

CMPE 220

Class 17 – System Security

Protection

- An operating system must protect users and processes from each other's activities.
 - Mechanisms to control the access by programs, processes, or users to the computer system resources.
- Each resource object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
 - Ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.

Principle of Least Authority (POLA)


- A guiding principle of protection.
- Give programs, users and systems just enough privileges to perform their tasks.
- Limit damage if an entity has a bug or gets abused.
- “Need to know”
 - At any time, a process should be able to access only those resources that it currently requires to complete its task.

Protection Granularity

- Rough-grained privilege management is easier and simpler.
 - Principle of least authority done in large chunks.
 - Example: Traditional UNIX processes either have abilities of the associated user or of the root user.
- Fine-grained management is more complex and more overhead, but more protective.
 - Examples:
 - File access control lists (ACLs)
 - Role-based access control (RBAC)

Protection Domains

- A **domain** is a set of resource objects and their allowable operations.
 - A set of access rights as **<object-name, rights-set>** pairs
 - Example: **<file *F*, {read, write}>**
- Users, processes, and program procedures can be in domains.



UNIX Domains

- In UNIX, a process's domain is defined by its **UID** (user ID) and **GID** (group ID).
- A (UID, GID) combination determines:
 - A complete list of all the accessible resource objects.
 - Whether they can be read, written, or executed.

UNIX Domains, *cont'd*

- Two processes with the same (UID, GID) combination have access to the same set of objects.
- Processes with different (UID, GID) combinations will have access to different but possibly overlapping sets of objects.

UNIX Domain Switching

- A system call causes a domain switch from the user's domain to that of the kernel.
- When a process executes a file with the SETUID or SETGID bit on, it acquires the UID or GID of the file owner.
 - Get a different set of access rights.
 - The UID and GID are reset when the execution completes.

UNIX Domain Switching, *cont'd*

- Domain switch accomplished via passwords.
 - The **su** command temporarily switches to another user's domain when the other domain's password is provided.
- Domain switching via commands
 - The **sudo** command prefix executes a specified command in another domain.

The Access Matrix

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	printer
D_1	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	

- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- $\text{Access}(i, j)$ is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain_{*i*} can invoke on Object_{*j*}

The Access Matrix, *cont'd*

- Domains are also objects.
 - Allow switching operations between domains.

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			


- The access matrix is generally very sparse.
 - Can be implemented in other more efficient ways.

The Access Matrix, *cont'd*

- Separate mechanism from policy.
- Mechanism
 - The OS provides access matrix + rules.
 - The OS ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced.
- Policy
 - User dictates policy.
 - Who can access what object and in what mode.

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

- Implements the principle of least authority.
- Users are assigned **roles** that grant access to privileges and programs
 - Enable a role via a password to gain its privileges.



Operating System Concepts, 10th edition
by Abraham Silberschatz, Greg Gagne, and Peter B. Galvin
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Program-Level Protection

- Programming languages can have built-in protection mechanisms.
- Allow the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
- Provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable.

Security

- Protection mechanisms protect against internal problems.
- Security measures protect against external threats.

Security Violations

- Breach of confidentiality
 - Unauthorized reading of data.
- Breach of integrity
 - Unauthorized modification of data.
- Breach of availability
 - Unauthorized destruction of data.

Security Violations, *cont'd*

- Theft of service
 - Unauthorized use of resources.
- Denial of service (DOS)
 - Prevention of legitimate use.

Security Violation Methods

- Masquerading (breach authentication)
 - Pretend to be an authorized user to escalate privileges.
- Replay attack
 - With or without message modification.
- Session hijacking
 - Intercept an already-established session to bypass authentication.

Security Violation Methods

- Man-in-the-middle attack
 - An intruder sits in data flow to masquerade as the sender in order to fool the receiver, and vice versa.


The Bad Guys

- “Script kiddies”
 - “Hackers” who run malicious scripts that are shared among the hacker communities.
 - Can be thwarted by “honey pots”
 - Fake data at a site designed to lure hackers.
 - **Best defense: up-to-date software**
- Corporate thieves
 - Steal confidential data from competitors.
- Hostile (or friendly) governments
 - Snooping and monitoring
 - Spying

Layers of Security


- It is impossible to have absolute security.
- Make the cost to the perpetrator sufficiently high to deter most intruders.
- Security is as strong as the weakest link in the chain.
- But can too much security be a problem?

