Restrictions to Resilience: Lessons from China's Response to Semiconductor Export Controls

Abstract:

Export controls are a key instrument of **economic statecraft**, designed to constrain adversarial technological development. However, their long-term effectiveness is uncertain, as restrictions may redirect rather than prevent innovation. This paper evaluates the extent to which export controls shape global supply chains, questioning whether they achieve strategic containment or accelerate self-sufficiency initiatives in restricted economies.

Through a structured methodology, this study analyzes how China's semiconductor sector has adapted to export controls, examining policy shifts, financial investments, and innovative workforce strategies. By integrating insights from Political Economy, Technology Policy, and China Studies, this research assesses the impact of international regulatory frameworks on trade dynamics, including China's responses through state-backed industrial policies.

While export restrictions seek to limit China's technological progress, their secondary effects suggest a more complex trajectory, reinforcing domestic capacity-building and alternative innovation efforts. This study provides a comprehensive assessment of semiconductor competition, highlighting the interplay between policy restrictions and adaptive industrial strategies.

The complex dynamics of export controls and technological competition outlined in this abstract invites a deeper exploration of the intricate strategies employed by nations in the semiconductor ecosystem. The following analysis explores a wide base of nuanced foreign economic legislation, with a particular focus on China's response to U.S. semiconductor export restrictions, revealing a multifaceted approach that goes far beyond simple reactive measures.

Introduction:

Export Controls and Strategic Competition

The global semiconductor industry is at the center of an intensifying geopolitical and economic competition. Export controls have emerged as a key instrument of economic impressibility, particularly in the modern technological rivalry between the United States and China. While these restrictions are intended to slow adversarial innovation and restrict access to critical technologies, their long-term impact remains uncertain. Some evidence suggests that instead of halting technological progress, export controls may redirect innovation efforts, accelerating domestic self-sufficiency initiatives in targeted economies.

In the case of China, export controls have reshaped industrial strategies, altering capital flows, supply chain structures, and workforce development efforts. To mitigate dependency on foreign technology, China has embraced their challenges and developed a state-directed approach to semiconductor expansion, leveraging a combination of financial incentives, regulatory maneuvers, and talent recruitment programs. These policies reflect a broader shift in industrial policy, wherein government-backed investment plays a decisive role in ensuring supply chain resilience.

This study evaluates the extent to which export controls function as effective trade instruments versus whether they primarily catalyze counterstrategies that lessen their long-term impact. By examining China's policy responses, investment mechanisms, and industrial adaptations, this research assesses how restrictions have influenced the global semiconductor landscape.

To understand the strategic implications of these export controls, it is crucial to examine the theoretical and historical foundations that inform current policy approaches. The literature reveals a rich overlay of scholarly perspectives regarding technological competition, trade restrictions, and national innovation strategies. This writing is intended to provide critical context for analyzing China's semiconductor adaptation.

Literature Review: Regulatory and Industrial Policy Foundations

The effectiveness of export controls as economic containment measures remains a contested issue in political economy and technology policy literature. While policymakers frame export controls as a tool to curb adversarial innovation, scholars highlight that the restrictive trade mechanism often stems from concerns over relative economic gains, prompting targeted economies to adopt adaptive economic positioning to bolster domestic technological capabilities and counter competing global markets (Tyson, 1992; Mastanduno, 1991). Export restrictions have long been a cornerstone of U.S. economic policy, tracing back to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which effectively regulated sensitive technology transfers to the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War by leveraging the limited trade integration of communist states (Marx, 2023). Following COCOM's dissolution, the Wassenaar Arrangement (1996) sought to establish a multilateral framework for controlling dual-use technologies. However, weak enforcement mechanisms and uneven adoption among member states created regulatory gaps that China has effectively leveraged through third-party supply chains and indirect market acquisitions to bypass restrictions (Roberts et al., 2021; Breznitz & Murphree, 2011). Unlike Cold War-era controls, where adversarial states had limited global integration, China operates within interdependent supply chains, making unilateral U.S. restrictions more complex (Chen, 2023).

Scholars in political economy and industrial policy highlight that export restrictions often reshape—rather than halt—technological progress. Breznitz and Murphree (2011) argue that China's innovation system, while constrained by external limits, is built to adapt by rerouting development through domestic ecosystems. Similarly, Naughton (2018) emphasizes that China's state-driven model enables rapid reallocation of capital and industrial policy resources in response to external trade pressures, reinforcing its resilience to export controls.

U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors are framed as a necessary tool of economic leverage, aimed at restricting adversarial technological progress. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo emphasized this dual function, stating, "This action is the culmination of the Biden-Harris administration's targeted approach, in concert with our allies and partners, to impair [China's] ability to indigenize the production of advanced technologies that pose a risk to our national security" (Foreign Policy, 2024).

