

Arming Small Security Programs

Troopers17





Arming Small Security Programs

OVERVIEW

Network baseline generation with Bropy



Disclaimer

- I "borrowed" my employers slide template
 - Creating .POT files is hard

This is NOT my employers material

TLDR; You can sue me, not my employer

About Me

Matt Domko

- Beard Enthusiast
- Giessen American High School
- Former:
 - Parachutist
 - Enterprise Admin
 - "Cyber Network Defender"
- Instructor at Chiron Technology Services
- Started blogging about Blue Team stuff http://goo.gl/uznCag
- Brakesec Slackhttps://brakesec.signup.team
- @hashtagcyber



CHIRON



Why I'm here

We are excited to have all of you here so that our TROOPERS attendees can learn from you, so they in turn can go and "make the world a safer place". We want you to thrive and deliver the very best of your work here at TROOPERS17, while also fully enjoying the conference. We have so many surprises in store for you!

"Make the world a safer place" {by sharing information}



Get Out!

Leave now if:

- You were looking for a red team talk
 - Joffrey Czarny is talking about pentesting Citrix in one room
 - Rebecca Shapiro is breaking down bootloaders in the other

Please stay if:

- You want to know every host your critical assets communicate with
- You want a list of every port a server listens on
- You want to do it all in less than 5 mins.



₩CHIRON



Malicious network activity CAN be identified using signatures...

```
# ---- Begin ET-emerging-activex Rules Category ---- #
# -- Begin GID:1 Based Rules -- #
##alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Internet Explorer Plugin.ocx Heap Overflow"; flow: from_server,established; file_data; c ontent:"06DD38D0-D187-11CF-A80D-00C04FD74AD8"; nocase; distance:0; content:".load("; nocase; distance:0; reference:url,www.hnc3k.com/ievulnerabil.htm; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/2001181; classtype:misc-attack; sid:2001181; rev:13;)
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX winhlp32 A ctiveX control attack, phase 1"; flowbits:noalert; flow: to_client,established; file_data; content:"|3C|OBJECT"; nocase; distance:0; content:"application/x-oleobject"; nocase; within: 64; content:"codebase="; nocase; distance:0; content:"hh ctrl.ocx"; nocase; within:15; flowbits:set,winhlp32; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/2001622; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:2001622; rev:14;)
```



alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX winhlp32 A ctiveX control attack, phase 2"; flow:to client,established; flowbits:isset,winh lp32; file data; content:"|3C|PARAM"; nocase; distance:0; content:"value="; noca se; distance:0; content:"command|3B|"; nocase; distance:0; pcre:"/(javascript|ht tp|ftp|vbscript)/iR"; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/200162 3; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:2001623; rev:14;) alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX winhlp32 A ctiveX control attack, phase 3"; flow:to client, established; flowbits:isset,win hlp32; content:".HHClick|2829|"; nocase; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/b in/view/Main/2001624; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:2001624; rev:12;) #alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX MciWndx A ctiveX Control"; flow:from server,established; file data; content:"288F1523-FAC4 -11CE-B16F-00AA0060D93D"; nocase; reference:url,www.microsoft.com/technet/securi ty/bulletin/ms05-054.mspx; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2002724; classt ype:web-application-attack; sid:2002724; rev:14;) ##alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX COM Obje ct Instantiation Memory Corruption Vulnerability MS05-054"; flow:established,fro m server; pcre:"/000(2(042[1-5]|1401|000D)|6F071)-0000-0000-C000-00000000046|6E 2271(FB|0[9A-F])-F799-11CF-9227-00AA00A1EB95|ECAB(AFC0|B0AB)-7F19-11D2-978E-0000 F8757E2A|3050F4F5-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B|DF0B3D60-548F-101B-8E65-08002B2BD1 19|2D2E24CB-0CD5-458F-86EA-3E6FA22C8E64|51B4ABF3-748F-4E3B-A276-C828330E926A|E49 79309-7A32-495E-8A92-7B014AAD4961|62EC9F22-5E30-11D2-97A1-00C04FB6DD9A|B1D4ED44-EE64-11D0-97E6-00C04FC30B4A|D675E22B-CAE9-11D2-AF7B-00C04F99179F/i"; reference:c ve,2005-2831; reference:url,www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms05-054 .mspx; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2002725; classtype:web-applicationattack: sid:2002725: rev:13:)



```
##alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET $HTTP PORTS -> $HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Microsof
t WMIScriptUtils.WMIObjectBroker object call CSLID"; flow:from server,establishe
d; file data; content:"7F5B7F63-F06F-4331-8A26-339E03C0AE3D"; nocase; distance:0
 reference:url,www.securityfocus.com/bid/20843; reference:url,secunia.com/advis
ories/22603; reference:cve,2006-4704; reference:url,www.microsoft.com/technet/se
curity/bulletin/ms06-073.mspx; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2003158; cl
asstype:attempted-user; sid:2003158; rev:13;)
##alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET $HTTP PORTS -> $HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Microsof
t VsmIDE.DTE object call CSLID"; flow:from server,established; file data; conten
t:"06723E09-F4C2-43c8-8358-09FCD1DB0766"; nocase; distance:0; reference:url,doc.
emergingthreats.net/2003159; classtype:attempted-user; sid:2003159; rev:13;)
##alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET $HTTP PORTS -> $HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Microsof
t DExplore.AppObj.8.0 object call CSLID"; flow:from server,established; file dat
a; content: "639F725F-1B2D-4831-A9FD-874847682010"; nocase; distance:0; reference
:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2003160; classtype:attempted-user; sid:2003160; rev
:14;)
##alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET $HTTP PORTS -> $HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Microsof
t VisualStudio.DTE.8.0 object call CSLID"; flow:from server,established; file da
ta; content: "CLSID"; nocase; distance:0; content: "BA018599-1DB3-44f9-83B4-461454
C84BF8"; nocase; distance:0; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2003161; clas
stype:attempted-user; sid:2003161; rev:13;)
##alert tcp $EXTERNAL NET $HTTP PORTS -> $HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Microsof
t Microsoft.DbgClr.DTE.8.0 object call CSLID"; flow:from server,established; fil
e data; content: "CLSID"; nocase; distance:0; content: "DOC07D56-7C69-43F1-B4A0-25
F5A11FAB19"; nocase; distance:0; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2003162;
classtype:attempted-user; sid:2003162; rev:10;)
```



##alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Possible Microsoft IE Install Engine Inseng.dll Arbitrary Code Execution (2)"; flow:from server, established; file data; content: "ASControls.InstallEngineCtl"; distance :0; content: "BaseUrl"; nocase; distance:0; content: "SetCifFile"; nocase; distanc e:0; pcre:"/new[\r\n\s]*ActiveXObject[\r\n\s]*\([\r\n\s]*(\x22ASControls\.Instal lEngineCtl\x22|\x27ASControls\.InstallEngineCtl\x27)[\r\n\s]*\)|(\w+)[\r\n\s]*=[\r\n\s]*(\x22ASControls\.InstallEngineCtl\x22|\x27ASControls\.InstallEngineCtl\x 27)[\r\n\s]*\x3b.*new[\r\n\s]*ActiveXObject[\r\n\s]*\([\r\n\s]*\1[\r\n\s]*\)/smi "; reference:url, osvdb.org/10705; reference:cve,2004-0216; reference:url,doc.em ergingthreats.net/2003232; classtype:attempted-user; sid:2003232; rev:60;) ##alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX Possible Microsoft IE Shell.Application ActiveX Arbitrary Command Execution"; flow:from server, established; file data; content: "Shell. Application"; distance: 0; content :"GetLink"; nocase; distance:0; pcre:"/new[\r\n\s]*ActiveXObject[\r\n\s]*\([\r\n \s]*(\x22Shell\.Application\x22|\x27Shell\.Application\x27)[\r\n\s]*\)|(\w+)[\r\ n\s]*=[\r\n\s]*(\x22Shell\.Application\x22|\x27Shell\.Application\x27)[\r\n\s]*' x3b.*new[\r\n\s]*ActiveXObject[\r\n\s]*\([\r\n\s]*\1[\r\n\s]*\)/smi"; reference: url, osvdb.org/7913; reference:cve,2004-2291; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats. net/2003233; classtype:attempted-user; sid:2003233; rev:10;) ##alert tcp \$EXTERNAL NET \$HTTP PORTS -> \$HOME NET any (msg:"ET ACTIVEX ACTIVEX Possible Microsoft IE Shell.Application ActiveX Arbitrary Command Execution (2)' flow:from server,established; file data; content: "13709620-C279-11CE-A49E-4445 53540000"; nocase; distance:0; content:"GetLink"; nocase; distance:0; pcre:"/<OB JECT\s+[^>]*classid\s*=\s*[\x22\x27]?\s*clsid\s*\x3a\s*\x7B?\s*13709620-C279-11C E-A49E-444553540000/si"; reference:url, osvdb.org/7913; reference:cve,2004-2291; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2003234; classtype:attempted-user; sid:20 03234: rev:10:)



