

# Portfolio Credit Risk

University of Chicago Masters in Financial Mathematics 36702

<https://uchicago.instructure.com/courses/48373>

Lecture 2

Thursday 30 March 2023

Simulation and non-simulation models of portfolio default

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# Last week and this week

**We want a model of the portfolio default rate.**

- We'll add LGD and loss later.

**We assume banks have good estimates of PDs.**

**Data show that the defaults of firms are not independent.**

**There are very few copulas that might connect defaults.**

- With the  $t$ -copula, independent variables do not have zero correlation. This complicates the analysis that we perform.
- The Gauss copula is more familiar. It keeps the focus on learning the portfolio model, rather than learning a new copula.

**This week we introduce the simplest Gauss copula.**

- It is called the single risk factor model.

# **Tonight's list of topics**

**The standard portfolio simulation**

**Modeling without simulation**

**The single risk factor (SRF) model**

**The Vasicek distribution**

**Basel minimum capital requirement**

# **The standard portfolio simulation**

# The standard portfolio simulation

A simulation run has inputs:

- There are  $k$  firms in the portfolio.
- Each firm in the portfolio has a probability of default,  $PD_i$ .
- Each firm has a latent variable,  $Z_i$ .
  - Firm  $i$  is in default if the percentile of  $Z_i$  is less than  $PD_i$ .
- The latent variables have a joint standard normal distribution.
  - Gauss copula.
- Each pair of latent variables has a correlation,  $\rho_{i,j}$ .
  - The off-diagonal correlations are not all zero.

In each simulation run,

- Draw values of the correlated latent variables  $\{Z_i\}_{i=1}^k$ .
- Calculate the set of default indicators  $D_i = I[z_i < \Phi^{-1}[PD_i]]$ .
- Keep track of the defaults.
  - Often the main item of interest is the default rate,  $DR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^k D_i}{k}$ .

# Last week's optional reading

The standard portfolio simulation was first articulated for a wide audience in the CreditMetrics manual, 1998.

It required a lender to know whether a loan had defaulted, and to know the probability with which a loan would default within a year.

- The event of default had to be defined.
- The probabilities had to be estimated.

And the model required estimates of the  $\{\rho_{i,j}\}$ .

- Most banks used asset correlations or equity correlations.
  - Again, data vendors supply the estimates.

# One run with a 4-firm portfolio

| Firm | $PD_i$ | Correlation Matrix $\rho_{i,j}$             |     |     |     | Simulated $Z_i$ | $\Phi^{-1}[PD_i]$ | $D_i$ |
|------|--------|---|-----|-----|-----|-----------------|-------------------|-------|
| 1    | 0.1    | 1   | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | -1.3559         | -1.2816           | 1     |
| 2    | 0.2    | 0.1   | 1   | 0.4 | 0.5 | -0.6171         | -0.8416           | 0     |
| 3    | 0.3    | 0.2   | 0.4 | 1   | 0.6 | -0.4817         | -0.5244           | 0     |
| 4    | 0.4    | 0.3   | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1   | -0.0562         | -0.2533           | 0     |
|      |        | Number of defaults in this simulation run = |     |     |     |                 |                   | 1     |

Keeping track over many runs, you could estimate the distribution of the default rate, its expectation, and so forth.

You could judge the sensitivity of the results to the inputs.

# Time and risk

**This is a one-period model.**

- **It estimates the distribution of the default rate in the next year.**
- **It says nothing about the world after that.**

**But real life goes on, and it usually resembles today.**

- **If the current quarter is weak, next quarter is likely to be weak.**
- **If the current quarter is not weak, next quarter is likely to be not weak.**

**The serial dependence of credit loss data is a channel of inquiry that we touch on in Week 5.**



# Portfolio loss simulation

Simulation can handle portfolio loss as well as default.

