ASSIGNMENT 2

Part A: Conceptual Understanding

1. Spam Detection with Perceptron vs. SVM: A Comparative View

The Perceptron algorithm, one of the earliest machine learning models, offers a simple and efficient solution for this tast. It is a start of the earliest machine learning models, offers a simple and efficient solution than iteratively for this task. It is a linear classifier that learns a set of weights for input features, updating them iteratively based on classification errors.

Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning algorithm used for classification and regression tools. regression tasks, with its most common use being in binary classification problems.

Below given is the comparative view:

| Perceptron | Support Vector Machine (SVM) | | | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Linear classifier | Margin-based classifier (can be linear or non-linear) | | | | | |
| Online learning (updates weights on each misclassified sample) | 1 | | | | | |
| Requires linearly separable data for best performance | Can handle both linearly and non-linearly separable data | | | | | |
| Moderate; may misclassify if data is complex | | | | | | |
| Low; sensitive to noisy and overlapping data | High; aims for maximum margin, reducing impact of noise | | | | | |
| No | Yes; supports kernel trick for non-linear separation | | | | | |
| Low; fast training and prediction | Higher; especially with kernel functions | | | | | |
| High; easy to understand weight updates | Medium; decision boundaries can be complex | | | | | |
| Good for simple datasets | Excellent for complex, high-dimensional spand detection tasks | | | | | |
| Lightweight filters in real-time applications | Email security systems requiring higher precision | | | | | |

2. Phishing detection using Logistic Regression and Decision Trees.

Phishing is a cyberattack where attackers trick users into revealing sensitive information by impersonating trusted entities.

Goal: Use machine learning to automatically detect phishing attempts from features extracted from URLs, emails, or websites.

Logistic Regression

- A linear classification algorithm.
- Predicts the probability of an instance being phishing or legitimate.
- Works well with linearly separable data.
- Fast and easy to implement.

• May struggle with non-linear data patterns. Decision Trees

- A non-linear classification model.
- Splits data based on feature thresholds (e.g., URL length, use of IP address).
- Captures complex feature interactions.
- Easy to interpret due to decision paths.
- Prone to overfitting if not pruned properly.

3. How Naïve Bayes helps in Email Filtering?

Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic machine learning algorithm based on Bayes' Theorem. It is especially effective for email filtering tasks like spam detection due to its simplicity and efficiency.

Role in Email Filtering (Spam Detection)

- Naïve Bayes classifies emails into categories like spam and ham (not spam).
- It uses the frequency of words in an email (like "offer", "free", "win") as features.
- Each word contributes to the probability of an email being spam or ham.

Bayes' Theorem:

$$P(Spam|Email) = rac{P(Email|Spam) \cdot P(Spam)}{P(Email)}$$

Naïve Assumption:

Assumes that all words in the email are independent (which is not always true, but works well in practice).

Advantages

- Fast and efficient on large datasets.
- Performs well even with limited training data.
- Easy to implement and interpret.
- Works well with text classification tasks like email filtering.

4. Malware detection and classification using Decision Trees

- To detect and classify software as malicious or benign using the Decision Tree machine learning algorithm.
- Input: Features extracted from software (static or dynamic analysis). Examples: file size, number of API calls, entropy, permissions, system behavior.
- Algorithm: Decision Tree learns decision rules from training data (if-else structure).
- Output: Class label e.g., "Malware" or "Benign".

Implementation Steps

- Data Collection:
 - Use labeled datasets from sources like Kaggle, VirusShare, or CIC-MalMem.
 - Feature Extraction
 - Static: Byte patterns, opcodes.
 - Dynamic: API calls, system/network behavior.
 - Preprocessing:
 - Encode categorical data.

- Normalize features if needed.
- Model Training:
 - Fit the Decision Tree using sklearn.tree.DecisionTreeClassifier.
- - Metrics: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1-score.
- Use confusion matrix for detailed analysis.

5. Network Anomaly Detection: Techniques and Use Cases

Network Anomaly Detection (NAD) is the process of identifying abnormal patterns in network traffic that may indicate security threats such as intrusion attempts, malware activity, or data breaches. Unlike signaturebased detection, which relies on known attack patterns, anomaly detection focuses on deviations from normal behavior, making it effective for detecting zero-day attacks and unknown threats.

Techniques Used in NAD

- Statistical Method These involve creating baseline profiles of normal network behavior (e.g., average packet size. connection frequency) and flagging deviations. They are simple and interpretable but often produce false positives in dynamic environments.
- Machine Learning Techniques
 - Unsupervised learning (e.g., k-Means, DBSCAN) clusters normal and abnormal behaviors without labeled data.
 - Supervised learning (e.g., Random Forest, SVM) requires labeled datasets to classify traffic as normal or malicious.
 - Semi-supervised learning focuses on learning normal patterns and identifying outliers.
- iii. Deep Learning Methods Models such as autoencoders and LSTM networks capture complex temporal and spatial patterns in network traffic, offering high accuracy for large-scale systems.

