



HighStreetMarket – Staking

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: December 10th, 2021 – December 22nd, 2021

Visit: Halborn.com

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY	5
CONTACTS	5
1 EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW	6
1.1 INTRODUCTION	7
1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY	7
1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY	7
RISK METHODOLOGY	8
1.4 SCOPE	10
2 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW	11
3 FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS	12
3.1 (HAL-01) DENIAL OF SERVICE CAUSED BY NONREENTRANT MODIFIER - CRITICAL	14
Description	14
Risk Level	15
Recommendation	15
Remediation Plan	16
3.2 (HAL-02) SUBVAULTREWARDS ARE NOT UPDATED CORRECTLY WHEN CALLING PROCESSREWARDS - HIGH	17
Description	17
Proof of Concept	17
Risk Level	18
Recommendation	18
Remediation Plan	19
3.3 (HAL-03) UNSTAKE FUNCTION CAN BE LOCKED IF TOTALWEIGHT EQUALS TO ZERO - MEDIUM	20
Description	20

Risk Level	21
Recommendation	21
Remediation Plan	22
3.4 (HAL-04) UPDATEHIGHPERBLOCK IMPACTS NEGATIVELY ALL THE UNCLAIMED REWARDS - MEDIUM	23
Description	23
Proof of Concept	23
Risk Level	24
Recommendation	24
Remediation Plan	25
3.5 (HAL-05) MISSING REQUIRE STATEMENT IN UPDATERESTAKELOCK FUNCTION - LOW	26
Description	26
Code Location	26
Risk Level	26
Recommendation	27
Remediation Plan	27
3.6 (HAL-06) USERS CAN STAKE IN A FLASHPOOL EVEN IF THE POOL IS DISABLED - LOW	28
Description	28
Code Location	28
Risk Level	28
Recommendation	28
Remediation Plan	29
3.7 (HAL-07) INCORRECT AMOUNT IN STAKED EVENT EMISSION - LOW	30
Description	30
Code Location	30

Risk Level	32
Recommendation	32
Remediation Plan	32
3.8 (HAL-08) SOLC 0.8.0 COMPILER VERSION CONTAINS MULTIPLE BUGS - INFORMATIONAL	33
Description	33
Risk Level	33
Recommendation	33
Remediation Plan	33
3.9 (HAL-09) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATIONAL	34
Description	34
Risk Level	34
Recommendation	34
Remediation Plan	34
3.10 (HAL-10) UINT32(UINT64 TYPES ARE LESS GAS EFFICIENT - INFORMATIONAL	35
Description	35
Risk Level	35
Recommendation	35
Remediation Plan	36
3.11 (HAL-11) WRONG COMMENT - INFORMATIONAL	37
Description	37
Risk Level	37
Recommendation	38
Remediation Plan	38
4 AUTOMATED TESTING	39
4.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT	40

Description	40
Slither results	40
4.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN	48
Description	48
MythX results	48

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CONTACTS

CONTACT	COMPANY	EMAIL
Rob Behnke	Halborn	Rob.Behnke@halborn.com
Steven Walbroehl	Halborn	Steven.Walbroehl@halborn.com
Gabi Urrutia	Halborn	Gabi.Urrutia@halborn.com
Roberto Reigada	Halborn	Roberto.Reigada@halborn.com
Aidan Marlin	Halborn	Aidan.Marlin@halborn.com

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

HighStreetMarket engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their staking smart contracts beginning on December 10th, 2021 and ending on December 22nd, 2021. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract provided in the Github repository [Highstreet-World/StakingPool](#)

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a week for the engagement and assigned two full time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineers are blockchain and smart-contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were addressed by HighStreetMarket team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. ([MythX](#))
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Brownie](#), [Remix IDE](#))

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of **5 to 1** with **5** being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of **10** to **1** with **10** being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10** - CRITICAL
- 9** - **8** - HIGH
- 7** - **6** - MEDIUM
- 5** - **4** - LOW
- 3** - **1** - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts:


- HighStreetCorePool.sol
- HighStreetFlashPool.sol
- HighStreetPoolBase.sol
- HighStreetPoolFactory.sol

Commit ID: [ff826505c538bbfb7b84a898361e7d1bc0e921b0](#)

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
1	1	2	3	4

LIKELIHOOD




EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - DENIAL OF SERVICE CAUSED BY NONREENTRANT MODIFIER	Critical	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL02 - SUBVAULTREWARDS ARE NOT UPDATED CORRECTLY WHEN CALLING PROCESSREWARDS	High	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL03 - UNSTAKE FUNCTION CAN BE LOCKED IF TOTALWEIGHT EQUALS TO ZERO	Medium	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL04 - UPDATEHIGHPERBLOCK IMPACTS NEGATIVELY ALL THE UNCLAIMED REWARDS	Medium	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL05 - MISSING REQUIRE STATEMENT IN UPDATEREWORD FUNCTION	Low	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL06 - USERS CAN STAKE IN A FLASHPOOL EVEN IF THE POOL IS DISABLED	Low	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL07 - INCORRECT AMOUNT IN STAKED EVENT EMISSION	Low	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL08 - SOLC 0.8.0 COMPILER VERSION CONTAINS MULTIPLE BUGS	Informational	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL09 - POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	Informational	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL10 - UINT32/UINT64 TYPES ARE LESS GAS EFFICIENT	Informational	SOLVED - 12/16/2021
HAL11 - WRONG COMMENT	Informational	SOLVED - 12/16/2021



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) DENIAL OF SERVICE CAUSED BY NONREENTRANT MODIFIER - **CRITICAL**

Description:

The following functions contain the `nonReentrant` modifier:

- `HighStreetPoolBase.stake()`
 - `HighStreetPoolBase.unstake()`
 - `HighStreetPoolBase.updateStakeLock()`
 - `HighStreetPoolBase.processRewards()`
 - `HighStreetCorePool.transferHighToken()`
 - `HighStreetCorePool.transferHighTokenFrom()`

When `receiveVaultRewards()` function is called the `pendingVaultRewards` of the stakers will be always different from 0. In this case, when `HighStreetPoolBase.unstake()` is called, the flow below will be executed:

- ```
1. HighStreetPoolBase.unstake() (nonReentrant)
2. ---- HighStreetCorePool._unstake()
3. ----- HighStreetPoolBase._unstake()
4. ----- HighStreetPoolBase._sync()
5. ----- HighStreetCorePool._processRewards()
6. ----- HighStreetCorePool._processVaultRewards()
7. ----- HighStreetCorePool.transferHighToken()
 (nonReentrant again)
```

As we can see, in this case, `HighStreetCorePool.transferHighToken()` will be called by `HighStreetPoolBase.unstake()`, which is not possible as both functions got the `nonReentrant` modifier. This only happens when `pendingVaultRewards > 0` as per the code below:

