

# Week 5: Threat Modeling & Vulnerability Classification

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
This report models threats for five Alexa skills captured via the Alexa mobile app using mitmproxy/mitmweb. We applied STRIDE for security, LINDDUN for privacy, and consolidated findings into a vulnerability taxonomy with concrete mitigations.

## Scope & Skills Assessed

- 1) Sleep Sounds by Sleep Jar (media streaming)
- 2) Question of the Day (Matchbox)
- 3) Cat Facts (content)
- 4) Ask My Buddy (account linking)
- 5) Philips Hue (account linking + device cloud)

## High-Level Data Flow

The diagram below summarizes the primary interactions observed during skill use and account linking:



## STRIDE Threat Modeling

Threat	Where / Asset	Example in Flow	Likely Impact	Mitigations
Spoofing	Account Linking / OAuth Client	Phishing-like pages or tampered redirect URIs	Account takeover / token theft	PKCE + state, exact redirect URIs, HTTPS-only, CSP
Tampering	Media playlists / responses	Unsigned m3u8/ts segments on CDNs	Content injection / malvertising	Signed URLs, TLS pinning (where possible), integrity checks
Repudiation	User consent logs	Ambiguous permission prompts	Disputes over consent/data use	Fine-grained consent records, immutable logs
Information Disclosure	Excess scopes / profile data	Requesting profile+email+location when not needed	Privacy loss; broad data exposure	Least privilege scopes; periodic scope reviews
Denial of Service	Skill backends / media CDNs	Burst requests; missing rate limits	Service disruption; throttling	Rate limiting; caching; retries with backoff
Elevation of Privilege	Weak access separation	Single token grants multiple device actions	Unauthorized control/data access	Role-based scopes; token binding; short TTLs; rotation

## LINDDUN Privacy Analysis

Category	Data / Subject	Example	Risk	Mitigation
Linkability	User sessions across skills	Shared identifiers across vendors/CDNs	Cross-service tracking	Rotate pseudonyms; minimize shared IDs
Identifiability	PII (email/name)	Over-privileged OAuth scopes	User deanonymization	Collect only required claims; DPIA
Non-repudiation	Consent evidence	Implicit opt-ins via app UI	Weak accountability	Explicit prompts; user-accessible logs
Detectability	Traffic patterns	Predictable media fetch bursts	Skill usage inference	Padding, caching, aggregation
Disclosure of info	Media URLs/tokens	Unsigned playlists; broad cache	Leak of content or tokens	Signed URLs; short TTLs
Unawareness	Purpose/transparentcy	Opaque linking pages	User misunderstanding	Clear scopes/purposes; granular revoke
Non-compliance	Consent, retention	No retention limits	Policy/regulatory risk	Documented retention; user deletion

## Vulnerability Taxonomy & Evidence

Category	Observation / Evidence	Risk	Recommendation
Data Over-collection	OAuth scopes include profile/email where not necessary	Medium	Limit to least-privilege; justify each scope
Weak OAuth (PKCE/state)	Multiple redirects; possible missing state validation on vendors	High	Enforce PKCE+state; exact redirect matching
Token Hygiene	Long-lived tokens; unclear rotation	High	Short TTL; refresh rotation; revoke on logout
Transport/Content Security	Unsigned m3u8/ts assets from CDN	Medium	Signed URLs; integrity checks
Injection/Tampering	Media path manipulation feasible if unprotected	Medium	Input validation; integrity; secure storage
DoS/Abuse	Observable burst traffic; no clear rate limit headers	Medium	Rate limits; caching; backoff
User-Confusion Consent	Generic prompts; unclear data use	Medium	Granular, purpose-based prompts; user dashboard

## Alexa Platform Constraints vs Real-World Risks

Platform Constraints (What Amazon Controls)	Real-World Risks (Vendor / Skill Owner)
Skill certification focuses on functionality + content policy	Certification does not fully audit third-party OAuth servers
Traffic is TLS-terminated by platform	Downstream media/OAuth endpoints may have weaker controls
Standardized permission categories	Vendors may request broader scopes than required
Account linking UX limited in-app	Phishing-like off-domain login pages can confuse users

## Key Recommendations

- Enforce PKCE + state on all account linking; exact redirect URIs.
- Use least-privilege OAuth scopes; document purpose for each claim.
- Short token TTLs, automatic rotation, revoke on unlink.
- Signed media URLs, integrity checks for playlists/segments.
- Rate limiting + caching; client retry with exponential backoff.
- Clear, granular, purpose-based consent prompts and a user permission dashboard.



