#### ECON3096 2022Fall

# Final Project — II. Data Analysis Replication

For the data analysis replication, you can choose one papers attached below for replication tasks by the following rule. Please select a paper from group A if your student number is an even number (ends with 0, 2, 4, 6, 8), and select a paper from group B if your student number is an odd number (ends with 1, 3, 5, 7, 9). You can download the detailed instruction, questions, dataset for each paper from the corresponding folder from the following links:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Vr-FvxKUZgowsUgqjejjepJhGhnOoNh ?usp=share link

or

https://pan.baidu.com/s/14P\_szVsUMJqowkhGYvDzqQ?pwd=z3gj

提取码: z3gj

For each paper, I prepared five questions for you, each worth 20 points. You should answer all five and prepare the related R-script. For the third papers in both Groups, I prepared an extra question for each, which is related to the more advanced IV estimation. This question is optional, you can get an extra 20 points if you answer it correctly. Please prepare your answers and r-script for the paper you have chosen and submit it to moodle by 18:30pm 25 December, 2022.

#### Group A

- 1. Gerber, Alan S., Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan. 2009. "Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1 (2): 35-52. See the pertinent instrument on pp.2-4. OLS
- 2. Abramitzky, Ran, Adeline Delavande, and Luis Vasconcelos. 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3 (3): 124-57.
  - See the pertinent instrument on pp.5-6. OLS DID
- 3. Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act See the pertinent instrument on pp.7-8. OLS DID IV\*(optional)

#### Group B

- Rose, Andrew, K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" American Economic Review, 94 (1): 98-114.
   See the pertinent instrument on pp.9-11. OLS
- Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael), and Feng Zhu. 2011. "Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia." *American Economic Review*, 101 (4): 1601-15.
   See the pertinent instrument on pp.12-13. OLS DID

3. Imai, Masami, and Seitaro Takarabe. 2011. "Bank Integration and Transmission of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Japan." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 3 (1): 155-83.

See the pertinent instrument on pp.14-15. OLS DID IV\*(optional)

## Group A

1. Gerber, Alan S., Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan. 2009. "Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1 (2): 35-52.

In this paper, authors try to study whether the exposure to newspaper affect one's political knowledge and stated opinions, or increases voting turnover, and affect a voter's support to a Democrat (more liberal) or Republican (conservative) candidate. Using a randomized experiment, in which authors assigned individuals to a free subscription of either the liberal Washington Post or the more conservative Washington Times newspaper (two major newspaper in Washington, DC.), authors study these questions using a sample of residents in Prince William County VA, a county 25 miles outside of Washington, DC. In term of the econometric method, this paper is relatively easy. Since it is a randomized experiment, many of the omitted variable bias has already been taken care of by design. Nevertheless, authors still add a lot of controls variables so as to get a more robust estimation.

Variable Name	Variable Definition
treatment	TREATMENT
wave2	Newspaper subscription processed in 2nd wave
completematch	Successfully matched to state voting data
Bgetsmag	Subscribes to any news or political magazine
post	Received Post treatment
times	Received Times treatment
surveyed	Surveyed in post-election survey
Bfemale	Female
reportedage	Age of respondent
Bvoted2004	Self-report, voted in 2004 general election
Bvoted2002	Self-report, voted in 2002 general election
Bvoted2001	Self-report, voted in 2001 general election
Bconsumer	Respondent drawn from consumer database sample frame
Bpreferrepub	Prefers the Republican candidate for upcoming VA gubernatorial election
Bpreferdem	Prefers the Democratic candidate for upcoming VA gubernatorial election
Bprefernoone	No stated preference for upcoming VA gubernatorial election
paper	Received either Post or Times treatment
voted	Self-report voted in 2005 VA Gubernatorial election
voteddem	Voted for Democrat in 2005 Gub election, set to missing if did not vote
voteddem_all	Voted for Democrat in 2005 Gub election, set to 0 if did not vote
preferdem	Did not vote in 2005 Gub election, but preferred Democrat
voteddem2	Voted for or preferred Democrat in 2005 Gub election
mostimp_scandals	Most important problem facing country (1=issue other than scandals, 0=scandal

