the whole regime of disarmament.

Addressing the issue of undeclared stockpiles in the current situation requires strengthening the authority and technical capacity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), improving intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and enhancing confidence-building measures among states. Without renewed political commitment and international cooperation, the continued existence of hidden chemical weapon stockpiles will remain a major obstacle to achieving the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

10. Past UN Actions and Resolutions

UNSC Resolution 612 (1988)
This resolution said the use of chemical weapons, vehemently denounced their continued use in the conflict, demanded that both sides abstain from using them, and urged all states to impose stringent regulations on the transfer of chemical products to any nation suspected of using chemical weapons. The Council declared in resolution 620 that it would take additional action.

UNSC Resolution 620 (1988)
This resolution dealt with the use of chemical weapons, strongly condemned the further use of these weapons in the conflict, demanded both sides avoid their use, and called on all states to impose strict controls on the transfer of chemical products to any country that had used chemical weapons. Further measures would be taken, as stated in resolution 620.

UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004)
The Security Council decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery in particular for terrorist purposes. The resolution requires that all States shall adopt and enforce appropriate laws to this effect, as well as other effective measures, in order to prevent the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery to non-State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes.

UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013)

This resolution was adopted unanimously by the Council, requiring verification and destruction of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles, called for the convening of the Geneva II peace talks, and endorsed the establishment of a transitional governing body in Syria with full executive powers.

UNSC Resolution 2209 (2015)

This resolution condemned toxic chemical use, such as chlorine, without assigning blame; underscored that those responsible should be held accountable; recalled resolution 2118; and supported the 4 February 2015 decision of the OPCW.

UNSC Resolution 2235 (2015)

This was a resolution that requested the UN Secretary-General and OPCW Director-General to recommend the establishment and operation of a UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to determine responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

DISEC Resolutions

The First Committee of the General Assembly (Disarmament and International Security Committee) worked on annual resolutions on chemical weapons since the 1990s, mostly called "Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)". While these resolutions are not legally binding, they play a vital role in political pressure and coordination. The topics that were handled in these resolutions were "universality of the CWC" which urges all non-State Parties to join the CWC without losing any more time and emphasizes the essentiality of universal membership to avoid legal loopholes. Another topic that got handled was "full and effective implementation" where the resolution invites the State Parties to associate their law to the declaration obligations of the CWC and complete the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles. These resolutions also heavily focus on the importance of transparency while reporting to the OPCW. Another topic is the "national implementation measures" which contain the emphasis on adoption of domestic regulation that criminalizes chemical weapon activities. "Support for the OPCW" is another essential headline that we can observe. In this topic, supporting the confidence in the technical field and impartiality of the OPCW was spoken. Also, cooperation and financial contributions to the OPCW is encouraged while welcoming the efforts of the organisation in areas such as verification and investigations. These resolutions were also effective in terms of "Addressing Terrorism" and states were encouraged to regulate the dual-use chemicals of their nation and prevent any terrorist actions with access to toxic chemicals. The final topic which was mentioned is "International Cooperation and Assistance" which promotes some peaceful usages of chemical substances and encourages technical assistance for developing states.

11. Possible Resolutions

One of the most effective ways to improve compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the strengthening of verification and inspection mechanisms. Expanding the authority, resources, and technical capabilities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) would allow for more frequent, thorough, and independent inspections. Enhanced verification procedures can help identify undeclared stockpiles, prevent violations, and increase confidence among States Parties.

Another important solution involves the effective implementation of sanctions against states that fail to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Targeted diplomatic and economic measures can serve as a deterrent against non-compliance, while reinforcing the binding nature of international law. Ensuring that sanctions are applied in a consistent and impartial manner is essential to maintaining the credibility of the CWC.

Capacity building and technical assistance also play a crucial role in improving compliance. Some states lack the financial, technical, or institutional capacity to fully implement the Convention. Providing training, expertise, and resources can help these states strengthen national legislation, improve monitoring systems, and safely destroy chemical weapons stockpiles.

Finally, promoting transparency and confidence-building measures is essential for strengthening trust among States Parties. Voluntary information sharing, regular reporting, and cooperative inspections can reduce suspicion and misunderstandings. By encouraging open communication and cooperation, these measures contribute to a more effective and sustainable implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

12. Questions to be Answered

1. How can compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention be effectively strengthened among all States Parties?

2. What measures can be taken to improve the detection and prevention of undeclared chemical weapon stockpiles?

3. How can the authority and operational capacity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) be enhanced?

4. In what ways can sanctions and accountability mechanisms be applied more consistently and fairly in cases of non-compliance?

5. How can technological advancements be regulated to prevent the misuse of dual-use chemicals while allowing peaceful scientific development?

6. What strategies can be adopted to prevent non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, from acquiring chemical weapons or related materials?

7. How can transparency and confidence-building measures be strengthened to improve trust among States Parties?

8. What forms of international cooperation and technical assistance are most effective in supporting states with limited capacity to implement the CWC?

13. References

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