More inputs are needed:

- The dollar exposure of each loan to each firm
- The distribution of LGD for each loan

If a loan defaults in a simulation run:

- Draw a value of LGD from its distribution.
- Multiply LGD by exposure to find dollar loss.

The loss portfolio rate:  $Loss = \sum_i \$Loss_i / \sum_i \$Exposure_i$ .

- We simplify when we assume all the exposures are equal.
- We model conditional LGD in Week 4.

# Questions? Comments?

**Something like this simulation is run by most banks.**

# Modeling without simulation

# **To simulate or not to simulate?**

**Simulation keeps track of all the relevant details, but it is easy to get lost in the details.**

**Suppose you want to know what kind of loan would produce the least risk when added to your portfolio.**

- The simulation answer depends on all the PDs,  $\rho$ s, etc.**
- A clear picture might not appear.**

**But given explicit formulas for loss distributions, the answers are easier to see and to comprehend.**

- And the results appear close enough for some purposes.**

# To not simulate, simplify

The default rate simulation has two major inputs:

- $\{PD_i\}$ , the set of PD's for the  $k$  firms in the portfolio
- $\{\rho_{i,j}\}$ , the set of  $\frac{(k-1)k}{2}$  correlations between latent variables.
  - The correlation matrix is the target of the simplification.

The Gauss copula allows any correlation matrix that is positive definite.

The single factor model restricts the choice of matrix.

- Every firm depends on a single random factor,  $Z$ .
  - Think of it as an overall level of credit stress.
  - When  $Z$  is elevated, every firm becomes more likely to default.
- There is no other variable affecting more than one firm.
  - There is no source of correlation between firms other than  $Z$ .
  - Some firms are affected more strongly by  $Z$  than others.

# Single risk factor (SRF) model

Each firm's latent variable,  $Z_i$ , depends on a portfolio-wide (or economy-wide) factor,  $Z$ .

- This is called the “systematic” factor.

The model also contains  $k$  other factors,  $\{X_i\}$ .

- $X_i$  affects  $Z_i$  and affects nothing other than  $Z_i$ .
- The  $X_i$  are called “idiosyncratic” factors.

Since  $Z$  affects every  $Z_i$ , the  $Z_i$ 's are correlated.

The next slide expresses this in linear math.

$$Z_i = -\sqrt{\rho_i} Z + \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i$$

$Z$  and  $\{X_i\}$  are assumed independent standard normal.

- Therefore,  $Z$  and  $\{X_i\}$  are jointly normal.
- Therefore,  $\{Z_i\}$  are jointly normal.
  - That is, they are normal variables connected by a Gauss copula.

$$E[Z_i] = E[-\sqrt{\rho_i} Z] + E[\sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i] = 0 + 0 = 0.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}[Z_i] &= \text{Var}[-\sqrt{\rho_i} Z] + \text{Var}[\sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i] + 2 \text{Cov}[-\sqrt{\rho_i} Z, \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i] \\ &= \rho_i + 1 - \rho_i + 0 \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,  $\{Z_i\}$  are jointly standard normal.

- They always were, and still are, jointly standard normal.

# Correlations galore

When we had a portfolio with two firms, we used  $\rho$  to represent the correlation between their latent variables.

We articulated the two firms in the symbol  $\rho_{1,2}$ .

The expression for the single risk factor model contains a new symbol,  $\rho_i$ .

- Each firm has its own value of  $\rho_i$ .
- We assume that  $0 \leq \rho_i \leq 1$  for all  $i$ .
  - Remember, correlation is in the range 5% to 15% for most firms.

Next, we calculate  $\text{Corr}[Z_i, Z_j]$  in the single factor model.