iraq\_post Most important issues in Iraq (1=constitution or Hussein trial, 0=other)

bushapproval Bush approval (4=strong approval, 1=strong disapproval)

repfavorable Overall opinion of Republican Party favorable (0=v unfavorable, 3=v favorable) demunfavorable Overall opinion of Democratic Party unfavorable (1=v favorable, 4=v unfavorable)

iraq Progress in Iraq (o=very badly, 3=very well)

leak Leak case (3=no one did anything wrong, 1=something illegal) alito Alito confirmation (3=should confirm, 1=should not confirm)

iraqdead Knew number of dead in Iraq libby Idendified Libby as involved in leak

miers Indentified Miers as Supreme Court nominee

getapaper Reports receiving a paper gettimes Reports receiving Times getpost Reports receiving Post

readfrqr Frequency respondent reads paper (o=Never, 3=Every day)

readsome Reads paper at least several times per week

conservative Self-identified Conservativism (7=extreme conservative, 1=extreme libral)

consindexgen Broad policy index (higher scores conservative)

consindexpol Specific Issue Index (mostimp\_scandals, iraq\_post, iraq, leak, alito)

factindex Fact index (iraqdead, libby, meirs)

cells Strata indicator

dateoperator Surveyor/date indicator

voted2006gVoted 2006 - Administrative state voting datavoted2005gVoted 2005 - Administrative state voting datavoted2004gVoted 2004 - Administrative state voting datavoted2003gVoted 2003 - Administrative state voting datavoted2002gVoted 2002 - Administrative state voting datavoted2001gVoted 2001 - Administrative state voting datavoted2000gVoted 2000 - Administrative state voting data

treatmentn Experimental treatment (control,post or times) - numeric

MBfemale Female, missing

Mreportedage Age of respondent, missing

MBvoted2004 Self-report voted in 2004 general election, missing MBvoted2002 Self-report voted in 2002 general election, missing MBvoted2001 Self-report voted in 2001 general election, missing

MBconsumer Respondent drawn from consumer database sample frame, missing

MBgetsmag Subscribes to any news or political magazine, missing

MBpreferdem Prefers the Democratic candidate for gubernatorial election, missing MBpreferrepub Prefers the Republican candidate for gubernatorial election, missing

MBprefernoone No stated preference for gubernatorial election, missing

Mwave2 wave2, missing

MZBfemale Female, missing coded as zero

MZreportedage Age of respondent, missing coded as zero

MZBvoted2004 Self-report voted in 2004 general election, missing coded as zero
MZBvoted2002 Self-report voted in 2002 general election, missing coded as zero
MZBvoted2001 Self-report voted in 2001 general election, missing coded as zero

MZBconsumer Respondent drawn from consumer database sample frame, missing coded as zer

MZBgetsmag Subscribes to any news or pol magazine, missing coded as zero

MZBpreferdem Prefers the Democratic candidate for gubernatorial election, missing coded as ze MZBpreferrepub Prefers the Republican candidate for gubernatorial election, missing coded as ze

Question 1) To replicate the empirical result in Table 3 about the effect of the newspapers on political knowledge and attitudes and Table 4 on voting behavior.

Hint: a) Control variables in each regression include: gender; reported age; three separate indicators for voting in the 2001, 2002, and 2004 general elections; an indicator for whether the respondent was drawn from a consumer list; self-reports of receiving any news or political magazines; baseline survey self-reports of preferring the Democratic candidate in the gubernatorial election and having no preference in the gubernatorial election; and an indicator for the wave of the study. In addition, authors also included the fixed effects of strata indicators and surveyor/date indicators. b) for Panel A of Tables 3 and 4, after running the regression, conduct an F test to test if the coefficient of "post" (Received Post treatment) is the same as that of the variable "time" (Received Times treatment).

Question 2) Now write two paragraphs to describe your replication results of table 3 and 4, please use your own language.

Question 3) suppose we are interested in finding out if the treatment effect of receiving Washington Post on Voted for Democrat (column (4) Panel A in Table 4) is different between male or female, design a new regression to test if it is true. Show your results in a new table (like the authors, you can conceal other results and only report the results on treatments, gender and their interactions).

