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## PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY : AN ANALYTICAL STUDY

By

D.C. JHA\*

Like the foreign policy of every other country, Pakistan's foreign policy has been determined by various factors such as the national interests, geo-political compulsions, external environment, domestic setting and pressures, dreams and images of policy makers, the personality as well as emotions, beliefs and motives of leaders, and national tradition. As a result of these, the foreign policy of Pakistan has moved from the phase of seeking friends, gaining recognition and forging ties with the Muslim countries, a phase of independence and disillusionment, to that of alignment with the United States and then to the era of setting up "bilateral equations" with each of the great Powers. Such policies were by and large strictly maintained in the periods 1947-1952, 1953-1961 and 1962 to the present in respective order. During the period 1962 to the present one can also observe Pakistan's especial relations with Communist China during 1962-1965 and with the Soviet Union since 1965. At the same time Pakistan continued to remain, however resentful and reluctant, an official ally of the United States and a member of the Western military pacts, SEATO and CENTO.

The present paper attempts at analysing the factors that have entered into the making of Pakistan's foreign policy. It also tries to find the different turns that Pakistan's foreign policy has taken since its birth in 1947. Finally, it seeks to answer the questions<sup>1</sup> whether the foreign policy of Pakistan since 1961-62 is fundamentally different from the Indian policy of non-alignment, and (2) whether the policy of having "bilateral equations" with all the great Powers, can reasonably be maintained.

### (1) DETERMINANTS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

(a) National Interests : The most important factor governing Pakistan's foreign policy, and for that matter of any country in the world, is national interest. National interest is considered as "the general, long-term, and continuing purpose which the State, the nation, and the government all see themselves serving."<sup>1</sup> When we go through the speeches and writings of Pakistani leaders and certain concrete actions

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1. Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, *Concepts of International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), p. 6.

of the various Pakistani governments, we note that security, economic development, and preservation as well as promotion of Islamic ideals are the chief interests and objectives of Pakistan. Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, described his country's "strongest interests" as : (1) integrity of Pakistan, (2) Pakistan's culture, *i.e.* the Islamic way of life, and (3) economic development.<sup>2</sup> Mohd. Ayub Khan (1958-1969) similarly spoke about "security and development" as the principal objective of Pakistan's foreign policy and added : "The consideration of security embraces the defence of our country and preservation of our ideology."<sup>3</sup> Other Pakistanis thought likewise.<sup>4</sup> Pakistan's vast expenditure on defence and subsequent concern for obtaining foreign assistance for its economy, as well as emphasis on Islam in its Constitutions and attempts to forge a union of Islamic countries, *i.e.* the concrete actions of its governments,—confirm the Pakistani concern with the national interest. It may be mentioned here that Pakistani concern for the preservation and promotion of Islam is more politically motivated than otherwise.<sup>5</sup>

In Pakistani thinking and actions security has been given the first place. And security for Pakistanis, means security against India. According to Mohammad Ayub Khan "we have our security problem with India since partition. India's foreign policy and its policy towards Pakistan has been offensive and non-cooperative."<sup>6</sup> Eminent Pakistanis like K. Sarwar Hasan and I.H. Qureshi hold, "The problem of Pakistan's defence in the eyes of the Pakistanis is mostly the problem of defence against India. The danger of Communist infiltration or an actual Communist attack have always looked remote and indirect."<sup>7</sup> The former also observes : "Robert Schuman, former Prime Minister of France, once observed that since 1871 the foreign policy of his country had been 'continuously dominated by one main preoccupation, that of ensuring her security and independence from her neighbour, Germany'". Unfortunately the foreign policy of

2. Liaquat Ali Khan, *Pakistan : The Heart of Asia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 11-12.

3. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography* (London, 1967), p. 114.

4. See Ishtiaq Hussain Qurashi, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan" in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds, *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York, 1963) p. 463 ; Mohammad Ahsan Chaudhri, *Pakistan and Regional Pacts* (Karachi, 1958), p. 111 ; and Samim Khan, *Pakistan : Ideology Constitution, Laws, Foreign Policy* (Karachi, 1961), p. 101.

5. It is Pakistan's motive to create an Islamic block or forge ties with Muslim countries against India, to strengthen its claim on Jammu and Kashmir, and to keep India divided within itself between the non-Muslims and the Muslims that chiefly lie at the root of Pakistani concern about Islam.

6. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, vol. 4 (Karachi, n.d.) p. 83.

7. K. Sarwar Hasan, *The Strategic Interests of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1954), p. 3 and Qurashi, n. 4, p. 463. Also see G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966* (London, 1965), p. 9.

Pakistan has in a similar manner been dominated by considerations of security and defence from its neighbour, India.<sup>8</sup>

Such a Pakistani thinking has been the result of the following factors: (1) the opposition of the Indian leaders to the creation of Pakistan until their last minute agreement to it, their dream even after the partition, of a United India, and their continued denunciation of the two-nation concept, to which Pakistan owes its existence ; (2) the long history of bitter relations between two national forces—the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress—before the partition which later started ruling Pakistan and India respectively ; and (3) bitter quarrel between India and Pakistan over several issues following the partition.<sup>9</sup>

In fact, Pakistan has had no more bitter disputes and greater problems with any other country than with India. The partition was inaugurated by a communal holocaust, mass-migrations, quarrel over the partition of assets and liabilities of the undivided India, disputes over the accession of native states, and exchange of several threats between the two countries. According to the Pakistanis India deprived them of their due share of military stores, created difficulties for it by unilaterally stopping the supply of water through one of the canals in the Indus system in 1948, and by taking several steps when Pakistan refused to devalue its currency though India advised it to do so following the devaluation of pound sterling in 1949. India occupied both Junagadh a Hindu-dominated State with a Muslim ruler, who had opted to merge with Pakistan as well as Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-dominated State with a Hindu ruler, sent troops to occupy Hyderabad on the very day when Pakistan was mourning the death of the father of the nation, Qaide-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and massed Indian troops on the Pakistani border in 1951 and other occasions.<sup>10</sup>

The relative difference in size and other potentials between India and Pakistan make the Pakistanis think all the more about their security against India. India is three times bigger in size than Pakistan and its population is five times larger than the latter. India's economy is also several times stronger than Pakistan : India inherited most of the industrialised areas of the sub-continent and has steel and coal in abundance. India received two-thirds of the military stores and equipment of British India and retained all the ordnance factories. India's armed strength is three times Pakistan's. In comparison, Pakistan is a small country with

8. K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations* (New York, 1960). pp. 49-50.

9. For details, see author's *India-Pakistan Relations 1960-1965* (Patna, Bharati Bhavan, In Press), Ch. One.

10. For details see, *ibid.* Also see Choudhury, n. 7, Ch. Two.

little economic resources. It has neither adequate stock of coal or steel nor the amount of public or private capital that India can command.<sup>11</sup> The two wings of Pakistan, East and West, are also separated by 1,100 miles of Indian territory. East Pakistan is, however, surrounded on three sides by India and the only approach is from the sea which is not difficult for an enemy to control.<sup>12</sup> Pakistan's two main ports—Karachi and Chittagong—are within easy reach of Indian air bases and every town of importance, except Quetta, lies within 150 miles of Indian soil. And apart from the rivers of the Punjab, there are no natural obstacles to an advance of the Indian army toward Lahore and Peshawar.<sup>13</sup> All this makes the Pakistanis hysteric because they have all the time fought for equality with India and "have reacted with emotional intensity to any suggestion of Indian superiority in any field."<sup>14</sup>