This tension underscores a recurring debate in economic statecraft: while the U.S. seeks to slow China's technological rise, policymakers themselves concede that restrictions cannot completely halt progress. This contradiction reflects broader scholarly discussions on the adaptive nature of industrial policy (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011; Naughton, 2018), where trade barriers often accelerate domestic innovation rather than stifle it.

The American counter to Chinese supply chain strengthening, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, represented a paradigm shift in U.S. industrial policy. The initiative marked a transition from laissez-faire technology development to state-backed semiconductor investment (Sullivan, 2023). Researchers debate whether this approach effectively secures long-term supply chain resilience or simply mirrors China's state-driven model policy (Goujon & Reynolds, 2024). To counter Beijing's industrial rise, the rate of foreign investment in the US must continue to increase and CHIPs Act funding allowed to expand and root itself in US school districts and communities.

Despite initial setbacks, China's semiconductor sector adapted near instantaneously, leveraging a mix of state-backed financing, stockpiling strategies, and talent acquisition programs (Yang & Potkin, 2024). Analysts observe that China's response aligns with longstanding industrial policy models, where the government directly intervenes in selected sectors (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011). State-backed semiconductor funding funneled through banks and private organized lending strategies encouraged preemptive stockpiling of restricted materials including DUV lithography and AI integrated hardware. Chinese interests of supercharging their supply chain were widely supported from the top CCP leadership, inspiring enterprise level talent recruitment and acquisition programs. Two Chinese labor initiatives identified as the Thousand Talents and Qiming Programs reinforced China's long-term commitment to self-reliance, fueling their technological rise (Min & Wei, 2024).

These trends have influenced American policy, prompting the U.S. to shift from a reactive containment strategy to proactive state investment, recognizing that export controls alone are insufficient. The CHIPS Act's passage reflects a broader consensus that industrial policy—not just restrictions—is necessary to secure long-term supply chain resilience (Goujon & Reynolds, 2024).

While existing research provides valuable insights into the strategic implications of export controls, gaps remain in measuring their long-term economic impact and innovation displacement effects. Current literature does not quantify how semiconductor restrictions have stifled or restructured trade flows. Further, it is difficult to segregate, trace and distribute credit for altered investment behaviors, therefore it’s difficult to measure China's technological adaptation strategies. This study addresses these gaps by introducing a quantitative assessment of trade shifts, workforce realignment, and capital allocation patterns with respect to China's Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (Big Fund) and its evolving role in semiconductor self-sufficiency. The following sections examine how China's semiconductor policies, financing strategies, and countermeasures against U.S. restrictions have evolved across different phases of industrial policy, beginning with an in-depth analysis of the Big Fund's structure and objectives.

The theoretical frameworks and historical precedents discussed in the literature review find practical maturation in China's contemporary semiconductor strategy. Rather than succumb to external pressures, China has realigned a sophisticated response that leverages state-directed investment, workforce development, and strategic industrial policy to counter technological restrictions.

China’s Strategic Adaptation: State-Directed Investment and Workforce Expansion

China’s response to US semiconductor and AI enabled hardware restrictions (think ECCN 3A090.a and 4A090.a) has relied on two primary pillars: financial intervention and talent acquisition. On the financial side, the ICF (‘Big Fund’) has provided structured capital for semiconductor supply chain development, encouraging the reduction of reliance on foreign firms. On the workforce side, programs like the Thousand Talents Program (TTP) and Qiming Program have strengthened domestic expertise in semiconductor research and deployment, allowing China to compensate for limited access to international talent.

While the United States has pursued some institutional investments through programs such as the AI Institute for Advances in Optimization *(AI4OPT)* under the CHIPS Act, China’s strategy has focused on centralized state investment and regulatory incentives. These divergent approaches highlight key differences in industrial policy, with China favoring direct intervention and the U.S. opting for decentralized, private-sector-driven solutions.

Facing escalating U.S. semiconductor restrictions, China has framed its response as an opportunity for self-sufficiency. Reinforcing state-led industrial development themes, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian stating, “Containment and suppression cannot stop China’s development, but will only enhance China’s determination and ability to develop its scientific and technological self-reliance” (Jowitt, 2024).

This official message is substantiated by China’s aggressive policy realignment. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has set ambitious benchmarks, including doubling national computing power to 300 exaflops by 2025 (American Affairs Journal, 2024). Meanwhile, the latest phase of the Big Fund 3.0 allocates $47.5 billion toward indigenous semiconductor R&D after expanding their memory capabilities, rounding out the necessities**.**

These initiatives underscore a core theme of China’s industrial strategy: rather than yielding to external pressure, the state leverages sanctions as a catalyst for deeper structural reforms. This aligns with economic theories of strategic trade resilience, where targeted nations respond to restrictions by intensifying domestic investment and import substitution (Tyson, 1992; Mastanduno, 1991).

