

RATIONING MEDICINE THROUGH BUREAUCRACY: AUTHORIZATION RESTRICTIONS IN MEDICARE

Brot-Goldberg et. al, 2023

Han Zhang

UT Austin

Background

- Administrative costs make up a substantial portion of healthcare spending in the United States
- half of administrative effort is spent on activities that aim to reduce healthcare utilization and spending
- evaluate the trade-off between administrative burden for potential reductions in moral hazard and lower costs of insurance provision
- specifically, of **prior authorization restrictions** in healthcare, specifically focusing on their impact on drug utilization and healthcare costs

- comprehensive analysis of the effects of prior authorization on drug utilization using a large dataset and advanced statistical techniques
- examines the efficiency and equity implications of prior authorization policies, shedding light on their broader impacts on the healthcare system.

Outline

- 1 Prior Authorization Restrictions in Theory and Practice
 - A Model of Prior Authorization Restriction
- 2 Setting & Data
 - Data
 - Sample Selection
- 3 the Effect on Drug Utilization
- 4 Substitution Patterns and Spending Effects
- 5 Administrative Cost Burdens
- 6 Welfare Effects
 - Revealed Preference Approach
 - Health Effects
- 7 Conclusion

Prior Authorization Restrictions in Practice

- Prior Authorization Restrictions: insurers require approval from providers before covering certain medical services or prescription drugs
- Purpose: ensures appropriate utilization of healthcare resources, control costs
 - The physician's willingness to complete the forms implicitly signals to the payer that the value of the drug or treatment to the patient is high enough to justify going through the process.

A Model of Prior Authorization Restriction

without Prior Authorization Restriction

- $\Delta v_{id} = v_{id} - v_{i(-d)}$ the incremental value; Δc_{id} the incremental cost
- consumer type $\theta \in [0, 1]$
- The patient will receive the drug if $u(\theta_{id}) \geq 0$
- social welfare

$$W(0) = \int_{\Theta_0} [V_d(\theta) - C_d(\theta)] d\theta$$

, where $\Theta_0 = \{\theta : u(\theta_{id}) \geq 0\}$

A Model of Prior Authorization Restriction

with Prior Authorization Restriction

- new choice utility function $u_A(\theta_{id})$
- administrative cost a
- social welfare

$$W(1) = \int_{\Theta_1} [V_d(\theta) - C_d(\theta)] d\theta - a$$

, where $\Theta_1 = \{\theta : u_A(\theta_{id}) \geq 0\}$

Welfare Impact of Prior Authorization Restriction:

$$W(1) - W(0) = - \int_{\Theta_M} V_d(\theta) + \int_{\Theta_M} C_d(\theta) d\theta - \int_{\Theta_1} a$$


, where $\Theta_M = \Theta_0 \setminus \Theta_1$

Model: When Should Policymakers Restrict Drugs?

this model implies drugs under the restriction should be:

- Optimizing Administrative Costs: few inframarginal users
- Addressing Moral Hazard: incremental value is low
- Ideal drugs for restriction are expensive, niche-branded drugs, particularly new entrants in established therapeutic classes

Figure 2: Prior Authorization Restrictions by Drug Price



utilizes administrative datasets from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from 2007 to 2015.

- ① Beneficiary Demographics, Enrollment, and Choice Status
 - tracks whether enrollment was initiated through active choice or the default auto-assignment mechanism.
 - allows us to observe the *assigned* plan and the *enrolled* plan for each beneficiary, even when the two differ.
- ② Plan Characteristics
- ③ Formulary Data: drug-level, the set of drugs covered by each plan each year
- ④ Outpatient Prescription Drug Data
- ⑤ Other Drug Information: rebates etc.