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Use Cases

- i. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): Detect unauthorized access attempts.
- ii. DDoS Attack Detection: Identify sudden spikes in traffic volume.
- iii. Threat Monitoring: Detect unusual data transfers or privilege misuse.
- iv. IoT Security: Identify abnormal communication patterns among IoT devices.

Part B: Research and Analysis

Research and answer the following (with proper references):

1. Identify and explain a real-world incident or attack from the category.

The Mirai botnet is one of the most infamous real-world botnet attacks. It first came to light in 2016 when it was used to be was used to launch one of the largest Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in history. The attack targeted Denial targeted Dyn, a major DNS provider, causing widespread outages on websites like Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, and Species and Spotify.

How It Worked:

- 1. Target Devices:
 - Mirai infected Internet of Things (IoT) devices—such as home routers, IP cameras, DVRs, and smart appliances—that were running outdated firmware and using default usernames and passwords.
- 2. Infection Mechanism:

The malware scanned the internet for vulnerable devices, logged in using a hardcoded list of default credentials, and infected them. Once a device was infected, it became part of the Mirai botnet.

- 3. Command and Control (C2):
 - All infected devices (bots) were controlled by a remote server. The attacker could issue commands to launch DDoS attacks from thousands of compromised devices simultaneously.
- 4. Attack Execution:

On October 21, 2016, Mirai flooded Dyn's DNS infrastructure with massive amounts of traffic. Since DNS is essential for routing web addresses, the attack crippled access to major websites across the U.S. and parts of Europe.

2. Describe how AI/ML models could have detected/prevented the threat.

Al and Machine Learning (ML) models are powerful tools in cybersecurity, especially for detecting and mitigating botnet-based threats like Mirai. Here's how they could have been effectively used:

1. Network Traffic Anomaly Detection

AI/ML models trained on normal network behavior could have flagged the unusual spike in traffic generated by infected IoT devices:

- Unsupervised ML models (e.g., Isolation Forest, Autoencoders) could detect outliers in traffic volume, port scanning, or unusual destination IPs.
- Time-series models (e.g., LSTM) could recognize patterns of periodic scanning or bursty DDoS-like behavior.
- Prevention: Early detection could have triggered rate limiting or traffic blocking rules before the fullscale DDoS attack was executed.

2. Device Behavior Profiling

ML models could learn typical behavior profiles for IoT devices:

- If a security camera suddenly began sending large volumes of DNS or HTTP requests, a behaviorbased model would recognize it as abnormal.
- · Reinforcement learning systems could dynamically adapt to evolving device usage patterns and adjust alerts or blocks accordingly.
- Prevention: Automatic isolation of misbehaving devices on the network.

3. Mention at least two ML algorithms that are suitable for detecting this type of threat and justify your choice your choice.

Two Suitable ML Algorithms for Detecting Mirai-like Botnet Threats

1. Isolation Forest

- Anomaly detection focused: Isolation Forest is designed specifically for identifying outliers or anomalies in large devices anomalies in large datasets—perfect for detecting unusual network behavior from infected IoT devices.

 Scalable and officials.
- Scalable and efficient: It works well in high-dimensional data environments like network traffic logs
- No need for labeled data: Since most network environments lack labeled "attack" data, Isolation Forest works well in the works well in unsupervised settings, learning from normal behavior to detect deviations.
- It could detect abnormal outbound traffic spikes or unusual scanning behavior from devices that previously showed low or stable activity.

2. Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Networks

- Sequential pattern learning: LSTMs are a type of recurrent neural network (RNN) that excel at learning temporal dependencies in time-series data, such as network traffic over time.
- Detects stealthy attacks: Can identify subtle but consistent changes in behavior, like periodic
- communication with a Command and Control (C2) server. Real-time monitoring: LSTMs can continuously learn and adapt to new behavior, making them
- LSTM could detect repetitive scanning and traffic bursts that gradually build up to a DDoS event, providing early warning.