Question 4) look at your replication result of column (1) in Table 4, whether if age has a significant effect on whether a respondent voted in 2005 election? Now suppose we are interested in finding out whether age has non-linear effect on one's probability to voted in 2005, design a new regression to test if it is true. Show your results in a new table (like the authors, you can conceal other results and only report the results on age).

Question 5) In table 4, authors applied linear probability model for each regression with dummy variable as dependent variable. Now we want to use logit regression to re-run the regressions in Table 4 and report your results in a new table.

2. Abramitzky, Ran, Adeline Delavande, and Luis Vasconcelos. 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3 (3): 124-57.

Marital assortative matching refers to a phenomenon that males and females from the same social class (defined by family background, education and income level etc.) are more likely to marry each other (in Chinese we usually call it "門當戶對"). In this paper, authors are interested in finding out whether the relative population of one gender contributes to marital assortative matching. Authors answer this question by a very smart differences-in-differences design. In French, a lot of young males lost their life during WWI. Therefore, after the war, those regions with a higher wartime mortality rate in the army, authors hypothesize men were more likely to marry women with higher social classes (an indicator of marital assortative matching). The key differences-in-differences variable thus is the interaction term between the dummy variable of post-war period ("post") and the military mortality rate for each region or department in French ("mortality"). The interaction term is titled "post\_mortality" in the data.

Variable Name	Variable Definition
depc	departement code
year	year
post	post war
clgr	groom's class
clbr	bride's class
clfgr	groom's father's class
clfbr	bride's father's class
clmgr	groom's mother's class
clmbr	bride's mother's class
agegr	groom's age
agebr	bride's age
rural	rural
city	city size
secmargr	groom is remarrying
secmarbr	bride is remarrying
mortality	military mortality rate
post_mortality	post war * military mortality rate
sr	sex ratio (#males 18-59/#females 15-49)
sr_39	sex ratio (#males/#females, ages 15-39)
sr_49	sex ratio (#males/#females, ages 15-49)
fdgr	groom's father is dead
mdgr	groom's mother is dead
fdbr	bride's father is dead
mdbr	bride's mother is dead
classdiff	class difference
mardn	married down
lowbr	low class bride
agebrd	bride's age(/100)
agegrd	bride's age(/100)

Question 1) To replicate the empirical result in Table 3 in the paper.

Hint: a) Control variables in each regression include: Rural, bride's age (/100), groom's age (/100), the fixed effects of groom class and department.

Question 2) Now write a paragraph to describe your replication results of table 3, do the results confirm author's hypothesis? Please use your own language to describe.

Question 3) For typical differences-in-differences design using the interaction term, authors should also control for the main effects of both "post" and "mortality" variables. Why did the authors exclude the "mortality" variable in each regression in Table 3? Please answer.

Question 4) Now let us confirm if the parallel time trend assumption of differences-in-differences can be satisfied in authors' setting. Now divide all the observations by high or low mortality rate (>15.037 [the mean of mortality] or <= 15.037), and then calculate the proportion of individuals that were married down by year for the high and low mortality groups. The last step is to draw a line plot on the pertinent proportions by year with two lines corresponding to high and low mortality groups. Are these two lines parallel to each other pre-war (before 1918)?

Question 4) Now suppose you want to once for all take care of the parallel time trend assumption, how can you modify the regression to solve it? (Hint: utilize the department dummies and year variables)

Question 5) In table 3, authors applied linear probability model for each regression with dummy variable as dependent variable. Now we want to use probit regression to re-run the regressions in Table 3 and report your result in a new table.

### 3. Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. Have you watched the movie "dying to survive" (我不是藥神) two years ago? The movie is somewhat related to this topic. Every year countries such as Brazil, Thailand, and India have used this policy to procure life-saving drugs for millions of patients, who otherwise cannot pay for the original drugs produced by the patent-holders. However, in the policy realm, the compulsory licensing is a very controversial policy, some opponents to the policy raise concerns that compulsory licensing may discourage invention by the patent holder firms as well since most of the products produced under compulsory licensing are sold under market price. In this paper, authors analyze the welfare effect of this policy from a new perspective: whether compulsory licensing can also increase or discourage domestic invention. After World War I, the US Congress passed the "Trading with the Enemy Act", allowing US firms to violate enemyowned patents if they contributed to the war effort. After some amendment, by February 1919, all German-owned patents were systematically licensed to US firms, a de facto compulsory licensing to all those patents owned by German in other words. Authors try to test if the effect of this policy treatment will increase or decrease the invention in the same subclass of those German-owned patents, a typically differences-in-differences research design. The treatment variable "treat" in the data is the interaction term of the dummy variable indicating the pertinent subclass has at least one license (the "licensed class" variable) and the dummy variable of post-1919 (the "post-1919 dummy").