And more signatures....


```
owner@onion:/etc/nsm/rules$ ls *.rules
app-layer-events.rules files.rules
                                             so rules.rules
black list.rules
                        http-events.rules
                                             stream-events.rules
decoder-events.rules
                        local.rules
                                             tls-events.rules
dns-events.rules
                        modbus-events.rules
                                             white list.rules
downloaded.rules
                        smtp-events.rules
owner@onion:/etc/nsm/rules$ cat *.rules | wc -l
21823
```

- Fingerprinting EVERY attack is impossible
- Signature based detection is USELESS if a signature does not exist for the attack being performed





The Initial Idea







The Initial Idea

Step 1: Build a network baseline.

- Bro?
- Netflow?

Step 2: Write SNORT rules.

I need alerts for non-standard traffic

Step 3: ?

- Something ... Something ... Something ...

Step 4: Profit!

Or at least spend less time worrying





A Similar Problem: Malicious Binaries

- Administrators face a similar problem with detecting malicious binaries.
- Antivirus products initially only used file signatures to identify malware:
 - Evil Hashes
 - Ego Strings
 - Reused code blocks
- This eventually failed, as attackers could easily modify malware to avoid signatures faster than they are generated
 - MSFVenom, Veil-Evasion, Hyperion





A Similar Problem: Malicious Binaries

- Heuristic detection helped, but does it catch everything?
 - No. (Malware still exists/functions today)

- What else can we do?
 - Enter Application Whitelisting





A Similar Problem: Malicious Binaries

- Application Whitelisting provides ability to:
 - Log execution of all files except explicitly authorized (whitelist):
 - File Hashes (tedious)
 - File Names (poor protection)
 - Signed Code (Awesome)
 - Source Directory (simple)
 - Prevent execution of files that are not in the whitelist.
 - Prevent execution of explicitly defined files (Blacklisting)



Simple Application Whitelisting Implementation



- 1. Start with an empty whitelist
- 2. Apply a policy to log everything not in whitelist
- 3. Use logs to generate a whitelist
- 4. Modify policy to block everything not in whitelist
- 5. Review new logs
 - Investigate blocked files
 - Update whitelist as needed



Malicious Network Activity: Anomaly Detection



- The same concept can be applied to network activity:
 - Start with an empty whitelist
 - Apply a policy to log all traffic not in the whitelist
 - Use logs to update the whitelist
 - Review new logs
 - Investigate new ports/hosts
 - Update whitelist as needed





But Matt, How Do I <do thing>?

- Get data for my whitelist?
 - Bro.
- Create a policy to log traffic?
 - Bro scripts
- Create logs from new traffic?
 - Bro scripts
- Review new logs?
 - ELSA

Last question... Can you tell me more about Bro?