Data: Sample Selection

- restriction to full Low Income Subsidy (LIS) Beneficiaries
 - they effectively pay nothing out of pocket for covered drugs, making prior authorization the primary feature of the insurance contract that shapes drug demand
 - they frequently face default rules which assign them to a randomly-chosen plan if they do not make an active plan choice
- restrict to those who were automatically reassigned to a benchmark plan
- data from the year before their reassignment to two years after reassignment

The Effect of Authorization Restrictions on Drug Utilization

the treatment effect of moving a drug from being covered with no restrictions to being covered with restrictions, all else equal.

identification challenges:

- 1 beneficiaries are free to choose plans, beneficiaries intending to take specific drugs may be inclined to avoid plans that restrict the drugs they want, introducing reverse causality between propensity to use a drug and whether a beneficiary faces prior authorization
- 2 plans do not randomly select which drugs to restrict

Effect of on Drug Utilization: Research Design

solutions:

- ① restrict to *only* beneficiaries who faced random assignment to default plans.
- ② use an indicator for whether the drug was restricted under the beneficiary's **assigned plan** as an **instrument** for whether the drug was restricted under the beneficiary's **enrolled plan**, for each beneficiary-drug pair
- ③ rich controls: drug-by-market fixed effects; assigned-plan-by-market fixed effects; whether the drug was excluded in the enrolled plan; formulary status of substitutes

Effect of on Drug Utilization: Research Design

estimating equations

$$Y_{idt} = \beta_1 Auth_{idt}^{Enrolled} + \beta_2 Excl_{idt}^{Enrolled} + \kappa_{dm(it)} + \lambda_{j(it)m(it)} \quad (1)$$
$$\gamma_1 Auth_{j(it)dt}^{Sub,Assigned} + \gamma_2 Excl_{j(it)dt}^{Sub,Assigned} + \nu_{idt}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} Auth_{idt}^{Enrolled} \\ Excl_{idt}^{Enrolled} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \delta_1 Auth_{idt}^{Assigned} + \delta_2 Excl_{idt}^{Assigned} + K_{dm(it)} + \Lambda_{j(it)m(it)} \\ \Gamma_1 Auth_{j(it)dt}^{Sub,Assigned} + \Gamma_2 Excl_{j(it)dt}^{Sub,Assigned} + u_{idt} \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

where the utilization outcome is a binary indicator for whether the beneficiary filled the drug at least once in the year.

Effect of on Drug Utilization: : Main Estimates


Table 5: Estimates of the Effect of Prior Authorization Status on Drug Utilization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Auth ^{Enrolled}	-1.169 (0.012)	-0.136 (0.005)	-0.098 (0.004)	-0.099 (0.003)	-0.101 (0.003)	-0.108 (0.004)
Auth ^{Sub}						0.049 (0.0036)
PA % Effect	-290.0	-33.7	-24.3	-24.5	-25.1	-26.8
Control Mean				1.299		
Reweightd Control Mean				0.403		
Drug FEs		X				
Drug-year FEs			X			
Drug-market-year FEs				X	X	X
Plan-market-year FEs					X	X
Substitution Controls						X
Number of drug × beneficiary-years			1,723,975,571			
Number of market years			210			
Average plans per market-year			6.6			
Average beneficiaries per plan			51			
Average drugs per year			1569.2			

Figure 1: %PA effect = coefficient estimates divided by reweighted control mean


Effect of on Drug Utilization: Heterogeneous Effects

Figure 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Prior Authorization on Utilization by Beneficiary Characteristics



Effect of on Drug Utilization: Heterogeneous Effects

Figure 6: Heterogeneous Effects of Prior Authorization on Utilization by Drug Characteristics



Spending Effects: Estimating Substitution Patterns

a discrete choice of a single drug within a therapeutic class for a given year:

$$u_{idt} = \underbrace{\beta_C Auth_{idt} + \delta_C Excl_{idt} + \kappa_{dm(it)}}_{V_{idt}} + \xi_{it} 1\{d \neq 0\} + \lambda_C \epsilon_{idt}$$

which implies a nested logit demand system. The probability of taking a drug is

$$P_{id} = \frac{\exp \frac{V_{idt}}{\lambda_C} (\sum_{k \in C} \exp \frac{V_{ikt}}{\lambda_C})^{\lambda_C - 1}}{1 + (\sum_{k \in C} \exp \frac{V_{ikt}}{\lambda_C})^{\lambda_C - 1}}$$

with $1 - \lambda_C$ governing the within-nest correlation of unobserved preferences

