OECD Public Governance Reviews

OECD Integrity Review of Jordan

TOGETHER FOR AN ACCOUNTABLE AND TRANSPARENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Foreword

Jordan has demonstrated its political commitment to improving transparency, integrity and accountability, which are essential for addressing policy challenges and fostering public trust and inclusive development. This has culminated in the most recent wave of political, economic and public administration reforms that reflect the country's aspirations and efforts in terms of improving good governance and supporting sustainable economic development. The reforms include the Economic Modernisation Vision, the Political System Modernisation Plan and the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap.

Public integrity is essential to the economic and social well-being and prosperity of individuals and societies, and as such, a cornerstone of any country's modernisation efforts. Public integrity is the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector. Anti-corruption and integrity efforts are an important part of promoting economic prosperity and political stability.

Over the years, Jordan has developed a comprehensive public integrity framework to address the country's integrity and corruption challenges. These challenges include insufficient transparency and undue interference in recruitment and selection processes and weak enforcement and oversight. In several areas, such as whistle-blower protection, Jordan has been a pioneer in the region. In 2008, the Jordanian Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) developed the country's first anti-corruption strategy, covering a four-year period. This strategy was renewed for 2013 to 2017, after which the current National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) was adopted for the period 2017-2025, providing a strategic approach to promoting integrity and fighting corruption in Jordan. Currently, plans are underway to develop a new strategy through an evidence-informed and participatory approach.

This report contributes to OECD work to support countries in effectively implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity and is delivered in the context of the project "Ma'an – Together for an accountable and transparent public administration in Jordan", funded by the European Union. The project assists Jordan in building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions and is part of the Programme of Work 2023-2024 of the OECD's Public Governance Committee in the framework of the MENA-OECD Governance Programme in support of public sector efficiency in the MENA region. The project is also implemented in close co-operation with the SIGMA Programme, a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union, principally financed by the European Union. This Integrity Review is complemented by a Public Governance Review of Jordan, which provides an in-depth peer-reviewed assessment of the government's capacity to design and implement more responsive, transparent and accountable policy outcomes and strengthen the link between strategic policy objectives and their implementation. As such, these reviews build on each other's work.

The report was approved by the Public Governance Committee on 19 November 2024 and prepared for publication by the Secretariat.

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Executive summary

Jordan has introduced measures to strengthen integrity as a key element of its recent political, economic and public administration reforms. These measures are outlined in the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2020-2025. Building on these and previous efforts implemented by Jordan, this Integrity Review provides recommendations for closing gaps and ensuring the effective implementation of integrity and anti-corruption policies across the public sector and society.

Towards a co-ordinated public integrity system

Jordan has developed an institutional integrity framework led by the Jordanian Integrity and Anticorruption Commission (JIACC), but challenges remain in relation to its financial and administrative independence and inter-institutional co-ordination. The regulatory framework for integrity could benefit from further simplification and harmonisation. Integrity policies could also be better mainstreamed throughout the public administration, both at the central and local levels. OECD recommends:

- Reinforcing JIACC's preventive mandate and financial and administrative independence.
- Establishing a permanent co-ordination mechanism between key Jordanian integrity actors to ensure synergies and avoid overlaps.
- Establishing integrity officers in all public entities in the central administration and in municipalities to provide ad hoc advice, guidance and training related to public integrity.

Reinforcing the evidence-informed strategic approach to public integrity

Since 2008, Jordan has developed comprehensive strategies to address corruption challenges, including the Anti-Corruption Strategies of 2008-2012, 2013-2017 and the current National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2017(2020)-2025. The next NIACS offers an opportunity to renew the country's political commitment to integrity and launch a comprehensive and nation-wide consultation process. OECD recommends:

- Ensuring a participative and evidence-informed design of the next NIACS, which should consider, for example, information gathered through the National Integrity Indicators, the integrity risk assessments and the evaluation of the NIACS 2020-2025.
- Defining an action plan for the NIACS, including required financial resources, and a monitoring and evaluation framework with a set of indicators to assess its implementation and impact and to allow for learning and accountability.

Promoting open cultures of integrity in the public administration

Jordan has adopted principles and values to foster a culture of integrity within the public administration. However, additional clarity and guidance are needed to build ownership and ensure all public officials understand what is expected from them. Public officials need more support to identify and manage conflicts of interest and to build capacities for managing integrity, especially at the municipal level. Jordan is currently modernising public human resource management, providing an opportunity to further integrate integrity and transparency into these processes. OECD recommends:

- Strengthening conflict-of-interest regulations by including definitions and procedures, complemented with guidance on key concepts, including examples and detailed steps on managing conflict of interest.
- Undertaking a participatory process to review and simplify the current principles and values for public officials and complement these efforts with tailored and innovative awareness-raising campaigns and capacity-building activities aimed at promoting behavioural change.
- To mitigate risks of favouritism in recruitments, the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC) could continue to clarify job categories and selection criteria as well ensure timely and broad advertising of openings.

Promoting a culture of integrity across society

Jordan has implemented several initiatives to raise awareness about the negative consequences of corruption and the role of citizens, civil society, academia and the private sector in combating it. By partnering with external stakeholders and public entities, JIACC developed awareness raising campaigns targeting youth and citizens. There is an opportunity to further invest in integrity, participation and openness to enhance trust in public institutions and foster a whole-of-society commitment to public integrity. OECD recommends:

- Encouraging dialogue among citizens and the public sector to identify shared values, principles and norms and to allow citizens to express their expectations from their government.
- Civil society organisations and private companies could further strengthen their commitment to integrity by undertaking autonomous self-regulation efforts while recognising their heterogeneity.
- Led by Jordan, donors (i.e., bilateral and multilateral development organisations) could establish official co-ordination channels on integrity to reduce duplication risks and prioritise alignment with national priorities and local needs.

Strengthening the integrity risk management, internal control and audit framework

The Ministry of Finance, the Audit Bureau (AB) and JIACC play a key role in risk management as well as in internal control and audit within the public sector. Despite recent efforts, integrity risk management is not yet implemented across public institutions. Moreover, challenges remain in the reforms aimed at changing the profile of internal control units from *ex ante* to *ex post* control. Jordan's constitutional and legal framework includes provisions for the independence of the AB, Jordan's Supreme Audit Institution. However, additional efforts are needed to strengthen its independence and to improve stakeholders' understanding of the AB's work and its role in accountability. OECD recommends:

- Implementing an integrated risk management framework, entailing senior management commitment, the assignment of clear roles and responsibilities and established means of co-operation.

- Ensuring internal control units assume their third line role by building capacities and providing training to internal control units in line with international standards.
- Strengthening the AB's independence, for example by clarifying the term of appointment of its Head, ensuring no interference in the institution's proposed budget and providing independence in the recruitment of its staff.
- Developing a stakeholder engagement strategy to communicate the impact of the AB's work to public institutions and citizens.

Strengthening whistleblowing and criminal enforcement

Jordan has established several channels for reporting integrity violations**,** but more efforts are needed to ensure these channels are clear, consistent, coherent and visibly effective. With Regulation 62 of 2014, Jordan became the first country in the MENA region to enact whistleblower protection legislation. Now, there is an opportunity to learn from the experience so far, provide further clarity and close remaining gaps. The Judiciary Branch has become more effective and efficient, but additional efforts could strengthen preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC and improve required inter-institutional co-ordination. OECD recommends:

- Establishing clear procedures for transferring reported cases across responsible public institutions and publishing a short guide in plain language to explain the different reporting channels.
- Strengthening the whistle-blower protection framework by , for instance, clarifying key definitions and protection measures, integrating a good faith clause in existing legislation and allowing anonymous reporting.
- Strengthening criminal enforcement by establishing regular channels for co-ordination and co-operation between investigative entities at national and international levels and building competencies of investigators at JIACC and judges.

1 Towards a co-ordinated public integrity system in Jordan

This chapter provides recommendations for achieving a coherent and consistent integrity system in Jordan. First, it reviews the current legal and institutional arrangements on public integrity. Second, it analyses the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, as the lead entity responsible for anti-corruption and integrity in Jordan, and how the horizontal co-ordination and co-operation between the main public integrity actors could be strengthened to support coherence and to share and build on lessons learned from good practices. Finally, it looks at how integrity could be better integrated into the wider public management and governance framework to enable public-sector organisations, including the local level, to take responsibility for effectively managing integrity.

1.1. Public integrity: A safeguard for economic and political progress and stability

Corruption and the lack of integrity are affecting countries worldwide with corrosive effects. Corruption undermines democracy and trust in governments, widens economic and social inequalities, perpetuates inequality and poverty and reduces the quality of public services (OECD, 2017[1]). Corruption can serve as a breeding ground for organised crime and terrorism and weaken a state's capacity to protect its citizens. Tackling corruption as well as promoting trust and integrity, therefore should be a priority for countries.

Corruption is a challenge to all countries and Jordan is not an exception. According to Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2023 (0 = high perceived level of corruption, to 100 = low perceived level of corruption), Jordan's CPI score (46) is significantly higher than the average of 17 countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) included in the CPI (38),meaning that the corruption level perceived in Jordan is lower (Figure 1.1). In 2023, only three countries in MENA scored significantly better and seven countries scored significantly worse. The confidence interval of Jordan (41-51) overlaps with those of Saudi Arabia (43-61), Qatar (50-66), Kuwait (43-49), Oman (34-52), Bahrain (33-51), Tunisia (37-43), Morocco (35-41) and Egypt (29-41), making a comparison between these countries statistically difficult. In turn, Jordan's CPI score (46) is significantly lower than the average of the OECD (66), the EU (64) or the G-20 (53), meaning that the perceived levels of corruption in Jordan are higher. Finally, the time series and the significance analysis carried out by Transparency International indicate that, between 2012 and 2023, Jordan's CPI score did not change significantly.

Figure 1.1. Jordan's Corruption Perceptions Index 2023 is above the regional average but lower than the average of the OECD, EU or G-20

Note: MENA average calculated with the scores from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2023, (Transparency International, 2023[2]).

These results from the CPI are mirrored in other international measurements. The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBI), for instance, report that Jordan's performance with respect to the indicator "control of corruption" has only slightly improved (0 indicates the lowest and 100 the highest rank): from 1996 (55,38) to 2022 (58,02). However, while the best performing year was 2003 with a score of 67,72, the indicator is declined between 2015 and 2022. In turn, the Basel Institute on Governance Anti-Money-Laundering Index

(AMLI) shows that Jordan slightly improved in recent years from 5.60 in 2021, to 5.07 in 2022 and 4.90 in 2023. The AMLI measures a country's susceptibility to money laundering and terrorist financing (10 indicates the highest, while 0 the lowest susceptibility).

Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer measures, amongst others, the experience with corruption of citizens who had contact with public services (Figure 1.2). With only 4% of Jordanians reporting in 2019 that they had to pay a bribe in such a situation, the country has the lowest bribery rate in the region (average 22%) and is even lower than the average of the European Union in 2021 (7%). However, when asking citizens in Jordan about their perception, the same Global Corruption Barometer 2019 evidenced that 86% of Jordanians perceive corruption to be a big problem in the country, while only 13% responded that corruption is not a problem or a small problem. Citizens only can *experience* corruption in direct contact with public officials, e.g., with police forces or public officials delivering public services. In turn, their *perception* of corruption can be influenced by many ways and is a complex phenomenon. Research has shown that personal characteristics such as "being a woman, being divorced, being unemployed, working at the private sector or being self-employed", but also macro-variables such as "macroeconomic instability and income-inequality" are all positively correlated with the perception of corruption (Melgar, Rossi and Smith, 2010[3]). The authors of the study emphasise the relevance of corruption even if it is "only" perceived:

> *"Corruption and corruption perception can be considered as cultural phenomena because they depend on how a society understands the rules and what constitutes a deviation. (…) High levels of corruption perception could have more devastating effects than corruption itself; it generates a "culture of distrust" towards some institutions and may create a cultural tradition of gift giving and hence, raising corruption." (Melgar, Rossi and Smith, 2010[3])*

Figure 1.2. Experienced corruption: Total Bribery Rates in six MENA countries (2019) compared to average of the European Union (2021)

Note: The original question: "In the past 12 months have you had contact with any of the following services? How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour in order to get the assistance or services you needed?"
MENA average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: For MENA: Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Transparency International, for European Union: Global Corruption Barometer 2021, Transparency International.

Jordan has recognised this challenge and has been taking measures to address corruption. Efforts to prevent and fight corruption have been ongoing for over 30 years and can be traced back at least to the mid-1990s (Al-Zu'bi, Al-Tal and Rubaiha, 2023[4]). Consequently, the country has established a remarkable and comprehensive national framework to tackle corruption and promote integrity. Jordan was the first Arab country that ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005 and went through the UNCAC review mechanism in 2012. The country joined the Open Government Partnership Initiative in 2011, ratified the statute of the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) in Austria in 2011 as well as the Arab Convention against Corruption in 2012 (entry into force in 2013). Further milestones were, for example, the creation of the Jordan Anticorruption Commission in 2006, which later became the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct in the Civil Service in 2013 (see Chapter 3) or the adoption of the Whistleblower Protection Law in 2014 (see Chapter 6). Jordan had established a first anti-corruption strategy in 2008, followed by the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2017-2025, which was updated in 2020. These and other efforts seem to be reflected in the perception of citizens as well. In the Global Corruption Barometer 2019, 55% of citizens in Jordan seemed to have acknowledged that the government has been handling the problem rather well, which is significantly higher than the average of 28% of the six MENA countries included in this survey (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3. In 2019, 55% of Jordanians perceived that the government was handling the corruption issue well

Note: Regional average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Transparency International.

Jordan's reform efforts to control corruption have been ongoing for over 30 years. Most recently, His Majesty King Abdullah ll and the government recognised corruption as an obstacle to modernise the public sector, promote economic progress and attract foreign investments. These ongoing economic and political reforms provide an opportunity to reinforce the efforts and to gradually shift from traditional anti-corruption policies to a more modern approach promoting a culture of integrity. To achieve this effectively, countries need to establish a proactive "culture of integrity", which requires both adequate mechanisms to detect, investigate and sanction corruption and proactive and thorough preventive actions that address systemic and institutional weaknesses facilitating corruption and other unethical practices (OECD, 2017[1]). This, in turn requires coherent and co-ordinated public integrity systems as well as adapted institutional and legal frameworks.

The 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity ("2017 OECD Recommendation") provides policy makers with a vision and practical framework for such a coherent and comprehensive public integrity system. Public integrity is defined there as "the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector" (OECD, 2017[1]). As such, it looks at the legal, institutional and cultural frameworks that support integrity. By shifting the focus from fragmented and ad hoc integrity policies to a context dependent, behavioural and risk-based approach, emphasis is put on building a culture of integrity across government and the whole of society (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4. A Strategy for Public Integrity: The 2017 OECD Recommendation

Source: (OECD, 2017[1])

This chapter follows the principles of "Commitment" and "Responsibilities" of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[1]) in view of providing concrete and realistic recommendations for improvement, building on what has been achieved in Jordan over the past years. The chapter is structured as follows:

- The first section reviews briefly the current legal and institutional arrangements on public integrity, looking into the relevant legislation, responsibilities and appropriate mandate and capacities.
- The second section analyses JIACC, as the lead entity responsible for anti-corruption and integrity in Jordan, and the horizontal co-ordination and co-operation between the main public integrity actors to support coherence and to share and build on lessons learned from good practices.
- The third section looks how integrity is integrated into the wider public management and governance framework to enable public-sector organisations to take responsibility for effectively managing the integrity of their activities as well as that of the public officials who carry them out.

The remaining chapters of this Integrity Review analyse in further detail other specific areas of the 2017 OECD Recommendation: The evidence-based and strategic approach to public integrity (Chapter 2), the promotion of a culture of integrity throughout the public administration (Chapter 3) and in society as a whole

(Chapter 4), the integrity risk management and audit framework (Chapter 5) as well as whistleblowing and the enforcement of integrity laws and regulation (Chapter 6).

1.2. The legal and institutional integrity framework in Jordan

1.2.1. Jordan has adopted a comprehensive regulatory framework on anti-corruption and integrity that could benefit from further simplification and harmonisation

A practical translation of commitment into practice requires, among other things, clear, harmonised and up to date legislation and standards on a criminal, civil and administrative level (see also Chapter 3 and 6). This is important to ensure legal certainty for public officials and the general public and to know which behaviour is allowed and which prohibited. Clear standards also provide a common framework to ensure accountability (OECD, 2020[5]). In turn, an overly complex regulatory framework, lack of transparency in the preparation of regulations and ineffective or inappropriate application of laws are factors that could even favour corruption and dishonest behaviour.

On a regulatory level, Jordan has adopted and updated several laws and regulations that have been added to already existing relevant legislation. The Jordan's Constitution of 1952, as amended, establishes a balance between the legislative and executive branch of the government. The Constitutional Court, established in 2011/12, is responsible for the oversight of the constitutionality of laws and regulations and for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. Key integrity and anti-corruption legislation and regulations include, for example, the Jordan's Penal Code 1960, as amended, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law and its amendments, outlining amongst others the responsibilities of the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), the Civil Service Bylaw and the Public Human Resources Management Bylaw from 2024, the Audit Bureau Law and its amendments, the Internal Control Bylaw, the Government Procurement Bylaw (in particular Appendix 3), the Financial Disclosure Law, the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Law of 2007 and its amendments, the Illicit Enrichment Law of 2014 and its amendments, the Jordanian Economic Crimes Law of 1993, the Competition Law of 2004 or the Jordan Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct in Public Services (CoC), which includes integrity provisions to be followed by public servants.

Although Jordan has adopted this comprehensive set of laws and standards, the legal framework could be further strengthened. Such reforms would be in line with project number 4 of the NIACS 2020-2025, which aims at identifying loopholes in the applicable national legislation and working to harmonise them with international agreements, as well as the related projects number 2, 5,11 and 17 (JIACC, 2019[6]).

First, Jordan could further increase the clarity of anti-corruption and integrity regulations. Indeed, the relevant provisions are currently distributed in different acts of legislation. The Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law, for instance, refers to the Penal Code, Economic Crimes Law (Article 16.1 and 16.2) or the Illicit Enrichment Law to define what falls under its jurisdiction and qualifies as corruption. While dispersed laws are not per se a bad practice and quite common practice given the incremental reality of laws being created or amended over time, it makes it more difficult for non-experts to know and understand the relevant rules. JIACC noted in its annual report 2021 that a lack of knowledge may be the reason why they continue to receive complaints that fall outside of its jurisdiction and that more awareness raising is necessary (JIACC, 2021[7]). Furthermore, Laws are frequently amended in Jordan. While this also reflects the country's will to reform, it increases legal complexity and could create confusion, especially amongst non-legally trained public officials and citizens. In fact, several stakeholders mentioned during interviews conducted by the OECD that frequent amendments and laws sometimes perceived as vague are a challenge for their practical application and could create legal uncertainty. Therefore, Jordan could discuss the possibility to codify into one single law all offences and relevant aspects, for instance following principles of the 2012 OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance (Box 1.1). As a minimum, since such a

profound legal reform of relevant legislation could be difficult to achieve, JIACC could, together with the judiciary, elaborate guidance material in plain language to provide an overview of the current laws and explain the interpretation of some of the key provisions in further detail.

Box 1.1. The OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance 2012

The OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance is the first international instrument to address regulatory policy, management and governance as a whole-of-government activity that can and should be addressed by sectoral ministries, regulatory and competition agencies.

In 12 Principles, it sets out the measures that governments can and should take to support the implementation and advancement of systemic regulatory reform to deliver regulations that meet public policy objectives having a positive impact on the economy and society. The measures are integrated in a comprehensive policy cycle in which regulations are designed, assessed and evaluated ex ante and ex post, revised and enforced at all levels of government, and supported by appropriate institutions.

Source: (OECD, 2012[8])

Finally, a revision of the current anti-corruption legislation could involve conducting a comprehensive gap analysis to identify corrupt practices that are currently not explicitly or adequately codified. For example, bribery in the private sector (Art. 21 UNCAC) is currently not explicitly codified as a standalone offense, while trading in influence (Art. 18 UNCAC) and the obstruction of justice (Art. 25 UNCAC) are codified only to a certain extend. For instance, while undue interference of witnesses and others in a position to provide authorities with relevant evidence is addressed in the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law, the Law does not explicitly address the second part of Art. 25 UNCAC which obliges member states to criminalise the use of physical force, threats or intimidation to unduly interfere with actions of judicial or law enforcement officials (Rasheed and USAID, 2019[9]). Finally, the concept "wasta" is arguably criminalised in Article 16 of the Anti-Corruption and Integrity Law and in Article 176 of the Penal Code, but nepotism and favouritism are concepts that are not further defined leaving room for interpretation and potential misunderstandings. Together with the difficulty to prove such an offense, another reason for this could be the ambiguity and vagueness of the law which fails to provide a clear definition of "wasta" (Merhej, 2022[10]). A clear definition of "wasta" and its relation to concepts such as nepotism and favouritism as well as including "wasta" into guidance on managing conflict of interest more broadly could therefore help to provide more clarity.

1.2.2. Jordan's main integrity actors cover the key elements of a national integrity system

Complementing a clear legal framework, the promotion of public integrity also requires a clear institutional arrangement. A public integrity system typically involves many different official actors in the public sector that cover the various functions of an integrity system (Table 1.1). While civil society and private sector also play a role in an integrity system, these official integrity actors include the "core" integrity actors, such as the institutions, units or individuals responsible for implementing, promoting and enforcing integrity policies, but also "complementary" integrity actors with key support functions such as public finance, external audit, human resource management or public procurement.

Table 1.1. Main integrity functions in the public sector

SYSTEM	CULTURE	ACCOUNTABILITY
• Assigning clear responsibilities • Ensuring mechanisms to support horizontal and vertical co-operation • Designing and implementing the integrity strategy or strategies • Monitoring and evaluating the integrity strategy or strategies • Setting integrity standards	• Integrating integrity into human resource management (e.g., assessing the fairness of reward and promotion systems) and personnel management (e.g. integrity as criterion for selection, evaluation and career promotion) • Building capacity and raising the awareness of public officials • Providing advice and counselling • Implementing measures to cultivate openness • Opening channels and implementing mechanisms for complaints and whistle-blower protection • Raising awareness in society • Conducting civic education programmes • Implementing measures to support integrity in companies • Implementing measures to support integrity in civil society organisations	• Assessing and managing integrity risks • Applying internal audit • Implementing enforcement mechanisms • Applying independent oversight and audit • Applying access to information and implementing open government measures • Engaging stakeholders across the policy cycle • Preventing and managing conflict of interest • Implementing integrity measures for lobbying • Implementing integrity measures in financing of political parties and election campaigns

Source: (OECD, 2020[5])

The assignment of responsibilities for these integrity functions depends on the institutional and jurisdictional setup of a country and can vary significantly. In Jordan, the main integrity actors are:

- The core responsibility for integrity and anti-corruption policies is assigned to the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), established in 2006 and merged with the Ombudsman Bureau in 2016. Its mandate and responsibilities will be analysed in more details below.

- The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Council of Ministers play key roles for co-ordinating the implementation of Jordan's broader reform agenda, including the modernisation roadmap and the integrity-related objectives (see also Chapter 2 of this Integrity Review).

- The Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC), that replaced the Civil Service Bureau as of January 2024, and the Institute for Public Administration (IPA) are key complementary integrity actors that promote a culture of integrity in the public administration through their mandates and within their spheres of influence. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice's Financial Disclosure Department currently has a role in receiving asset declaration. Their roles are analysed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this Integrity Review.

- The Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA) has a jurisdiction of municipal and governorate councils. Amongst others, MOLA has the role of inspection over the municipalities, governorate councils, committees and joint services councils and to ensure accountability of heads and members of municipal and municipal councils.

- The co-responsibility of the whole of society, including the private sector, civil society organisations and the citizens but also actors of international cooperation, in upholding and promoting a culture of integrity in the country is analysed in Chapter 4.

- The Audit Bureau (AB), as the Supreme Audit Institution of Jordan, and the Ministry of Finance, responsible for steering internal control and audit, are the main actors of the public control and audit framework in Jordan, which is analysed in Chapter 5.

- Public prosecutors, the judiciary, including the Judicial Council and the Constitutional Court, are key integrity actors to ensure the investigation and sanctioning of integrity violations. They are analysed in Chapter 6.

- Other relevant institutions, which are not further analysed in detail in this Integrity Review, are the Procurement Policy Committee, the Independent Election Committee (IEC), the Jordan Customs Department (e.g., related to customs smuggling) or the Income and Sales Tax Department (e.g., related to tax evasion). The Anti-Money Laundering Unit (FIU) within the Jordan Central Bank (CJB) and the Financial Disclosure Department (FDD) within the Ministry of Justice play an important role in relation to money laundering.

1.3. Strengthen JIACC and promote co-ordination amongst key actors in Jordan

1.3.1. Jordan should strengthen JIACC by increasing its financial and administrative independence and by reinforcing its preventive mandate in the Law, while ensuring that public entities can get advice on integrity-related issues

A core question with respect to responsibilities relates to the dual functions of anti-corruption efforts: preventive and enforcement. The UNCAC requires member countries to address both and to establish "preventive anti-corruption bodies" (Art. 6) and "authorities" whose task is to combat corruption via law enforcement (Art. 36). Neither the UNCAC nor its interpretative documents recommend or require the existence of a single body responsible for both areas. While some countries have established one single authority responsible for both, most OECD countries have separated the two areas (OECD, 2013[11]; Recanatini, 2011[12]; Doig and Recanatini, 2020[13]; Hussmann, Hechler and Peñailillo, 2009[14]). Even across preventative institutions, mandates differ to a meaningful extent within OECD countries and, in many cases, responsibilities are shared between various institutions (OECD, 2017[15]).

The Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) is mandated with prevention and has a role in enforcement. On the one hand, JIACC's task is to ensure that the public administration acts fairly and impartially (Art. 4.b Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law), activates and applies the set of values and rules of conduct in the public administration (Art. 4.a) or to raise awareness of citizens on the negative impact of corruption (Art. 8). It also has the primary responsibility for implementing and co-ordinating the implementation of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2020-2025. On the other hand, JIACC is responsible for receiving complaints on corruption incidents as defined in Art. 16 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law (Art 4.g), carrying out preliminary investigations (Art. 4.i), ensuring international co-operation and legal assistance (Art. 4.h) and providing whistleblower protection. Chapter 6 of this Integrity Review analyses in more detail this enforcement role of JIACC.

In recent years, JIACC, mainly through the Integrity and Prevention Directorate, has increased its efforts on prevention. Most importantly, the corruption risk assessment methodology (see Chapter 5) and the National Integrity Indicators (see Chapter 2) are significant steps towards strengthening the prevention of corruption. The Integrity and Prevention Directorate also has conducted several lectures and trainings for public administrations, developed training materials for the IPA on integrity and combating corruption for public officials (leadership and lower ranking levels), conducted awareness raising activities in schools (sometimes jointly with religious bodies) and universities (such as a master programme in integrity and anti-corruption with the University of Jordan), or analysed legislation in the health sector with respect to integrity issues (JIACC, 2021). In turn, JIACC's legal division analyses legislation to identify corruption loopholes and proposes amendments to laws, regulations and instructions regulating the work of the Commission (JIACC 2022). JIACC also published studies, for instance on the extent and impact of wasta in Jordan (Queen Rania Center for Jordanian Studies Community Service, 2020[16]) and has developed tools to recover funds.

Building on these achievements and to further increase JIACC's preventive profile, Jordan could consider revising the existing legislation in view of providing JIACC with a clearer prevention mandate. Some tasks already carried out by JIACC such as the elaboration of studies, the consultative role in drafting legislation

relevant for integrity, or co-ordinating the implementation of the NIACS are currently not clearly anchored in the law and an authoritative mandate would be useful.

Furthermore, it is important to continue strengthening JIACC's independence and capacities. Given its role in both prevention and enforcement, independence is key and adequate resourcing and well-trained staff are necessary for achieving results. Independence includes also being able to recruit the required professionals. The way in which the JIACC attracts, retains and motivates staff is ultimately a key determinant of its ability to continue acting independently and taking decisions that are objective and evidence-based. Strengthening a "culture of professionalism", with professional staff being proud of belonging to JIACC, accompanied by "soft" incentives can compensate for remuneration gaps with the industry (OECD, 2016[17]).

However, while JIACC formally is an independent institution (Art 5 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law), this independence seems to be *de facto* constrained from a financial and administrative perspective. For example, in terms of human resources, JIACC notes challenges related to hiring staff in more specialised fields such as engineering and finance. JIACC often must rely on personnel on secondments from other departments to fill key roles. These, however, require to be trained and are facing a learning curve. Reportedly, they often must go back to their entities precisely when they start getting acquainted to the work in JIACC. A further challenge mentioned during interviews is that JIACC falls under the Civil Service Bylaw. As such, in the past employees were chosen by the CSB (now the SPAC), which reportedly represented a challenge for JIACC in selecting adequate staff as they do not have the discretion to independently appoint their personnel. This, however, may improve with the SPAC and new regulations.

Jordan could therefore renew and reaffirm its strong political commitment to fighting corruption at the highest level by reviewing the law in view of granting JIACC stronger financial and administrative independence. This includes providing the necessary flexibility needed to appoint employees and determine their contracts and compensation, allowing JIACC to select its employees and revise the current selection and recruitment processes to ensure technical know-how and capacities. The current reforms in the context of the SPAC, could provide an opportunity to grant JIACC autonomy in hiring outside of the SPAC data base, while following SPAC procedures related, for example, to the advertisement, the exams, the interviews etc. A similar arrangement to the Audit Bureau could be envisaged. This autonomy should go along with measures aimed at strengthening a "culture of independence" within JIACC and promoting the pride and intrinsic motivation of its staff to belonging to the institution. This, amongst others, also requires increased capacity building measures and continued training and coaching, including, for example, in areas key for prevention such as the design of integrity strategies, corruption risk management or on data management and statistics.

Finally, experience has shown that combining prevention and enforcement roles is coming along with some challenges. On the one hand, the investigative mandate often dominates, providing the agencies with a certain power, which is more respected by other public institutions than the preventive mandate. On the other hand, a key preventive function is to provide not only generic guidance to public entities through trainings or awareness raising, but only concrete and specific advice and support to help entities strengthen their own organisational integrity policies and practices. This, however, may be tricky as this same public entity might be investigated by JIACC later and could try to argue that they just did exactly what JIACC recommended. During a workshop discussing a first draft of this Integrity Review, JIACC was very clear that they cannot and should not provide advice to public entities on integrity matters. The question is then, who in Jordan could provide such advice.

JIACC, together with other key integrity actors, could consider initiating an open dialogue on how to find a constructive way to overcome this challenge. Several alternative solutions could be envisaged and discussed.

- First, JIACC could introduce a strict internal separation between prevention and enforcement areas and increase internal and external communication about this separation. While information from

the enforcement area is beneficial for prevention and has, according to JIACC, already informed preventive actions in the past, such internal communication could be maintained but focusing on general dimensions, never mentioning specific cases. Also, security screening of staff and secrecy requirements could be significantly higher for staff in the enforcement area, while such restrictions would not be required for staff working on prevention.

- Second, JIACC could reflect on whether the preliminary investigative powers could be passed entirely to the specialised prosecution services on corruption. JIACC could still receive complaints, for example, but would pass them directly to the relevant authority. This would not only allow JIACC to completely embrace its preventive mandate, but also prevent from any discussions regarding a potential undue influence in JIACC investigations, despite its independence pursuant to Art. 5.a of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law. Even a perceived undue influence or deliberately disseminated false rumours claiming such an influence could undermine JIACC's legitimacy and the trust of citizens in this institution.

- Third, JIACC could continue under the current setting, while passing the mandate to provide advice and guidance to public sector entities to another body. Just as JIACC, the Audit Bureau also needs to stay at arms-length with the public entities it is auditing. However, the mandate to provide advice and support in strengthening organisational culture of integrity could be given to Ministry of Finance, in the context of its function related to steering internal control systems, or to the SPAC, given its mandate related to public compliance and developing institutional cultures in the context of the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022.

1.3.2. Establish a permanent and sufficiently resourced and assertive co-ordination mechanism to ensure synergies and avoid overlaps between the main integrity actors

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity invites countries to promote mechanisms for horizontal and vertical co-operation between the different relevant public integrity actors, including, where possible, with and between subnational levels of government. The idea is that all core or non-core integrity actors work towards a common and shared objective to ensure impact of the integrity policies (OECD, 2020[5]; OECD, 2009[18]). Such co-ordinating mechanisms can have different formats, such as councils, commissions, committees or networks. They can be formal, i.e., through set structures and procedures created for the explicit purpose of co-operation, or more informal, i.e., voluntary through integrity networks, ad hoc working groups or similar. A key advantage of gathering the relevant actors and promoting a co-ordinated approach is that integrity policies can take advantage of the various kinds of expertise around the table and ensure broad implementation across the public sector by promoting ownership and commitment (OECD, 2019[19]). Such mechanisms are often established to jointly steer the development and monitor the implementation of a national anti-corruption strategy (see Chapter 2).

In Jordan, co-operation between JIACC and other relevant integrity actors is currently based on bilateral memoranda of understanding (MoUs). JIACC has such bilateral agreements with the Audit Bureau, the IPA, the University of Jordan or the Public Security Directorate/Preventive Security to grant physical protection for whistleblowers, for example. While such bilateral agreements provide JIACC an effective basis to address key issues of concern and help to implement its mandate, they are not suitable to allow for broader, multi-actor co-ordination and discussions on advancing key integrity reforms. Beyond the bilateral MoUs, there is no regular formal or informal co-ordination and co-operation mechanism on public integrity. In fact, the UNCAC peer review in 2012 already recommended to improve co-ordination among key actors (UN, 2012[20]).

At the same time, there is scope for increased synergies and co-ordination in several areas. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5 in more detail, there are multiple actors receiving integrity complaints. While each channel has its purpose and corresponds to the mandate of the respective entity, this may not always be clear to citizens and public officials. A space for co-ordination could facilitate the exchange of

information or allow to jointly identify scope for improving the overall system of reporting channels. Another area which would benefit from such a co-ordination space, is related to promoting the implementation of the NACS 2020-2025 and future strategies. According to JIACC, the implementation currently often depends on the goodwill of other responsible entities. Indeed, implementation of such a multi-stakeholder strategy cannot be enforced, it must be promoted by creating and sustaining ownership of the different entities responsible for the implementation of the projects (see also Chapter 2). Finally, all participants could benefit from the specialised knowledge of the participating entities, which could share insights and lessons learnt, allowing for joint learning, while respecting the different mandates and functions.

Therefore, to benefit from such synergies and co-ordination, Jordan could consider creating a formal mechanism that meets regularly (at least every three or four months) and that is complementary to the current arrangements that rely on bilateral agreements between JIACC and other entities. As a pilot for a more permanent and formal co-ordination mechanism, Jordan could implement a working group to steer the development and implementation of the next NIACS in 2024 (see Chapter 2). Building on this experience, the mandate and working procedures of the co-ordination mechanism could be reviewed and formalised. The mandate could include, for example, the regular update of the strategies, steering and monitoring the implementation of the NIACS, regular exchanges on integrity challenges in the country including a clear mandate to make proposals for integrity reforms to address existing challenges.

As the main responsible for anti-corruption and integrity, JIACC should co-ordinate, steer and manage such a mechanism. This may require clarifying JIACC's mandate as well as granting sufficient resources for JIACC to be capable of taking up this role. The SPAC could be considered as a co-chair to strengthen the connection to the executive and considering their key mandate related to integrity in human resource management and the development of institutional cultures. The mechanism could also involve the Prime Minister's Project Management Implementation Office (PMIO) to ensure the link to the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022 and to increase the political leverage of the mechanism. A legislative framework would need to provide power and authorities to the mechanism. Finally, regular meetings with the Council of Ministers could be envisaged to promote the implementation of integrity policies across ministries.

With JIACC and the SPAC, actors that should participate in such a mechanism are the Audit Bureau, the IPA, the relevant units of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Ministry of Local Administration, to include the local dimension. Furthermore, the Procurement Policy Committee, the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence, selected national and local integrity officers (see section below) could be regularly involved if relevant for the sessions. Selected CSOs, academics, journalists, tribal representatives and religious leaders also could be sometimes invited to share their "external" views and contribute to specific discussions.

In addition, a more informal or ad-hoc co-operation mechanism could be established between investigation actors for the primary purpose of exchanging information, avoiding overlaps while at the same time keeping confidentiality when necessary. JIACC should lead this platform for exchange on investigation, where selected prosecutors and judges as well as complaints receiving entities within other public bodies such as AB, ministries, customs department could participate. Those meetings could address implementation and enforcement challenges and eventually also discuss legal loopholes that need to be addressed or how mutual legal assistance and international co-operation could be improved. In terms of frequency, such meetings could take place biannually.

Several countries have established similar co-ordination mechanisms. For example, Korea has an anti-corruption policy co-ordination body composed of representatives from ten government agencies (ministries and supervisory bodies) to ensure communication among their institutions (OECD, 2020[5]). Colombia, Peru and Portugal have established national commissions/mechanisms that bring together relevant integrity actors (Box 1.2).

Box 1.2. National co-ordination mechanisms in Colombia, Peru and Portugal

Colombia's National Moralisation Commission (CNM)

The National Moralisation Commission (CNM) in Colombia is a high-level mechanism to co-ordinate strategies to prevent and fight corruption. The CNM has 13 members: the President of the Republic; the Inspector General; the Prosecutor General; the Comptroller General (Colombia's Supreme Audit Institution); the Auditor General; the National Ombudsman; the Secretary of Transparency; the President of the House of Representatives; the President of the Senate; the President of the Supreme Court; the President of the Council of the State; the Minister of Justice; and the Minister of the Interior. The CNM must ensure information and data exchange among the aforementioned bodies, establish indicators to assess transparency in the public administration, and adopt an annual strategy to promote ethical conduct in the public administration. In addition, the CNM provides guidelines to be implemented by the Regional Moralisation Commissions (CRM) at sub-national level (Departments). The CNM issues reports and publishes the minutes of the meetings. The Secretariat for Transparency, in the Presidency of Colombia, is the technical secretariat responsible for the agenda and steering the CNM.

Peru's High-level Commission against Corruption (CAN)

Since 2010, Peru has been promoting inter-institutional co-ordination through the High-level Commission against Corruption (CAN) and, since 2013, through the Regional Anti-corruption Commissions (CRAs) at sub-national level. The CAN is a round table of institutions from the public sector, including autonomous entities, the legislative and the judiciary. Institutions from the private sectors and civil society are not full members; they can participate with voice but without vote. Bringing these actors around the table at regular intervals aims at promoting horizontal co-ordination and guaranteeing the coherence of the anti-corruption policy framework. The institutional presidency of the CAN rotates every two years. The candidate has to be elected from a full member of the CAN. The presidency is not *ad personam*, so if there is a change at the head of the institution having the presidency of the CAN, the presidency stays with this same institution. Amongst other functions, the Secretariat for Public Integrity (*Secretaría de Integridad Pública*, SIP), in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) is the technical secretariate of the CAN, steering the discussions, preparing the agenda and following up with concrete proposals, for example.

Portugal's National Anti-Corruption Mechanism (MENAC)

The National Anti-Corruption Mechanism (MENAC) in Portugal was created by Decree-Law 109-E/2021 with the aim of promoting transparency and integrity in public action and guaranteeing the effectiveness of policies to prevent corruption and related offences. The MENAC has several bodies, including the Advisory Council (*Conselho Consultivo*), the Accompanying Committee (*Comissão de Acompanhamento*) and the Sanctions Committee (*Comissão de Sanções*).

- **Advisory Council**: responsible for giving its opinion on the proposal for the three-year strategic plan, the annual activity plan and the annual report of the MENAC and on other matters submitted to it by the MENAC President. It meets ordinarily twice a year and may also meet extraordinarily at the call of the MENAC President, if exceptional circumstances justify it. The Advisory Council has the following members: Inspector General of Finance; Inspector General of Justice Services; Inspector General for Agriculture, the Sea, the Environment and Spatial Planning; Inspector General of the Food and Economic Safety Authority; Inspector General for Education and Science; Inspector General for Health Activities; Secretary-General for the Economy; Director of Legal Services, Audit and Inspection of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; one regional inspector for each Autonomous Region, appointed by the competent regional body; a magistrate from the Public Prosecutor's Office

> representing the Attorney General of the Republic; a representative of the Portuguese Bar Association; a person of recognised merit, who has distinguished himself/herself in the investigation and study of corruption and related crime; and a representative appointed jointly by the business organisations with a seat on the Standing Committee on Social Dialogue.
>
> - **Accompanying Committee**: responsible for developing MENAC's activities. It has the following members: the Vice-President of MENAC, who chairs it, and six general inspectors (four are appointed on a rotating basis by the general inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council, and the remaining two are appointed by the regional inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council).
>
> - **Sanctions Committee**: responsible for exercising MENAC's powers with regard to sanctions. It has the following members: the Vice-President of MENAC, who chairs it, and four general inspectors (two are appointed on a rotating basis by the general inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council, and the remaining two are appointed by the regional inspectorates represented on the Advisory Council).
>
> Source: (OECD, 2017[21]; OECD, 2017[22]; OECD, 2021[23]; OECD, 2021[24]; Government of Portugal, 2021[25]).

1.4. Enable public sector entities to manage public integrity

1.4.1. While maintaining the role of JIACC liaison officers, Jordan could establish permanent integrity officers in all public entities in the central administration

Integrity is the responsibility of all public officials. Nonetheless, countries around the world are facing the challenge of ensuring a coherent and effective implementation of integrity policies throughout their public administration. Some OECD countries use legislation as primary vehicle to ensure that public entities assume integrity responsibilities (Box 1.3). Typically, however, gaps exist between the normative requirements and actual effective implementation. In particular, the challenge involves translating and anchoring standards into a wide variety of organisational and local realities. Public entities, particularly at the local level, often do not have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to identify and address the specific integrity risks involved in their work. Furthermore, in line with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, implementation goes beyond a formal compliance with the existing regulations and should achieve real change in organisational cultures and behaviours at all levels of government (Rangone, 2021[26]; OECD, 2018[27]).

> **Box 1.3. Enabling public entities to take responsibility for integrity through legislation**
>
> **France**
>
> In France, Law 2016-1691 from 2016 on Transparency, Fighting Corruption and Modernisation of the Economy (Sapin II), provides for the implementation of procedures to prevent integrity breaches in public sector organisations, including state administrations, local authorities and related entities.
>
> **Germany**
>
> In Germany, the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption lists specific measures that all federal administrative agencies must take to prevent corruption, including establishing responsibility for identifying and analysing corruption risk areas and for designating an officer in charge of corruption prevention. The Directive also assigns additional rules to the respective offices for carrying out responsibility in their specific areas.
>
> **Korea**
>
> In Korea, Article 3 of the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Act No. 14831) requires all public organisations to take active efforts to prevent corruption and establish a culture of social ethics.
>
> **Sweden**
>
> The Swedish Administrative Procedure Act details basic principles of good governance, notably rule of law, objectivity and proportionality. These principles are applicable to all public offices at state, regional and municipal levels. In addition, an ordinance on internal control was drafted for all government agencies with an internal audit function (about 70 agencies). It requires these agencies to have an internal control and a "good internal environment" to foster good governance.
>
> Source: (G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, 2018[28]; Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2014[29]); contributions from the governments of France and Sweden.

In Jordan, to promote integrity and compliance of public entities with integrity regulations, JIACC has been sending liaison officers to public entities (Art. 14 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law). The decision of whether to send a JIACC liaison officer is taken by JIACC's board chairman and public bodies are obliged to accept. By law, the liaison officers have the right to attend procurement and tenders' committee meetings without having the right to vote (Art 14.b).

Their specific tasks are described in separate guidelines and include, for example, to support and co-ordinate with investigators at JIACC or to help activating the Internal Control Units that undertake internal control and internal auditing of the financial, administrative, and technical transaction in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Control Bylaw (see Chapter 5).

Liaison officers are assigned for one year, open to renewal. Currently there are liaison officers in 23 public bodies (departments with larger budgets). A specific liaison officer department has been created within JIACC that also follows up on complaints of those entities, ensures that they provide services with high quality, transparency and fairness, and monitors any abuse of public funds (JIACC, 2021[7]). Enhancing the role of these liaison officers is part of the NIACS (project 3). Some of the positive effects of these liaison officers include, for example, taking preventive and corrective measures, such as amending procedures and gaps; receiving intelligence information and complaints; improving procurement processes; enabling faster access of JIACC to databases and other information of the entity; or contributing to awareness raising (JIACC, 2021[7]).

Although their role has been perceived positively by others outside of JIACC, within the institutions themselves they often are perceived as "unwanted guests''. During a virtual focus group organised by the OECD with JIACC liaison officers, they mentioned the institutional culture of resistance to change and preferring the status quo as a primary challenge within the public administration. Other challenges include excessive bureaucracy and the uneven electronic transformation (corruption risks being higher in those departments in which transformation is delayed). To overcome these challenges, it was mentioned during interviews and the virtual focus group that it would be important that the Internal Control Units, who are responsible for the internal audits, become stronger. However, internal audit should not be involved in management and not provide direct support in operational activities on public entities. At the same time, public managers require advice, support and guidance on public integrity which could be provided by a dedicated person or unit within the public entity.

Of course, JIACC cannot (and should not) be sending JIACC liaison officers to every public entity of the public administration. This would require prohibitively high resources and would not resolve the issue that these liaison officers are considered as outsiders. In addition, there is the already mentioned challenge inherent to JIACC as a body combining prevention and enforcement: public officials in the entities could never be entirely sure if the JIACC liaison officer is there to help or to control.

At the same time, international experience shows that dedicated "integrity officers" in public entities can contribute to ensure implementation of integrity policies and to promote organisational cultures of integrity (OECD, 2009[18]; G20, 2017[30]; OECD, 2019[19]). Box 1.4 provides further reasons for having such a dedicated function within the organisation. The idea is close to the compliance officers or ethics advisors in private sector companies and are increasingly implemented in the public sector.

