

Introduction to Information Security

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**Unit 5, Lecture 1-2 Addendum:
SSL/TLS overview**

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SSL/TLS overview


■ Perform secure communications (e-commerce) across Internet

- ▼ Secure bank transactions
- ▼ Secure online purchases
- ▼ Secure web login (e.g., canvas)

■ Security requirements

- ▼ Secrecy to prevent eavesdroppers to learn sensitive information
- ▼ Entity and message authentication to prevent message alteration / injection

Position of security in the network stack



SSL/TLS history

- **SSL: Secure Sockets Layer protocol**
- **SSL v1: Designed by Netscape, never deployed**
- **SSL v2: Deployed in Netscape Navigator 1.1 in 1995**
- **SSL v3: Substantial overhaul, fixing security flaws, publicly reviewed**
- **TLS: Transport Layer Security protocol**
- **TLS v1: IETF standard improving on v3**
- **TLS 1.2 (2008)**
 - ▼ MD5/SHA1 replaced with SHA-256
- **TLS 1.3 (March 2018)**
 - ▼ Removed weak elliptic and MD5/SHA-224, DES, 3-DES, AES-CBC
 - ▼ Added ChaCha20 cipher, Ed25519 digital signature

SSL/TLS protocol

- C → S: client_hello
- S → C: server_hello

} Phase 1

optional
message

- S → C: certificate
- S → C: server_key_exchange
- S → C: certificate_request
- S → C: server_hello_done

} Phase 2

- C → S: certificate
- C → S: client_key_exchange
- C → S: certificate_verify

} Phase 3

- C → S: change_cipher_spec
- C → S: finished
- S → C: change_cipher_spec
- S → C: finished

} Phase 4

SSL/TLS phase 1

- **Phase 1: Establish security capabilities**
- **{Client,Server}_hello_message**
 - ▼ Highest supported version
 - ▼ Random = 32 bit timestamp || 28 bytes random
 - ▼ Session id
 - ▼ client_hello
 - ▼ Supported cipher suite
 - ▼ Ciphers are listed in decreasing order of preference
 - ▼ server_hello
 - ▼ chosen cipher

Cipher suite

- **Cipher suite = key exchange, cipher spec**
- **Key exchange methods**
 - ▼ RSA, encrypt key with receiver's public key
 - ▼ Fixed Diffie-Hellman, public key certificate contains public DH key
 - ▼ Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, public key is used to sign temporary DH key
 - ▼ Anonymous Diffie-Hellman, DH without authentication
- **Cipher spec**
 - ▼ Cipher Algorithm (RC4, RC2, DES, 3DES, DES40, IDEA, AES)
 - ▼ MAC Algorithm (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256)
 - ▼ Cipher Type (stream or block)
 - ▼ Is Exportable (true or false)
 - ▼ Hash size (0 or 16 for MD5, 20 for SHA-1)
 - ▼ ...

SSL/TLS phase 2

- After Phase 1, both parties know which key exchange mechanism and which cipher to use
- Phase 2: Server authentication and key exchange
- **$S \rightarrow C$: certificate**
- **$S \rightarrow C$: server_key_exchange**
 - ▼ Anonymous DH, Ephemeral DH, ...
- **$S \rightarrow C$: certificate_request**
 - ▼ Cert_type (RSA or DSS for key exchange)
 - ▼ List of acceptable certificate authorities
- **$S \rightarrow C$: server_hello_done**

SSL/TLS phase 3

- After phase 2, client has all required values to generate the session key
- Phase 3: Client authentication and key exchange
- **C → S: certificate**
 - ▼ If server requested a certificate
- **C → S: client_key_exchange**
 - ▼ RSA: client generates 48 byte pre-master secret, encrypts it with server's public key
 - ▼ Eph or anon DH: client public DH value
 - ▼ ...
- **C → S: certificate_verify**
 - ▼ Only used if client sent signing certificate
 - ▼ `CertificateVerify.signature.SHA-256_hash =`
`SHA-256(master secret || pad2 || SHA-256(handshake messages || master secret || pad1))`

SSL/TLS phase 4

- After phase 3, client and server share master secret and authenticated each other
- Phase 4: Finish
- C → S: change_cipher_spec
 - ▼ Establish set up cipher and keys
- C → S: finished
 - ▼ $\text{SHA-256}(\text{master_secret} || \text{pad2} || \text{SHA-256}(\text{handshake messages} || \text{Sender} || \text{master_secret} || \text{pad1})) || \text{SHA-256}(\text{master_secret} || \text{pad2} || \text{SHA-256}(\text{handshake messages} || \text{Sender} || \text{master_secret} || \text{pad1}))$
 - ▼ Handshake messages contains all messages up to now
- S → C: change_cipher_spec
- S → C: finished

Cryptographic computations

- **Master secret (MS) creation from pre-master secret (PS), Client random (CR), Server random (SR)**
 - ▼
$$\begin{aligned} \text{MS} = & \text{SHA-256}(\text{PS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'A'} \parallel \text{PS} \parallel \text{CR} \parallel \text{SR})) \parallel \\ & \text{SHA-256}(\text{PS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'BB'} \parallel \text{PS} \parallel \text{CR} \parallel \text{SR})) \parallel \\ & \text{SHA-256}(\text{PS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'CCC'} \parallel \text{PS} \parallel \text{CR} \parallel \text{SR})) \end{aligned}$$
- **ChangeCipherSpec requires client & server MAC key, client & server encryption key, client & server IV, generated from MS:**
 - ▼
$$\begin{aligned} & \text{SHA-256}(\text{MS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'A'} \parallel \text{MS} \parallel \text{SR} \parallel \text{CR})) \parallel \\ & \text{SHA-256}(\text{MS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'BB'} \parallel \text{MS} \parallel \text{SR} \parallel \text{CR})) \parallel \\ & \text{SHA-256}(\text{MS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'CCC'} \parallel \text{MS} \parallel \text{SR} \parallel \text{CR})) \parallel \\ & \text{SHA-256}(\text{MS} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{'DDDD'} \parallel \text{MS} \parallel \text{SR} \parallel \text{CR})) \parallel \dots \end{aligned}$$

SSL record format

- SSL Record =
Content type || Major version || Minor version || Length ||
{ Data || MAC(K', Data) }_K
- Different keys for each direction, encryption or MAC


Sample TLS session

- Client has no certificate, only server authenticated
- C → S: client_hello
- S → C: server_hello
 - ▼ Ephemeral DH key exchange, AES encryption, SHA-384-based MAC
- S → C: **Server certificate, containing RSA public key**
 - ▼ Client checks validity + verifies URL matches certificate!
- S → C: **server_key_exchange: $g, p, g^s, \{H(g, p, g^s)\}_{K_S^{-1}}$**
- S → C: server_hello_done
- C → S: client_key_exchange: g^c
- C → S: change_cipher_spec
- C → S: finished
- S → C: change_cipher_spec
- S → C: finished

The HTTPS Ecosystem

Slide ack: Bryan Parno

- **Most widely deployed security protocol?**
 - ▼ 40% all Internet traffic (+40%/year)
- **Web, cloud, email, VoIP, 802.1x, VPNs, ...**



The HTTPS Ecosystem is buggy

Slide ack: Bryan Parno

■ 20 years of attacks & fixes

- Buffer overflows
- Memory management
- Incorrect state machines
- Lax certificate parsing
- Weakly or badly implemented crypto
- Side channels
- Error-inducing APIs
- Flawed standards
- ...

■ Many implementations

SChannel, OpenSSL, NSS, ...

Still patched every month!