Layers of Security, *cont'd*



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Man (or Woman) in the Middle Attack



Operating Systems Concepts, 9th edition
Silberschatz, Galvin, and Gagne
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Trojan Horse Attack

- A program written by one user can execute in another user's environment.
 - The program gains the other user's access rights.
 - The program misuses those rights.
- A long UNIX path names exposes each directory on the path.
- A path that includes "." when used in another user's directory can give a program access to the other user's home directory.

Trojan Horse Attack, *cont'd*

- Examples:
 - spyware
 - pop-up browser windows
 - browser plug-ins
 - covert channels
- Up to 80% of spam is delivered by spyware-infected systems.

Trap Door Attack

- Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures.

Logic Bomb

- A program initiates a security incident under certain circumstances.
- Developed by a disgruntled programmer.
 - Must enter a password daily to prevent the bomb from going off.
- If the programmer is fired, the bomb explodes.
- Must hire the programmer back as an expensive consultant to “solve” the problem.

Stack and Buffer Overflow

- Exploit a bug in a program to gain unauthorized user or privilege escalation.
 - Overflow either the stack or memory buffers.
 - Fail to check bounds on inputs or arguments.
- Write past the arguments on the stack into the return address on stack.
 - When routine returns from a function call, it returns to a hacked address.

Viruses

- A malicious code fragment embedded in a legitimate program.
- Self-replicating, designed to infect other computers.
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications.
- Usually borne via email or as a macro.

Categories of Viruses

- Parasitic file
- Boot
- Macro
- Source code
- Polymorphic
 - Avoids having a virus signature
- Encrypted
 - Encrypted to avoid detection.
 - Decrypts to execute.

Categories of Viruses, *cont'd*

- Stealth
 - Modifies parts of the system that can be used to detect it.
- Tunneling
 - Installs in the interrupt-handler chain or in device drivers.
- Multipartite
 - Infect multiple parts of a system.
- Armored
 - Hard for antivirus researchers to detect.

Ransomware

- A virus that encrypts important data on a user's computer system.
 - The villain demands payment (often in bitcoins) for the decryption key.
- Threaten to post stolen private data on the web.
 - The villain demands payment (often in bitcoins) or the data will be made public.

Keystroke Logger Virus

- A virus that intercepts keystrokes.
- Records passwords, etc.
- Sends confidential information to a malicious recipient.

Port Scanning

- Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one IP address or on a range of IP addresses.

Denial of Service

- Overload the targeted computer to prevent it from doing any useful work.
- A distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) comes from multiple sites at once.
 - “Ping” of death.
- Consider traffic to a web site.
 - How can you tell the difference between being a target and being really popular?
 - Accidental: Students writing bad `fork()` code.

Design Principles for Security

- The system design should be public.
- The default should be no access.
- Check for current authority.
- Give each process the least authority possible.
- The protection mechanism should be simple, uniform, and built into the lowest layers of the system.
- The scheme chosen must be psychologically acceptable.


User Authentication: Passwords

- Passwords are often easy to guess.
- A classic research study compiled a list of likely passwords.
 - first and last names
 - street and city names
 - words from a moderate-sized dictionary
 - license plate numbers
 - short strings of random numbers
- Discovered that over 86% of passwords then in use were in their list.

Best Passwords

- ~~Upper case, lower case, digit, symbol~~
 - Hard to remember, so users write it down
 - Very difficult to enter on smartphones
- A long text string
 - Easy to remember, easy to type

Security Firewalls



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
The Biggest Risk to Computer Security

- PEOPLE!
 - Nefarious
 - Dumb

Nontechnical Security Lecture

- Sending data such as email messages to each other via the Internet ...

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


... is like sending postcards via the U.S. mail system.

- Anyone can read the message along the way!




Security, *cont'd*



- How can we keep the nefarious Bart from reading confidential messages that Jill and John are sending each other?