Spending Effects: Estimating Substitution Patterns

primary parameters of interest are

- β_C , the effect of prior authorization on choice utility
identified from differences in a drug's market share among beneficiaries enrolled in plans that restrict it versus the market share among beneficiaries in plans that do not restrict it
- λ_C , governs the extent of intensive margin substitution
compare the relative market shares of *all other drugs* from beneficiaries in plans that restrict a given drug, compared to the market shares of those drugs from beneficiaries in plans that do not restrict a given drug

Spending Effects

with the estimated parameters, simulate demand for drugs under (1) status quo of beneficiary plan assignment (2) alternative where drugs that were previously under restrictions are now unrestricted.

Then measure the effects of moving from simulation (2) to (1)

Table 6: Spending and Utilization Effects of Status Quo Relative to Ban on Prior Authorization Restrictions

	Total	Restricted Drugs	Unrestricted Drugs	No Drug
Change in	-3.57%	-21.8%	+0.72%	-
Spending	-95.88	-111.57	+15.69	-
Per Capita				
Change in	-0.65%	-28.9%	+0.58%	+0.06%
# Users	-0.065	-0.120	+0.056	+0.065
Per Capita				
Diversion	-	-100%	46.2%	53.8%

Administrative Cost Burden

relevant parameters:

- joint cost to both the physician (submit requests) and the insurer (process requests): a
- constant rejection rate across all drugs and years: r
- # of patients taking the drug: N

then there will be $\frac{N}{1-r}$ requests and the administrative cost is $\frac{aN}{1-r}$

Administrative Cost Burden– Calibration

- estimates N using simulation under status quo in the previous section
- estimates cost a based on previous literature: provider-side paperwork cost is \$18.53 per application; processing cost is \$3.95 per application

Table 7: Per Capita Administrative Burden of Authorization Restrictions

		Request Rejection Rate				
		0%	1.5%	4%	7.5%	15%
Paperwork Cost	\$11.62	\$4.84	\$4.92	\$5.04	\$5.24	\$5.70
	\$18.19	\$7.58	\$7.70	\$7.90	\$8.20	\$8.92
	\$21.72	\$9.05	\$9.19	\$9.43	\$9.79	\$10.65
	\$22.48	\$9.37	\$9.51	\$9.76	\$10.13	\$11.02
	\$31.30	\$13.04	\$13.24	\$13.59	\$14.10	\$15.35
	\$50	\$20.84	\$21.16	\$21.71	\$22.53	\$24.52
	\$100	\$41.68	\$42.31	\$43.41	\$45.06	\$49.03
	\$200	\$83.35	\$84.62	\$86.83	\$90.11	\$98.06

Figure 2: subtracting from \$96, a net saving of around \$86

Welfare Effect: a Revealed Preference Approach

aim: estimate the total loss in consumer surplus due to being turned away from a drug

$$\Delta CS_d = - \int_{\Theta_M} V_d(\theta) d\theta$$

denote the WTP for drug d for θ type consumer as $W_d(\theta_{id})$

the market demand curve is $D_d(P_d) = \int 1\{W_d(\theta) \geq P_d\} d\theta$

use the exogenous variation in P_d to trace out $D_d(\cdot)$ and the distribution of W_d

if $W_d(\theta) = V_d(\theta)$, can get the distribution of V_d

Welfare Effect: a Revealed Preference Approach

leverage the transitions of 62,785 beneficiaries into the LIS as a source of exogenous variation in price

$$\log(E[Y_{idt}]) = \frac{\epsilon}{100} P_{dt} \times \text{NotLIS}_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_{dmt} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where $P_{dt} \times \text{NotLIS}_{it}$ is equal to the price of the drug d in year t for those not yet enrolled in the LIS program ($\text{NotLIS}_{it} = 1$) and zero for those enrolled ($\text{NotLIS}_{it} = 0$)

estimated by Poisson regression, the estimated $\epsilon = 0.15$

assume the demand curve is $D_d(P_d) = D_d(0)e^{\frac{\epsilon}{100}P_d}$ then the distribution of W_d is

$$F_d(W) = 1 - D_d(0)e^{\frac{\epsilon}{100}W}$$

estimate $D_d(0)$ in simulation absent of restriction

Welfare Effect: a Revealed Preference Approach

with 28.9% of users deterred by the restriction,

- if marginal beneficiaries screened away are those with the lowest WTP

$$\Delta CS_d^{best-case} = - \int_{(1-0.289)D_d(0)}^{D_d(0)} D_d^{-1}(\theta) d\theta$$

