

Week1

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1 Examples

1.1 Duopoly

$$x_1(p_1, p_2) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p_2 < p_1 \\ x(p_1) & \text{if } p_1 < p_2 \\ x(p_2)/2 & \text{if } p_1 = p_2 \end{cases}$$

$\max(p_1 x(p_1, p_2))$ for p_1

1.2 Auctions

values known to only agents and no sharing of information

places bids

highest bid wins

model:

$1, 2, 3, \dots, N$

$v_1, v_2, v_3, \dots, v_N \rightarrow \text{values}$

$b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots, b_N \rightarrow \text{bids}$

max bidden value wins

$\rightarrow b_1^* = \max(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_N)$

but has to pay second max bid

$\hat{b}^* \rightarrow$ second best bid

1.3 NCG

$N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\} \rightarrow$ set of players

$S = \{S_{i,i \in N}\} \rightarrow$ set of actions

$U = \{U_{i,i \in N}\} \rightarrow$ set of utilities

$U_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \forall a_i \in S_i, a_{-i} \in S_{-i} = S_1 \times S_2 \times \dots \times S_{i+1} \dots$

For 2 players: $N = 2$

$$U_1(a_1, a_{-1}) = \begin{cases} -C & a_1 = 1 \& a_{-1} \in S_{-i} \\ x(p_1) & a_1 = 2 \& a_{-1} \in S_{-i} \\ x(p_2)/2 & a_2 = 2 \end{cases}$$

For N players: $N = N$

$$U_1(a_1, a_{-1}) = \begin{cases} -C & a_1 = 1 \& a_{-1} \in S_{-i} \\ -\frac{n_2(a_{-i})+1}{N} & a_1 = 2 \& a_{-1} \in S_{-i} \end{cases}$$

1.4 Hotelling Game

$$N = \{H_1, H_2\}$$

$$S_1 = S_2$$

People are lazy, will try to go to the nearest hotel

$$U_1(a_1, a_{-1}) = \begin{cases} \frac{a_1 + a_{-1}}{2} & a_1 < a_{-1} \\ 0 & a_1 = a_{-1} \\ L - \frac{a_1 + a_{-1}}{2} & a_1 > a_{-1} \end{cases}$$

- Order of decisions
- Best Response

BR \rightarrow BEST Response

$$BR_i(a_{-i}) = \arg \max_{a_i} U_i(a_i, a_{-i})$$

Situations where players don't know each other's actions

Best strategy is to anticipate i.e. assume $a_{-i} = \tilde{a}$

Then, play $BR_i = BR_i(\tilde{a})$

1.5 Free Riding

- Simultaneous move games (assumption)

eg. N people in area, decide whether to participate in a cleaning activity or not

- n_p participates
- Every person who participates gets a negative utility of $-v$
- Everybody in area gets positive reward of $g(n_p)$

Num of people participated,

$$n_p(a_{-i}) = \sum_{j \neq i}^N 1_{a_j=1} = \sum_{j \neq i} a_j$$

Utility:

$$U_1(a_i, a_{-i}) = -a_i \cdot v + g(n_p(a_{-i}) + a_i)$$

2 Week2

2.1

Prove that all Dominant Eqm are Nash Eqm