To the Pakistanis, the problem of security against India is further complicated by Indian control over most of the rich areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian forces in control of the State can outflank the main defended positions of the Punjab. Again, the control of the upper reaches of two of the Punjab rivers places India in such a position that it can inflict great devastation on the agriculture of West Pakistan without resort to force.<sup>15</sup> But more than that, for the Pakistanis, Pakistan as a nation is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir. Indian retention of Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim populated State, refutes the whole validity of the two-nation theory, on which Pakistan is based. The Pakistanis are so worked-up over this issue that as Keith Callard puts, "No public figure in West Pakistan would feel that his life was safe if he declared in public that he was willing to accept as inevitable the incorporation of Kashmir in India."<sup>16</sup> (From this it will, however, be wrong to conclude that the question of Kashmir is the sole factor or even the all-important factor conditioning Indo-Pakistani relation.)<sup>17</sup>

To a much lesser degree, Afghanistan also figures in Pakistani sense of security. Afghanistan has a 1000-mile border with Pakistan. The

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11. For these details, see Qurashi, n. 4, p. 463; Andrew Mellor, *India Since Partition* (London, 1951), pp. 38-39; O. H.K. Spate, *India and Pakistan* (London, 1957), p. 306; and G.E. Percy and Associates, *World Political Geography* (New York, 1957), p. 534.

12. Ayub Khan, n. 3, p. 117.

13. Keith B. Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation* (New York, 1957 Mimeographed), p. 9.

14. Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London, 1958), p. 304. For details, see author's n. 9, Ch. One.

15. Callard, n. 14, p. 310.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

17. See author's, "Foreign Policies of India and Pakistan: Kashmir as a Factor", *South Asian Studies* (Jaipur), vol. 4, No. 2, (July 1969).

Afghans had long had claims to a large area on the North-West Frontier inhabited by the Pathans. They have also invited disaffection among the tribes within the Pakistan border<sup>18</sup> and have conducted raids and forays into Pakistani territory.<sup>19</sup> Since the partition of the subcontinent, Afghanistan has supported and fanned the Pathan's quest for the creation of an independent state of Pakhtunistan whose maps show in it about three-quarters of West Pakistan, including the port of Karachi.<sup>20</sup> In this the Afghans have until recently been supported by the Soviet Union which has also done everything to arm the State. On a number of occasions—in 1949, 1955, and 1961—their relations reached a breaking point and in 1961 diplomatic relations were actually severed.<sup>21</sup> It may be mentioned that Afghanistan was the only country that opposed Pakistan's admission into the United Nations.<sup>22</sup>

To some extent, Pakistanis have also maintained "traditional fear of inimical developments in Central Asia" and regarded the Soviet Union and Communism as a threat to Pakistani security.<sup>23</sup>

Second only to the question of its security, the greatest single interest of Pakistan lies in rapid economic development. Pakistan has been an underdeveloped country with its economy dominantly agrarian and natural resources yet to be exploited.<sup>24</sup> As mentioned earlier, its mineral resources, capitals and other industrial potentials have been very limited. Heavy spending on defence puts another drain on its economic investment. All this makes Pakistan very much dependent on the goodwill, assistance and cooperation of developed countries. Again the fact that Pakistan's trade and economic structure is heavily oriented to the West,<sup>25</sup> further influences its foreign policy.

18. Callard, n. 14, p. 317.

19. Qureshi, n. 4, p. 473.

20. Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London, 1968), p. 141.

21. Qureshi n. 4., pp. 473-4 and Sisir Gupta, *India and Regional Integration in Asia* (Bombay, 1964), pp. 141-2.

22. Ayub Khan, n. 3, p. 176.

23. Qureshi, n. 4, p. 459. Also see Aslam Siddique, *Pakistan Seeks Security* (Lahore, 1960). While proposing a joint defence agreement between India and Pakistan, President Ayub Khan also hinted to the Soviet threat. See Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 38 (1959-60), p. 556.

24. Qureshi, n. 4., p. 465. Also see statement on International Policy, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, Vol. 1 (1948), p. 624.

25. Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan placed "reliance" on private enterprise. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, *The Second Five Year Plan 1960-65* (Karachi, 1960), p. 225. Aziz Ahmed talked of Pakistan as "the largest show-case of private enterprise in the under-developed Afro-Asian World". Embassy of Pakistan, *Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan: Background Report* (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 5-6.

Another interest of Pakistan is promotion and preservation of the Islamic ideals. It means that Pakistan is religiously, culturally, and emotionally allied to other Muslim countries of the world.<sup>26</sup> And as such from the very beginning forging ties with the Islamic countries and forming an Islamic union with them has remained the dominant theme of Pakistan's foreign policy.

(b) GEO-POLITICAL COMPULSIONS: Geo-political factors play an important role in Pakistan's foreign policy. West Pakistan has always been the traditional route for all invasions by land on the subcontinent. It is now contiguous with the powerful USSR and a strip of Communist China. On the North-West of Pakistan is Afghanistan which has been one of Pakistan's hostile neighbours and a close friend of Soviet Russia. East Pakistan similarly is very close to Southeast Asia and other areas of operation of Communist China. Strategically this makes Pakistan very important in global power-politics, in the East-West conflict. West Pakistan is, again, a continuation of Muslim West Asia. Particularly some portions of Iran and West Pakistan are parts of the same landscape. This increases Pakistan's interest in West Asia and more so in Iran. In the South of West and East Pakistan lie Arabian sea and Bay of Bengal respectively which have until recently remained under British dominance. Finally, between East and West Pakistan lies India, a three-times big and unfriendly neighbour with which Pakistan has had most of disputes.

(c) EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: External factors conditioning a country's foreign policy are: (1) Interests and objectives of global powers; (2) Balance of power and tensions within the region in which the country is situated; and (3) Bilateral alignments with major powers or countries with equal or weaker standing which include factors like economic and military aid.<sup>27</sup>

Since 1945 the principal objective of the Soviet Union has been the extension of Soviet and communist influence in every possible part of the world. Soviet Union has been trying to intrude into West Asia. The traditional Russian objective to have access to the open seas in the South is too well known. Since the death of Stalin, it has tried to gain influence in several countries of Asia like UAR, Afghanistan, India, Burma and Indonesia. Since the establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949, Communist China has been trying to establish its supremacy and control over South and Southeast Asia. It has laid claims to part of Pakistani controlled Kashmir, northern India, Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, Bhutan

26. Qureshi, n. 4, p. 464.

27. Khalid B. Sayeed, "Preliminary Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: In Terms of Objectives, Costs and Returns", *South Asian Studies*, July 1968, p. 70.



and several other countries of South and Southeast Asia <sup>28</sup> and has aimed at keeping India in subjugation to itself. The United States, on the other hand, has been doing everything possible, economically, militarily, and otherwise, to contain the spread and influence of these two Communist Powers and, through forging alliance with countries lying on the border and near them, has aimed at building military bases around the periphery of the Communist world. This East-West conflict places Pakistan in a very strategic position, being placed geographically near the two Communist Powers and being the most powerful nation, after India, which has remained non-aligned, in South Asia. West Asia, again, has remained Britain's main source of oil supply. Britain also needed a trustful ally in this part of the world for its imperial and other objectives East of Suez. Pakistan, which owes its birth greatly to the British,<sup>29</sup> and has large number of friends in Britain, therefore, also otherwise fitted into British scheme of things.