- if screening is random

$$\Delta CS_d^{random} = -0.289 \int_0^{D_d(0)} D_d^{-1}(\theta) d\theta$$

Welfare Effect: a Revealed Preference Approach

Table 9: Revealed Preference Estimates of Consumer Surplus Loss

	(1)	(2)
Best-Case Screening	3.83	13.05
Random Screening	23.80	80.91
Beneficiary FEs	X	
Net Financial Savings from Prior Authorization	86.58	

Figure 3: two columns represent two amounts under the two estimates of semi-elasticity demand. Under the best-case screening, the amount consumers are willing to pay for the forgone drugs is around 15% of the net savings. In the random screening case, the amount consumers are willing to pay for the forgone consumption is in the same general range as the net savings.

Health Effects: Case Study of Oral Anticoagulants

understand the impact of prior authorization restrictions on access to non-Vitamin K oral anticoagulants (NOACs) compared to warfarin, a low-priced generic alternative, with:

$$Y_{it} = \beta AuthAllNOACs_{j(it)t} + \gamma OtherFormulary_{j(it)t} + \delta_{m(it)} + \epsilon_{it}$$

, where

- *AuthAllNOACs* is a dummy variable indicating whether assigned to a plan *j* where all NOACs were restricted;
- *Y* is an indicator of a beneficiary's health outcomes

health outcomes such as strokes, bleeding events, and death yield inconclusive results

Health Effects: Aggregate Health Effects

construct two indicators:

- *AuthExposureQ5_i*; whether the beneficiary's assigned plan was in the quantile with the most exposure to prior authorization
- *ExclExposureQ5_i*; assignment to the worst plans in terms of their exclusion of previously-taken drugs

$$Y_{it} = \beta \text{AuthExposureQ5}_i + \gamma \text{ExclExposureQ5}_i + \delta_{m(i)} + \epsilon_i$$

β thus represents the health consequences of greater exposure to prior authorization. The result is still inconclusive.

Health Effects: Aggregate Health Effects

Table 12: Effects of Aggregate Prior Authorization Restriction Exposure on Utilization and Health Outcomes

All Beneficiaries				
	Spending	% Died in Year	Inpatient Spending	Non-Drug Medical Spending
AuthExposureQ5	-64.825 (29.508)	0.058 (0.065)	68.446 (87.435)	78.948 (120.543)
Control Mean	4,210.39	2.253	12,196.71	1,579.28
N (beneficiary-years)	609,316			

Top 25% of Beneficiaries by Spread in Fit				
	Spending	% Died in Year	Inpatient Spending	Non-Drug Medical Spending
AuthExposureQ5	-192.499 (43.018)	-0.051 (0.115)	-162.382 (145.638)	-309.17 (201.224)
Control Mean	3,909.49	2.151	5,429.84	11,090.72
N (beneficiary-years)	152,385			

Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from a set of regressions of a beneficiary's utilization and health outcomes in a given year on an indicator for whether their assigned plan was in the bottom quintile of benchmark plans in terms of putting authorization restrictions on their previously-taken drugs. Regressions include market fixed effects and a control for exclusion exposure.

Figure 4: second panel restrict to a subset of beneficiaries who face the greatest variation across plans in terms of exposure to prior authorization

Conclusion

- reducing drug spending by \$96 per beneficiary-year , while only generating approximately \$10 in paperwork costs. The cost savings likely exceed beneficiaries' willingness to pay for foregone drugs.
- Despite its benefits, prior authorization policies may not be optimal if implemented more widely, and there may be more efficient alternatives for managing healthcare costs.