

An Empirical Study on

Prompt Injection Attacks and Defences

Group 06 | FYP



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Content

Introduction


Methodology

Review/ Analysis

Research Gaps

Use of AI tools

Demonstration



Introduction

Prompt injection attacks,

Involves manipulating a system by **injecting malicious commands or data** through **user prompts**

Leading to To execute **unauthorized/ unintended actions** and steal sensitive information

Motivation


Wide user base of LLMs - **direct and indirect**

Improving **robustness, security** of LLM Systems



Methodology

Comprehensive Review of Existing Literature



- Keyword searches
- Research papers, pre prints, articles, Websites
- Relatively new topic

Analysis

LLM and Usage

Vulnerabilities of
Generative AI
Models

Prompt Injection
Attacks

Classification of
Prompt Injection
Attacks

Impact of
Prompt Injection
Attacks

Defence
Mechanisms

Research Gaps
Identified

Recap

LLM and Usage

- LLMs introducing a new era in NLP
- Diverse range of applications
- Adversarial attacks

Deliberate manipulation of ML models by introducing carefully crafted input data

- Prompt Injection attacks
- Unintended/ Unethical outputs

Vulnerabilities

Prompt Injection


Data Poisoning

Backdoor attacks

Privacy violations

Prompt Injection Attacks


Security threat where malicious users manipulate prompts to LLMs or AI systems to influence outputs in unintended ways.



Direct Prompt Injection Attacks

Involve a malicious user injecting harmful prompts directly into application inputs to manipulate the application into responding differently from its original intent.


Y. Liu et al., "Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications," arXiv (Cornell University), Jun. 2023, doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2306.05499.



Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Adversaries remotely affect other users' systems by strategically injecting the prompts into data likely to be retrieved at inference time.

K. Greshake, S. Abdelnabi, S. Mishra, C. Endres, T. Holz, and M. Fritz, "Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection," arXiv (Cornell University), Feb. 2023, doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2302.12173.



Impact

Generating text under prohibited scenarios

Goal hijacking

Hallucination

Prompt leaking

File leakage


Black-box Defenses


- Input Validation
- Output Validation
- Blacklist/Whitelist

- Post-Prompting
- Border String Manipulation
- Data Marking
- Multi-turn Dialogue
- Structural Enclosure defenses
 - Sandwich Defense
 - XML Tag enclosure
 - Random Sequence Enclosure

White-box Defenses

- Adversarial Training
- Using another LLM as a Harm-filter






AI Tools Used



CHATPDF



LLMs tested



Gemini (prev. Bard)



ChatGPT3.5



ChatGPT4



Copilot (prev. BingChat)



LLAMA2 (By Meta)




MistralAI



Demonstration

Classification



Recap



LLM and Usage



Prompt Injection Attacks



Defenses Against PI Attacks



Research Gaps Identified



Demonstration



Thank you