Paper Review:

Contingent Thinking and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory

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There is an urn with 90 balls, 30 of which are red (R) and 60 of which are yellow (Y) or blue (B), and one ball is selected from the urn and its color is used to determine the payoff.

Now subjects have two payoff options:

$$f = \begin{cases} 10 & if R & or B \\ 0 & if Y \end{cases} \qquad g = \begin{cases} 10 & if Y & or B \\ 0 & if R \end{cases}$$

Majority of people will prefer g over f.

- Now we consider "Sure-Thing Principal(STP)". Suppose $\Omega = \{All\ Possible\ States\}, \Omega = A \cup A^c$, if $g \gtrsim f$ if state $\subseteq A$ and $g \gtrsim f$ if state $\subseteq A^c$, then choosing f.
- Add a further constrain, such preference should not depend on specific payoff, then we have *Savage's P2 as Separability (SEP)*.

Now,			1	4	A^c
f' =			\widetilde{R}	\sum_{Y}	$\widehat{\mathbf{B}}$
	Question 1	f	\$10	\$0	\$10
		g	\$0	\$10	\$10
	Question 2	f'	\$10	\$0	\$0
		g'	\$0	\$10	\$0

Figure 1: Example - Ellsberg problem (ELLS)

- Majority of people prefer g over f at Q1 but prefer f' over g' at Q2.
- Economist attributed the violation of SEP to non-standard preference.
- Psychologists(Nickerson, 2015) argued that hypothetical (contingent) thinking is challenging (i.e. people may have difficulty putting themselves in situations that have not occurred). (i.e. STP fails)

Five Problems

- Ellsberg(ELLS) The violation of SEP.
- Common-Consequence Allais(CC ALLAIS) The violation of SEP.
- Auction(AUCT) The violation of dominance.
- Common-Value Election(ELECT) the violation of dominance.
- Common-Ratio Allais(CR ALLAIS) the violation of dominance.

Experimental Design

• Conduct two treatments in every problem:

Noncontingent treatment

Contingent treatment – ask subject to think in hypothetical way.

• Two effects:

Highlighting the payoff structure of the problem.

Asking subjects to put themselves in hypothetical position.

Treatments

Between-subjects design





Figure 4: Experimental design and tests of STP, SEP, and C-SEP. Unity inform subjects of payoff structure.






Figure 7: Within design: summary of results

Results

	ELLS	CC ALLAIS	AUCT	ELECT	CR ALLAIS	
ELLS		560 . 482 **	006060	.111030	.298 . 086	
CC ALLAIS			.254070	250 . 047	248 . 692 ***	
AUCT				.198* . 419 ***	.006 .415***	
ELECT					429 . 389 **	
CR ALLAIS		_				

Table 1: Correlations across problems


Results

- Recall: Conti
- Auxiliary(Au not asking su

Treatment

of observations

p-value Aux v. C



problem but position.

Figure 8: Aux frame vs. contingent & noncontingent frames

Conclusion

• The failure of SEP and DOM(Classic Anomalies) can be attributed to failure of contingent thinking (STP fails).

Possible Reasons:

- People have difficulty with contingent thinking
- Prefer not to engage with contingent thinking

	ELLS		CC ALLAIS		AUCT		ELECT		CR ALLAIS	
	Benchmark	All								
% Always Cons	26.9	23.7	42.9	46.2	47.9	49.6	13.4	24.1	51.3	47.5
$% Cons \rightarrow NOT$	16.8	16.5	21.0	13.7	10.9	11.3	2.5	2.6	10.9	14.1
% NOT → Cons	35.3	35.0	22.7	25.5	21.9	23.0	24.4	19.4	25.2	25.2
% Always NOT	21.0	24.9	13.5	14.6	19.3	16.1	59.7	53.8	12.6	13.2
% fail SEP or DOM	56.3	59.8	36.1	41.7	41.2	39.2	84.0	73.2	37.8	38.4
% fail C-SEP or C-DOM	37.8	41.3	34.4	28.3	30.2	27.4	62.2	56.4	23.5	27.3
p-value	.001	.000	.762	.001	.049	.000	.000	.000	.010	.000
% fail STP	66.4	69.9	49.6	49.9	32.8	34.3	26.9	22.1	31.9	36.1
$q_{C I}$.63	.58	.63	.64	.53	.58	.29	.27	.67	.66
$q_{I C}$.38	.42	.33	.23	.19	.19	.16	.09	.18	.23
p-value	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.294	.003	.000	.000

Table 12: All problems: Within and within+ designs

Append




Figure 19: WithinCNC design: summary of results

CC ALLAIS

• There is an 89 are B. It million for and \$100 n f', which g gives \$500 significant (risky optic




Figure 2: CC ALLAIS

are Y, and gives \$100 ll is yellow ose between and g', which at a 1 and g'

AUCT

• Consider a the second other bidd bid amour integer bid an outside

		$A \longrightarrow A^c$		
		\$4.50	\$0.50	\$8.50
Quest.*	f	\$3	\$3	\$3
	g	\$1	\$1	\$1
Quest. 1	f'	\$3	\$5	\$3
	g'	\$1	\$5	\$3

nd pays the bid of subject and one equally likely to choose an the auction and


(a) AUCT

Common Value There is an urn randomly draw \$5 \$5 (w), both comp Quest.* computers vote \$0 \$0 gcolor of the dra-\$5 \$5 choose between Quest. 1 \$5 \$0 chosen by the 1 gets \$5; otherw (b) ELECT

s, and one ball is drawn ball is white vn ball is black (b), t observing either the ers, the subject must 'hite. If the color awn ball, the subject

Common-Rati

- There is a jar Question 1 (1) yellow, and { \$4 if the drav it is red. In C subject must option that g
- x is a lottery \$5.30 with p pays \$0 for s



70 questions, s 12 red, 3 ption that gives gives \$5.30 if alls. The r sure and an

that gives is a lottery that

		ئـــہ	A^c	
		R (1)	Y (10)	B (89)
0	f	\$100m	\$100m	\$100m
Question 1	\boldsymbol{g}	\$0	\$500m	\$100m
Question 2	f'	\$100m	\$100m	\$0
Question 2	g'	\$0	\$500m	\$0

Figure 2: CC ALLAIS

		$\stackrel{A}{\rightleftharpoons}$	\mathbf{I}^c			
		\$4.50	\$0.50	\$8.50		
O*	f	\$3	\$3	\$3		
Quest.*	\boldsymbol{g}	\$1	\$1	\$1		
0	f'	\$3	\$5	\$3		
Quest. 1	g'	\$1	\$5	\$3		
(a) AUCT						

Quest.2
$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} & RY & B \\ f & x & x \\ \hline g & y & y \\ \hline Quest. 1 & f' & x & \$0 \\ g' & y & \$0 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

