

# Digital Communications

## SSY125, Lecture 14

### Coding beyond reliable communication

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December 4, 2019



**CHALMERS**

## Coding beyond coding

We can now provably (and in practice) achieve capacity for most channels.

# Coding beyond coding


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
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


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# Coding beyond coding

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
- Channel coding for classical applications has reached the point of **diminishing returns**



- A **very powerful tool** for many applications and research fields:
  - Uncoordinated multiple access
  - Post-quantum cryptography
  - DNA storage
  - Caching
  - Distributed computing


# Uncoordinated multiple access

## Slotted ALOHA



# Uncoordinated multiple access



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

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

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

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

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

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
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


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
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


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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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


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





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
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
Alternative representation



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
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Users (VNs)




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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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


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



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


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


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
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


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


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
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
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


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
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
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
- A **coding problem**!

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
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



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

- A **coding problem**! → Can be analyzed using the **theory of codes on graphs**

## Coded slotted ALOHA: Decoding





## Coded slotted ALOHA: Decoding

- A packet can be reliably decoded if no collision occurs





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- A packet can be reliably decoded if no collision occurs
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

## Coded slotted ALOHA: Decoding

- A packet can be reliably decoded if no collision occurs
- Each packet contains pointers to its replicas
- The replicas of a decoded packet can be perfectly removed from the signal





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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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- The new matrix  $G'$  is the generator matrix of **another linear code**, that is **very difficult to decode** if the secret key is not known.

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## Problem

**Very big key sizes** (hundreds of thousands of bits, compared to few thousands for RSA)

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- Archival DNA-based storage **already feasible!**



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- Each nucleotide (called oligo) can be considered to **represent 2 bits** → Data can be **stored** in oligos!

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- **Four DNA base nucleotides**: Adenine (A), Cytosine (C), Guanine (G), and Thymine (T).
- It's possible to **synthesize** (almost) **arbitrary chain molecules** by **concatenating** the **DNA base nucleotides**. (Modern synthesizers: a few hundreds of nucleotides)
- Each nucleotide (called oligo) can be considered to **represent 2 bits** → Data can be **stored** in oligos!
- Data can be **recovered reading the sequence of DNA** by a DNA **sequencer**.

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- Data can be **recovered reading the sequence of DNA** by a DNA **sequencer**.
- Once desired information is stored in DNA, it may be **rewritten** using **DNA editing techniques**.

# DNA storage

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
## Solution: **Use coding!**

- Coding to correct insertions, deletions and substitutions.
- **Constrained coding** to avoid some DNA patterns.

## Coding for content delivery: Distributed caching




video on demand







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
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
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
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
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


## Coding for content delivery: Distributed caching



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
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


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


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
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
video on demand




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
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
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
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
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
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


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





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
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


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
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
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Idea

Use **erasure correcting codes** to store content!

And many more applications...

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- Distributed computing
- Distributed storage
- Security and privacy
- Quantum key distribution
- Quantum error correction
- ...