**Supplementary Information**

Table S1 Frequency Statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Condition | Age group | Trials indicating possibility | Trials indicating impossibility | Percentage |
| No Evidence | 5-6 group | 72 | 8 | 90% |
| No Evidence | 7-8 group | 73 | 7 | 91.3% |
| No Evidence | Adults | 65 | 15 | 81.3 % |
| Counterevidence | 5-6 group | 76 | 2 | 97.4% |
| Counterevidence | 7-8 group | 75 | 4 | 94.9% |
| Counterevidence | Adults | 72 | 8 | 90% |
| Strong Evidence | 5-6 group | 35 | 42 | 45.5% |
| Strong Evidence | 7-8 group | 34 | 44 | 43.6% |
| Strong Evidence | Adults | 28 | 52 | 35% |

Table S2 Frequency Statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Condition | Age group | Trials indicating possibility | Trials indicating impossibility | Percentage |
| Opinion | 5-6 group | 72 | 8 | 90% |
| Opinion | 7-8 group | 76 | 4 | 95% |
| Opinion | Adults | 70 | 10 | 87.5% |
| Immoral | 5-6 group | 73 | 5 | 93% |
| Immoral | 7-8 group | 80 | 0 | 100% |
| Immoral | Adults | 68 | 12 | 85% |
| Moral | 5-6 group | 25 | 50 | 33% |
| Moral | 7-8 group | 34 | 46 | 42.5% |
| Moral | Adults | 47 | 33 | 58.8% |

**Study 1 – Description of the statistical analysis**

We used logistic Generalized Linear Mixed Models fitted via maximum likelihood (GLMMs; Baayen, 2008). We used the statistical program R with the function *glmer* from the package *lme4* (Bates, Maechler, and Bolker, 2012). *Possibility* was the binary response term (0 = belief/action is not possible, 1 = belief/action is possible). Thus, we used a logit link function. All statistical models were fitted with bound optimization by quadratic approximation (BOBYQA optimization;

Powell, 2009).

In the first model we fitted, we analyzed only the trials of the belief conditions (without the action conditions). The full model contained the main predictors *condition* (No Evidence, Counterevidence, Strong Evidence) and *age group* (5-6-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds, adults). To control for effects across trials within a participant, we included the random intercept *individual identity* with the random slope of *trial number* (z-transformed) and *condition* (manually dummy coded). The correlations of the random effects in the model were unidentifiable, so we excluded them from the model (indicated by ||). We also fitted a null model that contained only the random intercept and random slope. Below were our model equations:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Logistic GLMM Full Model | Belief is possible (*yes/no*) -  Evidence condition (*no evidence/counterevidence/strong evidence*) \*  Age group (*5-6-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds, adults)* +  (1 + Trial z-transformed + Condition manually dummy-coded || ID),  family=binomial *logit-link* |

Next, we checked for the assumption of the absence of collinearity. Generalized variance inflation factors (vif) were derived using the function *vif* of the R package *car* (Fox & Weisberg, 2011) applied to a standard linear model excluding the random effects. This suggested that collinearity was not an issue (largest vif = 1.01). We further checked the distribution of random effects visually, which fulfilled the assumption to be normally distributed. To estimate model stability, we excluded the levels of random effects one at a time and compared the resulting estimates with those obtained from the model based on all data. All estimates can be seen as being stable.

We first tested the overall effect of the test predictors. The full model’s deviance was compared to that of the null model. The full model (see Table S3) was a significantly better fit than the null model, χ2 (8, N=120) = 117.49, *p* < .001. To determine the effects of the interaction we further compared the full model with a reduced model that lacked the predictor of interest. We found no significant interaction effect between condition and age group, χ2 (4, N=120) = .90, *p* = .92.