Cold War in West Asia and Southeast Asia which became acute in the fifties and to which some reference has already been made earlier, struggle for power and influence between India and Communist China, more specifically since the late fifties and later open struggle between the two communist giants, the Soviet Union and Communist China, also affected Pakistan's foreign policy.

Finally, Pakistan's relations with Britain, countries of West Asia, particularly Iran and Turkey, United States (since 1953), Communist China (since early sixties), and the Soviet Union (since 1965) have always changed the modes and faces of Pakistan's foreign policy from time to time.

(d) DOMESTIC SETTING AND PRESSURES: Among domestic settings and pressures conditioning Pakistan's foreign policy first mention may be made of the absence of a stable government until October 1958 and continuance of some sort of military rule since then. Since the death of Mohammed Ali Jinnah in September 1948, Pakistan has had no leader of national stature and since the death of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951 Pakistan had no stable government until the army took over the administration in October 1958. This prevented Pakistan in having any broad perspective of world affairs and a long-term foreign policy. The result was that Pakistan adopted short-term policies that suited its immediate interests. Again, political instability perhaps also led Pakistan Government to take refuge in the image of a potential foreign enemy, India, and prevented them from coming to terms with India. Stability of government

28. See the map attached in Lui Pei-Hua, *A Brief History of Modern China* (Peking, 1954) and the observation of G.F. Hudson in the *Financial Times* (London), 18 February 1963.

29. Even Keith Callard observes that if Britain had opposed the partition, "the result might have been civil war, but would almost certainly not have been Pakistan". Callard, n. 13, p. 15.



in Pakistan since October 1958 until President Ayub Khan's abdication from power in the beginning of 1969 improved Pakistan's image in the outside world and also resulted in some settlements with India. But the reins of Pakistani power in the hands of a military general since October 1958 (even after Ayub's retirement from power, Pakistan is being governed by a General) has given a military orientation to Pakistani foreign policy. In fact, army has been playing an important role in Pakistan's foreign policy every since 1953 and for some time since 1954 General Ayub Khan also occupied the post of a Central Cabinet Minister in Pakistan.<sup>30</sup>

Another internal factor conditioning Pakistan's foreign policy has been East Pakistan's disaffection with West Pakistan and the Central Government of Pakistan. There is very little in common between the two wings, in respect of language, culture, dress, food habits, landscape and other things. The disparity between the two wings have been "acute enough to threaten the Union itself".<sup>31</sup> The East Pakistanis are conscious of the fact that the Lahore Resolution on Pakistan of March 1940 spoke of "independent States" in the north-west and eastern regions of India.<sup>32</sup> They have all the time pressed for complete autonomy.<sup>33</sup> This has forced the Pakistani leaders to emphasise on Islam and overemphasise the Indian threat. As a keen observer of Pakistani affairs rightly holds, the conflict between East and West Pakistan has led Pakistan to resolve this problem of nationhood "in terms of her conflict with India" and that "the continued state of tension with India is too important a political asset for Pakistan to be easily dispensed with".<sup>34</sup> Keith Callard also maintains that India "provides a powerful stimulus to (Pakistan's) national unity".<sup>35</sup>

Other domestic settings governing Pakistani foreign policy have been : (a) military capability ; (b) economic capability to mobilize resources ; and (c) demands from economic and political interest groups. On the eve of the partition, Pakistan's military capability was strictly limited, more particularly in relation to the problem of security that it faced. The same was true, as mentioned earlier, with its economic capability to mobilize resources. So far as Pakistan's economic and political interest groups were concerned, most of them had feudal and right-wing orientations. Leftist forces were weak, and until recently, even non-existent in Pakistan. There were few other groups which were religious (Islamic) in character. All this has had important bearings in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy orientations.

30. Callard, n. 14, p. 141.

31. A. Tayyeb, *Pakistan : A Political Geography* (London, 1966) p. 180.

32. Callard, n. 13, p. 7.

33. See item 19 of the Twentyone Point Programme of the United Front (East Pakistan) in the fifties, *ibid.*, and the programme of the National Democratic Front (East Pakistan) of 1964, *The Pakistan Observer* (Dacca), 6 August 1964.

34. Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pakistan Relations", *International Studies* (Bombay), Vol. 5 (1963-64), p. 117.

35. Callard, n. 14, p. 17.

(e) DREAMS AND IMAGES OF POLICY FRAMERS: Dreams and images of policy-makers always play an important role in a country's foreign policy. As aptly put by Kenneth Boulding, "people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation,... but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we think the world is like...that determines our behaviour."<sup>36</sup> If we look to the dreams and images of Pakistan's policy-framers, three things stand out clearly: first, their dream of building Pakistan as a model Islamic State and to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries; second, making Pakistan equal in status and power to India; and third, viewing India as an arch-villain which has done everything to destroy Pakistan.

(f) PERSONALITY AND BELIEFS OF LEADERS: Apart from the dreams and images of policy-makers, their personality and beliefs also play a role in shaping their policies. For example, in recent years, the difference between the personalities and ways of thinking of Mohammed Ayub Khan, an experienced soldier, and Z.A. Bhutto, a dynamic but over-ambitious, and even rash politician, have definitely left their mark on Pakistan's foreign policy. Whereas the former never tried to over-reach his target and tried to obtain as much as the resources of Pakistan and global power-setting permitted, the latter never hesitated in pushing Pakistan even ahead of what its resources and global interests permitted. To quote Bhutto, "The question...is a larger one than that of meeting the immediate needs of capital and equipment. It involves consideration of what is Pakistan's place in the world. The size, population, and geopolitical situation of Pakistan...have thrust upon it a certain role and responsibility. Pakistan is today in the mainstream of world politics."<sup>37</sup>

(g) NATIONAL TRADITION: As regards Pakistan's tradition in international affairs, it started with relatively few emotional or intellectual international commitments. The period between the League's demand for a sovereign State and its coming into being was so extremely brief, certainty about the nature and form in which the Muslim demand would be fulfilled was so little, the internal task of the Muslim League was so much more difficult and absorbing than that of the Indian National Congress and internationally-oriented personality in the higher echelons of the Muslim League was so non-existent, that Pakistan had little foreign affairs orientation.<sup>38</sup> However, two things were always there: (1) a general sympathy for the

36. Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in James N. Rosenau (Ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1964), pp 391-2.

37. Pakistan, *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Vol. 1, 14 March 1966, p. 358.

38. Sisir Gupta, n. 21, p. 121.

Muslim countries since the very day of the Khilaphat movement;<sup>39</sup> and (2) a long history of animosity with and struggle against the Indian National Congress which after the partition was transformed into India-Pakistan antagonism. Pakistanis were also somewhat favourably inclined towards Britain which had remained a source of inspiration to them. Along with these, Pakistanis also shared the sentiment of Asian and African, or perhaps non-white solidarity.<sup>40</sup>

As a result of the above mentioned factors, India has always remained the main preoccupation of Pakistan's decision-makers and Pakistan's foreign policy has revolved more or less around India.<sup>41</sup> This, along with other factors, referred to earlier, led to changes in the techniques and modes of Pakistan's foreign policy from time to time.

