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1. Let (E, D) be an authenticated encryption system built by combining a CPA-secure symmetric cipher and a MAC. The system is combined with an error-correction code to correct random transmission errors. In what order should encryption and error correction be applied? **1 / 1 point**

- The order does not matter -- either one is fine.
- Encrypt and then apply the error correction code.
- The order does not matter -- neither one can correct errors.
- Apply the error correction code and then encrypt the result.

Correct
That is correct. The error correction code will do its best to correct random errors after which the MAC in the ciphertext will be checked to ensure no other errors remains.

2. Let X be a uniform random variable over the set $\{0,1\}^n$. Let Y be an arbitrary random variable over the set $\{0,1\}^n$ (not necessarily uniform) that is independent of X. Define the random variable $Z = X \oplus Y$. What is the probability that Z equals 0^n? **1 / 1 point**

- $2/2^n$
- $1/n^2$
- $1/2^n$
- $1-(1/2^n)$

Correct
The probability is $1/2^n$. To see why, observe that whatever Y is, the probability that $Z = X \oplus Y = 0^n$ is the same as the probability that $X = Y$ which is exactly $1/2^n$ because X is uniform.

3. Suppose (E_1, D_1) is a symmetric cipher that uses 128 bit keys to encrypt 1024 bit messages. Suppose (E_2, D_2) is a symmetric cipher that uses 128 bit keys to encrypt 128 bit messages. The encryption algorithms E_1 and E_2 are deterministic and do not use nonces. Which of the following statements is true? **1 / 1 point**

- [x] (E_1, D_1) can be one-time semantically secure, but cannot be perfectly secure.

  Correct
  Yes, for example (E_1, D_1) can be a secure stream cipher.

- [ ] (E_2, D_2) can be perfectly secure, but cannot be one-time semantically secure.
- [x] (E_2, D_2) can be one-time semantically secure and perfectly secure.

  Correct
  Yes, for example (E_2, D_2) can be the one time pad.

- [ ] (E_1, D_1) can be semantically secure under a chosen plaintext attack.

4. Which of the following statements regarding CBC and counter mode is correct? **1 / 1 point**

- ○ Both counter mode and CBC mode can operate just using a PRF.
- ○ Both counter mode and CBC mode require a block cipher (PRP).
- ◉ CBC mode encryption requires a block cipher (PRP), but counter mode encryption only needs a PRF.
- ○ counter mode encryption requires a block cipher (PRP), but CBC mode encryption only needs a PRF.

Correct
Yes, CBC needs to invert the PRP for decryption, while counter mode only needs to evaluate the PRF in the forward direction for both encryption and decryption. Therefore, a PRF is sufficient for counter mode.

5. Let $G : X \to X^2$ be a PRG where $X = \{0,1\}^{256}$

5. Let $G : X \to X^2$ be a secure PRG where $X = \{0,1\}^{256}$. **1 / 1 point**

We let $G(k)[0]$ denote

the left half of the output and $G(k)[1]$ denote the right half.

Which of the following statements is true?

- ○ $F(k,m) = m \oplus k$ is a secure PRF with key space and message space X.
- ○ $F(k,m) = G(k)[0] \oplus m$ is a secure PRF with key space and message space X.
- ◉ $F(k,m) = G(k)[m]$ is a secure PRF with key space X and message space $m \in \{0,1\}$.
- ○ $F(k,m) = G(m)[0] \oplus k$ is a secure PRF with key space and message space X.

✓ **Correct**
Yes, since the output of $G(k)$ is indistinguishable from random, the left and right halves are indistinguishable from random independent values.

6. Let (E, D) be a nonce-based symmetric encryption system (i.e. algorithm E takes as input a key, a message, and a nonce, and similarly the decryption algorithm takes a nonce as one of its inputs). The system provides chosen plaintext security (CPA-security) as long as the nonce never repeats. Suppose a single encryption key is used to encrypt 2^{32} messages and the nonces are generated independently at random for each encryption, how long should the nonce be to ensure that it never repeats with high probability? **1 / 1 point**

- ○ 48 bits
- ◉ 128 bits
- ○ 16 bits
- ○ 64 bits

✓ **Correct**
Yes, the probability of repetition after 2^{32} samples is negligible.

7. Same as question 6 except that now the nonce is generated using a counter. The counter resets to 0 when a **1 / 1 point**

7. Same as question 6 except that now the nonce is generated using a counter. The counter resets to 0 when a new key is chosen and is incremented by 1 after every encryption. What is the shortest nonce possible to ensure that the nonce does not repeat when encrypting 2^{32} messages using a single key? **1 / 1 point**

- (●) 32 bits
- ( ) 64 bits
- ( ) 16 bits
- ( ) the nonce must be chosen at random, otherwise the system cannot be CPA secure.

✓ **Correct**
Yes, with 32 bits there are 2^{32} nonces and each message will use a different nonce.