Variable Name	Variable Definition
uspto_class	subclass of patent (text)
grntyr	year of patent granted
count_usa	number of patents by the US inventors
count_france	number of patents by the France inventors
count_germany	number of patents by the Germany inventors
count	number of patents
count_for	number of patents by foreign inventors
count_for_2	number of patents by foreign inventors squared
count_noger	numberf of patents by the non-Germany inventors
count_for_noger	numberf of patents by the non-Germany foreign inventors
main	first half of subclass id (text)
subcl	second half of subclass id (text)
year_conf	remaining lifetime of licensed patents
year_conf_2	remaining lifetime of licensed patents squared (*100)
count_cl	number of licenses
count_cl_2	number of licenses squared
licensed_class	subclass has at least one Germany license
confiscated_class	number of confiscated patents in class
class_id	subclass of patent
treat	(subclass has at least one Germany license)*post-1919
year_conf_itt	remaining lifetime of enemy patents
count_cl_itt	number of enemy patents
post	post-1919 dummy

Question 1) To replicate the empirical result in Table 2 in the paper.

Hint: a) Control variables in each regression include: the fixed effects of the year (of the patent granted) and subclass.

Question 2) Now write a paragraph to describe your replication results of table 2, do the results confirm the author's hypothesis? Please use your own language to describe.

Question 3) Now let us confirm if the parallel time trend assumption of differences-in-differences can be satisfied in the authors' setting. Now draw a line plot on the average number of patents by the US inventors by year with two lines corresponding to treatment and control groups ("licensed\_class"=1 for the treatment group, and "licensed\_class"=0 for the control group). Are these two lines parallel to each other pre-war (before 1918)?

Question 4) Now suppose you want to once for all take care of the parallel time trend assumption, how can you modify the regression to solve it? (Hint: utilize the subclass dummies and year variables)

Question 5) Given the "Trading with the Enemy Act" gives licenses for all German-owned patents to the US firms, it may discourage patent application for Germany firms in the US patent office. Check if this is true to replace the dependent variable in Table 2 using the numbers of patents by Germany inventors (the "count\_germany" variable). Report your result in a new table and describe it.

\*Question 6) (optional) Now replicate the regressions using an instrumental variable approach in Table 4.

For this optional question, you can get an extra 20% of scores on top of the full mark for the first five questions.

### Group B

1. Rose, Andrew, K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review*, 94 (1): 98-114.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) may be one of the most important international organization aiming to promote free trade. However, does the membership to WTO really promote trade? The author tries to answer this question using a large panel data of bilateral merchandise trade between 175 countries over 50 years. In addition to the WTO, the author also examines whether its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) has a positive effect on promoting trade between two countries.

Variable Name	Variable Definition
cty1	IFS Country Code 1
cty2	IFS Country Code 2
year	Year
pairid	Unique Country-Pair Identifier
landl	# Landlocked 0/1/2
island	# Islands 0/1/2
border	Land Border Dummy
comlang	1 for Common Language
comcol	Dummy for Common Colonizer post 1945
comctry	Dummy for Same Nation/Perennial Colonies
colony	Dummy for pairs ever in Colonial Relationship
curcol	Dummy for pairs currently in Colonial Relationship
custrict	Strict Currency Union
ltrade	Log Value of Bilateral Trade in Real \$
averltrade	Mean of Log value of bilateral trade in each year
above_average	A dummy of trade value above yearly average
regional	RTA Dummy
lareap	Log of Product of Land Areas
ldist	Log of Distance
lrgdp	Log of Product of Real GDPs
lrgdppc	Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita
rta	RTA: EU(1) usis(2) nfta(3) crcm(4) ptcr(5) anzd(6) ccm(7) mrc(8)
sasia1	South Asian Dummy
ssafr1	Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy
easia1	East Asian Dummy
highi1	High Income Dummy
latca1	Latin-Caribbean Dummy
least1	Least Developed Dummy
lowin1	Low Income Dummy
menaf1	Middle East and North African Dummy
midin1	Middle Income Dummy
sasia2	South Asian Dummy
ssafr2	Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy
easia2	East Asian Dummy
highi2	High Income Dummy