## (2) PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY 1947-1952: NEUTRALITY AND DISILLUSIONMENT

When Pakistan was born in August 1947 it had, as referred to earlier, very few international orientation except the feeling of Islamic bond with Muslim countries, traditional hatred and antagonism with Indian leaders and some link with Britain. Again, Pakistan was an unfamiliar and possibly unstable complication on the political map of Asia.<sup>42</sup> Gandhi and Nehru were more known to the outside world than Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Moreover, whereas India retained the original membership of the United Nations, Pakistan had to apply afresh for its membership. Pakistan, again, was born in chaos and the Pakistanis faced the "almost impossible task of making it work".<sup>43</sup> It was a "moth-eaten" State<sup>44</sup> with scores of problems. To this was added, the bitter quarrel that started with India on a number of problems, involving issues vital to Pakistan's survival.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-26.

40. Callard, n. 13, p. 2.

41. I.H. Qureshi holds that "the fear of India has always dominated Pakistan's foreign policy". Qureshi n. 4, p. 463. Keith Callard maintains, "Relations with India have been the main preoccupation of the foreign policy of Pakistan" and that for Pakistan, India has filled the role of an "enemy". Callard, n. 14, pp. 313, 17. According to Richard Weekes, "To Pakistan, India is the bitterest of enemies and the greatest foreign affairs problem." Richard V. Weekes, *Pakistan: Birth and Growth of Muslim Nation* (Princeton, N.J., 1964). Also see Hasan, n. 7, p. 3; Hasan, n. 8, p. 50; G.W. Choudhury, n. 7, p. 8; Ahsan Chaudhri, n. 4, p. 35 and Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan and China" in A.M. Halpern, ed. *Policies Towards China* (New York, 1965), p. 229.

42. Callard, n. 14, p. 303.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

44. This expression was used by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. See Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. 2 (Lahore, 1947), p. 75.

In such a context, the need of the hour propelled Pakistan to search feverishly for friends who could help it in solving scores of internal problems and support it against India. In such a drive for friends and supporters Pakistan moved in two directions : (a) Muslim countries and (b) Britain—countries with whom Pakistan had past affinities.

From the very beginning, and more particularly since 1949, Pakistan made efforts to come closer to the Muslim countries of West Asia and to bring Muslim governments closer together. An unofficial Muslim World Conference was organised in Karachi which was attended in February 1949 by delegates from 19 Muslim countries. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan emphasised in London in May 1949 that Muslim nations between Cairo and Karachi could play an important role between the two Power blocs.<sup>45</sup> On his way home he stopped at Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran and made moves for a conference at the governmental level. The same year, the President of the Muslim League, Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman visited West Asian countries to promote the idea of an Islamic bloc. In November 1949 the first International Islamic Economic Conference was held in Karachi, and was presented with a major presidential address by Ghulam Mohammad, the Finance Minister of Pakistan. The Pakistani Finance Minister envisaged Islamic unity and cooperation leading to the creation of a third bloc of nations.<sup>46</sup> At the second Muslim World Conference held in Karachi in February 1951 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan talked of Pakistan's "mission...to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries".<sup>47</sup> In early 1952 Pakistan's Muslim Peoples' Organisation held a conference attended by delegates from several Muslim countries. In 1949 and 1952 abortive attempts were also made by Pakistan to arrange official or inter-governmental Islamic conference. In 1953 an attempt was similarly made to set up a permanent consultative organization of Muslim States.<sup>48</sup> Contacts with heads of State and Prime Ministers of Muslim countries were maintained through frequent visits.

Pakistan similarly championed the Arab cause against Israel and otherwise tried to support every Muslim cause in the United Nations.<sup>49</sup>

Thus Pakistan sought to build an Islamic bloc and to obtain friendship and support of Muslim countries which could be mobilized against its principal enemy, India.

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45. Siddiqui, n. 23, p. 88.

46. *The Dawn* (Karachi), 26 November 1949.

47. *Ibid.*, 10 February 1951.

48. Callard, n. 13, p. 21.

49. *Ibid.*, n. 14, p. 316.

Another direction towards which Pakistan moved in the initial phase of the history was Britain. Pakistan owed a lot to Britain for its emergence as a sovereign nation. For a few years after its birth it depended heavily on Britain for economic assistance, technical, administrative and military personnel, military build-up, general security, and political support. The Government of Pakistan always stressed the value of friendship with Britain. Pakistan continued as a dominion under the British Commonwealth even after India became a republic in 1950. It even tended to regard the Commonwealth as a means of satisfaction of Pakistan's claim against India.<sup>50</sup> It tried to invoke the Commonwealth on issues like communal riots<sup>51</sup> and Jammu and Kashmir and sought to obtain Commonwealth guarantee for its territorial integrity.

In both these attempts—forging ties with the Muslim countries and cultivating intimate relations with Britain and the British Commonwealth—Pakistan was disappointed in its objectives. The fact was that Pakistan hoped that it would find allies which would look upon Pakistan's quarrels as their own. "In particular", writes Callard, "she has demanded that her friends commit themselves clearly in their disputes with India. On these terms Pakistan could find no takers and the result has been a sense of disillusion."<sup>52</sup> All Pakistani attempts to hold World Islamic Conference at Governmental level failed<sup>53</sup> and the same happened to Pakistani attempts to obtain the support of Muslim countries against India. As Callard puts it, "Muslim states were reluctant to make a choice between friendship for India or Pakistan. If a choice had to be made, India, as more powerful, more stable and more influential, was likely to have the advantage."<sup>54</sup> Again, the leaders of the national movements in Egypt, Syria or Indonesia had not been men who had stressed the role of religion; instead, they were persons engaged in internal struggles against minority group which shared Pakistani view of Islam's potentialities in the modern world. Pakistan's disillusionment with Muslim countries was correctly presented by *Dawn* on 4 May, 1952. It wrote: "The time has come for Pakistan's intelligentsia to realize that Pakistan is not adding to its prestige in the international field by running after certain other countries which are economically and otherwise in a far less stable position than Pakistan itself and which can really be of little help to us...Let us not forget that we in Pakistan constitute a Muslim world in ourselves. We say to our nation: give up sloganism and be realists."