As China’s self-sufficiency efforts gain traction, it is essential to assess whether export controls are achieving their intended strategic outcomes. Have these restrictions delayed China’s technological progress, or have they forced a structural realignment that, in the long run, strengthens its position in the semiconductor industry?

At the heart of China's semiconductor resilience lies a carefully orchestrated financial strategy. The Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (ICF) represents more than just a funding mechanism—it is a living blueprint for technological self-sufficiency, demonstrating how strategic capital allocation can transform external constraints into opportunities for indigenous innovation.

Financing the Chinese Semiconductor Supply Chain

Despite regulatory constraints, China's semiconductor self-sufficiency efforts continue to advance, supported by state-backed financial arrangements. A milestone marker, the Big Fund introduced a structured financing model that directed investments into chip fabrication capacity, third-party supply chains, and lithography R&D (Fuller, 2021; VerWey, 2019). The People's Bank of China (PBOC) played a key role in coordinating these efforts, ensuring alignment with China's broader industrial objectives (Naughton, 2018). The fund's investment structure was divided into three phases: Phase I (2014-2019) focused on scaling domestic semiconductor manufacturing, Phase II (2019-2024) expanded wafer fabrication, and Phase III (2024-2039) prioritizes advanced lithography and AI-driven production (Reuters, 2024).

The following sections provide a detailed examination of each investment phase, analyzing China's evolving response to semiconductor restrictions and the long-term implications of state-directed industrial policy. These financial and workforce maneuvers represent the linkages behind China's Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund – an economic plan and focus of the next section.

History and Analysis - Funding of Phases:

Evolution and Impact of China's Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (ICF)

The Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund or Integrated Circuit Fund was launched on September 26, 2014, by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) to direct investments into semiconductor manufacturing for planned industrial expansion including mergers and acquisitions (Caixin, 2022).

Administered jointly by the MIIT and the Ministry of Finance, the fund organized capital disbursement across three phases, each responding separately to policy and industry requirements:

- **Phase I:** Directed investments toward domestic semiconductor production and initial research and development.
- **Phase II:** Increased manufacturing capacity and supported supply chain stability amid export restrictions.
- **Phase III (2024–2039):** Focuses on understanding and matching western lithographic limitations, reducing supply chain redundancy, and leveraging acquisitions to address global supply chain weaknesses or dependencies.

How resilient is the Chinese industrial supply chain?

After examination and summarizing each phase, policy shifts are reflected in the financial strategy revealing a reactive response to US trade controls. Data, therefore, demand planning, was shaped by varying degrees through pathways of external pressure. Underneath the surface, the overall goals of each phase developed into:

- Phase I prioritized rapid capacity-building to reduce reliance on foreign semiconductor imports.
- Phase II adapted to tightening U.S. export restrictions by reinforcing supply chain resilience.
- Phase III directs investment toward advanced lithography and risk mitigation strategies to sustain long-term competitiveness amid persistent and organized embargoes.

Throughout these phases, the ICF has demonstrated increasing institutional resilience, adjusting financial structures and investment priorities to withstand incoming economic pressure, trade restrictions, and internal setbacks. For example, in May 2024, the ICF launched its third phase with a registered capital of US$47.5 billion, securing US$15.73 billion from six major state-owned banks to bolster financial stability amid economic challenges. The third iteration includes targeted investments toward AI integrated chips, third-generation semiconductors, and advanced lithography equipment to counter U.S. trade limitations. The iterative adaptation of fund-based operations suggests a system engineered to absorb shock and maintain strategic continuity despite constant assured volatility. Charts and tables detail the evolution of funding, sector market investment trends, and other industrial output metrics, illustrating how these financial adjustments contributed to long-term semiconductor expansion.

[The chart below illustrates the structured disbursement of funds to support China's semiconductor supply chain expansion. This allocation highlights the fund's manufacturing focus, shaping China's early self-reliance efforts.]



Below: Table highlights the scale of funding efforts compared to other Chinese industrial priorities

Table 5.2: Largest Industrial Guidance Funds (2020)

Fund Name	Level	Scale (Billion RMB)
Integrated Circuit Fund (both rounds)	National	338.70
Optical Valley Fund (Wuhan)	Municipal	250.00
Government-Enterprise Cooperation Fund	National	180.00
Central SOE Innovation Fund	National	150.00
Kunpeng Fund (Shenzhen)	Municipal	150.00
National SOE Adjusment Fund	National	130.00
Shanxi Taihang Fund	Provincial	105.00
Jiangxi Development and Upgrading Fund	Provincial	100.01
Beijing Investment Guidance Fund	Provincial	100.01

Sources: own elaboration compiled by the author from data supplied by Zero2IPO / Qingke Research Center (清科研究中心). Accessed at https://www.pedata.cn/. Some data may be behind paywalls.