We then fitted a new model that contained only the main effects of condition and age group and the same random effect structure as the other models. To determine the effects of the main predictors, we again compared this model to respective reduced models lacking the predictor of interest. This revealed a significant main effect of condition, χ2 (2, N=120) = 111.13, *p* < .001, such that judgments of possibility depended on whether the belief was backed by no evidence, contradicted by evidence, or supported by strong evidence. There was no effect of age group, χ2 (2, N=120) = 4.19, *p* = .123. Confidence intervals were derived from the function *emmeans* (Lenth, 2018) and are depicted in Figure S1.

Because we found an effect of condition, we performed pairwise comparisons using the emmeans package Lenth et al., 2020), which conducts pairwise comparisons with the Tukey method. Results of these comparisons are shown in Table S4.

Table S3 - *Model output for the full model of Study 1: Estimates, standard errors (SE), and likelihood ratio test output for the single effects*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | estimates | SE | *χ*2 | *df* | *p* |
| (Intercept) | 3.222 | .66 |  |  |  |
| Condition |  |  | 111.125 | 2 | <.001 |
| Counterevidence(1) | 2.072 | 1.039 |  |  |  |
| Strong evidence(1) | -3.604 | .753 |  |  |  |
| Age group |  |  | 4.191 | 2 | .123 |
| 7-8-year-olds(1) | .242 | .775 |  |  |  |
| adults(1) | -.870 | .718 |  |  |  |
| Condition\*Age group |  |  | 0.901 | 4 | .924 |
| Counterevidence : 7-8-year-olds(1) | -.933 | 1.319 |  |  |  |
| Counterevidence : adults(1) | -.693 | .879 |  |  |  |
| Strong evidence : 7-8-year-olds(1) | -.397 | 1.219 |  |  |  |
| Strong evidence : adults(1) | .133 | .830 |  |  |  |

*Note.*

(1) Factors were dummy coded and had the following reference levels: Condition: No evidence, Age group: 5-6-year-olds; the estimates for the single predictors indicate the change from the response when the predictor changes from the reference level to the in parentheses indicated level of the predictor.

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*Figure S1.* Estimates and 95% confidence intervals (derived from the function *emmeans*, Lenth, 2018)

Finally, we compared the belief conditions to the action conditions. Therefore, we fitted additional models containing one belief condition and one action condition at the time. These models contained the predictors Condition and Age group as well as the random intercept individual identity with the random slope of Condition. Results of these comparisons are shown in Table S5.

**Table S4**

*Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons of the Belief Conditions*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Condition comparison | *p-*value |
| *No Evidence / Strong Evidence* | <.001\* |
| *Counterevidence / Strong Evidence* | <.001\* |
| *No Evidence / Counterevidence* | .022\* |

**Table S5**

*Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons of Action-Belief Condition Comparisons*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Condition comparison | *p-*value |
| *Possible Action / No Evidence* | .388 |
| *Impossible Action / No Evidence* | <.001\* |
| *Possible Action / Counterevidence* | .854 |
| *Impossible Action / Counterevidence* | <.001\* |
| *Possible Action / Strong Evidence* | <.001\* |
| *Impossible Action / Strong Evidence* | <.001\* |

**Study 2 – Description of the statistical analysis**

As for Study 1, we first analyzed only the belief conditions with the predictors *condition* (Opinion, Immoral, Moral) and *age group (*5-6-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds, adults) and the random effect of *individual identity* with the random slope of *trial* and *condition* (the correlations between random intercept and random slope were removed). The estimates of the model could not be calculated for the original data because of complete separation issues (Field, 2005) due to all 7-8-year-olds answering the same (1 = yes) in the Immoral condition. Therefore, one at a time each trial indicating 1 in this condition was replaced by a 0, and every time a separate full model, a null model, and the respective reduced models were fitted. This led to models with minimal confidence intervals and highly overestimated effects. Thus, we reduced model complexity by dropping the random slopes from the model and repeating the procedure. For each full model, we checked for the assumption of the absence of collinearity, which was not an issue (largest vif = 1.01).