Box 1.4. Rationale for a dedicated integrity function at organisational levels

There are several reasons why it is important to have a dedicated integrity function (a person or a unit) in an organisation:

- It allows to steer and co-ordinate different integrity measures, such as ensuring the implementation of an ethics code, providing advice on managing conflict of interest or ethical dilemmas, providing guidance on how to file a complaint or on how to identify, assess and manage integrity risks.

- It allows to create a "safe haven" in the organization, where employees can go with questions, dilemmas and issues without fear of reprisal.

- It allows for a true accumulation of expertise, as recommendations, insights and good practices are compiled in a single area within the organisation.

- It can facilitate the continuity of integrity policies. In practice, it is common that, even when integrity management draws attention and enthusiasm when launched for the first time, this tends to decrease after some time. Having dedicated persons with the responsibility to manage integrity and asking them to report on their progress will significantly reduce this risk.

- It has a symbolic element. It sends the signal that integrity is deemed important within the organisation. A typical rule in the theory of organisational design is that "the structure follows the strategy": the structure reflects the areas of strategic importance for the organisation. If an organisation seeks to attribute importance to integrity, this shall be reflected and visible in its organisational chart.

- It allows to co-ordinate and achieve synergies for promoting integrity with other relevant areas such as human resource management, the procurement unit, leadership or financial management.

Source: Based on (OECD, 2009[18]; OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2021[32]).

Therefore, given the good practice of the JIACC liaison officers, while acknowledging the benefits of internal dedicated integrity officers, Jordan could consider a two-pronged approach:

- Maintaining the current practice of JIACC liaison officers that are temporarily placed within public entities for specific support tasks or for data collection.
- Creating as a new, internal function a permanent and dedicated integrity officer in every public entity. These integrity officers should be selected from the permanent staff of the entity, have an institutionalised direct access to the highest authority and receive specialised training to allow them to fulfil their role.

While a dedicated, full-time position would be ideal, Jordan could consider assigning this function to an already existing position or unit. To be able to create a "safe haven", to provide credible advice and to build a trusted relationship with employees of the entity, it is key that these integrity officers do not play any role at all related to control, oversight, audit or enforcement. Rather, these integrity officers should have the following three core responsibilities:

- Providing ad hoc advice to staff as well as guidance and training on areas on public integrity, including for example guidance and trainings on values, dealing with ethical dilemmas, developing skills for ethical leadership and management of conflict of interests.
- Provide guidance on and support to public managers on integrity risk management (identification, assessment and management).
- Planning (involving all relevant internal units), co-ordinating and monitoring an organisational sub-strategy or an executive plan on integrity (to be implemented by different units of the public entity, for instance, integrity measures to be implemented by the HR units or the procurement units, following national regulations).
- Support the entity in collecting the data required for the National Integrity Index.

While responding only to the head of the public entity they are working in, the integrity officers could receive training, guidance and support from JIACC and from the JIACC liaison officers, but also from the Audit Bureau, the SPAC (in particular, from the recently established Compliance Department) and the IPA, or the Ministry of Finance, for example. The following table provides an overview the rationale and respective functions of the existing JIACC liaison officer and the recommended integrity officials clearly laying out the complementarity of both roles (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2. Complementary rationale and functions of existing JIACC liaison officers and functions of potential integrity officials

	JIACC liaison officers	Integrity Officials
Rationale	Oversight and manage relationship and interactions with JIACC	Advice and support to management and employees
Functions	- Oversee procurement processes. - Oversee compliance with regulations. - Support the entity in collecting the data required for the National Integrity Index. - Co-ordinate with AB liaison officer, if needed.	- Provide a safe haven to deliver ad hoc advice on ethics, conflict of interest and any other integrity related questions. - Provide trainings on integrity to staff. - Provide guidance and support to managers in identifying, assessing and managing integrity risks. - Co-ordinate, plan and monitor organisational integrity strategies and action plans. - Support the entity in collecting the data required for the National Integrity Index.
Respond to	JIACC	Maximum authority of the public entity

Source: Elaborated by the OECD.

In Peru, the Offices of Institutional Integrity have to be established throughout the national public administration and in local governments, with the Secretariat for Public Integrity as governing body (OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2021[23]). In Brazil, Integrity Sectorial Units have been established in all entities of the federal executive branch. Box 1.5 provides an overview of these two experiences. Other examples of countries that have implemented such dedicated units or persons are Germany and Austria (Box 1.6).

Box 1.5. Towards systems of public compliance: Peru and Brazil

Institutional Integrity Offices in Peru

To mainstream integrity throughout its public administration, Peru has developed and implemented the so-called "Integrity Model". This model establishes a framework of public compliance for integrity and anti-corruption measures at organisational levels. The Integrity Model has nine components that all public entities must implement: (1) Commitment by senior management; (2) risk management; (3) integrity policies; (4) transparency, open data and accountability; (5) internal control; (6) communication and training; (7) Whistleblower Channel; (8) supervision and monitoring of the Integrity Model; (9) integrity model manager. Public entities must implement the Integrity Model progressively to strengthen their prevention capacity against corruption. The Secretariat for Public Integrity (*Secretaría de Integridad Pública*, SIP) developed and is implementing Institutional Integrity Offices (IIO) to fulfil the role of the Integrity Model Manager and has developed the *Index of the Preventive Capacity against Corruption* which tracks progress in the implementation of the Integrity Model. The IIO are responsible for the implementation of the Integrity Model within their entities, they provide trainings to employees, implement awareness raising activities and can receive complaints to carry out preliminary investigation before sending the cases to the relevant authorities.

Integrity Management Units in Brazil

The Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (*Controladoria-Geral da União*, or CGU) of Brazil is leading integrity policies. Bodies and entities of the Federal Government (ministries, autarchies and public foundations) have to implement integrity programmes. The first phase of integrity programmes involves the creation of Integrity Sectorial Units. The creation of these units is a necessary condition for public entities to developing and applying an internal Integrity Plan. Integrity Sectorial Units are bodies vested with functional autonomy, which may also be created on the basis of another unit. Specifically, Integrity Management Units have, among others, the following attributes:

- Co-ordination of the design, implementation and monitoring of the integrity programme.
- Advice to, and training of, public servants regarding subjects related to the integrity programme.
- Promotion of other actions related to the implementation of integrity plans together with other relevant units of the entity.

Source: (OECD, 2019[31]; OECD, 2021[32]), updated based on Decree 11.529/2023 of the Government of Brazil.

Box 1.6. Dedicated integrity units or persons in Austria and Germany

Germany's Contact Persons for Corruption Prevention

Germany, at federal level, has institutionalised contact persons for anti-corruption. The "Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration" defines these contact persons and their tasks as follows:

1. A contact person for corruption prevention shall be appointed based on the tasks and size of the agency. One contact person may be responsible for more than one agency. Contact persons may be charged with the following tasks: serving as a contact person for agency staff and management, if necessary without having to go through official channels, along with private persons; advising agency management; keeping staff members informed (e.g. by means of regularly scheduled seminars and presentations); assisting with training; monitoring and assessing any indications of corruption; helping keep the public informed about penalties under public service law and criminal law (preventive effect) while respecting the privacy rights of those concerned.

2. If the contact person becomes aware of facts leading to reasonable suspicion that a corruption offence has been committed, he or she shall inform the agency management and make recommendations on conducting an internal investigation, on taking measures to prevent concealment and on informing the law enforcement authorities. The agency management shall take the necessary steps to deal with the matter.

3. Contact persons shall not be delegated any authority to carry out disciplinary measures; they shall not lead investigations in disciplinary proceedings for corruption cases.

4. Agencies shall provide contact persons promptly and comprehensively with the information needed to perform their duties, particularly with regard to incidents of suspected corruption.

5. In carrying out their duties of corruption prevention, contact persons shall be independent of instructions. They shall have the right to report directly to the head of the agency and may not be subject to discrimination as a result of performing their duties.

6. Even after completing their term of office, contact persons shall not disclose any information they have gained about staff members' personal circumstances; they may however provide such information to agency management or personnel management if they have a reasonable suspicion that a corruption offence has been committed. Personal data shall be treated in accordance with the principles of personnel records management.

The Austrian Integrity Network (Integritätsbeauftragten-Netzwerk)

In Austria, the Federal Bureau to prevent and fight corruption (*Bundesamt zur Korruptionspraevention und Korruptionsbekaempfung*, BAK) created the Austrian Integrity Network (*Integritaetsbeauftragten-Netzwerk*) to strengthen integrity by firmly anchoring integrity as a fundamental element in public sector. The BAK trains civil servants to become experts in the field of integrity and corruption prevention within the Integrity Network. These integrity officers provide advice and guidance in their entities to strengthen integrity. The integrity officers can access further information on compliance, corruption, ethics, integrity and organisational culture. The BAK also offers regular follow-up meetings for integrity officers on specific topics such as risk management, ethics and values.

Source: For Germany: German Federal Ministry of the Interior "Rules on Integrity",
www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschueren/2014/rules-on-integrity.pdf?__blob=publicationFile; For Austria:
https://integritaet.info/

1.4.2. Jordan should consider establishing integrity officers in municipalities and promote local integrity strategies, aligned with the national strategy

To have an impact on building a culture of integrity in a country, it is key to reach out to the local level, especially to municipalities. While the autonomies and mandates of municipalities vary across countries, they typically have responsibilities in the provision of public services and their proximity and recurrence of the interactions between local authorities and citizens and the private sector makes them vulnerable to integrity risks. At the same time, integrity policies at municipal levels can achieve highly visible results for citizens.

In Jordan, the subnational level is predominantly governed by the Local Administration Law 25 of 2021. According to this law, there are three categories of municipalities:

- Category A municipalities of governorate centres with a population of more than 200,000 people (in total 12 with Amman, Irbid, Zarqa as the three biggest ones).
- Category B municipalities of priority centres with a population of more than 50,000 people.
- The rest of the municipalities (category C).

The management of those municipalities largely falls under the responsibility of mayors (chairing the municipal councils), the executive manager of the municipality and municipal councils. The latter two do not have legislative powers but are responsible for setting the local development vision and adopting strategic plans and annual budgets. Mayors, members of the municipal councils and 85% of members of the governorate councils are directly elected all four years, 15% are appointed by the central government and 25% in Amman (Freedom House, 2023[33]). Governors are appointed by the King through the Ministry of the Interior (and are supervised by the Ministry of Interior). They enjoy wide administrative authority and in specific cases, they exercise the powers of ministers through the executive councils in the governorates. Despite some reforms in recent years, municipalities and governors are perceived as an extension of the central government (SmartGov, 2021[34]).

Budgets for the municipalities are elaborated by the municipal councils and approved by the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA). 50% of the municipal budget should (de facto it is reportedly only 25%) be allocated to the municipalities by the central government, the remaining parts come from local revenues and fees (e.g., fees, construction). At municipal level, there is no obligation to publish the budgets, there are no participatory mechanisms for their preparation and Parliament has no participation and/or oversight role in their elaboration. There reportedly is a challenge in data driven elaboration of priorities for those budgets, translating into "wish lists" and allocating most of the budget (reportedly about 85%) to operational costs and salaries. The practices of municipalities are subject to oversight by the Audit Bureau and JIACC, Government Procurement Bylaw 8 of 2022 applies to procurement processes and hiring processes follow the Municipal Employees Bylaw of 2007 and the following 2020 amendments. However, according to interviews conducted by the OECD, both the oversight for procurement and hiring processes could be more efficient and policies applied more consistently to prevent abuses such as nepotism/favouritism in hiring or vote buying practices.

Consequently, there are several challenges with respect to public integrity at the local level. For example, there is a reported overstaffing within municipalities as a direct result of regular elections and close tribal or family (or other) ties of the candidates with the constituents. Vote buying through recruitments in local administrations has also been mentioned as an issue. This reportedly leads to hiring of staff lacking adequate qualifications and consequently inadequate application of regulations and procedures on, for instance, recruitment or procurement. This can again lead to errors and corruption. Services are reportedly sometimes delivered based on tribal or familial (or other) proximity rather than on law and merit. In general, there is also a lack of awareness of integrity regulations and their application, which is, according to interviews, more often the cause for integrity misbehaviours than deliberate deception.

Notwithstanding a potential opportunity to review the Local Administration Law, which is outside the scope of this Integrity Review, Jordan could establish integrity officers as recommended above at least in the larger municipalities of category A and B to promote integrity in municipalities. Again, it is important to emphasise that these integrity officers are not JIACC liaison officers and are not related to nor employed by JIACC but should belong to the municipality and respond to the mayor. In total, this would correspond to around twenty-five integrity officers, some of them (for instance those responsible for the twelve category A municipalities) could also have some regional responsibility and/or responsibility for specific smaller municipalities. According to information provided by Jordan, a first integrity unit has been implemented in Greater Amman Municipality.

Like the integrity officers recommended for the national level, the roles and responsibilities of those officers could include:

- Advocate and contribute to elaborating local integrity strategies and action plans including the identification of clear responsibilities as well as co-ordination and monitoring of their implementation. Such local integrity strategies, aligned to the NIACS, would be particularly desirable because of the specific challenges local levels face. Elaborated in municipalities, such strategies would also contribute to raising awareness and promoting ownership.

- Provide guidance and, in close co-ordination and collaboration with JIACC, the AB, the Ministry of Finance, the IPA, the Procurement Policy Committee and MOLA, provide training on areas on public integrity, including for example guidance and trainings on values, dealing with ethical dilemmas, developing skills for ethical leadership and management of conflict of interests, corruption risk management, internal control and audit. This could also include trainings and guidance on key processes such as recruitment and procurement. In those areas close collaboration with the SPAC and the Procurement Policy Committee would be recommended.

The placement of integrity officers in category A and B municipalities could be helpful to contribute to building trust in the political system. This appears to be particularly relevant given the low numbers of voters having participated and the large distrust expressed during the last local elections in 2022 (Ersan, 2022[35]). Several countries have implemented integrity functions at the local level. Box 1.7 provides examples from France and the Netherlands, which could provide Jordan with additional and alternative ideas on how to reach municipalities.

> **Box 1.7. Assigning local integrity responsibilities in the Netherlands and France**
>
> The following are examples of how local governments assign integrity functions in line with their capacity and resource levels.
>
> **The Netherlands**
>
> Most cities and communities in the Netherlands develop and implement their own local integrity strategy. In the City of Amsterdam, the Integrity Office (*Bureau Integriteit*, BI) is responsible for promoting integrity with the local political leaders and managers, the whole city administration, and service providers and businesses. The mandate of the BI covers ethics and legal advice, training, risk assessments, disciplinary procedures and integrity investigation. This office is also the contact point for whistleblowers to report misconduct and breaches of integrity rules. The staff is specially trained to provide integrity advice, and usually has had extensive experience working for the administration of the City of Amsterdam.
>
> **France**
>
> In France, some major cities and regions have designed and implemented an integrity policy and specific functions. Since 2014, the City of Paris has an ethics commission responsible for conflict of interest and asset disclosure, gifts and gratuities, interpretation and application of the code of conduct, and counselling and advice. In 2014, the City of Strasbourg assigned a similar role to an independent ethics officer for promoting the integrity of political leaders and managers, as well as administration of the municipality. Regions that have adopted a comparable approach include Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. The 2016 revision of civil service status introduced a right to access ethics counselling in public organisations for all civil servants regardless of their status. The organisations must assign this responsibility, internally or externally. However, there are close to 35 000 municipalities, among which more than 90% have less than 5 000 inhabitants and have more limited financial and human resources. Consequently, some of the integrity functions are either the responsibility of a local management centre, general director or other designated person(s) of the administration, or they are not assigned locally and rely upon other actors in the integrity system.
>
> Source: For the Netherlands, (City of Amsterdam, 2019[36]). For France, (City of Strasbourg, 2019[37]; Government of France, 2016[38]; Mairie de Paris, 2018[39]).

1.4.3. Networks between JIACC liaison officers and potential future integrity officers could promote mutual learning and support

The exchange of good practices as well as discussions about common challenges and how to find solutions are important reasons to promote an exchange between JIACC liaison officers. The virtual focus group organised by the OECD is a good example of the value added of bringing these officers together to talk about their work. While they already share informally, a more formal and regular get-together could be promoted by JIACC. Such exchanges also could include discussing, for instance, training modules or guidance materials elaborated jointly with other relevant entities such as the IPA. These meetings could take place every three or four months or at least, twice a year.

If implemented, the establishment of regular exchange fora among the proposed integrity officers may also be useful. For example, at subnational level, regional networks could be organised. The chairmanship of the network could rotate annually among the Category A integrity officers. The network could allow a better information flow and awareness raising for public officials to act correctly. JIACC and MOLA could participate to identify the issues that could be addressed at a policy level. Those meetings of local integrity

officers could be organised once or twice a year, outside of Amman. Again, there are helpful examples from OECD countries that could serve as an inspiration for Jordan (Box 1.8).

Box 1.8. Integrity networks in Austria, Canada, Germany and Sweden

The Austrian Network of Integrity Officers

To mainstream integrity into the public sector, Austria has established the Network of Integrity Officers, which aims to place integrity officers in various federal institutions (e.g., ministries). Tasks performed by the officers include: performing advisory services for employees and senior officials; circulating information on integrity and awareness raising; providing training; analysing the risk of corruption; collaboration and experience sharing; serving as the focal point for compliance-related issues. The Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption is responsible for managing the network, generating and collecting expertise on the topic of integrity, and providing basic training and training materials to the officers.

Formal and informal co-operation mechanisms in Canada

In Canada the central agency, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), hosts two communities of practice: the Interdepartmental Values and Ethics Network and the Senior Officers for Internal Disclosure Group (whistleblowing). These communities of practice meet regularly, and mutually benefit from sharing good practices and lessons learned. The communities and their regular exchanges provide the TBS with an informal means of keeping up with emerging issues and evolving challenges. Their input can also help shape integrity policies as well as the Secretariat's awareness-raising and communications activities.

The German network of contact persons for corruption prevention

In Germany, the lead federal ministry for corruption prevention and integrity is the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. Since preventing corruption does not involve having a supervisory role over other ministries, co-operation is essential to reach a common understanding of integrity policies and comprehensive standards for their implementation. For the German federal administration, the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries regulates (among other issues) co-operation within the federal government. Article 19 stipulates that "in matters affecting the remits of more than one Federal Ministry, those Ministries will work together to ensure that the Federal Government speaks and acts consistently". In practical terms, co-operation happens through a network of contact persons for corruption prevention that meets frequently. The network also develops guidelines, handbooks and recommendations for implementing the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration.

The Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies

The Swedish Agency for Public Management hosts the Network against Corruption for Swedish State Agencies. Delegates participating in the network include heads of administrative departments and heads of legal departments. The network meets four times a year, and each meeting usually gathers close to 100 agencies. The purpose of the network is to share experiences, learn about good examples and take part in the production of handbooks, reports, and other publications of the Swedish Agency for Public Management on anti-corruption measures, internal control, and efficiency.

Source: (IBN, 2020[40]); Germany: information provided by the Ministry of the Interior; Sweden: information provided by the Swedish Agency for Public Management. Canada: Adapted from inputs shared by the Treasury Board Secretariat.

Chapter 1: Proposals for Action

The legal and institutional integrity framework in Jordan

- Jordan could further increase the clarity of anti-corruption and integrity regulations and discuss the possibility to codify into one single law all offences and relevant aspects.

- JIACC could, together with the judiciary, elaborate guidance material in plain language to provide an overview of the current laws and explain the interpretation of some of the key provisions in further detail.

- A revision of the current anti-corruption legislation could involve conducting a comprehensive gap analysis to identify corrupt practices that are currently not explicitly or adequately codified.

Strengthen JIACC and promote co-ordination amongst key actors in Jordan

- To further increase JIACC's preventive profile, Jordan could revise the existing legislation in view of providing JIACC with a clearer prevention mandate, for instance, by explicitly including tasks already carried out by JIACC such as the elaboration of studies, the consultative role in drafting legislation relevant for integrity, or co-ordinating the implementation of the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategies (NIACS).

- Jordan could review the law in view of granting JIACC stronger financial and administrative independence. In particular, the current reforms in the context of the SPAC, could provide an opportunity to grant JIACC autonomy in hiring outside of the SPAC data base, while following SPAC procedures.

- JIACC should continue promoting measures aimed at strengthening a "culture of independence" within JIACC and promoting the pride and intrinsic motivation of its staff to belonging to the institution.

- JIACC, together with other key integrity actors, could consider initiating an open dialogue on how to find a constructive way to overcome the challenges related to combining prevention and enforcement roles.

- To benefit from synergies, allow for exchange of information and to promote an inter-institutional dialogue on anti-corruption and integrity, Jordan could consider creating a formal co-ordination mechanism steered by JIACC, which could be co-chaired by the SPAC and should involve key integrity actors.

- A more informal or ad-hoc co-operation mechanism could be established between investigation actors for the primary purpose of exchanging information, avoiding overlaps while at the same time keeping confidentiality when necessary.

Enable public sector entities to manage public integrity

- While maintaining the current practice of JIACC liaison officers, Jordan could create permanent and dedicated integrity officers in every public entity. These integrity officers should be selected from the permanent staff of the entity, have an institutionalised direct access to the highest authority and receive specialised training to allow them to fulfil their role. It is key that these integrity officers do not play any role at all related to control, oversight, audit or enforcement.

- In addition, Jordan could establish such integrity officers at least in the larger municipalities of category A and B to promote integrity in municipalities.

- JIACC could consider establishing networks between JIACC liaison officers and potential future integrity officers to promote mutual learning and support.

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2 Reinforcing the evidence-informed strategic approach to public integrity in Jordan

This chapter provides recommendations to strengthen the implementation of Jordan's current National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2020-2025. It also provides guidance to develop the next strategy and how to strengthen the evidence-base and involvement of key stakeholders through this process. The chapter follows criteria of the OECD Public Integrity Indicators and looks at the phases of strategy design, implementation and monitoring as well as evaluation and accountability.

2.1. A strategic and evidence-informed approach to public integrity

A strategy for public integrity is essential for supporting a coherent and comprehensive integrity system. However, a strategy is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. In particular, the process of strategy development is perhaps as important as the resulting strategy. An inclusive and rigorous process can help select relevant strategic objectives that are meaningful to citizens and businesses; prioritise and sequence actions in an open manner to address the most crucial integrity risks; and provide the necessary evidence for the interventions that are most cost-effective and likely to have the greatest impact. Strategies are also a way of demonstrating commitment and can be used to establish institutional responsibilities and resources. If, however, strategies do not lead to visible gains, for example, due to inadequate implementation, they can at best become irrelevant and at worst erode public confidence in national authorities (OECD, 2020[1]).

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity emphasises the relevance of an evidence-informed strategic approach to promoting public integrity. This includes (OECD, 2017[2]):

- Setting strategic objectives, and priorities for the public integrity system using a risk-based approach to violations of public integrity standards while taking into account the contributing factors for effective public integrity policies.
- Developing benchmarks, and indicators, as well as collecting credible and relevant data on the implementation level, performance, and overall effectiveness of the public integrity system.

Jordan has developed a comprehensive framework of strategic documents and guidelines that in principle has the potential to address integrity and corruption challenges within the country. In 2008, the country's first anti-corruption strategy was developed for a four-year period. The strategy was renewed for the period from 2013 to 2017, after which, the current National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) was adopted for the period 2017-2025. This strategy was updated in 2020 due to some internal and external developments and is now valid for 2020-2025 (JIACC, 2019[3]).

The NIACS 2020-2025 strives for a "national environment that upholds integrity and rejects corruption" and aims at promoting integrity on three levels: 1) integrity and prevention, 2) law enforcement, and 3) building organisational capabilities. Overall, 24 strategic projects, including concrete timeframes and responsibilities, are aimed at reaching five strategic objectives (JIACC, 2019[3]):

- Activating the national integrity system and assuring the public administration compliance with it
- Enhancing the efficiency of preventive action against corruption
- Enhancing and developing the efficiency of the investigation and complaints department
- Enhancing the management of local and international strategic partnerships
- Developing the organisational and human capabilities

The following recommendations aim at strengthening the implementation of Jordan's current NIACS 2020-2025. More importantly, the chapter provides guidance to develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate the next strategy and how to strengthen the evidence-base and involvement of key stakeholders through this process. The analysis follows criteria for the assessment of the quality of public integrity and anti-corruption outlined in Principle 3 of the OECD Public Integrity Indicators as well as good international practices. It looks at the following key phases: strategy design; implementation and monitoring, and evaluation and accountability.

2.2. Ensuring a participative and evidence-informed design of integrity strategies

Given that the current NIACS ends in 2025, there is a window of opportunity in 2024 for Jordan to renew its political commitment and launch a comprehensive and nationwide consultation process on integrity and design the follow-up strategy. This new strategy can provide for continuity by building on successes of the current strategy, but also by learning from the design and the implementation challenges of the current NIACS.

2.2.1. Jordan could renew and strengthen the commitment to promote integrity at the highest levels by developing the next Anti-Corruption and Integrity Strategy in a co-ordinated way

JIACC is the ideal institution to organise, manage and co-ordinate the development of the next NIACS, including a consultation process. For that purpose, it is recommended to establish a committee or working group, steered by JIACC. The working group could involve key public entities, for example, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Audit Bureau (AB), the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC), which replaced the Civil Service Bureau as of January 2024, the Prime Minister's Office as well as prosecutors and judges, while maintaining their autonomy. Other key central bodies, such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Planning or the Department of Statistics, for example, should be involved whenever required. Civil society, private sector, academia, and other relevant stakeholders could be invited to join the working group to provide inputs. Because this process is also an opportunity to renew the commitment on a political level, it is recommended that the next NIACS should be approved by the Council of the Prime Minister.

Such a working group or committee should have a clear mandate and sufficient resources and authority to manage the process and take decisions. This exercise could also be the first step towards creating a more permanent and formal co-ordination mechanism as recommended above. Costa Rica's recent experience could be an inspiration (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1. Costa Rica's Working Group to steer the development of the country's integrity and corruption prevention strategy

Costa Rica's National Integrity and Corruption Prevention Strategy (*Estrategia Nacional de Integridad y Prevención de la Corrupción*, ENIPC) was launched in August 2021. Between October 2019 and December 2020, the Attorney for Public Ethics (*Procuraduria de la Ética Pública*, PEP) and *Costa Rica Íntegra* (the national chapter of Transparency International) jointly led the development of the ENIPC through a participative process involving civil society, academia and the private sector.

The ENIPC was prepared through a co-creation process, in a working group made up of 17 public, private, academic and civil society organisations. Amongst others, the working group steered a public consultation process, in which 350 responses were received from citizens and which was complemented with focus groups of selected specialists by sectors (business, academia, civil society and government).

Stakeholders of the ENIPC consider the working group as an achievement in itself, as it de facto constitutes an inter-institutional co-ordination and monitoring mechanism, with a diversity of actors and responsibilities that previously never met in such a co-ordinated and constructive way.

Source: Based on information provided by Costa Rican stakeholder and (OECD, 2022[4]).

2.2.2. JIACC can ensure the relevance of the next NIACS through a risk and evidence-informed strategy design

To develop a meaningful and realistic strategy, a comprehensive and rigorous problem analysis is essential. The analysis aims to identify and analyse the integrity risks that pose the greatest threat to public integrity. This analysis should be conducted before drafting the strategy and should involve the use of a diversity of data sources, including survey data collection, and to ensure the alignment of data with international instruments against corruption. The evidence is crucial for making informed decisions about prioritising strategic objectives, especially when addressing multiple issues simultaneously (OECD, 2020[1]). The criteria of the OECD Public Integrity Indicators can guide such an evidence-informed problem analysis (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1. OECD Public Integrity Indicator – Evidence-informed problem analysis

OECD Public integrity indicator 3.2	Criteria to fulfil
3.2.1	Within the last five years, an inter-institutional body has prepared and published an analytical report on public integrity risks that formulates recommendations and sets priorities for the whole public integrity system.
3.2.2	Each existing strategy is based on an assessment of public integrity risks, identifying as a minimum specific types of relevant integrity breaches, the actors likely to be involved, as well as the expected likelihood and impact if the risk materialises.
3.2.3	Each existing strategy refers to at least 4 out of the following 8 sources of information related to public integrity: (a) indicators from international organisations or research institutions, (b) employee surveys, (c) household surveys, (d) business surveys, (e) other survey data, such as user surveys, or polls from local research institutions, (f) data from public registries (e.g. law enforcement, audit institutions, national statistics office), (g) published research documents from national or international organisations or academia (e.g. articles, reports, working papers, political economy analysis) and (h) commissioned research.

Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators

In Jordan, an analysis of the current NIACS document evidences a lack of explicit analysis and structured risk assessment that would rely upon various kinds of data. Furthermore, the strategy does not identify the areas and sectors at high risk of corruption and does not use any kind of data for a diagnostic. While an analysis was carried out internally by JIACC to prepare the NIACS, this analysis has not been communicated and can therefore not be assessed by stakeholders. As such, it is unclear and less evident to assess if the objectives proposed in the current strategy are relevant and address the most pressing issues. In particular, when looking at the scope of the current strategy, it seems that at least two areas are not covered: public procurement and public finance management, which are clearly two high-risk areas, independent of the country context. In fact, and unsurprisingly, public procurement, has been identified by an OECD-SIGMA report as vulnerable to corruption risks in Jordan (SIGMA, 2016[5]). This raises the possibility of a misalignment between the strategy and the actual corruption risks on the ground.

However, since the release of the current strategy, JIACC has been proactive in several key areas. For example, JIACC carried out research and published more than 20 studies than can provide relevant information to inform the next strategy. Furthermore, the promotion of integrity risk assessments with various entities are a significant improvement for the evidence-base of integrity policies (see more on this in Chapter 5). For example, together with the relevant entities, JIACC has been conducting risk assessment studies within the Ministry of Health and Jordan Customs as well as in eight other entities. Based on these assessments, JIACC provides recommendations to address these risks, as outlined in its annual report for 2021 (JIACC, 2021[6]). Such recommendations can be a relevant input for the design of the next strategy. Finally, the National Integrity Indicators (NII) also provide insights on gaps and opportunities to strengthen integrity across the public administration and will be analysed in more detail below. The research, the risk assessments and the NII will be of great value for the design of the next strategy.

2.2.3. Ownership and relevance of the next NIACS can be further promoted through public and inter-governmental consultations and by actively involving key stakeholders

Beyond the use of risk assessments and data, consultations and the involvement of stakeholders play a crucial role in problem identification, discussing solutions as well as enhancing ownership and practically in a country's reform process (OECD, 2018[7]). The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity emphasises in its principle 5 on the whole of society the relevance of engaging relevant stakeholders in the development, regular update and implementation of the public integrity system (see also Chapter 4 of this Integrity Review). This involves advanced participation, where both stakeholders and citizens provide feedback to the government (OECD, 2020[1]). The entity responsible for developing and implementing the strategy should therefore engage from the early stages of strategy formulation. Including public entities in this process can promote ownership of the strategy beyond the main integrity actors and provide insights that are valuable for setting realistic and relevant objectives. In turn, including external stakeholders allows for greater transparency, inclusivity, accountability and democratic policy-making. It fosters trust by enabling the public to follow, influence and understand the process (OECD, 2020[1]).

In addition to good international practices, JIACC could consider following the criteria stipulated in Indicator 4 of Principle 3 of OECD's Public Integrity Indicators on the "Quality of Strategic Framework" as a guidance for designing the next consultation process. This indicator measures the extent to which public integrity strategies are consistently developed in an inclusive and transparent manner (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. OECD Public Integrity Indicators – Inclusiveness and transparency of intergovernmental and public consultations

OECD Public integrity indicator 3.4	Criteria to fulfil
3.4.1.	A minimum duration of at least 2 weeks for inter-governmental and public consultation period is established in legislation.
3.4.2.	The public consultation portal contains the draft strategy, including all supporting relevant materials.
3.4.3.	All public integrity strategies in force have undergone inter-governmental and public consultation.
3.4.4.	At least one public integrity strategy has undergone an extended consultation process
3.4.5.	At least one key integrity body has been consulted and provided inputs through the regular intergovernmental or public consultation procedures to at least one of the existing public integrity strategies
3.4.6.	At least one non-state actor has been a member of a working group mandated to develop or amend public integrity strategies in force
3.4.7.	The public consultation portal contains a summary sheet for all draft strategies with responses to all submitted comments provided during the public consultation

Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators

According to the current NIACS document, several debates and consultative sessions were held with partners on the national level, including from the public and private sectors, civil society organisations and the media. However, these consultations were not public, there was no open public consultation and there are no summaries of the responses or reports documenting the process. Also, according to some interviews conducted by the OECD, consultation did not systematically include the subnational level and some external stakeholders expressed doubts regarding the inclusiveness of the consultations. This view, in turn, is difficult to confirm or debunk because of the lack of transparency regarding the actual consultation process and the inputs received.

Therefore, JIACC could demonstrate its commitment to engage stakeholders both in the remainder of the implementation of the current NIACS (see next section) and for the design of the follow-up strategy in 2024. When renewing the commitment at the highest level and to ensure buy-in and ownership at all levels

of the public administration and within the population, a comprehensive and tailored consultation and participatory process in the process of designing the next NIACS would be strongly recommended.

For these consultations, it is crucial to involve key actors in society meaningfully and as early as possible (see also Chapter 4). In the case of Jordan, this includes academia, think tanks, CSOs, business and professional associations. Given their societal influence in the country, religious and tribal representatives should be involved in the process as well. In particular, JIACC could do more to engage young people in the design of the next NIACS, to ensure their vision, needs and experiences are reflected in the coming strategy and to explore new ways to communicate with them to achieve a more systematic engagement on issues around public integrity (see also Chapter 4 of the (OECD[8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan).

In addition to such targeted involvement of actors across society, JIACC could consider publishing on an open website an advanced draft of the next strategy for comments for a minimum of two weeks, to allow broad and open consultations. Furthermore, the next strategy should include a summary report of the consultation process and JIACC could make publicly available the inputs received to increase transparency and promote trust in the process. The recent experience of Chile could be a relevant inspiration for such an inclusive process (Box 2.2).

Box 2.2. Stakeholder involvement in the design of Chile's National Public Integrity Strategy

The Presidential Advisory Commission for Public Integrity and Transparency (*Comisión Asesora Presidencial para la Integridad Pública y Transparencia*) promoted a public consultation process to build, together with citizens, Chile's first national integrity strategy (*Estrategia Nacional de Integridad Pública*, ENIP). This strategy, which sets goals for the next 10 years, aims to establish an anti-corruption culture and promote ethical values aimed at protecting the public interest and strengthening democracy. Citizens were invited to participate in a public consultation between 20 October and 10 November 2022 on a website, where the proposed objectives and components of the ENIP were available. To ensure the transparency of the process, the details and conclusions of the voluntary and anonymous public consultation were presented in aggregated form and were published on the consultation website.

In addition to the public consultation, the Presidential Advisory Commission for Public Integrity and Transparency carried out a series of targeted activities aimed at fostering the participation of specific, relevant stakeholders in the ENIP's formulation process:

- Activity with academics and representatives of civil society organisations.
- Workshop with technical counterparts from ministries, services and other state bodies with responsibilities for public integrity.
- An event with high-level authorities, called "State Commitment for a National Strategy on Public Integrity" (*Compromiso de Estado para una Estrategia Nacional de Integridad Pública*), which concretised the conviction of these authorities to advance in a strategic, comprehensive and preventive approach, from the entire State.
- Five regional participatory workshops on public integrity, called "Let's Talk about Integrity" (*Hablemos de Integridad*).
- Meeting with chambers of commerce from different regions.
- Working day with the gender officers of all ministries to promote the gender approach in the implementation of the ENIP.

Source: (OECD, 2024[9]).

Such a process could be used also to discuss sensitive issues (providing safe spaces and Chatham House settings) and to review and streamline core principles and values for the public sector in Jordan (see Chapter 3). It could also provide the opportunity to clearly define public integrity. Such a clear definition is the starting point for an effective integrity system (OECD, 2020[1]). While Jordan has developed both a vision ("a national environment that upholds integrity and rejects corruption") and mission ("consolidating the national integrity system, law enforcement, prevention of corruption and limiting its effects on the national level, in accordance with the international best practice, in order the establish national environment that rejects corruption") it has not yet defined "integrity". It, however, would be useful to provide clarity to all actors within the public integrity system: for the public and the private sector, civil society and citizens, but also for external stakeholders such as donors, tourists or multinational companies and investors. Indeed, sometimes "integrity" is merely related to individual behaviours, while a public integrity system is broadly understood as also comprising the legislation and the institutions in place to define, support, control and enforce integrity behaviour (OECD, 2020[1]).

2.2.4. Jordan could further strengthen the connections between the NIACS, the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap and the Open Government Action Plan

The NIACS 2020-2025 can be considered as a major achievement and an important milestone for promoting integrity and anti-corruption in Jordan. In addition, the Public Sector Roadmap 2022 and the Open Government Action Plan 2021-2025 also contribute to the establishment of a rigorous public integrity system to tackle corruption (Table 2.3). The Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap addresses Jordan's current overarching reform objective to boost its economy, which, inter alia, shall be achieved via fostering "transparency and accountability" as one out of seven modernisation pillars. The explicit goal of this modernisation process is to "create a comprehensive road map to elevate public administration, enhance the institutional approach in responding efficiently to local and global developments, and contribute effectively to attain economic recovery, based on the principles of excellence, transparency and accountability". The Open Government Action Plan aims at fostering democratic structures and participatory processes as well as consolidating the rule of law within a framework of transparency, governance, and accountability at all levels within Jordan. Enhancing integrity thereby is one of six national commitments to achieve this.

Table 2.3. Specific integrity-related actions included in the Jordanian Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022 and the Open Government Action Plan 2021-2025

Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022	Open Government Action Plan 2021-2025
Objective 3.5 Develop and amend the current system of legislation, laws and bylaws, in addition to developing the civil service system 3.5.1 Continuing to develop and re-evaluate the integrity, transparency and accountability systems (2022) 3.5.2 Identifying clear and applicable roles and responsibilities in the integrity, transparency and accountability system that enhances the discretionary and preventive role of internal control units (2023) 3.5.3 A comprehensive application of the non-conflict of interest policy to all institutions and individuals in the public administration (2024)	**Commitment 5: Enhance Integrity at the National Level** 5.1.1 Reviewing the general framework and work methodologies of the government compliance matrix for public integrity in the public sector. Also, reviewing the follow-up mechanism of the recommendations reached through consultations with stakeholders from the public sector, civil society, and experts based on international best practices. 5.1.2 Capacity-building of the Compliance Department on these methodologies to be utilized in the evaluations that will commence in 2023. 5. 1.3 Utilize the methodology and matrix that has been developed in conducting the evaluation of the targeted ministries and institutions that will commence in 2023 and issue relevant reports. 5.1.4 Incorporating the concept of integrity into the implementation plans of the governmental institutions through the recommendations reached in the compliance reports. Therefore, these institutions are obligated to develop activities to implement these recommendations in their implementation plans and allocate the related budget. This will be regarded as part of the responsiveness to the compliance matrix, which will be followed up. 5.2.1 Developing a compliance matrix for good governance and anti-corruption, particularly for regulatory bodies, over the private sector and CSOs, to ensure their compliance with the principles of governance, transparency, and disclosure, as well as designing a mechanism to follow up with recommendations reached through consultations with stakeholders from the public sector, civil

Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap 2022	Open Government Action Plan 2021-2025
	society, and experts, based on international best practices.
	5.2.2 Capacity-building of the Compliance Department on these methodologies to be utilized in the evaluations that will commence in 2023.
	5.2.3 Utilize the methodology and matrix that has been developed for conducting the evaluation of ministries and regulatory institutions over the private sector and CSOs that will commence in 2023 and issue relevant reports.
	5.2.4 Incorporating the concept of integrity into the implementation plans of the governmental regulatory bodies over the private sector and CSOs through the recommendations reached in compliance reports. Therefore, these bodies are obligated to develop activities to implement these recommendations in their implementation plans and allocate the related budget. This will be regarded as part of the responsiveness to the compliance matrix, which will be followed upon.
	5.3.1 Launching a training platform within the Innovation and Creativity Centre at the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission targeting the government sector, civil society, the private sector, regulatory bodies, and universities. The purpose of the platform is to enhance integrity, combat corruption, create experts in the field, disseminate information and knowledge related to the fight against corruption, and introduce some subjects into the Institute of Public Administration's materials.
	5.3.2 Incorporating the concept of public integrity in training programs for senior leadership and new officials within the Institute of Public Administration.
	5.3.3 Encouraging employees from the public sector, the private sector, CSOs, and all citizens to use the "Bekhedmetkom" platform via the anti-corruption complaints window as well as the mobile application for submitting complaints to JIACC. This will be done through high-quality campaigns and meetings with various stakeholders to enhance citizens' trust in the platform and encourage them to use it in a way that enhances accountability and combats corruption.
	5.3.4 Forming a committee of Senior Management/ Secretary-Generals from various ministries and governmental bodies, where biannual and periodic meetings are organized (as the need arises) to keep them apprised of the methodologies of the compliance assessment, JIACC reports, and evaluation results. Also, to gain their support to public sector employees to enhance the integrity and act responsively to JIACC recommendations.

Source: Public Sector Roadmap and Open Government Action Plan

However, while JIACC is advancing in the implementation of the commitments in the Open Government Action Plan that are under its responsibility, there is no mention of the Open Government Action Plan in the updated NIACS 2020-2025 that would allow to make visible the connection and synergies between both documents. Furthermore, the NIACS has not been revised to consider the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap and the activities foreseen in it. In turn, it also appears that the objectives related to integrity of the Roadmap did not take into account ongoing initiatives and are not linked logically to the NIACS. Nonetheless, these activities in the Roadmap are highly relevant and should be more explicitly communicated to the citizens and relevant stakeholders.

The other two elements of Jordan modernisation efforts, on economic and political reforms, are not explicitly making the link to integrity policies. For seeking and attracting foreign investment, an enabling and clean business environment is key. However, the role of integrity in the economic vision is not evident, and efforts with and within the private sector seem limited (see also Chapter 4). The role of integrity is also not clearly stated and elaborated in the political reform agenda, that focuses on awareness raising and electoral processes. These two dimensions contribute to strengthen an integrity system but could also be undermined by integrity risks. Indeed, the absence of an integrity dimension in those reforms could affect their impact, and the trust they should generate. For example, the trust in electoral processes is also determined by the perceived integrity of the system, the political parties and the candidates.

Therefore, the next NIACS should aim at establishing clear and explicit links to the goals set under the different modernisation efforts and the Open Government Plans. In fact, the next NIACS could be an instrument to ensure coherence and oversee the cross-cutting impact of integrity policies. This would signal co-ordination amongst these national strategies and prevent from creating confusion affecting the effective implementation of all strategies.

2.3. Promoting implementation and monitoring of integrity strategies

As mentioned, a strategy that is not effectively implemented can backfire. For an effective implementation, several elements are key. For instance, the strategic goals of a strategy need to be clarified in an action plan with clear responsibilities, timelines and resources allocated to achieving them. Of course, required resources must be available and an effective monitoring mechanism based on relevant indicators and processes needs to be in place. In turn, monitoring should inform decision-making and should not be confused with control of compliance. Monitoring should allow for honest and open discussions concerning challenges and for finding solution on how to adapt the action plan, if necessary. In addition, effective communication with stakeholders during implementation is essential. Sharing progress and results with both internal and external stakeholders, as well as the general public, not only fosters accountability but enhances the credibility of integrity initiatives and stimulates future anti-corruption and integrity actions (OECD, 2020[1]).

Again, Jordan could consider taking the OECD Public Integrity Indicators measuring the adequacy of implementation and reporting structures as a benchmark for reforms aimed at ensuring an effective implementation (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4. OECD Public Integrity Indicators – Adequacy of implementation structures and reporting

OECD Public integrity indicator 3.5	Criteria to fulfil
3.5.1	For each strategy, there is a central coordination function responsible for coordinating the implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the action plan
3.5.2	All public integrity strategies have an action plan in force.
3.5.3	All action plans include objectives with dedicated outcome-level indicators, baseline targets, and a list of activities.
3.5.4	All action plans identify lead organisations at least for each objective.
3.5.5	All action plans contain a section specifying the monitoring, reporting, and evaluation arrangements
3.5.6	All action plans reference administrative data sources from existing public registries
3.5.7	At least one action plan includes data sources from staff, household, or business surveys
3.5.8	At least one action plan includes activities to collaborate with institutions at the subnational level.
3.5.9	All action plans are published as a minimum on the website of the responsible body during the public consultation
3.5.10	Monitoring reports are published for all action plans, at least once a year, and publicly available no later than 3 months after the defined reporting schedule.
3.5.11	All monitoring reports report on progress against pre-defined indicators and targets in the action plan
3.5.12	All monitoring reports present the rate of implementation for activities in the action plan
3.5.13	All monitoring reports draw conclusions and have a dedicated section with recommendations to management.
3.5.14	The responsible body(ies) have initiated consultations with relevant state administration bodies to discuss the monitoring report(s) during the latest full calendar year
3.5.15	At least one responsible body has initiated consultations with the general public and/or civil society organisations on its monitoring reports during the latest full calendar year or the year prior to that.

Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators

2.3.1. JIACC could further promote the successful implementation of the next National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy by including estimates for required financial resources in the next action plan

The current NIACS (2020-2025) encompasses an action plan that undergoes annual updates, which are clearly documented in supplementary materials containing detailed operational plans for all departments and units within JIACC. JIACC's consistent efforts to make annual and regular updates to its action plan represents a proactive approach on their part. The action plan of the NIACS consists of 24 projects, each

outlining a specific set of actions designed to accomplish the project's objectives, accompanied by a timeline and designating responsible entities.

The operational plans for each project are documented separately and demonstrate significantly more specificity and detail. They clearly define the responsibilities of each unit within JIACC and strive to achieve alignment with the strategic objectives. For each unit, the plan specifies internal and external stakeholders, includes regular updates of the timeline, assigns indicators for tracking progress and includes a resource section. This resource section, however, primarily focuses on providing information about required human and technical resources, while financial resources requirements are specified only for some projects.