Phase I: Laying the Foundation (2014-2019)

The first phase of the ICF, with a total raised capital of 138.72 billion yuan ($21.8 billion), prioritized foundational investments to expedite China's semiconductor capabilities. *("Expedite" is illustrated in the accompanying charts)* 67% of the fund's initial capital was directed toward semiconductor manufacturing, with major contributions to leading firms such as:

- YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation): RMB 13.5-19 billion, primarily for memory chip production.
- HLMC (Shanghai Huali Microelectronics): RMB 11.6 billion.
- SMIC North and South (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation): RMB 16.7 billion combined.
- San'an Optoelectronics: RMB 4.7 billion.
- JCET (Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology): RMB 4.6 billion for advanced assembly, test, and packaging (ATP) (GF Securities, cited in Caixin, 2022).

Despite notable allocations, only RMB 2 billion—a total of 1.44% of the total fund—was dedicated to equipment development**.** This early oversight created a critical bottleneck in China's ability to achieve modern high-performance semiconductor production.

Phase II: Scaling and Realignment (2019-Present)

Phase II of the ICF, launched in 2019 with a capital pool of 204 billion yuan ($29.08 billion), represent expansion in scale and ambition**.** This phase shifted focus toward scaling wafer fabrication capabilities, with 75% of funds—approximately RMB 55 billion—allocated to this segment (CSC Financial, cited in Caixin, 2022).

Key Aspects of Phase II

- **Wafer Fabrication Dominance**: Investments in large-scale production facilities were a central focus of Phase II, aiming to address the capital-intensive nature of semiconductor manufacturing. This is evidenced by the significant allocations to wafer fabrication, which constituted approximately 75% of the total funds (CSC Financial, cited in Caixin, 2022). Naughton (2018) underscores that China's state-driven model enables rapid reallocation of capital to strategic sectors like semiconductors in response to external pressures, such as U.S. export controls, supporting the push for advanced manufacturing capabilities during this phase (Naughton, 2018, *The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth*). Furthermore, Allen (2024) emphasizes that China's semiconductor equipment industry, despite starting with low R&D expenditure, showed extraordinary growth during this period, aligning with the focus on large-scale fabrication facilities (Allen, 2024, *The True Impact of Allied Export Controls*).

- **Design and ATP**: RMB 18 billion was allocated to IC design companies, while RMB 13 billion supported assembly, test, and packaging (CSC Financial, cited in Caixin, 2022). These investments reflect China's broader effort to build a comprehensive semiconductor ecosystem, as evidenced by Breznitz and Murphree (2011), who argue that China's innovation system adapts to external limits by rerouting development through domestic supply chains (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011, *Run of the Red Queen*). Additionally, Cao and Pan (2023) report that, despite U.S. sanctions, firms like YMTC intensified domestic investments in advanced chip design and packaging, highlighting a strategic response to export controls (Cao & Pan, 2023, *South China Morning Post*).

- **Equipment Development Gap**: Despite the scale of Phase II, only RMB 500 million was allocated to equipment development (CSC Financial, cited in Caixin, 2022). This underinvestment in domestic equipment development remains a persistent challenge, as noted by Allen (2024), who points out that while China's progress in semiconductor equipment localization predates modern export controls, significant gaps persist in developing advanced domestic tools (Allen, 2024, *The True Impact of Allied Export Controls*). Similarly, Yang and Potkin (2024) highlight that China's stockpiling of foreign equipment, such as DUV lithography machines, reflects ongoing reliance on Western technology, underscoring the limitations of Phase II's equipment funding (Yang & Potkin, 2024, *Reuters*).

Financial investment alone cannot guarantee technological progress. China's response to export controls extends beyond monetary commitments, encompassing a comprehensive approach to trade policy, supply chain management, and strategic repositioning that seeks to neutralize the impact of international restrictions.

Navigating Export Controls: China’s Strategic Response

Retaliatory Trade Policies & Supply Chain Adjustments

In response to escalating U.S. semiconductor export controls, China enacted wide-reaching retaliatory trade policies aimed at disrupting global supply chains. In mid-2023, China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium, two critical rare metals essential for semiconductor manufacturing, directly impacting U.S. and European producers (Rhodium Group, 2024). While these countermeasures created short-term leverage, China remained reliant on imports of EUV (Extreme Ultraviolet) lithography technology, necessitating their continued investment in domestic lithography solutions, pushing to close the technological gap.

