

# MSG

## Technical Whitepaper & Developer Guide

Version 2.0.0

Status: Stable / Production

January 12, 2026

### Abstract

**MSG** is a privacy-first, zero-knowledge messaging platform designed to eliminate digital footprints. Unlike traditional messaging apps that rely on server-side storage and metadata retention, MSG operates on a "**Blind Relay**" architecture. The server functions solely as a transient data pipe, storing encrypted messages only until delivery or for a maximum of 48 hours in volatile storage. This document outlines the cryptographic primitives, system architecture, API specifications, and security mechanisms of the protocol.

## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Security Architecture</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1	Cryptographic Primitives . . . . .	3
2.2	Identity & Key Generation . . . . .	3
2.3	End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) Flow . . . . .	3
<b>3</b>	<b>System Design</b>	<b>4</b>
3.1	Technology Stack . . . . .	4
3.2	Database Schema (MongoDB) . . . . .	4
<b>4</b>	<b>API Specification</b>	<b>5</b>
4.1	Authentication Endpoints . . . . .	5
4.2	Messaging Endpoints . . . . .	5
<b>5</b>	<b>Real-Time Protocol (Socket.io)</b>	<b>5</b>
5.1	Events . . . . .	5
5.2	P2P Signaling (Video) . . . . .	6
<b>6</b>	<b>Client-Side Mechanics &amp; Storage</b>	<b>6</b>
6.1	Local Storage Strategy . . . . .	6
6.2	The "Nuke" Implementation . . . . .	6

<b>7</b>	<b>Build &amp; Deployment</b>	<b>6</b>
7.1	Prerequisites . . . . .	6
7.2	Environment Variables . . . . .	6
7.3	Compliance & Legal . . . . .	7

# 1 Executive Summary

## Core Philosophy:

- **Ephemeral by Design:** Data exists only as long as necessary.
- **Zero-Knowledge:** The server processes encrypted binary blobs without access to decryption keys for message content.
- **Identity Agnostic:** No phone numbers, emails, or government IDs are linked to accounts.

The platform empowers users with self-sovereign identity management, where keys are generated client-side and never exposed to the centralized relay in plain text (except for encrypted backup blobs).

## 2 Security Architecture

### 2.1 Cryptographic Primitives

The protocol utilizes the **Web Crypto API** (SubtleCrypto) for high-performance, native browser-based cryptography. This ensures that cryptographic operations are handled within the secure context of the browser engine.

Component	Algorithm	Specification
Key Exchange	ECDH	NIST P-256 Curve (secp256r1)
Symmetric Encryption	AES-GCM	256-bit Key, 12-byte random IV
Key Storage	JWK	JSON Web Key format
Transport Security	TLS 1.3	Standard HTTPS/WSS

Table 1: Cryptographic Standards

### 2.2 Identity & Key Generation

Unlike centralized apps that issue keys, MSG empowers the client to generate authority locally.

1. **Generation:** Upon registration, the client generates an ECDH Key Pair (P-256) locally.
2. **Format:** Keys are exported as **JWK** (JSON Web Key) objects.
3. **Persistence:**
  - **Private Key:** Stored in the user's browser `localStorage` as `priv_{username}`.
  - **Public Key:** Sent to the server to allow other users to derive shared secrets.
  - **Key Backup:** The private key is encrypted and stored on the server to facilitate multi-device login (Host-Proof Storage).

### 2.3 End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) Flow

Message confidentiality is guaranteed via a **Shared Secret** derived locally by both peers.

1. **Derivation:**
  - Sender uses `Sender_PrivateKey + Receiver_PublicKey`.

- Receiver uses Receiver\_PrivateKey + Sender\_PublicKey.
- Both result in the mathematically identical **AES-256 Shared Key**.

## 2. Encryption:

- A random 12-byte **IV** (Initialization Vector) is generated for *every* message.
  - Message text is encrypted using AES-GCM.
  - Payload = IV (12 bytes) + Ciphertext.
3. **Transmission:** The Base64-encoded payload is sent via Socket.io/REST. The server sees only opaque strings.
  4. **Decryption:** Receiver splits the payload to extract the IV and uses the Shared Key to decrypt the ciphertext.