To test the overall effect of all the predictors, we performed a full-null model comparison for each iteration. On average, the full model (see Table S6) was a significantly better fit than the null model, χ2 (8, N=120) = 263.82, *p* < .001. To determine the effects of the effects of the interaction and the main effects, we compared the full model with the respective reduced models that lacked the predictor of interest. We did this for each iteration. Across all iterations, we found a significant interaction effect between condition and age group (on average: χ2 (4, N=120) = 28.60, *p* < .001), and a main effect of condition, χ2 (2, N=120) = 233.79, *p* < .001, such that judgments of possibility depended on whether the belief was an opinion, an immoral belief, or a moral belief. There was no significant main effect of age group, χ2 (2, N=120) = 1.84, *p* = .398. Confidence intervals were derived from the function *emmeans* (Lenth, 2018) and are depicted in Figure S2.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Logistic GLMM Full Model | Belief is possible (*yes/no*) ~  Moral condition (*opinion/immoral/moral*) \*  Age group (*5-6-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds, adults)* +  (1 | ID), family=binomial *logit-link* |



*Figure S2.* Estimates and 95% confidence intervals (derived from the function *emmeans*, Lenth, 2018)

Because we found an interaction effect of condition and age group, we performed further post hoc pairwise comparisons to test for differences across condition and age, as well as their interaction. Significant results of these comparisons are shown in Table S7 and S8.

**Table S7**

*Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons of the Moral-based Belief Conditions*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Condition comparison | *p-*value |
| Opinion / Moral | <.001\* |
| Immoral / Moral | <.001\* |
| Opinion / Immoral | .465 |

**Table S8**

*Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons of Moral-based Belief Conditions Across Age Group*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Condition comparison across age group | *p-*value |
| Moral 5-6-year-olds / Moral 7-8-year-olds | .289 |
| Moral 5-6-year-olds / Moral Adults | <.007\* |
| Moral 7-8-year-olds / Moral Adults | <.076 |

Finally, we used the same procedure as in Study 1 to create models containing both belief and action conditions for condition comparisons and used post-hoc pairwise comparisons to compare the conditions. Due to complete separation issues, a similar procedure as described above was performed for comparisons including the Immoral condition. Results of these comparisons are shown in Table S9.

Table S6 - *Model output for the full model of Study 2: Estimates, standard errors (SE), and likelihood ratio test output for the single effects*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | mean estimates | mean *χ*2 | mean *df* | mean *p* |
| (Intercept) | 3.801 |  |  |  |
| Condition |  | 233.79 | 2 | <.001 |
| Immoral(1) | 0.729 |  |  |  |
| Moral(1) | -5.101 |  |  |  |
| Age group |  | 1.84 | 2 | .398 |
| 7-8-year-olds(1) | 0.926 |  |  |  |
| adults(1) | -0.524 |  |  |  |
| Condition\*Age group |  | 28.60 | 4 | <.001 |
| Immoral : 7-8-year-olds(1) | 0.847 |  |  |  |
| Immoral : adults(1) | -1.029 |  |  |  |
| Moral : 7-8-year-olds(1) | -0.168 |  |  |  |
| Moral : adults(1) | 2.595 |  |  |  |

*Note.*

(1) Factors were dummy coded and had the following reference levels: Condition: Opinion, Age group: 5-6-year-olds; the estimates for the single predictors indicate the change from the response when the predictor changes from the reference level to the in parentheses indicated level of the predictor.

**Table S9**

*Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons of Action-Belief Condition Comparisons*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Condition comparison | *p-*value |
| Possible Action / Opinion | .198 |
| Impossible Action / Opinion | <.001\* |
| Possible Action / Immoral | .966 |
| Impossible Action / Immoral | <.001\* |
| Possible Action / Moral | <.001\* |
| Impossible Action / Moral | <.001\* |