When designing the next NIACS, JIACC can build on this experience of elaborating one action plan which is detailed further in operational plans. The practice of annually updating the action plan is a good practice that should be maintained. The consistent evolution and improvement in the action plan, demonstrate JIACC's proactive approach toward addressing its strategic objectives. To further facilitate implementation and provide orientation to potential international co-operation, the action plan of the next NIACS could offer more comprehensive financial assessments for each project and actions proposed.

2.3.2. JIACC could promote evidence-informed monitoring of the NIACS using amongst others the National Integrity Indicators (NII), while reviewing and fine-tuning their methodology, their use and the communication around them to avoid misunderstandings

JIACC has been developing indicators designed to measure the progress and success of achieving the strategic objectives included in its NIACS. These indicators are still in process of refinement. Initially, JIACC's strategy introduced five key performance indicators corresponding to the five strategic objectives. Those indicators proved to be insufficient as they lack baseline and target values, leaving their practical application unclear. Subsequently, new indicators have been developed and integrated into the operational action plans, encompassing output indicators for each phase and the implementation of corresponding actions for each project. Annual indicators with pre-defined target values have been also established for each project.

However, while these indicators are used for assessing the performance of each project, their alignment with the strategic objectives of the current NIACS is not immediately evident and the methodology for measuring these indicators within each project could be clearer. The design of the next strategy should therefore take into account the identification of a set of indicators at different levels of the theory of change that allow the monitoring of its implementation and the evaluation of its results.

Additionally, JIACC has developed a set of indicators, the National Integrity Indicators (NII), to measure the level of implementation of the National Integrity Standards (NIS) by a selected group of public institutions, which could be used to further build on an evidence-informed monitoring approach in Jordan. A first pilot measurement of the NII was carried out with support from the CSO "Al Hayat Centre" in 2022. For this first measurement exercise, the methodology of the NII stipulated to calculate an aggregate value per institution based on two complementary measurement instruments:

- **Compliance matrix:** Evaluates the compliance of public entities with the NIS. For the pilot exercise, it consisted of 122 questions, divided into 5 criteria: (i) rule of law, (ii) accountability, (iii) transparency, (iv) justice, equality and equal opportunities, and (v) good governance). These were measured using a total of 21 sub-criteria.
- **Integrity survey:** Targets public servants in the 100 public entities that participated in the pilot exercise to assess their knowledge and experience related to the application of internal integrity policies and frameworks in their institutions.

Based on these measurement instruments, JIACC conducted an assessment, calculated a result and provided recommendations to each institution. Consequently, the NII are of great value for tracking progress in the implementation of mitigation measures. They have the potential to provide a good view on the readiness of a public institution to deal with potential integrity risks (through the Compliance matrix) and to measure the level of performance with respect to preventing corruption (though the Integrity survey). The NII are a good practice that is commendable and have the potential to indirectly strengthen the preventive work of JIACC and promote cultures of integrity in the Jordanian public administration, together with additional measures of support and guidance to public entities.

Additionally, JIACC could use the criteria and the results of the NII to communicate with both internal and external stakeholders and organise workshops or training sessions. It is important to convey that the results are not a judgment but should be understood as concrete and objective guidance for continuous improvement and demonstrate the commitment of the public sector entities to integrity. Such communication, workshops and trainings also serve as valuable opportunity to enhance stakeholder's comprehension of how to effectively apply and use the indicators and lead to more evidence-informed and co-ordinated efforts toward a national integrity system.

To further strengthen the NII, the criteria underlying the compliance matrix and the methodology to calculate the results could be reviewed and fine-tuned based on the first measurement experience. Additionally, both the criteria and the methodology should be publicly available to encourage transparency and public trust. In addition, the integrity survey could be reviewed to ensure up-to-date questions and its methodology could be revised to ensure the sustainability of this exercise in the long run.

Moreover, in the context of the next National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy, JIACC could consider a survey to measure public perceptions, experiences or attitudes of external stakeholders towards corruption. JIACC has been already considering such a survey, referring to this idea as an "integrity scan". Ideally, this should be developed and implemented in co-operation with the Department of Statistics and/or potentially with a local university. JIACC, together with other stakeholders, could also continue exploring and improving the collection of data sources that could be used to collect relevant information for the NII and the monitoring activities of the NIACS without adding a burden to the public institutions.

Finally, JIACC should pay attention to the way the NII are understood by public officials. During meetings in the context of this Integrity Review some public officials seemed to view the NII as a means to measure the "level of integrity" of a public institution, that is, a means to measure whether a public entity is more or less "corrupt" or "honest". This is of course not what the NII are measuring and JIACC should invest significant efforts in a communication strategy targeting leaders of public entities, public officials, but also civil society and citizens, in view of explaining how the NII should be interpreted, what they are telling and what they are *not* telling. This will improve the acceptance of the NII and promote a constructive use of this exercise.

2.3.3. While being the main responsible for monitoring the NIACS, JIACC could consider actively involving stakeholders in the exercise

JIACC holds the primary responsibility for drafting the monitoring reports. Currently, these reports are elaborated with limited engagement from stakeholders to discuss the results. As mentioned above, the implementation process and the monitoring could be improved by actively involving the responsible entities and stakeholders, moving away from a "control of compliance" focus to constructive discussions about challenges and successes. A too heavy focus on control of compliance or indicators can undermine the readiness of some entities to share data and information and to communicate challenges and ideas for improvement. In turn, actively involving stakeholders, keeping them informed, interested and inspired, will promote their commitment and their sense of "owning" the NIACS, setting incentives to jointly meet the objectives, and reducing frictions during implementation and monitoring.

JIACC could thus consider providing opportunities for stakeholder feed-back and involvement in the implementation. This could be piloted in 2024 for the remainder of the current NIACS, for example to discuss progress made and remaining challenges. These inputs would be of value for the evaluation of the current NIACS and the design of the follow-up strategy. The design for involving actively stakeholder could be inspired by good practices from Romania and the Netherlands (Box 2.3). The lessons learnt from this pilot could help to fine-tune the mechanism and implemented in the next NIACS.

Box 2.3. Involving stakeholders in the implementation of a national integrity strategy

The Netherlands

The Platform for Corruption Prevention in the Netherlands provides an example of how various stakeholders, including civil society organisations (CSOs), can be involved in implementing an anti-corruption strategy and in helping design future strategies. Beyond public institutions, representatives from business and civil society were invited. These representatives were from private integrity and investigation services; the corporate risk and security management services of multinationals; the Association of Chambers of Commerce; the Association of Business Enterprises; Transparency International Netherlands; journalists; and academia. The meetings allowed to exchange expertise and experiences with anti-corruption developments in the Netherlands, and to share contributions to policy design and implementation, identification of corruption risks, research and training.

Romania

As the co-ordinator of the implementation of the National Anticorruption Strategies (NAS), the Ministry of Justice implemented five platforms as an innovative monitoring tool to ensure the active involvement of several key stakeholder groups, including stakeholders beyond the public sector. The five platforms are: a) the platform of independent authorities and anticorruption institutions; b) the platform of the central public administration; c) the platform of the public local administration; d) the platform of the business environment; e) the platform of the civil society.

The platforms are convened biannually or whenever necessary and have decision-making powers regarding the monitoring of the NAS. For example, they decide on carrying out of peer-review missions in public institutions, adopt the evaluation reports and approve the annual monitoring report. The participating entities also discuss the progress and challenges in the implementation of the NAS and are consulted and informed about the latest developments in the anti-corruption field. Furthermore, according to the NAS monitoring methodology, the review teams assessing the compliance of public institutions must contain at least one representative of CSOs or private businesses. Outside of their regular tasks, the platforms also play a major role in the consultation phase for the drafting of a new NAS, as happened most recently to prepare the NAS 2021-2025, which replaced the NAS 2017-2020.

Source: Based on information provided by the Ministry of Justice of Romania and (OECD, 2021[10]; OECD, 2023[11]) and (OECD, 2020[1]).

2.4. Evaluation and accountability of integrity strategies

2.4.1. JIACC should initiate an evaluation of the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy 2020-2025 to enable learning and accountability and to inform the design of the next strategy

The information produced by monitoring integrity policies can be used, together with adequate indicators or proxies for the desired outcomes, to evaluate the outcome and impacts of the NIACS. Evaluations ask questions beyond the implementation status of a given action and look instead into questions such as relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact or sustainability (inspired by the OECD DAC criteria). As such, evaluations usually use a broad spectrum of sources of both quantitative and qualitative information to answer these questions and focus on drawing lessons learnt.

Establishing evaluation mechanisms from the start is crucial for ensuring measurability, progress, reporting and accountability. Evaluation can be conducted in house or outsourced, with the choice depending on the evaluation's purpose and available resources. In house evaluation can facilitate organisational self-reflection and learning, often at lower cost with faster execution. However, they may be perceived as less objective and staff may lack the time and necessary skills for a comprehensive evaluation (OECD, 2020[1]). Table 2.5 provides an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

Table 2.5. Benefits and limitations of the options for evaluation setup

Options	Pros and Cons
In House evaluation	Evaluation is designed and carried out internally by the lead institution staff. • Benefits: may allow for faster evaluation, as there is no need to procure the service of an evaluator; availability of inside information; further enhancement of analytical skills and insight. • Limitations: could be less objective, due to reluctance to disclose challenges and problems.
Outsourced evaluation	Evaluation is carried out by external consultants through an outsourcing procedure. • Benefits: objective evaluation by external and independent evaluators. • Limitations: requires additional resources to procure the expertise; may require more time to procure the service of an evaluator
Mixed/combined evaluation	Only some parts of the evaluation are outsourced (e.g., data collection and some of the more sophisticated analysis), while the rest is done in-house (internally). • Benefits: objective evaluation due to the involvement of external and independent evaluators; faster evaluation process, as the more time-intensive evaluation steps can be outsourced. • Limitations: requires additional resources to procure certain services

Source: (OECD, 2020[1])

In Jordan, the current NIACS does not explicitly ask for a formal evaluation. Nevertheless, JIACC should consider evaluating the strategy in 2025 to inform the design of the next strategy. The indicators and the monitoring reports could be valuable inputs for the evaluation. Box 2.4 provides some suggestions for guiding questions for such an evaluation of the NIACS. To ensure an objective and fresh look at the implementation and the results of the NIACS, an outsourced or mixed/combined evaluation could be the best option, as it could provide comparisons with good practice and recommendations for keeping the strategy and Jordan's integrity and anti-corruption work relevant and responsive. For instance, the Romanian NAS 2016-2020 was independently reviewed by the OECD (OECD, 2021[10]).

Box 2.4. Evaluating the Jordanian National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy 2020-2025

As a policy evaluation, the goal is not to assess whether every single activity of a given strategy has been implemented and to what degree, but rather to look at whether the strategy has been able to contribute to the stated goals and objectives. As such, while the level of implementation is a relevant dimension to look at, an evaluation goes beyond the implementation and achievement of outputs to investigate the change to which the strategy has contributed and to what extend the desired results have been achieved and how (OECD, 2017[12]).

As such, the methodology to evaluate the achievement of the envisaged results and the objectives of the Jordanian National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy (NIACS) could consider the following dimensions:

- **Relevance**: Was the NIACS designed to respond to country needs and priorities? To what extend are the objectives still valid? Do the stakeholders feel that they "own" the strategy, that they are an active part of it (sense of ownership)?

- **Coherence**: Was the NIACS coherent with other governance reforms and policies in relevant key areas (external coherence)? Were the different objectives and projects of the NIACS designed in a way to reinforce one another and create synergies and were the activities relevant to contribute to the achievement of the results and the objectives (internal coherence)?

- **Effectiveness**: To what degree has the NIACS achieved the envisaged goals and implemented the projects (level of implementation)? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

- **Efficiency**: How well were the available resources used to achieve the objectives of the NIACS? Were the objectives achieved on time?

- **Impact**: What differences did the NIACS make? What were the positive changes and could some unintended consequences be observed?

- **Sustainability**: How did the NIACS build on earlier efforts to prevent and combat corruption and how likely are the implemented changes to last over time?

Note: The criteria follow the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.
Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2021[10]), *Evaluation of the Romanian National Anti-corruption Strategy 2016-2020*, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/evaluation-romanian-national-anti-corruption-strategy-2016-2020.pdf

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The next NIACS should provide clarity and plan for a final evaluation and perhaps a mid-term evaluation within specified timelines. This evaluation framework should include crucial tasks such as soliciting feedback from stakeholders, assessing results, formulating recommendations as well as systematically documenting lessons learned and insights. Equally essential is the inclusion of budget considerations and identification of the stakeholders to be involved in the evaluation process, along with a clear definition of their roles and responsibilities and a transparent specification of the topics to be discussed with stakeholders during the evaluation.

Finally, evaluation reports are also particularly relevant for enabling accountability and ensuring transparency. Evaluations are looking into achievements, which arguably are more interesting for citizens and stakeholders than the details of a monitoring exercise. JIACC should therefore adopt robust reporting practices focusing on results. Equally important is that the evaluation reports are readily accessible to the public and presented in plain language, as this accessibility significantly enhances both clarity and transparency.

Chapter 2: Proposals for Actions

Ensuring a participative and evidence-informed design of integrity strategies

- To develop the next anti-corruption and integrity strategy in a co-ordinated way, a committee or working group could be established, steered by JIACC. The working group could involve key public entities, for example, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Audit Bureau (AB), the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC), as well as prosecutors and judges. Other entities could be involved when necessary. Civil society, private sector, academia, and other relevant stakeholders could be invited to join the working group to provide inputs. Such a working group or committee should have a clear mandate and sufficient resources and authority to manage the process and take decisions.

- Because this process of developing the new NIACS is also an opportunity to renew the commitment on a political level, it is recommended that the next NIACS should be approved by the Council of the Prime Minister.

- JIACC can ensure the relevance of the next NIACS through a risk and evidence-informed strategy design. JIACC's promotion of integrity risk assessments with various entities can be a relevant input for the design of the next strategy.

- When renewing the commitment at the highest level and to ensure buy-in and ownership at all levels of the public administration and within the population, a comprehensive and tailored consultation and participatory process in the process of designing the next NIACS would be strongly recommended. The next strategy should include a summary report of such a consultation process and JIACC could make publicly available the inputs received to increase transparency and promote trust in the process.

- The participative development process of the new strategy could be used to discuss sensitive issues by providing safe spaces, to review and streamline core principles and values for the public sector in Jordan and to clearly define public integrity.

- The next NIACS should aim at establishing clear and explicit links to the goals set under the different modernisation efforts and the Open Government Plans. The next NIACS could be an instrument to ensure coherence and oversee the cross-cutting impact of integrity policies.

Promoting implementation and monitoring of integrity strategies

- JIACC could further promote the successful implementation of the next NIACS by including estimates for required financial resources for each project and actions proposed in the next action plan.

- For the design of the next strategy, JIACC should take into account the identification of a set of indicators at different levels of the theory of change that allow the monitoring of its implementation and the evaluation of its results.

- To further strengthen the National Integrity Indicators (NII), JIACC could review and fine-tune the criteria underlying the compliance matrix and the methodology to calculate the results, based on the first measurement experience. Both the criteria and the methodology should be publicly available.

- JIACC could review the integrity survey to ensure up-to-date questions. JIACC could also review its methodology to ensure the sustainability of this exercise in the long run.

- In the context of the next National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy, JIACC could consider a survey to measure public perceptions, experiences or attitudes of external stakeholders towards corruption. JIACC, together with other stakeholders, could also continue exploring and

improving the collection of data sources that could be used to collect relevant information for the NII and the monitoring activities of the NIACS without adding a burden to the public institutions.

- JIACC should pay attention to the way the NII are understood by public officials and invest significant efforts in a communication strategy targeting leaders of public entities, public officials, but also civil society and citizens, in view of explaining how the NII should be interpreted, what they are telling and what they are not telling. This will improve the acceptance of the NII and promote a constructive use.

- While being the main responsible for monitoring the NIACS, JIACC could consider actively providing opportunities for stakeholder's feed-back and involvement in the implementation. This could be piloted for the remainder of the current NIACS, for example to discuss progress made and remaining challenges. These inputs would be of value for the evaluation of the current NIACS and the design of the follow-up strategy.

Evaluation and accountability of integrity strategies

- JIACC should consider evaluating the NIACS 2020-2025 to inform the design of the next strategy. To ensure an objective and fresh look at the implementation and the results of the NIACS, an outsourced or mixed/combined evaluation could be the best option, as it could provide comparisons with good practice and recommendations for keeping the strategy and Jordan's integrity and anti-corruption work relevant and responsive.

- The next NIACS should plan for a final evaluation and perhaps a mid-term evaluation within specified timelines. This evaluation framework should include crucial tasks such as soliciting feedback from stakeholders, assessing results, formulating recommendations as well as systematically documenting lessons learned and insights. Equally essential is the inclusion of budget considerations and identification of the stakeholders to be involved in the evaluation process, along with a clear definition of their roles and responsibilities and a transparent specification of the topics to be discussed with stakeholders during the evaluation.

- JIACC should adopt robust reporting practices focusing on results, ensuring that evaluation reports are readily accessible to the public and presented in plain language, as this accessibility significantly enhances both clarity and transparency.

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3 Promoting open cultures of integrity in the Jordanian public administration

This chapter provides an overview of the strengths and areas of opportunity for promoting open cultures of integrity throughout the Jordanian public administration. It provides recommendations on how to provide clear guidance with respect to expected behaviour by simplifying the principles and values, on how to strengthen the prevention and management of conflict of interest, on how to continue raising awareness and strengthening capacities of public officials, and on how to better incorporate integrity in human resource policies and management, particularly in municipalities.

3.1. Introduction

Achieving open cultures of integrity in the public administration requires going beyond laws and regulations and ensuring public values are deeply rooted in the behaviour of individuals and organisational structures (OECD, 2020[1]). Open organisational cultures also mean that public officials at all levels feel safe to engage in conversations with the aim of voicing their concerns and discussing integrity issues such as ethical dilemmas, potential conflict-of-interest situations, suspicions of integrity violations and other integrity concerns (OECD, 2020[1]). In short, building open organisational cultures is about creating safe environments, in which public officials know the rules, behave accordingly, and feel safe to speak up. The benefits of open organisational cultures in the public administration include enhanced trust in the organisation, an greater sense of ownership and pride among public employees in their work, and the ability to address integrity issues before they become potentially damaging.

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity sets out the main pillars for building a culture of integrity in the public sector (OECD, 2020[1]; OECD, 2017[2]). This chapter reviews strengths and opportunities for improvement with respect to promoting open organisational cultures of integrity in the Jordanian public administration. The subsequent sections provide recommendation in the following areas:

- Setting clear integrity standards. Principles and values help public officials carrying out their public duties ethically and upholding the public interest over private interests.
- Preventing and managing conflict of interest. Having clear rules and guidelines in place to prevent and manage conflicts of interest is also essential for public officials to uphold public integrity.
- Raising awareness and building capacities. Providing sufficient information, training and guidance to public officials to understand and apply integrity standards and values is key. Leaders can be role models and enablers for good behaviour.
- Promoting a values and merit-based civil service. Hiring people with the right skills for the job improves performance and productivity, reinforces integrity and prevents favouritism and nepotism. At the same time, even minor violations of integrity standards must be timely, fairly and visibly sanctioned to ensure the credibility of the integrity system.

In Jordan, the National Integrity Standards (NIS) are used to promote integrity inside public institutions. The Jordanian Integrity and Anticorruption Commission (JIACC) developed and implemented the National Integrity Indicators (NII) in 2020/21 to measure the level of implementation of the National Integrity Standards (NIS) by public institutions (see also Chapter 2). These NII are currently being fine-tuned to provide, in the future, coherent measurement of the level of institutional preparedness (through a Compliance Matrix) and the level of institutional implementation (through an Integrity Survey). The recommendations generated by the NII will provide concrete guidance to heads of public entities on how to improve their system of institutional preparedness and strengthen their organisational cultures of integrity.

In addition, the Prime Minister's Project Management Implementation Office (PMIO) is currently working on developing an Institutional Culture Framework (IFC), which aims to build an institutional culture and work environment that enhances commitment and accountability as well as further develop institutional capacities to lead changes and promote commitment to institutional values. This programme is part of the implementation of the Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap for 2023. Some dimensions of the IFC are also part of the NIS and the NII. JIACC and PMIO should co-ordinate to align the IFC to the NIS and the revised NII.

This chapter informs and strengthens the implementation of key integrity dimensions aimed at promoting open cultures of integrity in the Jordanian public administration, such as providing simple and clear guidance to public officials on values and principles, strengthening the prevention and management of

conflict of interest, raising awareness and strengthening the capacities of public officials on public integrity as well as integrating and mainstreaming integrity into human resource management.

3.2. Providing simple and clear guidance on overarching principles and values

Setting high standards of conduct that must be followed by all public officials and that prioritise the public interest reflects the commitment to serving the general interest and building a public service-oriented culture. Public values set out the basic principles and expectations that society deems to be of importance for public officials and provide clarity for organisations and public officials at all levels regarding expected behaviours. These standards can be out in in legal frameworks. Additionally, countries often implement guidance to public officials through *codes of conduct*, describing expected standards and prohibited situations, and/or through *codes of ethics*, identifying principles and values (OECD, 2020[1]).

Jordan has put in place a comprehensive legal and institutional integrity framework (see Chapter 1), and political leaders have expressed the necessity to promote public integrity and tackling corruption. The main legal texts providing guidance on expected behaviour of public officials are the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law 13 of 2016 and the Civil Service Bylaw 9 of 2020, as well as their amendments. The last amendment of the Civil Service Bylaw was issued in December 2023. The Public Sector Human Resources Management Bylaw was issued in 2024 and further changes are to be expected related to the ongoing reforms of the civil service. The Civil Service Bylaw lays out values and prohibits exploiting the position of a public official to serve any personal benefit or for partisan ends.

These two legal texts are complemented by the Code of Conduct and Ethics of the Public Service (CoC). However, at the time this OECD report was drafted, it was not entirely clear which version of the CoC was the official one and different versions were found on official websites. In addition, interviews also seem to indicate that the awareness of public officials on the CoC is low and it was not possible to find publicly available information regarding formal events or communication strategies for disseminating the Code. Therefore, effective communication and dissemination of the CoC, including clarity about the current version, remains an area for potential improvement to ensure comprehensive awareness and compliance across all levels of public service.

Two actors have core responsibilities in promoting and monitoring compliance with these provisions. The Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC) is responsible for ensuring the application and implementation of the Civil Service Bylaw and the CoC. The establishment of the SPAC marks a significant milestone in the ongoing efforts to modernise the public sector in Jordan. According to its Bylaw 80 from 2023, SPAC replaces the Civil Service Bureau (CSB) and takes up new responsibilities beyond human resource management and which are particularly relevant for public integrity, such as ensuring the delivery of public services and promoting institutional development in the public sector. In turn, JIACC is responsible for activating and ensuring the application of the set of values and rules of conduct in the public administration, for example through the NIS and NII mentioned above, and for ensuring that the public administration fairly and impartially provides high quality services (Article 4, literals a and b of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law).

3.2.1. To achieve one set of well-defined principles and values for public officials, the SPAC and JIACC could lead a participatory process to review and streamline the current principles and values in the Civil Service Bylaw and the Code of Conduct and Ethics

Standards and guidance for ethical conduct are often derived from a commitment to overarching values (OECD, 2018[3]). Such public values aim to guide ethical judgement when serving the public interest by becoming the reference against which public officials can evaluate their everyday choices and actions. Having such over-arching public values is particularly relevant considering that it is impossible to capture

in a country's regulatory framework all eventualities and situations that public officials could encounter in their day-to-day work. Consequently, these overarching values should be clear and simple, so they can be easily understood, recalled and applied by public officials in their everyday choices and behaviours.

In Jordan, the Civil Service Bylaw states that the civil service is based on the following set of principles and values (Article 4): Rule of law; Accountability and transparency; Welfare; Justice, equality and equal opportunities; Good governance and integrity; Excellence in performance and continuous improvement; Sound planning; Empowerment and motivation; and Effectiveness and efficiency. In one version of the CoC, the following set of principles are provided: fairness/justice, transparency, accountability, integrity, professionalism and impartiality/neutrality. The civil service human resources strategy 2023-2027 defines the following set of values: Integrity, Responsibility, Innovation, Efficiency, Respect, Excellence, Justice. As such, the values or principles included in these documents overlap and, in part, try to capture the same with different words. For example, "professionalism" in the CoC could arguably encompass the dimensions of "Excellence in performance and continuous improvement", "Sound planning" or "Effectiveness and efficiency", for example. In turn, "Fairness" could be linked to the dimensions of "Welfare" and "Justice, equality and equal opportunities". While all these dimensions are relevant, the use of different words and concepts adds an additional layer of complexity and could undermine the clarity of the intended messages to public officials.

Therefore, there is an opportunity for SPAC and JIACC to review and streamline the set of principles and values and ensure coherence between the CoC, the human resource strategy 2023-2027 and the Civil Service Bylaw (and its current revision). The objective would be to have one single set of principles and values. Ideally, this list should not be too long (Miller, 1955[4]). This would enhance the clarity for public officials concerning the overarching principles and values guiding the public sector. Such a review process steered by SPAC and JIACC, on the one hand, would enable defining clear and common definitions for the revised set of principles and values. On the other hand, it could allow involving public officials across the public administration and different levels of government in the revision. Involving public officials enhance their ownership and commitment and contribute to aligning expectations and promoting a common understanding. The resulting principles and values should represent what public servants themselves feel relevant for guiding their personal development, work routines, skills and organisational climate. A single set of principles and values could also help JIACC, SPAC and the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) to develop and conduct coherent trainings that are referring to this common foundation while delving into different aspects and/or targeting different groups of public officials (see section below).

> *"If staff members were not involved in the process of developing the code and everybody knows that the code is just a reproduction of an existing document, then this might drastically reduce staff-members" feelings of **ownership** of the code. This problem is expressed in the maxim "a code is nothing, coding is everything" (Kaptein and Wempe, 1998[5]). Although the maxim is of course exaggerated, it does catch the psychological **importance of involvement** in the design of a code. (OECD, 2009[6])*

 Successful experiences from countries such as Australia, Brazil and Colombia could be used as an inspiration for designing such a participatory process and for setting and defining common public principles and values that are easy to remember (Box 3.1). Of course, even a participatively elaborated code is likely to not have any impact on behaviour if it does not go along with measures to ensure its implementation, such as trainings and leadership but also the formal or informal sanctioning of behaviour that is not aligned with those principles and values (see also below in this chapter). A participative definition of the values is nonetheless one of the success factors evidenced by international good practice.

Box 3.1. Setting and defining common public principles

Defining the Australian Public Service Values

The Australian Public Service (APS) Values are set out in the Public Service Act 1999. These values provide the philosophical underpinning of the APS, shape its organisational culture, and reflect public expectations of the relationship between public servants and government, Parliament, and the community. The APS Values complement one another and are of equal importance. The APS Values were developed following extensive public consultation, and are as follows: Impartial (The APS is apolitical and provides the government with advice that is frank, honest, timely, and based on the best available evidence); Committed to service (The APS is professional, objective, innovative and efficient, and works collaboratively to achieve the best results for the Australian community and the government); Accountable (The APS is open and accountable to the Australian community under the law and within the framework of ministerial responsibility); Respectful (The APS respects all people, including their rights and heritage); Ethical (The APS demonstrates leadership, is trustworthy, and acts with integrity, in all that it does). Moreover, commencing on 11 December 2024, Stewardship will be a new APS Value (Stewardship: The APS builds its capability and institutional knowledge, and supports the public interest now and into the future, by understanding the long-term impacts of what it does).

Defining the 7 Values of the Federal Public Service in Brazil

The Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) of Brazil, in partnership with the OECD, led a process of identifying the core Values of the Federal Public Service, launched in April 2021. The initiative was carried out by an online voting procedure, through which federal public servants throughout Brazil could choose and propose which values should guide the culture of the federal public administration. During October 2020, the CGU launched the online survey inviting all federal civil servants to participate. In this first survey, 33 407 public servants participated. The CGU, together with the OECD, cleaned the responses and grouped similar values. The top ten values were selected in a process including the participation of representatives from the private sector and civil society. A second survey, with 25 637 participants, then reduced the 10 values to the 7 final values, which are: Integrity, Professionalism, Impartiality, Justice, Engagement, Kindness and Public Vocation. Each value comes along with a brief description, which provided the opportunity to add similar values that pointed into the same direction.

Defining the Colombian Integrity Code

In 2016, the Colombian Ministry of Public Administration initiated a process to define a General Integrity Code. Through a participatory exercise involving more than 25 000 public servants through different mechanisms, five core values were selected: Honesty, Respect, Commitment, Diligence and Justice. In addition, each public entity has the possibility to integrate up to two additional values or principles to respond to organisational, regional and/or sectorial specificities.

Source: (Australian Public Service Commission, 2020[7]); (OECD, 2021[8]) and (OECD, 2017[9]).

Having one single set of principles and values could significantly contribute to facilitating the understanding of public officials in Jordan of what is expected from them. At the same time, such principles and values typically require further guidance and clarification: what concrete behaviours are related to each of the principles and values in day-to-day practice? As such, to support ongoing and future efforts in raising awareness and capacity building by JIACC and the IPA (see section below), Jordan could provide a short definition of each principle and value in the CoC and in the Civil Service Bylaw (or the new and unique set of principles as recommended above) as well as further guidance on how to translate each of these into concrete expected behaviours. This guidance could be provided in specific codes for areas or

organisations (see section below), with the advantage of allowing to include concrete and relevant examples, or in a complementary guideline or manual. The example from Canada in Box 3.2 could provide an inspiration on how to frame such complementary guidance.

Box 3.2. Detailing expected behaviour from public officials in Canada

In Canada, the Code of Conduct of the Employment and Social Development Department includes the set of five public sector values – respect for democracy, respect for people, integrity, stewardship and excellence – that should guide public servants in everything they do. Additionally, the code includes the definition of each public sector value, along with the expected behaviours that support them. For example, the value "Respect for people" is further defined as follows:

- Definition: Treating all people with respect, dignity and fairness is fundamental to our relationship with the Canadian public and contributes to a safe and healthy work environment that promotes engagement, openness and transparency. The diversity of our people and the ideas they generate are the source of our innovation.

Expected behaviours associated with the value "Respect for people" are:

- Treating every person with respect and fairness.
- Valuing diversity and the benefit of combining the unique qualities and strengths inherent in a diverse workforce.
- Helping to create and maintain safe and healthy workplaces that are free from harassment and discrimination.
- Working together in a spirit of openness, honesty and transparency that encourages engagement, collaboration and respectful communication.

These lists of expected behaviours are further elaborated into practical examples and guidance on how the civil servant should act under certain circumstances. In this way, the code not only encompasses the standards of conduct, but also presents a practical tool for reaching ethical and lawful decisions, safeguarding the integrity of the public service and employees alike.

Source: (ESDC, 2016[10]).

3.2.2. JIACC, together with the SPAC and relevant entities, could continue developing specific codes for at-risk categories of public officials and encouraging the development of organisational codes of conduct through a clear methodology and ad-hoc support

Different public entities, at different levels of government or in different sectors, face diverse risks and ethical dilemmas due to the specificity of the context and the type of work they carry out. Similarly, some at-risk positions, such as procurement officials or officials in human resources (HR) units, are confronted with very specific risks that are transversal across the public administration. Therefore, institutional or sector codes of conduct, or codes for specific positions, can allow to include relevant and concrete examples from the day-to day work to which public officials can easily relate to. Box 3.3 provides examples of countries that encourage the development of specific codes.

> **Box 3.3. Good practice examples of countries that encourage the development of organisational codes or codes for at risk positions**
>
> In **Costa Rica**, the Manual of Ethics for Civil Servants sets ethical norms, principles, duties and prohibitions for the 47 entities of the civil service regime, while the Ethical Principles of Civil Servants (Decree 33146 of 2006) provide the shared principles and values of the Costa Rican public sector. Additionally, the *Ethics Management Model* provides guidance for the development of an organisational Ethics Code or an Ethics Manual to allow public institutions to reflect their specific contexts, risks and challenges. Following this guidance, public institutions have developed institutional codes of ethics, including, for example: the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the General Directorate of the General Archive of the Nation or the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements. The process typically includes a survey to employees, a diagnosis and work sessions to present and validate the proposed principles and values.
>
> In **Canada**, the Values and Ethics Code for the Canadian Public Service describes the values and expected behaviours that guide public servants in all activities related to their professional duties (Respect for Democracy, Respect for People, Integrity, Stewardship and Excellence). Moreover, public institutions are expected to develop organisational codes of conduct to reflect their specific contexts, including, for example, the Code of Conduct of the Employment and Social Development Department, which describes how employees expected to behave when delivering the services that are specific to their mandate and work environment, or the Code of Values and Ethics for the Canadian Transportation Agency, which outlines the core values and expected behaviours that should guide the Agency's employees and public servants in all activities related to their professional duties.
>
> In the **United Kingdom**, the Seven Principles of Public Life (Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and Leadership) outline the ethical standards that anyone working in the public sector is expected to adhere to. In line with these principles, there are specific codes for public officials considered to be at high-risk positions, including, for example the Ministerial Code, which sets out the standards of conduct expected of ministers, or the Code of conduct for Special Advisers, which sets out the standards of conduct expected of special advisers working in the UK government.
>
> Source: Costa Rica: https://www.pgr.go.cr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Manual_etica_Funcion_Publica.pdf, (OECD, 2022[11]); Canada: https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=25049,https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=25049 https://otc-cta.gc.ca/sites/all/files/altformats/books/Code-VE-en-final_0.pdf, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/edsc-esdc/Em4-7-2016-eng.pdf; United Kingdom: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministerial-code, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d834869e5274a2036a24e0d/201612_Code_of_Conduct_for_Special_Advisers.pdf.

In Jordan, in addition to the CoC, JIACC requires each public entity to develop and implement a special code of conduct at entity level. Indeed, JIACC's National Integrity Indicators (NII, see also Chapter 2) measure whether the entities have a special code of conduct that considers the specific nature of its work. These codes need to be signed by all employees and communicated actively. Through the NII, JIACC is providing incentives to public entities to comply and implement codes. According to information provided by JIACC, municipalities are starting to develop their own codes of conduct and JIACC is following-up on the progress. Jordan has also adopted specific codes of conduct for some risk areas. For example, there exists specific codes for the judiciary, including the prosecution services, for JIACC staff, for the House of Representatives and for Students and teachers (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Examples for specific codes in Jordan

Specific Codes (examples)	Description
JIACC's Code of Conduct	Outlines some general obligations of JIACC's staff including to work for the public interest, commit to the principles of integrity and transparency. It includes some more specific rights and obligations related to JIACC's work.
Code of Conduct of the Judiciary	Requires prosecutors and judges to by loyal to the nation and the King, judging people with justice, achieving the job obligations, maintaining integrity and loyalty at work, abiding to sincerity and honour in the personal and judicial behaviour, devoting the official work hours to the work entrusted to the judge, or not being absent from work or abstain from working without the approval of the concerned authority, devotion to the judicial work.
Code of Ethics for Students and Teachers	Outlining specific integrity issues related to universities, students and teachers.
Code of Conduct of the House of Representatives	The code contains, amongst others, provisions whereby parliamentarian are obliged to disclosure financial assets, to avoid abuses and situations of conflict of interest, to not interfere in voting, to respect confidentiality or to not use language that threatens, insults or provokes.

Source: Compiled by OECD

This approach of providing more detailed guidance on expected behaviour is a good practice and Jordan is encouraged to continue promoting and supporting the development of such codes. Identifying other high-risk areas where specific codes could be useful. For example, other high-risk areas in Jordan include high-level positions, such as senior public officials and ministers, or employees in municipalities not covered by the CoC, that are directly delivering key public services and therefore have a high level of direct contact with citizens and firms.

Of course, public procurement is a high-risk area in all countries given the financial resources involved and the close interaction between the public and the private sector. As such, providing clear guidance to procurement officials at all levels on their duties and responsibilities as well as on integrity policies is key. Jordan has undertaken recent reforms, modernising its procurement system. Most recently, the Government Procurement Bylaw 8 from 2022 continued to modernise Jordan's procurement system following international practices and standards, including a centralised electronic procurement system (Jordan Online Electronic Procurement System, JONEPS). Building on this progress, the Procurement Policies Committee could task the Government Procurement Department, reporting to the Ministry of Finance, and the Government Tenders Department, reporting to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, to develop a specific code of conduct for those involved in public procurement procedures. The code should allow procurement officials to better identify, understand and mitigate the risks and potential conflicts of interest they are facing and include concrete examples from practice. A participative process involving procurement officials of different entities and sectors could significantly enrich the process and ensure a relevant code. The Procurement Policies Committee could approve and promote the use of the code in all procuring government agencies and units.

To ensure that such institutional codes or codes for at-risk categories of public officials are coherent and based on a common set of public principles and values (for instance a new and streamlined set of values and principles as recommended above), JIACC and SPACC could jointly elaborate a simple generic manual offering methodological guidance (a "step-by-step" guide) on how to develop and implement codes. The *Ethics Management Model* used in Costa Rica is a good example on how such methodological guidance could look like (see Box 3.3 above). Upon request, JIACC and SPAC could provide ad-hoc assistance to entities, but the main effort should come from the entities. This way, JIACC and SPAC can ensure the quality of the resulting codes and their alignment with the overarching principles and values, while allowing enough space and flexibility to respond to the specific context or risk group.

This methodological guidance should include information on how to develop, step-by-step, a code of conduct, an include information on, for example:

- How to conduct an internal diagnostic exercise (for example using an internal survey, focus groups or interviews with staff) which maps key internal processes and positions and their integrity risks.

Ideally, this diagnostic exercise would be able to draw on current efforts to promote corruption risk assessments in the public administration (Chapter 5). Identifying situations of conflict of interest that can typically happen in the given context would be an essential part of this diagnostic.

- How to implement exercises that invite public officials to link the generic set of principles and values that apply to the whole public sector in Jordan to relevant behaviours and situations of their specific day-to-day context (e.g., what does "fairness" or "transparency" concretely mean for a public procurement official). These concrete behaviours and situations can be used as examples in the code or in trainings and will be key to ensure that the code is relevant and reflects the reality of the entity or at-risk situation.

- How to write a draft code in simple and plain language based on the inputs received from the diagnostic exercise and the exercises aimed at identifying concrete situations and examples.

- How to organise an internal consultation on the draft code to raise attention, receive feed-back, continue building ownership amongst staff at all levels and elaborate the final version of the code.

- How to implement the code, for example by providing a toolbox with measures aimed at integrating the code into existing processes and at communicating the code to ensure it becomes a well-know and relevant reference to public officials

- How to monitor its implementation, evaluate its success and periodically revise the code.

3.3. Strengthening the prevention and management of conflict of interest

Establishing procedures for identifying, managing and resolving conflict of interest is essential for public officials to uphold public integrity in their role. Public officials must know what is required of them in relation to identifying and declaring conflict-of-interest situations (OECD, 2004[12]). When conflict-of-interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of organisations and may lead to corruption in the public sector and private sector alike. At the same time, in many countries, conflicts of interest are typically often misunderstood and equated with corruption by public officials. This misunderstanding may imply that some public officials are reluctant to disclose a situation of conflict of interest out of fear of what might happen to them afterwards.

Therefore, having a strong and consolidated framework, where management and prevention of conflict-of-interest situations are effective, is key to safeguarding democratic achievements. Of key importance is the understanding and recognition that everybody has interests; interests cannot be prohibited, but rather must be properly managed. The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[2]) has called for countries to set high standards of conduct for public officials, through:

- Setting clear and proportionate procedures to help prevent violations of public integrity standards and to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest.

- Providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of interest situations.

- Averting the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups through managing conflict-of interest situations.

In Jordan, conflict of interest is currently addressed in Article 69 of the Civil Service Bylaw 9 of 2020 and in the CoC. Also, the Integrity and Antti-corruption Law criminalises if public officials do not disclose their conflicts of interest. The Civil Service Bylaw 2020 lists a series of prohibited conducts, under penalty of disciplinary liability, including "exploiting his/her position to serve any personal benefit or benefit he/she has no right to". The version of the CoC published currently on JIACC's website includes provisions on "accepting or requesting gifts, privileges and other benefits" (Article 8) and on conflicts of interest (Article 9), covering several areas that could lead to a conflict of interest:

"Article 9. Conflict of interest for the employee

A. Refrain from carrying out any activity that would lead to the emergence of a real, apparent or potential conflict between their personal interests on the one hand, and between their responsibilities and job tasks on the other.

B. Refrain from carrying out any activity that is not compatible with the objective and impartial performance of their duties, or that could lead to preferential treatment to natural or legal persons in their dealings with the government or harms the reputation of their department or jeopardizes its relationship with the public.

C. Informing their direct superior in writing and in an urgent manner in the event of a conflict of interest taking place with any person in their dealings with the government, or if there's a conflict between personal interest and public interest, or the employee is exposed to pressure that conflicts with or their official duties or provokes doubts with their objectivity in addition to, clarifying the nature of the relationship and the nature of the conflict. The direct manager must take necessary measures as a result. In all cases, the public interest must be considered when dealing with this type of conflict.

D. Not to use their job, directly or indirectly, to obtain financial gains or anything of value for their or their family's benefit.

E. Not to exploit or employ the information they obtain during the performance of their official duties and after the end of their work in the department, as a means to achieve personal benefits for themselves or others, directly or indirectly, or to harm others, and not to disclose information to give an unfair or unreasonable advantage to other parties.

F. The necessary approvals and authorizations must be obtained in accordance with the relevant applicable laws and regulations, if they wish to participate in the process of collecting donations, prizes, or in-kind contributions to charitable organizations, and the direct manager may request from the employee reduces, modifies, or terminates activities when they believe that they will result in a real, apparent or potential conflict of Interests.

G. Avoid establishing close relationships with individuals or institutions whose interests depend primarily on their decisions or the decisions of their department.

H. Not accepting a job, within one year from their end date, in any institution that has important official dealings with the department in which they worked in, except with written approval from the Minister. Additionally, they are not allowed to provide advice to clients of these institutions based on information that might not be available to the public regarding the programs and policies of the department for which they worked.

I. The direct supervisor must inform the employee who intends to quit their job of the obligations listed in this article.

3.3.1. Jordan could consider amending the Civil Service Bylaw to provide a clear definition of real, potential and apparent conflict of interest, to include the procedure public officials and the superiors must follow and to strengthen the cooling-off provision

First, to enable public officials to identify and manage conflict-of-interest situations, it is advisable to adequately define a "conflict of interest" (OECD, 2004[12]). This can be done descriptively (i.e., defining a conflict of interest in general terms) or prescriptively (i.e., defining a range of situations considered as conflicting with public duties) (OECD, 2020[1]). The OECD defines a conflict of interest as "a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities" (OECD, 2004[12]).

In Jordan, the Civil Service Bylaw currently does not provide a general definition of a conflict of interest. Rather, it follows a prescriptive approach: the legislation defines a range of situations considered as conflicting with official duties. While this has the advantage of clearly laying out key dimensions, the approach requires a comprehensive list of potential situations. Arguably however, such an exhaustive list

is impossible to achieve. While jurisprudence and interpretations could adapt to emerging issues that were not explicitly considered in the legal texts, such a reactive approach would leave public officials with a certain level of uncertainty as they would depend on *ex post* jurisprudence and interpretation. Indirectly, it may also lead public officials to (wrongly) believe that all situations that are not listed, are fine, without carrying out an ethical reflection of whether the situation could involve conflicting interests.

Therefore, Jordan could provide a clear and simple legal definition of conflict of interest. Such a definition could be provided in the Civil Service Bylaw, for example, by aligning it with Article 9 of the CoC as cited above. In addition, the legal text could be complemented by a guideline (see next section). The amendment could be the opportunity to clarify the difference between real, potential and apparent conflict of interest, as introduced in the version of the CoC as published on JIACC's website, as each one is relevant to safeguard the public interest. In France, for example, the Law of 11 October 2013 on transparency in public life defined a conflict of interest as "a situation in which a private or public interest interferes with a public interest in such a way that it influences or appears to influence the independent, impartial and objective performance of a duty". State the procedure for the management for conflict of interest, including its reporting (to whom) and management (recusal).

Second, in addition to a clear definition, public officials need clarity concerning procedures they are expected to follow to prevent and to manage conflicts of interest. Public officials need to know the concrete steps of what is expected from them. Clarity of what follows a declaration of conflict of interest is therefore key as it can contribute to mitigating such fear and reduce the uncertainty of the consequence of disclosure.

In Jordan, the version of the CoC published on JIACC's website stipulates that public officials shall inform their superiors in writing, but it is not clear if an informal statement would be sufficient or whether the public officials must follow a certain procedure. This absence of a clear procedure was emphasised by stakeholders in Jordan during interviews carried out by the OECD. In addition, the CoC currently requires the direct manager to take "necessary measures" when an employee declares a conflict of interest. However, there are no clear guidance on what measures exactly a superior could take. It is important that Jordan clearly set out and communicate the procedure for managing a conflict of interest. Public officials need clarity on *how* and *to whom* to declare a conflict of interest and superiors need to know *what* to do when receiving such declarations.

Therefore, in addition to considering to include a clear definition in the Civil Service Bylaw, Jordan could add a standalone provision that includes the procedure for declaring a conflict of interest and the avenues for resolving it. It should also specify in which timeframe a conflict of interest shall be declared and in which timeframe the public official can expect a response from its superior on how to resolve the situation. Jordan could also reflect on elaborating a template form that public officials could use to proactively declare a conflict-of-interest situation, including several relevant elements (Box 3.4).

Box 3.4. Relevant elements when declaring conflicts of interest

- Description of the private interest, pecuniary or non-pecuniary, impacting the official duties.
- Description of the official duties the public official is expected to perform.
- Identification of whether this is an apparent, potential or real conflict of interest.
- Signed employee declaration committing to manage the conflict of interest.
- Description by the manager of the proposed action to resolve the conflict of interest.
- Signature of both manager and employee that has been discussed.