# ***Corr* $[Z_i, Z_j]$**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Corr}[Z_i, Z_j] &= \text{Cov}[Z_i, Z_j] \\ &= \text{Cov}[-\sqrt{\rho_i} Z + \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i, -\sqrt{\rho_j} Z + \sqrt{1 - \rho_j} X_j] \\ &= (-\sqrt{\rho_i}) (-\sqrt{\rho_j}) \text{Cov}[Z, Z] \\ &\quad + -\sqrt{\rho_i} \sqrt{1 - \rho_j} \text{Cov}[Z, X_j] \\ &\quad + \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} (-\sqrt{\rho_j} Z) \text{Cov}[X_i, Z] \\ &\quad + \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} \sqrt{1 - \rho_j} \text{Cov}[X_i, X_j] \\ &= \sqrt{\rho_i \rho_j} \end{aligned}$$

If  $\rho_i = \rho_j = \rho$ , then  $\text{Corr}[Z_i, Z_j] = \rho$ . We refer to the value of  $\rho_i$  as “the correlation of Firm  $i$ .”

# The correlation matrix

In a single factor model, the correlation between two firms is the geometric average of  $\rho_i$  and  $\rho_j$ :

$$\text{Corr}[Z_i, Z_j] = \sqrt{\rho_i \rho_j}$$

The  $k$  values  $\{\rho_i\}$  imply the  $k(k - 1)/2$  values of  $\rho_{i,j}$ .

This greatly restricts the set of positive definite matrices.

The correlation matrix of any single factor model is positive definite.

- I don't have a proof handy. If you find one, please send it to me.

# Interpretations

**When  $Z$  is elevated, each  $Z_i$  tends to be depressed.**

- **Therefore, each firm is more likely to default than otherwise.**

**A firm with a greater value of  $\rho_i$  is more affected by  $Z$ .**

- **Such a firm is said to be a “cyclical” firm, such as an airline.**
  - **Airlines have high fixed costs and revenues that are highly dependent on the overall economy. They are bailout magnets.**
- **A firm with low  $\rho_i$  is effected less, like Proctor and Gamble.**
  - **Consumer nondurable firm P&G is a noncyclical firm.**

# Questions? Comments?

**The single risk factor model is the main topic for today.  
And it is the main topic for the course.**

# Conditional expectations

**PD is the probability of default in the next year.**

- **It can be viewed as an average of what is expected if future conditions are favorable, unfavorable, or neutral to the firm.**
  - In favorable conditions, the probability of default would be low.
  - In unfavorable conditions, the probability of default would high.

**Next we use the single factor model to find the probability of default given  $Z$ .**

- **This is called “conditional PD” and symbolized cPD.**
  - If the economy has a bad year indicating that  $Z$  is elevated, then conditional PD is greater than PD.

**Later we find the distribution of conditional PD.**

# Conditional PD: cPD


$$\begin{aligned} cPD_i &= Pr \left[ Z_i < \Phi^{-1}[PD_i] \mid Z = z \right] \\ &= Pr \left[ -\sqrt{\rho_i} z + \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i < \Phi^{-1} [PD_i] \right] \\ &= Pr \left[ X_i < \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD_i] + \sqrt{\rho_i} z}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i}} \right] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD_i] + \sqrt{\rho_i} z}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i}} \right] \end{aligned}$$

**This applies to each firm in a single risk factor model.**

- **If every firm had the same PD and the same value of  $\rho$ , this would be the conditionally expected PD of the portfolio.**
- **If in addition the number of firms in the portfolio were very large, then the law of large numbers assures that the default rate would equal the conditionally expected rate.**

**This expression is called the Vasicek formula.**

# cPD is monotonic in $Z$



# Conditional independence

$Z = z$  fully specifies conditions in a SRF model.

- A firm's default depends only on  $X_i$ , which is independent.
  - Given  $z$ , the defaults of firms are conditionally independent.

This provides a second way to perform simulation.

- Instead of drawing  $k$  correlated values  $\{Z_i\}_{i=1}^k$ , draw  $k$  independent values  $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^k$  and an independent value of  $Z$ .
- Then calculate each  $Z_i : Z_i = -\sqrt{\rho_i} Z + \sqrt{1 - \rho_i} X_i$ .
- Check for defaults and keep track as before...