**Listing 1:** HighStreetCorePool.sol (Lines 275)

```
258 function _processVaultRewards(address _staker) private {
259 User storage user = users[_staker];
```

```
260 uint256 pendingVaultClaim = pendingVaultRewards(_staker);
261 if (pendingVaultClaim == 0) return;
262 // read HIGH token balance of the pool via standard ERC20
263 // interface
264 uint256 highBalance = IERC20(HIGH).balanceOf(address(this));
265 require(highBalance >= pendingVaultClaim, "contract HIGH
266 balance too low");
267
268 // update `poolTokenReserve` only if this is a HIGH Core Pool
269 if (poolToken == HIGH) {
270 // protects against rounding errors
271 poolTokenReserve -= pendingVaultClaim > poolTokenReserve ?
272 poolTokenReserve : pendingVaultClaim;
273 }
274
275 user.subVaultRewards = weightToReward(user.totalWeight,
276 vaultRewardsPerWeight);
277
278 // transfer fails if pool HIGH balance is not enough - which
279 // is a desired behavior
280 transferHighToken(_staker, pendingVaultClaim);
281
282 emit VaultRewardsClaimed(msg.sender, _staker,
283 pendingVaultClaim);
284 }
```

This would cause every single call to `HighStreetPoolBase.unstake()` to revert with the following error message: `ReentrancyGuard: reentrant call`

Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 5**

**Impact - 5**

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the `nonReentrant` modifier from the `HighStreetCorePool.transferHighToken()` function. The same is recommended for the `HighStreetCorePool.transferHighTokenFrom()` function. Both functions are internal.

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The HighStreetMarket team solved the issue in the commit ID `ffef2b7402a0e5308b8019727688a242a220443e`

## 3.2 (HAL-02) SUBVAULT REWARDS ARE NOT UPDATED CORRECTLY WHEN CALLING PROCESSREWARDS - HIGH

### Description:

In the `HighStreetCorePool` contract, the function `receiveVaultRewards()` is executed by the vault to transfer vault rewards HIGH from the vault into the pool.

The function `processRewards()` and `_processVaultRewards()` handle the distribution of these rewards but this is not done correctly, and the users are sent a higher amount of reward tokens than the initial amount sent by the vault to the pool.

This causes that the smart contract eventually gets a lower reward token balance that what it actually should not allow users to unstake as the balance of the contract is not enough to transfer the users their reward tokens.

### Proof of Concept:

```
>>> contract HighStreetCorePool.HighPool.stake(1000_0000000000000000000000000000, chain.time() + (24*60*60*7), {'from': user1})
Transaction sent: 0x1dbacf7793fd701c1d1cf3de1bed20be43e832228f3c77f5d60aae981945
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 1
HighStreetCorePool.stake confirmed Block: 13808775 Gas used: 230907 (3.44%)
<Transaction '0x1b0bcf793fffd701c11d2ef3de1bed20be43e832228f3c77f3d60aae981945'>
>>> contract HighStreetCorePool.HighPool.stake(1000_0000000000000000000000000000, chain.time() + (24*60*60*7), {'from': user2})
Transaction sent: 0x335ab9c9c418e36ee961bcd4d78d78a9e9e4dd3da172cf1535fcfc5eed63a24dc
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 1
HighStreetCorePool.stake confirmed Block: 13808776 Gas used: 237248 (3.53%)
<Transaction '0x335ab9c9c418e36ee961bcd4d78a9e9e4dd3da172cf1535fcfc5eed63a24dc'>
>>> output.green("Sleeping " + str(604800) + " seconds / 1 week..\n")
chain.sleep(24*60*60*7)
chain.mine(1)
Sleeping 604800 seconds / 1 week...
>>> contract ERC20.high.approve(contract.HighStreetCorePool.HighPool.address, 100_000000000000000000000000000000, {'from': vault})
Transaction sent: 0x8ce27bcfffbdfa7670d8fe67e9511d8cbfb69e95d9ef280ed1bed5df086483fe
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 0
MockERC20.approve confirmed Block: 13808778 Gas used: 44225 (0.66%)
<Transaction '0x8ce27bcfffbdfa7670d8fe67e9511d8cbfb69e95d9ef280ed1bed5df086483fe'>
>>> contract HighStreetCorePool.HighPool.receiveVaultRewards(100_000000000000000000000000000000, {'from': vault})
Transaction sent: 0xd5d148424965706caabcd3dc40943a55f59b880179e509e59e25f00a6e449e4
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 1
HighStreetCorePool.receiveVaultRewards confirmed Block: 13808779 Gas used: 50696 (0.75%)
```

As we can see, 100 tokens were sent by the vault through the call to `receiveVaultRewards()` functions, but the total vault rewards that will be given are higher than that. In this case, this will cause that the smart contract will not have enough balance to allow user2 to unstake:

```
>>> contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.unstake("0x1000_0000000000000000000000000000", "from: user1")
Transaction sent: 0xa57b57ccae39123b3d1l745e17743d19867c0ea502d1f9beaaac51dd2d38
Gas price: 0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 3
HighStreetCorePool.unstake confirmed Block: 13808702 Gas used: 111879 (3.15%)
<Transaction '0xa57b57ccae39123b3d1l745e17743d19867c0ea502d1f9beaaac51dd2d38'>
-->> output.read("contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.address") -> " str(contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.address))"
output.read("contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.balanceOf(user1.address)") -> "+ str(contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.balanceOf(user1.address))
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.balanceOf(user1.address) -> "0x00000000000000000000000000000000"
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.balanceOf(user2.address) -> "999411c0032525800d5165
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.balanceOf(user3.address) -> "105058870567741931545838
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.balanceOf(user2.address) -> "499999999999999999999999
-->> contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.unstake(0, 1000_000000000000000000000000000000, "from: user2")
Transaction sent: 0x10361b815933e6fb152afcc66510df37b95b77df4e460bc52e4845a3f4a3
Gas price: 0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 3
HighStreetCorePool.unstake confirmed (ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance) Block: 13808783 Gas used: 250936 (3.73%)
<Transaction '0xa57b57ccae39123b3d1l745e17743d19867c0ea502d1f9beaaac51dd2d38'>
-->> output.read("contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingVaultRewards(user1.address)") -> " str(contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingVaultRewards(user1.address))
output.read("contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingVaultRewards(user2.address)") -> "+ str(contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingVaultRewards(user2.address))
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingVaultRewards(user1.address) -> "0
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingVaultRewards(user2.address) -> "450017146714322292
```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 4

## **Impact - 5**

#### **Recommendation:**

It is recommended to fix the logic in the `processRewards()` and `_processVaultRewards()` functions so the stakers are not sent a higher amount of reward tokens than the initial amount sent by the vault to the pool through `receiveVaultRewards()` function.