latca2 Latin-Caribbean Dummy least2 Least Developed Dummy lowin2 Low Income Dummy

menaf2 Middle East and North African Dummy

midin2 Middle Income Dummy carib1 Caribbean dummy carib2 Caribbean dummy

join1 Date of GATT/WTO accession (-999 2002 observer; 10000

never)

join2 Date of GATT/WTO accession (-999 2002 observer; 10000

never)

onein One country in GATT/WTO
bothin Both countries in GATT/WTO
nonein Neither country in GATT/WTO
found1 One founding GATT member
found2 Both founding GATT members
years1 Years inside GATT/WTO
years2 Years inside GATT/WTO

minyrs Minimum years in GATT/WTO maxyrs Maximum years in GATT/WTO

**GSP Dummy** gsp ecd Dummy for EC/EU **Dummy for USIS** usi **Dummy for NAFTA** naf **Dummy for CARICOM** car **Dummy for PATCRA** pat **Dummy for ANZD** anz **Dummy for CACM** cac

mer Dummy for MERCOSUR ase Dummy for ASEAN spr Dummy for SPARTECA

cty1name Name for Country 1 in the pair cty2name Name for Country 2 in the pair

Question 1) To replicate the empirical result in Table 1 about the effect of the GATT/WTO membership on bilateral trade between two countries.

Hint: a) Apart from the control variables reports in each column, all four regressions in Table 1 also add the year fixed effects. b) all regressions use robust standard errors and clustering by county pairs (the "pairid" variable). c) for column (2) to exclude all the industrial countries, we need to exclude those observations with IFS country code less than 200 (cty1<200 & cty2<200), see footnote 16 on p. 104 for detail. D) for column (4) to add the fixed effects for country 1 and country 2 (using the variables "cty1" and "cty2").

Question 2) Now write a paragraph to describe your replication results of table 1. Does joining the WTO help a country's trade with others? Please use your own language to illustrate.

Question 3) suppose we are interested in a test that if the treatment effect of GATT/WTO membership is significant for country pairs speaking a common language (the "comlang" variable), but not for country pairs speaking different languages. Design a new regression to test if it is true. Show your results in a new table.

Question 4) The data used in this paper is a panel data of country pairs over time. In other words, the cross-sectional variation is at country pair level while time variation at the year level. So we can use a two-way fixed effects model to estimate the effect of GATT/WTO membership, controlling for both the fixed effects of country pair (using the "pairid" variable) and the fixed effects of the year (now the model only use one-way fixed effects. Now apply the two-way fixed effects to the model. Show your results in a new table and compare it with those in original Table 1. Explain what kind of change it brings by adding the country pair fixed effects. Also, do you find some variables automatically drop in the estimation? If yes, which variables and why?

Question 5) Now suppose we concern more about the relative size of trade instead of the absolute size. We generate a new dummy variable "above average" which equals to 1 if the log value of bilateral trade between country i and j is larger than the yearly average in year t (if ltrade>=averltrade) and otherwise o (if ltrade<averltrade). Now use the same sample, control variables, and specification as column (1) in Table 1, replace the dependent variable "above average" as a dependent variable to run the regression. Use both linear probability model, Probit and Logit model for the new regressions. Show your results in a new table.

2. Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael), and Feng Zhu. 2011. "Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia." *American Economic Review*, 101 (4): 1601-15.