Instead of simulating, we now find a compact expression for the distribution of the number of defaults.

- $\sum D = \sum_{i=1}^k D_i$ , the number of defaults among  $k$  firms.
- “ $PMF$ ” = “probability mass function.” Think: “Discrete PDF”.



# Conditional distribution of $\sum_{i=1}^k D_i$

Suppose that there are  $k$  firms in the portfolio, that the firms are affected by a single factor model, and that all firms have the same PD and same  $\rho$ .

In conditions  $Z = z$ , the  $k$  firms default independently at rate  $cPD[z]$ . The number of defaults conditioned on  $Z$  is has the  $\text{Binomial}[k, cPD[z]]$  distribution:

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^k D_i \mid Z = z\right) \sim \text{Bin} [k, cPD[z]].$$

$$PMF[\Sigma D \mid z] = \binom{k}{\Sigma D} \left( \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD] + \sqrt{\rho} z}{\sqrt{1-\rho}} \right] \right)^{\Sigma D} \left( 1 - \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD] + \sqrt{\rho} z}{\sqrt{1-\rho}} \right] \right)^{k - \Sigma D}$$

# Remove the conditioning

We have the conditional distribution,  $PMF[\Sigma D|z]$ .

The joint distribution is  $PMF[\Sigma D, z] = PMF[\Sigma D|z] PDF[z]$ .

The desired distribution is  $PMF[\Sigma D] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} PMF[\Sigma D, z] dz$ .



$$= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \binom{k}{\Sigma D} \left( \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD] + \sqrt{\rho} z}{\sqrt{1-\rho}} \right] \right)^{\Sigma D} \left( 1 - \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD] + \sqrt{\rho} z}{\sqrt{1-\rho}} \right] \right)^{k-\Sigma D} \phi[z] dz$$

where  $PDF[z] = \phi[z]$ , the standard normal density bell curve.

This is the distribution of  $\Sigma D$  defaults among  $k$  firms where

- Each firm has the same value of PD,
- Firms respond to a single risk factor and
- Each firm has the same value of correlation.

# Two PMFs: $PD = 0.25$ , $\rho = 0.25$



# Questions? Comments?

**This stuff is important.**

**You should be able to derive the Vasicek formula for cPD.**

# Letting $k \rightarrow \infty$ ?

**As  $k$ , the number of firms in the portfolio, increases, the PMF approaches a continuous distribution.**

- An easier route to finding the same distribution is to find the distribution of the cPD of a single firm.

**To derive the PDF of cPD:**

- Find the inverse CDF of cPD from the Vasicek function.
- Find the CDF of cPD by inverting the inverse CDF.
- Find the PDF by differentiating the CDF.

**The resulting distribution is the Vasicek Distribution.**

- Same guy who did the interest rate model.

# The inverse CDF

$$cPD_i[z] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD_i] + \sqrt{\rho_i} z}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i}} \right]$$

Evaluate the Vasicek function at  $q = \Phi[z]$ :

$$invCDFcPD_i[q] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD_i] + \sqrt{\rho_i} \Phi^{-1}[q]}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i}} \right]$$

$q$  is the quantile of  $Z$ ; therefore,  $q$  is the quantile of  $cPD$ .

Given  $q$ , this gives the associated value of  $cPD$ .

- It is the inverse CDF of the random variable  $cPD$ .

# Invert the inverse CDF

The inverse CDF from the previous slide is:

$$cPD_i = \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD_i] + \sqrt{\rho_i} \Phi^{-1}[q]}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i}} \right]$$

Solve for  $q$  :

$$q = \Phi \left[ \frac{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i} \Phi^{-1}[cPD_i] - \Phi^{-1}[PD_i]}{\sqrt{\rho_i}} \right] = CDF_i[cPD_i]$$

For a value of  $cPD_i$ , this gives its quantile.