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The HighStreetMarket team solved the issue in the commit ID `99c5bf0cc40bc76fce973756a45634dfafaa3e01`

### 3.3 (HAL-03) UNSTAKE FUNCTION CAN BE LOCKED IF TOTALWEIGHT EQUALS TO ZERO - MEDIUM

Description:

The contract `HighStreetPoolBase` contains the following function:

**Listing 2: HighStreetPoolBase.sol (Lines 565)**

```

538 function _sync() internal virtual {
539 // update HIGH per block value in factory if required
540 if (factory.shouldUpdateRatio()) {
541 factory.updateHighPerBlock();
542 }
543
544 // check bound conditions and if these are not met -
545 // exit silently, without emitting an event
546 uint256 endBlock = factory.endBlock();
547 if (lastYieldDistribution >= endBlock) {
548 return;
549 }
550 if (blockNumber() <= lastYieldDistribution) {
551 return;
552 }
553 // if locking weight is zero - update only `lastYieldDistribution` and exit
554 if (usersLockingWeight == 0) {
555 lastYieldDistribution = uint64(blockNumber());
556 return;
557 }
558
559 // to calculate the reward we need to know how many blocks
560 // passed, and reward per block
561 uint256 currentBlock = blockNumber() > endBlock ? endBlock :
562 blockNumber();
563 uint256 blocksPassed = currentBlock - lastYieldDistribution;
564 uint256 highPerBlock = factory.highPerBlock();
565
566 // calculate the reward

```

```
565 uint256 highReward = (blocksPassed * highPerBlock * weight) /
566 factory.totalWeight();
567
568 // update rewards per weight and `lastYieldDistribution`
569 yieldRewardsPerWeight += rewardToWeight(highReward,
570 usersLockingWeight);
571 lastYieldDistribution = uint64(currentBlock);
572
573 // emit an event
574 emit Synchronized(msg.sender, yieldRewardsPerWeight,
575 lastYieldDistribution);
576 }
```

If `factory.totalWeight()` equals to zero, a division by zero occurs and the call reverts. As this `_sync()` function is called every time by the `unstake()` function, if this value is zero all the rewards and staked tokens will be locked.

This scenario where `factory.totalWeight()` equals to zero can only occur if all the registered pools are `HighStreetFlashPool` and if all of them have expired/are disabled. In that case, when the users call the `unstake()` function to retrieve their staked tokens and their rewards the operation will revert.

Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 5**

Recommendation:

It is recommended to modify `HighStreetPoolFactory.registerPool()` function so it does not allow anyone to add a `HighStreetFlashPool` unless there is already at least one `HighStreetCorePool` added. This way, the lock would never be possible, as that scenario where the `factory.totalWeight()` is zero can only happen if all the registered pools are `HighStreetFlashPool`.

## Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `HighStreetMarket team` fixed the issue in the following commit IDs:

- `8f0b49cb90cbad93ed0586e6b05f54bac228e68b`  
`HighStreetPoolFactory.changePoolWeight()` function can now be called by the owner of the contract or by a pool.
- `53dff6a43b47cdc21d83bb3b8232cbbc96e238b5`  
`HighStreetMarket team` added an `emergencyWithdraw()` function that will allow users to retrieve their staked tokens and the yield rewards in case that `factory.totalWeight()` equals to zero.

## 3.4 (HAL-04) UPDATEHIGHPERBLOCK IMPACTS NEGATIVELY ALL THE UNCLAIMED REWARDS - MEDIUM

### Description:

In the contract `HighStreetPoolFactory` the function `updateHighPerBlock()` decreases every `blocksPerUpdate` the `highPerBlock` rewards by a 3%. This could result, as shown in the Proof of Concept below, in a user losing a part of his reward by calling `unstake()` right after the execution of `updateHighPerBlock()`.

## Proof of Concept:

Based on a `HighStreetPoolFactory` contract with the following initial parameters:

- `_highPerBlock = 10_000000000000000000`
  - `_blocksPerUpdate = 50`
  - `endBlockNumber - initBlockNumber = 200`

Current yield block: 48/200

```
contract_poolFactory.highPerBlock() -> 10000000000000000000000000
```

```
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingYieldRewards(user1.address)
-> 479999999999999999999999
```

Call to updateHighPerBlock() - REVERTED: (too frequent)

Current yield block: 49/200

```
contract poolFactory.highPerBlock() -> 1000000000000000000000000000
```

```
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingYieldRewards(user1.address)
-> 489999999999999999999999
```

Call to `updateHighPerBlock()` - CONFIRMED

Current yield block: 50/200

```
contract_poolFactory.highPerBlock() -> 970000000000000000000000
```

```
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.pendingYieldRewards(user1.address)
-> 484999999999999999999999
```

As we can see, if the user calls `unstake` in the block `49/200` he will get a higher reward than if he called it in the block `50/200`.

This happens because when `updateHighPerBlock()` is called it does not pay out the pending rewards to the users at the previous rate.

The difference can be really high as shown in the example below:

Based on a `HighStreetPoolFactory` contract with the following initial parameters:

- `_highPerBlock = 10_00000000000000000000000000000000`
- `_blocksPerUpdate = 1`
- `endBlockNumber - initBlockNumber = 40`

Amount of reward tokens received by the user if he just calls `unstake()` after reaching `endBlockNumber`: `118284914959653117599`

Amount of reward tokens received by the user after calling 40 times `processRewards()` generating 40 deposits and after retrieving those 40 deposits by calling `unstake()`: `1227719693740947062768`

Difference:

`227719693740947062768 - 118284914959653117599 = 109434778781293945169 = 109` reward tokens.

Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 2

**Impact** - 4

Recommendation:

It is recommended to loop through the users generating a deposit with the previous rate that they can use to unstake the rewards at the previous rate. Although this solution may eventually require a lot of gas reaching the block gas limit and totally blocking the `updateHighPerBlock()` function.

## Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `HighStreetMarket` team will mitigate this issue by:

- Incentivizing their users to claim the rewards more frequently to maximize their profit by compound mechanism.
- Creating a script that executes automatically once before each `updateHighPerBlock()` call. This script will trigger the `sync()` function updating the `yieldRewardsPerWeigh` variable.