**Study 1 and Study 2 – Condition comparison**

Following a suggestion by a reviewer, we compared Studies 1 and 2. We thereby focused on the most compelling comparison was between the *Strong Evidence Condition* in Study 1 and the *Moral Condition* in Study 2 (especially given there was not enough variance in the other conditions across Study 1 and 2 to compare). We fitted a model that contained the main effects of condition (Strong Evidence, Moral) and age group (5-6-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds, and adults), and their interaction, and the same random effect structure as the other models described above. Next, we checked for the assumption of the absence of collinearity. Generalized variance inflation factors (vif) were derived using the function *vif* of the R package *car* (Fox & Weisberg, 2011) applied to a standard linear model excluding the random effects. This suggested that collinearity was not an issue (largest vif = 1.01). We further checked the distribution of random effects visually, which fulfilled the assumption to be normally distributed. To estimate model stability, we excluded the levels of random effects one at a time and compared the resulting estimates with those obtained from the model based on all data. All estimates can be seen as being stable.

Next, to determine the effects of the main predictors, we again compared this model to reduced models. This revealed a significant interaction effect between condition and age (*p* < .01). Visual inspection of the data indicates that this interaction effect is driven by the absence of an age effect in the *Strong Evidence Condition* and the presence of an age effect in the *Moral Condition* (in this condition children viewed holding alternative beliefs as less possible than adults; see Figures 2 and 4 in the main manuscript).