To further insulate itself from geopolitical risks, China adopted a multi-faceted industrial strategy that integrated workforce expansion, trade realignment, and supply chain redundancies. While technological independence and domestic innovation remain core objectives, Chinese policymakers also prioritized the development of a highly skilled labor pipeline, recognizing that semiconductor self-sufficiency requires both infrastructure and talent.

A key component of this strategy involved the creation and expansion of state-backed talent acquisition and retention programs, designed to counteract restrictions on foreign expertise and technology transfers while strengthening domestic R&D capabilities. Although this paper does not explore every facet of China’s workforce strategy, several highlights illustrate the breadth of their approach:

Workforce Development & Talent Retention Initiatives

Rather than relying on foreign expertise, China scaled up domestic talent recruitment programs to sustain semiconductor R&D. Key initiatives included:

- Qiming Program (est. 2018): Targeted high-caliber engineers with signing bonuses ranging from $420,000–$700,000 and housing subsidies in Shanghai and Shenzhen (Caixin, 2023).
- Thousand Talents Program & Kunpeng Plan: Recruited semiconductor specialists from overseas to backfill knowledge gaps created by U.S. visa and employment restrictions.
- Eastern Institute of Technology (EIT) Program: Focused on domestic AI-integrated semiconductor expertise, ensuring the next generation of chip designers is trained within China’s own academic ecosystem.
- Fast-Follower Strategies: China leverages trade partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’s markets to acquire restricted technologies, mirroring industrial catch-up models seen in aerospace and telecommunications.

While these workforce investments allowed China to maintain short-term resilience, long-term success remained constrained by access to cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

Stockpiling & Preemptive Equipment Acquisition Strategy

Recognizing the risk of prolonged U.S. trade restrictions, China began strategic stockpiling efforts as early as 2017. Between 2017 and 2022, China imported $93 billion worth of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including DUV lithography machines and critical fabrication tools before additional U.S. sanctions could take effect (Yang & Potkin, 2024). This preemptive strategy was intended to:

1. Sustain domestic production capacity while China ramped up its indigenous semiconductor research.
2. Create a buffer period to develop homegrown EUV technology in Phase III of the Big Fund.
3. Reduce immediate dependence on Western suppliers, ensuring continued chip manufacturing for strategic sectors such as AI, defense, and telecommunications.

While these stockpiling efforts delayed severe supply chain disruptions, they failed to eliminate reliance on ASML's EUV lithography systems, a bottleneck that continues to limit China's ability to produce advanced-node semiconductors below 7nm. During the focus on manufacturing excellence, stockpiling gained a temporary edge against supply chain shocks. However, as the broader impact of export controls reverberated through China's semiconductor industry, pressuring key players, Chinese leadership began to take notice.

Mounting Pressures on Tech Leaders

The tightening of U.S. semiconductor restrictions in 2022, building upon Trump-era 2019 export controls, triggered immediate industry-wide disruptions within China (BIS, 2022). The combined effects of supplier fragmentation, workforce losses, and talent migration constraints resulted in project delays, factory shutdowns, and major financial losses across key Chinese semiconductor firms (Cao & Pan, 2023).

Key Industry Disruptions:

- **Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (HSMC):** Collapsed in late 2019 after $20 billion in mismanaged investments, marking one of the most severe financial failures in China's semiconductor history.
- **SMIC's $7.6 billion Lingang Plant:** Announced indefinite delays in early 2023, citing "uncertain market conditions" following U.S. export restrictions.
- **YMTC Workforce Reduction:** China's leading NAND flash memory producer laid off 10% of its workforce in 2023, directly attributing job losses to tightened U.S. trade policies.

Despite these setbacks, China avoided full stagnation, quickly recalibrating funding priorities and strategic investments through the re-imagined, Big Fund 3.0.

Despite initial successes, China's semiconductor journey has not been without significant challenges. The path to technological self-sufficiency has been marked by institutional complexities, management issues, and the need for continuous strategic recalibration.

The disruptions and significant industry setbacks necessitated not just technical and financial adjustments but a fundamental reorganization of leadership and governance mechanisms, prompting the overhaul introduced in Big Fund 3.0.