## 3.5 (HAL-05) MISSING REQUIRE STATEMENT IN UPDATESTAKELOCK FUNCTION - LOW

Description:

In the contract `HighStreetPoolBase` the function `updateStakeLock()` allows a user to extend the locking period for a given deposit. This function does not check that the `tokenAmount` is different from zero allowing users to extend deposits that were already unstaked, which makes no sense:

```
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.getDeposit(user1.address, 0) -> (0, 0, 0, 0, False)
>>> contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.updateStakeLock(0, 1671611232, {'from': user1})
Transaction sent: 0xb0128385775c11350d3def57c382aa34e9c9cd7507fc7537af7bae690f3cfca
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 3
HighStreetCorePool.updateStakeLock confirmed Block: 13802206 Gas used: 180859 (2.69%)
<Transaction '0xb0128385775c11350d3def57c382aa34e9c9cd7507fc7537af7bae690f3cfca'>
>>> output.read("contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.getDeposit(user1.address, 0) -> " + str(contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.getDeposit(user1.address, 0)))
contract_HighStreetCorePool_HighPool.getDeposit(user1.address, 0) -> (0, 0, 1640075337, 1671611232, False)
```

Code Location:

**Listing 3: HighStreetPoolBase.sol**

```
307 function updateStakeLock(
308 uint256 depositId,
309 uint64 lockedUntil
310) external nonReentrant {
311 // sync and call processRewards
312 _sync();
313 _processRewards(msg.sender, false);
314 // delegate call to an internal function
315 _updateStakeLock(msg.sender, depositId, lockedUntil);
316 }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add a require statement in the `updateStakeLock()` function that checks that the `tokenAmount` in the deposit is  $> 0$ .

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `HighStreetMarket` team fixed the issue in the commit ID `f2562ad8f6e8cc39eb1ec17471368e7058b0df92`

### 3.6 (HAL-06) USERS CAN STAKE IN A FLASHPOOL EVEN IF THE POOL IS DISABLED - LOW

#### Description:

The contract `HighStreetFlashPool` allows user to stake tokens even if the pool is disabled. This makes no sense as the users will not get any reward for staking their tokens in a disabled `HighStreetFlashPool`.

#### Code Location:

**Listing 4: HighStreetFlashPool.sol**

```
73 function _stake(
74 address _staker,
75 uint256 _amount,
76 uint64 _lockedUntil
77) internal override {
78 // override the `_lockedUntil` and execute parent
79 // we set "locked period" to 365 days only to have correct
80 // calculation of locking weights,
81 // the tokens are not really locked since _unstake in the core
82 // pool doesn't check the "locked period"
83 super._stake(_staker, _amount, uint64(now256() + 365 days));
84 }
```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 1

**Impact** - 3

#### Recommendation:

It is recommended to not allow staking if the `HighStreetFlashPool` is disabled:

**Listing 5: HighStreetFlashPool.sol (Lines 78)**

```
73 function _stake(
74 address _staker,
75 uint256 _amount,
76 uint64 _lockedUntil
77) internal override {
78 require (!isPoolDisabled(), "Pool disabled");
79 // override the `_lockedUntil` and execute parent
80 // we set "locked period" to 365 days only to have correct
81 // calculation of locking weights,
82 // the tokens are not really locked since _unstake in the core
83 // pool doesn't check the "locked period"
84 super._stake(_staker, _amount, uint64(now256() + 365 days));
85 }
```

**Remediation Plan:**

**SOLVED:** The [HighStreetMarket team](#) solved the issue in the commit ID [dc058f113a6009585f7a47280c9b5cf2930a087b](#)

## 3.7 (HAL-07) INCORRECT AMOUNT IN STAKED EVENT EMISSION - LOW

Description:

In the contract `HighStreetPoolBase` the event `Stake` will emit a wrong amount in case that the tokens staked are deflationary.

Code Location:

Listing 6: `HighStreetPoolBase.sol` (Lines 462)

```
394 function _stake(
395 address _staker,
396 uint256 _amount,
397 uint64 _lockUntil
398) internal virtual {
399 // validate the inputs
400 require(_amount > 0, "zero amount");
401 require(
402 _lockUntil == 0 || (_lockUntil > now256() && _lockUntil -
403 now256() <= 365 days),
404 "invalid lock interval"
405);
406 // update smart contract state
407 _sync();
408
409 // get a link to user data struct, we will write to it later
410 User storage user = users[_staker];
411 // process current pending rewards if any
412 if (user.tokenAmount > 0) {
413 _processRewards(_staker, false);
414 }
415
416 // in most of the cases added amount `addedAmount` is simply `_
417 // however for deflationary tokens this can be different
418
419 // read the current balance
```

```
420 uint256 previousBalance = IERC20(poolToken).balanceOf(address(
 this));
421 // transfer `_amount`; note: some tokens may get burnt here
422 transferPoolTokenFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
423 // read new balance, usually this is just the difference `_
 previousBalance - _amount`
424 uint256 newBalance = IERC20(poolToken).balanceOf(address(this))
);
425 // calculate real amount taking into account deflation
426 uint256 addedAmount = newBalance - previousBalance;
427
428 // set the `lockFrom` and `lockUntil` taking into account that
429 // zero value for `lockUntil` means "no locking" and leads to
 zero values
430 // for both `lockFrom` and `lockUntil`
431 uint64 lockFrom = _lockUntil > 0 ? uint64(now256()) : 0;
432 uint64 lockUntil = _lockUntil;
433
434 // stake weight formula rewards for locking
435 uint256 stakeWeight =
436 (((lockUntil - lockFrom) * WEIGHT_MULTIPLIER) / 365 days +
 WEIGHT_MULTIPLIER) * addedAmount;
437
438 // makes sure stakeWeight is valid
439 require(stakeWeight > 0, "invalid stakeWeight");
440
441 // create and save the deposit (append it to deposits array)
442 Deposit memory deposit =
443 Deposit({
444 tokenAmount: addedAmount,
445 weight: stakeWeight,
446 lockedFrom: lockFrom,
447 lockedUntil: lockUntil,
448 isYield: false
449 });
450 // deposit ID is an index of the deposit in `deposits` array
451 user.deposits.push(deposit);
452
453 // update user record
454 user.tokenAmount += addedAmount;
455 user.totalWeight += stakeWeight;
456 user.subYieldRewards = weightToReward(user.totalWeight,
 yieldRewardsPerWeight);
457
```

```
458 // update global variable
459 usersLockingWeight += stakeWeight;
460
461 // emit an event
462 emit Staked(msg.sender, _staker, _amount);
463 }
```

Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 3

**Impact** - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `addedAmount` instead of `_amount`:

#### **Listing 7**

```
1 emit Staked(msg.sender, _staker, addedAmount);
```

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The HighStreetMarket team fixed the issue in the commit ID [3255a48e93ce0558de9ba33651f943b8f83b6b9f](#)

## 3.8 (HAL-08) SOLC 0.8.0 COMPILER VERSION CONTAINS MULTIPLE BUGS - INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

Solidity compiler version 0.8.3, 0.8.4 and 0.8.9 fixed important bugs in the compiler. The version 0.8.0 is missing all these fixes:

- 0.8.3
- 0.8.4
- 0.8.9

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 1

**Impact** - 1

### Recommendation:

It is recommended to use the most tested and stable versions, such as 0.6.12 or 0.7.6. Otherwise, if ^0.8.0 is still chosen to be used because of the new functionality it provides, it is recommended to use 0.8.10 version.

### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The HighStreetMarket team solved the issue in the commit ID [ec469c0e14949a991a5383ed836ba7dbf5534a7a](#)

## 3.9 (HAL-09) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

In the following contracts there are functions marked as `public` but they are never directly called within the same contract or in any of their descendants:

`HighStreetPoolFactory.sol`

- `getPoolData()` (`HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#169-183`)
- `registerPool()` (`HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#209-227`)

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 1

**Impact** - 1

### Recommendation:

If the functions are not intended to be called internally or by their descendants, it is better to mark all of these functions as `external` to reduce gas costs.

### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `HighStreetMarket` team solved the issue in the commit ID [c31e617d3aec0115855a50c8b39b8e31fbabe7c4](#)

## 3.10 (HAL-10) UINT32/UINT64 TYPES ARE LESS GAS EFFICIENT - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

`uint32`, `uint64`... variables are less gas efficient than `uint256`. Due to how the EVM natively works on 256 bit numbers, using for example 32 bit number introduces additional costs as the EVM has to properly enforce the limits of this smaller type.

This happens in multiple functions across the different smart contracts. For example:

**Listing 8: HighStreetPoolBase.sol**