Today many public goods on the Internet are provided to users for free, many of which rely entirely on free user contributions. Taking Wikipedia as an example, as a free online encyclopedia, Wikipedia relies on volunteer contributors around the world to created and edited content. It is an interesting question, then whether the size of the user of a platform could change the incentive for users to contribute. Authors utilize the shock event of the block of Chinese Wikipedia in mainland China in October 2005 as a natural experiment to test if the content contribution decrease as a result of the block event. During the block, mainland Chinese could not use or contribute to Chinese Wikipedia, while contributors outside mainland China can still use and contribute; naturally, this causes a dramatic decrease of users of the platform. Authors then test if the contribution levels of the nonblocked contributors also decrease within several weeks of the event.

You can find the variable list and definition to each variable below:

Variable Name	Variable Definition
date	calendar date
id	Registered contributor ID
Addition	Total number of characters added
Deletion	Total number of characters deleted
Total	Total number of characters added and deleted
joindate	Date of joining Wiki for the contributor
lastdate	Date of the last editing of the contributor
nonblocked	Dummy of nonblocked contributor
overseas	Dummy of oversea IP
week	week before/since the block event
id_week	week before/since the block event (text)
weekly_Addition	Weekly total number of characters added
weekly_Deletion	Weekly total number of characters deleted
age	Age
agesqr	age squared
logAddition	Log of (weekly total number of characters added + 1)
logDeletion	Log of (weekly total number of characters deleted + 1)
logTotal	Log of (weekly total number of characters added and deleted +1)
after	AfterBlock
social_participation	Log of (weekly average of total addition and deletion in user
:0n-1-1	pages or user-talk pages before the block +1)
ifTotal	Dummy to indicate if the weekly total number of character add and delete is larger than zero
	and defete is larger than zero

Question 1) To replicate the empirical result in Table 2 in the paper.

Hint: a) columns (1) to (3) use OLS estimate with only AfterBlock, Age and Age Squared as a regressor, while columns (4) to (6) add contributor's fixed effects. b) all regressions use robust standard errors. c) restrict the observations to 4 weeks prior and after the block event and exclude the week zero (week >= -4 & week!=0).

Question 2) To further examine the impact of social effects, authors use a differences-in-differences design, in which they further distinguish contributors' participation in social communication. They use the contributors' weekly average contribution to the user pages and user-talk pages—both of which are designed to facilitate communication between contributor in Wikipedia—prior to the block event to construct a measure of average social participation of each contributor. Then authors use the interaction term between the AfterBlock dummy and the measure of social participation pre-block as the differences-in-differences variable in Table 3. Now replicate the results in Table 3 and write a paragraph to describe your replication results of table 3. Do the results suppose the authors' hypothesis that group size matter to the user's free contributions? Please use your own language to illustrate.

Question 3) For an alternative differences-in-differences design using the interaction term, authors can also use the fixed effects of the contributor and the fixed effects of the week to replace the AfterBlock dummy and SocialParticipation variable. Now try to add the fixed effects of the week to re-run the results in columns (4) to (6). Show your results in a new table. How do the results change? Do you prefer to keep the AfterBlock dummy? Why?

Question 4) Now suppose we have a hypothesis that the treatment effect of the block event is driven by the contributor from oversea IP. Now use the triple interaction terms between the "oversea" dummy variable and our differences-in-differences variable using the specification in columns (4) to (6) in Table 3. Show your results in a new table. What do the results tell us about this hypothesis?

Question 5) Now suppose we concern more about whether the non-block contributors contribute after the event instead of how much they contribute. We generate a new dummy variable "ifTotal" which equals to 1 if the weekly total number of character add and delete is larger than zero for contributor i in week t (if weekly\_Addition+weekly\_Deletion>0) and otherwise 0 (if weekly\_Addition+weekly\_Deletion==0). Now use the same sample, control variables, and specification as column (4) in Table 3, replace the dependent variable "ifTotal" as a dependent variable to run the regression. Use both linear probability model, Probit and Logit model for the new regressions. Show your results in a new table.

3. Imai, Masami, and Seitaro Takarabe. 2011. "Bank Integration and Transmission of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Japan." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 3 (1): 155-83.