For some similar reasons, Pakistan was disappointed by Britain and the British Commonwealth. This was clear from the statement of Prime

50. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

51. Richard Symonds, *Making of Pakistan* (London, 1949), p. 169.

52. Callard, n. 13, p. 10.

53. Sisir Gupta, n. 21, p. 134.

54. Callard, n. 14, p. 314.

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan made in London in May 1949 in which he said: "Pakistan must not be taken for granted. "Pakistan is not a camp-follower of the Commonwealth."<sup>55</sup> *Dawn* similarly came out with a very angry editorial on 8 May, 1949 demanding elimination of British elements from army and civil service of Pakistan. In 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan also refused to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference until he was assured that Kashmir would be discussed in the conference.<sup>56</sup> In May 1953 Prime Minister Mohammed Ali stated: "India became a republic... Pakistan recognised the Crown. And my people watched to see what difference it would make. My people know your queen as our queen but still they ask : what difference does it make ?"<sup>57</sup>

As regards Pakistan's relations with the USA and the USSR, Pakistan tried at first to avoid taking sides in their power politics. Pakistan's policy was "friendliness towards all States."<sup>58</sup> According to Liaquat Ali Khan it was "neither tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc nor was it a camp-follower of the Communist bloc."<sup>59</sup> It was the only non-communist country to vote with the Soviet bloc on the question of the Interim Committee in the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>60</sup> But during the same session on the Essentials of the People Resolution and in the next session on the Uniting for Peace Resolution it voted with the Western bloc.<sup>61</sup> Again, although it supported UN operation in Korea, it declined to lend armed assistance to the UN.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognise Communist China. It also abstained on a resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor in Korea and opposed the proposal of instituting blockade against that country.<sup>63</sup>

But neither the United States nor the Soviet Union gave importance to Pakistan. In fact, so far as the United States was concerned, the American policy under President Truman seemed to attach more importance to an understanding with India.<sup>64</sup> In 1949 Indian Prime Minister was also invited to the United States and was accorded a warm welcome. This was very distasteful to Pakistan and the Pakistani Prime Minister secured an invitation from Moscow soon afterwards. But then Russia also did not appear enthusiastic about Pakistan and remained quite

55. *The Dawn*, 14 May 1949.

56. *The Round Table* (London), vol. 31 (1950-51), p. 170.

57. *The Dawn*, 20 May 1953.

58. See Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan's statement, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, vol. 1 (1948) p. 821.

59. *The Dawn*, 9 March 1951.

60. Mustaq Ahmad, *United Nations and Pakistan* (Karachi, 1955), p. 56.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

62. *The Hindu* (Madras), 17 June 1951.

63. Hasan, n. 8, p. 252.

64. Callard, n. 14, p. 320.



indifferent. As the *Newsweek* reported on 21 December 1949, "After several weeks of unsuccessful attempts, Liaquat Ali Khan gave up in disgust and announced that it would not be possible for him to make a trip. No one in Karachi has any idea why Moscow failed to carry through its invitation."

On Afro-Asian questions like self-government for colonial peoples, Indonesia, the Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland and Morocco and Tunisia Pakistan voted with African-Asian States.

Its two close neighbours, India and Afghanistan, appeared hostile to Pakistan. We have already mentioned that Pakistanis have regarded India as their greatest threat. Pakistan had several problems with India all of which remained unresolved and aggravated during the period 1947—52. In fact, this period was in a sense a very dark one in Indo-Pakistani relations.<sup>65</sup> And Afghanistan remained a hostile neighbour, claiming a large area of Pakistan.

Thus Pakistan was feeling quite disillusioned. It appeared isolated and friendless. "Pakistan could find no single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and ally willing to lend aid and comfort in time of need."<sup>66</sup>

It was under such situations that certain other things happened which brought Pakistan in the Western system of alliance.

### (3) PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY 1953—1961 : ALIGNMENT WITH THE WEST

From 1950 onwards Pakistanis, who were feeling isolated and disillusioned, began thinking seriously about alignment with the world's most powerful and wealthy nation, the United States. To correct United States' ignorance and incomprehension about Pakistan and create an interest for his country, Liaquat Ali Khan undertook a vigorous speech tour in the United States in May 1950. In July 1951 the Pakistanis found, to their great dismay, that their loud cry for a jihad for Kashmir resulted in the concentration of Indian troops on Pakistan's border. Pakistanis maintain that it was soon after this incident that Mohammad Ayub Khan started thinking of a military alliance with the United States<sup>67</sup> Towards the end of 1952 Pakistan also faced a grave economic crisis following a drop in the world prices of raw materials.<sup>68</sup> About this time the United

65. See author's, "An Appraisal of Indo-Pakistani Relations", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, spl. no., December 1967, p. 104.

66. Callard, n. 14, p. 303.

67. Sayeed, n. 27, p. 73.

68. See Mohammad Ali's statement, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative Debates*, Vol. 1 (1953), p. 135.



States, which was in search of an ally in this part of the world and which was disappointed by India's refusals to become a partner in the Western system of alliance, also started taking interest in Pakistan. Thus towards the end of 1952 rumours were widespread that Pakistan and the United States were planning to enter into military pact.<sup>69</sup> The United States' interest in Pakistan increased further when in January 1953 Eisenhower was installed as the President, with Richard Nixon<sup>70</sup> as the Vice-President and John Foster Dulles, a man known in history as lover of military pacts, as Secretary of State. Two months later, in April 1953, Mohammad Ali, formerly ambassador in Washington, replaced Nizamuddin as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. "Mr. Dulles wanted pacts. Mr. Mohammed Ali liked Americans, Pakistan wanted money and arms."<sup>71</sup>

Things moved very quickly after this. By the end of 1953 Pakistan and the United States started intense negotiations for a military agreement and in May 1954 a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed between them. In September 1954 Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and exactly a year later became a member of the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan thus became an ally of the United States for all intents and purposes. It became 'America's most allied ally in Asia'.<sup>72</sup>

From then on for quite some time Pakistan voted with the United States on the question of representation of Communist China in the United Nations. On crises in Hungary and Lebanon and Jordan Pakistan loyally toed the American line and gave support to the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle-East. Even at the time of the Suez crisis of 1956 its tone was different from that of the other countries of Asian-African bloc. Even Ayub Khan has admitted this fact when he wrote: "In the Middle-East our position had been compromised by some of our leaders who handled the situation, at the time of the Suez crisis, in a clumsy fashion."<sup>73</sup> Pakistan's attitude at the Colombo (1954) and Bandung (1955) conferences was also quite different from that of countries like India, Indonesia and Burma.

This policy continued even after the establishment of martial law administration, under General Mohammad Ayub Khan, in October 1958. In fact, the idea of Pakistan's alignment with the United States was the birth of Ayub Khan's mind, then the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan

69. *The Dawn*, 11 November 1952.

70. Selig Harrison explains how India's refusal to align with the United States created an interest in Richard Nixon for Pakistan, Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the US : A Case History of Mistake", *New Republic* (Washington, D.C), vol. 141, 10 August 1959.

71. Callard, n. 14, p. 321.

72. Ayub Khan, n. 3, p. 130.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

Army, and was the result of his "initiative and efforts", his "negotiations with American political and military leaders."<sup>74</sup> He himself admits as much<sup>75</sup> and denies, of course, his hand in Pakistan's membership of SEATO.<sup>76</sup> In March 1959 Ayub administration reinforced this alignment further by signing a bilateral Agreement of co-operation with the United States. "Thus", to quote Ayub Khan himself, "Pakistan was associated with the United States through not one, but four mutual security arrangements."<sup>77</sup> He reaffirmed his desire to honour all the past commitments of Pakistan and to remain faithful to its allies.<sup>78</sup>

Thus Pakistan was in favour of a Western-supported resolution on Tibet in 1959<sup>79</sup> and voted against the representation of Communist China in the United Nations at the 14th and 15th sessions of the General Assembly. Commenting on the situation in Laos, President Ayub Khan also declared in December 1960: "If Pakistan [as a member of SEATO] is called upon to shoulder its burden and responsibility we will never hesitate to do it."<sup>80</sup>

