
# Understanding Cryptography – A Textbook for Students and Practitioners

by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl



These slides were prepared by Thomas Eisenbarth, Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl


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- Intro to stream ciphers
- Random number generators (RNGs)
- One-Time Pad (OTP)
- Linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs)
- Trivium: a modern stream cipher


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# Stream Ciphers in the Field of Cryptology



Stream Ciphers were invented in 1917 by Gilbert Vernam

## Stream Cipher vs. Block Cipher



#### Stream Ciphers


- Encrypt bits individually
- Usually small and fast → common in embedded devices (e.g., A5/1 for GSM phones)

#### Block Ciphers:

- Always encrypt a full block (several bits)
- Are common for Internet applications


# Encryption and Decryption with Stream Ciphers

Plaintext  $x_i$ , ciphertext  $y_i$  and key stream  $s_i$  consist of individual bits



- Encryption and decryption are simple additions modulo 2 (aka XOR)
- Encryption and decryption are the same functions
- Encryption:  $y_i = e_{si}(x_i) = x_i + s_i \mod 2$   $x_i, y_i, s_i \in \{0,1\}$
- **Decryption:**  $x_i = e_{si}(y_i) = y_i + s_i \mod 2$

## Synchronous vs. Asynchronous Stream Cipher



- Security of stream cipher depends entirely on the key stream  $s_i$ :
  - Should be **random**, i.e.,  $Pr(s_i = 0) = Pr(s_i = 1) = 0.5$
  - Must be reproducible by sender and receiver

## Synchronous Stream Cipher

Key stream depend only on the key (and possibly an initialization vector IV)

#### Asynchronous Stream Ciphers

Key stream depends also on the ciphertext (dotted feedback enabled)

# Why is Modulo 2 Addition a Good Encryption Function?

- Modulo 2 addition is equivalent to XOR operation
- For perfectly random key stream  $s_i$ , each ciphertext output bit has a 50% chance to be 0 or 1
  - → Good statistic property for ciphertext
- Inverting XOR is simple, since it is the same XOR operation

X <sub>i</sub>	Si	y <sub>i</sub>
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

# Stream Cipher: Throughput


Performance comparison of symmetric ciphers (Pentium4):

Cipher	Key length	Mbit/s
DES	56	36.95
3DES	112	13.32
AES	128	51.19
RC4 (stream cipher)	(choosable)	211.34

Source: Zhao et al., Anatomy and Performance of SSL Processing, ISPASS 2005

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
## Random number generators (RNGs)



## ■ True Random Number Generators (TRNGs)

- Based on physical random processes: coin flipping, dice rolling, semiconductor noise, radioactive decay, mouse movement, clock jitter of digital circuits
- Output stream  $s_i$  should have good statistical properties:  $Pr(s_i = 0) = Pr(s_i = 1) = 50\%$  (often achieved by post-processing)
- Output can neither be predicted nor be reproduced

Typically used for generation of keys, nonces (used only-once values) and for many other purposes



# **Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)**

- Generate sequences from initial seed value
- Typically, output stream has good statistical properties
- Output can be reproduced and can be predicted

Often computed in a recursive way:

$$s_0 = seed$$
  
 $s_{i+1} = f(s_i, s_{i-1}, ..., s_{i-t})$ 

Example: rand() function in ANSI C:

$$s_0 = 12345$$

$$s_0 = 12345$$
  
 $s_{i+1} = 1103515245s_i + 12345 \mod 2^{31}$ 

# Most PRNGs have bad cryptographic properties!

# Cryptanalyzing a Simple PRNG

Simple PRNG: Linear Congruential Generator

$$S_0 = seed$$

$$S_0 = seed$$
$$S_{i+1} = AS_i + B \mod m$$

#### **Assume**

- unknown A, B and S₀ as key
- Size of A, B and S<sub>i</sub> to be 100 bit
- 300 bit of output are known, i.e. S<sub>1</sub>, S<sub>2</sub> and S<sub>3</sub>

#### Solving

$$S_2 = AS_1 + B \mod m$$

$$S_3 = AS_2 + B \mod m$$

...directly reveals A and B. All  $S_i$  can be computed easily!

# Bad cryptographic properties due to the linearity of most PRNGs

# Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator (CSPRNG)

- Special PRNG with additional property:
  - Output must be unpredictable

**More precisely:** Given *n* consecutive bits of output  $s_i$ , the following output bits  $s_{n+1}$  cannot be predicted (in polynomial time).

- Needed in cryptography, in particular for stream ciphers
- Remark: There are almost no other applications that need unpredictability, whereas many, many (technical) systems need PRNGs.