Strategic Overhaul and Institutional Challenges

China’s Semiconductor Investment Evolution

As China’s semiconductor sector absorbed mounting external pressures, the government restructured its financial and governance frameworks to accelerate self-sufficiency. Under Big Fund 3.0 guidance, leadership transitioned to Zhang Xin, who shifted investment priorities toward long-term R&D in lithography and AI-integrated semiconductor manufacturing (Caixin, 2024; Min & Wei, 2024). DOUBLE CHECK THIS AGAIN

This evolution marked a response to several systemic challenges encountered in earlier phases:

1. **Corruption and Mismanagement**: Investigations by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) revealed significant resource misallocation under former Big Fund President Ding Wenwu. The collapse of HSMC, despite $20 billion in allocated investments, reinforced the need for stricter oversight (Lee, 2024).
2. **Over-Investment in Fabrication Without Equipment Support**: Despite major financial commitments—RMB 55 billion to wafer fabrication, RMB 18 billion to IC design, and RMB 13 billion to ATP—only RMB 500 million was allocated to equipment development in Phase II. This skewed prioritization perpetuated reliance on foreign photolithography and etching tools, delaying China’s ability to domestically produce advanced semiconductors (CSC Financial, cited in Caixin, 2022).
3. **Regional Disparities in Investment**: Coastal hubs like Shanghai and Shenzhen absorbed most semiconductor funding, while inland cities such as Xi’an and Wuhan remained underdeveloped. Phase III aims to redistribute resources more equitably to sustain industrial expansion.
4. **Overreliance on Legacy Technologies**: Continued dependence on DUV lithography technologies restricted China’s ability to manufacture sub-7nm chips (e.g., sub-7nm). Although SMIC has refined 7nm production, bottlenecks remain, pushing Big Fund 3.0 to prioritize EUV research and AI-driven semiconductor advancements.

The strategic realignment under Zhang Xin reflects a shift from short-term industrial scaling to long-term systemic autonomy. Yet, success depends on sustained implementation of these corrective measures and the ability to adapt amid ongoing export controls and technological bottlenecks.

Despite these challenges, China’s semiconductor sector continues to evolve rapidly, as seen in the emergence of Deep Seek R1, a domestic RAG model (and AI image generator) and the expansion of firms like Lonten Semiconductor. These developments suggest a resilient industrial strategy, even amid external restrictions and market instability (Priyadarshi, 2025; Lonten Semiconductor Financial Report, 2024).

After consideration of Chinese influence and expansion, the following summary has been developed to quickly reference and understand the implications and outcomes since developing US export controls on China.

Below is a framework that examines Chinese industrial policy across a broad spectrum, assessing not only direct financial investments but also the social, technical, organizational, regulatory, and market-driven mechanisms that shape its strategic response to U.S. export controls.

The STORM Framework (*Social, Technical, Organizational, Regulatory, Market Conditions*) provides a structured analysis of China's adaptation, capturing both immediate responses and long-term strategic shifts in the semiconductor industry.

[STORM – Projective Analysis]

S – Social Conditions: Talent Acquisition and Workforce Development

U.S. restrictions on knowledge transfer continue to push China to bolster its domestic talent pipeline, with significant strides in 2025:

• Expanded Talent Programs: The 2025 China Qiming Plan has scaled up, now incorporating multiple talent initiatives including the Torch Plan, Ruijin Plan, and Yangtze River Scholars programs, targeting PhD-level researchers with at least three years of post-doctoral experience. The program matches researchers with China-based enterprises to solve specific research problems and develop domestic research environments (China Talents Plan, 2025).

• Reverse Brain Drain Incentives: New policies under the Thousand Talents Plan provide returning engineers with equity stakes in state-backed firms like SMIC, alongside executive-level pay exceeding $1 million annually for senior chip designers, building on the program's documented success in boosting research output (Lewis, 2023, Nature).

• Educational Overhaul: The Eastern Institute of Technology (EIT) has partnered with Huawei and Tsinghua University to launch a Semiconductor Engineering Academy in 2025, graduating 2,000 specialists yearly, though global collaboration limits hinder frontier innovation (Goujon & Reynolds, 2024).

T – Technical Conditions: Infrastructure and Indigenous Innovation

China's technical resilience in 2025 reflects a focus on circumventing export controls and advancing indigenous capabilities:

• SMIC's DUV Mastery: By 2025, SMIC has refined its 7nm production using enhanced DUV lithography, achieving yields competitive with TSMC's 2019 output, powering devices like Huawei's Mate 70 series (Sohail, 2025).

• Breakthrough in Silicon Photonics: Tsinghua University's 2025 memristor advancements have evolved into silicon photonics integration, boosting chip efficiency for AI workloads by 15% over Western counterparts (Priyadarshi, 2025).

• EUV Progress: Chinese semiconductor manufacturers are preparing for trial production of domestically developed 13.5nm EUV lithography machines in Q3 2025, utilizing a simplified design approach that benefits mass production timelines (Sohail, 2025).

O – Organizational Conditions: Strategic Stockpiling and Retaliation

China's organizational strategies in 2025 have matured to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities and exert global leverage:

• Stockpiling Expansion: Huawei and other firms have doubled semiconductor reserves since 2022, securing a 3-year buffer for 7nm and 14nm production (Min & Wei, 2024, Nikkei Asia).