Pakistan's alignment with the United States paid rich dividends to Pakistan. By 1963 Pakistan received military aid worth exceeding \$ 1,000,000,000 and economic aid worth \$ 1,500,000,000.<sup>81</sup> To quote one-time Information Officer in the United States Information Service in Karachi, Richard Weekes, "Few countries in the world had gained more—economically and militarily—than Pakistan from American friendship."<sup>82</sup> Moreover, Pakistan received American and Western support *vis-a-vis* India on issues like Kashmir. The SEATO communique of March 1956 reaffirmed Pakistan's western frontier along the Durand Line and urged an early settlement of the Kashmir question.<sup>83</sup> Talking about Pakistani gains from Western alignment, a Pakistani pertinently observed that "in 1957, when discussions on Kashmir were resumed in the Security Council Pakistan's allies, some of whom were members of the Security Council, unequivocally supported Pakistan's legitimate stand in Kashmir."<sup>84</sup>

For alignment with the West, Pakistan had to suffer from certain deprivations. Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who had agreed to appoint

74. Col. Mohammed Ahmed, *My Chief* (Lahore, 1959), pp. 73-74.

75. Ayub Khan, n. 3, pp. 116, 129.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

78. See the text of the Proclamation of 7 October 1958, *Ibid.*, p. 245.

79. See United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records*, mtg. 834, 21 October, 1959.

80. *The Dawn*, 15 December, 1960.

81. Weekes, n. 41, p. 258.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Cited in Callard, n. 14, p. 322.

84. Ahsan Chaudhri, n. 4. p. 115.

a Plebiscite Administrator for Kashmir by the end of 1954 in his negotiations with the Pakistani counterpart in August 1953, backed out from his commitment stating that if military aid came to Pakistan the whole context of the Kashmir agreement would change. Secondly, Pakistan also incurred the wrath of the Soviet Union which from 1955 became an open supporter of Indian claim on Kashmir.<sup>85</sup> Finally, it adversely affected Pakistan's prestige and position among the Asian-African nations "divided the Arab world", and Pakistan fell "in the estimation of the Arabs".<sup>86</sup>

However, on the whole, Pakistan gained considerably from alignment with the United States. Khalid Bin Sayeed admits this fact when he writes: "Until the beginning of 1960 or so one could say that Pakistan was reasonably satisfied in the sense that the returns that it realised from its foreign policy were of the same order as the objectives"<sup>87</sup>.

During this period Pakistan's search for forging an alliance with the Muslim countries also declined considerably. After the third session of the International Islamic Economic Conference, held in Karachi in April 1954, it became "dormant and its activities have remained confined to Pakistan".<sup>88</sup> The same was true with other Islamic organizations in Pakistan. On 22 October 1956 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said that "Pak-Islamism and not Pan-Islamism should now be the slogan".<sup>89</sup> Speaking about the uselessness of forging such an Islamic union, Prime Minister S.H. Suhrawardy even said: "...zero plus zero is after all equal to zero".<sup>90</sup>

Pakistan's positions *vis-a-vis* India also improved<sup>91</sup> and so also, to some extent, its relations with that country. Relations with Afghanistan experienced rough weather, but then it had now the Western Powers to uphold Pakistani position *vis-a-vis* Afghanistan.

Moreover, during this very period Pakistan was also curiously able to convince, despite its membership of SEATO and alliance with the United States, Communist China that its association with the Western military pacts was not a hindrance to the development of Sino-Pakistani relations and the latter accepted the former's version. From 1955 Pakistan's relations with Communist China began to develop slowly but surely. The

85. For these deprivations, see Ayub Khan, n. 3, pp. 131-2 and Sayeed, n. 27, pp. 73-74.

86. Hassan, n. 8, p. 76.

87. Sayeed, n. 27, p. 74.

88. Siddiqui, n. 23, p. 90.

89. Cited in Sisir Gupta, n. 21, p. 139.

90. *Prime Minister's Statement on Foreign Policy*, 9 December 1956.

91. See author's article, n. 65, pp. 104-5.

two countries found their conflict with India as their strong meeting point.<sup>92</sup>

(4) PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1962—  
DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE WEST, CORDIALITY  
TOWARDS COMMUNIST CHINA AND SUBSEQUENT  
INTIMACY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Like the year 1954, the year 1962 was another "watershed" in the foreign policy of Pakistan. "In that year [1962] Pakistan's disenchantment with pro-Western alliances crystallized into cordiality towards the Chinese".<sup>93</sup>

Even after 1961 Pakistan continued as an ally of the United States and a member of CENTO and SEATO. And this proved quite profitable to Pakistan. As observed by an American columnist in April 1965, "Pakistan has been able to acquire a disproportionately strong power position relative to that of India" and has "commanded from the United States an economic and military subsidy much larger than her size would otherwise warrant".<sup>94</sup> Khalid Bin Sayeed, until recently a Pakistani national, also holds that upto 1965 the United States supplied three-fourth of Pakistan's requirements in security and development fields.<sup>95</sup> Moreover, in the debates on Kashmir in the Security Council of the United Nations in 1962 and 1964, the United States and other Western Powers upheld Pakistani positions.<sup>96</sup>

However, as the US interest in India increased, Pakistan began feeling unhappy with the United States. By 1961 several developments took place which made Pakistan apprehensive about US policies. Threat of Communist China to India, the only Power which could act as a counterweight to China in South Asia, increased. United States had come to look at non-aligned policy with some respect; it no longer remained a sinful and contemptuous policy. John F. Kennedy, who had in March 1958 talked about US "stake in the survival of free government in India",<sup>97</sup> became the President of the United States. Invention of sophisticated weapons like ICBM proportionately reduced the value of having military

92. For these details, see author's, "Attitude of Communist China Towards the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 3, July-September 1959, pp. 251-2.

93. Sayeed. n. 27, p. 73.

94. Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43 (1964-65), p. 322.

95. K.B. Sayeed, "Southeast Asia in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), p. 235 and Sayeed, n. 27, p. 77.

96. See author's, n. 9, Chs. Two and Three.

97. Cited in Norman D. Palmer, "India as a Factor in United States Foreign Policy", *International Studies*, Vol. 6 (1964-65), p. 65.

bases. In such a context, US interest in the economic reconstruction of India increased. And following the Chinese aggression on India in October-November 1962, the United States also started giving military aid to India. US policy with regard to Kashmir also began to change.<sup>98</sup> As put by Ayub Khan, "Until 1962, however, the policy of the United States continued to distinguish between a 'non-aligned' India and the American ally, Pakistan...However, this distinction between Pakistan and 'non-aligned' India disappeared after the border disputes between India and China which flared up into an armed clash in 1962...In 1963, however, Pakistan received a new cause of disillusionment with American foreign policy...the United States proceeded to rush arms to India...since then arms aid has been flowing into India..."<sup>99</sup>

Pakistanis, therefore, began vigorously criticizing the US policies and even threatened to quit US-sponsored military pacts. The fact is, as stated earlier, that Pakistan wants its allies to be only its allies and to be clearly on its side against India. And when that is not so it gets angry and disillusioned. As early as in April 1946 Feroz Khan Noon had said : "If the Hindus give us Pakistan and freedom, then the Hindus are our best friends. If the British give it to us then the British are our best friends. But if neither will give it to us, then Russia is our best friend".<sup>100</sup> On 16 October 1948 *Dawn* had spelled out more clearly in its editorial captioned, "A call for Reality" : "If the British choose India and let Pakistan down we must make our choice also—between the West and the East."