```
157 constructor(
158 address _high,
159 HighStreetPoolFactory _factory,
160 address _poolToken,
161 uint64 _initBlock,
162 uint32 _weight
163)
```

In general, the usage of these smaller types only improves the gas costs in cases where the variables can be packed together, for example structs.

Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 1

**Impact** - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to make use of `uint256` variables, for example, in state variables like `HighStreetPoolFactory.lastRatioUpdate` that are not

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

part/packed in any struct to reduce gas costs.

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `HighStreetMarket team` fixed the issue in the commit ID `769e9773783a517a4389da5e602abe7595bb8454`

## 3.11 (HAL-11) WRONG COMMENT - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the contract `HighStreetPoolFactory`, in the function `changePoolWeight()` the first comment describes that the function verifies that it is executed by the factory owner or by the pool itself when actually it only verifies and allows the pool to call it.

**Listing 9: HighStreetPoolFactory.sol (Lines 272,273)**

```
271 function changePoolWeight(address poolAddr, uint32 weight)
272 external {
273 // verify function is executed either by factory owner or by
274 // the pool itself
275 require(poolExists[msg.sender], "access denied");
276
277 bool isFlashPool = IPool(poolAddr).isFlashPool();
278 // only flash pool can change weight
279 require(isFlashPool, "invalid poolAddr");
280
281 // recalculate total weight
282 totalWeight = totalWeight + weight - IPool(poolAddr).weight();
283
284 // set the new pool weight
285 IPool(poolAddr).setWeight(weight);
286
287 // emit an event
288 emit WeightUpdated(msg.sender, poolAddr, weight);
289 }
```

Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 1

**Impact** - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to correct the comment in the code.

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `HighStreetMarket team` fixed the issue in the commit ID `8f0b49cb90cbad93ed0586e6b05f54bac228e68b`

`HighStreetPoolFactory.changePoolWeight()` function can now be called by the owner of the contract or by a pool.

# AUTOMATED TESTING

## 4.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abi and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

### Slither results:

#### HighStreetCorePool.sol

```

Reentrancy in HighStreetCorePool._processRewards(addresses, bool) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#240-251):
 External calls:
 - _processRewards(_staker) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#244)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(HIGH), to, value) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#207)
 - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data, SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#131)
 - pendingYield = super._processRewards(_staker, withDate) (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#245)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#451)
 - contract/HighStreetPoolBase.stakePool(stake, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
 External calls sending eth:
 - _processVaultRewards(_staker) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#244)
 - processVaultRewards(staker) (value)(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 State variables written after the call(s):
 - poolTokenReserve += pendingYield (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#249)
 - pendingYield -= user.deposit.pushedNewDeposit() (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#453)
 - user.tokenName += pendingYield (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#140)
 - user.totalWeight += pendingYield (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#140)
 - user.tokenName += pendingYield (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#140)
 - user.totalWeight += pendingYield (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#140)
 - user.pushedNewDeposit = weightToReward(user.totalWeight, yieldRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#463)
 - user.pushedNewDeposits = weightToRewards(user.totalWeight, yieldRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#463)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetCorePool._stake(address, uint256, uint256) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#203-219):
 External calls:
 - super._stake(_staker, amount, lockedUntil) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#208)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(ERC20(poolToken), from, to, value) (contracts/HighStreetCorePoolBase.sol#758)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(HIGH), to, value) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#127)
 - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data, SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#131)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#451)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 - (value, returnData) = stake(staker, poolToken, stakes, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
 External calls sending eth:
 - super._stake(_staker, amount, lockedUntil) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#208)
 - poolTokenReserve += amount (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#212)
 - user.pushedNewDeposit = weightToReward(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#210)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address, uint256, uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#394-403):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#47)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#451)
 - _processRewards(_staker, false) (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#453)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(poolToken), staker, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
 - transferPool(highPool).stake(staker, pendingYield) (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#142)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(ERC20(HIGH), staker, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#758)
 - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data, SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#131)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 External calls sending eth:
 - transferPool(highPool).stake(staker, pendingYield) (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#142)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 State variables written after the call(s):
 - poolTokenReserve += amount (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#453)
 - user.pushedNewDeposit = weightToReward(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#456)
 - userLockingWeight += stakerWeight (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#459)
 - userLockingWeight += stakerWeight (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#459)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetCorePool._unstake(address, uint256, uint256) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#221-232):
 External calls:
 - super._unstake(_staker, deposited, amount) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#230)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(HIGH), to, value) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#207)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(poolToken), staker, deposited) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#207)
 - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data, SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#131)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#451)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 - (value, returnData) = stake(staker, poolToken, stakes, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contract/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#451)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 - (value, returnData) = stake(staker, poolToken, stakes, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
 External calls sending eth:
 - super._unstake(_staker, deposited, amount) (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#230)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 State variables written after the call(s):
 - user.pushedNewDeposit = weightToReward(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#231)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetCorePool._stakePool(address, uint256) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#186-198):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#7)
 - contract/HighStreetCorePoolBase.stakePool(stake) (value)(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 - _processRewards(_staker, false) (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#153)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(HIGH), to, value) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#207)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(ERC20(poolToken), staker, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#207)
 - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data, SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#131)
 - (success, returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 - (value, returnData) = stake(staker, poolToken, stakes, pendingYield) (contracts/HighStreetCorePoolBase.sol#627)
 External calls sending eth:
 - _processRewards(_staker, false) (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#153)
 - processVaultRewards(staker) (value)(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 State variables written after the call(s):
 - poolTokenReserve += amount (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#154)
 - user.pushedNewDeposit = weightToReward(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#155)
 - user.deposit.push(newDeposit) (contract/HighStreetCorePool.sol#156)
 - user.pushedNewDeposit = weightToReward(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#156)
 - user.pushedNewDeposits = weightToRewards(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#156)
 - user.pushedNewDeposits = weightToRewards(user.totalWeight, vaultRewardsPerWeight) (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#156)
 - userLockingWeight += depositedWeight (contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol#158)
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities

```

# AUTOMATED TESTING



## HighStreetFlashPool.sol