Source: (OECD, 2019[13])

Third, one of the main risks and concerns related to conflict of interest is the so-called "revolving door". Movements between the private and public sectors result in many positive outcomes, notably the transfer of knowledge and experience. However, it can also be a vehicle for undue or unfair advantage and to influence government policies and decisions if not properly regulated. Time limits, or "cooling off" periods, are a useful tool to prevent abuses of the revolving door. When considering the length of cooling-off periods, these time lengths should be fair, proportionate and reasonable considering the seriousness of the potential offence and be tailored to the risk, e.g., depending on the type of problem area and level of seniority. Similarly, many countries have decided to include compensation for former high-level officials whose decision-making powers covered a wide range of issues which would make finding a job difficult (OECD, 2020[1]).

In Jordan, the version of the CoC cited above contains a "cooling-off-period" provision in Article 9.H. It prohibits accepting job offers within one year after leaving public functions, in any institution with which the department in which they worked had "important official dealings". Exceptions to this rule can be granted by the Minister. The CoC does not provide sanctions for individuals and companies that do not comply with the "cooling-off-period".

To strengthen its legal provision, Jordan should amend the Civil Service Bylaw in line with the CoC and clarify what "important official dealings" would entail as well as the criteria under which exceptions to this provision could be granted by the respective Minister. It should further require that such exceptions should be documented, clearly justified and archived. Lastly, for the sake of clarity and legal certainty, Jordan could establish a communication channel with the private sector to advise on potential questions regarding former public employees and the scope of coverage of the law. Similarly, the Civil Service Bylaw could establish concrete sanctions (primarily fines) for non-compliance with the cooling-off periods for both individuals and private companies who disregard these provisions and hire a public official during a cooling-off period.

Finally, when amending the Civil Service Bylaw, Jordan could consider including a standalone article which states the purposes and procedures of asset declarations. This would allow a clearer separation between asset declarations, focusing on preventing and detecting illicit enrichment, and the prevention and management of conflict of interest. However, Jordan's asset declaration system has not been analysed in the scope of this OECD Integrity Review.

3.3.2. JIACC, together with the SPAC, should elaborate complementary guidance on the definition and on key concepts, which should include non-exhaustive examples, and on the expected procedures for managing conflict of interest

In addition to amending the legal framework to clearly lay out the definition of conflict of interest and the expected procedure to prevent and manage them, public officials typically will require additional, complementary guidance in non-legal documents, such as guidelines or manuals. Such complementary material should be drafted in simple and plain language.

First, considering that the concept of "conflict of interest" can be difficult to comprehend, such a complementary guideline could further clarify what a conflict of interest is. For example, the French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (*Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique*, HATVP) published a comprehensive guide on conflicts of interests for public officials (HATVP, 2021[14]). A further example is a [website](#) provided by the Canadian Treasury Board in Canada which provides information, material and a section on frequently asked questions about the different types of conflict of interest and how public servants can prevent, manage and resolve them. Furthermore, it could be an inspiration for Jordan on why and how to clearly define real, potential and apparent conflict of interest (Box 3.5).

> **Box 3.5. Guidance on real, potential and apparent conflict of interest in Canada**
>
> The Treasury Board in Canada provides concrete definitions and guidance on real, potential and apparent conflict of interest as part of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service. It is emphasised that "preserving the appearance of integrity in government is as important as actual integrity" and that public servants therefore are required to avoid apparent conflicts of interests as much as actual or potential ones.
>
> The guidance provides the following definitions:
>
> > *A "real" conflict of interest is where a public servant's private interests are sufficient to influence the exercise of his or her public duties. A "potential" conflict of interest is where such a situation could arise in the future. An "apparent" conflict of interest, however, is where it appears to members of the public that a public servant's private interests could improperly influence the performance of his or her duties. "Private interests" are not limited to financial interests.*
>
> As apparent conflicts of interests can be particularly difficult to understand and identify, further guidance is provided, emphasising for example:
>
> > *In determining apparent conflicts of interest, the appearance of a public servant's actions to the public is the key, not the public servant's integrity or good faith. Public servants can be found to be in apparent conflict of interest even if they are not aware that their actions create an apparent conflict of interest. Public servants - and their managers – are required to think beyond the scope of their own perceptions and motives, and to consider how the public may perceive their actions.*
> >
> > *An apparent conflict of interest is determined by the perception of "a reasonable person" (a hypothetical member of the public) who is "reasonably well-informed".*
> >
> > *Such a person is to have a "reasonable perception" that a conflict of interest exists, even if the conflict of interest is not a major one.*
> >
> > *The onus is on public servants to anticipate apparent conflicts of interest arising from their actions, and to take steps to comply with the rules.*
> >
> > *This onus on public servants is ongoing, as apparent conflicts of interest may arise at any time, if their personal affairs or official duties change. This onus extends to disclosing items about which there is doubt, and continues after filing a disclosure report.*
> >
> > *Whether a conflict of interest is apparent or potential or real, the consequences are the same. The conflict must be remedied. Efforts should therefore focus on determining appropriate methods of compliance, rather than making definitive classifications on the type of conflict of interest.*
>
> Source: https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/values-ethics/conflict-interest-post-employment/apparent-conflict-interest.html#d1

Second, the concept of a conflict of interest entails several related concepts that can be difficult to understand as well. In Jordan, for instance, the CoC outlines that civil servants shall refrain to use public authority for private or financial interests or refrain from directly or indirectly accepting or requesting any gift or other benefits, but it does not define what private interests, gifts or other benefits entail.

Therefore, to further strengthen its conflict-of-interest management practices, Jordan could consider clarifying through complementary guidance key terms such as "private interests" (Box 3.6), "gift", "benefit", "nepotism" and "favouritism". These clarifications could include descriptions of circumstances as well as *concrete examples*. In any case, the guidance should emphasise that it does not provide an exhaustive list of situations. This way, public officials are nudged towards reflecting on conflict of interest and not just

checking boxes. These examples could include benefits that could impact officials' impartiality such as invitations for lunch/dinner or to events.

Box 3.6. Defining "private interests"

As established by OECD standards, private interests include financial or pecuniary interests, interests which generate a direct personal benefit to the public official and/or their family, legitimate private-capacity activity, personal affiliations and associations, family interests and other interests that could reasonably be considered likely to influence improperly the official's performance of their duties (OECD, 2004[12]).

In this sense, private interests that could lead to a conflict of interest may include, for example, personal relationships, family and community relationships, business interests, external activities and positions, as well as gifts, benefits, favours and hospitality.

Source: Based on (OECD, 2004[12]).

Third, besides establishing the procedures for the reporting and managing in the legal framework by the Civil Service Bylaw as recommended above, JIACC could consider providing additional guidance on concretely *how* public officials are expected to manage situations of conflicts of interest. Such complementary guidance could also include laying out potential solutions for conflict-of-interest situations and would also provide concrete guidance for the superiors expected to guide their employees after receiving a declaration of conflict of interest, as mentioned above (Box 3.7).

Box 3.7. Potential solutions for conflicts-of-interest situations

When a public official has a potential or real conflict of interest, there are several measures that can be taken to manage the conflict and reduce the risk of biased decisions. These measures be categorised into "strategies that focus on the private interest" and "strategies that focus on the public official".

Strategies that focus on the private interest aim to eliminate or mitigate the influence a private interest can exert on a public official and include:

*   Divestiture: the public official relinquishes their external interest entirely – for example, by selling shares or stocks. Transferring the private interest to a family member does not equal divestiture.

*   Resignation: the public official resigns from their external employment position that is causing the conflict of interest

*   Waiver: the public official waives their involvement in particular activities of their external employment that could lead to a conflict of interest

*   Establishing a bind management trust to manage the financial interests (e.g., stocks, shares, other investments) of the public official while holding public office: the interests are transferred to a third party, who manages them independently. The official remains the beneficiary, but cannot interfere in the management of the assets, issue instructions, or know how the assets are being invested/used.

Strategies that focus on limiting the influence of the public official on the decision-making process include:

*   Recusal or restriction: where a particular conflict is not likely to recur frequently, it may be appropriate for the public official concerned to maintain their current position but not participate

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in decision making on the affected matters, for example by having an affected decision made by an independent third party, or by abstaining from voting on decisions. Care must be taken to protect the integrity of the decision-making process where recusal is adopted. Likewise, an option to restrict access by the affected public official to particular information, by prohibiting them from receiving relevant documents and other information relating to their private interest, could be adopted.

- Reassignment: The public official is reassigned to a different set of functions, tasks or portfolios.

- Resignation: in some cases, the conflict of interest may be so difficult to manage and the potential negative consequences may be so serious, that resignation or termination may be the only feasible strategy to uphold the public trust. In the event of resignation of the public official from their public office, the conflict-of-interest policy (together with the relevant employment law and/or employment contract provisions) should provide the possibility that the official can be terminated in accordance with a defined procedure in such circumstances.

Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2004[12]) and (World Bank, 2018[15]).

3.3.3. Line managers and Integrity Officials as recommended in Chapter 1 should be trained to provide ad hoc advice to public officials on identifying and managing conflict of interest, while an online platform could be implemented to provide initial directions to employees

The legal framework and written complementary guidance materials must be supported by ad hoc support to public officials. Conflicts of interest can arise at any moment and public officials need to know and feel safe to seek advice and guidance on how to manage such situations correctly. In turn, superiors need to know what and how to provide guidance to their employees in such situations.

Currently, the CoC requires public officials to inform their direct superiors of a conflict-of-interest situation. Ad hoc guidance to public officials should be provided, therefore, primarily by line managers. However, public officials may not always feel comfortable to reach out to them. Therefore, line managers should encourage an environment of confidence so that their teams can formulate questions and reveal situations that may place them in a potential conflict of interest. In addition, good practice shows that dedicated Integrity Officers within each public entity as recommended in Chapter 1 can play a key role to really provide public officials a place to go in their organisation in case of questions and doubts on how to behave. They can also support officials in filling the conflict-of-interest template form, raise awareness on conflicts of interest more generally, emphasising in particular the difference between corruption and a conflict of interest (a situation of risk that needs to be managed correctly) and provide guidance and support to the direct superiors in charge of "taking measures" (i.e., help the direct superiors in what measures to recommend concretely to their employees). In any case, the persons who provide ad hoc support should be specifically trained to be able to respond to questions and concerns (see section below on "advanced trainings").

Finally, technological tools can help relieve the burden of line managers and integrity officials alike and allow them to focus their in-person ad hoc support to the most complex situations. The SPAC, together with JIACC, could design and implement an online tool, in simple and plain language, which guides public officials through the process of correctly identifying conflict-of-interest situations and which can provide initial directions on how to manage these. The online simulator implemented by the Anti-corruption Office of Argentina could inspire such a platform in Jordan (Box 3.8).

Box 3.8. Argentina online simulator for conflict-of-interest situations

To provide specific guidance and orientation on conflict-of-interest situations, the Anti-corruption Office of Argentina (*Oficina Anticorrupción*, OA) implemented an online conflict-of-interest simulator. Through the selection of answers to certain questions, public officials receive an assessment of whether they are in a situation of current or potential conflict of interest and orientation about what to do. The simulator is available for future, current and past public officials. By asking the public official various questions throughout the simulation, the simulator determines if the official is in a conflict-of-interest situation based on the legal framework. If a potential conflict of interest is detected, the simulator informs the official of the violated norm of the Public Ethics Law and advises the public official to seek more specific guidance of the OA. The simulator is a useful tool to enable officials to clarify any doubts they might have over a situation.

Source: (OECD, 2019[13]).

3.4. Raising awareness on integrity and strengthening the capacities of public officials

Developing clear standards of integrity, including on preventing and managing conflict of interest, is not an end in itself. Legal provisions and policies remain words on paper if they are not adequately communicated and trained. Socialisation mechanisms are the processes by which public servants learn and adopt ethical norms, standards of conduct and public service values (OECD, 2018[3]). Indeed, effective implementation and behavioural change require raising awareness about integrity standards and values, building technical knowledge and skills. Raising awareness helps to recognise integrity issues when they arise, while building capacities via trainings and guidance material help to address integrity challenges properly. Both, in turn, contribute to cultivating commitment among public officials (OECD, 2020[1]).

Countries can use several tools and mechanisms to raise awareness and build capacities relevant for public integrity to public officials. To be effective, awareness-raising and capacity building activities should be clear, provide up-to-date information, be tailored to the specific needs and be designed and implemented by considering the following elements: content, timing, targeted audience and delivery methods. Capacity building activities can include induction, regular and special trainings and should include monitoring and evaluation on the quality and impact of the trainings (OECD, 2020[1]).

3.4.1. JIACC and SPAC, if required in co-operating with the PMIO, IPA and MOLA, should further invest in raising awareness and developing capacities for integrity, especially at the municipal level and for integrity officers as recommended in Chapter 1

Jordan has invested in raising awareness through broader campaigns and specific activities as well as in building capacities on integrity and anti-corruption on different levels and for different audiences. Several initiatives from JIACC target citizens, civil society organisation and businesses, which are discussed in Chapter 4 of this OECD Integrity Review. JIACC, as well as the Institute of Public Administration (IPA), have also designed and implemented awareness raising and training activities targeting public officials.

Amongst these initiatives directed to public officials carried out of the past years, JIACC and the IPA have been implementing, for example, the following activities and programmes:

- JIACC has created courses on integrity standards and corruption crimes and has developed and conducted specialised trainings on integrity and countering terrorism via its Innovation and Training Centre, amongst others. For example, JIACC offers a 20-hour training for general managers. Also, the trainings related to the National Integrity Indicators provided by JIACC are particularly key in promoting change, raising awareness and promoting knowledge on issues such as the code of ethics, role models and values and integrity standards.

- JIACC is delivering awareness raising lectures for public officials in senior, supervisory and leadership management positions, executive staff and new staff in different ministries and in the Greater Amman Municipality.

- JIACC has partnered with different institutions to design and implement capacity building activities. For instance, JIACC and the University of Jordan offer a master's programme on anti-corruption and integrity.

- The IPA developed a leadership programme, which is compulsory for (i) managers under the umbrella of the SPAC, (ii) public officials that will or might become managers, (iii) supervisors that are heads of division, (iv) supervisors, and v) public officials that will or might become supervisors. The leadership programme includes, for example, components on integrity and anti-corruption, merit-based hiring, performance-based evaluations and on developing soft skills for leaders.

- Together with JIACC, the IPA has also developed and implemented training programmes on "compliance with national integrity standards" and on "enhancing governance practices", as well as training modules for all public officials, which include anti-corruption and integrity issues. Some of these modules are mandatory and are based on a competency dictionary that had been developed by the Civil Service Bureau (CSB), the precursor of the SPAC, while others are voluntary and are based on actual needs of the respective institutions.

Regarding the trainings and awareness raising activities by JIACC and the IPA, these represent an important improvement and Jordan can build on these initiatives in several ways.

First, there is room for strengthening capacity building on integrity and anti-corruption among employees at the local and municipal levels. Given the challenges and known integrity and corruption risks at subnational levels (see Chapter 1), increasing efforts to raise awareness and build capacities of employees at municipal and governorate levels is key. To that end, JIACC could co-operate with the IPA, the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA) and selected municipalities to develop specific trainings on integrity and anti-corruption for local employees. Trainings could focus on high-risk areas, such as procurement or the delivery of public services with frequent and direct interactions with citizens and business, and on sensitive topics such as favouritism/wasta, conflicts of interest in the context of recruitments or integrity in election processes and other areas considered as relevant. As such, it is commendable that JIACC has analysed training needs in municipalities and integrated the local level into training plans for 2024, amongst others, on procurement. The National Integrity Indicators will also be able to inform the trainings and the topics to be covered. Additionally, the trainings can provide additional guidance on developing and implementing the codes of conduct at municipal level mentioned above.

Second, there are several methods available to support delivery of integrity trainings, including lectures, online courses, coaching and mentoring programmes (OECD, 2020[1]). Research has shown that while online courses and lectures allow reaching a larger audience, interactive components, where participants are confronted with realistic situations, are more likely to generate a personal mental commitment to integrity than mere presentations by trainers (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011[16]). Considering this, JIACC could partner with the IPA and the SPAC to develop complementary training activities on anti-corruption and integrity that use different delivery methods tailored to the target audience, the training's objectives and the available resources.

For instance, the following multilevel approach could be considered:

- **General level**: JIACC, the IPA and the SPAC could consider developing an online course on anti-corruption and integrity to help public officials familiarise themselves with relevant concepts, expected behaviours and rules derived from the regulatory framework for public integrity. Such a training method could be prioritised in the case of induction training to new employees and specific training derived from changes to the regulatory framework. A special online training on identifying and managing conflict of interest could be considered. For example, the Office of the Independent Commissioner against Corruption of the Northern Territory in Australia provides a [free conflict of interest training course](#) that is available online.

- **Intermediate level**: Building on already existing in person trainings, JIACC, the IPA and the SPAC could consider further developing lectures and courses on specific areas of the regulatory framework for public integrity, in particular also on corruption risk management, on dealing with ethical dilemmas or on identifying and managing conflict of interest, where participants are presented with concrete situations (Box 3.9). These trainings are ideally in person, go into more details and provide concrete examples that public officials can relate to.

- **Advanced level**: To further engage specific priority groups of public officials and help them strengthening their capacities to address and manage integrity challenges, JIACC, the IPA and the SPAC could design and implement in-depth practical trainings and encourage participants to discuss and connect with their peers. Specialised trainings modules could be developed, for example, to train public officials in at-risk positions (e.g., procurement or human resource management). Middle and higher management levels, particularly secretary generals and director generals, could be trained in integrity leadership skills (see section below on promoting integrity leadership).

Box 3.9. Practical training to guide public officials in handling ethical choices

To raise awareness and capacities on public integrity, the Agency for Government Personnel of the Flemish Region developed a series of guidelines for integrity actors to discuss ethical dilemmas. Ethical dilemma training provides participants with practical situations in which they face an ethical choice with no clear path to resolving the situation in a good, moral way. In such training, the facilitator encourages discussion between the participants about how to resolve the situation and helps them explore the different choices. The focus of the ethical dilemma training is the debate rather than possible solutions, as the objective is to help participants identify how different values might act in opposition to one other.

Examples of ethical dilemma situations include the following:

Situation 1: "I am a policy officer. The Minister needs a briefing within the next hour. I have been working on this matter for the last two weeks and should have already been finished. However, the information is not complete. I am still waiting for a contribution from another department to verify the data. My boss asks me to submit the briefing urgently as the Chief of Cabinet has already called. What should I do?

- I send the briefing and do not mention the missing information.
- I send the briefing but mention that no decisions should be made based on it.
- I do not send the briefing. If anyone asks about it, I will blame the other department.
- I do not send the information and come up with a pretext and promise to send the briefing tomorrow."

> **Situation 2**: "I am head of a department. My senior official asks me to carry out an interesting assignment that will help my department score well. We need that after the recent blunders of my department. The content of that assignment actually belongs to another department. What am I doing?
>
> After I have notified the other department of the assignment, my department will carry out the job.
>
> - I inform the other department that I have received the assignment and ask them for input.
> - I refuse the assignment because I don't think I can do it in front of the other department.
> - I carry out the assignment and do not inform the other department myself: after all, this is the task of my senior official."
>
> Source: (Flemish government, n.d.[17]).

Finally, although integrity is ultimately the responsibility of all organisational members and in particular the leaders, dedicated "integrity actors" play a key role in stimulating integrity and shaping ethical behaviour. Considering this, Chapter 1 of this Integrity Review recommended to create permanent and dedicated integrity officers in every public entity at national and at subnational level. Such integrity officers should have the mandate and be empowered to become a "safe haven" to provide guidance, advice and counsel to public officials within their institution. As such, these integrity officers could play a key role in promoting open organisational cultures of integrity. To do so, they require specific capabilities and skills.

Therefore, to ensure some level of coherence across public entities and levels of government and to prepare integrity officers for the situations that they may encounter while carrying out their activities, the SPAC, together with JIACC and IPA, should create a specific training programme for integrity officers in public institutions and municipalities. Trainings provided to integrity officials could include train-the-trainer activities to turn these actors into multipliers of information and should include the development of soft skills and capacities needed to create trust and to build a "safe haven" in their entity.

Jordan should continue implementing measures to monitor and evaluate the quality and impact of their training activities, to learn from the implementation, introduce relevant changes to the trainings and/or focus limited resources in those activities that prove to deliver the best results. For example, a multi-level model for measuring their training activities could be adopted (Box 3.10).

> **Box 3.10. The Kirkpatrick "Four Levels Model" for measuring trainings**
>
> One of the commonly acknowledged models for assessing training is the Kirkpatrick "Four Levels Model" outlined as follows:
>
> - Level 1: Reaction, the immediate impressions of the participants and trainers, what they thought and felt about the training.
> - Level 2: Learning, the development of knowledge, skills and attitudes resulting from the training.
> - Level 3: Behaviour, the extent of behaviour and capability improvement, and demonstrated application of the new learning within the work setting.
> - Level 4: Results, the impact on work results; the return on the training investment.
>
> While most assessments focus on level 1, pre- and post-trainings assessments in the form of "multi-rater assessments", for instance, 360-degree assessments along a control group (McGivern and Bernthal, 2002[18]), could help to measure behaviour change. This would allow gathering useful data on whether the training really serves the purposes of the organisation and whether costs are justified (OECD, 2020[1]).
>
> To measure level 4, public organisations require a baseline established prior to the beginning of the trainings against which potential changes are measured. Potential indicators in this respect could be (OECD, 2020[1]):
>
> - Number of cases where public officials sought integrity advice and the outcome of such cases.
> - Number of disclosures of potential conflicts of interests to relevant authorities including mitigation measures taken and implemented.
> - Perceptions about the level of integrity and openness of the organisation.
> - Number of reports from citizens and businesses outlining public officials not behaving integer in providing public services.
> - Level of satisfaction of citizens and businesses about the quality of public services.
>
> Source: (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 1994[19]) (OECD, 2020[1])

3.4.2. JIACC could design and rigorously test different messages to be used in awareness raising campaigns before implementing them at scale

Making sufficient and relevant information available for public officials is key to raising awareness about integrity standards and triggering behavioural change. Public entities may use different means for raising awareness about integrity standards, including posters, computer screen savers, employee boards, banners, bookmarks, among others, as well as different messages depending on the targeting audience (OECD, 2020[1]). As mentioned before, awareness must be raised not only in the public sector, but also amongst citizens, civil society organisations and businesses, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Interviews and focus groups conducted in Jordan by the OECD with public officials highlighted that, as in many countries, corruption prevention is often more associated with concepts of control and enforcement rather than promoting integrity. Also, these same interviews and focus groups noted that there is often resistance from institutions and public officials to change. As such, communication activities aimed at raising awareness, both in form of broader campaigns targeting the public sector or more specific activities targeting specific groups or entities, could be key to achieve organisational cultures of integrity throughout

the public sector as they can ensure a general understanding of integrity standards and encourage specific behaviours.

However, when designing such communication activities, countries should be aware of sometimes unintended consequences. For instance, reminding people about the scope and costs of corruption could simply reinforce that corruption is the norm and thus facilitate the justification of own unethical behaviour ("everybody is doing it"). Corruption can then become a self-fulfilling prophecy and such messages can reinforce existing perceptions (Corbacho et al., 2016[20]; Peiffer, 2018[21]; Cheeseman and Peiffer, 2021[22]). Therefore, JIACC could build on recent available research and consider designing and implementing awareness-raising campaigns or activities that explicitly focus on making visible and salient desired behaviours, thereby contributing to reinforcing such behaviours as the social norm.

In that sense, it is commendable that JIACC already started to shift the narrative in its communications away from corruption and towards integrity. Additional efforts could, for example, link to the recommendation above to review and streamline the values and principles in the Civil Service Bylaw, the civil service human resources strategy 2023-2027 and the COC and develop messages focusing on behaviours related to these values and principles, making them visible and tangible to promote public officials understanding and making them see that these values and principles are applied in day-to-day practice and are not just wishful thinking.

To counteract unethical behaviour, so-called "moral reminders" have proven to be effective tools (OECD, 2018[3]). Moral reminders are specific, short messages that help remind public officials about the moral norms that they are expected to follow in the moment of decision making or when confronted to ethical choices (OECD, 2018[3]; Bursztyn et al., 2016[23]). Indeed, inconspicuous messages such as "Thank you for your honesty" can have striking impact on compliance with integrity standards (Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013[24]). Similarly, short messages reminding public officials of specific tasks can be helpful in promoting the desired behaviour. JIACC could therefore assess, together with other relevant entities such as procurement authorities or human resource management, processes and procedures to identify opportunities for inserting timely reminders that could "nudge" public officials into taking desired behaviours or reminding them to consider ethical implications of the task that they are about to carry out. For example, officials should be timely reminded of filling out a conflict-of-interest declaration before starting a tender procedure (in a procurement unit) or a hiring process (in a human resource management unit).

To fine tune such messages or moral reminders and to ensure that they unfold the desired impact and do not backfire, JIACC should consider testing the impact of such interventions in a pilot before implementing them at scale. Lessons from the pilot could then lead to improvements and help fine-tuning the messages. Jordan could follow, for example, the OECD BASIC methodology for applying behavioural insights systematically (BASIC stands for Behaviour, Analysis, Strategy, Intervention, Change) (OECD, 2019[25]; OECD, 2018[3]). The example from Mexico described in Box 3.11 can serve as an inspiration for such kind of interventions. As the new CoC 2024 requires departments to "open a special register for gifts (…), in which the gifts (…) shall be recorded", this experience from Mexico could be relevant to inspire ways to "nudge" public officials to actually declare the gifts they have received.

Box 3.11. Piloting messages to increase the declaration of received gifts in Mexico

In **Mexico**, the Ministry of Public Administration in co-operation with the research centre CIDE sent out reminder e-mails to public employees required to register their received gifts. They randomly varied the text of the message to see which message had the strongest impact.

Five different types of reminder messages were sent:

- Legal: It is your legal obligation to register received gifts.
- Honesty: We recognise your honesty as a public official. You are required to register gifts. Show your honesty.
- Impartiality: Receiving gifts can compromise your impartiality. When you receive a gift, register it.
- Social: More than 1,000 registrations per year are made by your colleagues. Do the same!
- Sanction: If you receive a gift and you do not inform us, someone else might. Don't get yourself punished. Register your gifts.

The Ministry of Public Administration and CIDE then observed the number of gifts registered around the Christmas period (peak season for gifts) and compared this with previous years and against a control group who did not receive any of the messages.

The study demonstrated that receiving a reminder email increased the number of gifts registered. However, some messages were more effective than others: reminding public officials of their legal obligations and appealing to their impartiality and honesty encouraged more people to register gifts than referring to sanctions or registrations made by colleagues.

Source: (OECD, 2018[3])

3.4.3. The SPAC could partner with JIACC and the IPA to further invest in integrity leadership via specialised trainings for managers and senior civil servants and by including an integrity dimension into their performance assessments

An open organisational culture requires empowerment and courage of public official to raise ideas or concerns while knowing they will not be punished for their initiative. Again, trusted integrity officers, as recommended in Chapter 1, can help to provide such an environment where employees feel safe.

Leaders also play a key role, however. The behaviours of both top and middle level managers are instrumental in promoting open organisational cultures and mitigating integrity risks. Leaders, especially middle managers because of their day-to-day proximity to most public servants, can enable ethical behaviour by all employees and, in particular, by their direct teams (OECD, 2023[26]). First, by setting the right example from the top, leaders ensure credibility and trust in integrity standards. Public employees see that values and principles are not only aspirations but are lived in practice. Second, by communicating about values and standards and engaging employees in discussions on integrity norms, leaders raise awareness and promote engagement. Third, by advising employees on integrity concerns and listening and acting upon employees' suggestions and reports of misbehaviour without punishing them, senior officials promote empowerment and courage (OECD, 2023[26]).

In Jordan, as mentioned above, both JIACC and the IPA have designed and implemented specific awareness raising and capacity building activities (voluntary and mandatory) for senior public officials and managers. Moreover, there are mandatory integrity modules that public officials must pass for career

advancements. However, Jordan could further invest in strengthening integrity leadership behaviour to effectively promote a culture of openness and integrity in the public sector. This is particularly important as discussions with key stakeholders highlighted, as already mentioned, the existence of a strong culture of control within the public administration, low levels of trust amongst public officials, the existence of cases of wasta (close personal connections between employees and managers) in public institutions, and resistance to change both from organisations and individuals.

Given the mandate for developing institutional cultures and human resource policies, the SPAC could partner with JIACC and the IPA to develop advanced-level training for senior public officials and managers aimed at further developing capacities and skills that are needed to promote integrity and openness in their organisations. Such trainings should target not only high-level managers, but also middle-levels managers as they experience larger day-to-day proximity to most public servants and can enable ethical behaviour by their direct teams. These trainings could be developed under a gender-responsive approach that considers specific learning needs, dynamics, roles and expectations of female and male participants, and ensures both men and women are equally encouraged to participate.

Moreover, these trainings could consider several relevant dimensions to foster open organisational cultures and focus on developing key leadership skills leading to enhanced ethics in the public service (Box 3.12). For instance, trainings for Jordanian managers could consider the following dimensions aimed at supporting managers in becoming models of integrity and active promoters of an open environment for their employees:

- Training on relevant integrity standards and the new principles and values of the public sector, learn how to use these principles and values in their daily activities and how to foster their use by their employees.
- Training on how to manage ethical dilemmas and conflict of interest themselves as well as how to raise awareness within their teams through ethical dilemma case studies and discussions.
- Training on how to build and maintain a "safe space" within their direct teams to discuss integrity openly and sincerely in professional spheres.

Box 3.12. Key leadership skills leading to enhanced ethics in the public service

Five leadership skills can enhance individual and organisational integrity standards:

- Technical: Responsiveness, Rule of law, Accountability, Transparency
- Conceptual: Ethical Decision Making, Reliability, Resolve Ethical Dilemmas
- Interpersonal: Diffuse and Establish Ethical Values
- Emotional intelligence: Impartiality, Protection of Public Interest, Integrity
- Social intelligence: Compassion, Fairness

Source: (Haq, 2011[27])

Finally, the SPAC could include integrity more explicitly into the performance management system for public managers. Indeed, to ensure that performance systems promote and reward integrity leadership, these should not only focus on *what* leaders achieve, but also on *how* they achieve it (OECD, 2020[1]). By integrating values-based assessments into performance evaluations, organisations can reinforce a culture of integrity and ensure that ethical behaviour is prioritised and rewarded at all levels. As a guide for such performance assessments, the SPAC could for example seek inspiration in the Canadian Key Leadership Competencies (KLCs), which define the behaviours expected of leaders in the Public Service (Government of Canada, 2016[28]), or the competency framework of the New South Wales Government in Australia, which identifies five levels of integrity and the behaviours associated with each (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2. Act with integrity: A framework for assessment in New South Wales, Australia

Foundational	Intermediate	Adept	Advanced	Highly Advanced
• Behave in an honest, ethical and professional way • Take opportunities to clarify understanding of ethical behaviour requirements • Identify and follow legislation, rules, policies, guidelines and codes of conduct that apply to your role • Speak out against misconduct and illegal and inappropriate behaviour • Report apparent conflicts of interest	• Represent the organisation in an honest, ethical and professional way • Support a culture of integrity and professionalism • Understand and follow legislation, rules, policies, guidelines and codes of conduct • Recognise and report misconduct and illegal or inappropriate behaviour • Report and manage apparent conflicts of interest	• Represent the organisation in an honest, ethical and professional way and encourage others to do so • Demonstrate professionalism to support a culture of integrity within the team/unit • Set an example for others to follow and identify and explain ethical issues • Ensure that others understand the legislation and policy framework within which they operate • Act to prevent and report misconduct and illegal and inappropriate behaviour	• Model the highest standards of ethical behaviour and reinforce them in others • Represent the organisation in an honest, ethical and professional way and set an example for others to follow • Ensure that others have a working understanding of the legislation and policy framework within which they operate • Promote a culture of integrity and professionalism within the organisation and in dealings external to government • Monitor ethical practices, standards and systems and reinforce their use • Act on reported breaches of rules, policies and guidelines	• Champion and act as an advocate for the highest standards of ethical and professional behaviour • Drive a culture of integrity and professionalism across the organisation, and in dealings cross-government, cross-jurisdiction and outside of government • Define, communicate and evaluate ethical practices, standards and systems and reinforce their use • Create and promote a climate in which staff feel able to report apparent breaches of rules, policies and guidelines and act promptly and visibly in response to such reports

Source: (OECD, 2020[1]) , from New South Wales Government Public Service Commission, *The NSW Public Sector Capability Framework,* www.psc.nsw.gov.au/workforce-management/capability-framework/access-the-capability-framework/the-capability-framework, (accessed 22 February 2020).

3.5. Integrating and mainstreaming integrity in human resources management

A civil service selected and managed based on merit presents many benefits. First, a merit-based system reduces opportunities for clientelism, patronage and nepotism, which can be forms of corruption when they result in the use of public funds to enrich people based on their family ties, political affiliations or social status. Second, hiring people with the right skills for the job generally improves performance and productivity, which translates into better policies and services for citizens. Third, a merit-based system contributes to creating the necessary foundations to develop a culture of integrity in the public sector by providing the right type of incentives and accountabilities that underpin professionalism and public sector values (OECD, 2020[1]).

Integrity measures in merit-based systems should cover the selection, appointment and recruitment, but also be integrated throughout the whole career of public servants, including performance management, trainings and development opportunities, pay systems, discipline and dismissal. In general, the following principles should be applied to all processes: transparency (e.g., open and documented processes), objectivity (e.g., clear criteria and standardised processes), and consensus (e.g., involving multiple people in HR decision making) (OECD, 2020[1]).

To ensure consistent and fair application of the existing human resources policies, institutions and processes need to be in place. International good practices suggest that three interrelated mechanisms (institutions and processes) are key: assigning authority for the oversight and protection of the merit-based system to an independent body with investigative powers and authority to intervene in human resources

processes when breaches are deemed to have happened or to be imminent; having recourse mechanisms available to candidates who feel they have been treated unfairly; and ensuring that all managers have a clear and consistent understanding of the system and their discretion within it (OECD, 2020[1]).

3.5.1. Jordan has strengthened the institutions and processes needed to ensure consistent and fair application of the existing human resources policies

In Jordan, the public sector is the largest employer and amounts to around 40% of total employment as registered for social security purposes (PEFA, 2022[29]). As such, promoting integrity in public employment is even more important. Article 22 of the Jordanian Constitution grants every Jordanian the right to be appointed to public office under the conditions as prescribed by law or regulations. It also states that appointments to any government office or to establishment attached to the government or municipal offices, whether permanent or temporary, shall be made based on merit and qualifications.

Over the past years, Jordan has made progress in modernising human resource management in the public sector. Jordan's public employment system is governed by several laws and regulations, including the Civil Service Bylaw and the Social Security Law 1 of 2014, amongst others. Reforms are ongoing. As mentioned above, since 2024, the main responsible institution for developing human resource policies and standards and overseeing their implementation is now the SPAC. The SPAC is reporting to the Prime Minister's Office and is an important step towards ensuring consistent and fair application of human resource policies and towards promoting merit-based recruitment. The reform reflects the transformation of the civil service system from a centralised model to a more decentralised one, as government entities have the responsibility to implement the human resource policies and procedures.

To effectively manage human resources and ensure that laws and policies are adequately implemented, SPAC became responsible for monitoring the departments' commitment and compliance to implementing legislation, policies, standards, indicators and targets related to human resources management in all ministries. There are also several tools available to ensure that selection and recruitment processes are equal, objective and transparent. SPAC's Assessment Centre is responsible for providing an integrated assessment centre to conduct tests for government entities if they wish to conduct them at the commission. Transparency is promoted, for example, by granting access to the electronic database where all candidates can see their rankings. JIACC is currently in the process of preparing job competencies for its positions, such as the investigators and researchers, which will include a commitment to national integrity standards.

Moreover, the recent reform in Jordan also considers recourse mechanisms available for candidates that feel unfairly treated. Article 14.c of the Public Sector Human Resources Management Bylaw from 2024 states that the if a candidate feels that its rights have been affected, the candidate can submit a complaint to the hiring entity. There, the organisational unit concerned with human resources and institutional performance development shall consider the submitted complaint and respond to them within one week after reception. By the time this report was finalised, SPAC has worked on instructions that will detail all the articles of the reform and plans to carry out control activities. It is key that these instructions are being endorsed by the prime ministry as soon as possible. Additionally, the Audit Bureau and JIACC have put in place complaints mechanisms for violations of integrity standards and allegedly cases of corruption, which can include, for example cases of nepotism and favouritism.

At the local level, the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA) follows the Civil Service Bylaw and SPAC and MOLA are jointly responsible for supervising recruitment processes. Finally, according to the Civil Service Bylaw, the Prime Minister's Office is responsible for hiring directly senior public officials such as Secretary Generals or Directors. Exceptionally, the Prime Minister's Office can also hire directly through employment contracts or service outsourcing contracts. These appointments are outside the civil service system and are not undergoing the SPAC process.

3.5.2. To mitigate risks of favouritism in recruitments, SPAC should continue ongoing efforts in clarifying job categories and selection criteria, introducing more transparency as well as ensuring timely and broad advertising and communicating openings

The current reform of the SPAC offers an opportunity to continue strengthening the independence of the authority responsible for overseeing and protecting the merit-based system and ensuring its powers to oversee, investigate and intervene in human resources processes when breaches are deemed to have happened or to be imminent. While improvements have been achieved with respect to access to public services, for which wasta rates are lower than in Lebanon and Palestinian Authority (Figure 3.1), interviews conducted by the OECD confirm that interference in recruitment and selection processes remains an issue, and wasta and nepotism are still considered a widespread in Jordan's recruitment processes, as highlighted in several reports (Rasheed, 2016[30]; Jackson, Tobin and Egger, 2019[31]; Baranik, Gorman and Wright, 2023[32]; Queen Rania Center for Jordanian Studies Community Service, 2020[33]). In fact, key stakeholders emphasised during interviews conducted by the OECD that these issues are amongst the most important integrity challenges. Concrete actions addressing this with visible results would therefore be important to restore trust of citizens. Indeed, a survey shows that 81% of respondents in Jordan perceive wasta as an unacceptable practice (Queen Rania Center for Jordanian Studies Community Service, 2020[33]).

Figure 3.1. Total Wasta Rate in Jordan, Lebanon and Palestinian Authority, 2019

Note: The original question: In the past 12 months have you had contact with any of the following services? How often, if ever, did you have to use wasta in order to get the assistance or services you needed?
Note: Average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon and Palestinian Authority.
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Transparency International

Despite the advances in the recruitment systems, there seem to be loopholes that allows for nepotism and favouritism to happen. A lack of effective implementation of existing laws and regulations seems to be the main reason for this. Indeed, a report from Rasheed (Rasheed, 2016[30]), the national chapter of Transparency International, emphasises that while vacancies, administrative and technical needs are determined in accordance to staffing procedures by the end of each year, in practice, selection criteria or methods were often not disclosed and appointments were de facto often made outside of existing procedures. Furthermore, the report states that often exceptions were made for not openly publishing job offers to bypass formal structures without having clear criteria for such exceptions. Even for lower ranking

public servant positions, exceptional recruitment processes and special employment contracts were rather frequently used and allow for circumventing existing processes and criteria (Rasheed, 2016[30]). While this report is relatively old, interviews conducted by the OECD with key stakeholders for this Integrity Review emphasised that the findings, overall, still hold: While rules and procedures exist, a lack of effective implementation continues to allow for favouritism in recruitments. The problem is particularly acute at the local level, where such practices reportedly lead to overstaffing, people being hired for positions that are not needed or people being hired without having the required skills to perform the functions of the position.

To contribute to overcoming these challenges, the SPAC should continue working towards ensuring that all positions at lower, middle, and higher levels of government are clearly identified and the role to be performed is described. Such information should be publicly available. This ensures that positions are created based on functional needs (OECD, 2020[1]). Moreover, it is advisable to publish the full organisational charts of all public entities for public scrutiny. Jordan could do so, for instance, by requiring that all public entities to publish the organisational chart on their websites. Furthermore, Jordan could consider implementing job-profiling, which helps not only to describe the tasks of positions, but also to focus on the outcomes of the job and the skills and competencies needed to achieve them (Box 3.13). SPAC could focus efforts on timely and broadly advertising and communicating job openings. Vacancies should be public and define the profile and the selection procedures. Clear and transparent criteria need to be defined for allowing exceptional, alternative hiring processes. Monitoring of these practices could fall under the responsibility of JIACC liaison officers, while the internal audit units and the Audit Bureau could continue auditing the compliance with HR regulations and procedures. Finally, JIACC and MOLA could be entitled to revise and evaluate the HR system at the municipal level from an integrity perspective.

Box 3.13. Job profiling

Job profiling is a way of combining a statement about what is expected from a job with a view of what the job holder must bring in terms of the skills, experience, behaviours and other attributes needed to do the job well. It is an approach that helps organisations think about the outputs and results they want as well as what they are looking for in terms of the person who will perform the corresponding duties.

Job profiles differ from traditional job descriptions in two important respects:

- They focus on the outputs or results expected from the job rather than, as in the case of traditional job descriptions, the tasks or functions to be carried out.
- They include a statement about the skills and personal attributes needed for the job.

Job profiles help to determine the criteria for both selection and performance in a post. Job profiles are best when based on objective job analysis methods, which ideally include expert input and engagement with people who do those jobs. Job profiles usually include some combination of the following:

- Job title
- Purpose of the post (oriented towards objectives and goals of the organisation)
- Scope of the post (some sense of the range of responsibility, relationships internal and external to the organisation)
- Principal duties and responsibilities (what this post will be accountable for achieving)
- Skills and knowledge (can include behavioural and cognitive competencies, often oriented toward a competency framework)
- Experience
- Personal attributes (e.g., personal values, including integrity).

Source: (OECD, 2011[34]).

3.5.3. The SPAC and JIACC could jointly increase efforts in raising awareness on disciplinary violations and sanctions and consider operating a common website to display key statistics on the disciplinary system

People orient their actions in accordance with their perception of acceptable behaviour within their social context (Bicchieri, 2005[35]; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009[36]). The key to organisational cultures of integrity is therefore to continuously strengthen and renew efforts to establish integrity as a social norm and to integrate integrity into professional identities as discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. However, if a public employee behaves unethically without facing consequences, this behaviour can spread among or colleagues. Gradual divergences from an ethical norm tend to be more accepted by others, creating a slippery slope towards generalised dishonesty (Gino and Bazerman, 2009[37]; Robert and Arnab, 2013[38]).

While good behaviour needs to be made visible to become the reference behaviour, it is equally important to sanction undesired behaviour timely, fairly and visibly. The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity emphasises that this requires a mix of disciplinary/administrative (e.g., warnings, dismissal), civil (e.g., compensation, appeal) and criminal (convictions) proceedings and sanctions (OECD, 2020[1]). While criminal enforcement is typically at the centre of debates around corruption (see Chapter 6), disciplinary enforcement plays an important, albeit sometimes underappreciated, role in public integrity systems. It can increase the credibility of the standards, ensure trust in the system and contribute to the creation of open organisational cultures in which integrity is a lived and practiced value.

In Jordan, the most important disciplinary regulations are codified in the Civil Service Bylaw, in the Public Sector Human Resources Management Bylaw, the CoC as well as in specialised codes of conduct for certain areas and institutions. In principle, there are two categories of violations: First, major violations, where it is not clear whether the breach might qualify as well as a criminal offence. These cases are referred to JIACC or directly to the public prosecution services (see Chapter 6). Second, for other violations, an internal investigation must be conducted by the concerned public entity. Within ministries, investigation committees can be formed consisting of representatives of different units as well as a representative from the Audit Bureau and/or JIACC liaison officer. Disciplinary sanctions can start with a warning and can include dismissal. Decisions can be appealed in front of the Administrative Court. The decision goes to the respective minister, who will sign and commission the execution of the decision. After the decision is issued, it can be stopped through a judicial appeal or by filing a grievance and issuing a decision in favour of the appellant or the complainant. However, this procedure will potentially be reviewed in the context of the ongoing reform of the civil service.

While a detailed analysis of the disciplinary process is out of the scope of this Integrity Review, interviews carried out by the OECD in Jordan indicate, however, that there is a perceived lack of enforcement of disciplinary matters. The ongoing reforms therefore are an opportunity to continue strengthening disciplinary enforcement. Also, considering that there is no statistical data publicly available, this perception is difficult to debunk, and efforts could be made to publish data on the disciplinary system. While there are different approaches in countries with respect to the statutory (and thus legally binding) character of codes of conduct, Jordan has chosen to adopt a legally binding document (Art. 11 of the CoC). Therefore, on the one hand, the SPAC, together with JIACC and the IPA, could increase their efforts in raising awareness and building capacities on this legally binding character of the CoC and the disciplinary consequences derived from violations this may entail. On the other hand, to ascertain and communicate that violations of integrity standards are not tolerated, statistical data on disciplinary enforcement should be rigorously collected and published. While individual cases of course should remain confidential, statistics play a key role in demonstrating the overall effectiveness and thus credibility of the system. A common portal operated by SPAC and JIACC could be considered to increase transparency and accountability of the disciplinary system. Korea, for example, has developed the Corrupt Public Official Disciplinary Index (Anti-Corruption

and Civil Rights Commission, 2016[39]). Other good practices in terms of availability and visibility of data on disciplinary processes and sanctions can be found, for example, in Brazil and Colombia (Box 3.14).

Box 3.14. Public data on disciplinary processes and sanctions in Brazil and Colombia

The federal executive branch's disciplinary system in Brazil

In Brazil, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (*Controladoria-Geral da União*, CGU) is responsible for overseeing the federal executive branch's disciplinary system (*Sistemas Correcionais*, SisCor). Through a dedicated website (https://centralpaineis.cgu.gov.br/visualizar/corregedorias), users can access data on disciplinary sanctions imposed on public officials from the Federal Executive Power. The information is reported and updated monthly, and it can be filtered according to different criteria (e.g., by year, month, entity, state or underlying conduct). Tables and graphs are generated to highlight trends and enable comparisons.