## 3 System Design

### 3.1 Technology Stack

- **Frontend:** React, Framer Motion (Animations), Vite (Bundler).
- **Backend:** Node.js, Express, Socket.io (Real-time).
- **Database:** MongoDB (Mongoose ORM).
- **P2P:** WebRTC (Peer-to-Peer Video/Audio).

### 3.2 Database Schema (MongoDB)

Data storage is minimized to the bare essentials required for routing.

#### User Model (User.js)

Field	Type	Description
username	String	Unique anonymous identifier.
friendCode	String	Public discoverable ID (e.g., USER-1234).
publicKey	String	Public ECDH key for encryption.
privateKey	String	Backed up private key (Encrypted blob).
contacts	Array	List of usernames the user has interacted with.

#### Message Model (Message.js)

Uses MongoDB TTL (Time-To-Live) indexes for auto-deletion.

Field	Type	Description
text	String	<b>Encrypted</b> ciphertext (Server cannot read this).
senderId	String	Routing metadata.
expireAt	Date	<b>Auto-Delete:</b> Indexed to remove doc 48h after creation.
isSaved	Boolean	If true, bypasses the "Nuke" command (but not 48h TTL).

## 4 API Specification

### 4.1 Authentication Endpoints

POST /register

Creates a new anonymous identity.

- **Payload:** { username, password, publicKey, privateKey }
- **Behavior:** Hashes password (bcrypt), generates friendCode, stores keys.
- **Response:** { \_id, username, friendCode }

POST /login

Retrieves identity and keys.

- **Payload:** { username, password }
- **Behavior:** Verifies hash. **Critical:** Returns the privateKey to the client to restore E2EE capability on a new device.
- **Response:** { username, friendCode, privateKey, contacts }

### 4.2 Messaging Endpoints

GET /messages/:userId

Fetches chat history.

- **Behavior:** Retrieves encrypted messages where userId is sender OR recipient.
- **Security:** Content returned is fully encrypted.

DELETE /messages/nuke (The Nuke Protocol)

Immediate destruction of conversation history.

- **Payload:** { myId, otherId }
- **Behavior:**
  1. Deletes ALL messages between the two users from DB (unless isSaved: true).
  2. Emits real-time chatNuked event to connected sockets.

## 5 Real-Time Protocol (Socket.io)

The WebSocket layer handles instant message delivery and WebRTC signaling.

### 5.1 Events

Event	Direction	Payload	Description
addNewUser	Client → Server	username	Registers socket connection map.

sendMessage	Client → Server	senderId, recipientId, text, time	Saves to DB and relays to recipient.
getMessage	Server → Client	Message Object	Incoming encrypted message.
chatNuked	Server → Client	{ target }	Signal to clear local UI/Cache immediately.

---

## 5.2 P2P Signaling (Video)

WebRTC signaling bypasses DB storage entirely. The `callUser` and `answerCall` events exit the MSG server architecture to establish direct peer-to-peer media streams (Mesh topology).

# 6 Client-Side Mechanics & Storage

## 6.1 Local Storage Strategy

To maintain "Zero-Knowledge" properties while ensuring usability, sensitive keys are managed as follows:

- `priv_{username}`: The raw JWK Private Key. **Critical Security Asset.**
- `my_friend_code`: Public shareable ID.

**Warning:** If a user clears their browser cache (and has not synced the key via Login), the ability to decrypt past messages is lost forever.

## 6.2 The "Nuke" Implementation

The Nuke feature is a dual-action delete mechanism:

1. **Server-Side:** The DELETE API call wipes the MongoDB documents.
2. **Client-Side:** The `chatNuked` socket event triggers a frontend state update to wipe the React view state immediately, ensuring no visual remnants remain on either device.

# 7 Build & Deployment

## 7.1 Prerequisites

- **Node.js:** v16+
- **MongoDB:** v4.4+ (Replica Set recommended for Transactions)
- **Vite:** v4+

## 7.2 Environment Variables

```
1 MONGO_URI=mongodb+srv://...
2 PORT=3000
```

Listing 1: Server .env Configuration

```
1 const SERVER_URL = "https://msg-p0th.onrender.com"; // Adjust for Prod
```

Listing 2: Client Config (Login.jsx)

### 7.3 Compliance & Legal

- **GDPR:** The architecture is compliant by default as it adheres to "Data Minimization" and "Right to Erasure" (via Nuke/TTL).
- **Export Control:** Application uses standard AES-256 encryption. Check local regulations regarding encryption export.