```

Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#394-463):
External calls:
- _sync() (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#430)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- processRewards (_staker,falses) (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#414)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakeAPool(_staker,pendingYield) (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
- transferPoolTokenFrom(meg.sender,address(this),_amount) (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#423)
 - ICorePool(highPool).transferPoolTokenFrom(_staker,pendingYield,_amount) (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#755)
 - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data, SafeERC20. low-level call failed) (node_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#92)
 - (success,returnData) = target.delegatecall(data) (node_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/Address.sol#105)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Parameter HighStreetCorePool._pendingVaultRewards(address) _staker (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#105) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._setVault(address, vault) (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#196) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._stakeAPool(address,uint256) _staker (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#111) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._takeAPool(address,uint256) _staker (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#166) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._updateStakeLock(uint256) _staker (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#166) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferHighToken(address,uint256) _value (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1285) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferHighTokenFrom(addresses,address,uint256) _from (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#296) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferHighTokenFrom(addresses,address,uint256) _to (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#295) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferHighTokenFrom(addresses,address,uint256) _value (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#295) is not in mixedCase
Constant HighStreetCorePool._isFlashPool (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1018) is not an UPPPER CASE WITH underscores
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._isHighPool (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1018) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._isLowPool (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1018) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._isStakePool (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1018) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._isWithdrawPool (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1018) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._lockDeposits(address) _user (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#125) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._lockDeposits(address) _user (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#139) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._lockDeposits(address) _user (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#152) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._lockDeposits(address) _user (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#202) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._stake(uint256,uint64) _amount (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#269) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._stake(uint256,uint64) _amount (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#270) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._stake(uint256,uint64) _depositId (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#137) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._unstake(uint256,uint256) _amount (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#208) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._weight(uint256) _amount (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#186) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._withdraw(uint256,uint256) _amount (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#188) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferPoolToken(address,uint256) _to (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#1745) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferPoolTokenFrom(addresses,address,uint256) _value (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#1745) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferPoolTokenFrom(addresses,address,uint256) _value (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#1755) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetCorePool._transferPoolTokenFrom(addresses,address,uint256) _value (contracts/HightStreetPoolBase.sol#1756) is not in mixedCase
Value _staker (contracts/HightStreetCorePool.sol#1018) is not in mixedCase
Function _Pool(HIGH) (contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol#429) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (node_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omnable.sol#853-855)
transferFromOwner(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferFromOwner(address) (node_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omnable.sol#841-844)
getPoolData(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address) (contracts/HightStreetPoolFactory.sol#169-169)
registerFor(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.registerPool(address) (contracts/HightStreetPoolFactory.sol#209-227)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (node_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omnable.sol#853-855)
transferFromOwner(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferFromOwner(address) (node_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omnable.sol#841-844)
getPoolData(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address) (contracts/HightStreetPoolFactory.sol#169-169)
registerFor(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.registerPool(address) (contracts/HightStreetPoolFactory.sol#209-227)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

```

# AUTOMATED TESTING

```

Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase..processRewards(address,bool) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#582-637):
External calls:
- _Sync() (factory.updateHighPerBlock) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#551)
State variable written after the call(s):
- user.deposits.push(newDeposit) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#645)
- user.totalWeight += depositWeight (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#648)
- user.totalWeight += depositWeight (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#649)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase.._sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#588-573):
External calls:
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
State variable written after the call(s):
- _Sync() (factory.updateHighPerBlock) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#555)
- lastYieldDistribution = uint4(currentBlock) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#569)
- yieldRewardsPerWeight = rewardPerWeight(hipReward,userLockingWeight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#568)
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities

Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase..processRewards(address,bool) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#582-637):
External calls:
- _Sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#551)
- factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- IDcorePool(staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#646)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase.._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#394-463):
External calls:
- _Sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#407)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _processRewards(_staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#413)
- factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- IDcorePool(staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Synchronized(msg.sender,yieldRewardsPerWeight,lastYieldDistribution) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#419)
- YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#636)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#413)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase.._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#394-463):
External calls:
- _Sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#407)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _processRewards(_staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#413)
- factory.updateHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- IDcorePool(staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
- transferFromSafeERC20(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(IERC20(poolToken), from, to, value) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#758)
- returnData = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20.sol#192)
- (success,returnData) = target.functionCall(data,modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/Address.sol#131)
External calls sending eth:
- transferFromPoolToken(msg.sender,address,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#142)
- (success,returnData) = target.callValue(value)(data,modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Staked(msg.sender,_staker,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#462)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase.._unstake(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#538-573):
External calls:
- _Sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#402)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#404)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _Sync() (factory.updateHighPerBlock,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Synchronized(msg.sender,yieldRewardsPerWeight,lastYieldDistribution) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
- YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#646)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#449)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase.._unstake(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#472-530):
External calls:
- _Sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#402)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#404)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- IDcorePool(staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
- factory.updatedSafeERC20(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- transferFromSafeERC20(msg.sender,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- (success,returnData) = target.callValue(value)(data,modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
External calls sending eth:
- transferFromPoolToken(msg.sender,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- (success,returnData) = target.callValue(value)(data,modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Unstaked(msg.sender,_staker,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#529)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolFactory..changePoolWeight(address,uint32) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#271-287):
External calls:
- _Sync() (factory.updateHighPerBlock) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#404)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- IDcorePool(staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
- factory.updatedSafeERC20(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- transferFromSafeERC20(msg.sender,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- (success,returnData) = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20.sol#192)
- (success,returnData) = target.functionCall(data,modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/Address.sol#131)
External calls sending eth:
- transferFromPoolToken(msg.sender,amount) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#112)
- (success,returnData) = target.callValue(value)(data,modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- WeightUpdated(msg.sender,addr,weight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#256)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- WeightUpdated(msg.sender,addr,weight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#256)
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase..updateStakeLock(uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#307-316):
External calls:
- _Sync() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#312)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- _processRewards(_staker,false) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#404)
- factory.updatedHighPerBlock() (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541)
- IDcorePool(staker,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#627)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- StakeLockUpdated(_staker,depositId,lockUntil) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#697)
- _updatedStakeLock(msg.sender,depositId,lockedUntil) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#619)
- Synchronized(msg.sender,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
- _processRewards(msg.sender,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#404)
- YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingField) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#646)
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