**Study 1 Fact-based Belief Storylines**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Weather Storyline |
| No Evidence  version | James is at home one morning and wants to go outside and have fun. He hopes the sun is shining so he can swim in his pool. James wonders if it is sunny or rainy. All morning James has been in his bedroom. The bedroom does not have any windows so he cannot see outside. There are no clues for what the weather is like is. James believes it is rainy outside. Instead of believing its rainy outside, could James believe it is sunny? Why do you think so? |
| Counterevidence  version | James is at home one morning and wants to go outside and have fun. He hopes the sun is shining so he can swim in his pool. James wonders if it is sunny or rainy. James goes into the living room. He looks out the big window and sees the sun shining. James feels the warmth of the sun. James believes it is rainy outside. Instead of believing its rainy outside, could James believe it is sunny? Why do you think so? |
| Strong Evidence  version | James is at home one morning and wants to go outside and have fun. He hopes the sun is shining so he can swim in his pool. James wonders if it is sunny or rainy. James goes into the living room. He looks out the big window and sees the sun shining. James feels the warmth of the sun. James believes it is sunny outside. Instead of believing its sunny outside, could James believe it is rainy? Why do you think so? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Christmas Storyline |
| No Evidence  version | On Christmas, Mike and his family opened all the presents beneath the tree except for one box. The unopened box has Mike’s name on it. Mike is on the other side of the room. Mike wonders if there is an action figure or a toy train in the box. The box is heavily wrapped and Mike has not picked it up or looked in it. There are no clues for what is inside. Mike believes there is an action figure in the box. Instead of believing there is an action figure in the box, could Mike believe there is a toy train in the box? Why do you think so? |
| Counterevidence  version | On Christmas, Mike and his family opened all the presents beneath the tree except for one box. The unopened box has Mike’s name on it. Mike is on the other side of the room. Mike wonders if there is an action figure or a toy train in the box. Mike goes over and grabs the box. Mike opens the top of the box and sees an action figure in it! The Buzz Lightyear action figure says “To infinity, and beyond!” Mike believes there is a a toy train in the box. Instead of believing there is a toy train in the box, could Mike believe there is an action figure in the box? Why do you think so? |
| Strong Evidence  version | On Christmas, Mike and his family opened all the presents beneath the tree except for one box. The unopened box has Mike’s name on it. Mike is on the other side of the room. Mike wonders if there is an action figure or a toy train in the box. Mike goes over and grabs the box. Mike opens the top of the box and sees an action figure in it! The action figure says “To infinity, and beyond!” Mike believes there is an action figure in the box. Instead of believing there is an action figure in the box, could Mike believe there is a toy train in the box? Why do you think so? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Cookie Jar Storyline |
| No Evidence  version | In Steve’s kitchen at home, there is a cookie jar in the cabinet. Steve is allowed to eat the cookies. Steve is in his bedroom and is getting hungry.  Steve wonders if there are cookies in the jar or not. Steve has not seen the jar in a long time. There are no clues for if there are cookies in the jar. Steve believes there are cookies in the jar. Instead of believing there are cookies in the jar, could Steve believe the jar is empty? Why do you think so? |
| Counterevidence  version | In Steve’s kitchen at home, there is a cookie jar in the cabinet. Steve is allowed to eat the cookies. Steve is in his bedroom and is getting hungry.  Steve wonders if there are cookies in the jar or not. Steve walks into the kitchen, opens the cabinet, looks into the jar, and sees cookies. Steve smells the delicious cookies. The cookies look and smell fresh and are a yummy treat. Steve believes the jar is empty. Instead of believing the jar is empty, could Steve believe there are cookies in the jar? Why do you think so? |
| Strong Evidence  version | In Steve’s kitchen at home, there is a cookie jar in the cabinet. Steve is allowed to eat the cookies. Steve is in his bedroom and is getting hungry.  Steve wonders if there are cookies in the jar or not. Steve walks into the kitchen, opens the cabinet, looks into the jar, and sees cookies. Steve smells the delicious cookies. The cookies look and smell fresh and are a yummy treat. Steve believes there are cookies in the jar. Instead of believing there are cookies in the jar, could Steve believe the jar is empty? Why do you think so? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Dad Storyline |
| No Evidence  version | Zoey is at home on the weekend. She wants to play a game with her dad. Zoey wonders if her dad is in his bedroom or not. Zoey knocks on the door of her parent’s bedroom and calls out for her dad. Zoey has not seen her Dad all day. There are no clues for if her Dad is home. Zoey believes her dad is *not* in his bedroom. Instead of believing her dad is *not* in his bedroom, could Zoey believe her dad *is* in his bedroom? Why do you think so? |
| Counterevidence  version | Zoey is at home on the weekend. She wants to play a game with her dad. Zoey wonders if her dad is in his bedroom or not. Zoey knocks on the door of her parent’s bedroom and calls out for her dad. Zoey sees her dad opening the door. Zoey’s dad says that he is home and can play the game with her. Zoey believes her dad is *not* in his bedroom. Instead of believing her dad is *not* in his bedroom, could Zoey believe her dad *is* in his bedroom? Why do you think so? |
| Strong Evidence  version | Zoey is at home on the weekend. She wants to play a game with her dad. Zoey wonders if her dad is in his bedroom or not. Zoey knocks on the door of her parent’s bedroom and calls out for her dad. Zoey sees her dad opening the door. Zoey’s dad says that he is home and can play the game with her. Zoey believes her dad *is* in his bedroom. Instead of believing her dad *is* in his bedroom, could Zoey believe her dad *is* *not* his bedroom? Why do you think so? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Bunny Storyline |
| No Evidence  version | Hayley has a bunny who runs away sometimes. Today the bunny ran away *again*. When the bunny runs away, he usually hides behind the trees or behind the bushes at the park. Hayley wonders if the bunny is behind the tree or the bushes. Hayley goes to the park but she does not see the bunny. There are no clues for where the bunny is. Hayley believes the bunny is behind the tree. Instead of believing the bunny is behind the tree, could Hayley believe the bunny is behind the bushes? Why do you think so? |
| Counterevidence  version | Hayley has a bunny who runs away sometimes. Today the bunny ran away *again*. When the bunny runs away, he usually hides behind the trees or behind the bushes at the park. Hayley wonders if the bunny is behind the tree or the bushes. Hayley goes to the park and sees her bunny behind the tree. The bunny is happy to see Hayley and squeaks. Hayley believes the bunny is behind the bushes. Instead of believing the bunny is behind the bushes, could Hayley believe the bunny is behind the tree? Why do you think so? |
| Strong Evidence  version | Hayley has a bunny who runs away sometimes. Today the bunny ran away *again*. When the bunny runs away, he usually hides behind the trees or behind the bushes at the park. Hayley wonders if the bunny is behind the tree or the bushes. Hayley goes to the park and sees her bunny behind the tree. The bunny is happy to see Hayley and squeaks. Hayley believes the bunny is behind the tree. Instead of believing the bunny is behind the tree, could Hayley believe the bunny is behind the bushes? Why do you think so? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | TV Storyline |
| No Evidence  version | Mary and Emily sometimes get to watch a TV show in the afternoon and sometimes they do not. Mary and Emily are outside. Mary wonders if today they will watch a cartoon or not. Mary cannot see or hear the TV from outside. There are no clues for if there is a cartoon on. Mary believes there is a cartoon on TV. Instead of believing there is a cartoon on TV, could Mary believe there is *not* a cartoon on TV? Why do you think so? |
| Counterevidence  version | Mary and Emily sometimes get to watch a TV show in the afternoon and sometimes they do not. Mary and Emily are outside. Mary wonders if today they will watch a cartoon or not. Mary and Emily go inside. They see a cartoon on TV! The characters on TV say “Hi!” Mary believes there is not a cartoon on TV. Instead of believing there is not a cartoon on TV, could Mary believe there is a cartoon on TV? Why do you think so? |
| Strong Evidence  version | Mary and Emily sometimes get to watch a TV show in the afternoon and sometimes they do not. Mary and Emily are outside. Mary wonders if today they will watch a cartoon or not. Mary and Emily go inside. They see a cartoon on TV! The characters on TV say “Hi!” Mary believes there is a cartoon on TV. Instead of believing there is a cartoon on TV, could Mary believe there is *not* a cartoon on TV? Why do you think so? |