From October 1962, therefore, Pakistan turned vigorously for intimate relations with Communist China and soon the two countries became, for all practical purposes, each other's friends and ally against India. On 2 March 1963 China and Pakistan signed a border agreement along the border between Pakistani-held Kashmir and Chinese province of Sinkiang. In July 1963 Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, gave broad hints of a Sino-Pakistani *entente* against India and the same was confirmed by various Chinese statements. From February 1964 Communist China also began supporting Pakistani view on Kashmir. It supported Pakistani positions against India during the armed clash over the Rann of Kutch and undeclared Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. Pakistan and China signed a number of agreements strengthening economic and cultural ties and for establishing shipping, banking, and air links between the two countries. Following the Indo-Pakistani undeclared war of September 1965, China has also been supplying tanks, supersonic jets, spare parts, and other military equipments to Pakistan.<sup>101</sup>

98. See author's article, n. 17, p. 169.

99. Ayub Khan, n. 3, pp 132-3.

100. Cited in A.B. Rajput, *The Muslim League: Yesterday and Today* (Lahore, 1948), p. 109.

101. For these details, see author's, n. 92, pp 254-8.

By 1965 Soviet Union was also added to the list of Pakistan's hot search for friends. If in seeking friendship with Communist China Pakistan sought to obtain support and help against India and to forge an anti-India *entente*, in seeking friendship with the Soviet Union, she sought to neutralize the Soviet support, *vis-a-vis* Pakistan, to India and, to a lesser degree, Afghanistan. Moreover, it was also undesirable for Pakistan to keep a very strong and powerful neighbour like the Soviet Union hostile, more so since the latter had, following the U-2 incident in 1960, threatened to blow off the Peshawar base from which that plane had reported to have flown over the Soviet territory. Soviet Union could also help Pakistan in the latter's economic development and defence build-up. On the other hand, Pakistan's disenchantment with the United States, her strategic position in the warming atmosphere of Sino-Soviet conflict, her close relations with China, Soviet desire to get US air bases eliminated from Pakistan which were quite close to Soviet industrial areas, and several others,—attracted Soviet interest towards Pakistan.

Pak-Soviet collaboration had already started in some form with the signing of an agreement between them for prospecting of oil in Pakistan in March 1961. In 1963 the two countries also signed air and border agreements.<sup>102</sup> During the debate over Kashmir in the Security Council of the United Nations in 1964, the Soviet stand was not as pro-Indian and anti-Pakistani as it was in 1962 and a Soviet delegate was even reported to be confiding a Pakistani correspondent in Washington that Russia might "re-examine" the Kashmir problem if "developments justified it."<sup>103</sup> Pak-Soviet relations, however, did not develop as long as Nikita Khrushchev remained the Prime Minister of Russia. And when President Ayub Khan visited Moscow, on Soviet invitation, the first Pakistani head of Government or State to do so, relations between Rawalpindi and Moscow began to improve rapidly. For the first time *Pravda* (Moscow) in its May Day slogan wished on 22 April 1965 that relations between the Soviet and Pakistani peoples should "develop and grow stronger."<sup>104</sup> Kosygin described Pakistan, on the eve of the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Moscow, as "peace-loving".<sup>105</sup> The Soviet Union observed complete neutrality between India and Pakistan during their armed clashes in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir in April and September 1965 respectively.<sup>106</sup> And since the

102. Khalida Qureshi, "The Soviet Union, Pakistan, and China", *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi) Vol. 16 (1963), p. 355 and "Pakistan and the World", *ibid.*, p. 357.

103. Ejaz Hussain, "Washington Letter: Foreign Policy and Kashmir", *The Dawn*, 5 March 1964.

104. For the text, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Ann Arbor, Mich.), Vol. 17, 17 May 1965, p. 4.

105. See the text in *Pravda* of 16 May 1965, *ibid.*, Vol. 17, 9 June 1965, p. 7.

106. See author's, n. 9, Chs Five and Nine.



Tashkent Declaration Moscow has been trying to maintain strict equidistance from Delhi and Rawalpindi. In September 1967 President Ayub Khan made his second trip to Moscow and in April 1968 Alexi Kosygin paid his return visit to Rawalpindi, the first Soviet top leader to do so. On all these occasions the Soviet Union offered several economic concessions to Pakistan.<sup>107</sup> In July 1968 the Soviet Union also agreed to supply military hardwares to Pakistan and the latter is now receiving tanks and other equipments from the Soviet Union in good number. Even on Farakka barrage the Soviet Union has started advising India to come to some agreement with Pakistan.<sup>108</sup>

Thus Pakistan has been able to develop good relations with all the three major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China—who matter in today's world affairs. The United States is the wealthiest and the most powerful country of the world. And so, while protesting against US aid to India, Pakistan has not chosen to give up its alignment with that country and continues to remain a member of the Western military pacts. The United States is still the largest single source of Pakistani security and development requirements.<sup>109</sup>

The Soviet Union, the second most powerful and prosperous nation of the world, is now Pakistan's next major source of economic and military needs.<sup>110</sup>

And Communist China, having a huge land army and a very long common frontier with India, keeps Pakistan's "greatest security problem", India, always pre-occupied in the latter's security against Communist China. Moreover, Communist China is a major source of Pakistani defence and, to a lesser degree, other requirements.<sup>111</sup> Over and above these things, the Sino-Soviet conflict and US apprehension of Communist China, have attracted the two super powers considerably, towards Pakistan lest the latter commit itself absolutely to Communist China. Again, some form of rivalry which still continues between the two Super-Powers further puts them in a race with each other for winning Pakistan's trust.

Thus Pakistani foreign policy has reached a unique phase where all the three Great Powers, who matter in world politics today, are competing for the friendship of Pakistan.

In this way in his political autobiography, published in 1967, President Ayub Khan talked of setting up "bilateral equations with each one of

107. *The Dawn*, 19 April 1968.

108. See *The Statesman* (Calcutta), 17 July 1968 and Ajit Bhattacharya, "Soviet Arms to Pakistan-1 : Road to Disillusionment," *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 19 July 1968.

109. Sayeed, n. 95, p. 239.

110. *Ibid.*

111. Sayeed, n. 27, p. 77 and *Ibid.*, n. 95, p. 239.



them, with clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interest without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties".<sup>112</sup> He further added : "If their [US, Communist China and Soviet Union] global policy is served by our understanding of their problems and by our not acting against them, well and good. But if the demand goes beyond that and requires us to do something that is against the interest of another power, then we will have to decline because that would be going against the interests of Pakistan."<sup>113</sup> Accordingly, whereas in December 1960 the Pakistani President had been prepared to shoulder "burden and responsibility" in Laos under SEATO in July 1964 he stated that if there were confrontation between China and the United States over North Vietnam, Pakistan would not get involved.<sup>114</sup> Similarly, while developing intimacy with Communist China, the Pakistani leaders continued emphasizing the friendship of the US and, in their joint communique with their Chinese counterparts avoided any condemnatory reference to US action in Vietnam. Moreover, while embracing Moscow, Rawalpindi has refused to adopt Brezhnev's suggestion, made at the International Communist Conference on 5 June 1969, to develop a collective security system in Asia<sup>115</sup> presumably as a counterweight to China.