The Information System Register for Sanctions and Inability Causes in Colombia

In Colombia, the Transparency and Anti-corruption Observatory publishes statistics on criminal, disciplinary and fiscal sanctions related to corruption (http://anticorrupcion.gov.co/medir/indicador-de-sanciones-disciplinarias). Data on disciplinary sanctions, data are taken from the Information System Register for Sanctions and Inability Causes (*Sistema de Información de Registro de Sanciones y Causas de Inhabilidad*, or SIRI) which keeps record of the decisions executed and notified to Inspector General (Procuraduría General de la Nación) by the competent authorities. In turn, the Transparency and Anti-corruption Observatory elaborates this information not only providing a map and details of sanctions but also analysing the data and providing graphs breaking the data according to several criteria such as entity, breach, department, sanction, typology of official on its website:

Source: Updated based on (OECD, 2019[13]).

Chapter 3: Proposals for Action

Provide simple and clear guidance on overarching principles and values

- Fine-tune the National Integrity Indicators (NII) to provide a coherent measuring of the National Integrity Standards (NIS) through the level of institutional preparedness (through a Compliance Matrix) and the level of institutional implementation (through an Integrity Survey). In addition, JIACC and PMIO should co-ordinate to ensure that the Institutional Culture Framework (IFC) considers and is aligned to the NIS and the revised NII.

- Ensure effective communication and dissemination of the Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics, including clarity about the current version, to ensure comprehensive awareness and compliance across all levels of public service.

- To achieve one single set of well-defined principles and values for Jordanian public officials, the SPAC and JIACC could lead a participatory process to review and streamline the current principles and values in the Civil Service Bylaw, the Code of Conduct and Ethics and the civil service human resources strategy 2023-2027.

- To support ongoing and future efforts in raising awareness and capacity building by JIACC and the IPA, Jordan could provide a short definition of each principle and value as well as further guidance on how to translate each of these into concrete expected behaviours (e.g., through specific codes for areas or organisations or in a complementary guideline or manual).

- JIACC, together with the SPAC and relevant entities, could continue developing specific codes for at-risk categories of public officials (e.g., procurement officials and municipal employees) and encouraging the development of organisational codes of conduct through a clear methodology and ad-hoc support.

Strengthen the prevention and management of conflict of interest

- Jordan could consider amending the Civil Service Bylaw to provide a clear definition of real, potential and apparent conflict of interest, to include the procedure public officials must follow and to strengthen the cooling-off provision.

- JIACC, together with the SPAC, should elaborate complementary guidance (i) on the definition and on key concepts, which should include non-exhaustive examples, and (ii) on the expected procedures for managing conflict of interest.

- Line managers and Integrity Officials as recommended in Chapter 1 should be trained to provide ad hoc advice to public officials on identifying and managing conflict of interest, while an online platform could be implemented to provide initial directions to employees.

Raise awareness on integrity and strengthen the capacities of public officials

- JIACC could co-operate with IPA, SPAC and MOLA to further invest in raising awareness and developing capacities for integrity, including and especially at the municipal level.

- JIACC could expand its partnership with the IPA and the SPAC to develop complementary training activities on anti-corruption and integrity that use different delivery methods tailored to the target audience, the training's objectives and the available resources, differentiating between a general level (online, for all public employees), an intermediate level (in person, on specific dimensions of integrity policies) and an advanced level (in person, for leaders, officials working on integrity and anti-corruption and at-risk positions).

- The SPAC, together with JIACC and IPA, should create a specific training programme for integrity officers in public institutions and municipalities, which should include train-the-trainer

activities to turn these actors into multipliers of information and the development of soft skills and capacities needed to create trust and to build a "safe haven" in their entity.

- Jordan should continue implementing measures to monitor and evaluate the quality and impact of their training activities, to learn from the implementation, introduce relevant changes to the trainings and/or focus limited resources in those activities that prove to deliver the best results.

- JIACC could design and rigorously test different messages to be used in awareness raising campaigns or for nudging public officials towards integrity before implementing them at scale.

- The SPAC could partner with JIACC and IPA to develop advanced-level training for senior public officials aimed at further developing capacities and skills that are needed to support them in becoming models of integrity and active promoters of an open environment for their employees. Such trainings should target not only high-level managers, but also middle-levels managers as they experience larger day-to-day proximity to most public servants and can enable ethical behaviour by their direct teams.

- The SPAC could include more explicitly an integrity dimension into the performance management system for public managers to ensure that performance systems promote and reward integrity leadership.

Integrate and mainstream integrity in human resources management

- To ensure that positions are created based on functional needs, SPAC should continue working towards ensuring that all positions at lower, middle, and higher levels of government are clearly identified and the role to be performed described.

- Public entities could be required to publish their organisational charts for public scrutiny on their websites.

- Jordan could consider implementing job-profiling, which helps not only to describe the tasks of positions, but also to focus on the outcomes of the job and the skills and competencies needed to achieve them.

- JIACC and MOLA could be entitled to revise and evaluate the HR system at the municipal level from an integrity perspective.

- SPAC could focus efforts on timely and broadly advertising and communicating job openings. Vacancies should be public and define the profile and the selection procedures. Clear and transparent criteria need to be defined for allowing exceptional, alternative hiring processes.

- Monitoring of HR practices could fall under the responsibility of JIACC liaison officers, while the internal audit units and the Audit Bureau could continue auditing the compliance with HR regulations and procedures.

- The SPAC, together with JIACC and the IPA, could increase their efforts in raising awareness and building capacities on this legally binding character of the CoC and the disciplinary consequences derived from violations this may entail.

- The ongoing reforms of related to human resource management are an opportunity to continue strengthening disciplinary enforcement. To ascertain and communicate that violations of integrity standards are not tolerated, data on disciplinary enforcement should be rigorously collected and published. A common portal operated by SPAC and JIACC could be considered to increase transparency and accountability of the disciplinary system.

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4 Promoting a culture of integrity across society in Jordan

This chapter focuses on strengthening a whole-of-society approach to public integrity in Jordan. This approach recognises that upholding and promoting public integrity in Jordan also depends on citizens, civil society, businesses and development partners to recognise their shared responsibility and take actions. The chapter recommends ways to foster trust in the relationship between Jordanian public institutions and citizens and to reach out and set incentives for non-state actors to contribute to the shared goal of achieving a culture of public integrity in the country.

4.1. Introduction: Whole-of-society

Public integrity is not just a matter for the public sector alone: individuals, civil society organisations and businesses have a shared responsibility as they can harm or promote public integrity through their actions (OECD, 2020[1]). Recognising this, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity places particular emphasis on the importance of promoting a culture of public integrity throughout society, working with the private sector, civil society and individuals, in particular by (OECD, 2017[2]):

- Recognising the role of the private sector, civil society and individuals in the public integrity system through respect for public integrity values in their interactions with the public sector, and in particular by encouraging the private sector, civil society and individuals to uphold these values as a shared responsibility.

- Involving all stakeholders in the development, regular updating and implementation of the public integrity system (see Chapter 2).

- Raising public awareness of the benefits of public integrity and reducing tolerance for breaches of integrity standards in the public sector, and developing, where appropriate, campaigns promoting civic education on public integrity among individuals and, in particular, in schools.

- Engaging the private sector and civil society in the complementary benefits derived from upholding integrity in both commercial and non-profit activities, benefiting from lessons learned from the implementation of good practices.

The active role and part-taking of the whole-of-society in upholding public integrity depends on the framework that allows them to exercise that power and to do so responsibly. Jordan's Constitution grants rights and duties to all Jordanians, including freedom of association, opinion and expression within the limits set by the law. Moreover, His Majesty King Abdullah II has expressed the relevance of all citizens in promoting integrity. As quoted in the Jordan Economic Modernisation Vision's document, His Majesty King Abdullah II, in a letter of January 30, 2022, when highlighting the aspirations for Jordan's future, assured that (Government of Jordan, 2022[3]):

> *"…citizens are key partners in expediting positive change and benefiting from it. We must all stand in unity against those who seek to maintain the status quo to protect their personal interests, or out of fear of stepping out of their comfort zones and putting in the needed efforts and sacrifices for the benefit of all".*

Indeed, Jordan has been making persistent efforts to reform. These efforts driven by internal, regional and international events span from the 1980's and the 1990's into the 2000's, and around 2011 after the demands that arose through the Arab Spring. The current modernisation efforts, as described in Chapter 2 and the (OECD[4]) Public Governance Review of Jordan, initiated around 2020 and focus on three pillars: economic reform, political reform and public sector modernisation. An important and cross-cutting characteristic of these efforts is the emphasis that Jordan has made in stakeholder involvement and consultation, seeking diversity in input across the Jordanian social and economic spectrum. When it comes to integrity, Jordan has started strengthening stakeholders' involvement and engagement in designing elements of its national integrity system, for instance, by conducting debates and consultative sessions for developing the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2020-2025 (see Chapter 2).

The recommendations included in this chapter acknowledge and build on these on-going efforts. First, the chapter provides recommendations aimed at fostering trust between Jordanian citizens and their public institutions. Trust is one of the foundations needed to effectively promote a whole-of-society approach to public integrity. The following sections assess current efforts by the Jordanian government and relevant non-state actors (i.e., citizens, civil society organisations, the private sector and the donor community) to define, adhere to and promote shared integrity principles and norms, and provide recommendations to encourage a shared responsibility towards promoting a culture of integrity across society in Jordan.

4.2. Fostering trust between Jordanian public institutions and citizens

4.2.1. Investing in integrity and openness is particularly relevant to support Jordan's objective to enhance trust of Jordanians in their public institutions

Trust and integrity reinforce each other. Trust is at the centre of the successful and effective relation between the government and citizens. It is also at the centre of government effectiveness at all levels. Key stakeholders interviewed as part of this Review coincide in identifying trust as the main ingredient that will enable progress and a sustainable future for Jordan. Considering this, the recommendations of this Integrity Review aim at supporting Jordanian efforts in increasing public integrity in ways that enhance trust between the government, its citizens and other relevant non-state actors (i.e., business, civil society organisation, academia, among others) as well as their respective co-responsibility in cultivating a culture of integrity in the country.

The OECD has built a conceptual framework aimed at understanding the main drivers of trust in public institutions and providing countries with actionable evidence to build and maintain people's trust: the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (herein "OECD Trust Framework"). Within this framework, trust is defined as "a person's belief that another person or institution will act consistently with their expectation of positive behaviour" (OECD, 2017[5]; OECD, 2022[6]). The OECD Trust Framework identifies 5 key drivers of trust in public institutions, namely responsiveness, reliability, openness, integrity and fairness (Table 4.1). As such, reforms aimed at increasing governmental competencies (responsiveness and reliability) also require efforts to ensure public values (openness, integrity and fairness) to achieve the desired impact of increased trust, while reforms addressing values only will fall short should they not focus also on ensuring public sector competencies (Brezzi et al., 2021[7]; OECD, 2017[5]). The role of integrity in the public modernisation efforts in Jordan is therefore crucial.

Table 4.1. OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions

Levels of trust in different public institutions		
Trust in national government, local government, civil service, parliament, police, political parties, courts, legal systems and intergovernmental organisations		
Public Governance Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions		
Competencies	*Responsiveness*	• Provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government and satisfy users. • Develop an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs
	Reliability	• Anticipate needs and assess evolving challenges. • Minimise uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment. • Effectively commit to future-oriented policies and co-operate with stakeholders on global challenges.
Values	*Openness*	• Provide open and accessible information so the public better understands what government is doing. • Consult, listen, and respond to stakeholders, including through citizen participation and engagement opportunities that lead to tangible results. • Ensure there are equal opportunities to be part of and participate in the institutions of representative democracy.
	Integrity	• Align public institutions with ethical values, principles, and norms to safeguard the public interest. • Take decisions and use public resources ethically, promoting the public interest over private interests while combating corruption. • Ensure accountability mechanisms between public institutions at all levels of governance. • Promote a neutral civil service whose values and standards of conduct uphold and prioritise the public interest.
	Fairness	• Improve living conditions for all. • Provide consistent treatment of businesses and people regardless of their background and identify (e.g., gender, socio-economic status, racial/ethnic origin).
Cultural, Economic and Political Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions		
• Individual and group identities, traits, and preferences, including socio-economic status; interpersonal socialisation and networks. • Distrust of and disengagement from the system		
Perception of government action on intergenerational and global challenges		
• Perceptions of government commitment to and effectiveness in addressing long-term challenges.		

Source: (Brezzi et al., 2021[7])

The Jordanian Government has realised the importance of the link between government effectiveness and public trust in its Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap of 2022 (herein "Roadmap"), prompted by the recognition of the low levels of social trust, this is, trust between individuals or trust in other people, and trust of citizens in public institutions. Indeed, there has been a decline in social trust, as 78% of Jordanians believe that they cannot trust the majority of people, which represents a decrease of 9 points compared to 2022 (University of Jordan, 2023[8]). Moreover, similar to most countries around the world, trust in government (37%), local authorities (32%), the House of Representatives (22%) and political parties (15%) is low in Jordan, especially when compared to trust in institutions responsible for national security and intelligence services, universities and teachers/professors (Figure 4.1).Additionally, when asked about the main non-economic challenges facing Jordan, Jordanians identified the following top three challenges: i) internal security challenges (e.g., drugs, theft, crime, etc.) (36%), decline in the level of government services in general (24%), and financial, administrative, nepotism, and corruption issues (14%) (University of Jordan, 2023[8]). These challenges further support the relevance of addressing both governmental competencies and public values as part of Jordan's reforms.

Figure 4.1. Trust in institutions in Jordan

Note: The sample included 1,200 Jordanian over the age of 18, with 50% males and 50% females, from 150 locations covering the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and 607 Jordanian opinion leaders (senior male and female state officials, political leaders, professional and labour union leaders, university professors, professional unions, senior male and female businesspeople, writers and journalists, and literary and artistic figures).
Source: (University of Jordan, 2023[8])

The Roadmap is ambitious with respect to trust. It sets a goal of "Enhancing citizens trust in government by at least 60% through the governance of service delivery and increasing transparency and accountability" (Government of Jordan, 2022[9]). Indeed, the ongoing political, economic and public sector modernisation efforts are means to increasing public trust by strengthening responsiveness and reliability of public institutions. Achieving impact that is visible and credible to citizens is key to avoid fomenting cynicism and apathy. However, as highlighted by the OECD Trust Framework, focusing on strengthening responsiveness and reliability of public institutions is not enough. Efforts to ensure public values (openness, integrity and fairness) are in fact particularly relevant to ensure impact (Brezzi et al., 2021[7]). Previous experimental studies carried out by the OECD in developing the Trust Framework in fact showed that integrity and openness are the most relevant determinants explaining trust levels (Murtin et al., 2018[10]). Investing into these public values is therefore key and the recommendations in both this Integrity Review and the (OECD[4]) Public Governance Review of Jordan are aimed at supporting the efforts of Jordan to enhance trust.

4.2.2. Jordan could further encourage citizens' participation and engagement in the development and implementation of different elements of the public integrity system to strengthen trust in public institutions

The OECD Trust Framework stresses the relevance of "Openness" in terms of providing open and accessible information to the public, consulting, listening and responding to stakeholders as well as ensuring there are equal opportunities to be part of and participate in the institutions of representative democracy (Brezzi et al., 2021[7]). The principles 5 "Society" and 13 "Participation" of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity echo this relevance. Principle 5 emphasises the relevance of engaging relevant stakeholders in the development, regular update and implementation of the public integrity system (see Chapter 2), while principle 13 invites countries to promote transparency and stakeholder's engagement across the entire public policy cycle (OECD, 2017[2]).

Jordan has a constitutional framework that supports openness and participation, as well as transparency, freedom of opinion, expression and association (for more information see (OECD[4]) Public Governance Review of Jordan). In this context, public institutions have put in place initiatives to allow and promote such openness and participation in practice. For example, the "At Your Service – Bekhidmatikom" platform enables citizens to voice complaints as well as requests, praises and suggestions, and the "You Have the Right to Know" platform allows citizen to inquire about information related to the public sector. With respect to public integrity, for instance, the Jordanian Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) conducted several debates and consultative sessions with relevant stakeholders concerned with its implementation to develop the National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2017-2025 and to update it in 2020 (see Chapter 2). However, as developed in Chapter 2, these efforts could be further strengthened to foster inclusiveness of such process.

Additionally, several complaint mechanisms have been established through which citizens can voice concerns or report cases of corruption (see Chapter 6). Relying mostly on such channels to allow citizens to express themselves, however, reduces the communication between citizens and public institutions to complaints related to misconduct and violations of public integrity. This cuts-off the possibility of constructive dialogue and communication of what citizens want, need and expect from the government, while restricting it to what they do not want nor need in terms of integrity-related aspects in the day-to-day life of citizens. Moreover, such complaint mechanisms could become a problem if they lead only to accumulated unresolved issues and a perceived impunity that could engender frustration by the Jordanian population.

To effectively promote trust and encourage engagement, communication should be a two-way street where both government and citizens have the chance to express themselves and to listen to each other. Listening is not only an empty action but requires the government to acknowledge what is being said and to provide an explanation (feedback) on how information is being used or considered. In this sense, communication and dialogue between government and citizens should encourage engagement and involve two purposes: i) enhance accountability of the government and ii) create effective channels to listen to citizens' needs and expectations.

To that end, Jordan could enhance existing participation initiatives and develop channels of communication and interaction with Jordanian citizens that go beyond submitting complaints and allow for a two-way dialogue with the government about needs, interests and expectations on integrity-related aspects. This includes going beyond providing information and contributing to consultations related to integrity and anti-corruption policies. Rather, it should aim at encouraging active engagement of citizens to collaborate in the development and implementation of the different elements of the public integrity system by providing sufficient opportunities and the necessary resources for such an engagement to take place. For instance, engaging stakeholders in developing regulations can lead to higher trust and compliance with and acceptance of the regulations, in particular when stakeholders feel that their views were considered, when they understand how their comments were taken into account, and when they feel they are treated with respect (Lind and Arndt, 2016[11])). Chapter 2 of this Integrity Review provides recommendations on how to further strengthen the engagement of stakeholders in designing integrity strategies with recent good practices from Costa Rica and Chile. The example from Mexico in Box 4.1 also shows how society can be engaged through an institutionalised process. More general recommendations on how to strengthen stakeholder participation can be found in the (OECD[4]) Public Governance Review of Jordan.

> **Box 4.1. Engaging civil society and companies in the development of the public integrity system: The case of Mexico**
>
> In Mexico, the National Anticorruption Policy (*Política Nacional Anticorrupción*) was developed through a participative process and discussion involving civil society, academia, business chambers, public institutions and experts from all over the country.
>
> - First, a Consultative Council (*Consejo Consultivo de la Política Nacional Anticorrupción*) was established by the National Anti-Corruption System's (*Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción*, SNA) Citizen Committee and Executive Secretariat to collect inputs from and promote dialogue with experts from civil society organisations, academia, the business sector, public institutions (including at the sub-national level) and international organisations.
> - Second, a parallel public consultation process collected citizens' opinions and perceptions related to the causes and effects of and possible solutions to the problem of corruption in Mexico (*Consulta Ciudadana*).
> - Third, the consultation process involved the sub-national level, with eight regional forums organised throughout the country to include local needs and challenges in the development of national policy.
>
> Source: (OECD, 2020[1])

Finally, participation and engagement need to be consistent to ensure impact. For example, if public institutions do not involve youth in the design and implementation of initiatives and policies to encourage youth participation, such initiatives risk not being tailored to the needs of youth and not being picked up by the target group. A good example for engaging youth in Jordan is the political party dialogue platform that aims at encouraging the exchange of views among young men and women on mechanisms and methodologies of political party work. The platform is currently being developed by JIACC and Rasheed under the Nazaha Programme, funded by the European Union and Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation AECID. Therefore, for example, if the Audit Bureau of Jordan wishes to adapt the practice of the Peruvian Supreme Audit Institution consisting in involving youth in audit practices mentioned in Chapter 5 of this Integrity Review, this adaptation and implementation should be developed as well jointly with young people.

4.2.3. JIACC could encourage discussions with citizens and public sector actors in view of clarifying shared values, norms and expectations

The 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity defines public integrity as "the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector" (OECD, 2017[2]). These values, principles and norms need to be clearly understood and shared by all members of society (i.e., citizens, representatives of private sector and civil society organisations, and public sector actors across the country). Such a shared understanding cannot be taken for granted and needs to be permanently renewed as society is in permanent change. Moreover, public integrity is closely linked to safeguarding the public interest. In this sense, listening to citizens expectations and needs to understand the public interest is a crucial part of public integrity. Additionally, a whole-of-society approach requires such culture of integrity to be shared, acknowledged and lived not only by stakeholders within the public sector but also by all stakeholders outside the public sector.

Considering this, JIACC could build on previous activities to create spaces to promote dialogue amongst citizens and with public sector actors about public values, principles and norms, as well as the expectations they have from their government and the public sector. To do so, JIACC could consider partnering with the Prime Minister's Project Management Implementation Office (PMIO) and the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA) to build up on and create synergies with relevant existing initiatives and ensure the participation and engagement of citizens and public officials across the country. Relevant existing initiatives may include, for instance, the recent Institutional Culture Framework of the PMIO that places citizens in the centre of attention of government institutions and services (for more information see Chapter 3) or the sessions conducted by JIACC with religious figures with regards to ethics and integrity to ensure their preventive role in the community. Since Jordanian society is rich and diverse, exchanges across tribes, religions, origins and ethnicities are important to create a common understanding of public integrity, a shared vision of the future and encourage trust among citizens themselves and towards public institutions.

A dialogue focusing on shared values, principles and norms instead of corruption is also a positive and constructive way to reach out to society. Concretely, JIACC could initiate and steer a series of workshops and focus groups with different stakeholders throughout the country with the aim to facilitate a dialogue on the values they share and the aspirations they have in common. Such an exercise could be a fundamental contribution to set the foundations to promote a culture of integrity in the whole-of-society and follow-up with more concrete and targeted measures, for example, in the context of the next NIACS starting in 2025.

Moreover, such discussions with citizens and public sector actors on shared values, norms and expectations could also be used to further raise awareness and provide clarity about the responsibilities of different public organisations particularly at the local level (e.g., municipal councils, governorate councils, among others) and the mechanisms available for holding them accountable. Indeed, interviews with key stakeholders undertaken as part of this Integrity Review highlighted the exiting gaps and heterogeneity when it comes to citizen's understanding about the role of local authorities and the available mechanisms for participation and engagement. Promoting this understanding is key for setting expectations and promote dialogue. When developing these awareness-raising sessions, it is important to use a simple language and provide day-to-day examples that allow citizens to better understand how public institutions relate to them.

4.3. Fostering citizens' commitment to public integrity in Jordan

Citizens play a key role in promoting a culture of integrity in the whole-of-society (OECD, 2020[1]). They have a shared responsibility to ensure that society's ethical norms, principles and values are respected in all their interactions with the public sector. This responsibility is translated into practice in several ways: through respecting the rules governing their exchanges with public officials, not participating in fraudulent schemes to access social benefits, paying their taxes, and reporting corruption and fraud whenever they encounter them, among others. To cultivate citizens' commitment to public integrity, governments can take a variety of actions that include raising awareness on the benefits of integrity and equipping children and young people with the knowledge and skills to resist integrity failures (OECD, 2020[1]).

4.3.1. JIACC could reorient awareness raising activities from corruption towards integrity, considering carefully potential unintended consequences of communication strategies

Awareness-raising activities are one mechanism by which countries can increase citizens' understanding of public integrity issues and their shared responsibility in promoting integrity (OECD, 2020[1]). Raising awareness about public integrity is not only a question of educating about the existence and consequences of corruption, which citizens are usually aware of, but also about how to break the vicious circle that enables misconduct and how citizens can embrace their responsibility in promoting public integrity. Although

awareness-raising activities can help increase citizens' understanding and commitment to public integrity, for these activities to be credible, they need to be accompanied by the leading example from government institutions and public sector officials.

In Jordan, several efforts have been made by JIACC and partners to raise awareness about integrity and anticorruption among citizens and specifically among youth (see next section). For instance, during 2021 and 2022, over 2 million SMS messages about the danger of nepotism and its negative impact to society were sent to different segments of the population through project No. 11 of the NIACS 2020-2025 via a partnership with the private sector and civil society organisations. JIACC also has carried out several campaigns related to the National Integrity Standards (NIS) and the National Integrity Indicators (NII). JIACC's Facebook profile ranked second in terms of outreach among the Kingdom's profiles several times. JIACC also kept up its efforts of promoting awareness on the need to fight corruption by using media and social media platforms to share news, publications, educational messages and instructional films with the public. Examples of specific campaigns include content aimed at promoting the reporting of acts of corruption under the slogan "Report and the Integrity Commission protects you", or at countering wasta and other practices, e.g., the "No Nepotism and Favouritism" campaign and the "I am against bribery" campaign aimed at raising awareness of the dangers of these phenomena and encouraging citizens to reject and fight them (JIACC, 2022[12]). According to JIACC, when currently planning awareness-raising media campaigns about integrity and anticorruption, the main objectives are to inform members of society about corruption acts and how it affects both society and the individual, making them aware of the costs of corruption and enhance their role in standing together to reject it, prevent it and report it whenever witnessed. Moreover, JIACC has established partnerships with civil society organisations to raise awareness about integrity in selected municipalities, under the Integrity Project, and among youth, via the Integrity School Project -a cultural and intellectual camp to broadcast integrity messages and other related campaigns.

These media and awareness-raising campaigns designed and implemented by JIACC and partners follow several good international practices including using different communication channels to cover a broader audience, tailoring awareness-raising campaigns to different audiences and encouraging cooperation amongst relevant public institutions to leverage on their different capacities and encourage synergies.

Such awareness raising campaigns and communication activities could however benefit from insights from recent research to further increase their impact. Indeed, beyond well-known success factors for campaigns as shown in Table 4.2, more specific academic research on communicating on corruption has emerged over the past years. For example, findings show that talking about corruption and the costs related to this phenomenon can have unintended consequences. Indeed, in contexts where corruption is present in public debate and the media, campaigns that seek to raise awareness about corruption could have a counter-productive effect by increasing the already high perception of corruption and confirming the impression that this is a widespread situation. Thus, corruption campaigns could contribute to nurture the perception of corruption. In Jordan, a recent poll indicates that despite efforts to mitigate corruption, "financial, administrative, nepotism, and corruption issues" continue to be seen as one of the three main non-economic challenges the government needs to address (University of Jordan, 2023[8]). Moreover, research has shown that unethical behaviour can be contagious and that corruption-centred communication can result in a "self-fulfilling prophecy" effect. Indeed, the mere perception that corruption is a common practice in society can help individuals to rationalise and justify their own unethical behaviour (Ajzenman, 2021[13]; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009[14]; Gingerich et al., 2015[15]; Gino, Ayal and Ariely, 2009[16]; Robert and Arnab, 2013[17]).

Table 4.2. Success factors for behaviour changing campaigns

Success factor	Specific actions
Tailor the campaign to the audience	• Use existing attitudes • Make the issue accessible to the public • Make the issue culturally specific • Look at the issues from the target audiences' point of view
Generate community responsibility	• Make the issue socially unacceptable by framing it in moral terms • Highlight the wider impact of the issue on society and demonstrate its impact on human life
Increase a sense of agency	• Develop a sense of self-control, motivation, knowledge and skills • Offering alternative behaviours
Encourage action	• Highlight the action that needs to be taken, such as the proper procedures to report corrupt activities

Source: Adapted from (Mann, 2011[18])

These research results are highly context dependent but nevertheless provide food for thought. Building up on this, JIACC could consider carrying out its own research, perhaps in co-operation with a university in Jordan or a specialised civil society organisation. This research could aim at understanding better how citizens perceive corruption and identify common justifications for unethical behaviours. International research shows that citizens often use euphemisms or similar unconscious strategies to rationalise corrupt behaviour and tolerate such practices carried out by friends or family members (OECD, 2018[19]). Indeed, the problem with traditional awareness raising or teaching activities is that rationally, almost all but a minority of criminals know already and agree that corruption is bad and should not be tolerated. Nonetheless, they still may participate in illegal activities or behave unethically, while managing to feel as an honest person thanks to such unconscious rationalisations (Shalvi et al., 2015[20]; OECD, 2018[21]; Sezer, Gino and Bazerman, 2015[22]).

In addition, JIACC has already carried out several campaigns to explain the National Integrity Indicators and standards. This is important to show citizens that actions are being taken. However, as emphasised in Chapter 2, there seem to be misunderstandings around the concept of such integrity measurements as they seem to be understood as reflecting the integrity of public entities, not their level of preparedness to deal with integrity risks. There is thus scope for JIACC to develop a communication strategy aimed at countering such misunderstandings and at showing visible change from government institutions and public sector officials. It is important that such messages should go beyond communicating about the government's efforts to prevent corruption and instead focus on demonstrating results and that change is possible and impacts the daily life of citizens. This can be done by presenting success stories of effective behavioural change in the public administration and in society and how these changes of behaviour have had a positive impact.

Finally, for example, based on the exercise recommended above to discuss shared values with citizens, JIACC could tailor a communication campaign on those values and why each of them matters for Jordanians. This could be a good opportunity to make even more emphasis on using positive messages and visualising desired good behaviour instead of problems. Given the "messenger effect", this is a cognitive bias that lead people to process the same information differently depending on who they received it from (e.g., depending on the perceived credibility, expertise or likeability of the person delivering the information) (Clark et al., 2013[23]; Eckel and Gintis, 2010[24]), JIACC could consider identifying credible and respected individuals to transmit those messages. This strategy is also aligned to previous efforts by JIACC, for example, the aforementioned "No Nepotism and Favouritism" campaign in which leaders in Jordanian society from various sectors were invited to talk about the importance of rejecting nepotism and favouritism. Moreover, the experience from Ecuador in Box 4.2 could be an inspiration to develop such communication campaign.

> **Box 4.2. Positive campaigns: Examples Ecuador**
>
> **"Creole Honesty" (Honestidad Criolla) campaign in Ecuador**
>
> On 9 December 2019, the International Chamber of Commerce, through its Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, launched the "Honestidad Criolla" campaign, with the aim of promoting a cultural change in Ecuadorian society and preventing acts of corruption. The campaign, which includes a YouTube video, seeks to reach Ecuadorians with a positive message, to promote a change in citizens' behaviour and to stop normalising acts that are wrong, such as petty corruption and bad actions. The video presents citizens who, given the choice to act contrary to integrity – for example, by buying pirated films, plagiarising publications or accepting bribes – decide to act honestly and contribute to change.
>
> Source: (OECD, 2020[1]; OECD, 2024[25])

Similar to the recommendation in Chapter 3 on communication to public officials, JIACC could use the BASIC methodology developed by the OECD to guide such interventions aimed at promoting behavioural and cultural change (OECD, 2018[19]; OECD, 2019[26]). Indeed, to fine tune the key messages to be communicated and ensure that the awareness-raising campaigns unfold the desired impact, JIACC could consider developing and implementing small scale campaigns (pilots) by first selecting a subset of individuals where the awareness-raising campaigns could be tested. Lessons from the pilots could then lead to improvements in the messages and campaigns before implementing them at large scale. To monitor the effectiveness of the messages, JIACC should also use evaluation mechanisms such as public opinion surveys, web analytics, focus groups, participation in events, number of complaints submitted, etc.

4.3.2. Jordan could further strengthen education for public integrity in schools and universities

Promoting a culture of integrity in society necessarily begins with the education of the very young (OECD, 2018[27]). A growing trend around the world today involves countries using their school systems to communicate to children and young people the roles and responsibilities of public integrity as well as helping them develop the knowledge, skills and behaviours necessary to resist corruption, challenge the social norms that enable unethical behaviours to flourish (OECD, 2018[27]). Additionally, education for public integrity can generate new social norms and common knowledge about expected behaviours to prevent corruption, which contributes to raising citizens who are aware of their role and responsibility in promoting integrity.

In Jordan, several efforts have been made to raise awareness among children and young people of integrity and integrity related matters and promote an education for public integrity, including the following:

- In 2010, JIACC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Education, which stipulates conducting lectures and awareness-raising activities for school students. Since then, more than 200 public and private schools have been targeted to educate students, administrative and academic staff about the importance of ethics and national integrity standards.

- Within the NIACS 2020-2025, in particular project 9 aimed at raising awareness of integrity in educational institutions and project 10 aimed at raising awareness in cooperation with the religious institutions (Islamic and Christian), JIACC has also raise awareness about integrity among children and young people. For instance, in 2022, JIACC's Integrity Directorate carried out awareness lectures for students at universities, colleges, schools, municipalities, civil society organisations and hospitals. These lectures included the governorates of: The capital Amman, Irbid, Balqa, Ajloun, Karak, Zarqa, Jerash, and Madaba (JIACC, 2022[12]). Additionally, JIACC partnered with

the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research to disseminate JIACC's messages in schools and universities through social media platforms, their websites and university radio stations (JIACC, 2022[12]).

- In 2017, the National Centre for Curriculum Development elaborated a new curriculum, which includes the topics of democracy, integrity and transparency for 12 to 15-year-old students, under the *National and Civil Education* course. The curriculum is accompanied by a series of relevant publications including grade-appropriate textbooks and teacher's guides. During 2022 and 2023, more than 20 awareness sessions on the *National and Civil Education* course and the new teaching materials were conducted in the Kingdom's schools for teachers and supervisors. Additionally, values and practices of integrity are incorporated as cross-subject concepts in several courses of the curriculum (e.g., Arabic language, Islamic education, social studies, among others) linked to the specific subject and the targeted age group.

- In 2024, JIACC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Zaha Cultural Centre aimed at raising awareness of children about the importance of National Integrity Standards and rejecting acts of corruption through activities and events organised by the Centre in a manner that suits children's cognitive and perceptual levels.

- Jordan has developed some extracurricular activities to deepen students' knowledge and capacities on public integrity and related matters, such as Parliamentary Student Councils, which allow students to learn the different mechanisms that are available to participate in public life.

- JIACC developed, through a joint project with UNDP, training guides on how to deliver awareness messages related to integrity and anti-corruption in simple language that mimics the way in which students think and promote interactive activities to consolidate the concepts intended to be conveyed to school students. 15 employees from JIACC were trained on how to use these guides, some of which delivered 3 awareness lectures in schools, with direct supervision by UNDP experts, to ensure that the concepts were duly applied on the ground.

- Aware of the value of training teachers, JIACC adopted an awareness resource as part of the mandatory and permissive promotion programme held by the Ministry of Education for teachers from all governorates. This was done in co-operation and coordination with the Ministry of Education through the Department of Educational Supervision and Training. In 2022, 21,000 male and female teachers graduated from this programme (JIACC, 2022[12]) and in 2023, 23,750 supervisors, teachers and administrative staff were trained through this electronic training platform.

- Regarding high level education, JIACC has developed, together with the Jordan University, a master's degree programme on integrity and a diploma in governance and anti-corruption. Moreover, as part of the activities conducted within project 9 of NIACS 2020-25, JIACC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Higher Education to support the work of universities in the field of integrity through lectures and awareness activities in universities. In 2022, 27 awareness raising lectures were held (JIACC, 2022[12]), and in 2023, more than 7 events were conducted in universities (e.g., Yarmouk University, Hashemite University, Mutah University, National University College of Technology, among others).

These efforts adhere to several good international practices. For instance, public integrity education is mainstreamed through the curriculum of 12 to 15-year-old students to ensure coverage of all students of these ages and guidance material (i.e., grade-appropriate textbooks and teacher's guides) is provided to students and teachers to support learning/teaching. Additionally, public integrity education is also provided via extracurricular teaching activities allowing to deepen key concepts, knowledge and skills on public integrity outside of the classroom. Moreover, educators are encouraged to build capacities and skills to educate for public integrity via the awareness resource developed with the Ministry of Education. Finally, there is cooperation amongst relevant public institutions (i.e., JIACC, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, and universities) which encourages engagement and synergies needed for an effective implementation of any education for integrity intuitive.

In this sense, JIACC is encouraged to continue leading efforts to inspire ethical behaviour and equip all children and young people with knowledge and skills to resist corruption and act with integrity. These efforts should be implemented in cooperation with relevant institutions such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the National Centre for Curriculum Development, schools and universities. Different initiatives could be considered. For instance, JIACC and relevant institutions could extend and adapt the *National and Civil Education* course to students from all grades, or further introduce public integrity and integrity related matters on relevant classes. Regarding the latter, the University of Jordan recently introduced a course titled "Ethics and Human Values" to emphasize the importance of integrity for students, teachers, and the local community. Inspired in such initiative, universities could consider developing and integrating courses on public integrity into undergraduate and graduate degree programmes to strengthen public integrity education before students start their working life. Moreover, examples from other jurisdictions could also be used by Jordan for inspiration (Box 4.3). In any case, efforts should be made to ensure that the lesson design enables students to identify and apply the integrity concepts in their existing contexts, to develop age-appropriate learning and reading materials aligned with public integrity learning outcomes and to develop lesson plans and tasks that include tangible, hands-on initiatives to help students see the impact of integrity actions (OECD, 2018[27]). This would allow to strengthen the approach to education for public integrity since an early age and throughout the educational process and ensure comprehensive coverage for all students throughout the country.

Box 4.3. Education for integrity in Brazil

The General Comptroller of the Union (CGU) of Brazil, in partnership with the Instituto Maurício de Sousa and more recently with the Ministry of Education, developed in 2008 the programme "One for all and all for one! For ethics and citizenship" (*Um por todos e todos por um! Pela ética e cidadania*). This programme is a free citizen education initiative in Brazil aimed at educating future generations of citizens on topics related to ethics, citizenship, social participation, among others. The programme targets elementary school students (this is, students between 6 and 10 years old) from both public and private schools.

The programme is structured around comic characters. It includes didactic material such as magazines, stories, animation videos and comic books – including in digital format, as well as teaching materials such as teacher's guides, student's notebook and activities banks. Adherence to the programme is voluntary. Several lessons can be drawn from this initiative:

- The didactic material has been designed to ensure a methodical progression in the internalisation of key concepts of ethics, citizenship, social responsibilities and participation, in alignment with the official curriculum, providing a solid approach to education for public integrity.
- The didactic material offers students the opportunity to get to learn and practice, in a playful way, concepts such as self-esteem, respect, tolerance, inclusion, combating bullying, democracy, ethics, citizenship, social participation, public property, environment, solidarity and volunteering.
- The programme provides for the participation of educators, families and the community as a whole, with the school as the centre for the development of awareness rising and education actions, allowing to reach out both students and their families.

The programme has been implemented in Brazilian schools from more than 15 years and it is part of a broader set of training and knowledge management actions developed by the CGU for children and young people, known as "Citizen Education".

Source: (OECD, forthcoming[28]) and https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/educacao-cidada/programas/upt

Moreover, it is important to keep up the efforts to provide educators with the skills, knowledge and confidence they need to educate for public integrity. Indeed, educating for public integrity goes beyond sharing key concepts and requires addressing contemporary social problems such as corruption, ethical dilemmas and lack of integrity. In this sense, the Ministry of Education, the National Centre for Curriculum Development and JIACC could continue their partnership and further develop specific trainings for educators to provide them with the appropriate knowledge to teach about public integrity and anti-corruption as well as to support them in developing skills to foster an environment of trust and openness. Such trainings could be incorporated in the mandatory and permissive promotion programme of the Ministry of Education and/or could be made compulsory for new teachers. Trainings can be complemented with guides and guidance materials on how to deliver the lesson in a dynamic and engaging way, how to communicate key concepts effectively and how to promote respectful and open dialogues within the classroom so that students can open up about their views and concerns regarding ethical and moral issues.

4.4. Sharing the responsibility of promoting public integrity with civil society

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights the key responsibility civil society organisations (CSOs) have in promoting public integrity and displaying exemplary behaviour. First, CSOs have a key role in addressing gaps in society as well as collaborating with both government and business to face key challenges, including in the public integrity field. Second, CSOs have the responsibility of acting in alignment with their mission, showing integrity and being trustworthy, as they often receive special status, such as tax exemption and other benefits, and funds from companies or private individuals (OECD, 2020[1]). In this sense, adhering to integrity standards which recognise potential capacity and resource constraints of smaller CSOs is key to ensuring that CSOs are seen as a vehicle for the pursuit of the public interest.

4.4.1. Jordan could further build capacities for social accountability and programme implementation to enable a stronger and more autonomous involvement of CSOs at the local level

State and non-state stakeholders at both national and sub-national levels are expected to be involved in promoting integrity and reducing corruption as well as to share the responsibility of building strong and resilient integrity systems (OECD, 2017[2]; OECD, 2020[1]). Jordan has embarked in a process of decentralisation since 2015 to place citizens at the heart of local policies and services, which is both complex and ambitious (OECD, 2020[29]). The OECD has looked at these efforts in its 2020 report *Engaging Citizens in Jordan's Local Government Needs Assessment Process* and made recommendations including to step-up communication and stakeholder engagement at the local level. These are also relevant for purposes of promoting a whole-of-society approach to public integrity, as local stakeholder engagement is key to secure local social accountability and ensure that policy solutions are closer to citizens' needs (Box 4.4).

Box 4.4. Key recommendations to promote greater stakeholder participation and improve public communication at the local level in Jordan

The 2020 report *Engaging Citizens in Jordan's Local Government Needs Assessment Process* provided recommendations aimed at strengthening governance mechanisms to promote greater stakeholder participation in the needs assessment cycle and improving public communication at the local level. Key recommendations include the following:

- Ensure the reflection of local needs into governorate and national development plans and support the transformation of the strategic planning process at the sub-national from the collection of wish lists to the creation of a more structured approach through innovative forms of stakeholder participation that promote co-creation.

- Strengthen the capacities and skills of public servants to conduct stakeholder participation activities in the needs assessment process, including by providing technical and specialized trainings to the Local Development Units at the Municipal and Governorate levels, in particular on how to carry out stakeholder participation related initiatives in the context of the needs assessment process.

- Build the capacities of local civil servants to ensure they have the skills to communicate effectively with stakeholders throughout the phases of the needs assessment process.

- Improve the feedback process and clarify why needs were or were not selected.

- Use a diverse range of communication channels to reach a variety of stakeholders based on audience insights to reflect different needs and media consumption patterns.

- Ensure that communication is tailored to the needs of different segments of the population, based on demographic factors and regional needs.

- Tailor communication for young people. This would not only increase the responsiveness of policies and services but could also promote their engagement in the wider decentralisation and policymaking processes.

- Establish participation initiatives that move beyond sole consultation to assign a more direct and meaningful role for citizens in the co-creation of local policies.

Source: (OECD, 2020[29])

However, interviews with key stakeholders undertaken as part of this Integrity Review highlighted that additional efforts are needed to raise awareness on the role of local authorities, the legal framework setting the responsibilities in terms of service delivery and the existing mechanisms for citizens' participation and accountability. Moreover, discussions with key stakeholders revealed that there exist important differences among CSOs in terms of needs, capacity, resources and geographical location. In this sense, as administrative and political reforms are currently taking place in Jordan, it is important to bear in mind the different capacities, needs and aspirations of CSOs at the local level to ensure they can provide the appropriate support in the implementation of the reforms and allow them to carry out their watchdog role.

Considering this, Jordan could further step-up tailored-made communication and stakeholder engagement at the local level as well as build capacities for social accountability and programme implementation to enable a stronger and autonomous involvement of CSOs in municipalities according to local needs and possibilities. Regarding the former and as recommended in a previous section, Jordan could consider leveraging the discussions with citizens and public sector actors on shared values, norms and expectations to further raise awareness and provide clarity about the responsibilities of public entities and the mechanisms available for holding them accountable. This could be done together with local CSOs as well

as CSOs with a national presence. Building on existing joint awareness-raising activities between JIACC and the MOLA, Jordan could continue to enable meaningful and adapted spaces for participation of citizens and CSOs that are adapted to local realities, acknowledging CSO's differences in sizes and resources.

Additionally, Jordan could consider designing and implementing capacity building sessions on social accountability and programme implementation to enable a stronger and more autonomous involvement of CSOs at the local level. This could be done inspired by existing initiatives such as the awareness-raising campaign and training programme by the Foreign Funding Unit (for more information see Chapter 3 of the (OECD[4]) Public Governance Review of Jordan), or the awareness-raising events in targeted municipalities on integrity and anticorruption by JIACC and the MOLA. These trainings would also be an opportunity for CSOs working at the local level to come together to exchange experiences and lessons learnt and to foster dialogue between CSOs. For these capacity building sessions to be successful, it is important to actively publicise and promote this initiative across the country and publishing relevant materials online to ensure as many CSOs as possible are aware of the training and CSOs can get access to relevant trainings even if they cannot attend the sessions.

4.4.2. Civil society organisations in Jordan could undertake autonomous self-regulation efforts to boost public integrity

CSOs and other non-governmental actors such as universities, think-tanks, amongst others, play an important role in promoting and ensuring integrity. Jordanian CSOs have been actively contributing to many different fields from implementing public policy and humanitarian assistance to exercising social control and making expert contributions to several areas that are relevant to the quality of life of all Jordanian citizens: anti-corruption, gender equality, youth participation, decentralisation and human rights. Ensuring CSOs sustainability and legitimacy in the eyes of the government, public and private donors and the broader society requires CSOs to be role-model for integrity, transparency and accountability.

Discussions with key stakeholders revealed the absence of self-developed frameworks for accountability, transparency and integrity for CSOs in Jordan. These discussions also showed a self-critical civil society that raised questions about their own impact and standards for transparency. While a few initiatives have started, for instance, through the Nazaha Programme, co-funded by the European Union and AECID, Rasheed (Transparency International Jordan) and RASED (Al-Hayat Centre) are supporting and empowering CSOs to achieve better governance at the local level, these initiatives could be further strengthened and expanded to include direct activities aimed at raising accountability, transparency and integrity standards for CSOs. Considering this, CSOs in Jordan could establish and implement initiatives of self-regulation to increase their accountability as well as standards of transparency and integrity they adhere to while conducting their activities. CSOs in Jordan could use examples from other jurisdictions as an inspiration (Box 4.5). Transparency and accountability by CSOs are important not only to provide assurance to public and private donors, but also to encourage citizen's trust, which is needed to support the effectiveness of CSOs' work in all fields.

