


RF-Mehndi: A Fingertip Profiled RF Identifier


<u>Cui Zhao</u>¹, Zhenjiang Li², Ting Liu¹, Han Ding¹, Jinsong Han³, Wei Xi¹, Ruowei Gui¹

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²City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

³Zhejiang University, China









Transportation Card



Access Card



Credit Card

Any potential security risk with these cards?







Thievery

Loss

Why can't these cards resist loss and thievery?



Motivation



Sth you have?



Who are you?




Motivation









Device Authentication







User(Biometric) Authentication




Motivation

Issues with these approaches:

- Not convenient
- Not easy to customize
- Not light-weight
- Not fast to implement
- Not low cost
- **>** ...





User-dependent & Unique



Our goal

Device Authentication



User Authentication

Light-weight

Low-cost

Universal


Counterfeiting

Impersonation

Replay



Radiative & Inductive coupling





$$\theta = \left(\frac{4\pi d}{\lambda} + \theta_{reader} + \theta_{tag}\right) \mod 2\pi$$



Observation 1 --- Impact of tag coupling

➤ Tags in a vicinity → Their circuit characteristics change.







(a) Phase of individual tags $_{11}$



Observation 1 --- Impact of tag coupling

What will happen if we collect their phases together?






(b) Coupling phase of these tags




Why does the phase change due to coupling?






Observation 2


Impact of human impedance








Why does phase change with fingertip touch?
















- (a) Phase of individual tags
- (b) Coupling phase of these tags

User-dependent & Unique Phase Fingerprint


$$\Delta\theta_{ij} = \theta_i - \theta_j = (\frac{4\pi d_{ij}}{\lambda} + \Delta\theta_{tag}^{ij}) \mod 2\pi$$
Phase Difference of Tags (PDoT)

Phase Difference of Tags (PDoT)



Challenge 1

The impact of touching is unstable.




- (b) Touch different tags
- (c) Touch Tag9 three times without conductor



Tackle with challenge 1

Introduce a conductor




Complexity of coupling & Size of array



Challenge 2

Phases change with distance.



Tackle with challenge 2

Phase shifting algorithm


Algorithm 1: Phase Shifting

```
Input: Unwrapped phase sequence:
      \theta = (\theta_{t_1}, \theta_{t_2}, ... \theta_{t_n}), n \in [1, N]
Output: Calibrated phase sequence: \theta' = (\theta'_{t_1}, \theta'_{t_2}, ..., \theta'_{t_n})
  1: Descending sort: \theta \leftarrow sort(\theta), i \in [1, N]
  2: i \leftarrow 1
  3: while i < N do
  4: \delta_i \leftarrow \theta_{t_i} - \theta_{t_{i+1}}
  5: if i == N then
  6: \delta_i \leftarrow \theta_{t_i} - \theta_{t_1} + 2\pi
  7: end if
  8: i \leftarrow i + 1
  9: end while
 10: Obtain maximum of \delta_i: \delta^{ma} \leftarrow max(\delta_i), i \in [1, N]
 11: if \delta^{ma} == \delta_N then
12: \theta'_{t_i} \leftarrow (\theta_{t_i} - (\theta_{t_N} - \frac{1}{2}\delta^{ma})) \mod 2\pi
13: else if \delta^{ma} == \delta_j, j \in [1, N-1] then
14: \theta'_{t_i} \leftarrow (\theta_{t_i} + (2\pi - \theta_{t_{j+1}} - \frac{1}{2}\delta^{ma})) \mod 2\pi
15: end if
16: Descending sort: \theta' \leftarrow sort(\theta'_{t_i}), i \in [1, N]
```



Tackle with challenge 2


Phase shifting algorithm





Tackle with challenge 2


Phase shifting algorithm






Challenge 3

Impact of accessories






- 1. Impinj R420 reader
- 2. Larid antenna A9028
- 3. Alien-9629 tag





Overall accuracy vs. Human diversity


- 7 females + 8 males
- 15 representative tag array layouts





Resisting impersonation attack


• 10 attackers try to use an authorized user's credential to access the system.





Resisting counterfeiting attack

- Attacker produces a counterfeited array with the same tag model and layout.
 - 90 Alien-9629 tags





Average FAR < 0.01


Tags' hardware differences will reflect in phases.





Resisting replay attack

- Effective read range < 30cm
- Tolerable space angle of tag rotation < 10° (w.r.t. x-y-z axis)




Effective authentication range \approx 15cm

±4cm region > 90% accuracy



Accuracy vs. rotation and accessories



Tolerable space angle < 10°



- Converting an array of tags attached on a card into an effective authentication credential.
- Light-weight, low-cost, universal solution for a fingertip profiled RF identifier, authenticating both the card and its holder's identity simultaneously.
- Demonstrated a working system implemented purely based on COTS RFID devices.

Thanks! Question?