HighStreetPoolBase.pendingTotalRewards(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#593-217) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- blockNumber() > lastYieldDistribution && userLockingWeight != 0 (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#199)
HighStreetPoolBase.pendingTotalRewards(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#593-217) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(block.string)(<=lockUntil == now() && now() - now() <= 256) <= lockUntil - now() <= 256 (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#401-404)
HighStreetPoolBase.pendingTotalRewards(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#593-217) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- userLockingWeight == 0 (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#554)
HighStreetPoolBase.pendingTotalRewards(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#593-217) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- pendingField == 0 (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#593)
HighStreetPoolBase.pendingTotalRewards(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#646-68) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(block.string)(<=lockUntil == now() && now() - now() <= 256) <= lockUntil - now() <= 256 (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#642)
- require(block.string)(<=lockUntil == now() && now() - now() <= 31560000, lock period is 365 days) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#644)
- require(block.string)(<=lockUntil == now() && now() - now() <= 31536000, max lock period is 365 days) (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#647)
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#timestamp-integer-overflows

Address.isContract(address) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#26-36) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#32-34)
Address.verifySig(bytes,address,bytes) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#195-210) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#207-210)
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-use

Different versions of Solidity is used:
- Version used: ['0.8.1', '**0.8.0**']
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol#13)
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#8)
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#3)
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#8)
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#1)
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#1)
- 0.8.0 (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#8)
- 0.8.1 (contracts/HighStreetFlashPool.sol#13)
- 0.8.1 (contracts/HighStreetPool.sol#13)
- 0.8.1 (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#2)
- 0.8.1 (contracts/interfaces/ICorePool.sol#3)
- 0.8.1 (contracts/interfaces/ISafeERC20.sol#1)
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Address.sol#79-81) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Address.sol#109-114) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Address.sol#165-170) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,bytes) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Address.sol#141-146) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Address.sol#151-160) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,bytes,bytes) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Address.sol#151-160) is never used and should be removed
Context, msg.sender) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Context.sol#22) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#57) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#79) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeDecreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#95) is never used and should be removed
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

Pragma version='0.8.0' (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/utils/Ownable.sol#4) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.0' (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.0' (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.0' (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.0' (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#1) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.0' (mode/modules/OpenZeppelin/Contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.1' (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.1' (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version='0.8.1' (contracts/interfaces/ICorePool.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
References: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

```



# AUTOMATED TESTING

```

Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._processRewards(address,bool) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#882-837):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#839)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#841)
 Event emitted after the call(s):
 - _processRewards(_staker,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - _processRewards(_staker,true) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#845)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - SyncedRewards(_staker,_yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#972)
 - YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingYield) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#846)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#394-463):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#837)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#841)
 - _processRewards(_staker,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - _processRewards(_staker,true) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#845)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - SyncedRewards(_staker,_yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#972)
 - YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingYield) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#846)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._unstake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#394-463):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#837)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#841)
 - _processRewards(_staker,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - _processRewards(_staker,true) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#845)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827)
 - transferForTokenFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(IERC20(poolToken),from,to,value) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#789)
 - transferForTokenTo(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - transferForTokenFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 External calls sending eth:
 - transferForTokenFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - SyncedRewards(_staker,_yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#541):
 External calls:
 - Synchronized(msg.sender,yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#837)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#841)
 - _processRewards(_staker,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - _processRewards(_staker,true) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#845)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - SyncedRewards(_staker,_yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
 - YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingYield) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#846)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._unstake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#472-530):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#837)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#841)
 - _processRewards(_staker,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - _processRewards(_staker,true) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#845)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827)
 - transferForTokenFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(poolToken),from,to,value) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#789)
 - transferForTokenTo(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - transferForTokenFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 External calls sending eth:
 - transferForTokenFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#842)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - Unstaked(msg.sender,_staker,_amount) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#529)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolFactory._poolAddrs() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#271-287):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#271)
 - IPool(poolAddress).setWeight(msg.sender,weight) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - _poolAddrs.setWeight(msg.sender,weight) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
 - IPool(poolAddress).setWeight(msg.sender,weight) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolFactory._changeFees(IFpool,highPool,highFee,lowFee) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#286):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#286)
 - IPool(poolAddress).setWeight(msg.sender,weight) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - _poolAddrs.setWeight(msg.sender,weight) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
 - IPool(poolAddress).setWeight(msg.sender,weight) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
 Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolBase._updateStakeLock(uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#307-316):
 External calls:
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#312)
 - factory.updateHighPerBlock() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#841)
 - _processRewards(msg.sender,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - _processRewards(msg.sender,true) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#845)
 - ICorePool(highPool).stakePool._staker.pendingYield() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - Stakeholder(staker,lockedUntil,unlockUntil,depositLockedUntil) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#687)
 - updateStakeLock(msg.sender,deposit,lockedUntil) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#315)
 - Synchronized(msg.sender,yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
 - YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingYield) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#846)
 - _processRewards(msg.sender,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 - YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingYield) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#846)
 Events emitted after the call(s):
 - _sync() (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#312)
 - Stakeholder(staker,lockedUntil,unlockUntil,depositLockedUntil) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#687)
 - updateStakeLock(msg.sender,deposit,lockedUntil) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#315)
 - Synchronized(msg.sender,yieldReward,_lastYieldDistribution) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#572)
 - YieldClaimed(msg.sender,_staker,pendingYield) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#846)
 - _processRewards(msg.sender,false) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#843)
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

HighStreetPoolBase._pendingieldRewards(address) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#193-217) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
 - blockNumber > lastYieldDistribution as userLockingWeight != 0 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#199)
 - HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) uses timestamp for comparisons
 - blockNumber > 0 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#338-373) uses timestamp for comparisons
 - require(bool,string) (lockWeight > 0 || !lockUntil || now <= lockUntil) < 31536000, invalid lock interval (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#401-404)
 - HighStreetPoolBase._sync() (lockUntil > now || lockUntil < now) < 31536000, max lock period is 365 days (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#667)

HighStreetPoolBase._processRewards(address,bool) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#582-637) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
 - userLockingWeight == 0 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#554)
 - HighStreetPoolBase._processRewards(address,bool) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#582-637) uses timestamp for comparisons
 - pendingYield == 0 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#595)
 - HighStreetPoolBase._updateStakeLock(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#646-689) uses timestamp for comparisons
 - require(bool,string) (lockedUntil > now || lockShould be in the future) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#652)
 - require(bool,string) (lockedUntil > stakeDeposit.lockedUntil, invalid new lock) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#650)
 - require(bool,string) (lockedUntil < now, lockShould be in the past) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#654)
 - require(bool,string) (lockedUntil > now <= stakeDeposit.lockedFrom < 31536000, max lock period is 365 days) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#667)
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#timestamp

Address.isContract(address) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#26-36) uses assembly
 - INLINE ASM (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#32-34)
Address.verifyContractAddress(address) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#195-215) uses assembly
 - INLINE ASM (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#207-210)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-use

Different versions of Solidity is used:
 - Version used: '0.8.1', '**0.8.0**
 - 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol#8)
 - 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#13)
 - 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#8)
 - 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#8)
 - 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#13)
 - 0.8.1 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#13)
 - 0.8.1 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#12)
 - 0.8.1 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#12)
 - 0.8.1 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#12)
 - 0.8.1 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#12)
 - 0.8.1 (Contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol#2)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#79-81) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#108-114) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,bytes) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#107-107) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,bytes) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#114-114) is never used and should be removed
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#94-95) is never used and should be removed
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115-116) is never used and should be removed
Context._msgData() (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#20-22) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#87-95) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#55-66) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#read-code