Box 4.5. Transparent Civil Society Initiative in Germany

In Germany, on the initiative of Transparency International Deutschland e.V., numerous actors from civil society and academia defined ten basic points that every civil society organisation should make accessible to the public. This includes:

1. Name, registered office, address and year of foundation
2. Complete articles of association as well as information on the organisational objectives
3. Information on tax relief
4. Name and function of key decision-makers
5. Annual report
6. Personnel structure
7. Information on the source of funds
8. Information on the use of funds
9. Affiliation with third parties under company law
10. Names of people whose annual payments account for more than 10% of the total annual budget

As of December 2023, 1 861 organisations have joined the initiative. The complete list of organisations can be found in: https://www.transparente-zivilgesellschaft.de/ueber-uns/unterzeichnerorganisationen.

Source: https ://www.transparente-zivilgesellschaft.de/

For such initiatives to be effective, they need to be driven and implemented by Jordanian civil society on its own. The Jordanian government can and should be supportive of these efforts acknowledging and encouraging them, but it should not drive nor set any criteria nor try to influence such initiatives for it would take away the responsibility civil society has to take on its own. It is also important to emphasise that such self-regulatory efforts should be meant to ensure accountability, transparency and integrity, but they cannot translate in limitations to civic space or freedom of expression (for more information see Chapter 3 of the (OECD[4]) Public Governance Review of Jordan). One concrete tool to support the integrity of CSOs that CSOs in Jordan could be inspired by is the "Global Standard for CSO Accountability", which was developed by a group of CSOs specialised in accountability. It lays out twelve commitments and provides guidance to CSOs for improving their accountability practices (Box 4.6).

> **Box 4.6. Supporting CSOs in establishing effective accountability measures: The Global Standard for CSO Accountability**
>
> The Global Standard for CSO Accountability has been developed in a participatory process by a partnership of nine established Accountability Initiatives from across the world. Built on their practical experience and together with a wide range of consultative partners, they have created a common accountability framework for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that consists of the following 12 commitments:
>
> 1. Justice and Equality: We will address injustice, exclusion, inequality, poverty and violence to create healthy societies for all.
>
> 2. Women's rights and gender equality: we will promote women's and girls' rights and enhance gender equality.
>
> 3. Healthy planet: we will protect the natural environment and enhance its ability to support life for future generations.
>
> 4. Lasting positive change: we will deliver long-term positive results.
>
> 5. People-driven work: we will ensure that the people we work with have a key role in driving our work.
>
> 6. Strong partnerships: we will work in fair and respectful partnerships to achieve shared goals.
>
> 7. Advocating for fundamental change: we will address root causes by advocating for fundamental change.
>
> 8. Open organisations: we will be transparent about who we are, what we do and our successes and failures.
>
> 9. Empowered and effective staff and volunteers: We will invest in staff and volunteers to develop their full potential and achieve our goals.
>
> 10. Well-handled resources: we will handle our resources responsibly to reach our goals and serve the public good.
>
> 11. Responsive decision-making: we will ensure our decisions are responsive to feedback from people affected by our work, partners, volunteers and staff.
>
> 12. Responsible leadership: we will ensure our management and governing body are accountable.
>
> Such framework is further defined in guidance material. This document suggests steps to work towards a global CSO practice in which CSOs are truly accountable to all of their stakeholders for their impact, approach and organisational processes.
>
> Source: (Global Stanfard for CSO Accountability, n.d.[30])

Additionally, discussions with key stakeholders also emphasised the need of more dialogue and exchange between CSOs, and more understanding and acceptance for diverse approaches among them. Crafting and seeking higher integrity and transparency standards for CSOs should entail a framework that is respectful of diverse approaches and that encourages communication and sharing. Therefore, CSOs in Jordan could consider undertaking a participatory approach to establishing and implementing initiatives of self-regulation. Again, while JIACC and other governmental entities could be supportive of these efforts and exchange with CSOs on what their best role under such self-regulatory processes is, CSOs should lead this initiative themselves to secure its own impact and ownership.

4.5. Strengthening the responsibility of the private sector for promoting public integrity and boosting economic modernisation efforts

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity underscores the role the private sector has as a key stakeholder in promoting public integrity. There are different ways in which actions by private companies could harm public integrity. Companies that evade their taxes, offer bribes for procurement contracts or provide illegal funds to political parties, threaten the legitimacy of the government and weaken citizens' trust in institutions. Additionally, all these harmful actions by companies affect the business environment, reducing competitiveness and discouraging investments and trade. However, the private sector can be a force for good as a driver for change towards public integrity by advancing corporate integrity reforms and reshaping the global integrity landscape. As such, addressing corruption challenges and encouraging integrity in the private sector is beneficial, not only for the business sector itself, but also for governments and society as a whole.

In Jordan, the cultural concept of 'wasta', which involves favouritism and emphasizes the importance of building relationships, makes the Jordanian private sector particularly susceptible to corruption (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023[31]). For instance, investors with good wasta can expedite procedures, gain exclusive access to services and information, and even influence legislation to their advantage (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023[31]). Despite these challenges, current efforts to unleash Jordan's full economic potential and improve quality of life for all citizens lack more actions to address corruption risks and to strengthen the role of the private sector in promoting public integrity. For instance, when it comes to the Jordan Economic Modernisation Vision "For a better Future", the strategy does set up-front the need for transparency and accountability in its implementation, but it is not explicit on how integrity will play a role in addressing the foreseen economic vision.

Moreover, Jordanian businesses aiming to operate regionally or internationally need to visibly demonstrate adherence to integrity standards, giving them the competitive advantage to access markets in other regions and countries. As such, integrity can also be a market opener. Customers in relevant international markets and supply chains are increasingly requiring higher integrity and higher social and environmental standards from their suppliers. There is a clear opportunity for Jordanian companies to gain a clear and differentiated competitive advantage in the region, and a reason to be proud of, as responsible businesses.

4.5.1. JIACC could disentangle the concept "private sector" and propose differential actions based on businesses' type, size, needs and potential contributions to public integrity in its next NIACS

Big international or multinational companies operating in Jordan, big Jordanian companies, small and medium size Jordanian enterprises (SMEs) as well as business and professional associations can all contribute to strengthening public integrity, even if that contribution may vary from their own standpoint. A business environment with a strong culture of integrity is a cost-effective and more predictable environment to operate in, so it is also in the companies' own interest to promote integrity. Integrity is also key in unlocking business opportunities and facilitating local, regional and foreign investment in Jordan so needed for economic progress and job creation, so it will be also a decisive factor in implementing the Economic Modernisation Vision Jordan has set forth.

Promoting integrity in the private sector needs to be understood beyond the usual aspects of improving national and local governance and reducing bureaucracy. Integrity is required to create trust within society and to ensure modernisation efforts get enough traction. For this, integrity requires to be understood as a shared responsibility of private sector actors themselves. In this sense, it is positive that the updated NIACS 2020-2025 foresees collaboration between JIACC and the private sector, particularly in project 11 *Partnership with the civil society organizations and private sector*. Moreover, the process of designing the

NIACS 2020-2025 included debates and consultative sessions with the private sector and civil society organisations thus promoting their involvement in the fight against corruption (on how to further strengthen this engagement, see also Chapter 2).

However, the goals and activities set forth in the NIACS seem to be too broad and unspecific to be actionable. As such, JIACC could consider disentangling the concept "private sector" and breaking it down into the different types of businesses, their different needs and the types of contributions they can make to the integrity system at different levels, both locally and nationally, to propose differential actions in its next NIACS. For instance, with SMEs constituting more than 96% of all companies in Jordan (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2020[32]), they deserve a special focus. Such specific effort could aim at encouraging and supporting SMEs in developing and implementing integrity standards that are appropriate to their size and capacities, without overburdening them and instead enabling them to reap the benefits of increased integrity in their relationship with the government and as providers in the value-chain.

4.5.2. Businesses and businesses associations in Jordan could step-up integrity self-regulatory efforts based on their type, size and sector

The most important opportunity the private sector has to promote integrity in their respective industries, nationally and locally, is by role-modelling and by developing self-regulatory efforts that establish higher standards of integrity. In Jordan, different efforts by businesses associations, public institution and civil society organisations are being implemented in this area:

- The American Chamber of Commerce in Jordan initiated developing a private sector code of conduct in 2016. A more recent draft has been circulated by JIACC, but it is not clear whether this code is currently in force. There have also been several initiatives to implement standards for corporate governance and increase transparency at that level.

- The Board of Directors of the Amman Chamber of Commerce approved in December 2023 the adoption of a Code of Conduct and Best Practices for the commercial and service sector. The code will be distributed to all members, will be published in the Chamber's website and social media and will be socialised via awareness raising videos.

- JIACC has partnered with business associations to raise awareness on the role of the private sector in promoting a culture of integrity. For instance, JIACC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chambers of Commerce aimed at developing awareness on integrity and governance.

- Rasheed for Integrity and Transparency (Transparency International's chapter in Jordan) elaborated a draft code of conduct for the private sector and a roadmap for how to implement this Code in the private sector. It also created a simple 6-step model for strengthening integrity within corporations and conducted training for staff of JIACC and the Corporate Control Department on such model.

However, it seems that many of these efforts have been focused on corporate governance aspects and have not translated into general improvements in corporate ethics so far (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2020[32]). Moreover, codes of conduct, which constitute a great proportion of the efforts implemented so far, have a risk of staying on paper and never translating into concrete changes of behaviour towards a culture of integrity. In this sense, initiatives to develop integrity standards in the private sector need to be strengthen and supported with monitoring and accountability mechanisms to ensure they are enforced and acted upon by businesses.

To that end, the private sector in Jordan could consider stepping-up integrity self-regulatory efforts. To do so, it can get inspirations from international standards such as the OECD's Responsible Business Conduct instruments and, in particular, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, a

key tool for identifying, detecting and managing activities where risks arise (OECD, 2018[33]). However, there cannot be a realistic aspiration to have homogeneous integrity standards – e.g., a unique code of conduct- across the private sector for all companies and the different sectors, given their differences in size, type, needs, capacities and impact. Rather, each company has to identify and find a response to its own integrity challenges. Moreover, Jordanian associations, including the Jordanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, could play a key role in raising awareness about international standards and the responsibility of the private sector in promoting and acting within integrity standards among their members, encouraging high standards of integrity by businesses, building capacities within the private sector and monitoring the implementation of integrity standards.

Additionally, Jordanian businesses, businesses associations and JIACC could exchange on what is the best role JIACC could play to further promote such self-regulatory processes. Such role could include creating an appropriate incentive regime to encourage businesses' behavioural changes, such as establishing procurement incentives or introducing a reputational incentive programme to encourage public acknowledgement of a company's commitment to public integrity. Box 4.7 provides some examples for such measures.

Box 4.7. Incentives for business integrity

Incentives that reward a company for good practice are an important complement to enforcement sanctions. They recognise that meaningful commitment to and investment in anti-corruption programmes and other measures that strengthen corporate integrity are largely voluntary and can be encouraged through inducements that signal their priority to company leadership. Four main types of incentives can be identified:

Penalty mitigation

- Companies that have made a significant effort to detect and deter corruption may be rewarded with a reduction in fines, reduced charges or even a defence against liability for the misconduct of an employee or agent. In a settlement context, the perception that a company is serious about countering corruption can substantially ease the conditions for resolving an investigation.

- Relevant policy considerations: Incentives should strike an appropriate balance between the potential investigative benefits that result from the cooperation of offenders and the administration of justice, particularly in view of the public perception of the benefits for this cooperation.

Procurement incentives

- Companies that demonstrate a meaningful commitment to integrity practices can benefit in procurement procedures, in the form of an eligibility requirement or and affirmative competitive preference.

- Relevant policy considerations: The simplest form of this incentive is a requirement that companies meet certain minimum good practice standards as a condition for doing business with State agencies. However, mandatory programme requirements can be a very effective way to strengthen corporate integrity practices but can also present special challenges for smaller enterprises that may not have the experience or resources to compete on this basis. As such, governments can provide technical assistance to smaller companies, through training seminars, model content and other means, or ease programme requirements for smaller companies, recognizing their different circumstances and risk profile and taking into account that changing entrenched attitudes and practices will take time.

Preferential access to government benefits

- Government benefits can be made available on a preferential basis to individuals and companies that are able to demonstrate a commitment to good practices of business integrity. This incentive may take the form of an eligibility requirement, for example, that an applicant for government benefits meets specified minimum programme standards.

- Relevant policy considerations: This is most commonly associated with government procurement opportunities addressed in the preceding section but may also be applied to other categories of government benefits or services (e.g., "fast-track" access to customs services or a preference in export credit support).

Reputational incentives

- These are a type of benefit that encourage corporate integrity, through public acknowledgement of a company's commitment to integrity and combating corruption.

Source: (UNODC, 2013[34])

In particular, drawing from the experience of the King Abdullah II Award for Excellence for Private Sector, which has been in place since 1999 and aims at enhancing the competitiveness of Jordanian businesses by promoting quality awareness and performance excellence, and inspired by good international examples (Box 4.8), Jordan could consider developing and implementing an incentive programme to encourage the expected behavioural changes from private sector actors. When designing this programme, it is important to encourage the active participation of the private sector and to communicate broadly all programme regulations -including evaluation criteria, composition of the evaluating committee, timelines, among others- to guarantee relevance, transparency and trust. Moreover, although it is unlikely that a JIACC-sourced code of conduct would have the same impact and traction as standards developed by businesses and businesses associations themselves, JIACC could offer guidance, resources, knowledge and expertise to support these efforts by the private sector.

Box 4.8. ProEthics Programme of the CGU of Brazil

As part of the efforts to promote ethics and integrity in the Brazilian private sector, the General Comptroller of the Union (CGU) created the Pro-Ethics *(Pró-Etica)* programme, an incentive programme that promotes the adoption of integrity policies by private companies. Through this programme, companies can voluntarily apply for a "Pro-Business Ethics" seal, a certification in recognition of their integrity and anti-corruption efforts.

The Pro-Ethics programme has been implemented since 2010, and in its 2022-2023 edition – the most recent edition – nearly 299 private companies participated by filling out the assessment questionnaire, more than 250 companies were admitted and evaluated by CGU, and subsequently 84 companies were approved by the Pro-Ethics Committee and received the "Pro-Ethics Business" seal.

The Pro-Ethics Committee (*Comité Pró-Ética*) is the collegial body responsible for deciding which companies receive the seal each year, as well as for discussing and deciding on updates to the Pro-Ethics participation requirements. The composition of the Pro-Ethics Committee – i.e., public entities, civil society organisations, civil associations, representatives of private companies – demonstrates the whole-of-society vision of this initiative.

Source: (OECD, forthcoming[28]), https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/integridade-privada/avaliacao-e-promocao-da-integridade-privada/empresa-pro-etica and https://centralpaineis.cgu.gov.br/visualizar/painelproetica.

4.6. Aligning donors' efforts towards a whole-of-society approach to public integrity

Given the amounts of resources that they provide and their capacity to leverage technical knowledge, donors (i.e., countries, donor agencies, international financing institutions, multilateral financial institutions and international organisations) play an important role in the integrity systems of the countries they cooperate with. Donors have an influential role in policy making and implementation and can have an impact on a country's governance and socio-economic indicators. In this sense, the responsibility of donors is twofold: i) through the implementation of their own integrity standards in their operations and increasing transparency of their practices and procedures, and ii) through the support and contribution they make to different stakeholders and initiatives within a country's integrity system.

4.6.1. Prioritising locally led approaches, demanding impact and improving co-ordination can boost donors' contribution to public integrity in Jordan

Over the years, Jordan has qualified to receive Official Development Assistance (ODA) and related support from countries, donor agencies, international financing institutions, multilateral financial institutions and international organisations. Although the bilateral share (gross ODA) of Jordan has slightly decreased in the last years (from 86.3% in 2019 to 73.6% in 2021 (OECD, 2023[35])), the share of development aid to Jordan is still among the highest (Jordan is placed 6th in the top ten ODA recipients, for both DAC and non-DAC countries (OECD, 2023[35]). Moreover, the top ten donors to Jordan, except for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, are part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which has made pledges to several standards including policy coherence and civil society involvement, among others, and are signatories of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action.

As such, like CSOs and business, donors too are relevant societal actors in Jordan. Their commitment to integrity, through their own actions, the adherence to their own integrity standards and their support and contribution to advancing the country's integrity system, is key. Indeed, donors have been decisive in supporting both governmental and non-state actors in their efforts to promote and increase integrity in Jordan. For instance, through different Twinning Projects, several Jordanian public institutions with responsibilities in the public integrity system (e.g., JIACC and the Audit Bureau) have received support to strengthen their capacities. Donors also play a critical role in Jordan's effort to articulate and address regional, national and local agendas. However, through their actions and given the funds involved, international development agencies can also be part of the problem and unintendedly fuel corruption in the country or undermine incentives for reform through their responses to corruption cases.

The 2016 OECD Recommendation for Development Co-operation Actors on Managing the Risk of Corruption acknowledges this ambiguity. The 2016 Recommendation invites development partners to set up or revise their systems to manage risks of and respond to actual instances of corrupt practices in development co-operation (OECD, 2016[36]). Such a system should be implemented by international development agencies and their implementing partners when they are involved in the disbursement and/or management of aid (OECD, 2016[36]). This includes, for example, ensuring that agencies carry out corruption risk assessments, have internal prevention and detection measures in place and ensure effective internal and external auditing of their programmes. Furthermore, the 2016 Recommendation emphasises the relevance of joint and co-ordinated responses to cases of corruption involving aid as well as of taking into consideration the risks posed by the environment of operation. On the latter, the 2016 Recommendations concretely asks for "working collaboratively, providing resources and/or technical assistance, with recipients and grantees in the home country of the international development agency or in developing countries to improve their own corruption risk management systems" (OECD, 2016[36]).

More generally, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness aimed to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development through five fundamental principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation,

Results and Mutual Accountability (OECD, 2005[37]). The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action further complemented the 2005 Paris Declaration and reinforced, amongst others, the principle of ownership emphasising on making greater use of country's systems for aid delivery (OECD, 2008[38]).

However, the interviews in the country revealed some areas for improvement to increase impact on the integrity systems and probably on aid effectiveness in general:

- **Improving alignment with local needs.** Overall, CSOs have expressed discontent with donors' overemphasis on national-level agendas and the lack of focus on subnational needs. Because different donors have taken different approaches, it is not clear what portions of donors' efforts are directed at implementing programmes responding to local citizens' needs. Integrity initiatives are among the activities that require efforts at the municipal level for their effectiveness, as well as efforts that are knowledgeable of the context, the local social norms and that are aligned with local aspirations. The absence of decisive localisation efforts results in derailing funds for expensive diagnostics, imposing priorities, fuelling brain drain from the public sector and using intermediaries or foreign implementation partners. Discussions with key stakeholder from both the government and non-state actors highlighted the concern that donors, through higher over-heads and salaries, were taking skilled resources out of government and the CSO sector; this is an impact that localisation efforts should consider addressing or at least mitigating.

- **Improving impact and effectiveness.** Often, donor funded projects are cited by our interviewees to be costly and not resource efficient. Some actors noted that donors generally do not demand results or impact from their projects and do not undertake due diligence on their recipients. Also, integrity efforts are usually long-term initiatives that risk being finished abruptly the moment donor support ceases or staff rotates, and before they manage to create impact. A greater focus on outcomes and impact would benefit both taxpayers in Jordan and abroad. Moreover, according to some interviews, the allocation of donor funds results in competition among government agencies, among CSOs and among donors. It is unclear whether such behaviour improves policy and service delivery or creates duplication and inefficiency.

- **Improving co-ordination and accountability.** Interviews revealed a perception of a lack of transparency in the way how donors and developing agencies plan and implement programmes. Issues of duplication (overcharging the system), lack of co-ordination and lack of accountability of recipients appear to affect trust as well. For some interviewees, donors thereby contribute to the status quo and make change difficult, hollowing reform efforts.

Therefore, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), together with JIACC and potentially leveraging the interinstitutional co-ordination mechanism recommended in Chapter 1, could consider promoting official co-ordination channels among donors. This co-ordination should focus on supporting Jordan's anti-corruption and integrity efforts and aim at reducing duplication risks and prioritising allocations' alignment with national priorities and local needs in ways consistent with integrity policy targets. Indeed, international development agencies can play a key role in strengthening the country's integrity system by aligning behind and supporting Jordan's own strategic objectives and integrity actors in a co-ordinated way. The current NIACS (as well as the follow-up strategy after 2025, see Chapter 1), for example, provides a road map for support on integrity and anti-corruption and could be used to promote co-ordination meetings with donors to improve the alignment of their support, to ensure synergies and to avoid overlaps and gaps. Such co-ordination of course cannot come at the expense of necessary flexibility in development aid and needs to be efficient and accountable.

Donors could make efforts to sharpen the alignment of their programming to national and local needs as expressed by different stakeholders, and could seek to establish programme and knowledge stability, particularly in integrity related initiatives that require a long-term approach. Donors are also encouraged to lead by example and establish and implement standards of integrity, transparency and accountability as well as practices of monitoring and evaluation of their own programmes.

Chapter 4: Proposals for action

Fostering trust between Jordanian public institutions and citizens

- Jordan could further encourage citizens' participation and engagement in the development and implementation of the different elements of the public integrity system to strengthen trust in public institutions.

- JIACC could encourage discussions with citizens and public sector actors in view of clarifying shared values, norms and expectations. To create synergies with existing initiatives and ensure participation and engagement of stakeholders across the country, JIACC could partner with the PMIO and the MOLA. Additionally, discussions with citizens and public sector actors on shared values, norms and expectations could also be used to further raise awareness and provide clarity about the responsibilities of different public organisations particularly at the local level and the available accountability mechanisms.

Fostering citizens' commitment to public integrity in Jordan

- JIACC could reorient citizens' awareness raising activities from corruption towards integrity, considering carefully potential unintended consequences of communication strategies by using behavioural insights and methodologies aimed at promoting behavioural change. To monitor the effectiveness of the strategies, JIACC could use evaluation mechanisms such as public opinion surveys, web analytics, focus groups, participation in events, number of complaints submitted, among others.

- Jordan could further strengthen education for public integrity in schools and universities and could keep up the efforts to provide educators with the skills, knowledge and confidence they need to educate for public integrity. Such efforts should continue to be implemented in coordination with relevant stakeholders such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the National Curriculum Centre, among others.

Sharing the responsibility of promoting public integrity with civil society

- Jordan could further build capacities for social accountability and programme implementation to enable a stronger and more autonomous involvement of CSOs at the local level.

- Civil society organisations in Jordan could undertake autonomous self-regulation efforts to boost public integrity.

Strengthening the responsibility of the private sector for promoting public integrity and boosting economic modernisation efforts

- JIACC could disentangle the concept "private sector" and propose differential actions based on businesses' type, size, needs and potential contributions to public integrity in its next NIACS.

- Businesses and businesses associations in Jordan could step-up integrity self-regulatory efforts based on their type, size and sector. Additionally, they could exchange with JIACC on what the best role of JIACC could be to further promote such self-regulatory processes.

Aligning donors' efforts towards a whole-of-society approach to public integrity

- To boost their contribution to public integrity in Jordan, donors could prioritise locally led approaches, further demand impact from implementing partners and improve co-ordination among themselves.

- MOPIC, together with JIACC, could consider establishing official co-ordination channels among donors to support Jordan's anti-corruption and integrity efforts, to help reduce duplication risks and to prioritise allocations' alignment with national priorities and local needs in ways consistent with integrity policy targets.

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5 Strengthening the integrity risk management, internal control and audit framework in Jordan

This chapter discusses Jordan's integrity risk management, internal control, and audit arrangements, which are undergoing change. This entails a move towards integrating risk management across the public sector and the gradual adoption of ex-post control with the introduction of an internal audit function in alignment with international standards. Recommendations include codifying risk management practices into policies and tools for guidance, strengthening key internal controls and building an independent and capable internal audit function. The chapter also addresses Jordan's Supreme Audit Institution, the Audit Bureau, and recommends that the Audit Bureau's independence be reinforced. Other recommendations include enhancing the Audit Bureau's approach to engaging its stakeholders and making greater use of performance audits.

5.1. Introduction

The Jordanian integrity risk management, internal control and the audit framework is undergoing change. It is adopting an ex-post approach by strengthening independent oversight through the introduction of an internal audit function and the continued reinforcement of the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI); and it is in the early stages of implementing integrity risk management. This a critical juncture as the country launches ambitious plans to promote integrity and combat corruption (see Chapter 1). It is therefore important to design a control framework that is strong yet responsive to modernisation and pressure from citizens demanding accountability and transparency. A strong control framework assures efficiency and effectiveness of an organisation's operations.

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity recommends that public sector organisations apply an internal control and risk management framework and to ensure effective oversight (OECD, 2017[1]). This is essential to safeguarding public integrity (OECD, 2020[2]). For example, an organisation's ability to respond to risks that threaten its objectives is contingent upon its capacity for risk management. Risks confronting the Jordanian public sector can impact its ability to deliver services, to retain competent individuals and to safeguard its assets against fraud and corruption. Therefore, a robust risk management framework is crucial. It should be strategic, integrated entity-wide, and focussed on the achievement of objectives and decision-making (ISO, 2018[3]). The internal control system lays the foundation for risk management to support the achievement of integrity objectives as well as other strategic and operational objectives (OECD, 2020[2]). Its importance therefore cannot be understated. A healthy internal and external control environment will set the expectation for management and personnel to take ownership of risk management and ultimately set the tone for integrity. Box 5.1 provides a glossary of terms differentiating internal control concepts that may cause confusion.

Box 5.1. Glossary of terms related to internal control and internal audit

Internal Control: Internal control is a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and compliance.

Internal control activities: Internal control activities are policies, procedures, and activities to ensure that an organisation meets its objectives with regard to compliance with legal and other requirements, undertaking effective operations and transparent reporting. Effectively designed and implemented internal controls are key to addressing risks.

Preventive Control: An activity designed to deter unintended events from occurring. For example, the pre-approval of actions such as a procedure stating that a vendor invoice should be matched with the organisation's purchase order, prior to payment being made.

Detective Control: An activity designed to discover events that have already occurred. For example, reconciliations such as reviewing transaction records to ensure that payments made or received were accurate.

Internal audit: An independent and objective activity that provides assurance and advisory services with the aim of adding value to the department and improving its work. This activity helps achieve the department's objectives by adopting a systematic and organized approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of internal control, risk management, and governance. Internal audits are not undertaken by those responsible for implementing controls as internal audit operates independently of management responsibilities. Independence is secured when the head of the internal audit function reports directly to the highest decision-making authority with direct oversight of the organisation.

> **Monitoring**: Within the context of COSO's internal control framework, monitoring evaluates whether the controls in place are present and functioning. For example, monitoring may entail evaluating whether quality of information used in reconciling payables was appropriate or whether employees responsible for applying controls are sufficiently trained.
>
> Source: The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (2015), Leveraging COSO Across the Three Lines of Defense; The Official IIA Glossary (2020). Accessed at https://www.theiia.org/globalassets/documents/certifications/the-iia-official-glossary/official-iia-glossary-vietnamese.pdf on 11 March 2024; The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (2013), Internal Control - Integrated Framework. Framework and Appendices

This chapter looks into the Jordanian integrity risk management and audit framework and focuses in particular on the following three core elements:

- Implementing effective risk management as well as internal control and audit.
- Supporting the Internal Control System with the introduction of internal audit.
- Continue strengthening the external oversight provided by the Audit Bureau.

5.2. Implementing effective risk management as well as internal control and audit

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) has established key objectives for public integrity and thus has committed to numerous actions to this effect. The 2022 Public Sector Modernisation Roadmap outlines key areas for improvement that align with a more robust control environment. This includes the identification of roles and responsibilities in the integrity, transparency and accountability system, a renewed focus on attracting, developing, and retaining competent leaders and employees and the identification of clear and applicable roles and responsibilities in the integrity, transparency and accountability system that enhances the discretionary and preventive role of internal control units. The National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS) 2020-2025 commits to creating a culture of integrity and transparency with strategic projects aimed at capacity development (JIACC, 2019[4]).

Many of the projects considered in the NIACS are relevant for internal control. This includes, in particular, the following projects:

- Project No. 3: Enhance the role of liaison offices/representatives of the Commission (JIACC) at the public administration.
- Project No. 5: Identifying and assessing risks.
- Project No. 7: Activating the role of the internal control units in combating corruption.
- Project No. 8: Building the capabilities of the public administration employees in the field of integrity and anti-corruption.

Furthermore, the Jordanian Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), in collaboration with the NGO Al Hayat-RASED, launched the National Integrity Indicators (NII) project in August 2021 (see Chapter 2). The aim of the project is to "*push public administration institutions to engage in real and concrete actions to combat and prevent corruption through their application of integrity standards*" (RASED, n.d.). There are five National Integrity Standards (NIS) (JIACC, 2023[5]). The standard of accountability and the standard of good governance are of prime importance to risk management and internal control. Sub-criteria for the standard of accountability are: (1) Ensure that an internal control unit is in place and (2) Develop mechanisms to strengthen the role of the internal control units in the public sector. The standard of good governance sub-criteria includes risk and performance management, and a measurement indicator is "*the extent to which internal controls are documented and compliance with its recommendations*" (JIACC, 2023[5]).

In general, the responsibility for the implementation of risk management as well as internal control and audit across the public sector is shared among a variety of public sector organisations such as central harmonisation units, audit institutions and anti-corruption bodies (OECD, 2020[2]). The roles of such bodies include setting and harmonising internal control standards and policies; providing guidance and tools; evaluating government-wide efforts to safeguard integrity; and co-ordinating and standardising practices for reporting and responding to suspected integrity breaches for the public sector.

In Jordan, the Ministry of Finance, the Audit Bureau and the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission all play a key role in risk management and internal control within the public sector:

- **Ministry of Finance (MoF)**. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the Internal Control System according to the Internal Control Bylaw and therefore serves as the central harmonisation function. A central harmonisation unit is a body located within the executive branch and typically accountable to the Ministry of Finance that is responsible for internal control systems across the public sector. In Jordan, the Ministry of Finance has established a Central Internal Control Unit to oversee the compliance of the Internal Control Units (ICU) across the public sector. Furthermore, the Minister of Finance is responsible for forming a Central Committee for Internal Control Standards composed of multi-disciplinary members from government, academia, and the private sector. According to the Internal Control Bylaw, this Committee develops criteria for evaluating the performance of internal control units; it develops internal control policy, standards and procedures; and it builds institutional capacities of government departments and units.

- **Internal Control Units (ICU)**. The Internal Control Bylaw stipulates that each department should establish an Internal Control Unit that undertakes internal control and internal auditing of the financial, administrative, and technical transactions in accordance with the provisions of this system. The mission of the ICUs is to preserve public funds and ensure their proper use. They must ensure the accuracy of financial information, verify the effectiveness and efficiency of financial operations in place, ensure compliance with legislation and financial policies, and oversee administrative and technical areas (Internal Control Bylaw). The units report annually on their financial audit plan and any other work, on an as-needed basis. The Minister of Finance must also submit a summary of the reports of internal control in government departments and units to the Council of Ministers on an annual basis.

- **The Audit Bureau (AB)**. The Jordanian Audit Bureau is the Supreme Audit Institution of Jordan. Primarily, the AB undertakes compliance and financial audits, although in the last few years the AB has carried out some performance audits as well (European Commission, 2023[6]). The AB is also responsible for auditing the use of funds provided through international grants and loans. According to a Memorandum of Understanding between the AB and JIACC, the AB provides technical expertise to JIACC to investigate complaints and suspicions of corruption. AB officials also noted that they act on materially significant evidence provided by the public related to the misuse of public funds. Lastly, the AB has liaison officers located throughout all public sector departments. The Audit Bureau evaluates the ICUs, the internal control system, and recommends areas for their improvement (see below).

- **Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC).** The role of JIACC, described in detail throughout this OECD Integrity Review, also plays a role in risk management and oversight. Within its preventative function, JIACC undertakes corruption risk assessments in collaboration with ministries and institutions. Also, JIACC places liaison officers within departments and ministries to provide oversight; for example, liaison officers can attend procurement meetings and investigate adherence to national integrity standards and legislation (Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law 13). Amongst others, these liaison officers from JIACC have the task of helping to activate the Internal Control Units.

5.2.1. Building on recent progress, Jordan should support its commitment to integrity by implementing an integrated risk management framework

Risk management is fundamental to governance and to how an organisation is managed at all levels. It is integral to the creation, protection, and preservation of value (ISO, 2018[3]; COSO, 2013[7]). Within the context of the public sector, "value" refers to the proper management of public funds and serving the public interest (INTOSAI, 2019[8]). To support the achievement of its objectives, risk management equips an organisation to confront and control the myriad internal and external factors that can influence the fulfilment of its objectives.

Best practice posits that an effective risk management framework should be integrated across all organisational activities, it should be implemented by people at every level, and it should be supported by all stakeholders (ISO, 2018[3]; COSO, 2004[9]). Top management should demonstrate leadership and commitment to risk management (ISO, 2018[3]). For example, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, has outlined in its *Guide to Integrated Risk Management*, the importance of articulating a vision for a supportive risk management culture. It further recommends that organisations "*consider making a statement that clearly articulates the organisation's objectives for integrated risk management activities and demonstrates a commitment to implementing integrated risk management throughout the organisation*". The guide also speaks to the allocation of appropriate resources (people and tools) for the design, implementation, and maintenance of the risk management approach (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2016[10]).

OECD interviews with public officials discussed Jordan's current approach to risk management. All ministries and departments are required to have a Quality and Risk management unit. These units study "cases" to determine level of risk and present them to the Minister. Officials noted that the level of proficiency across these units was not uniform with some working well and others seeking to improve their capacity. More specifically, as of 2020, JIACC has undertaken to conduct risk assessments relating to corruption in the public sector. According to administrative regulations, teams from ministries and government departments (typically the Quality and Risk Management Units and legal experts) are formed to carry out corruption risk assessments. As part of this exercise, they work with an equivalent team at JIACC. Once risk mitigation measures have been identified and implemented, the ministerial teams and JIACC follow up to assess compliance. In this attempt to integrate the corruption risk assessment process throughout the public sector JIACC has made it mandatory that all public sector departments develop a risk management plan including a focus on corruption risks. More specifically, JIACC has issued memos to a few public institutions so that they may conduct their own risk assessments. The memo instructs that the corruption risk assessments be conducted by multi-disciplinary (technical, legal, and financial) and multi-level teams to ensure adequate coverage.

Although JIACC officials have described their risk assessment approach as new and are seeking to further develop capacity in this area, they have nonetheless developed an approach that consists of the following key steps: 1) identifying risks; 2) proposing a mechanism to address them; 3) putting this mechanism into practice; and 4) re-evaluating the change in the target sector (JIACC, 2021[11]). This aligns with some of the key elements of risk management best practice (Figure 5.1) that includes risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. JIACC has proposed guidance and tools for risk assessment including a risk assessment matrix, a risk assessment guideline, an opinion survey on risks for corruption and a risk assessment report.

Figure 5.1. JIACC's Methodology for identifying and assessing corruption risks vs. ISO 31000 Risk Management Process, that includes the components of risk assessment

Source: (ISO, 2018[3]) and (JIACC, 2021[11]).

JIACC reported in its 2021 annual report that these risk assessments had resulted in recommendations for the public sector entities of interest. For example, JIACC's risk assessments for the Jordan Customs Department found weak controls in procurement. Consequently, the studies recommended adherence to procurement legislation, the development of clear procedures for contract procurement, and the development of a conflict-of-interest policy for certain positions (JIACC, 2021[11]).

Although JIACC has taken the lead on undertaking corruption risk assessments and is encouraging other public sector actors to do the same, the overall risk management system in the Jordanian public sector remains immature and disjointed. There are over 200 departments and ministries, yet JIACC officials noted that it only has the capacity to undertake between 2-4 risk assessments per year. Conducting risk assessment in a piecemeal manner does not support an integrated approach to risk management and is not a comprehensive approach to supporting integrity. For example, communication and consultation methods for the collection, synthesis and sharing of information have not been established and there are no policies or plans to guide the overall process. Finally, there are reportedly weaknesses concerning the overarching commitment by senior leadership to adopting an integrated integrity risk management approach. For risk management to be effective, it should promote a continuous, proactive and systematic process that facilitates understanding, managing and communicating risk from an organisation-wide perspective (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2016[10]) (Box 5.2).

Box 5.2. The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's Integrated Risk Management Process

The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) is the administrative arm of Treasury Board; the management board of the federal government of Canada. TBS establishes policies and common standards for administrative and organisational practices across government. TBS has published a *Framework for the Management of Risk*, which is a principles-based approach that promotes sound risk management as fundamental to effective public administration.

Some of the principles outlined in this framework that contribute to effective risk management are:

- Government-wide decisions, resource allocations, business planning, and priorities are informed by risk.
- Balance should be sought between level of risk and corresponding controls in order to improve performance.
- Effective risk management should be inclusive, transparent, integrated and systematic.

The practical application of risk management principles outlined in the framework is contained within the *Guide to Integrated Risk Management.* This guide proposes an integrated risk management process that consists of a series of inter-connected steps that structure the identification, assessment, response, communication and monitoring of significant risks through an established governance structure.

It consists of the following:

1. **Understand the organisation and its context**: By establishing the context, the organisation articulates its objectives, and defines the external and internal parameters to be taken into account when managing risk.

2. **Establishing and Articulating Direction for Integrated Risk Management:** A clear articulation of the vision, objectives and operating principles may foster the creation and promotion of a supportive risk management culture. An organisation may wish to consider accountabilities and responsibilities for managing risk, commitment to adequately resource risk management activities, commitment to review and update the risk management approach, and adopting a methodology for measuring risk management performance.

3. **Accountability:** Establishing clear risk management roles, responsibilities and networks throughout the governance structure to ensure that key risks are appropriately managed.

4. **Resources**: Appropriate resources (people, tools) need to be allocated for the design, implementation and on-going conduct of risk management activities. Existing organisational tools and human resource skills can be leveraged and training provided to ensure a common understanding of risk management.

5. **Defining the Risk Management Process:** A process is required for a consistent approach to operationalizing integrated risk management across the organisation. There needs to be an integrated set of mechanisms for identifying, assessing, responding to, communicating and monitoring risk. Once defined, the process would be used to conduct formal risk assessments that should be embedded in existing structures and process to support risk-informed decision-making.

Generic Risk Management Process

Risk Identification: Identify and understand risks through various activities such as workshops, checklists, risk assessment exercise etc. A risk taxonomy can be used to ensure that risk identification considers a broad range of risks.

Risk Assessment: Risks are analysed and prioritized, which involves assessing likelihood and impact of risks. An organisation's risk tolerance should be defined to inform future actions. Tools for risk assessments include surveys and workshops.

Risk Response: The selection and implementation of measures to respond to a risk: accept, monitor, transfer, avoid threat, or reduce the risk and its impact. The risk response should be accompanied by specific actions, responsibilities and timelines.

> **Risk Communication:** Timely communication and reporting of risk information to the appropriate levels of the organisation to support decision-making.
>
> **Risk Monitoring**: Regular review of risk information to consider the impact of change on existing risk responses. It also involves the review of the risk responses to ensure that they are effectively implemented and achieve their planned results.
>
> **Establishing Communications and Reporting Mechanisms:** Maintaining communication channels to keep stakeholders informed of risk management processes, practices, and risk responses. It involves responding effectively to public concerns and expectations. In the interest of transparency, provide interested stakeholders with a snapshot of the organisation's key risks and what is being done to manage them.
>
> Source: (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2016[10]).

Regarding how risk assessment influences the design and implementation of internal controls, Jordan's default is to attempt to eliminate all risk of fraud or wrongdoing (PEFA, 2022[12]). Although this may lead to a system of robust controls, the trade-off is that resources are used inefficiently and other areas that could benefit from additional resources are neglected. This is important because in an environment constrained by financial and other resources that is seeking to promote integrity and combat corruption, limited resources should be allocated to areas of greatest risk. A risk management framework and accompanying guidance can provide the direction and information on how to approach risk management and make decisions on resources (Box 5.2).

Therefore, to ensure a standardised and co-ordinated approach to risk management, the current risk management practices should be embedded within an integrated risk management framework that is ultimately in service of achieving the organisation's objectives and in making informed decisions. This would entail senior management commitment, the assignment of clear roles and responsibilities and established means of co-operation among actors. Furthermore, an integrated risk management framework and guidance would require communication and consultation methods to facilitate information sharing and the receipt of feedback to make improvements. Effective risk management would necessitate codifying risk management practices into policies and tools such as risk assessment guidelines. An integrated risk management framework must also ensure that risk management is embedded within management processes such that it is a part of governance, leadership and is fundamental to how the organisation is managed at all levels.

For example, policy issued by the United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the central harmonisation function for the federal government, stipulates management responsibility for internal control and risk management (OMB, 2016[13]). The OMB Circular No. A-123 policy outlines risk management components, which aligns closely with the ISO 31000 Risk Management Process: risk identification, analysis and evaluation of risk, risk response, monitoring and review, communication and consultation, and reporting and recording risk information. The policy also describes the governance structure best suited to implementing risk management and it recommends that responsibility for risk management be shared from the highest levels of executive leadership to service delivery staff executing programmes. The policy further stipulates the development of a risk profile – an analysis of an entity's risks to achieving its objectives and the identification of options for addressing those risks. Of note is the policy's requirement for management to consider fraud risks (OMB, 2016[13]). This policy defines key risk terms such as risk tolerance and risk appetite and encourages the opening of communication channels to ensure the right information is obtained to inform decisions.

Finally, effective risk management cannot be implemented without skilled and competent professionals who can use systems and tools to undertake effective risk management processes. The Commonwealth of Australia's risk management framework, for example, acknowledges that all staff have a role to play in risk management and that staff should be well-skilled, training and adequately resourced. Clear roles and responsibilities must be assigned, and staff should have the opportunity for ongoing development of their risk management competencies. Moreover, systems and tools are necessary to provide storage and accessibility of risk information. Systems and tools should be adapted to the needs of the organisation and should fulfil certain functions: the ability to store required data that will inform decisions; the ability to be modified to improve utilisation and functionality and the provision of timely and accurate information for communication to stakeholders (Commonwealth of Australia – Department of Finance, 2023[14]).

5.2.2. Management should be empowered to take ownership of risk management and the design and implementation of internal controls

Clear roles and responsibilities are critical to ensuring that all actors understand how to address risk management and internal controls. Such clarity is important in defining how they coordinate with each other and in preventing gaps or duplication. The Institute of Internal Auditors' Three Lines Model sets out a clear framework for the establishment of roles and the division of responsibilities for the management of risks and internal control (IIA, 2020[15]) (Figure 5.2). Under this model, three functions (lines) within the organisation are integral for effecting risk management and designing, implementing, and assessing internal control.

They are overseen by senior management and the organisation's governing body:

- The first line constitutes management who is on the front line of operations. They are responsible for owning and managing risk and control.
- The second line consists of supportive functions such as financial control, risk management, compliance and quality management that are put in place by management. They are responsible for monitoring risk management and internal controls.
- The third line is internal audit. They are independent from management responsibilities and provide independent and objective assurance and advice to senior management on the effectiveness of risk management, governance and internal controls.

Figure 5.2. The 3 Lines Model

Source: (IIA, 2020[15])

Management responsibility comprises both the first- and second-line roles where the first line role is directly responsible for operations and the second line role is complementary and focuses on risk (IIA, 2020[15]). Figure 5.2 provides a visual description of this framework, an international best practice. This is a sage approach, because management's expertise in operations can be leveraged to design and implement controls that are risk-based, including around integrity and anti-corruption. Controls that are risk-based can be more preventive and detective in nature, and can complement the work of other actors, such as JIACC's work in enforcement (Chapter 6). For example, putting in place a proper system for defence against fraud requires having an effective system of internal controls (IIA, 2019[16]). Internal controls include procedures such as requiring multiple signatures on high-value transactions or protocols such as requiring employees to take vacation time to prevent continual manipulation of records (IIA, 2019[16]). An internal control system that is effective against fraud and wrongdoing should target all aspects of the fraud triangle: financial pressure that cannot be solved through legitimate means; perceived opportunity to commit fraudulent activity without fear of being caught; and rationalisation that the fraudulent activity is somehow justified (ACFE, 2023[17]). Management is well-placed to identify the areas where the application of an internal control may be appropriate.

In Jordan, similar to many countries in the region (Box 5.3), the hierarchical and centralised structure of the public service currently makes it difficult for management to assume responsibility for both risk management and the design and implementation of internal controls (PEFA, 2022[12]). Thus, the first line is currently not assumed by management. Rather, the internal control units placed within each public sector entity assume this function. They are responsible for verifying transactions before they are incurred, such as checking payments before disbursement or reviewing salaries to ensure compliance with legislation (PEFA, 2022[12]). Stakeholders referred to these activities as 'pre-audit'. Stakeholders also described the second line function, noting that financial controllers and financial inspectors were responsible for ensuring departments do not exceed their allocated budgets and examining issues deemed necessary for further inspection.

> **Box 5.3. The hierarchical culture impedes managerial responsibility over Internal Control**
>
> Public institutions of the middle east are typically characterised by high degrees of centralisation and "strong government executives". This creates a control environment with low managerial responsibility and accountability due to lack of delegation, as decisions are taken at the higher levels. Because of this, line managers and staff tend not to be aware that their responsibilities also include internal control and risk management.
>
> For management to properly assume the first line, there must be the recognition that internal control and risk management should flow through entity processes and that everybody has a role and is involved to different extents. Coupled with this, training and capacity building should be undertaken to ensure that staff can discharge their responsibilities vis-à-vis internal control and risk management and to understand that internal control is not distinct from daily governance and core operations.
>
> Source: (OECD, 2017[18]).