• Critical Materials Leverage: China tightened export controls on antimony in 2025, driving U.S. aerospace costs up 20% and pressuring Western supply chains (Rhodium Group, 2025).

R – Regulatory Conditions: Big Fund 3.0 and Governance Reforms

Big Fund 3.0, launched in 2024 with $47.5 billion, has driven regulatory evolution in 2025:

• Governance Overhaul: Under Zhang Xin's leadership, 2025 reforms include systematic changes to fiscal policies supporting innovation, transitioning from direct funding to an ecosystem approach that reduces corruption incidents compared to Phase II (Baark & Qian, 2025).

• Targeted Investments: 40% of Big Fund 3.0 now supports indigenous lithography and chipset technologies, aiming to close the sub-5nm gap by 2028 (Wang & Chen, 2025, Semiconductor Industry Journal).

• Regional Equity Push: China’s regional development policies, such as the Western Development strategy, suggest that by 2025, inland provinces like Sichuan could receive up to 25% of semiconductor funding, while coastal hubs are projected to retain approximately 70% of resources. This estimate aligns with current government initiatives to boost inland tech industries (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2021; People’s Daily, 2023).

M – Market Conditions: Net Gains vs. Losses from Export Controls

The STORM framework illuminates the multidimensional nature of China's semiconductor adaptation, revealing both the challenges and opportunities inherent in this technological competition. These insights demand a forward-looking policy approach that goes beyond simple restrictive measures to embrace a more nuanced, proactive strategy.

In 2025, China's semiconductor market reflects a mixed but resilient response to U.S. export controls:

• Domestic Market Surge Industrial parks in Shanghai and Xi'an are expected to increase chip output by 25% from 2023 to 2025, driven by current capacity expansions and government targets. Additionally, SMIC's 7nm chip family and their march to close the gap between the next generation distance, represent a significant source of China's mid-tier smartphone market influence. The success of the hardware, including Huawei, reflects their demonstrated progress in 7nm production despite U.S. sanctions (TechInsights, 2022; World Semiconductor Trade Statistics [WSTS], 2023).

• Western Revenue Hit: Tightened U.S. export controls on advanced chips are projected to reduce NVIDIA's sales to China by 35% by 2025, while AMD could see a revenue loss of $2 billion. These estimates stem from current restrictions on A800/H800 chips and the escalating impact of U.S. sanctions (Reuters, 2023; Bloomberg, 2023).

• China's legacy chip exports are forecasted to rise by 15% by 2025, potentially establishing it as a leader in mature process nodes. This projection is based on current export trends and significant capacity increases in legacy chip production (International Data Corporation [IDC], 2022; Semiconductor Industry Association [SIA], 2022).

Synthesizing Key Findings

Through this analysis, we identify China's semiconductor response as an aggressive, reactionary vision that has left 'scar tissue' across its supply chain**.** Rather than merely resisting U.S. restrictions, China has adapted with a strategy that fosters fast-paced technological learning, enhances self-reliance, and forces iterative industrial improvements.

1. **Scar Tissue Effect:** China's rapid realignment has resulted in short-term inefficiencies and misallocations—for example, the collapse of HSMC, excessive stockpiling of DUV lithography tools**,** and overinvestment in mature-node semiconductor manufacturing**.** These inefficiencies, however, are offset by China's ability to continuously adapt and improve its industrial strategy**.**
2. **Strengthened Domestic Capacity:** While export controls initially slowed access to advanced semiconductor technologies**,** they inadvertently accelerated China's commitment to full supply chain integration**,** particularly in fabless design, packaging, and localized lithography development**.**
3. **Market Adaptation and Industry Validation:** The emergence of Deep Seek R1 validates that China is not merely replicating Western technology but innovating within its own ecosystem**.** Reports on China's AI and semiconductor advances suggest that U.S. firms are acknowledging the unintended acceleration effects of export controls,

as seen in discussions on 3A090.a restrictions impacting high-bandwidth memory (HBM) production**.**

Policy Recommendations

1. **Forge Strategic Alliances:** Enhance semiconductor collaborations with Japan, Taiwan, and the EU to strengthen supply chains and sustain U.S. technological leadership. Establish joint R&D task forces with TSMC and ASML to co-develop next-generation lithography and quantum computing technologies by 2027, leveraging existing Wassenaar Arrangement ties. Broaden the alliance's scope to secure critical material inputs, such as rare earth elements, and advance AI chip design, ensuring resilience against supply chain disruptions. These efforts counter China's technological advancements in quantum computing and critical resources, positioning the U.S. as a global leader in emerging technologies.