Pragma version 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#19) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#13) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#20) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#12) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.0 (Contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.1 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#20) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.1 (Contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#12) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version 0.8.1 (Contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
solc=0.8.1 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#59-59)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#127)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,bytes) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#122-133)
 - (success,returnData) = target.callWithValue(value)(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#131)
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,bytes) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#151-160)
 - (success,returnData) = target.delegatecall(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#155)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,bytes) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#178-187)
 - (success,returnData) = target.staticcall(data) (mode_modules/Openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#186)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#193) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#827) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase.getDeposit(address,uint256) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#239) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase.getDeposit(address,uint256) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#429) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#265) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#70) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#130) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#288) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#303) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase._stake(address,uint256,uint64) (Contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#474) is not in mixedCase

```

- No major issues found by Slither.

```

Parameter HighStreetPoolBase.transferPoolToken(address,uint256)_value (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#745) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase.transferPoolTokenFrom(address,address,uint256).from (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#754) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase.transferPoolTokenFrom(address,address,uint256).to (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#755) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolBase.transferPoolTokenFrom(address,address,uint256)_value (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#756) is not in mixedCase
Variable HighStreetPoolFactory.transferHighToken(address,uint256)_value (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#144) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address).poolToken (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#169) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address,uint256).to (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#220) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address,uint256).value (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#221) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.transferHighToken(address,uint256).to (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#304) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.transferHighToken(address,uint256)_value (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#304) is not in mixedCase
Variable HighStreetPoolFactory.registerPool(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#169) is not in mixedCase
Function IPool.HIGH() (contracts/interface/IPool.sol#249) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

HighStreetPoolBase (contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol#23-76) does not implement functions:
- IPool.isFlashPool() (contracts/interface/IPool.sol#183)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#implmented-functions

renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omable.sol#53-55)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omable.sol#61-64)
getPoolData(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#169-183)
registerPool(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.registerPool(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#209-227)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

HighStreetPoolFactory.sol
Reentrancy in HighStreetPoolFactory.changePoolWeight(address,uint32) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#271-287):
External Calls:
- IPool(poolAddress).setWeight(weight) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#283)
Event emitted after the function call: poolAddress,weight (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#266)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

Address.tonContract(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#26-36) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#32-34)
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#195-215) uses assembly
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-use

Different versions of Solidity is used:
- Version used: [0.8.1, **0.8.0]
 - 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omable.sol#5)
 - 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#3)
 - 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#3)
 - 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#1)
 - 0.8.1 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#3)
 - 0.8.1 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#9)
 - 0.8.1 (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#2)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#79-81) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#111-113) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#171-173) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#141-143) is never used and should be removed
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#54-55) is never used and should be removed
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#20-22) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeTransfer(address,IERC20,amount) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#44-57) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeTransfer(address,IERC20,amount) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#68-75) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#59-66) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeDecreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol#67-73) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#safe-calls

Pragma version=0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omable.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version=0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version=0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version=0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version=0.8.1 (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version=0.8.1 (contracts/interface/IPool.sol#249) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.setValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#54-59):
- (success) = recipient.call.value(amount) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#57)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#111-113):
- (success) = target.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,bytes,uint256,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115-116)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#141-143):
- (success, returnData) = target.staticcall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#145)
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#170-187):
- (success, returnData) = target.delegatecall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#185)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address).poolToken (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#169) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.mintVieldt(address,uint256). (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#226) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.mintVieldt(address,uint256).amount (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#226) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.mintVieldt(address,uint256).value (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#226) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetPoolFactory.transferHighToken(address,uint256).value (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#304) is not in mixedCase
Variable HighStreetPoolFactory.HIGH (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#142) is not in mixedCase
Function IPool.HIGH() (contracts/interface/IPool.sol#249) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omable.sol#53-55)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Omable.sol#61-64)
getPoolData(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.getPoolData(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#169-183)
registerPool(address) should be declared external:
- HighStreetPoolFactory.registerPool(address) (contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol#209-227)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

```

## 4.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on all the contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

### MythX results:

#### HighStreetCorePool.sol

Report for contracts/HighStreetCorePool.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/e4c502ef-4a23-470a-b845-ddf97078a774>

| Line | SWC Title                                | Severity | Short Description                     |
|------|------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------|
| 88   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-=" discovered  |
| 128  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 132  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 175  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "***" discovered |
| 180  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 184  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 185  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 188  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 194  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 212  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 227  | (SWC-110) Assert Violation               | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access            |
| 229  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-=" discovered  |
| 249  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered  |
| 269  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-=" discovered  |

#### HighStreetFlashPool.sol

Report for contracts/HighStreetFlashPool.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/d09f569f-9529-48b0-a635-814a6cfbff0c>

| Line | SWC Title                                | Severity | Short Description                   |
|------|------------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|
| 81   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered |

## HighStreetPoolBase.sol

Report for contracts/HighStreetPoolBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/e4c502ef-4a23-470a-b845-ddf97078a774>

| Line | SWC Title                                                  | Severity | Short Description                                        |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| 85   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 202  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 203  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 203  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 206  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 214  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 241  | (SWC-110) Assert Violation                                 | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                               |
| 384  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 402  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 426  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 436  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 436  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 436  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 436  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 454  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 455  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 459  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 483  | (SWC-110) Assert Violation                                 | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                               |
| 499  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 499  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 499  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 499  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 501  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 504  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 505  | (SWC-110) Assert Violation                                 | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                               |
| 507  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "==" discovered                     |
| 512  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 513  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 513  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 517  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 517  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 561  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 565  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 565  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 568  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 603  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 611  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 618  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 619  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 622  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 657  | (SWC-110) Assert Violation                                 | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                               |
| 664  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 667  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 673  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 673  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 673  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 673  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 683  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 683  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 684  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 684  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 700  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 700  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 716  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 716  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 727  | (SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Low      | Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness. |

## HighStreetPoolFactory.sol

Report for contracts/HighStreetPoolFactory.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/e4c502ef-4a23-470a-b845-ddf97078a774>

| Line | SWC Title                                                  | Severity | Short Description                                        |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| 199  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 223  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered                     |
| 238  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered                      |
| 238  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered                      |
| 280  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered                      |
| 280  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow                   | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered                      |
| 297  | (SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Low      | Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness. |

- Integer Overflows and Underflows flagged by MythX are false positives, as the contract is using Solidity 0.8.9 version. After the Solidity version 0.8.0 Arithmetic operations revert to underflow and overflow by default.
- Assert violations are false positives.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING  
 HALBORN