- It is the CDF of the random variable cPD.

# Find the PDF by differentiation


$$CDF_i[cPD_i] = q = \Phi \left[ \frac{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i} \Phi^{-1}[cPD_i] - \Phi^{-1}[PD_i]}{\sqrt{\rho_i}} \right]$$

$$PDF_i[cPD_i] = \frac{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i}}{\sqrt{\rho_i} \phi[\Phi^{-1}[cPD_i]]} \phi \left[ \frac{\sqrt{1 - \rho_i} \Phi^{-1}[cPD_i] - \Phi^{-1}[PD_i]}{\sqrt{\rho_i}} \right]$$

**This is the Vasicek distribution. It gives the probability density of cPD. Parameters are PD and  $\rho$ .**



# Vasicek PDFs



# Vasicek Distributions

$$\text{Inverse CDF: } CDF^{-1}[q] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\Phi^{-1}[PD] + \sqrt{\rho} \Phi^{-1}[q]}{\sqrt{1-\rho}} \right]$$

$$\text{CDF: } CDF[cPD] = \Phi \left[ \frac{\sqrt{1-\rho} \Phi^{-1}[cPD] - \Phi^{-1}[PD]}{\sqrt{\rho}} \right]$$

$$\text{PDF: } PDF[cPD] = \frac{\sqrt{1-\rho}}{\sqrt{\rho} \phi[\Phi^{-1}[cPD]]} \phi \left[ \frac{\sqrt{1-\rho} \Phi^{-1}[cPD] - \Phi^{-1}[PD]}{\sqrt{\rho}} \right]$$

**You should know how to derive these formulas.  
You don't need to memorize them.**

# Questions? Comments?

# PDF by change-of-variable

Suppose the distribution of  $Z$  is known, and we want the distribution of  $R = g[Z]$ , where  $g$  is monotonic.

- When these conditions are met, it is possible to find the distribution of  $R$  by “change-of-variable.”
  - It is the same as the derivation just completed.

cPD is a monotonic function of  $Z$ , which has a standard normal distribution. We're good to go...

# Change-of-variable technique

Suppose the distribution of  $Z$  is known, and we want the distribution of  $R = g[Z]$ , where  $g$  is monotonic.

$$CDF_R[r] = \Pr[R < r] = \Pr[g[Z] < r] = \Pr[Z < g^{-1}[r]] = CDF_Z[g^{-1}[r]]$$

$$PDF_R[r] = \frac{\partial CDF_Z[g^{-1}[r]]}{\partial r} = \left| \frac{\partial g^{-1}[r]}{\partial r} \right| PDF_Z[g^{-1}[r]]$$

So, "change-of-variable" is also called "the chain rule".

$$PDF_R[r] = \left| \frac{\partial g^{-1}[r]}{\partial r} \right| PDF_Z[g^{-1}[r]]$$

Know this cold. When applied to  $cPD[Z]$  with  $Z \sim N(0, 1)$ , it produces the PDF of the Vasicek distribution.

# Nice properties of Vasicek dist.

It has support on  $[0,1]$ .

- The other common distribution with support on  $[0,1]$  is Beta.

The first parameter is the expected value.

- Expected cPD is PD.

The second parameter takes a limited range of values.

- Most estimated values of  $\rho$  are between 5% and 15%.
  - The range reflects the difference between cyclical and non-cyclical firms.

The PDF, CDF, and  $\text{CDF}^{-1}[\cdot]$  can all be stated compactly.

- This is uncommon among statistical distributions.

The Vasicek distribution is a plank in a shipwreck.

- Otherwise, we are clueless. Like with the Central Limit Theorem.

# Vasicek summary

**The simplest Gauss copula is the independence copula.**

- But the data say that firms are not independent.
- The next-simplest Gauss copula is the single risk factor model.
  - Simpler models have fewer things that can go wrong. That's good!