It would therefore be of value for the Jordanian public sector to consider how it may align its internal control system with the Three Lines Model to ensure clearly delineated roles amongst all actors. Implicating managers—those on the front lines of operations and service delivery—in managing risk and designing, implementing, and monitoring internal controls would align with best practice (Figure 5.2). This may be particularly beneficial for the Jordanian public sector, as the current approach to the design and implementation of controls is, as mentioned above, to attempt to eliminate all risk rather than assessing risk and tailoring controls in accordance with the significance of those risks. This has implications for the efficient use of resources and the effectiveness of current controls (this is described in further detail in below). The Ministry of Finance should develop and implement policies assigning the first line role to management.

Furthermore, assigning management responsibility for risk management and internal control creates communication channels with the governing body and the rest of the organisation on the achievement of objectives and risks that may threaten objectives (IIA, 2020[15]). Communication methods facilitate the sharing of information and feedback, which can further reinforce the capacity to identify risks and respond with effective internal controls.

5.3. Supporting the transition of the Internal Control System from ex-ante to ex-post

5.3.1. The Ministry of Finance should ensure that the public sector is equipped to assume ex-post internal control

Internal control represents the processes in place to provide reasonable assurance that an organisation's objectives are being met. These objectives are efficient and effective operations, compliance with legislation and policies and timely and transparent financial and non-financial reporting (COSO, 2013[7]). Common internal controls include authorisation and approval procedures; spending limits; segregation of duties; reconciliations; system passwords; and ongoing monitoring and review. These processes also function to curb potential fraudulent behaviour (OECD, 2019[19]). Although internal controls can be broad, most countries have tended to focus on those related to the legality of spending (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2006[20]).

Internal control systems fall into one of two camps: ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante controls are compliance oriented. Thus, the focus is placed on verifying that an action (such as a payment) is allowed and that all supporting documentation is in place before that action is undertaken (OECD, 2017[18]). Ex-post control, on the other hand, furnishes management with the freedom to allocate financial and non-financial resources, which is then checked after the fact (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2006[20]). The ex-ante approach places emphasis on legality and compliance while the ex-post approach places emphasis on performance. Typical ex-ante internal controls include spending limits and signing authorities, while that of ex-post are, for example, spending reports and internal financial audits (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2006[20]). OECD member countries over the years have gravitated towards an ex-post internal control system as government budgets have grown and greater emphasis has been placed on the performance of government versus compliance with the law. Technological advancements and decentralisation have also contributed to this reform (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2006[20]).

Jordan's top-down budgeting structure requires strong ex-ante control as a means of ensuring that the government spends no more than it is allocated. Jordan's internal controls focus on compliance with regulations and involve multiple layers of ex-ante review in the areas of finance and accounting, payroll and procurement (OECD, 2017[18]). These layers of review consisted of each department's internal control unit, Ministry of Finance financial controllers and, ex-ante review by the Audit Bureau auditors (although this has lessened in recent years). This "heavy apparatus of control" is maintained by dedicating significant resources and procedures to layers of supervision for each expenditure transaction (PEFA, 2022[12]). The trade off from having a robust internal control system with extensive controls and inspection, is inefficiency. Furthermore, overreliance on the Ministry of Finance inspectors and to a lesser degree, the Audit Bureau, to detect irregularities may create a lack of accountability by absolving decision-makers of their responsibilities to ensure regularity and adherence to requirements. And directing significant resources to enforce strict compliance with regulations may impede the performance of systems and the delivery of services. Furthermore, the bureaucratic and hierarchical management style that currently characterises the Jordanian public sector may enable an ex-ante internal control system, but it can inhibit an ex-post internal control system. A key feature of an ex-post internal control system is that managers are delegated the responsibility to allocate resources, make decisions and manage risk which are then checked after the fact. (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2006[20]).

Present-day, Jordan finds itself in a similar situation as OECD European countries did years ago in transforming their internal control system from ex-ante to an ex-post (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2006[20]; PEFA, 2022[12]). As Jordan modernises, becomes more technologically savvy and continues to be a beneficiary of significant sums of donor funding, enhancing government performance becomes paramount, particularly considering Jordan's commitments to integrity and anti-corruption. However, there continues to be numerous controls and inspection activities, such as in payroll control, non-salary spending, and strong internal controls within the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS) (PEFA, 2022[12]). Despite this, there are areas where internal control is weak due to lack of automation or the standardisation of processes, particularly at the municipality level. Interviews with Jordanian officials also noted internal control disparities across the public sector and internationally accepted accounting principles were not applied equally.

Therefore, efforts should be made to reinforce those controls by standardising processes and automating where necessary, as some ex-ante control is important, particularly in a top-down budget environment. It is therefore incumbent on the Ministry of Finance to ensure that the current internal control system is not open to undue risk by maintaining key controls and reinforcing those that are weak. Key to this transition though would entail assessing the trade-off of applying burdensome internal controls and the limited benefit obtained from the risks mitigated by those controls. This should be followed by relinquishing those controls for which there is little benefit and too high a cost in maintaining it. This goes hand-in-hand with decision-makers adopting a healthier risk appetite as they empower managers to take responsibility for internal control and risk management and place greater reliance on internal and external audit. Managers therefore

should be empowered and provided with relevant training to assume responsibility for internal control and risk management.

As it moves towards ex-post control, the Jordanian public sector must recognise that such a reform is not without risks and challenges for which the system must be well equipped to handle. There has been noteworthy progress with the partial retreat of external audit (the Audit Bureau) from ex-ante control and the introduction of internal audit (see next section) role. The challenge that remains, however, is to maintain key internal controls that safeguard against fraud and wrongdoing and relinquish those that are costly, onerous and afford minimal benefit. This can liberate resources that can be allocated towards more effective internal controls as well as the establishment of internal audit.

5.3.2. The Internal Control Units should be supported in assuming the third line

A key feature of the ex-post system is the independent assurance and advice provided by an internal audit function. Internal audit provides an assessment of how well internal controls are functioning and can be instrumental in fraud detection and mitigation (IIA, 2019[16]). For example, management is well placed to implement internal controls that target fraudulent activity. In turn, internal audit can support management in this function by identifying potential fraud risks and suggesting internal controls that target all three aspects of the fraud triangle (IIA, 2019[16]).

Recent achievements in the development of internal audit, according to Jordan's Public Financial Management Strategy 2022-2025, have included the development of an internal audit approach, a special methodology to assess the internal control system, and internal audit documents such as a charter and procedure manual. The Ministry of Finance's Internal Audit Charter includes a definition of internal audit that aligns with international standards. An audit charter asserts the independence of the internal audit function, its unrestricted access to information and personnel, and the freedom to determine its scope of work and when and how it reports its findings (IIA, 2017[21]).

Stakeholders noted the attempt in recent years to change the profile of internal control units, using the terms 'pre-audit' and 'post-audit to describe 1) ex ante: verifying transactions prior to them being incurred and 2) ex-post: the retroactive assessment of controls, respectively. The current initiative to transition internal control units from ex ante to ex post has generated some resistance among stakeholders. Firstly, stakeholders noted that removing the internal control units from an ex-ante ('pre-audit') function to assume an ex-post or internal audit function ('post audit') would result in the loss of public funds, because the internal control units perform a critical function of verifying transactions before they are incurred and at times verify the transaction after the fact. Stakeholders also noted that complete coverage of all administrative processes to ensure controls were applied was still lacking, therefore the system could not afford to remove the internal control units from ex ante control. Adopting ex-post control would ensure that the party responsible for internal audit was independent from management functions such as applying internal controls.

To illustrate the difference between internal controls and internal audit, Figure 5.3 provides an overview of a generic cash payments cycle (i.e., the process followed by an organisation to pay a vendor for services rendered or products delivered once an invoice has been submitted to the organisation). This process spans three separate divisions to ensure the segregation of duties, an important control against fraud. Each division is identified according to its appropriate "line" from the "Three Lines" model described in Figure 5.2. To ensure that the payment is legitimate, the procurement unit will match the vendor invoice to the document issued by the purchasing department for fulfilment by the vendor. Once the two documents line up and the invoice is approved, a second check is undertaken by a controller prior to instructing the treasurer to make the payment. In this generic scenario, the function of internal control units, as described by stakeholders in Jordan, would likely entail verifying the transaction before it is made, thereby acting as the 2nd line. Note that an internal audit function would not participate in this process at all to safeguard its independence.

Figure 5.3. Generic example of the cash payments cycle and the placement of the 3 Lines

Vendor	1st Line Procurement unit	2nd Line Controller	Treasurer	3rd Line Internal Audit
	Procurement order ①			Internal audit is completely removed from Steps 1-5 Rather internal audit assesses this process to determine whether the 1st and 2nd lines actions are consistent with requirements.
Vendor invoice	Vendor invoice ②	Approved vendor invoice ③	Approved vendor invoice	
		Payment voucher	Payment voucher ④	
Cheque	Cheque	⑤	Cheque	
	(1) The Purchasing division receives the vendor invoice from the vendor and matches it with the purchase order. (2) The purchase order is marked as closed and the approval is forwarded to the Controller.	(3) The Controller matches the approved vendor invoice to their files and issues a payment voucher. (5) The Treasurer forwards the vendor cheque to purchasing who in turn forwards the payment to the vendor.	(4) The treasurer prepares a cheque for the vendor upon receipt of the payment voucher and approved vendor invoice.	

Source: CIA Review. Part 1: Essentials of Internal Auditing. Gleim Publications, Gainesville, Florida, 2019

Indeed, internal audit provides an independent and objective assessment; this is incompatible with direct involvement in the implementation of controls or undertaking risk management. This nuance is particularly important within the context of the Jordanian public sector where the internal audit function has been assumed by internal control units who are also responsible for ensuring controls were implemented. Successful implementation of an internal audit function necessitates safeguarding its independence where it reports directly to the head of the organisation and is independent of management duties.

As already mentioned, stakeholders in Jordan conveyed that internal control units played a critical role in the implementation of controls, particularly in light of fraud. Stakeholders noted that in some government departments, internal control units were directly involved in approving spending and thus were at the heart of operations. Furthermore, stakeholders emphasized the inherent conflict and impediment to independence if internal control units were expected to assume responsibility for applying internal controls while also undertaking the internal audit function. If internal control units are to assume responsibility for internal audit, they cannot also be charged with implementing internal controls, and therefore alternative arrangements would have to be made to re-establish the internal control function once held by the internal control units. This would entail amending the Internal Control Bylaw to distinguish the responsibility of internal control (management), from the responsibility of internal audit (an independent entity within the organisation). This arrangement could result from a cleavage of the existing internal control units where one half of the unit is now responsible for the internal audit function that reports directly to the head of the organisation (to assure independence) and has the capacity to undertake this work and the other half retains the original role of implementing internal controls. In addition, managers should be implicated in applying controls with support from the second line such as compliance or inspection departments. It is the prerogative of the Ministry of Finance on how it decides to move forward, nevertheless separating the internal audit function from that of implementing internal control should remain at the forefront of its decision-making.

Despite the resistance of some stakeholders to internal control units assuming the internal audit function, internal control units have been adopting this function in the last few years. In fact, the Audit Bureau

assessed some internal control units in 2022 for fiscal year 2021. The assessment revealed weaknesses in audit skills, internal audit standards and methodology, and highlighted impairments to independence. Additionally, a 2023 evaluation of 131 internal control units by the Audit Bureau assessed about 60% of them as being weak. Stakeholders noted however that additional training was being provided in response to these results (see next section that describes the potential impacts of this form of assessment on the Audit Bureau's independence).

Furthermore, the 2022 report on Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability found that there remained areas for improvement regarding the internal control units' continued focus on compliance as opposed to assessing overall performance and outcomes (PEFA, 2022[12]). Internal audit should add value by identifying areas where controls are weak or lacking or conversely highlight good practices adopted to curb fraud and corruption. Therefore, using internal audit simply to ensure compliance with regulations does not take advantage of the potential of internal audit to improve the effectiveness of controls. Consequently, there are opportunities for capacity building and training of internal control units to raise their level of proficiency in line with international standards, if internal control units are expected to assume the role of an internal audit function.

5.4. Continue strengthening the external oversight provided by the Audit Bureau

Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) are public bodies that operate at arm's length from government and report to Parliament. This ensures their independence as they undertake objective assessments of the performance of governments in responsibly and effectively spending public funds and in delivering required services and programmes to their citizens. SAI's will undertake financial audits to determine whether the government's financial statements are reflective of an organisation's financial performance. Compliance audits, assessing the legality of transactions, and performance audits, assessing the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of activities, programmes, and operations, are also undertaken by SAIs.

5.4.1. Jordan should continue to strengthen the Audit Bureau's independence to fulfil its mandate

The chief hallmark of a SAI, such as the Audit Bureau in Jordan, is its independence. This precondition allows the Audit Bureau to objectively assess government's management of financial and operational activities and to communicate these results to taxpayers and their representatives in Parliament. An SAI's independence has many facets including security of tenure and legal immunity of the head of the SAI, in addition to financial and administrative autonomy (INTOSAI, 2007[22]). In the area of anti-corruption activities, SAIs can have an impact where their independence is respected and where they have sufficient capacity and resources to undertake their work (Schöberlein, 2019[23]).

Jordan's constitutional and legal framework makes provisions for the independence of the Audit Bureau. The Constitution of 1952 stipulates that the law shall provide for the immunity of the head of the SAI. Since coming into force, the Audit Bureau Law has been amended several times to incrementally reinforce the Audit Bureau's independence (European Commission, 2023[6]).

The current Audit Bureau Law 28 specifies the Audit Bureau's independence in the following ways:

- Article 2 stipulates the Audit Bureau's financial and administrative independence.
- Article 2 further states that the President prepares the Audit Bureau's annual budget and sends it to the Prime Minister for inclusion in the general budget in accordance with established procedures.
- Article 5 stipulates that the head is appointed by royal decree based on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. This appointment is communicated to the House of Representatives. The head cannot be removed, transferred, forced to retire or have disciplinary penalties imposed except with the approval of the House of Representatives, if the Council of Ministers is assembled. If the Council of Ministers is not assembled, the King, based on their recommendation can remove,

transfer, force to retire or have disciplinary penalties imposed on the head of the Audit Bureau. In this case, the Prime Minister will brief the Council of Ministers once they have assembled.

Concerning the protection of the head of the Audit Bureau, the law confers immunity from prosecution resulting from the normal discharge of the head's responsibilities. However, the law is silent on a set appointment term for the head of the Audit Bureau. A pre-determined and fixed term that is sufficiently long would allow the head to discharge their responsibilities with confidence (INTOSAI, 2007[22]). This is particularly important as the Audit Bureau is modernising to align their practices with international standards and to raise the profile of the Audit Bureau (as described below). Furthermore, although approval must be sought from the House of Representatives to remove, transfer, force to retire or impose disciplinary penalties, the initial appointment is not subject to their approval as the royal decree is informed solely by the Executive. Jordan could therefore consider that the House of Representatives be included in the decision to appoint the Head of the Audit Bureau to ensure a participatory and open process.

The Mexico Declaration of SAI independence asserts that SAIs should have sufficient resources to fulfil their mandate and the Executive should not control or direct access to these resources (INTOSAI, 2007[22]). However, the current law allows for the scrutiny of the Audit Bureau's budget by the Ministry of Finance (European Commission, 2023[6]). This interference could potentially impede the Audit Bureau's work as there is the opportunity for the Executive to deny the Audit Bureau the resources necessary to carry out its mandate. The Audit Bureau's financial independence should therefore be strengthened by preventing the influence of the Executive on its proposed budget.

Another means by which an SAI exercises its independence is in the administration of its human resources. This allows the SAI to recruit the manpower it deems suitable to carry out the work of the institution and to determine appropriate pay scales. In the past, the Audit Bureau had typically obtained its personnel through the centralised public sector human resources service. Stakeholders have noted that co-ordination with this centralised service limits the independence of the Audit Bureau in the recruitment of its staff. This is reflected in the Audit Bureau's 2021-2023 Strategic Plan that identified the Audit Bureau's financial and administrative independence and legal immunity as a weakness. The latest proposed amendments to the Audit Bureau law were in 2022, and there are plans to further amend the law as stated in the 2024-2027 operational plan, including incorporating a provision to follow up on recommendations.

An SAI enjoys its independence by determining the scope of the work that it undertakes, by having unfettered access to documentation and personnel and by publicising freely the results of its assessments (INTOSAI, 2007[22]). The Audit Bureau has the latitude to determine its scope of work as it sees fit and has the power to audit all government departments, ministries, municipalities, universities and companies in which the government owns 50% or more of its shares. The Audit Bureau also audits international grants and loans. With regard to accessing information, Audit Bureau stakeholders noted that they sometimes encountered difficulty in obtaining documentation from audit entities either in a timely manner or even at all. Stakeholders felt that this was due to a lack of accountability and recourse. Increased engagement with audit entities about the Audit Bureau's work, its legal mandate and ability to hold government to account may compel audited entities to be more cooperative. A stakeholder engagement strategy might be useful in this case. See the section below on stakeholder engagement for more details.

Finally, the type of work undertaken by the Audit Bureau as well as where it does its work can also impact the Audit Bureau's real or perceived independence. As mentioned above, the Audit Bureau undertakes assessments and provides recommendations to the internal control units, which may be useful to promote improvement in their performance and may foster coordination and cooperation between external and internal audit. However, this form of assessment more closely resembles management advice and feedback, but it is more appropriate for the Audit Bureau's work regarding internal control and internal audit to be undertaken within the context of an audit. This may be an acceptable interim measure to facilitate the development of internal control units that do not yet exhibit the maturity and proficiency to undertake their internal audit functions, particularly in light of its past ex ante functions. However, it can infringe on

the Audit Bureau's independence and objectivity where the Audit Bureau is perceived as being responsible for improving the internal control units' weaknesses; which is a management function.

The Audit Bureau should therefore transition away from this advisory work and fully embrace its role as an independent assurance provider. Instead, the Ministry of Finance, in its central harmonisation role, should provide guidance and oversight to internal control units to build their capacity and promote their independence. The Audit Bureau can add value through both financial and performance audits where it can assess the internal control system and/or the internal audit function (as described in Box 5.4).

Furthermore, Audit Bureau stakeholders mentioned that the majority of their auditors were located in the spending units of other departments as opposed to Audit Bureau premises. While this was likely due to the Audit Bureau's past role in ex ante control of departments, its retreat from this function over the years begs the question of why as many auditors continue to reside at departments to which they do not belong. This can impede the Audit Bureau's independence as auditors are perceived as belonging to the departments that they audit. This arrangement may also hamper auditor objectivity as they are tasked with auditing those with whom they are co-located. This arrangement may also complicate internal communication within the Audit Bureau and the harmonisation of audit approaches. The Audit Bureau should therefore reconsider this arrangement, by scrutinizing how auditors located in departments impact the Audit Bureau's independence and by considering the potential benefits of relocating auditors to Audit Bureau premises.

Box 5.4. The Office of the Auditor General of Canada's performance audits on the federal government's internal audit activity

From 1999 to 2002, the professional practice of internal auditing underwent significant change. The Institute of Internal Auditors adopted a new definition for internal auditing which included an assurance and consulting role for internal audit, followed by a new professional practices framework. During that time, the government of Canada also emphasized the role of internal audit in providing assurance services to senior management in its Independent Panel's Report on the Modernization of Comptrollership within the Government of Canada.

In 2004, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) assessed whether a sample of departments and agencies complied with internal audit policy to determine whether the internal audit functions were independent and received support from senior management. The audit also assessed the internal audit functions' effectiveness in terms of whether auditors exercised due professional care, the extent to which internal audit provided coverage on internal control, governance and risk management and whether a quality assurance process was in place, The OAG found considerable variation in the organisations it assessed and proposed several recommendations to improve the quality of the internal audit across the government in the areas of independence, human resource capacity, and focus on assurance services.

A follow up audit in 2011, found that the government had made progress in acting upon the commitments it made in response to the observations and recommendations of the 2004 audit. Areas of improvements included independence, and strengthened internal audit capacity that were in conformance with internal audit policy and professional standards. The audit also found that the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada (the central harmonisation unit) had developed tools and guidance for the internal audit community.

Source: Office of the Auditor of Canada (2004): Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons – Chapter 1 Internal Audit in Departments and Agencies. Accessed at Chapter 3—Internal Audit (publications.gc.ca); and Office of the Auditor General of Canada (2011): Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Common – Chapter 3 Internal Audit. Accessed at 2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada - March (publications.gc.ca).

5.4.2. The Audit Bureau could consider performance audits that assess efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control system and other areas relevant to strengthening the integrity system

The Audit Bureau has undertaken many initiatives and improvements over the last several years to strengthen its capacity. Of note is the Audit Bureau's involvement in Twinning Projects funded by the European Commission, where the focus has been to modernise by adopting audit software and computer assisted auditing techniques. Other areas identified for capacity building include implementing quality assurance processes for the audit process and implementing a risk-based approach for audit selection (European Commission, 2023[6]). The Audit Bureau should continue to modernise its audit processes through the adoption of IT and to align its methodology with international best practice.

Although the Audit Bureau focusses primarily on undertaking financial and compliance audits, it also undertakes performance audits, but to a lesser degree (European Commission, 2023[6]). Compliance audits are valuable, in that they reveal where there are non-compliances with regulations and processes, and they provide recommendations to curb such non-compliance. Thus, they can play a role in helping to reinforce the internal control system (INTOSAI, 2019[24]). Compliance audits, however, are limited in their ability to showcase whether an overall system is working effectively or efficiently, which is what a performance audit can do. For example, a performance audit will assess whether the systems and processes in place to safeguard a procurement process are working well, while a compliance audit will assess whether there is conformance with procurement regulations. Although both are beneficial, performance audits are more likely to speak to transparency and fairness of the procurement process, while the compliance audit would not have this level of insight (INTOSAI, 2019[25]). Therefore, performance audit can be effective within the context of promoting integrity and controlling anti-corruption. Box 5.5 provides an example of the findings of an Australian performance audit on procurement.

Box 5.5. The Australian National Audit Office's 2022 Audit on Procurement

The National Capital Authority (NCA) manages and maintains assets for the national capital, Canberra. Most assets are maintained under competitively tendered contracts and represent some of the Capital's most nationally and culturally significant landscapes and attractions. Procurement is therefore the core business of the National Capital Authority. In 2019–20 and 2020–21, there were 327 contracts with a total value of $69.9 million AUD.

In 2022, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) undertook a performance audit of procurement of the NCA. The objective of the audit was to examine whether the NCA's procurement activities were complying with procurement rules and whether they demonstrated value for money.

The audit examined a sample of 42 procurement contracts to provide coverage across the different procurement approaches employed by the NCA. The audit found that the NCA did not sufficiently use open and competitive procurement processes and that the NCA's procurement approach was not sufficiently open and fair. For example, tender documentation often included conditions that limited competition and where suppliers were approached directly thereby limiting the pool of potential suppliers to those that had been previously engaged by the NCA. The audit also found that the NCA did not comply with procurement rules in that it did not always demonstrate that the contracts awarded would provide the best value for money.

Some of the recommendations included increasing the extent to which the NCA employs open competitive procurement processes and improving the NCA's controls over the use of procurement methods where contractors were approached directly.

Source: Australian Government – National Capital Authority: What we do. Accessed at https://www.nca.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do on 12 March 2024; Australian National Audit Office (2022) Auditor General Report No. 30 of 2021-22: Procurement by the National Capital Authority. Accessed at https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/procurement-the-national-capital-authority#para-2-3

Typically, the head of a Supreme Audit Institution has a legal mandate to exercise their discretion in undertaking performance audits. For example, Canada's *Auditor General Act* affords the Auditor General broad powers to "*call attention to anything that he considers to be of significance and of a nature that should be brought to the attention of the House of Commons*". This would include any cases where money has been expended without due regard to economy or efficiency or where there have been no established measures to report on the effectiveness of programmes. The Australian Auditor General Act also affords the Auditor General similar discretion. The Act states that the Auditor General "*may at any time conduct a performance audit of commonwealth entities and companies*" where a performance audit is described as a review or examination of any aspect of the operations of a body.

Although the Audit Bureau has undertaken performance audits, they have focussed primarily on environmental issues and there has been little coverage over the delivery of main public services (European Commission, 2023[6]). As the internal control system matures and transitions to an ex-post system, the Audit Bureau can leverage its growing capacity for performance audit to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control system. Performance audits can provide the insight into root causes of system failures or inefficiencies. Thus, a performance audit can facilitate the necessary action to address these issues from their point of origin.

Furthermore, the Audit Bureau enjoys a co-operative relationship with JIACC through a memorandum of understanding that promotes exchange of information and technical expertise. The Audit Bureau can further strengthen that relationship by targeting its performance audits on areas of mutual interest such as procurement or financial management at the municipality level. Providing insight into root causes of corruption may complement the work of JIACC in prevention, detection and enforcement. The Audit Bureau should therefore continue to strengthen its capacity to undertake performance audits and consider undertaking performance audits in areas of interest to both JIACC and the Audit Bureau.

5.4.3. The Audit Bureau could work on a stakeholder engagement strategy aimed at leveraging and promoting the impact of its work

Given a SAI's role in helping to ensure transparency of government operations and holding the government to account for its stewardship of public funds, it is crucial to have the trust and the attention of the legislature and the public (INTOSAI, 2016[26]). To be effective, SAIs require a supporting institutional context, such as parliamentary oversight of its work (Schöberlein, 2019[23]). In OECD interviews with the Audit Bureau, officials expressed that the Audit Bureau was seen as a trusted institution in the eyes of the public, often due to their work in uncovering corruption.

However, there is also limited understanding by stakeholders about the full scope of the Audit Bureau's work and its role in accountability. Audit Bureau public officials conveyed to the OECD during interviews that it publishes one annual report containing a summary of each audit completed. Audit Bureau officials further described that when the annual report is published and sent to Parliament, Parliamentary sessions are covered by the media. The Audit Bureau's annual report submitted to the legislature has been described as lacking simplicity and not being user-friendly, however (European Commission, 2023[6]). Moreover, the 2021 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability report found that legislative scrutiny of the Audit Bureau's audit reports were delayed and few hearings to discuss audit findings were held. This represents an opportunity for the Audit Bureau to reconsider how it engages with the legislative and other stakeholders, including how it presents its findings and explore whether to publish the full audit reports to increase accountability of audited entities. Principle 6 of the Mexico Declaration of SAI Independence states that SAIs are free to publish and disseminate their reports once formally tabled or delivered to the appropriate authority.

The Audit Bureau may therefore want to consider developing a stakeholder engagement strategy. This could entail defining the various means by which information is communicated to diverse audiences, including the public, who according to international standards, are entitled to access the full reports.

Exploring alternative communication tools to convey key messages could be of value, such as the use of visual depictions (infographics). Box 5.6 shows some examples from Canada.

Box 5.6. Audit findings can be conveyed in a reader friendly manner through visual depictions and snapshots highlighting key information: The experience of the Auditor General of Canada

In its 2022-23 Commentary on Financial Audits of federal organisations, the Auditor General of Canada made observations on significant findings identified as part of the audit on the Government of Canada's consolidated financial statements. To showcase deficiencies noted in general controls over key government IT systems, it used an infographic to describe types of IT controls:

Figure 5.4. Exhibit 3 – Information Technology (IT) general controls

Types of IT general controls	Description
Manage access	These controls prevent unauthorized users from accessing systems and data. For example, a username and password are required to gain access to a database, or a security badge is required to gain entry to a secure room.
Manage change	These controls prevent inappropriate changes to IT systems infrastructure. For example, changes prepared by one person must be approved by a separate person before they are implemented.
Manage IT operations	These controls are routine tasks performed to ensure systems operate as intended. For example, an error message occurs when transaction records are transferred between systems in a way that is incomplete or inaccurate.

Furthermore, to depict weaknesses in the internal controls of human resources processes (entering employee pay data into the human resource system and issuing payment), the report included a graph to show the errors in employees' pay:

Figure 5.5. Exhibit 4 – Percentage of employees in our sample with an error in basic or acting pay and who are awaiting a correction at year-end

Source: The Office of the Auditor General (2023[27]), *Commentary on the 2022-2023 Financial Audits*, https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_202310_00_e_44330.html.

The Audit Bureau could also consider formalising its relationship with the legislature by proposing more frequent hearings to discuss audit findings. On the one hand, the Audit Bureau could aim ensuring its audit findings are communicated in a simplified yet engaging manner, for example by applying a behavioural lens to strengthen communication between the SAI and stakeholders (OECD, 2022[28]). On the other hand, it could proactively engage public stakeholders in sensitisation initiatives to inform them on its work and in turn, stakeholders could be invited to provide input into work that they would like to see the Audit Bureau conduct (OECD, 2016[29]). Exploring innovative ways to engage civil society and citizens could be an option for the Audit Bureau to obtain buy-in and allow citizens to better understand the importance of the Audit Bureau's work. For example, social audits can be a powerful accountability tool and a hands-on way to engage citizens in the fight against corruption. The experience of involving youth into auditing in Peru could be a further inspiration on how to actively involve stakeholders (Box 5.7).

A 2024 OECD report on increasing the impact of European supreme audit institutions through external engagement found that 77% of SAIs participating in a survey confirmed that they cooperated with non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and other non-institutional stakeholders during their audits. Engagement may take a number of forms such as one-way communication through the provision of information or two-way communication through consulting stakeholders for input when selecting audits, planning and drafting audit reports and developing citizen complaint mechanisms. This type of engagement may contribute to external stakeholders' ability to hold the government to account (through information-sharing) as well as contributing to the SAI's ability to select meaningful audits (OECD, 2024[30]).

Box 5.7. The "Youth Auditors" Programme of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Peru

The objective of the "Youth Auditors" Programme implemented by the country's Supreme Audit Institution, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Peru (*Contraloría General de la República*, CGR), is to establish the foundations for the execution of activities aimed at contributing to training in ethical values and civic rights of citizens in the formative stage.

The specific objectives are:

- Include discussions in the classroom on topics related to State control, the fight against corruption, citizen participation, among others, that contribute to the development of an anti-corruption culture.
- Promote the participation of young people in public management through the monitoring of public activity with a direct impact on the well-being of their community.

Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of youth auditors by departments; the programme has achieved 100% coverage of the provinces throughout the country (CGR, 2023[31]).

Figure 5.6. Distribution of youth auditors by department, December 2022

Tumbes	Cajamarca	Amazonas	Loreto
2336	5925	1779	10344

Piura	San Martin
33198	15119
Lambayeque	Huánuco
8014	4425
La Libertad	Ucayali
15086	5750
Áncash	Pasco
11667	1474
Lima Metropolitana	Madre de Dios
33971	1606
Lima Provincias	Cusco
10684	25710
P. C. del Callao	Junín
2808	23928
Huancavelica	Puno
3885	8841

Ica	Ayacucho	Arequipa	Moquegua	Tacna	Apurímac
11982	4951	14312	1928	3999	3301

Source: (CGR, 2023[31])

With the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, students supported by their parents or teachers completed questionnaires (physical or virtual) about the functioning of specific public services in their educational institution or community to identify areas for improvement. During 2022, a total of 267.023 youth auditors have participated in the oversight concerning the correct start of the school year, cleaning and disinfection of the educational institution, coexistence at the school, road signs around the educational institution, as well as the cleaning and disinfection of public parks and public lighting.

Source: (CGR, 2023[31]) and https://controlsocial.contraloria.gob.pe/auditoresjuveniles/

Chapter 5: Proposals for Action

Implementing effective risk management as well as internal control and audit

- For risk management to be effective, an integrated approach should be adopted and implemented government-wide. This should entail codifying risk management practices into policies and tools, such as an integrated risk management policy, a framework outlining key principles of risk management and accompanying guidance providing practical advice on operationalising the principles of the framework. Elements of the guide should address responsibilities and accountabilities, the requirements for skills development and training, systems and tools to facilitate risk assessments and monitoring, as well as the means of co-ordination and collaboration across departments and government as a whole.

- An integrated risk management framework should embed risk management within management processes such that it is a part of governance, leadership, and is fundamental to how the organisation is managed at all levels.

- To ensure that management is equipped to assume responsibility over establishing and integrating internal controls into operations in a risk-based and cost beneficial manner, the Ministry of Finance, in collaboration with JIACC, should provide capacity building in risk management and internal control.

- The Ministry of Finance should develop and implement policies assigning the first line role to management and build capacity of managers to take on this role.

Supporting the transition of the Internal Control System from ex-ante to ex-post

- As Jordan adopts ex-post control, it should maintain and reinforce key internal controls that safeguard against fraud and wrongdoing and relinquish those that are costly, onerous and afford minimal benefit to the organisation.

- The Ministry of Finance, in its central harmonisation role, should continue to provide guidance and oversight to the entities responsible for internal audit (internal control units) to continue building capacity and to promote more advanced types of work such as assessing the effectiveness of internal control systems versus compliance with regulations. Training should be aligned with international standards. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance, should also promote the independence of the unit responsible for internal audit (internal control units).

- The Internal Control Bylaw should be amended to distinguish the responsibility of internal control (management), from the responsibility of internal audit (an independent entity within the organisation). The Ministry of Finance must decide on how it will achieve the establishment of a unit responsible for internal audit which is to be independent from management responsibility for implementing and overseeing internal controls.

Continue strengthening the external oversight provided by the Audit Bureau

- The Audit Bureau Law should be amended to confer onto the head of the Audit Bureau a pre-determined and fixed term that is sufficiently lengthy to allow the head to discharge their responsibilities with confidence. Jordan could also consider amending the law to involve the House of Representatives in the decision to appoint the head of the Audit Bureau.

- The Audit Bureau's financial independence should be strengthened by disallowing the Executive from influencing its proposed budget.

- The Audit Bureau can leverage its growing capacity for performance audit to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control system and auditing areas of mutual interest with JIACC, such as procurement.

- The Audit Bureau should reconsider how it engages with the legislative and other stakeholders, including how it presents its findings and exploring whether to publish the full audit reports to increase accountability of audited entities and exploring the various means by which information is communicated to diverse audiences.

- The Audit Bureau should refrain from assessing the quality of the internal control units and providing recommendations for improvement (a management function) and instead add value and maintain its independence through financial and performance audits to assess the internal control system and the internal audit function.

- The Audit Bureau should reconsider the co-location of Audit Bureau auditors in other departments, by scrutinizing how this may impact the Audit Bureau's independence and by considering the potential benefits of relocating auditors to Audit Bureau premises. Action should be taken to relocate auditors back to Audit Bureau premises if assessments show that co-location of auditors in other departments negatively impacts independence.

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6 Strengthening whistleblowing and criminal enforcement in Jordan

Corruption cases need to be detected before they can be investigated and eventually sanctioned. Therefore, this chapter focuses first on whistleblowing channels and whistleblower protection in Jordan, providing recommendations on how to strengthen the trust in and the coherence of the framework. Second, the chapter provides some concrete recommendations to further strengthen the chain of criminal investigations of corruption cases, starting from the preliminary investigation of a potential case by JIACC, the prosecution and the courts.

6.1. Introduction

A coherent and comprehensive public integrity system requires enforcement mechanisms to be credible and effective and avoid impunity that could undermine the rule of law, trust in institutions and could provide the breeding ground for more unethical practices, apathy, and cynicism. Therefore, if carried out in a fair, co-ordinated, transparent and timely manner, enforcement mechanisms can promote trust in the government's public integrity system, strengthen its legitimacy over time and help to instill integrity values in individuals, organisations and society (OECD, 2017[1]). Therefore, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to ensure that enforcement mechanisms provide appropriate responses to all suspected violations of integrity standards by public officials and all others involved in the violations (OECD, 2017[2]).

In Jordan, Art. 97 Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and the Law of Judicial Independence 29 of 2014, amongst others, stresses the independence of the judges and confirms the constitutional provision according to which there is no authority above the judges besides the law. In fact, Jordan performs relatively well in relevant international indicators related to rule of law and judicial independence. The World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) "Rule of Law" indicator captures, amongst others, perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement and the quality of the courts. With a score of 57,08/100 in 2022, Jordan performs better than other countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region (with an average of 41,24/100), but less than the OECD average of 80.44/100. However, between 1996 and 2022, Jordan's performance in the WGI "Rule of Law" indicator decreased from 60,80 to 57,08. In the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2023, Jordan scored 0,55/1 and the score remained relatively stable between 2015 (0.56) and 2023 (0.55). When looking at the relevant sub-indicators on "regulatory enforcement", "civil justice" and "criminal justice", Jordan score better than the regional and the global averages, but below OECD averages (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. Jordan scores above regional and global averages in relevant sub-indicators of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, 2023

Source: World Justice Project Rule of Law Indicator 2023

Furthermore, with a score of 7.28/10 in 2023, the Index of Public Integrity rates Jordan positively the country's sub-indicator on "judicial independence". This score reflects the perception of executives from business and is taken from the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum Global

Competitiveness Dataset, converting the original scale to a range from 1 (heavily influenced) to 10 (entirely independent). This sub-indicator asks the question "To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?" The perception of judicial independence in Jordan is thus above the world average (5.33/10), the regional average (6.21/10), the OECD average (7.08/10) and is the second-best performer amongst the 40 countries in the same income group with an average of 4.75/10. Finally, Jordanian's trust in the judiciary among citizens is quite high. According to a poll conducted by the Center of Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan in 2023, 64% of the Jordanian population expressed trust in the judiciary (University of Jordan, 2023[3]).

To enable enforcement of integrity laws and regulations and to investigate and sanction cases of corruption through criminal proceedings or other integrity breaches through disciplinary measures (see Chapter 3), alleged cases first need to be detected and brought to the attention of enforcement actors. In addition to, for example, information from media or civil society reports (Chapter 4) or from audit reports (Chapter 5), an effective whistleblower framework is recognised as a core component of any public integrity system and key to unveil corrupt practices. In fact, according to the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), whistleblower reporting is the most important source for investigating corruption offences (JIACC, 2021[4]; JIACC, 2020[5]).

Jordan has been a pioneer in the MENA region when adopting the Whistleblower Protection Bylaw in 2014 (Regulation 62). Data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2019, collected by Transparency International in six MENA countries, evidence that citizens in Jordan have a relatively good perception concerning the consequences faced by corrupt officials which had been reported. When asked how likely it is that appropriate action would be taken against a government official that had been reported as corrupt, almost halve of the citizens in Jordan (49%) believe that such an official would face consequences (Figure 6.2). This is the highest score across the six countries and seems to reflect a certain perceived success in both the existing reporting channels and the prosecution of cases.

Figure 6.2. Perceived likelihood of appropriate action taken against a government official that had been reported as corrupt in selected MENA countries

And thinking about if you were to report a case of corruption committed by a government official, how likely is it that appropriate action would be taken against them?

Note: average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: GCB, 2019

This chapter first analyses and provides recommendation on potential avenues to further strengthening the current whistleblowing framework in Jordan. It looks at the different channels for reporting misconduct and proposes avenues to improve their use by improving their coherence and the trust placed in them. Then, the chapter provides recommendations to further strengthen the chain of criminal investigations of corruption cases, starting from the preliminary investigation of a potential case by JIACC, the prosecution and ending with a brief look into the courts.

6.2. Strengthening whistleblowing in Jordan

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to ensure the implementation of whistleblower frameworks and calls countries to:

- Provide alternative channels for reporting suspected violations of integrity standards, including the possibility of confidentially reporting to a body with the mandate and capacity to conduct an independent investigation (OECD, 2017[2]). A mixture of internal and external channels allowing disclosures to designated bodies and to the public or media is recommended (OECD, 2020[6]).

- Ensure protection in law and practice against all types of unjustified treatments as a result of reporting in good faith and on reasonable grounds. It is key to establish a system that credibly protects whistleblowers from reprisals or harassment at the workplace, such as dismissal, suspension or demotion, transfer or reassignment, reduction of pay or even physical threats (OECD, 2016[7]). The system should provide clarity on the measures and remedies available, such as the return to employment after unfair termination. Protecting the confidentiality of whistleblowers and consider allowing for anonymous reporting is also a key element (OECD, 2020[6]).

In the end, there is a need to continuously work on strengthening trust in the existing channels and protection measures. Citizens and public officials can be aware of the existing channels and the available safeguards to protect whistleblowers, they can have clarity concerning which channel to use when, and there can be procedures for transferring reports in case they were filed to the wrong channel. However, if the channels and the protection measures are not trusted, people will not speak up and blow the whistle. Furthermore, as analysed in Chapter 3 and 4, whistleblowing is supported by the existence of general trust in the system and by openness so that public officials and citizens feel safe to raise questions, concerns or ideas (OECD, 2020[6]).

Trust in whistleblowing channels and, more broadly, for speaking up is difficult to achieve and to maintain. It requires several measures that reinforce one another. The following sections review the current whistleblowing framework in Jordan in view of providing recommendations to further improve its impact. They focus on three key dimensions: First, the clarity of the existing channels. Second, the credibility and effectiveness of protection measures. Third, raising awareness and communication.

6.2.1. JIACC, with other responsible entities, should continue promoting and improving the Bekhedmetkom platform and internal reporting channels as well as review existing channels to design a guide in plain language and to establish clear procedures for transferring cases

Currently, in Jordan, there are various channels to report criminal and disciplinary (administrative) violations against public integrity, based on several integrity standards and regulations. This includes all acts codified in Article 16 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law (herein "AC Law"), public integrity standards codified in the Civil Service Bylaw, the Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics of the Public Service (CoC) and in specialised codes of conduct for certain areas and institutions (see Chapter 3).

Alleged cases can be reported to JIACC, the police or public prosecutors. JIACC receives reports in person, per WhatsApp, e-mail, letter, via the website grievance option, via JIACC liaison officers or transferred from other entities such as the police, the Audit Bureau (AB) or internal control units in national institutions. Regardless of whether an allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, an investigation is launched. The JIACC Board decides within fifteen days whether it accepts or rejects the report and authorises its Chairman or any of its members to take necessary measures to resolve the administrative issue (Art. 11 of AC Law). JIACC also sends a report to the respective public body, which has fifteen days to respond (or ask for an extension of this period). If the public body refuses to take the necessary measures or does not respond, the matter will be referred to the Council of Ministers (Art. 13). If the allegation qualifies as a criminal offence, JIACC Board refers the case to the competent public prosecutor or courts (Art. 12).

In turn, disciplinary/administrative violations, including violations against the CoC, can be reported through other channels. Line ministries are primarily responsible for ensuring that the CoC is implemented (Art. 11 of the CoC). Some ministries reportedly apply an open-door policy so that any employee can go into the office of the secretary general and complain. Reporting of violations of the CoC can also be done to the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC) and/or the joint SPAC/JIACC committee. As a rule, complaints should first be addressed internally within each public entity. If they are not addressed within one month, the SPAC can be approached. It is also possible to directly address the SPAC if an employee feels more comfortable in doing so. Complaints to the SPAC can be filed internally or externally via different channels including online, per mail or directly in person. JIACC, the Audit Bureau or other institutions can also transfer complaints to the SPAC. The SPAC has established focal points at JIACC and the Audit Bureau to ensure this co-operation. Reports concerning potential violations of the CoC may also fall under Art. 16 of AC Law. In this case, the offence should be transferred to JIACC or public prosecutors. However, whether an offence that has been filed internally is correctly identified as "criminal" or "disciplinary/administrative" depends on the capacities of the employee having received the report, which entails a risk of criminal cases not being transmitted to JIACC or prosecutors.

Particularly interesting is the "At your Service" (*Bekhedmetkom*) interactive platform launched in 2018, which enables direct communication between citizens and the government, offering various options such as asking questions, making suggestions, giving compliments, submitting complaints and reporting potential misuse of funds or misconduct by public officials (OECD ([8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan). *Bekhedmetkom* is hosted by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship (MoDEE) and the communications from citizens are then transmitted to the responsible public entity. There are also other channels for reporting administrative and criminal allegations including to the Audit Bureau, to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), to the National Centre of Human Rights, to the police and prosecution services or to the Judicial Council (JC). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the most relevant existing channels for reporting administrative and criminal allegations.

Table 6.1. Overview of the most important current integrity reporting channels in Jordan

Criminal	Short description	Disciplinary / administrative	Short description
Reporting to Police	Reporting to the police / judicial police can be done based on provisions in relevant legislation and via the ordinary channels as being applied for other crimes and according to Code of Criminal Procedure law. Preliminary investigations are carried out by the judicial police and cases are then forwarded to JIACC or public prosecutors.	CSB reporting mechanism (now SPAC)	The CSB could receive complaints via different channels including mails, in person, sometimes also from JIACC or the AB. Grievance templates could be found on CSB website. Criminal cases are forwarded to JIACC (or if it is not clear whether the breach might qualify as a criminal offence) or directly to the public prosecution services. The SPAC continues to receive complaints on their website through a function called "Ask We Answer".
JIACC reporting channels	JIACC can directly receive complaints: via its own website, in person, by phone, hotlines, letters, the JIACC liaison officers, or personal contacts. JIACC can also receive complaints from police authorities or from reporting channels in ministries, the AB or the prime minister's office, for example.	Reporting mechanism in line ministries ("internal channels")	Internally, complaints can be filed to the direct supervisor or the internal control unit or the Secretary General applying an open-door policy. Complaints by externals can be sent to a specific department set up to serve public interests (online, telephone, hotlines).
Reporting to public prosecutors	Possible cases can be reported to all Public Prosecution Departments of the Kingdom (e.g., in writing or through police authorities).	AB reporting mechanism	Complaints to the AB can be filed via WhatsApp, AB's website, e-mail or through other entities, such as JIACC, who forward cases if they fall under the jurisdiction of the AB. If a violation has happened. If this is the case, they send a letter to the institution against which the complaint was filed for correction; it there was no violation, the case will be closed. In cases involving criminal behaviour, the case will be forwarded to the prosecution services or JIACC. Anonymous complaints are not possible, but the identity of the complainant can be hidden/protected by AB. Since the AB will not directly communicate with the complainant, he/she can only read the outcome of a case in the annual report.
		Judicial Council / Judicial Inspection Office reporting channel	The Judicial Inspection Office (JIO), affiliated to the Judicial Council, responsible for ensuring accountability of judges and transparency within the judiciary, receives complaints (e.g., through e-mail, personal presence, or fax) whenever someone feels violated in his or her rights, is victim of misconduct of a judge, prosecutor or court support staff or who observed a situation in which such violations might have taken place. A disciplinary council, consisting of three Judges of Cassation appointed by the Judicial Council, decides on these matters. It there is a reasonable suspicion, further investigations take place. If the case can be substantiated, disciplinary sanctions can be adopted. If a criminal offense is involved, the disciplinary case is closed and transferred to the prosecution services. Since judges benefit from the status of judicial immunity, this immunity must be lifted by the Judicial Council.