8. Let (S, V) be a deterministic MAC system with message space M and key space K. Which of the following properties is implied by the standard MAC security definition? **1 / 1 point**

- ( ) $S(k, m)$ preserves semantic security of m. That is, the adversary learns nothing about m given $S(k, m)$.
- ( ) The function $S(k, m)$ is a secure PRF.
- (●) For any two distinct messages m_0 and m_1, given m_0, m_1 and $S(k, m_0)$ it is difficult to compute $S(k, m_1)$.
- ( ) Given a key k in K it is difficult to find distinct messages m_0 and m_1 such that $S(k, m_0) = S(k, m_1)$.

✓ **Correct**
yes, this is implied by existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack.

9. Let $H : M \to T$ be a collision resistant hash function where $|T|$ is smaller than $|M|$. **1 / 1 point**

Which of the following properties is implied by collision resistance?

- (●) Given a tag $t \in T$ it is difficult to construct $m \in M$ such that $H(m) = t$.
- ( ) For all m in M, $H(m)$ must be shorter than m.
- ( ) it is difficult to find m_0 and m_1 such that $H(m_0) = H(m_1) + 1$. (here we treat the outputs of H as integers)

- ○ $H(m)$ preserves semantic security of m

  (that is, given $H(m)$ the attacker learns nothing about m).

  ✓ **Correct**
  yes, if these were easy then the attacker could easily

  find collisions.

10. Recall that when encrypting data you should typically use **1 / 1 point**

a symmetric encryption system that provides authenticated encryption.

Let (E, D) be a symmetric encryption system providing authenticated

encryption. Which of the following statements is implied by

authenticated encryption?

- ☐ Given k, m and $E(k, m)$ the attacker

  cannot create a valid encryption of $m + 1$ under key k.

  (here we treat plaintexts as integers)

- ☑ (E, D) provides chosen-ciphertext security.

  ✓ **Correct**
  yes, we showed this in class.

- ☑ Given m and $E(k, m)$ it is difficult to find k.

  ✓ **Correct**
  yes, otherwise the system would not even be chosen plaintext

  secure.

- ☐ Given $c = E(k, m)$ for some secret k, m,

  the attacker cannot find k', m' such that $c = E(k', m')$.

11. Which of the following statements is true about the basic Diffie-Hellman **1 / 1 point**

key-exchange protocol.

- ☑ The basic protocol enables key exchange secure against

  eavesdropping, but is insecure against active adversaries that can

  inject and modify messages.

  ✓ **Correct**
  yes, Diffie-Hellman is secure against eavesdropping,

  but is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack

but is insecure against man in the middle attacks.

- [ ] As with RSA, the protocol only provides eavesdropping security in the group $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ where N is an RSA modulus.
- [ ] The basic protocol provides key exchange secure against active adversaries that can inject and modify messages.
- [x] The protocol can be converted to a public-key encryption system called the ElGamal public-key system.

Correct
yes, that is correct.

12. Suppose $n+1$ parties, call them $B, A_1, \ldots, A_n$, wish to setup a shared group key. They want a protocol so that at the end of the protocol they all have a common secret key k, but an eavesdropper who sees the entire conversation cannot determine k. The parties agree on the following protocol that runs in a group G of prime order q with generator g: **1 / 1 point**

- for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ party A_i chooses a random a_i in $\{1, \ldots, q\}$ and sends to Party B the quantity $X_i \leftarrow g^{a_i}$.
- Party B generates a random b in $\{1, \ldots, q\}$ and for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ responds to Party A_i with the messages $Y_i \leftarrow X_i^b$.

The final group key should be g^b. Clearly Party B can compute this group key. How would each Party A_i compute this group key?

- ( ) Party A_i computes g^b as $Y_i^{-a_i}$
- ( ) Party A_i computes g^b as Y_i^{-1/a_i}
- (•) Party A_i computes g^b as Y_i^{1/a_i}
- ( ) Party A_i computes g^b as $Y_i^{a_i}$

Correct
Yes, $Y_i^{1/a_i} = g^{(ba_i)/a_i} = g^b$.

13. Recall that the RSA trapdoor permutation is defined in the group $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ where N is a product of two large primes. The public key is (N, e) and the private key is (N, d) **1 / 1 point**

where d is the inverse of e in $\mathbb{Z}^*_{\varphi(N)}$.

Suppose RSA was defined modulo a prime p instead of an RSA composite N. Show that in that case anyone can compute the private key (N, d) from the public key (N, e) by computing:

- (●) $d \leftarrow e^{-1} \pmod{p-1}$.
- ( ) $d \leftarrow e^{-1} \pmod{p^2}$.
- ( ) $d \leftarrow -e \pmod{p}$.
- ( ) $d \leftarrow e^{-1} \pmod{p+1}$.

Correct
yes, that is correct.