**Study 2 Value-based Belief Storylines**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Bike Storyline |
| Opinion  version | Ashley is walking outside. Ashley sees a boy sitting with his bike. She sees that the bike is orange. Ashley thinks about the bike. Ashley believes it’s good that the bike is orange. Instead of believing that, could Ashley believe it would be good if the bike was blue? Why do you think Ashley (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Immoral  version | Ashley is walking outside. Ashley sees a boy fall off his bike. She sees that the boy’s leg is injured and that he is hurt. Ashley thinks about what happened. Ashley believes it’s good that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Ashley believe it’s bad that the boy is hurt? Why do you think Ashley (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Moral  version | Ashley is walking outside. Ashley sees a boy fall off his bike. She sees that the boy’s leg is injured and that he is hurt. Ashley thinks about what happened. Ashley believes it’s bad that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Ashley believe it’s good that the boy is hurt? Why do you think Ashley (could / couldn’t) believe that? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Sidewalk Storyline |
| Opinion  version | Mia is out on a walk. Mia sees a boy looking for a place to sit. The boy sits on the bench to the left. Mia thinks about the boy sitting. Mia believes its good that the boy sat there. Instead of believing that, could Mia believe it would be good if he sat on the other bench? Why do you think Mia (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Immoral  version | Mia is out on a walk. Mia watches someone accidently slip and fall over. The boy scrapes his knee badly. Mia thinks about what happened. Mia believes it’s good that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Mia believe it’s bad that the boy is hurt? Why do you think Mia (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Moral  version | Mia is out on a walk. Mia watches someone accidently slip and fall over. The boy scrapes his knee badly. Mia thinks about what happened. Mia believes it’s bad that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Mia believe it’s good that the boy is hurt? Why do you think Mia (could / couldn’t) believe that? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Playground Storyline |
| Opinion  version | Zoey is at the park. She sees a boy playing on the swings. The boy is on the swing to the left. Zoey thinks about the boy swinging. Zoey believes it’s good that he is on that swing. Instead of believing that, could Zoey believe it would be good if he was on the other swing? Why do you think Zoey (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Immoral  version | Zoey sees a boy swinging. The swing breaks and the boy falls hard on the ground. Zoey sees that the boy is in pain. Zoey thinks about what happened.  Zoey believes it’s good that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Zoey believe it’s bad that the boy is hurt? Why do you think Zoey (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Moral  version | Zoey sees a boy swinging. The swing breaks and the boy falls hard on the ground. Zoey sees that the boy is in pain. Zoey thinks about what happened.  Zoey believes it’s bad that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Zoey believe it’s good that the boy is hurt? Why do you think Zoey (could / couldn’t) believe that? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Neighborhood Storyline |
| Opinion  version | John is walking through the neighborhood. John notices a boy painting a picture of a cat. John thinks about the painting. John believes it’s good that the boy painted a cat. Instead of believing that, could John believe it would be good if the boy painted a dog? Why do you think John (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Immoral  version | John is walking through the neighborhood. John sees a ladder fall on a boy. The boy’s wrist is injured. John thinks about what happened. John believes it’s good that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could John believe it’s bad that the boy is hurt? Why do you think John (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Moral  version | John is walking through the neighborhood. John sees a ladder fall on a boy. The boy’s wrist is injured. John thinks about what happened. John believes it’s bad that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could John believe it’s good that the boy is hurt? Why do you think John (could / couldn’t) believe that? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Beach Storyline |
| Opinion  version | Hayley is at the beach with her friend. Hayley sees that she is using the green shovel. Hayley thinks about the shovel. Hayley believes it’s good that the girl is playing with the green shovel. Instead of believing that, could Hayley believe it would be good if she played with the orange shovel? Why do you think Hayley (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Immoral  version | Hayley is at the beach. Hayley sees a girl accidently trip and fall. The girl is hurt. Hayley thinks about what happened. Hayley believes it’s good that the girl is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Hayley believe it’s bad that the girl is hurt? Why do you think Hayley (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Moral  version | Hayley is at the beach. Hayley sees a girl accidently trip and fall. The girl is hurt. Hayley thinks about what happened. Hayley believes it’s bad that the girl is hurt. Instead of believing that, could Hayley believe it’s good that the girl is hurt? Why do you think Hayley (could / couldn’t) believe that? |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Daycare Storyline |
| Opinion  version | James is at daycare. James sees a boy playing with a toy car. He sees that the toy car is blue. James thinks about the boy playing. James believes it’s good that he is playing with the blue car. Instead of believing that, could James believe it would be good if the boy played with the green car? Why do you think James (could / couldn't) believe that? |
| Immoral  version | James is at daycare. James sees a boy get hit by a ball. The boy is really hurt. James thinks about what happened. James believes it’s good that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could James believe it’s bad that the boy is hurt? Why do you think James (could / couldn’t) believe that? |
| Moral  version | James is at daycare. James sees a boy get hit by a ball. The boy is really hurt. James thinks about what happened. James believes it’s bad that the boy is hurt. Instead of believing that, could James believe it’s good that the boy is hurt? Why do you think James (could / couldn’t) believe that? |

