

EVMPatch: Timely and Automated Patching of Ethereum Smart Contracts

USENIX Security 2021

Background

- Smart contract

```
pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0;

contract Storage {

    uint256 number;

    function store(uint256 num) public {
        number = num;
    }

    function retrieve() public view returns (uint256){
        return number;
    }
}
```


Assembly

PUSH [tag] 8	function retrieve() public
JUMP [in]	function retrieve() public vie...
tag 7	function retrieve() public vie...
JUMPDEST	function retrieve() public vie...
PUSH 40	function retrieve() public vie...
MLOAD	function retrieve() public vie...
DUP1	function retrieve() public vie...
SWAP2	function retrieve() public vie...
SUB	function retrieve() public vie...
SWAP1	function retrieve() public vie...
RETURN	function retrieve() public vie...
tag 4	function store(uint256 num) pu...
JUMPDEST	function store(uint256 num) pu...
PUSH [tag] 9	function store(uint256 num
PUSH 4	function store(uint256 num) pu...
DUP1	function store(uint256 num) pu...
CALLDATASIZE	function store(uint256 num
SUB	function store(uint256 num) pu...
DUP2	function store(uint256 num) pu...
ADD	function store(uint256 num) pu...
SWAP1	function store(uint256 num) pu...
PUSH [tag] 10	function store(uint256 num
SWAP2	function store(uint256 num) pu...
SWAP1	function store(uint256 num) pu...
PUSH [tag] 11	function store(uint256 num
JUMP [in]	function store(uint256 num) pu...
tag 10	function store(uint256 num) pu...
JUMPDEST	function store(uint256 num) pu...
PUSH [tag] 12	function store(uint256 num
JUMP [in]	function store(uint256 num) pu...
tag 9	function store(uint256 num) pu...
JUMPDEST	function store(uint256 num) pu...

Bytecode

```
608060405234801561001057600080fd5b506
10150806100206000396000f3fe60806040523
4801561001057600080fd5b50600436106100
365760003560e01c80632e64cec11461003b5
780636057361d14610059575b600080fd5b61
0043610075565b60405161005091906100d95
65b60405180910390f35b6100736004803603
81019061006e919061009d565b61007e565b
005b60008054905090565b806000819055505
0565b60008135905061009781610103565b92
915050565b6000602082840312156100b3576
100b26100fe565b5b6.....
```


- EVM : custom instruction format ; stack-based ;
resource management mechanism(gas) ;
different address space




Background

- Contract Upgrade Strategies

eternal storage pattern




delegatecall-proxy pattern



Shortage :

- expensive
- update all contracts that interact with old contracts
- contact all users

Framework





Challenges


- Smart contract automatic rewriting
 - Correct
 - High efficiency
- Patch testing
 - Does not affect the original function
 - New patch available
- Deployment of patched contracts
 - Convert to proxy pattern

- Contract rewriting-Source VS Bytecode

Source Rewriting	Bytecode Rewriting
Corrupts storage-layout	Preserves storage layout
Checking modifications by human analyst feasible	Human analysis of bytecode changes challenging
Limited tool support for vulnerability analysis	Easy integration of vulnerability analysis tools




- Bytecode rewriting-trampoline concept



The basic block contains the patch point → Trampoline


exact same size

— Every instruction is represented as a one-byte opcode




Patch testing

- Does not affect the original function — differential testing approach
- New patch available — unit tests



Deployment of Patched Contracts

— Utilizes a proxy contract that is shipped with EVMPATCH



Evaluation

- Patching Access Control Bugs

Parity Wallet

```
function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) {  
    initDaylimit(_daylimit);  
    initMultiowned(_owners, _required);  
}
```

```
function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required) {  
    m_numOwners = _owners.length + 1;  
    m_owners[1] = uint(msg.sender);  
    m_ownerIndex[uint(msg.sender)] = 1;  
    for (uint i = 0; i < _owners.length; ++i) {  
        m_owners[2 + i] = uint(_owners[i]);  
        m_ownerIndex[uint(_owners[i])] = 2 + i;  
    }  
    m_required = _required;  
}
```

Overhead of access control patch

Version	Bytes	Size Increase	Gas Increase
Original	8290	0 %	0
Source-Patched	8201	-1.07 %	226
EVMPATCH'ed	8315	0.3 %	235

235 gas ≈
\$0.0006

```
function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required)  
    ① internal {  
    // ...  
    function initDaylimit(uint _limit) ① internal {  
    // ...  
    // throw unless the contract is not yet initialized.  
    modifier only_uninitialized { if (m_numOwners > 0) throw; _; }  
  
    function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required,  
        uint _daylimit)  
        ② only_uninitialized {  
    // ...
```

Source code of patched Parity Wallet

whether the contract
is not yet initialized

```
add_require_patch:  
    initWallet:  
        - load(m_numOwner) == 0  
  
delete_public_function_patch:  
    - initDayLimit  
    - initMultiowned
```

Customized Patch for Parity Wallet

removes a public
function from
the public function
dispatcher

Evaluation

- Patching Integer Bugs

Integer overflow bug brief

```
function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers, uint256 _value)
    public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {
    uint cnt = _receivers.length;
    // OVERFLOW: 2 * ((INT_MAX / 2) + 1) == 0
    uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;
    require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);
    // BYPASSED CHECK: balances[msg.sender] >= 0
    require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
    // RESULT: Transfer of ((INT_MAX / 2) + 1) tokens
```

```
function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers, uint256 _value)
    public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {
    uint cnt = _receivers.length;
    // OVERFLOW: 2 * ((INT_MAX / 2) + 1) == 0
    uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;    SafeMath.mul(uint256(cnt), _value);
    require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);
    // BYPASSED CHECK: balances[msg.sender] >= 0
    require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
    // RESULT: Transfer of ((INT_MAX / 2) + 1) tokens
```

Source code of patched Integer overflow contract

Integer patch templates add checks inspired by secure coding rules in the C programming language and the SafeMath Solidity library

Contract	CVE	# Patches	# Transactions		Overhead (gas)		Code Size Increase (B)		Additional Cost RW (US\$)	
			Total	Attacks	RW	SM	RW	SM	per TX	per Upgrade
BEC [2]	2018-10299	1	424,229	1	83	164	117 (1.0%)	133 (1.1%)	<0.01	0.01
SMT [36]	2018-10376	1	56,555	1	47	108	191 (0.8%)	97 (0.4%)	<0.01	0.01
UET [43]	2018-10468	55	24,034	12	225	21	1,299 (18.2%)	541 (7.6%)	<0.01	0.071
SCA [37]	2018-10706	1	292	10	47	0	3,811 (17.3%)	361 (1.6%)	<0.01	0.189
HXG [17]	2018-11239	9	1497	5	120	541	997 (28.1%)	519 (14.6%)	<0.01	0.057

Evaluation

- Developer Study
1. manually patch three contracts vulnerable due to integer overflow bugs given the output of a static analyze.
 2. convert a contract to an upgradable contract manually and with EVMPATCH.
 3. patch an access control bug using EVMPATCH by writing a custom patch-template.

Task	Time (Minutes)			Confidence
	Median	Min	Max	Median (1-7)
Manual	47.50	35	78	6
Integer Patches				
Conversion	62.50	33	110	2.5
EVMPATCH	1.50	1	3	-
Conversion				
Patch Template	4.00	2	15	7

Conclusion