**If a firm responds to a single risk factor, then its cPD is a monotonic function of the risk factor.**

- The distribution of its cPD is Vasicek.

**If a portfolio contains firms with uniform values of PD and  $\rho$ , each has the same cPD.**

- The default rate of a large portfolio is distributed like Vasicek.

# Questions? Comments?

**You must know the change of variable formula,  
and you must be able to use it.**

**You should be able to derive it if you forget it.**



# **The Basel capital requirement**

# The Basel Committee

The Bank for International Settlements is in Basel, CH.

- There is a Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, BCBS.

The BCBS drafted legislation requiring banks to have minimum capital. “Basel II”, “Basel III”, etc.

- A similar law was adopted by each developed country.
  - The US has other requirements that tend to be more binding than Basel.

Capital is the money a bank has available to lose.

- But it is a muddy accounting concept, hard to define.

The capital requirement is like a margin requirement.

- To make a given loan, a bank must have minimum capital.
  - Capital lets the bank survive if it has some credit loss.
  - This protects bank depositors and the public.

# One rule to ring them all

**The BCBS wanted a function that would give minimum capital that a bank regulator would require for a loan.**

- **The characteristics of the loan would imply minimum capital.**
- **The rest of the portfolio would not matter. Two implications:**
  - **Minimum capital for a loan would be the same for every bank.**
  - **Portfolio required capital would be the sum of loan required capital.**

**That is: there is no opportunity to diversify risk; risk is additive.**


**Risk additivity implies a single factor model.**

- **It is impossible to diversify risk with a single factor model.**
- **The characteristics of the loan are its PD,  $\rho$ , and ELGD.**
  - **The bank estimates PD and ELGD; BCBS specifies the value of  $\rho$ .**
- **Minimum capital would be loss at quantile 0.999.**

# Basel formula and cPD

Per dollar of "wholesale" loans, Basel requires a bank to have capital (K) equal to a fraction of the loan amount.

- “R” is Basel notation for correlation ( $\rho$ )
- “N” is the standard normal CDF ( $\Phi$ ), and
- “M” is the maturity of the loan in years ranging from 1 to 5.

$$K = \left[ LGD \times N \left( \frac{N^{-1}(PD) + \sqrt{R} \times N^{-1}(0.999)}{\sqrt{1-R}} \right) - (LGD \times PD) \right] \times \left( \frac{1 + (M - 2.5) \times b}{1 - 1.5 \times b} \right)$$


**This is cPD at  $q = 0.999$ .**

# Three main differences

1. Capital is required for loss, not just for default.

- The formula multiplies by LGD to take care of this.

2. Capital is required only for “unexpected” loss.

- Reserves should handle expected loss.
- Expected loss,  $LGD \times PD$ , is subtracted from the risk.

3. Loans might deteriorate but not default.

- Basel adjusts by a maturity adjustment factor.
  - Loans with longer maturity require perhaps 3 times more capital.

$$K = \left[ \underset{\boxed{1}}{LGD} \times N \left( \frac{N^{-1}(PD) + \sqrt{R} \times N^{-1}(0.999)}{\sqrt{1-R}} \right) - \underset{\boxed{2}}{(LGD \times PD)} \right] \times \underset{\boxed{3}}{\left( \frac{1 + (M - 2.5) \times b}{1 - 1.5 \times b} \right)}$$

# More Basel calibration

**Basel specifies these parameters in the formula:**

- **$R \text{ (correlation)} = 0.12 + .12 * \text{Exp}[-50 \text{ PD}]$** 
  - **Note: This is monotonic decreasing.**
  - **There is no evidence that correlation and PD are related this way.**
  - **A value of PD implies approximately nothing for correlation.**
- **$b \text{ (in the maturity adjustment)} = (0.11852 - 0.05478 \text{ Log}[\text{PD}])^2$** 
  - **Don't ask. Someone fit some data, probably on an emergency basis.**