Part C: Implementation Implement a simple simulation using Python and scikit-learn (or similar) based on any one of the following:

Ransomware detection using Random Forest:

• Dataset description (can use public datasets)

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
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Im [S1]: import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
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    plt.show()
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
• Model building and evaluation

```
In [75]: import os import pandas
            import numpy
            import pickle
            import pefile
import sklearn.ensemble as ek
            from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectFromModel
            from sklearn.tree import DecisionTreeClassifier
            from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix
from sklearn import svm
            import sklearn.metrics as metrics
            # Feature
            # Europing this because classification model will not accept object
# Target variable
            y = dataset['legitimate'].values
            from sklearn.ensemble import ExtraTreesClassifier from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectFromModel
            # Train ExtraTrees model with explicit n_estimators
            \label{eq:extratrees} \begin{split} & extratrees = \texttt{ExtraTreesClassifier}(n\_\texttt{estimators=180}).\texttt{fit}(\textbf{X},\ \textbf{y}) \\ & \texttt{model} = \texttt{SelectFromModel}(\texttt{extratrees},\texttt{prefit=True}) \end{split}
            X_new = model.transform(X)
            nbfeatures = X_new.shape[1]
            print(f"Number of selected features; {nbfeatures}")
            nbfeatures
            from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
X_train, X_test, y_train, y_test = train_test_split(X_new, y ,test_size=0.29, stratify = y)
            index = numpy.argsort(extratrees.feature_importances_)[::-1][:nbfeatures]
            for f in range(nbfeatures):
    print("%d. feature %s (%f) % (f + 1, dataset.columns[2+index[f]], extratrees.feature_importances_[index[f]]))
    features.append(dataset.columns[2+f])
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            Number of selected features: 13
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            4. feature Subsystem (0.068109)
           5. feature VersionInformationSize (0.062444)
            6. feature SectionsMaxEntropy (0.056239)
           7. feature ImageBase (0.046030)
           8. feature SizeOfOptionalHeader (0.044028)
           9. feature ResourcesMaxEntropy (0.038746)
10. feature MajorSubsystemVersion (0.03813)
            11. feature ResourcesMinEntropy (0.037628)
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           12. feature MajorOperatingSystemVersion (0.022191)

 feature SectionsMinEntropy (0.019408)
```

Testing which Classifier will give better result

Performance metrics Correlation matrix:



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Part D:Reflection And Innovation

Major Challenge: Class Imbalance in Random Forest Detection

A common issue in malware and intrusion detection is class imbalance. There are many more benign samples than malicious ones. When a Random Forest is trained on data that is heavily skewed, it tends to favor the majority (benign) class and often misses many attacks. For instance, mobile malware datasets usually have very few malicious apps compared to benign ones. In practice, a Random Forest can achieve high overall accuracy but still overlook rare threats. To address this, researchers use techniques to balance the data. Oversampling, like SMOTE, or under sampling can help rebalance the classes before training. Adjusting class weights in the Random Forest can also penalize mistakes in identifying malware more heavily. One recent study applied a balancing method in the Random Forest ensemble, training each tree on a different balanced subset. This approach improved the detection of minority class (malware) when compared to unbalanced training. In summary, balancing strategies, either through data sampling or weighted training, are essential to counteract the bias caused by class imbalance when using Random Forests in cybersecurity.

Idea: Federated Learning for Collaborative Threat Detection

A promising approach is to use federated learning (FL) to enhance detection accuracy while maintaining data privacy. In this method, multiple organizations (or network segments) each train a local threat-detection model on their own logs. They then share only model updates with a central server. The server uses federated averaging to create a global model that reflects patterns from all participants without exchanging raw data. This approach utilizes a much larger and more varied dataset of attacks than any single site can provide, improving the model's ability to generalize to new or rare threats. For example, an organization that has never encountered a specific malware strain could benefit if another participant's local model has learned it.


This federated IDS can adjust to evolving threats by consistently integrating fresh local updates. Importantly, it maintains privacy and compliance since sensitive logs remain under each host's control. Recent studies show that FL-based IDS can match or surpass traditional centralized models. One study found that a federated IDS achieved better accuracy and lower loss than a standard deep-learning IDS, particularly in situations where privacy is crucial. In other words, FL contributes to building an effective global detector, even in IoT or enterprise networks, while reducing the risk of data breaches during model training.

In practice, this idea could be put into action by developing a common AI threat-detection model, like a neural classifier for network anomalies, that is trained across firms or departments using federated learning. Each participant would periodically download the current model, train it on local logs, and upload model gradients. The server would then combine these updates into an improved model. Over time, the global model would learn a richer set of attack signatures and behavioral patterns. This collaborative, decentralized training method is effective because it leverages much more diverse data (enhancing detection of new attacks) and has been shown to improve IDS performance, all while ensuring that raw security data remains local. Thus, federated learning offers a practical way to enhance AI-driven threat detection by merging intelligence from multiple sources.

Sources: Recent studies and reviews support these points. For instance, Shanmugam et al.

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highlight that imbalanced traffic (benign far exceeding malicious) in IDS data causes ML models to excel on normal traffic but fail on rare attacks. Alazab et al. demonstrate that federated learning allows multiple parties to train a joint IDS model without sharing data, resulting in better accuracy and robust detection while preserving privacy. These and other works inform the analysis and proposed solutions outlined above.



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