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# **One-Time Pad (OTP)**

#### **Unconditionally secure cryptosystem:**

 A cryptosystem is unconditionally secure if it cannot be broken even with infinite computational resources

#### **One-Time Pad**

- A cryptosystem developed by Mauborgne that is based on Vernam's stream cipher:
- Properties:

Let the plaintext, ciphertext and key consist of individual bits  $x_i, y_i, k_i \in \{0,1\}.$ 

Encryption:  $e_{k_i}(x_i) = x_i \oplus k_i$ . Decryption:  $d_{k_i}(y_i) = y_i \oplus k_i$ 

OTP is unconditionally secure if and only if the key  $k_{i}$  is used once!

## One-Time Pad (OTP)

Unconditionally secure cryptosystem:

$$y_0 = x_0 \oplus k_0$$
$$y_1 = x_1 \oplus k_1$$
.


Every equation is a linear equation with two unknowns

- $\implies$  for every  $y_i$  are  $x_i = 0$  and  $x_i = 1$  equiprobable!
- $\Rightarrow$ This is true iff  $k_0$ ,  $k_1$ , ... are independent, i.e., all  $k_i$  have to be generated truly random
- ⇒ It can be shown that this systems can *provably* not be solved.

**Disadvantage:** For almost all applications the OTP is **impractical** since the key must be as long as the message! (Imagine you have to encrypt a 1GByte email attachment.)


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## Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs)



- Concatenated flip-flops (FF), i.e., a shift register together with a feedback path
- Feedback computes fresh input by XOR of certain state bits
- Degree m given by number of storage elements
- If p<sub>i</sub> = 1, the feedback connection is present ("closed switch), otherwise there is not feedback from this flip-flop ("open switch")
- Output sequence repeats periodically
- Maximum output length: 2<sup>m</sup>-1

# ■ Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs): Example with m=3



LFSR output described by recursive equation:

$$s_{i+3} = s_{i+1} + s_i \mod 2$$

• Maximum output length (of 2³-1=7) achieved only for certain feedback configurations, .e.g., the one shown here.

clk	FF <sub>2</sub>	FF <sub>1</sub>	FF <sub>0</sub> =s <sub>i</sub>
0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0
2	1	0	1
3	1	1	0
4	1	1	1
5	0	1	1
6	0	0	1
7	1	0	0
8	0	1	0

CLK

# **Security of LFSRs**


LFSRs typically described by polynomials: 
$$P(x) = x^m + p_{l-1}x^{m-1} + \ldots + p_1x + p_0$$

- Single LFSRs generate highly predictable output
- If 2*m* output bits of an LFSR of degree *m* are known, the feedback coefficients  $p_i$  of the LFSR can be found by solving a system of linear equations\*
- Because of this many stream ciphers use **combinations** of LFSRs

<sup>\*</sup>See Chapter 2 of *Understanding Cryptography* for further details.

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# A Modern Stream Cipher - Trivium




- Three nonlinear LFSRs (NLFSR) of length 93, 84, 111
- XOR-Sum of all three NLFSR outputs generates key stream s<sub>i</sub>
- Small in Hardware:
  - Total register count: 288
  - Non-linearity: 3 AND-Gates
  - 7 XOR-Gates (4 with three inputs)

#### Trivium

#### **Initialization:**

- Load 80-bit IV into A
- Load 80-bit key into B
- Set  $c_{109}$ ,  $c_{110}$ ,  $c_{111} = 1$ , all other bits 0



#### Warm-Up:

Clock cipher 4 x 288 = 1152 times without generating output

#### **Encryption:**

XOR-Sum of all three NLFSR outputs generates key stream s<sub>i</sub>

Design can be parallelized to produce up to 64 bits of output per clock cycle

	Register length	Feedback bit	Feedforward bit	AND inputs
Α	93	69	66	91, 92
В	84	78	69	82, 83
С	111	87	66	109, 110

#### Lessons Learned

- Stream ciphers are less popular than block ciphers in most domains such as Internet security. There are exceptions, for instance, the popular stream cipher RC4.
- Stream ciphers sometimes require fewer resources, e.g., code size or chip area, for implementation than block ciphers, and they are attractive for use in constrained environments such as cell phones.
- The requirements for a *cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator* are far more demanding than the requirements for pseudorandom number generators used in other applications such as testing or simulation
- The One-Time Pad is a provable secure symmetric cipher. However, it is highly impractical for most applications because the key length has to equal the message length.
- Single LFSRs make poor stream ciphers despite their good statistical properties. However, careful combinations of several LFSR can yield strong ciphers.