In the sixties Pakistan has also been able to secure respectability in the Asian-African world and develop close contacts with them. Pakistan has become quite friendly with countries like Indonesia, Nepal, Ceylon, and even UAR. As reports suggest, Pakistan has also been invited by India's friends like UAR and Yugoslavia, to a non-aligned meeting.

Pakistani urge for forming a union of Islamic countries has also revived. On 4 April 1961 President Ayub Khan expressed himself in favour of the idea of a Muslim Commonwealth.<sup>116</sup> In his political autobiography, he further developed this idea and even talked of creating a third World of a constellation of nations from Casablanca to Djakarta, from Cairo to Nairobi and beyond, most of whom professed "the faith of Islam."<sup>117</sup>

In July 1964 Pakistan was able to establish the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) whose members are Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Its objective has been to develop closer regional co-operation between them on the pattern of European Community.<sup>118</sup> Ayub Khan expressed the

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112. Ayub Khan, n. 3, p. 118.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

114. *The Morning News* (Dacca), 7 July 1964.

115. See *Pravda*, 6 June 1969 as produced in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 21, 2 July 1969, p. 16.

116. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 5 April 1961.

117. Ayub Khan, n. 3, p. 183.

118. For details of RCD, see Zubedia Hasan, "Iran, Pakistan and Turkey—Regional Cooperation for Development", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 17 (1964),

hope that RCD would become the nucleus of his concept of the Third world<sup>119</sup> about which a mention has been made earlier.

As a result of the above mentioned improved position of Pakistan in world affairs, Pakistan is much stronger now in respect of its security and economic development than in the past. India still fills the role of an 'enemy', but it can no longer be as great a threat as it was in the past. In fact, it is due to this improved position, besides other things that Pakistan even decided to forcibly change the *status quo* in the Indian subcontinent in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir in 1965. Relations are still not good with Afghanistan but with the Soviet Union serious for Pakistan's friendship, Afghanistan (which depended very much for military and other supplies on the Soviet Union) can create no problem for Pakistan. On the other hand it is Afghanistan which "has been.....apprehensive of its larger neighbour [Pakistan] in somewhat the same way that Pakistan has been of India."<sup>120</sup>

##### (5) A CRITIQUE OF PAKISTAN'S RECENT POLICY

We have already noted that in the changed complexion of international politics in the sixties Pakistan has by its policy of having "bilateral equations" with the United States, Communist China, and the Soviet Union attained a unique and most profitable position. One may ask therefore whether this is not the same as the position attained by India in the mid fifties and whether the policy of establishing "bilateral equations" with each of the three Great Powers is very much different from the Indian policy of non-alignment ?

There is no doubt that Pakistan has attained the position similar to India's in the mid fifties. But certain differences remain. They are : (1) In its relations with the three above-mentioned big Powers, Pakistan has attained, despite its relatively small size, resources and potentialities *vis-a-vis* India, even a better position than India's. At present each of the three Great Powers have been doing everything possible to placate Pakistan. And Pakistan, knowing their weakness, is even exploiting them. Moreover, unlike Pakistan, India never received any military aid from the United States until the Chinese invasion of 1962 and has not received any military supply from China. China has not remained kind to render any other assistance to India at any time in the past ; rather it has always, even in the days of *Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai*, looked at India as a rival and enemy.<sup>121</sup> (2) Pakistan has not attained India's even present position, due to Pakistan's inferior position to India and other factors, among the Asian-African and non-aligned countries.

119. Ayub Khan, n. 3, p. 182.

120. Brines, n. 20, p. 141.

121. See author's article, n. 92, p. 252.

Mohammad Ayub Khan has taken pains to explain that Pakistan's present policy is not an 'independent' policy and that "there is a fundamental difference" between Pakistan's policy of setting up "bilateral equations" with the three Great Powers and India's policy of non-alignment (Ayub Khan chooses to call it 'neutralism') "practised during the early fifties." Objecting to the use of the word 'independent' to characterize Pakistan's recent foreign policy, he writes: "By 'independence' is meant the freedom to criticize and curse everybody else. Now, we cannot afford the luxury of indulging in unbridled criticism of others just to prove our 'independence'. Our foreign policy has to be a national policy which must take into account our vital interests and operate towards the advancement of those interests."<sup>122</sup> Explaining the difference between Pakistan's recent policy and India's policy of non-alignment, Ayub Khan contends, "India's neutralism was at best a posture of sitting on the fence and seeing how best it could take advantage of both sides; at worst it was a kind of hypocrisy and a subterfuge..... India's 'neutralism' was an attempt to act 'big' and to create a cover for the expansion of her influence. We entertain no such illusions. Our approach is essentially intended to conserve our resources and to cut our commitment."<sup>123</sup>

Although one may accept Ayub Khan's explanations for his objections to Pakistan's policy being called an 'independent' foreign policy (and here, again, there may be difference of opinion), it is very difficult to agree to the explanation he gives for differentiating Pakistan's policy from the Indian policy of non-alignment. In fact, Pakistan has been doing the same thing which, according to Ayub Khan, India has been described to be doing and for which he refuses to call Pakistan's policy as one of non-alignment or neutralism. Pakistan has been trying to sit on the fence much more than India and has been taking advantage not from "both sides" but from *all the three sides*, the United States, Communist China, and the Soviet Union. Again, Ayub Khan's vision of the Third World of the constellations of nations from Casablanca to Djakarta, from Cairo to Nairobi and beyond in which Pakistan is "numerically most populous"<sup>124</sup> and "should belong to a major constellation"<sup>125</sup> is nothing but an attempt to act big and to create a cover for the extension of Pakistan's influence.

Pakistan's present policy is, however, different from non-aligned policy of India because Pakistan has been having very good days with Communist China and the Soviet Union even though she is a military ally of the United States and a member of SEATO and CENTO. In form, it is an 'aligned' and not a non-aligned or even a neutral country.

122. Ayub Khan, n. 3, pp. 114—15.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

124. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-8.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

Finally, one may ask whether Pakistan will be reasonably able to maintain "bilateral equations" with the United States, Communist China, and the Soviet Union "without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties" and would not be trapped in the "triangular tightrope"<sup>126</sup> which Ayub Khan expected? For the present it can be said that Pakistan has successfully maintained this position. But it is very difficult to say that Pakistan would be able to pursue this policy strictly even in the future. This is because the Soviet Union's main preoccupation is its conflict with Communist China and *vice-versa* and the United States' present policy in Asia seems to be aimed at limiting the influence of Communist China. Moreover, finding itself poised between two principal enemies, the Soviet Union and the United States, China may turn towards better relations with India. Or the United States may enter into a deal with China (and, as the indications suggest,<sup>127</sup> this is not altogether improbable) which may bring about a rethinking in the Soviet and Indian policies. In any case India, with bigger size and greater resources and potentialities than Pakistan, which tried to pursue a somewhat similar policy in the fifties, soon found itself in rough weather.

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126. *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119.

127. See Easwar Sagar, "Triangular Diplomacy of Super-Powers", *The Hindu*, 30th December 1969.