In a major financial crisis, the large nationwide banks were often the troublemakers, take the Lehman Brothers in 2008 Financial Crisis as an example. One the one hand, some believe the geographical diversified, big banks are more resilient to crisis or in other words, are "too big to fall" compared to the regional, small-size banks. On the other hand, some argue these nationwide operated big banks often play the role of an active transmitter of the bad debt during the crisis. To investigate whether the banking integration (a jargon to describe to what extent the banks operate in a region are more geographical diversified big banks while in contrast, the banks operate in a region are predominantly small-sized regional banks) has a significant effect in transmitting the financial shocks across regions during the financial crisis, the authors use the collapse of the real estate bubble in 80s Japan as a case study. Specifically, authors examine whether the effect of land price drop (an indicator of bubble bust) has a larger effect on debt and GDP in the prefectures with a more integrated banking system.

In Japan, there are roughly two types of bank, the big, city banks which have bank branches in many different prefectures, and the small, regional banks that often operate only in one prefecture. Thus, the authors use the proportion of city bank branches to total bank branches in a prefecture as a measure of bank integration in a given prefecture.

Variable Name	Variable Definition
name	Prefecture Name
	Prefecture ID
prefid	
year	Year
GDP averGDP	GDP Growth
	Average GDP growth rate at each year A dummy of GDP growth rate above yearly average
above_average LOAN	Loan Growth
gloan_city2	LOAN (City Bank)
gland	Local Land Price
cityshare1	City Bank Share
share_gland_city	City Land Price*City Bank Share
shareo_gland_city	City Land Price*City Bank Share (1979)
dist_closestcity	Distance to Nearest Major City
dist_gland_city	Distance*City Land Price
diff_gpc_gland_city	Income Diff*City Land Price
citybank_diff_city	Income Diff*City Bank Share
citybank_dist_city	Distance*City Bank Share
City_industry_shock	Industry Mix Control (Output)
gloan_noncity2	LOAN (Non-City Bank)
citysharedep	City Bank Share
sharedep_gland_city	City Land Price*City Bank Share
sharedepo_gland_city	City Land Price*City Bank Share
cit~p_dist_city	Distance*City Bank Share
cit~p_diff_city	Income Diff*City Bank Share
mean_diff_gpc_city	Income Difference

Question 1) To replicate the OLS results (columns (1) to (4) in Panel A) in Table 1 in the paper.

Hint: a) each regression controls for the two-way fixed effects of the prefecture (denoting the "prefid" variable) and year. b) use the robust standard errors for all regression.

Question 2) Now write a paragraph to describe your replication results of table 1, do the results confirm the author's hypothesis? Please use your own language to describe.

Question 3) Suppose we now concern that the variable of city bank share may be endogeneous to GDP growth rate, in other words, after the real estate bubble bust, some banks had gone bankrupt which may change the city bank share in a prefecture, a reverse causality problem. Therefore, instead of using city bank share in each prefecture i at each year t, we use the city bank share in each prefecture i at 1979 prior to the crisis to construct the interaction term. Now re-run the columns (2) and (3) in Table 1, Panel A and report your results in a new table. Now compare the coefficients in original columns (2) and (3) with those in the new regressions, what do the results tell you about the reverse causality? Do you think the new measures give you more robust results?

Question 4) Now use the specification in column (3) of Panel A, Table 1 to generate three new regressions results: first one to remove the fixed effects of year, the second one to remove the prefecture fixed effects, and then third to remove both fixed effects. Show your results in a new table. Now compare the coefficients of the interaction term in each of the new regression with the result of the original column (3). What do the differences tell you? How does it bias our results to remove each or both of the fixed effects?

Question 5) Now suppose we concern more about the relative growth rate of GDP instead of the actual growth rate. We generate a new dummy variable "above average" which equals to 1 if the GDP growth i is larger than the yearly average of GDP growth rate among prefectures in year t (if GDP>=averGDP) and otherwise o (if GDP<averGDP). Now use the same sample, control variables, and specification as column (3) in Table 1, replace the dependent variable "above average" as a dependent variable to run the regression. Use both linear probability model, Probit and Logit model for the new regressions. Show your results in a new table.

\*Question 6) (optional) Now replicate the regressions using an instrumental variable approach in columns (5) and (6) in Panel A and Panel B of Table 1.

For this optional question, you can get an extra 20% of scores on top of the full mark for the first five questions.