2. **Extend NSF-Led R&D Investments:** Build on the National Science Foundation's AI grant network, including the Institute for Advances in Optimization (AI4OPT, NSF Award #2112533), by allocating $50 billion over five years to NSF and DARPA. Focus funding on EUV lithography breakthroughs, AI-driven computational efficiency, and quantum computing research to match China's Big Fund 3.0 scale ($47.5 billion). Expand AI4OPT's scope to include graduate fellowships for training the next generation of chip designers and educational outreach to elementary students. By introducing young learners to AI and semiconductor concepts, this initiative fosters early excitement and builds a pipeline for future innovators. This aligns with NSF's Smart and Connected Communities (S&CC) program, which supports interdisciplinary research to improve quality of life, driving demand for advanced technologies through community-focused innovation.

3. **Refine Export Control Strategies:** Shift from broad restrictions to targeted controls on critical technologies (e.g., EUV equipment, AI chips, and quantum computing components), minimizing collateral damage to U.S. firms like NVIDIA. Create a $10 billion support fund, administered by the Department of Commerce, to offset losses for businesses impacted by supply chain shifts. Prioritize firms with significant export losses to ensure resilience during policy transitions, enhancing the strategy's practicality and economic stability.

The recommendations proposed are not merely theoretical exercises but critical interventions in an ongoing technological chess match. They reflect the fundamental understanding that technological leadership is not achieved through restriction, but through continuous innovation, strategic investment, and adaptive policymaking.

Export controls have, for better or worse, reshaped China's technological trajectory**.**
The STORM framework underscores the results of unpredictable consequences of policy, reinforcing the need for a balanced, adaptive, and case-by-case approach**.**

The U.S. must execute its semiconductor strategy more effectively, taking cues from China's ability to integrate business with government for industrial progress. Despite external constraints, China's semiconductor sector has demonstrated resilience and adaptation. The Made in China 2025 strategy prioritizes biotech, energy, agriculture, finance, and technology—sectors the U.S. must actively compete in to sustain long-term leadership. Strategic action is needed now to maintain the U.S. edge in global technology and innovation.

Conclusion

The U.S.-China semiconductor rivalry reveals that export controls are far more than simple trade restrictions—they are strategic instruments in a complex geopolitical chess match. What began as an attempt to constrain technological progress has ironically become a catalyst for unprecedented industrial creativity and strategic reimagination.

As the STORM framework illuminates, these restrictions ripple across social, technical, organizational, regulatory, and market dimensions, forcing both nations to develop more sophisticated technological strategies. The semiconductor competition is fundamentally reshaping global technological development, demonstrating that technological leadership cannot be achieved through restriction alone, but through continuous innovation and strategic investment.

The ultimate battleground is no longer just about microchips, but about defining the future of global technological sovereignty.

Here are some measurement concepts:

1. The Gravity Model of Trade (For Trade Flow Disruption)

Equation:

$$X_{ij} = G \cdot \frac{GDP_i \cdot GDP_j}{D_{ij}^{\beta}}$$

Where:

- X_{ij} = Bilateral trade volume between country i and j.
- GDP_i, GDP_j = GDP of exporting and importing countries.
- D_{ij} = Distance between trade partners (proxy for trade barriers).
- β = Elasticity of trade to distance.
- G = Scaling constant.

Justifies how you measure trade impact

Runner up philosophies:

1. Trade Flow Loss Rate (TFLR)

$$TFLR = \frac{X_{\text{pre}} - X_{\text{post}}}{X_{\text{pre}}}$$

Where:

- X_{pre} = Total exports to China before restrictions.
- X_{post} = Total exports to China after restrictions.
- **Interpretation:** A positive $TFLR$ indicates a decline in exports, meaning effective restrictions. A negative $TFLR$ (unexpected) means increased exports despite controls.

2. Capital Flight Factor (CFF)

$$CFF = \frac{I_{\text{pre}} - I_{\text{post}}}{I_{\text{pre}}}$$

Where:

- I_{pre} = Foreign direct investment in China's semiconductor sector before controls.
- I_{post} = Investment after controls.
- **Interpretation:** A high CFF (close to 1) means significant capital outflows from China, indicating economic damage.

3. Demand Decay Function (Similar to Signal Loss in Networks)

$$D_t = D_0 \cdot e^{-\lambda t}$$

Where:

- D_0 = Initial semiconductor demand in China.
- λ = Demand loss rate (influenced by export restrictions, R&D lag, domestic substitution).
- t = Time since export controls took effect.
- **Interpretation:** Higher λ values indicate faster demand erosion, while a low λ suggests resilience.

Appendix ii.

RESERVED

Appendix iii. Technical Conditions: Infrastructure and Innovation Responses

Formulas should go here……..

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