Disclaimer

 Robin Summer gave a MUCH BETTER presentation on Bro at TROOPERS14

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBI0yaUdq4c





- Bro in 30 Seconds
 - Much more than an IDS
 - Logs multiple layers of traffic
 - "Packet String"
 - Similar to NETFLOW
 - Plugins/Scripts
 - Interpret Data
 - Take action
 - Logs are small
 - Allows for longer retention than PCAP
 - Open Source, Built-in to Security Onion





- Bro Data Formatting
 - Tab Separated table
 - Headers at top
 - Common Fields:
 - Timestamp (ts)
 - Connection ID (uid)
 - IP Source (id.orig_h)
 - Source Port (id.orig_p)
 - IP Destination (id.resp_h)
 - Dest Port (id.resp_p)






Logs are simple to parse programmatically

```
#separator \x09
#set separator
#empty field
                 (empty)
#unset field
#path
        conn
        2017-01-18-19-23-59
#open
#fields ts
                uid
                         id.orig h
                                          id.orig p
                                                           id.resp h
                                                                            id.resp p
                                                                                             proto
service duration
                         orig bytes
                                          resp bytes
                                                           conn state
                                                                            local orig
                                                                                             local re
        missed bytes
                         history orig pkts
                                                  orig ip bytes
                                                                   resp pkts
                                                                                    resp ip bytes
tunnel parents orig cc resp cc sensorname
#types time
                string addr
                                                                   string
                                  port
                                          addr
                                                  port
                                                           enum
                                                                            interval
                                                                                             count
        string bool
                                                                                    set[string]
count
                         bool
                                  count
                                          string
                                                  count
                                                           count
                                                                   count
                                                                            count
string string string
1484767439.346533
                         CqVif63D0X1MTuvKX2
                                                  192.168.3.35
                                                                            205.188.156.248 25
                                                                   1041
                0.000019
                                                  REJ
tcp
                                 0
                                                                                    Sr
48
                         (empty) -
                                          บร
                 40
                                                  onion-eth1
1484767439.346576
                         Ck6VP7esgtLHHrp9a
                                                  192.168.3.35
                                                                   1041
                                                                            205.188.156.248 25
                                                  REJ
tcp
                 0.000020
                                 0
                                                          Т
                                                                            0
                                                                                    Sr
                                                                                             1
                 40
                         (empty) -
                                                  onion-eth1
1484767439.346734
                         CIzEAD4wIpoPrtDB9c
                                                  192.168.3.35
                                                                   1042
                                                                            65.54.188.110
                                                                                             25
                 0.000020
                                 0
                                                  REJ
                                                                                    Sr
                                                                                             1
tcp
                 40
                                                  onion-eth1
                         (empty) -
1484767439.346776
                         CXViX637jv9RTTgPWg
                                                  192.168.3.35
                                                                   1042
                                                                            65.54.188.110
                                                                                             25
tcp
                 0.000020
                                                  REJ
                                                                                    Sr
                                                                                             1
                                 0
                                                          Т
                         (empty) -
                                                  onion-eth1
                 40
1484767439.346935
                         CTZaik3J7IPPxvp6o5
                                                  192.168.3.35
                                                                            64.18.4.11
                                                                                             25
                                                                   1043
                                                  REJ
                                                                                             1
tcp
                 0.000019
                                 0
                                                                            0
                                                                                    Sr
                         (empty) -
                                          US
                 40
                                                  onion-eth1
1484767439.346977
                         CskXfugxD2IRKWS89
                                                  192.168.3.35
                                                                            64.18.4.11
                                                                                             25
                                                                   1043
                 0.000019
                                                  REJ
                                                                                    Sr
                                                                                             1
tcp
                                 Θ
                                          US
                                                  onion-eth1
                 40
                         (empty) -
```



Humans should use ELSA, Splunk, etc...





- Key Directories:
 - /nsm/bro/logs/current
 - notice.log
 - conn.log
 - weird.log
 - /opt/bro/share/bro/policy
 - Contains scripts loaded by Bro
 - /opt/bro/share/bro/site/local.bro
 - Add path to custom scripts to this file to load when bro starts





"The best way to learn to write Bro scripts, is to write Bro scripts"

Seth Hall, SecurityOnion Conference 2015



```
owner@onion:~/simple$ cat simple.bro
global myports: set[port] = {21/tcp, 22/tcp, 0/icmp};
event bro_init()
   print "Lets print myports.";
   print fmt ("There are %d in the list.", |myports|);
   for (x in myports)
       print x;
event new_connection(c:connection)
   if (c$id$resp_p in myports)
       print fmt("Port %s connection detected", c$id$resp_p);
       };
```



```
owner@onion:~/simple$ cat simple.bro
global myports: set[port] = {21/tcp, 22/tcp, 0/icmp};
```

```
global myports: set[port] = {21/tcp, 22/tcp, 0/icmp};
```