**A bank might estimate Basel parameters like this:**

- **A loan's PD equals the average annual default rate**
  - **within the rating grade that the bank assigns to the loan.**
- **LGD is the average LGD in historical "downturn" conditions,**
  - **taken among loans with similar seniority and security.**
- **M is maturity in years, bounded between 1 and 5.**
- **All estimates are subject to supervisory oversight.**

# **Basel formula summary**

**Basel requires banks to have minimum capital.**

- Banks treat capital as if it were expensive, so there are games galore surrounding the input estimates.**
- On top of the capital required for credit loss, more capital is required for other reasons.**

**Minimum capital is a high percentile of the cPD formula.**

**Minimum capital for the portfolio is the sum of minimum capital for each loan because there's only one risk factor.**

**The formula depends on estimates of PD and LGD.**

- These must be estimated by the bank.**
- The estimation process is overseen by bank supervisors.**

# Questions? Comments?



# **Multistate simulation models**

# Simulating rating transitions

**So far, we have simulated a two-state model.**

- **State 1: Default.     State 0: No default.**

**One could model transitions to other states.**

- **Usually, the other states are internal rating grades.**
- **This requires**
  - **the probability that a firm with a given rating experiences transition to a new rating**  
The probabilities are given in a ratings transition matrix like the next slide
  - **the cost or benefit to the lender of the rating transition**  
Downgrades of borrowers hurt the lender; upgrades of borrowers help.

# A rating transition matrix

High  
grade

| Rat'g | Rating at year end (%) |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |
|-------|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
|       | AAA                    | AA    | A     | BBB   | BB    | B     | CCC   | Default |
| AAA   | 87.74                  | 10.93 | 0.45  | 0.63  | 0.12  | 0.10  | 0.02  | 0.02    |
| AA    | 0.84                   | 88.23 | 7.47  | 2.16  | 1.11  | 0.13  | 0.05  | 0.02    |
| A     | 0.27                   | 1.59  | 89.05 | 7.40  | 1.48  | 0.13  | 0.06  | 0.03    |
| BBB   | 1.84                   | 1.89  | 5.00  | 84.21 | 6.51  | 0.32  | 0.16  | 0.07    |
| BB    | 0.08                   | 2.91  | 3.29  | 5.53  | 74.68 | 8.05  | 4.14  | 1.32    |
| B     | 0.21                   | 0.36  | 9.25  | 8.29  | 2.31  | 63.89 | 10.13 | 5.58    |
| CCC   | 0.06                   | 0.25  | 1.85  | 2.06  | 12.34 | 24.86 | 39.97 | 18.60   |
| D     | 0                      | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 100     |

The numbers are outdated, but this gives an idea.  
The most likely thing is no change of rating.

High  
yield


# Consider Firm $i$ , rated BBB

Assume that  $Z_i$  controls all transitions.

- According to the previous slide, a firm rated BBB defaults if  $Z_i$  is in the worst 0.07% of its range.
- The firm transitions from BBB to CCC if  $Z_i$  is very low but above the 0.07 percentile.
  - Specifically, the BBB firm is downgraded to CCC if its value of  $Z$  is between the 0.07% quantile and the 0.16% quantile.
- And so forth, right up through upgrades to AAA.

Partition the range of  $Z_i$  according to the transition probabilities...

# Transitions for a firm rated BBB



The latent variable  $Z_i$  controls all the transitions.

# Thoughts on transition matrices

**A model of rating transitions requires a cost matrix.**

- In a default-only model, the cost is LGD.**
- With a multistate model, you need the cost of transition from every initial state to every other state.**

**The set-up is too rich for a non-simulation approach.**

**The rest of the course studies the default-only model.**

- You can always simulate the multi-state model if needed.**

# Questions? Comments?

# **Don't forget**

**Homework Set 2 is due by 6PM Thursday April 6.**

**Lisheng's TA session will be 6PM Sunday April 2.**