**Study 1 and 2 Action Storylines**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Balls Story |
| Possible  Action | Oliver is outside playing and running around. He wants to play with one of his two favorite balls, either the red one or the blue one. Oliver is deciding which one he will play with. Oliver reaches towards the balls. Oliver grabs the red ball. Instead of grabbing the red ball, could Oliver have grabbed the blue ball? Why do you think so? |

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|  | Drinks Story |
| Possible  Action | Riley is thirsty. Riley’s mom puts her two favorite drinks on the table for Riley to choose, a cup of lemonade and apple juice. Riley reaches towards the cups. Riley grabs the apple juice. Instead of grabbing the apple juice, could Riley have grabbed the lemonade? Why do you think so? |

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|  | Kite Story |
| Impossible  Action | Mason is flying his kite outside on a windy day. All of a sudden, the wind blows the kite on top of a tall tree. Mason grabs a ladder. He climbs up and grabs the kite. Instead of climbing up the ladder to grab the kite, could Mason have flown up like a bird? Why do you think so? |

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|  | Wall Story |
| Impossible  Action | Ben is in his bedroom. He wants to read a book. Ben’s favorite book is in the living room. Ben opens the door and heads towards the living room. Instead of going through the open doorway, could Ben have gone through the solid wall? Why do you think so? |

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