The Shared Secret

- Jill needs to send a message containing the confidential data 7 to John.




- John and Jill can agree ahead of time to a shared secret – the number 12.
- Then Jill can encrypt the data by adding 12 to the confidential data 7.
- John decrypts the data by subtracting 12.

The Shared Secret, *cont'd*



- Because Bart doesn't know the shared secret **12**, he won't be able to decrypt the message and obtain the confidential data **7**.

The Shared Secret, *cont'd*



- But this shared secret solution has problems.
 - Jill and John must arrange beforehand to share the secret 12.
 - What if Jill doesn't already know John?
 - What if Jill wants to send the confidential data to all her vice presidents at the same time?



How can Jill and her recipients share a secret?

Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*


- How can Jill and her recipients share a secret number in order to encrypt the confidential data?
- A security scheme called **public key cryptography** was invented just for this purpose.
- In this simplified introduction, let's pretend that multiplication is a one-way operation.
 - Once you've multiplied two numbers, say $4 \times 5 = 20$, you can't recover the original numbers by dividing.
 - In other words, you can't do $20 \div 4 = 5$ or $20 \div 5 = 4$

Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*

- Jill chooses a **private key**.
 - Let's suppose Jill chooses 10.
- Each person to whom Jill wants to send confidential data also chooses a private key.
 - Let's suppose John chooses 8.




Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*




- Now Jill announces a **public key**.
 - Let's suppose the public key is 5.
- Everyone can see the public key.
 - Including the nefarious Bart.

Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*



- Now Jill can create her **public-private key**.
 - She multiplies her private key by the public key: $10 \times 5 = 50$.
- John creates his **public-private key**.
 - He multiplies his private key by the public key: $8 \times 5 = 40$.


Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*



Remember that we're pretending that multiplication is a one-way operation.


- We cannot discover Jill's private key 10 by dividing her public-private key 50 by the public key 5.
- We cannot discover John's private key 8 by dividing his public-private key 40 by the public key 5.

Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*




- What is the goal of all this?
 - To create a **shared secret** between Jill and John.
- Jill multiplies John's public-private key by her private key: $40 \times 10 = 400$
- John multiplies Jill's public-private key by his private key: $50 \times 8 = 400$

Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*



- Now Jill and John have a **shared secret 400**.
- Jill can encrypt the confidential data **7** by adding the shared secret 400.
- John can decrypt the confidential data **7** by subtracting the shared secret **400**.



Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*



- Bart can't decrypt the 407 because he doesn't know the shared secret 400.


Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*

- Public key encryption works with multiple recipients.
- Jill needs to send confidential data to both John and his twin brother Mark.
- Each picks a private key.




Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*

- Jill announces the **public key 5**, and everyone generates his or her public-private key.
 - Jill: $10 \times 5 = 50$
 - John: $8 \times 5 = 40$
 - Mark: $2 \times 5 = 10$




Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*

- Jill will have a shared secret with each recipient.
 - Jill and John will share 400 between them, as before.
 - Jill and Mark will have a different shared secret.
- Jill: Multiply Mark's public-private key by her private key:
 $10 \times 10 = 100$.
- Mark: Multiply Jill's public-private key by his private key:
 $50 \times 2 = 100$



Public Key Cryptography, *cont'd*

- Jill sends to each recipient.
 - Bart can't decrypt the messages to recover the confidential data 7 because he doesn't know the shared secrets.



Cryptography in the Real World

- Of course, in the real world, we can't use simple operations like multiplication and addition to generate keys and to encrypt data.
 - Multiplication and addition are not one-way operations.
- Real-world encryption uses very large prime numbers and modulo arithmetic.
 - Not even today's most powerful supercomputer can undo such operations.
 - Worry: Can quantum computers in the future?

When is Cryptography Used?

- Public key cryptography is a key exchange protocol first published by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976.
 - It was actually invented earlier in 1970 by the British government, but it was classified.
- Whenever you visit a secure website, you are using the **Diffie-Hellman** protocol or a variant.
 - A secure website has a URL that starts with **https:** instead of **http:**

Computer Security as a Career

- Cybersecurity is a hot field.
 - Computers are used everywhere.
 - Big data.
 - Privacy issues.