#Create a list

```
print fmt("Port %s connection detected", c$id$resp_p);
};
};
```



```
owner@onion:~/simple$ cat simple.bro
 global myports: set[port] = {21/tcp, 22/tcp, 0/icmp};
 event bro_init()
event bro init()
#Do stuff when Bro loads
```

};





```
owner@onion:~/simple$ cat simple.bro
  global myports: set[port] = {21/tcp, 22/tcp, 0/icmp};
  event bro_init()
      print "Lets print myports.":
      print fmt ("There are %d in the list.", |myports|);
print fmt ("There are %d in the list.", |myports|);
   #Format string
   # |var| gets length of list
```



```
event new_connection(c:connection)
{
```

Do the thing in curley braces when Bro detects a new connection

```
event new_connection(c:connection)
{
   if (c$id$resp_p in myports)
        {
      print fmt("Port %s connection detected", c$id$resp_p);
      };
};
```



```
if (c$id$resp_p in myports)
{
```

#If the destination port (c\$id\$resp_p) is in the list, do the thing in curley brackets



Something a little more useful...

Baselinereport.bro :: Pseudocode

- 1. Load table (baseline.data)
- 2. Check every new connection:
 - Is the destination on the baselined subnet?
 - If so, is it in the baseline?
 - If it's in the baseline, is the source address allowed to use that port?
- 3. Log any "No's"





Installing Baselinereport.bro

- git clone https://github.com/hashtagcyber/baseliner.git
- Edit line 32 of baselinereport.bro, replace with a comma separated list of subnets
- 3. Copy both files to /opt/bro/share/bro/policy/misc
- 4. Add "@load misc/baselinereport" to /opt/bro/share/bro/site/local.bro
- 5. Restart Bro





ELSA Demo

- Useful search terms:
 - Show all notice's generated by baselinereport
 - class=BRO_NOTICE "-" notice_type="TrafficBaselineException"
 - Show all connections to an IP, grouped by destination port
 - BRO_CONN.dstip=156.22.10.10 groupby:dstport
 - Show all connection to an IP/Port pair grouped by source IP
 - BRO_CONN.dstip=156.22.10.10 BRO_CONN.dstport=445 groupby:srcip





Updating Baseline w/ ELSa & VI

#DNS Client			
156.22.10.10	53	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#Kerberos			
156.22.10.10	88	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	88	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#LDAP			
156.22.10.10	389	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	389	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#SMB			
156.22.10.10	445	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	445	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#RPC			
156.22.10.10	135	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#NetBIOS			
156.22.10.10	139	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	137	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	138	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#Dynamic Ports-N	NeedToLoc	ckItDown	
156.22.10.10	49155	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	49155	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	49158	tcp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
156.22.10.10	49158	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24
#Windows Time			
156.22.10.10	123	udp	156.22.10.0/24,156.22.11.0/24



But

 That sounds like a lot of work...





Bropy


- Written in Python
- Installs baselinereport.bro script

- Parses notice.log
- Generates network baseline automatically
- Simple Yes/No interface





Scenario Network





Bropy

Demo Time





Bropy on SecurityOnion

- 1. git clone https://github.com/hashtagcyber/bropy
- 2. cd bropy
- 3. sudo ./bropy.py
 - Select option 3 to install
 - Enter the subnet and CIDR that you would like to monitor
 - Example: 156.22.10.0/24
- 4. Select Y to restart Bro
- 5. Wait for logs to be generated....
- 6. sudo ./bropy.py
 - Select option 1 to "Auto Baseline"
 - Select option 2 for Y/N prompting





Use Case

 Generate a list of every port/protocol critical hosts receive connections on

Receive alerts when non-standard connections are detected

 Baseline data can be used to generate firewall lists





Questions?

CYBER PROTECTION PROFESSIONAL™ (CPP)™