Source: Compiled by OECD based on information gathered through questionnaire and interviews.

Having a diversity of options to report misconduct, like in Jordan, is positive as it offers citizens and public officials a multitude of possibilities to file their reports. However, such alternative or complementary reporting channels need to be clear, consistent, coherent and visibly effective if they want to meaningfully contribute to improving public integrity. Above all, it should not be the burden of the public official or the citizen to know which channel is correct.

In Jordan, the exact roles and responsibilities of each of these channels are not always clear to people. There is reportedly a lack of knowledge amongst public officials on which mechanism exactly accepts and processes which offences or on what happens if the offense should have been filed elsewhere. This potentially can create confusion on which system to use, when and how. In fact, some of the bodies receive complaints falling under the jurisdiction of another body. The Audit Bureau, for instance, reported receiving complaints falling under the responsibility of JIACC. JIACC also stated to often receive reports for which they are not responsible (JIACC, 2021[4]). This certainly is also related to a lack of knowledge of many people about corruption more generally and which requires more awareness raising (JIACC, 2021[4]). Overlaps between channels appear to be unavoidable and can be addressed through an effective co-ordination and transfer of complaints. While the co-ordination between JIACC, the Audit Bureau or the former CSB has worked well, this co-ordination is less clear with other external channels and in particular with internal channels, i.e., reports submitted within or to a public entity (a line ministry, for example). Clearer procedures for such co-ordination and the transfer of cases would strengthen the overall system.

Furthermore, according to interviews and information received by the OECD, while internal channels are mandatory (Art. 11.G of the Civil Service Bylaw 2020), the level of implementation of such channels is relatively low. It is also unclear in how far direct supervisors, internal control units, or HR units are trained in handling complaints and in how far they are aware of available protection measures in law and practice. At the same time, promoting internal channels as the first option to public employees who wish to speak up and report violations is key. Only if whistleblowers do not trust internal channels, they should have the option to seek alternatives outside their public entity.

Therefore, JIACC could strengthen the coherence of the existing channels by the following measures.

- First, JIACC could review all existing channels and, together with the responsible entities, establish clear procedures for transferring cases if required. For instance, it would make sense to clearly define in the AC Law for which administrative integrity violations JIACC is responsible and what issues other reporting channels should address. The current practice between JIACC and the Audit Bureau is a good example. In turn, Jordan could reflect whether the current reporting channel to the PMO is necessary. Furthermore, JIACC could publish a short guide in plain language to provide an overview of the different channels and their purposes. These measures could streamline the system and lead to more clarity and to a better use of the reporting channels.

- As recommended in the (OECD[8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan could continue working on fine-tuning and increasing the visibility of the *Bekhedmetkom* platform and JIACC could promote the platform as the first option for external stakeholders who wish to report cases of suspected corruption.

- Third, both JIACC and SPAC should aim at ensuring that all public institutions provide an internal channel for employees and that general directors, direct supervisors and relevant units are trained accordingly. The National Integrity Indicators (NII) promoted by JIACC have the potential to provide further incentives to implement such internal channels.

- Finally, given the multiple reporting channels and complaints mechanisms, there is a risk that several entities deal with the same case. It is therefore important that bodies co-ordinate and exchange information on a regular level. For example, Brazil's SISCOR System is a good practice to ensure a co-ordinated approach to disciplinary cases (Box 6.1).

> **Box 6.1. A good example of co-ordinating administrative reporting channels comes from Brazil**
>
> The National Disciplinary Board (*Corregedoria-Geral da União*, CRG) in Brazil, established under the authority of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU), is the central unit of the Federal Executive Branch Disciplinary System (*Sistema de Correição do Poder Executivo Federal*, SISCOR) and has the competence to supervise and monitor the disciplinary activity within the Federal Executive Branch. . The activities under the SISCOR include the investigation of irregularities committed by civil servants and the enforcement of applicable sanctions.
>
> The SISCOR is endowed with legal powers to supervise, correct any ongoing disciplinary procedures and impose sanctions. These core tasks are carried out by its approximately 150 employees at the central department and more than 250 sectional units located in federal agencies (*corregedorias sectoriais*).
>
> One of the pillars of the co-ordination role of the CGU is the SISCOR System (*Sistema SISCOR*), a web-based platform that allows to store and make available, in a fast and secure way, information about the disciplinary procedures initiated within public entities. With the information available in the SISCOR System, public managers can monitor and control disciplinary processes, identify critical points, draw up risk maps and establish to for prevent and combat corruption and other administrative offences.
>
> Source: (OECD, 2017[1]); the CGU website, www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/atividade-disciplinar (accessed 5 October 2023)

6.2.2. Jordan could revise existing legislation to provide more clarity for whistleblowers on possibilities to be protected, ensure sufficient resources are allocated to provide protection and consider allowing anonymous reporting

A key ingredient for trust in whistleblowing channels is the protection granted to whistleblowers. With Regulation 62 of 2014, Jordan has adopted as one of the first countries in the MENA region a whistleblower protection bylaw. Regulation 62 grants protection to informers, witnesses, informants and experts as well as their relatives and closely related persons. Other relevant legislation is the AC Law and the Civil Service Bylaw. The decision to grant protection is taken by JIACC's Board (Art. 6 of AC law). While some aspects and processes are the same, the following analysis focuses on the protection granted to whistleblowers, not witnesses.

Protection can take the forms of legal protection (Art. 9, Regulation 62) or personal protection (Art. 10, Regulation 62). Measures or actions to ensure their personal safety can include protection at their places of residence, at their places of work or also the provision of accommodation, if necessary. Financial aid for whistleblowers might be granted, if needed (Art. 24.d, AC Law). Furthermore, the AC Law allows for non-disclosure of the identity and whereabouts of whistleblowers. The protection terminates if protection conditions are violated (Art. 25 of AC Law), if the need for providing protection expires, if the protected person wishes to terminate protection, or if the JIACC Board decides to do so (Art. 11 of Regulation 62).

If retaliation against a protected person takes place, the JIACC Chairman and the General Prosecutor shall be immediately informed (Art. 3.B, par. 5 of Regulation 62). Penalties for such retaliation can reach imprisonment for not less than one year, and in the case of use of force or threat by weapons or other physical means, to no less than two years of imprisonment and a financial fine (Art. 27, AC Law).

JIACC has created a whistleblower protection unit to ensure the implementation of protection measures for all categories that can seek protection under Regulation 62. The unit currently consists of five persons and is reporting directly to the Secretary General of JIACC. According to information provided by JIACC, since the first protection request in 2015, the unit has received 607 requests of which 104 were accepted. In 2021, 63 protection applications were received, 11 granted, 52 remained under reservation. In 2020,

out of 46 requests received, protection was granted 14 times and 32 cases were reserved. JIACC may consider whether the unit disposes of sufficient human and financial resources to ensure that effective physical protection can be granted. During interviews carried out by the OECD, a lack of resources was mentioned and JIACC could reflect on further strengthening the unit.

As such, Jordan has a strong framework for whistleblower protection, which could be further improved by considering the following measures:

- Consider some changes in the legal framework to improve clarity, consider integrating a good faith clause and putting the burden of proof on those being suspected to retaliate against whistleblowers.

- Consider establishing the possibility to report anonymously.

Consider some changes in the legal framework to improve clarity concerning definitions and protection measures, consider integrating a good faith clause and putting the burden of proof on those being suspected to retaliate against whistleblowers

Jordan's whistleblowing framework could be further clarified and strengthened. First, the legal framework grants protection to informers, witnesses, informants and experts as defined in Article 2 of Regulation 62 (Box 6.2). Both "informers" and "informants" would correspond to a common definition of whistleblowers, defined by the OECD as "employees who disclose to the competent authorities in good faith and on reasonable grounds wrongdoing of whatever kind in the context of their workplace" (OECD, 2016[7]). The difference between "informers" and "informants" in Regulation 62 is related to who receives the information provided by the whistleblower: the "competent authorities" for the informers and "the commission" for the informants. This, in turn, entails different protection options since only the identity of informants reporting to the commission, i.e., to JIACC, can be concealed. Otherwise, Regulation 62 treats both equally, including that all other types of protection – legal protection in the workplace and personal /physical protection – are granted to all categories.

Box 6.2. Definition of informers, witnesses, informants, experts in Jordan's Regulation 62

- **Informer**: The person who informs the competent authorities of information related to corruption incident

- **Informant**: The person who informs the commission of information related to a corruption incident.

- **Witness**: The person who testifies in a crime of corruption before the Commission, General Prosecutor, Judiciary or any competent authority.

- **Expert**: The person who is assigned to submit an expert's report in respect of a corruption crime.

Source: Translated from Regulation 62 of 2014

However, the current formulations in Regulation 62 are somehow misleading in this respect. For instance, Art. 3.b.2 states that JIACC's Protection Unit should "receive applications from the persons who do not wish to expose their identities, including, **Informers and Informants**, in order to study such applications and forward them to the Chairman for a decision in that respect" and Art. 3.b.4 states that it should "conceal the data provided in the protection applications which may lead to exposing the identity of the **Informer**, Witness, **Informant** or Expert and replace them with special codes". These two formulations seem to indicate that both informants and informers could receive protection through concealment of their identities. Therefore, Jordan should consider revising the current legal text to avoid any scope for misinterpretation

and clarify in Art 3.b.2 and 3.b.4 that only informants (those who report to JIACC) can be granted protection by concealing their identities, while informers, who report to other competent authorities, cannot. JIACC should also elaborate clear guidance materials on its website on which protection can be granted in which situation.

Second, the current text could be clearer with respect to what is meant with corruption. Citizens and employees often do not have always know what corruption offences are according to the law. JIACC emphasised during OECD interviews that clarifying what corruption is remains a significant challenge despite the efforts invested in raising awareness. Other stakeholders emphasised that recurring amendments of the laws have created some unclarities even for law enforcement agencies and experts (see also Chapter 1). This may imply, out of lack of understanding, that corrupt incidents sometimes simply do not reach JIACC and the courts. Jordan could therefore consider updating Regulation 62 to clearly define and codify all corruption incidents that can be reported and which qualify for whistle-blower protection mechanisms (Rasheed and USAID, 2019[9]).

Third, the decision about whether protection will be granted depends currently on the existence of a "seriousness threat". Whether such a "serious threat" exists, is decided by JIACC's Board. According to experts in Jordan, however, despite the existence of criteria to reach a conclusion concerning the seriousness of a threat, a whistleblower, at the moment of deciding about whether to report a case, is de facto faced with uncertainty. The whistleblower can indeed not be entirely sure of whether he will be granted protection or not. This uncertainty could deter the whistleblower from coming forward. JIACC suggested during a workshop moderated by the OECD that protection should not depend on legal criteria, or the existence of a serious threat, but be full and complete (unconditional). Then, of course, different levels and types of protection measures can be granted depending on the needs and JIACC should have the sufficient financial independence to be able to assign resources as required. The option of anonymous reporting (see below) can be an additional safeguard for whistleblowers who fear reprisals or are particularly risk-averse concerning the protection that will be available.

Fourth, it was mentioned during a workshop moderated by the OECD that there is currently a lack of clarity of what happens if a whistleblower discloses confidential information. This indicates that either the law is not entirely clear about such a case or that the law is not clearly communicated, leading to uncertainty and potentially reluctance of whistleblowers to come forward if they are not sure about the nature of the information they use. Here, Jordan could follow the EU Directive 2019/1937, Article 21.7, which states:

> *"It should not be possible to rely on individuals' legal or contractual obligations, such as loyalty clauses in contracts or confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements, so as to preclude reporting, to deny protection or to penalise reporting persons for having reported information on breaches or made a public disclosure where providing the information falling within the scope of such clauses and agreements is necessary for revealing the breach. Where those conditions are met, reporting persons should not incur any kind of liability, be it civil, criminal, administrative or employment-related. It is appropriate that there be protection from liability for the reporting or public disclosure under this Directive of information in respect of which the reporting person had reasonable grounds to believe that reporting or public disclosure was necessary to reveal a breach pursuant to this Directive. Such protection should not extend to superfluous information that the person revealed without having such reasonable grounds."*

Fifth, the current legislation does not explicitly contain a good faith provision, i.e., specifying that persons reporting or disclosing suspected wrongdoing should have the right for protection if they had a reasonable belief that the information reported was true at the time of reporting (OECD, 2016[7]). Good faith clauses serve the purpose of preventing misuse of corruption provisions for other purposes, e.g., against political opposition or other political activists. While according to JIACC there has so far never been an incident of bad faith and that good faith is part of practice, an explicit clause would be important to prevent misuse of reporting provisions and to establish trust in the system. Jordan could therefore consider integrating a good faith clause in its current legal framework. In doing so, it could follow the approaches of other agencies in OECD countries such as the French Anti-Corruption Agency, which recommends protection for good faith

reports from whistleblowers in its Anti-Corruption Agency Guidelines (AFA, 2020[10]). The threshold for good faith reporting could be based on Transparency International's approach, according to which all those who had a "reasonable belief in wrongdoing" should be awarded good faith (Transparency International, 2017[11]). The fact that such good faith can only be established during the proceedings should not stand in the way of the introduction of such a clause, but rather calls for intensifying adequate safeguards and fair trial guarantees throughout the proceedings.

Finally, Jordan could consider reflecting upon including a reversal of the burden of proof on those being suspected to actively retaliate whistleblowers. This would mean that whenever a whistleblower reports retaliatory measures or these have become known ex officio, the alleged perpetrator or employer must prove that this is not the case. This novel approach is followed, for example, by the new Directive of the European Union on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council).

Consider establishing the possibility to report anonymously

Currently, if whistleblowers want their identity and whereabouts to be protected, they must formulate a request (Art. 24.b of AC Law). A code system then allows to protect the names: when the report is received by JIACC, the name is replaced by a code. JIACC's investigators only get the coded information. The identity of the person is coded throughout the process. Only one employee at JIACC can open the coded document, which allows for some protection of the identities. However, in the end, to use JIACC's [protection request tool] on its website, one must indicate at least his/her name, national number, phone number, email address and the factual living address. This detailed level of information to be provided could be a deterrent to people who would wish to report but fear reprisals or do not trust the system. Indeed, whistleblowers may also not always trust the coding put in place. Because of this lack of a genuine anonymous reporting some people might reflect twice on whether to use the system.

Indeed, data for six MENA countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan, Tunisia) from Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2019 show that respondents fear reprisals if they would report about corruption (Figure 6.3). On average 58% of people in all countries assessed think they will suffer retaliation if they report corruption. In Jordan, only 36% of respondents believe that ordinary people can report incidents of corruption without fear, risking retaliation or other negative consequences if they speak out in the fight against corruption. To compare, in the European Union, the Global Corruption Barometer 2021, showed that on average 47% of respondents perceived that citizens could report incidents in their countries without fear of reprisals. Germany and Austria, with 71% and 70% respectively, have the highest percentages in the EU, while Cyprus and Croatia have the lowest percentages, with 19% and 25% respectively.

Figure 6.3. Ordinary people fear reprisals when reporting incidents in selected MENA countries

In this country, can ordinary people report incidents of corruption without fear, or do they risk retaliation or other negative consequences if they speak out in the fight against corruption?

Note: average calculated with the data from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Sudan and Tunisia.
Source: GCB, 2019

In Jordan, there is no similar data on perception from public officials with respect to reporting channels and the perceived fear of reprisals. However, interviews and a virtual focus group with JIACC liaison officers and one with Audit Bureau liaison officers carried out by the OECD for this Integrity Review allowed to get an idea of challenges at organisational levels. Overall, it seems that within public institutions in Jordan, there is still room for improvement with respect to creating open organisational cultures, in which everyone is allowed to speak freely and raise concerns, including about integrity issues. Liaison officers from both JIACC and the Audit Bureau, who arguably can get an "inside view" of the public entities to which they are sent, reported a widespread resistance to change and an acceptance of the status quo. Liaison officer from the Audit Bureau reported also a "failure to provide institutional protection to staff". During a workshop moderated by the OECD, it was also mentioned that "whistleblowers are often excited in the beginning and then get afraid and retract" and that the fear of retaliation is common. Furthermore, the current uncertainty with respect to whether a threat will be considered serious and therefore protection granted or not (see above) could provide a further rationale for allowing anonymous reports.

Therefore, establishing an anonymous reporting mechanism should be considered by JIACC. This may require changes in the Law that can be discussed and proposed by key stakeholders in Jordan. Independently from such legal aspects that need to be sorted out, technical solutions are available to allow JIACC for anonymous whistleblowing. These solutions can even allow anonymous communication between the whistleblower and the investigator. Jordan could consider examples implemented in Austria (Box 6.3), by the police of Baden-Württemberg in Germany or by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya, for example, where such mechanisms were implemented with success. An experimental study carried out in Indonesia shows that anonymous reporting channels are effective to encourage whistleblowing intentions where there are high levels of fear of retaliation (Henrico, Wahyudi and Imam, 2022[12]). Statistical evidence from companies in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Switzerland with anonymous channels show that these do not lead to an abuse of anonymity (Hauser, Bretti-Reinalter and Blumer, 2021[13]):

"Overall, (…) the fear that whistleblowing systems are being abused on a large scale is not borne out by the statistical analysis. At the same time, it is clear that the proportion of abusive reports is no higher among companies that allow anonymous reporting than among those that do not accept anonymous reports.

Box 6.3. Anonymous whistleblowing through electronic platform in Austria

In 2013, the Federal Ministry of Justice in Austria launched a portal to enable individuals to report wrongdoing anonymously. The portal can be accessed via a link on the Ministry's homepage, where individuals can find and download further information on the portal and is operated by the Central Public Prosecutor's Office for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (CPPOCECC). It is an online anonymous reporting system, which is suited for investigations on economic crimes and corruption. To guarantee anonymity, when setting up a secured mailbox, the whistleblower is required to choose a username and a password. The whistleblower (or "discloser") may then report anonymously; the investigation authority in turn may make inquiries with the whistleblower, while maintaining his or her anonymity to verify the value of the information. Any relevant reports outside the CPPOCECC remit are forwarded to the competent authority (mostly financial authorities). The anonymity of the information disclosed is maintained using encryption and other security procedures. Whistleblowers are asked not to enter any data that give clues as to their identity and to refrain from submitting a report using a device that was provided by their employer. After submission, the CPPOCECC provides the whistleblower with feedback and the status of the disclosure through a secure mailbox, which also allows for an anonymous dialogue between whistleblower and investigator.

The following description is available on the website in German:

"Particularly with regard to the prosecution of white-collar crime and corruption, new strategies and measures need to be developed in order to increase the effectiveness of prosecution and provide the authorities with the tools they need to fulfil their tasks.

White-collar crime and corruption are often characterised by the fact that the perpetrators are highly secretive and act in a conspiratorial manner. Criminal structures can often only be broken up if those involved who are willing to give evidence are given sufficient incentive to co-operate with the law enforcement authorities.

As a supplement to the leniency programme introduced as part of the criminal law competence package, an internet-based anonymous whistleblowing system was therefore set up at the Central Public Prosecutor's Office for the Prosecution of Economic Crime and Corruption (CPPOCECC) for a trial period of two years, which is particularly suitable for investigations into economic and corruption offences and was taken over into regular operation on 1 January 2016.

This whistleblower system gives the CPPOCECC the opportunity to communicate with an anonymous whistleblower via a mailbox. In contrast to the processing of anonymous reports received by post or other means, the system allows the public prosecutors involved to ask the whistleblower to objectify the value of the information while at the same time ensuring absolute anonymity. Reports objectified in this way can then be used as a starting point for investigations or as a prerequisite for concrete suspicion in order to conduct criminal proceedings.

The whistleblower system enables reports on the following key areas, which are based on the CPPOCECC's catalogue of responsibilities: Corruption; Economic offences; Social fraud; Accounting and capital market offences; Money laundering."

Source: (OECD, 2017[14]), Hinweisgebersystem (justiz.gv.at)

6.2.3. JIACC, Audit Bureau and SPACC could raise awareness about available reporting channels and protection measures, promote the use of internal channels as a first option and address cultural barriers to whistleblowing

Raising awareness and communicating about existing channels and protection measures is key to build trust. On the one hand, direct communication to whistleblowers is of course important, for instance, by sending a message that the report has been received and by providing updates on the follow-up status of the report. Such personal communication can even be achieved if reports are anonymous, as systems can allow for such bilateral anonymous communication, which can significantly increase the success of the investigation process as it allows to ask questions to the whistleblower (see Box 6.3 above). The EU Whistleblowing Directive, for instance, requires that authorities under obligation to follow-up on the reports received, have to, give feedback to the reporting persons about the follow-up (for instance, closure of the case based on a lack of sufficient evidence, launch of a full investigation and/or measures taken to address the issue raised) within 3 months (extendable to 6 months in case of complex cases).

On the other hand, from the perspective of enhancing trust in the system, it is particularly important to publish statistics on the number and nature of complaints received as well as on the results of investigations and sanctions (OECD, 2020[6]). Collecting data also can provide insights on risk areas and allow to assess the effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2020[6]). JIACC and the Audit Bureau provide date on their reporting channels in their annual reports, but for some other channels mentioned in Table 6.1 no information seems to be publicly available. In fact, many channels do not clearly communicate the way reports will be followed-up, neither in relevant legislation, nor on the websites, nor in other guidance documents. However, uncertainty about how a report will be processed and how the channel has performed in the past may deter a whistleblower from using it. In particular, interviews carried out by the OECD indicate that many internal reporting channels for violations of the CoC lack such transparency.

Therefore, JIACC, the Audit Bureau and the SPAC could jointly elaborate a strategic approach to promoting trust in existing channels, with particular emphasis on providing statistical data and on promoting the use of internal channels as first option. This could, for example, be an objective to include in the next National Integrity and Anti-corruption Strategy of Jordan. Also, gathering data through regular staff surveys on how public officials perceive the whistleblowing channels and whether they fear reprisals could be an important input to inform integrity policies aimed at promoting trust and use of whistleblowing channels and also would allow to measure progress. Such survey questions could be part of JIACC's National Integrity Indicators, for example (see Chapter 2).

Furthermore, JIACC should continue implementing awareness raising activities on whistleblowing and available protection measures, such as the campaign "Report and the Integrity Commission Protects You". These additional efforts could focus on explaining in plain language the different existing channels and on providing a positive image of whistleblowers. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) Civil Service Commission includes a statement in staff manuals to reassure staff that it is safe to raise concerns (Box 6.4). In Canada, the Public Interest Commission of Alberta designed a series of posters and distributed them to public entities to be displayed in employee workspaces. The posters show messages such as 'Make a change by making a call. Be a hero for Alberta's public interest'.

In addition to current and future awareness raising activities, JIACC, Audit Bureau and SPAC could consider developing and implementing a training for civil servants on the different existing channels and protection measures. The training could also involve the Institute for Public Administration (IPA). Integrity Officers, as recommended in Chapter 1, or HR units in public entities could be trained to provide further ad hoc guidance on available channels and protection measures.

Box 6.4. Statement to staff reassuring them to raise concerns in the United Kingdom

The UK Civil Service Commission uses the following statement to staff, reassuring them to raise concerns:

> *"We encourage everyone who works here to raise any concerns they have. We encourage 'whistleblowing' within the organisation to help us put things right if they are going wrong. If you think something is wrong please tell us and give us a chance to properly investigate and consider your concerns. We encourage you to raise concerns and will ensure that you do not suffer a detriment for doing so."*

Source: UK's Civil Service Commission: http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Whistleblowing-and-the-Civil-Service-Code.pdf

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Finally, as in many other cultures, in Jordan there is a strong loyalty to the family, the community or the workplace which can conflict with reporting misconduct. Such social norms can undermine other measures aimed at promoting open organisational cultures, where speaking up is seen as a positive value. JIACC could therefore work on analysing and assessing the cultural connotations of blowing the whistle and of speaking up more generally. This could allow to explicitly address cultural aspects with the aim of realising the full potential of whistleblowing. Cultural connotations are not static, they can change over time and can be actively targeted (Box 6.5). Such an exercise should involve civil society organisations, trade unions as well as religious and tribal leaders, for example.

Box 6.5. Change of cultural connotations of 'whistle-blower' and 'whistleblowing': The case of the UK

In the UK, a research project commissioned by Public Concern at Work from Cardiff University examined national newspaper reporting on whistleblowing and whistle-blowers covering the period from 1st January 1997 to 31 December 2009. This includes the period immediately before the introduction of the Public Interest Disclosure Act and tracks how the culture has changed since then. The study found that whistle-blowers were overwhelmingly represented in a positive light in the media. Over half (54%) of the newspaper stories represented whistle-blowers in a positive light, with only 5% of stories being negative. The remainder (41%) were neutral. Similarly, a study by YouGov found that 72% of workers view the term 'whistle-blowers' as neutral or positive.

Source: Public Concern at Work (2010), Where's whistleblowing now? 10 years of legal protection for whistle-blowers, Public Concern at Work, London, p. 17, YouGov (2013), YouGov/PCAW Survey Results, YouGov, London, p.8

6.3. Strengthening the criminal enforcement of corruption cases

To improve the criminal justice system, Jordan launched reforms, in particular since 2016, aiming at making the judiciary more effective and efficient. These efforts are also reflected in a relatively good performance in the World Justice Project sub-factors rating the country's criminal system (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. World Justice Project: Criminal justice Sub-factors for Jordan, 2023

Source: World Justice Project Rule of Law Indicator 2023

Nonetheless, during OECD interviews, several stakeholders stressed the good intentions of the judiciary, but mentioned some areas for improvement to further strengthen the effective enforcement of public integrity standards, which are presenting some particular challenges compared to other crimes. In Jordan, once an alleged case of corruption reaches JIACC, for example through whistleblowing channels, the process can be roughly divided into three steps:

1. **Preliminary investigation carried out by JIACC.** Since 2006, JIACC has been granted investigative powers allowing to investigate any kind of activity that qualifies as corruption offence based on Article 7 of the AC law at that time. Within JIACC, the Central Unit is currently responsible for the reception of complaints and for carrying out preliminary investigations, regardless of how they received the case. The Investigation Directorate currently has 24 investigators and is organised into a Public Investigation Division and a Private Investigation Division. The preliminary investigations consist of ensuring that the information received is correct and of collecting preliminary evidence. JIACC has developed its own investigation tools over time. If JIACC investigators conclude that there is substantial suspicion and further investigations are necessary, the case is sent with recommendations to the JIACC Board to be assessed. Cases that have no suspicion of corruption are documented and archived by JIACC. Whenever there is reasonable suspicion of corruption, cases are directed by JIACC Board to the Specialised Corruption Prosecution Department (Art. 17 of AC Law)

2. **Investigation carried out by public prosecutors.** The Specialised Corruption Prosecution Department is an independent institution affiliated to the Judiciary and is now located in the administrative court. It currently consists of 5 prosecutors, who are judges specialised in corruption. The Judicial Council decides, based on needs and an annual allocation procedure, the number of prosecutors allocated to this department (Art. 17 lit. b of AC Law). The prosecutors technically report to the Judicial Council on judicial issues and to the Ministry of Justice on administrative issues. Once the Specialised Corruption Prosecution Department receives cases from the JIACC Board, they are registered under a specific number and assigned to one of the prosecutors. The prosecutor assesses the investigations conducted so far and continues with the prosecution under Criminal Law supported by administrative governors, the police or heads of security centres (Art. 9 Criminal Procedure Principles of Law 9 of 1961). If needed, a corruption case could also be referred to additional general prosecutors. If prosecutors conclude that a case is substantiated,

they issue a decision of suspicion, which is sent to the Attorney General (given its general oversight and control role). If either the responsible prosecutor or the Attorney General conclude that the case is not sufficiently substantiated, the case will be closed, archived and might be reopened in the future if new evidence comes up. Otherwise, the case reaches the courts for trial.

3. **Alleged case reaches a court**. Jordan has a comprehensive and relatively complex court system, which has the potential to effectively ensure public integrity (Box 6.6). Corruption crimes are dealt with by criminal Courts. While there is no special corruption court in Jordan, specialised judicial panels are dedicated to examining corruption cases. According to information provided by Jordan to the OECD, there are currently around 5 judges specialised in dealing with corruption cases. Specialised trainings on corruption and money laundering are offered by the Jordanian Judicial Institute. Cases are distributed among the courts based on the legal foundations and jurisdiction. Afterwards, a corruption case would go to a judge specialised for corruption cases. This distribution of cases among judges of the same specialty is done automatically through an electronic system. However, the Prime Minister could also refer crimes related to economic security to the State Security Court (Art. 6 of the Economic Crimes Law).

Box 6.6. The Court System in Jordan

The Judiciary in Jordan is a separate and independent branch of the government. According to Article 27 of the Constitution, "the Judicial Power shall be exercised by the courts of law in their varying types and degrees. All judgments shall be given in accordance with the law and pronounced in the name of the King''. Based on Art. 99 of the Constitution, there are three categories of courts:

- **Civil Courts**: exercise their jurisdiction with respect to civil and penal matters in accordance with the law, and they have jurisdiction over all persons in all matters, civil and penal, including cases brought against the government (Art. 102 and 103 of the Constitution). The civil courts include Magistrate Courts, Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal, High Administrative Courts and the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court).

- **Religious courts**: include shari'a (Islamic law) courts and the tribunals of other religious communities. Religious courts deal with matters involving personal status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody, and blood money. Shari'a courts also have jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the Islamic waqfs (Art. 104-109 of the Constitution).

- **Special courts**: Include courts of a civil nature, and courts of a military nature. Special Courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the laws (Art. 110 of the Constitution). Special courts include the Income Tax Appeal Court, the State Property Court of the State Security Court with different jurisdictions and competencies based on different legislative acts.

Since a constitutional amendment in 2011, there also exists the Jordanian Constitutional Court responsible for the oversight of the constitutionality of laws and regulations and for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.

Source: Jordan Courts System – الأردن محامى - الحق حُماة (jordan-lawyer.com), Microsoft Word – JORDAN JUSTICE REPORT_ENG.doc (euromedrights.org),

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Figure 6.5 provides an overview of the criminal proceeding for corruption bases, from the moment a complaint is filed to the moment it reaches the Courts. Table 6.2 shows some key statistics related to this process between 2019 and 2022. It should be noted that this time period coincides with the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite of that, the data show an increase in recorded investigation, while the number of cases referred to prosecution roughly remains within a range of 200 to 300 cases per year. In percentage, the decrease of referrals to the Public Prosecution could be an indication that JIACC is taking measures other

than referral, for example by correcting situations, settlements and recovering funds. From the cases referred to prosecution, a slight increase of cases reaching courts can be observed between 2019 and 2021, which could indicate the quality of the investigations carried out. Also, the ratio of convictions from those cases reaching the courts have been increasing steadily between 2019 and 2022. It was not possible to obtain data for 2023. The next sections provide some avenues to further strengthening the three steps: Preliminary investigation, prosecution and courts.

Figure 6.5. Simplified overview of the criminal proceeding for corruption cases in Jordan

Source: OECD

Table 6.2. Key statistics of Jordan's criminal corruption investigation and prosecution, 2019-2022

Year	Recorded investigations	Investigations referred to the prosecutor		Cases reaching the Courts		Cases confirmed by Courts and convictions/sanctioned	Ratio of convictions to cases decided (some still pending)
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
2019	948	304	32,1%	183	60,2%	82	44,8%
2020	1289	201	15,6%	155	77,1%	74	47,8%
2021	1346	214	15,9%	191	89,3%	115	60,2%
2022	1742	220	12,6%	176	80%	106	60,2%

Source: Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), Annual Report 2020, 2021 and 2022 and data provided by JIACC

6.3.1. To strengthen the preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC, Jordan should grant administrative and financial autonomy to JIACC and consider transferring all preliminary investigations to prosecution or making public the criteria for the transfer of cases

Adequate investigative resources and skilled staff are necessary to conduct investigations effectively and independently on corruption. The quality of the preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC investigators are key to continue with the prosecution and, later, launch court proceedings. However, skills, capacities and resources for managing complex investigations could be further improved. Technical know-how could be strengthened, for example, the areas of collecting evidence, in the investigation of complex corporate cases or in investigating organised and transnational crimes and establishing methodologies for international co-operation. JIACC is currently providing trainings for investigators through its Innovation

and Training Unit. These trainings include procedural aspects based on the Criminal Procedures Law 9 of 1961 as well as trainings on the AC Law, including its corruption offences anchored in Art. 16. AS such, JIACC should continue its efforts to provide continuous training to its investigators, focusing on areas where challenges exist.

However, the availability of adequate skills and resources goes beyond training of investigators already working at JIACC. In addition, JIACC has to be able to attract and select new and skilled investigators. To enable this, as already recommended in Chapter 1, Jordan should strengthen JIACC by increasing its financial and administrative independence.

On an administrative level, staff recruitment is currently based on the Civil Service Bylaw. Given the very specific technical expertise required by investigators, it would be advisable to grant JIACC the right and competencies to hire their own personnel and grant JIACC with full administrative independence. JIACC should be able to directly manage and publish job advertisements. Indeed, this would help to overcome several challenges related to expertise. For example, it was reported that prosecutors sometimes need technical experts, but JIACC is often not able to hire such an expert. Also, hiring procedures through the procedures under the Civil Service Bylaw are typically long and might not enable to find the right profile in the databases of the Service and Public Administration Commission (SPAC), e.g., on money laundering. Sometimes, JIACC uses the help of experts or investigators from other public institutions, who come as secondments (for instance, from the public security department, forensic experts and engineers). However, these are often called back to their own institutions precisely when ending their learning curve at JIACC and, consequently, experience and knowledge are lost.

JIACC's financial independence should also be strengthened. Currently, JIACC must comply with the general financial system of Jordan, which results in JIACC falling under general budgetary law. Since the general budgetary law does not or only in a limited manner allow for special financing, costs related to special investigations can be difficult to finance. As an example, JIACC reported of a case where several translation services were required but could not be financed; the case could thus not adequately followed up. Such autonomy is key for the enforcement of corruption cases and would clearly renew the country's commitment to effectively fight corruption.

In turn, to ensure that not even the suspicion of influence could arise in the context of investigating corruption offences, JIACC could discuss the possibility to send all preliminary investigations to the prosecution services and focus on ensuring that they are followed up. This would also further align Jordan's compliance with the UN Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, requiring in its principle 3 that the "judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law" (UN, 1985[15]). Indeed, as described above, the JIACC Board currently decides on whether preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC investigators are referred to the prosecution department. Until now, according to the interviews, there seems to never have been an issue with respect to a potential interference and the JIACC Board structure helps to mitigate that risk. However, to avoid any doubt and further strengthen confidence in the judiciary, Jordan should seek to revise current legal texts to include a default procedure that requires the forwarding of all preliminary investigations to prosecutors; and the establishment of a joint, co-ordinated investigation by the police, JIACC and criminal prosecutors, where the public prosecutor's office has the lead and decides on the continuation and or discontinuation of the investigation.

6.3.2. To strengthen the prosecution of corruption cases, Jordan could further strengthen national and international co-ordination and co-operation

The co-ordination and co-operation between investigating entities are a key to success. Poor co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing among enforcement actors undermine the ability to enforce the public integrity system, with the consequence of making deterrent measures ineffective and affecting the trust in the system (OECD, 2020[6]). In turn, oversight and co-operation among investigating entities at a national level help ensure uniform application of the integrity system and addressing common challenges (OECD, 2020[6]). In criminal proceedings, co-ordination is often managed by the corresponding prosecutor's office or an attorney general. In addition, electronic case management systems help to further co-ordinate and co-operate among investigation actors and to avoid overlaps and double investigations. Electronic databases are not only useful to ensure consistency and a uniform application of the laws; they also provide helpful information for statistical or preventive purposes, and they also contribute to transparency (OECD, 2020[6]).

In Jordan, the Attorney General has oversight over the prosecution services and co-ordinates the work of the prosecution to ensure consistency. Jordan also has established an electronic case management system called "Mizan Computerised Case Management System", which allows cases to be registered and managed electronically. According to the Judicial Council, this system includes all stages of case registration, consideration, issuance of various decisions and reflects the various procedures. It is a system linked electronically to the system of the Public Security Directorate and partner agencies can view the system's data. It enables tracking cases referred to the public prosecutor or the court and extract accurate statistics. JIACC has a portal on the Mizan system allowing to follow-up on cases referred and relating them to other relevant cases.

However, it appears that co-ordination among preliminary investigation actors could be further improved. According to some interviews, the channels for co-ordination are not always entirely clear. Jordan could therefore establish regular channels for co-ordination and promoting co-operation between investigative entities. Such channels could build on existing memorandum of understanding, such as the one between JIACC and the General Security Department, and on successful exchanges of intelligence information with counterpart units such the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit to build the foundation for investigative files. As recommended in Chapter 1, this could be achieved by institutionalising a working group between investigating entities. The working group could discuss specific cases and develop standards and procedures for the exchange of information, for example. Also, there are reportedly challenges with the current electronic system. These include aligning the system with existing legal frameworks and regulations, infrastructure and connectivity, training and capacity building for judges and other users as well as overcoming resistance to change. To make full use of the potential of the system, Jordan should continue to invest in technical as well as human resources related to making use of the system. This requires joint collaborative efforts between government stakeholders and judicial actors, extending and further developing trainings for users, providing exchange and intelligence support for complex investigations and, if necessary, regularly updating the system.

Corruption sometimes transcends borders, constituting a transnational crime. Therefore, international co-ordination mechanisms and exchanges are equally important and are recognised by international instruments requiring countries to act proactively (whenever an authority detects a possible corruption offence) as well as upon request of investigating or prosecuting foreign entities (Council of Europe, 1999[16]). Establishing co-operation among foreign authorities and countries also helps promoting dialogue, mutual understanding and commitment (Collecting data also can provide insights on risk areas and allow to assess the effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2020[6]). Good practices involve transnational inter-agency agreements (such as Memoranda of Understanding), the establishment of networks and/or channels for continuing exchange or also regular meetings of investigative bodies and guidelines / manuals

for those bodies Collecting data also can provide insights on risk areas and allow to assess the effectiveness of the system (OECD, 2020[6]).

In Jordan, according to the Judicial Council, the International Cooperation Office of the Public Prosecutor's Department dealt with 74 requests for judicial assistance in 2023, all of which were implemented in the same year in which they were received and with a maximum working period not exceeding three months. The requests varied in terms of their scope and topic and concerned areas such as, for example, requests for evidence, examination of objects and locations, implementation of seizure, confiscation or search operations. These are very positive developments. However, there reportedly are also challenges related to international co-operation on corruption cases: currently there have not been any notification of Jordanian authorities to the UN on whether the UNCAC is accepted as legal basis for extradition, for instance. Furthermore, Jordan could extend its mutual legal assistance under certain well-established criteria even if the dual criminality requirement is not met.

6.3.3. To strengthen the judiciary, the Judicial Council should continue building competencies of the judges and continue attracting youth to work for the judiciary

The fair and timely enforcement of public integrity regulations requires skilled judges and judicial staff as well as adequate investigative resources. This includes specialised trainings, for example, on complex corporate cases or organised crime involving money laundering or transnational elements. This includes technical expertise on issues such as administrative law, IT, economics, accounting or similar (OECD, 2020[6]).

In Jordan, Judges are appointed by committees consisting of no less than five judges appointed by the Judicial Council. This decision is based on a recommendation of the chair of the Judicial Council (appointed by the King) and must be accompanied by Royal Decree. Also, more than one person must be nominated for the vacant position (Art. 13 Judicial Independence Law, as amended Number 29 of 2014). Only candidates with competence, good moral character and fitness for the judicial position can be appointed (Art. 10). The Judicial Council is also responsible for examining the performance, promotion, discipline, transfer and assignment of judges, evaluating the work of judges, developing technical, behavioural, ethical and professional competences and other administrative and disciplinary tasks that aim at making the judiciary more effective. In turn, the Ministry of Justice determines salaries and promotions based on merit and competences, as evaluated by the Judicial Council and the reports of the inspectors, also considering any disciplinary measures that may have been imposed (Art. 18 Judicial Independence Law). Judges, including prosecutors, are governed by the Code of Conduct for the Judiciary (CoC-J).

Over the past years, there have been substantive improvements in building the competencies and capacities of judges and prosecution services on corruption issues in Jordan. This includes specialised trainings in corruption and on "new" crimes delivered by the Jordanian Judicial Institute. From 2021-2023, for instance, a total of 48 such specialised trainings were held in addition to 82 specialised training programmes in criminal procedures, fair trial guarantees or investigative skills. However, technical knowledge in important areas such as, for example, litigation procedures and complex investigations on corruption, organised crime or money laundering could still be improved. In fact, while Jordan's performance with respect to timeliness of criminal proceedings overall is comparatively good (Figure 6.4 above), interviews conducted by the OECD mentioned some delays in processing corruption cases specifically, due to case complexities, caseload, the conduct of the accused, frequent legal reforms and procedures complicating firmly anchored processes or also inefficiencies in conducting investigations.

Therefore, Jordan should continue the efforts invested in building special capacities for judges needed to deal with corruption cases. Jordan should therefore continue to increase its efforts to offer specialised trainings on corruption, money laundering and litigation of, for instance, complex corporate corruption cases. Jordan could also reflect on making such regular trainings mandatory for judges specialised in corruption cases and should also include trainings for the administrative personnel supporting the judges.

Indeed, qualified civil administrative staff supporting the work of judges and prosecutors is key. In addition to training, it is important that the country continues to invest in technical and infrastructure facilities allowing the judiciary to fulfil their tasks more efficiently and effectively.

Furthermore, in Jordan young people are typically underrepresented in state institutions, including the judiciary (OECD, 2021[17]) and (OECD[8]) Public Governance Review of Jordan). At the same time, there is enormous potential in increasingly motivating and bringing young people to work for the judiciary. They can bring innovation and fresh perspectives, technological proficiency, connectivity with the youth, allow for early construction of future leaders or more diversity. Jordan could therefore consider to strategically promoting and providing incentives for younger generations to take up the role of a judge building on effort such as the "Future Judges Programme" implemented by the judiciary. Jordan could, for instance, integrate in its National Youth Strategy 2019-25 explicit measures that aim at promoting youth interest and opportunities to engage in the judiciary, such as inclusion of teaching modules in schools on the role and functioning of the judiciary, addressing structural barriers (for example financial through the provision of financial support to go to university) or eventually also quota for underrepresented (young) people. Bringing younger generations and currently underrepresented other groups to the judiciary would not only contribute to more trust in those parts of the society but also increase the human capacities within the judiciary.

Chapter 6: Proposals for Action

Strengthening whistleblowing in Jordan

- JIACC, together with other responsible entities, could lead an in-depth review of existing channels to clarify which reporting channel addresses which issue, establish clear procedures for transferring cases if required.

- Based on this review, JIACC could publish a short guide in plain language to provide an overview of the different channels and their purposes.

- JIACC and SPAC should aim at ensuring that all public institutions provide an internal channel for employees as foreseen in Art 11.G of the Civil Service Bylaw and that general directors, direct supervisors and relevant units are trained accordingly. The National Integrity Indicators (NII) promoted by JIACC have the potential to provide further incentives to implement such internal channels.

- Jordan could continue working on fine-tuning and increasing the visibility of the *Bekhedmetkom* platform and JIACC could promote the platform as the first option for external stakeholders who wish to report cases of suspected corruption.

- Jordan's strong framework for whistleblower protection, could be further improved by considering some changes in the legal framework to improve clarity, integrating an explicit good faith clause and putting the burden of proof on those being suspected to retaliate against whistleblowers. Jordan should also consider establishing the possibility to report anonymously.

- Jordan should revise Regulation 62 (Art 3.b.2 and 3.b.4) to avoid any scope for misinterpretation between informer and informants, clarifying that only informants (those who report to JIACC) can be granted protection by concealing their identities, while informers cannot. JIACC should also elaborate clear guidance materials on its website on which protection can be granted in which situation.

- JIACC, Audit Bureau and SPAC could raise awareness about available reporting channels and protection measures, promote the use of internal channels as a first option and address cultural barriers to whistleblowing.

Strengthening the criminal enforcement of corruption cases

- To strengthen the preliminary investigations carried out by JIACC, Jordan should grant administrative and financial autonomy to JIACC.

- Jordan should consider revising current legal texts to include a default procedure that requires the forwarding of all preliminary investigations to prosecutors and the establishment of a joint, co-ordinated investigation procedure by the police, JIACC and prosecutors, where the public prosecutor's office has the lead and decides on the continuation and or discontinuation of the investigation.

- To strengthen the prosecution of corruption cases, Jordan could further strengthen national and international co-ordination and co-operation.

- To strengthen the judiciary, the Judicial Council should continue building competencies of the judges and consider attracting youth to work for the judiciary.

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TOGETHER FOR AN ACCOUNTABLE AND TRANSPARENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Recognising that corruption hampers public sector modernisation, economic progress and foreign investment, Jordan is undertaking ambitious reforms to tackle it. The reforms provide an opportunity to build on past achievements while taking a more modern approach to anti-corruption that focuses on integrity. This Integrity Review provides concrete recommendations on how Jordan can strengthen its institutional arrangements and take a strategic approach to public integrity, including promoting a culture of integrity throughout the public administration and the whole of society. The report also offers suggestions for reinforcing both internal and external control and audit, improving the whistleblowing framework and strengthening the criminal investigation of corruption cases.