Path	Method	Status	Size	Time
https://www.philips-hue.com/	GET	200	0	132ms
https://www.philips-hue.com/en-ca	GET	200	23.4kb	67ms
https://avs-alexa-12-na.amazon.com/v20160207/ping	GET	404	45b	40ms
https://fls-na.amazon.com/1/batch/1/OE/	POST	204	1.1kb	42ms
https://fls-na.amazon.com/1/batch/1/OE/	POST	204	2.0kb	41ms
https://fls-na.amazon.com/1/batch/1/OE/	POST	204	1.1kb	48ms
https://fls-na.amazon.com/1/batch/1/OE/	POST	204	1.1kb	74ms
https://fls-na.amazon.com/1/batch/1/OE/	POST	204	1.1kb	80ms

cat\_facts.png

Search: ~u token|session|answer|choice|name|email|zip|postal|

Find: url matches /token|session|answer|choice|name|email|zip|postal/i

Path	Method	Status	Size	Time
https://na-api-alexa.amazon.ca/api/np/list-media-sessions?deviceSerialNumber=B24C072AE8E04813B94D8CE9B1A58776&deviceType=A2IVLV5VM2W81	GET	200	23b	96ms
https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com/punctual/multi-watch/channel?VER=8&gsessionid=eRFFp9ZinhXFGWl-qJcEaSVKbglILXY6jmqazZ-jW6Q&key=AlzaSyCIMH2ks6VPAIRC2lqU_Snz1Lo76XGdnlc&RI...	OPTIONS	200	0	55ms
https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com/punctual/multi-watch/channel?VER=8&gsessionid=eRFFp9ZinhXFGWl-qJcEaSVKbglILXY6jmqazZ-jW6Q&key=AlzaSyCIMH2ks6VPAIRC2lqU_Snz1Lo76XGdnlc&RI...	GET	200	0	...

qotd.png

Search: ~u token|session|answer|choice|name|email|zip|postal|

Find: Highlight

Path	Method	Status	Size	Time
https://na-api-alexa.amazon.ca/api/np/list-media-sessions?deviceSerialNu...	GET	200	23b	87ms
https://na-api-alexa.amazon.ca/api/np/list-media-sessions?deviceSerialNu...	GET	200	23b	...
https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com/punctual/multi-watch/channel?VER...	OPTIONS	200	0	65ms
https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com/punctual/multi-watch/channel?VER...	GET	200	0	...
https://na-api-alexa.amazon.ca/api/np/list-media-sessions?deviceSerialNu...	GET	200	23b	87ms

sleep\_soundspic.png

Path	Method	Status	Size	Time
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean.m3u8?src=alexa&src_request_id=amzn1.echo-api.request.c7bab921-76ec-48db-8e2b-0b0a01781530	GET	200	1.9kb	30ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean0.ts	GET	200	890.8kb	213ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean1.ts	GET	200	890.2kb	190ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean2.ts	GET	200	891.0kb	190ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean3.ts	GET	200	890.4kb	1
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean4.ts	GET	200	890.1kb	192ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean5.ts	GET	200	891.2kb	188ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean6.ts	GET	200	890.1kb	188ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean7.ts	GET	200	890.4kb	187ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean8.ts	GET	200	890.6kb	188ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean9.ts	GET	200	890.6kb	187ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean10.ts	GET	200	890.2kb	189ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean11.ts	GET	200	890.4kb	188ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean12.ts	GET	200	890.6kb	188ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean13.ts	GET	200	890.6kb	198ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean14.ts	GET	200	890.4kb	192ms

sleep\_soundspic2.png

https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean14.ts	GET	200	890.4kb	192ms
https://cdn.sleepjar.com/sleepsounds/v6/sd/3600/m3u8/ocean/ocean15.ts	GET	200	890.4kb	190ms

showhost

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